

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten

Aesthetica

Volume II

Consolidated Facing-Page Source

Latin pages with literal English facing pages

Source note. This file consolidates the existing Volume II frontmatter and section-batch translation files, using only the original Latin and literal English translation. The smoother scholarly translation column, key-term sections, batch title pages, and repeated continuation labels have been omitted. The Synopsis is retained in Latin only, following the Volume I front-matter treatment. Page geometry follows the supplied US Trade template: 6.25 by 9.25 inches including bleed for a 6 by 9 inch trim. PDF rendering is postponed except for layout proof checks.

Praefatio.

Fidem, quam edens partem aestheticorum primam praefando dederam, liberaturus non ita multo post hanc publici iuris factam horis subsecivis accedebam ad telam, quam exorsus fueram, quamque praemissa tunc synopsis breviter indicat, curatius pertexendam.

Praeunte scribendo non lentus sequebatur typographus, et cito satis eo usque perveneramus, ut absolveretur, quod nunc legentibus offerendum est, quum me morbus in lectum deiiceret adeo gravis, adeo pertinax, ut saepe non mihi solum, et meis, sed ipsis etiam peritissimis medicis conclamatus viderer.

Satis diu, reor, interruptum pendit opusculum, et penderet adhuc, si iudicarem aequum resistere bibliopolae, qui moram hucusque patienter tulit, et nunc, quae iam impressa habet, ulterius premere hoc minus persuaderi potest, quum nondum ea sit ratio meae valetudinis, quae vires libris eiusmodi scribendis idoneas magis, quam mortem, polliceatur.

Non sum nescius odiosos auctores esse plerumque de rebus suis narrantes, quae populus curet scilicet.

Rationes equidem tribus tantum verbis reddere volui, cur ne certitudinis quidem aestheticae prorsus exhausta materia, vitam venustae cognitionis dulcissimam pulcritudinem, methodum lucidam, et elegantem illam semioticam, quae pulcris in orationibus eloquutio dici solet et actio, non tetigerim, nec ad partem practicam aestheticorum pedem proferendi spes sit, quam aliquando secundam dixi, quaeque iam informaveram singula dictatis acroaseos, quae meditationibus his propiorem occasionem suppeditaverat.

Si quis tamen superes, amice lector, qui me curas, qui me nosti, qui me amas denique, disce fortunam ex aliis, ex me, qui iam octavum in annum per ambages aegritudinum circumferro, quae videantur inextricabiles, quam necessarium sit, maturius bene cogitandis optimis assuefieri.

Quid enim agerem, uti nunc sum, pro virili hoc agere nescius, profecto, nescio. Dabam Traiecti cis Viadrum, a. d. II. Kal. April. MDCCLVIII.

) o (

SYNOPSIS.

e. Lux aesthetica.

ℵ) generatim S. XXXVII. §. 614–630.

⌌) speciatim

α) obscuritas opposita. S. XXXVIII. §. 631–653.

β) umbra aesthetica. S. XXXVIII. §. 654–665.

γ) iusta lucis et umbrae dispensatio. S. XXXX. §. 666–687.

δ) colores aesthetici. S. XXXXI. §. 688–703.

ε) fucus oppositus. S. XXXXII. §. 704–729.

ζ) argumenta illustrantia

ℵ) generatim S. XXXXIII. §. 730–733.

⌌) speciatim,

a) comparatio latius dicta. §. 734.

I) assimilatio, §. 735–741.

II) comparatio maioris et minoris, S. XXXXIII. §. 742–762.

III) antithesis, S. XXXXV. §. 763–772.

IIII) comparatio strictius dicta, S. XXXXVI. §. 773–779.

b) tropi, S. XXXXVII. §. 780–807.

η) thaumaturgia aesthetica, S. XXXXVIII. §. 808–828.

f. Persuasio aesthetica.

ℵ) generatim

α) ipsa, S. XXXXVIII. §. 829–846.

β) evidentia, quam praestat, S. L. §. 847–854.

⌌) speciatim

α) confirmatio. S. LI. §. 855–885.

β) reprehensio. S. LII. §. 886–898.

γ) argumenta persuasoria. S. LIII. §. 899–904.

Aesthetica

Volume II

AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM

CAPUT I

HEURISTICA

SECTIO XXXVII

LUX AESTHETICA

§ 614. Verioris in cogitando §. 18. pulcritudinis §. 17. elegantiarumque studiosus quarto loco §. 115, 177, 423. LUCEM, claritatem, et perspicuitatem cogitatorum omnium sectetur, M. §. 531. sed AESTHETICAM, quae vel analogo rationis ad discrimina rei percipienda sufficiat. §. 22. M. §. 531. Perspicuitatem, ut unam ex primis virtutibus eloquentiae luculenter commendans Quintilianus VIII. 2. rectissime distinguit *perspicuitatem in verbis*, quae non est huius loci, §. 13. et *rerum perspicuitatem*, qua obiecta venustae meditationis sint dilucida et negligenter quoque audientibus attendentibus aperta.

§ 615. Huic si negligenter attendentem audientemve placeat et eum dicere, qui non intendat percipiendis rebus, quae tractantur, intellectus rationisque suae vires et nervos, ut ita dicam, rigidius: eo lubens in Quintiliani sententiam. Eam vero mentem optimo fuisse rhetori paene mihi persuaserim, quoniam causam asserti subiungit, *non semper esse tam acrem iudicis* (spectatoris, lectoris, auditoris) *intensionem, ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat, et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intelligentiae suae lumen*. Sin eum modo negligenter audientem attendentemve vocare placeat, qui multis cogitationibus advocatur, et distractus omnino, vel animo volutans ab iis, quae tu cogites, diversissima, vel ebrius oscitans et somno sit proximus, breviter, qui nec analogon rationis advertere tuis cogitationibus velit aut possit: huic etiamsi quaedam a te venustius cogitanda minus aperta sint, ea tamen pulchra luce propterea destitui nondum universim concesserim.

§ 616. Tam clara, quae meditamur ad elegantiae regulas, omnia esse debere, ut in animum audientis oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, incurrat, non sine ratione negaverim, §. 615. Sit caussarum patrono *curandum non, ut intelligere possit iudex, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere*. Non omnis venuste cogitaturus est patronus caussae, nec omnis, quem ille, ceu praecipuum suum obiectum personale, recte considerat, iudex est eiusmodi, quales esse solebant Romanorum pedanei.

AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM

CHAPTER I

HEURISTICS

SECTION XXXVII

AESTHETIC LIGHT

§ 614. The one devoted to truer beauty in thinking, §. 18, §. 17, and to the elegances, in the fourth place, §. 115, 177, 423, should pursue LIGHT, clarity, and perspicuity of all things thought, M. §. 531, but AESTHETIC light, clarity, and perspicuity, which may suffice even for the analogue of reason to perceive the distinctions of the thing, §. 22, M. §. 531.

Quintilian, brightly commending perspicuity as one of the first virtues of eloquence, VIII. 2, most rightly distinguishes *perspicuity in words*, which is not the concern of this place, §. 13, and *perspicuity of things*, by which the objects of graceful meditation are clear and open even to those hearing and attending negligently.

§ 615. If it pleases one to call even him a negligently attending or hearing person who does not more rigidly stretch, so to speak, the powers and sinews of his understanding and reason for perceiving the things that are being treated: so far I willingly go into Quintilian's opinion.

Indeed I would almost persuade myself that this was the mind of the best rhetorician, since he adds the cause of the assertion: *that the intensity of the judge* (spectator, reader, hearer) *is not always so keen that he himself may dispel obscurity for himself and bring into the darkness of the discourse a certain light of his own intelligence.*

But if it pleases one to call only him a negligently hearing or attending person who is called away by many thoughts and wholly distracted, either turning over in his mind things most diverse from those which you think, or drunk, yawning, and near to sleep, briefly, who neither wishes nor is able to turn the analogue of reason toward your thoughts: to this person, even if certain things to be thought more gracefully by you are less open, I would nevertheless not yet universally grant that they are for that reason deprived of beautiful light.

§ 616. I would deny, not without reason, §. 615, that all things which we meditate according to the rules of elegance ought to be so clear that the discourse rushes into the hearer's mind, as the sun into the eyes, even if attention is not directed to it.

Let the advocate of cases have it as his care *not that the judge can understand, but that he cannot altogether fail to understand.* Not everyone who is going to think gracefully is an advocate of a case, nor is everyone whom he rightly considers as his principal personal object a judge of the sort that the Roman *pedanei* used to be.

§ 617. LUCEM et perspicuitatem AESTHETICAM ipsa veritas iubet distinguere in ABSOLUTAM, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, §. 614. et COMPARATIVAM, eum absolutae gradum, qui non, nisi quibusdam venustius meditandis, affundendus est, cuius exemplum §. 616. vidimus. Claritatis intensio per distinctionem, adaequationem, profunditatem, intelligentiaeque veluti puritatem, M. §. 657. prorsus non est lux aesthetica, §. 614. hinc nec absoluta, nec comparativa, sed logica. Hinc nec intenditur directo, tanquam finis primarius, a pulcre cogitativo, §. 14. licet et prodesse non nunquam eidem inter venuste cogitandum possit, si eam de themate suam fecerit, §. 551. et per indirectum, quando partes thematis non ita paucae sensitiva in luce refulgent, obtineatur simul totius conceptus extensive distinctus, M. §. 634. intellectui pulcro, M. §. 637.

§ 618. Omnis itaque lux aesthetica, quam in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sensitiva, claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio, §. 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa vero vividarum cogitationum et materiae nitor ac splendor. M. §. 531. Neroni Tacitus Ann. XIII. 3. *puerilibus statim annis coelanti, pingenti, cantus aut regimen equorum exercenti, et aliquando carmina pangenti*, (quae farrago variarum occupationum!) *vividum animum* tribuit. *Spurinnae* Plinius ep. III. 1. inde putat *agile corpus esse et vividum*, quod non solum, *quoad honestum fuit, obierat officia, gesserat magistratus, provincias rexerat, multoque labore meruerat otium*, sed etiam *senex ambulabat mane millia passuum tria, nec minus animum, quam corpus, exercebat, mox vehiculum ascendebat*, e. c. Ubi mira denuo motuum variatio, quotidianaque vivendi rationis vicissitudo.

§ 619. Hinc iure mihi meo videor eas demum cogitationes dicere posse vividas, in quibus peculiaris quaedam varietas, et subita veluti notarum se mutuo prementium celeritasprehenditur, ex quarum eminenti diffusionem nitor et splendor ille meditationis exsurgat in parte, cuius totum esse tamen debet perspicuum et absolute clarum: Sic Quintilianus VIII. 1. licet ipsum exordium recte poscat *dilucidum*, §. 617. tamen *magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus, certos locos tantum admittit, quorum naturalis ubertas licentias aliquas notari circumfuso nitore non patiatur*. Quemadmodum hic naturalem ubertatem nitoris quasi matrem veneratur: ita Cicero de claris or. 36. *Hyperidi, Aeschini*, e. c. *hanc copiam, succum illum et sanguinem incorruptum* tribuit, *in quo naturalis fuerit, non fucatus nitor*. §. 104, 115.

§ 620. Nitida vividitas venustae meditationis ne confundatur cum eius ardore ac vita, §. 22. de qua deinceps curatius. Recte pulcreque coniunguntur, quoties fieri potest, ut cogitationes non splendeant solum, sed et ardeant. §. 142, 143. cf. Quint. VIII. 3. Natura tamen sua disiunctae sunt in cogitando veneres, per accuratam harum theoriam separatim expendendae. Deprehenditur etiam una non raro sine altera. Hac ratione Cicero de legibus I. 6. *Antipatrum narrat inflasse paullo vehementius*, ac eius antecessores, *et habuisse illum vires agrestes quidem atque horridas*, (vi movendi vitaeque non destitutum) *sine nitore tamen et palaestra*. §. 619, 256.

§ 617. Truth itself commands that AESTHETIC LIGHT and perspicuity be distinguished into ABSOLUTE, necessary for all beautiful thinking, §. 614, and COMPARATIVE, that degree of the absolute which is to be poured upon only certain things to be meditated more gracefully; we have seen an example of this in §. 616.

The intensification of clarity through distinction, adequation, depth, and as it were purity of understanding, M. §. 657, is not at all aesthetic light, §. 614; hence it is neither absolute nor comparative, but logical.

Hence it is not directly intended, as a primary end, by one about to think beautifully, §. 14, although it can sometimes also be useful to the same person while thinking gracefully, if he has made it his own concerning the theme, §. 551, and indirectly, when not a few parts of the theme shine in sensory light, an extensively distinct concept of the whole is at the same time obtained, M. §. 634, for the beautiful understanding, M. §. 637.

§ 618. Therefore all aesthetic light which you directly intend in things will be sensory perspicuity of things, the extension of clarity through a multitude of marks, §. 617, even when absolute; but comparative aesthetic light will be the brightness and splendor of vivid thoughts and of the matter, M. §. 531.

Tacitus, *Annals* XIII. 3, ascribes to Nero a vivid mind, since, *already in boyhood, he practiced carving, painting, singing or the management of horses, and sometimes composed poems* - what a medley of various occupations!

Pliny, *Letters* III. 1, thinks from this that *Spurinna's body is agile and vivid*, because not only, *so long as it was honorable, had he performed duties, held magistracies, governed provinces, and by much labor earned leisure*, but also, *as an old man, he walked three miles in the morning, exercised the mind no less than the body, and soon mounted a carriage*, etc. Here again is a wonderful variation of movements and alternation of a daily manner of living.

§ 619. Hence, by my own right, I seem able to call only those thoughts vivid in which a certain peculiar variety and a sudden speed, as it were, of marks pressing upon one another is perceived; from their eminent diffusion that brightness and splendor of meditation arises in the part, the whole of which nevertheless ought to be perspicuous and absolutely clear.

Thus Quintilian IV. 1, although he rightly requires the exordium itself to be *clear*, §. 617, nevertheless *admits certain places only when minds have been more conciliated and are now warm, places whose natural abundance does not allow certain liberties to be noticed because brightness has been poured around them*.

Just as he here venerates natural abundance as almost the mother of brightness, so Cicero, *On Famous Orators* 36, attributes to *Hyperides, Aeschines*, etc., *this abundance, that sap and uncorrupted blood, in which there was a natural, not cosmetically colored, brightness*, §. 104, 115.

§ 620. Let the bright vividness of graceful meditation not be confused with its ardor and life, §. 22, about which more carefully hereafter. They are rightly and beautifully joined as often as possible, so that thoughts not only shine, but also burn, §. 142, 143; compare Quintilian VIII. 3.

Yet by their own nature these charms in thinking are separate and must be weighed separately by an accurate theory of them. One is also discovered not rarely without the other. In this way Cicero, *On the Laws* I. 6, *relates that Antipater blew somewhat more vehemently than his predecessors and had powers indeed rustic and rough* (not lacking force of movement and life), *yet without brightness and training*. §. 619, 256.

§ 621. Idem Cicero de finibus III. 5. Catoni forsitan non obiecturus Stoicam huius politicorum theoriam eum non tantundem movere et ad bene merendum de republica compellere, ac se suam academicam, libere tamen Catoni obiicit Stoica *de politicis definire partisque squalidius*, dum *academicorum de iisdem niteat oratio*, quoniam *multa de republica scripserint, multa de legibus, multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus reliquerint bene dicendi*. Ex quo loco mihi nunc sufficit nitoris veram notionem eruere, Ciceronis autem obiectionem meam non facio, §. 251, 252. Nostrum iam ad finem conferamus tandem eundem de claris or. 238. ubi *valde nitentem et plane horridam orationem*, ut adversa fronte pugnantes describit.

§ 622. Iam bis naturalem, non fucatum, requiri nitorem vidimus, §. 619. Neque magis necessarium esse videatur monitum de quaquam ex primariis cogitationum elegantissimis, ac de hoc venustae meditationis nitore, §. 22. Quoniam in nulla facilius a recta naturae imitatione deflectitur. *Atque etiam, qui specie capiuntur, vulsis, levatisque, et inustas comas acu comantibus, et non suo colore nitidis, plus esse formae putant, quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulcritudo corporis venire videatur ex malis moribus*. Quint. II. 5. Erit autem naturalis in cogitando nitor, 1) cui capiendi naturales animi dotes, non distortae cum violentia, non intensae vehementius sufficiant, ut profluens *secundum naturam* meditatio *nihil ex ingenio habere videatur*, §. 104.

§ 623. Naturalis in cogitando nitor erit 2) materiis et rebus, de quibus cogites, sic aptus, accommodatus, et quasi proprius, ut ex iisdem earumque cogitatione necessario potius enasci, quam in eandem inferri illinique decoris causa deprehendatur. Huius hinc amicus elegantiae, si qua *tractata* per internas ac innatas opes *posse nitescere desuperat*, relinquit ea potius, quam ut peregrinis pigmentis cogat splendescere, 3) eorum, quorum potissimum causa cogitas, naturali captui, horizonti, ingenio, genio, indoli, ipsis, ut ita dicam, oculis adeo proportionatus, ut ab his sine fatigatione possit imbibi, nec eos praestringens, lumine tamen satians, collustrans amabiliter, non urens incommode. Tertium hoc naturalis nitoris requisitum non satis attendentes, eundem ubique negant deprehendi, quando cogitata e. g. legunt suae naturae, cogitandi sentiendique rationi, genio, principalibus studiis minus consentanea, quamvis largiri debeant eos se non esse, quos praesertim auctor vel docere, vel delectare secum decreverat, §. 104. cf. Cic. de or. I. 81.

§ 621. The same Cicero, *On Ends* IV. 5, perhaps not about to object to Cato that his Stoic theory of political matters did not move him and compel him to deserve well of the republic as much as his own Academic theory moved Cicero, yet freely objects to Cato that the Stoics *define and divide political matters more roughly*, while *the discourse of the Academics on the same matters shines*, because *they wrote much about the republic, much about laws, and left not only many precepts in the arts, but also examples of speaking well in speeches*.

From this passage it is now enough for me to draw out the true notion of brightness; I do not, however, make Cicero's objection my own, §. 251, 252. Let us now finally bring the same author to our end from *On Famous Orators* 238, where he describes a *very shining and a plainly rough speech* as if fighting on opposite fronts.

§ 622. We have now twice seen that natural brightness, not cosmetically colored brightness, is required, §. 619. Nor should a warning seem more necessary concerning any of the primary elegances of thoughts than concerning this brightness of graceful meditation, §. 22, because in none is one more easily turned away from the right imitation of nature.

And indeed those who are captured by appearance, with hair plucked and smoothed, and arranging scorched curls with a pin, and shining with a color not their own, think that there is more beauty than uncorrupted nature can bestow, so that beauty of body seems to come from bad morals. Quintilian II. 5.

Natural brightness in thinking will be, first, that for grasping which the natural gifts of the mind suffice, not distorted with violence, not intensified too vehemently, so that meditation flowing *according to nature* may *seem to have nothing from contrivance*, §. 104.

§ 623. Natural brightness in thinking will be, second, so fit, accommodated, and as it were proper to the materials and things about which you think, that it is perceived to be born necessarily from those things and from the thought of them, rather than to be brought into that thought and smeared upon it for the sake of adornment.

Hence the friend of this elegance, if he despairs that any things, *once handled, can shine by internal and innate resources*, leaves them rather than forcing them to gleam with foreign pigments.

Third, it will be so proportioned to the natural grasp, horizon, talent, genius, disposition, indeed, so to speak, to the very eyes of those chiefly for whose sake you think, that it can be drunk in by them without fatigue, not dazzling them, yet satisfying them with light, pleasantly illuminating them, not burning them inconveniently.

Those who do not sufficiently attend to this third requisite of natural brightness deny that it is found everywhere when, for example, they read thoughts less consonant with their own nature, manner of thinking and feeling, genius, and principal studies; although they ought to concede that they themselves are not those whom the author had especially resolved either to teach or to delight, §. 104; compare Cicero, *On the Orator* I. 81.

§ 624. *In picturis alios horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca, contra alios nitida, laeta, collustrata delectat. Quid est, quo praescriptum aliquod aut formulam exprimas, quum in suo quodque genere praestet, et genera plura sint? Hac ego religione non sum ab hoc conatu repulsus, existimavique in omnibus rebus esse aliquid optimum, (pulcerrimum, etiamsi lateret, (multos) idque ab eo posse, qui eius rei gnarus esset, indicari.* Cic. orator. 36. Si quos in aestheticis absoluta pulcritudinis luce destituta, §. 617. absolute horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca delectant, falluntur illi, nubemque pro Iunone, per me licet, amplectantur. Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in pictura, modo sint omnia luce, quam absolutam diximus, conspicua, non omnia, sed quaedam tantum, comparative lucida

*Ore floridula nitent,
Alba parthenice velut,
Luteumve papaver;* Cat.

quaedam sunt vere, sunt belle perspicua, quanquam, cum nitidis illis et admodum collustratis ubi comparentur, appareant opaca, quaeque primo obtutu iudicentur horrida, §. 621. Eleganter, non omnia, sed *plura nitent in carmine.* Hor.

§ 625. GENUS COGITANDI luce absoluta aesthetica non destitutum si dicamus SIMPLICITER DILUCIDUM et perspicuum (sensitivae) §. 617. sicuti comparativa etiam luce fulgens NITIDUM et splendidum: praeuntem sequimur Quintilianum VIII. 3. quando: *Emendate quidem, ait, et dilucide* §. 619. *dicentium tenue praemium est, magisque vitiis carere est, quam ut aliquam magnam virtutem adeptus esse videaris.* — *Non assequutus esset Cicero docendo tantum iudicem, et utiliter demum, ac latine perspicueque docendo, quod eum assequutum esse nitore fulgentium armorum,* §. 282. vidimus. *Sed hic ornatur, (licet enim repetere, §. 622.) virilis, fortis, ac sanctus sit, nec effoeminatam levitatem, nec fuco eminentem colorem amet, sanguine et viribus niteat.* §. 619. *Hoc autem adeo verum est, ut, cum in hac maxima parte sint vicina virtutibus vitia, §. 622. etiam qui vitiis utuntur, virtutis tamen his nomen imponant. Quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus. Non nego hanc esse virtutem. Sed illis eam non tribuo.*

§ 624. *In paintings, rough, uncultivated, hidden, and opaque things delight some, while bright, cheerful, illuminated things delight others. What is there by which you may express some prescription or formula, when each thing excels in its own kind, and there are many kinds?*

By this scruple I have not been driven away from this attempt, and I have judged that in all things there is something best (most beautiful, even if it lay hidden from many), and that it can be indicated by one who is knowledgeable in that matter. Cicero, Orator 36.

If in aesthetic matters things deprived of the absolute light of beauty, §. 617, things absolutely rough, uncultivated, hidden, and opaque, delight anyone, they are deceived, and, as far as I am concerned, may embrace a cloud instead of Juno.

But in every beauty generally, as in painting, provided that all things are conspicuous by the light which we have called absolute, not all things, but only certain things, are comparatively luminous.

*They shine with a flowery countenance,
like white parthenice,
or yellow poppy, Catullus.*

Some things are truly and beautifully perspicuous, although, when they are compared with those bright and highly illuminated things, they appear opaque and are judged rough at first glance, §. 621. Elegantly, not all things, but *many things shine in a poem.* Horace.

§ 625. If we call a KIND OF THINKING not deprived of absolute aesthetic light SIMPLY CLEAR and perspicuous (with respect to sensory cognition), §. 617, just as we call one also shining with comparative light BRIGHT and splendid, we follow Quintilian as our guide, VIII. 3.

For he says: *To speak correctly indeed and clearly, §. 619, is a slender reward, and it is more to be free from faults than to seem to have attained some great virtue.*

Cicero would not have attained it by merely teaching the judge, and finally by teaching usefully, and in Latin and perspicuously; we have seen that he attained it by the brightness of gleaming arms, §. 282.

But this adornment, for it is permitted to repeat it, §. 622, should be manly, strong, and sacred; it should love neither effeminate lightness nor color prominent with false coloring, but should shine with blood and strength. §. 619.

But this is so true that, since in this greatest part the vices are neighboring upon the virtues, §. 622, even those who use the vices nevertheless impose on them the name of virtue. Therefore let no one among the corrupt say that I am an enemy to those who speak in a cultivated way. I do not deny that this is a virtue. But I do not attribute it to them.

§ 626. Naturalis splendoris simiam, fucum in exemplis ridet Horatius. A. P. 25.

*Inceptis gravibus plerumque et magna professis,
Purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter
Assuitur pannus, quum lucus et ara Dianae,
Et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros,
Aut flumen Rhenum, aut pluvius describitur arcus.
Sed nunc non erat his locus.*

Habes ciconiam in maleseriatos eiusmodi pictores, qui materiam sibi legunt satis bel-
lam et de qua speres singulariter non pulcra solum, sed etiam novitate praeclara, de qua
promittat auctor ipse spe tua paene maiora, quando autem devenitur ad rem, caecum
imitatorum pecus nescit aliquid novi, quod rerum natura, de quibus agitur, pronissime
suppeditaret, in plena luce sistere, nescit collustrare; quae praecipuum splendorem re-
quirerent, sed, unitate neglecta, detorquet attentionem in diversam omnino, vel minus
connexum rem aliam, ideo tantum illatam in male cohaerens opus, ut ea, iam vero in
nitore picta ab ingeniis vere pulcris, nunc denuo pingatur, si diis placet, nitidius, vere
per obscurum et asiaticum, nescio quem, apparatum. §. 325, 623.

*Nota magis nulli domus est sua, quam mihi lucus
Martis, et Aeoliis vicinum rupibus antrum
Vulcani. Quid agant venti, quas torqueat umbras,
Aeacus, unde alius furtivae devehat aurum
Pelliculae, quantas iaculetur Monychus ornos,
Frontonis platani, convulsaque marmora clamant
Semper, et assiduo ruptae lectore columnae.
Expectes eadem a summo minimoque poeta.
Iuv. I. 8.*

§ 627. Alii pictores ex minimis, de quibus Iuvenalis, decipiuntur audacibus quorun-
dam magnorum ingeniorum dictis, quale ad §. 125. notavimus, quale Ciceronis est
in prooemio paradoxorum; *Nihil est tam horridum*, §. 621. *tam incultum, quod non
splendescat oratione et tanquam excolatur*. Nec enim sentiunt primarios eiusmodi vi-
ros, *fretos* suis viribus, si penitus asserta perspiciamus, *falsum constituisse de venusti
in cogitando hominis officio, et non quid ars, sed quid ipsi forte possent, exposuisse*.
Hinc pulcelli, de quibus loquimur, micrologi, §. 356. se plerumque putantes aliquid
egregii, colligunt suum esse nunc illorum implere vaticinia et audere, nisi Minerva,
Fortuna tamen iuvante, quae fieri posse Cicero quidam interdum dormitans effatus est.
Quaerunt itaque materias, quas excogitare possunt natura sua minimum splendoris ad-
missuras, easque, vel invitis diis omnibus, tot peregrinis flosculis, tot ornamentis am-
iciunt, ut potissimis suorum spectatorum sistant quidem thema non dissimile plumis
alienis apud Aesopum superbientis corniculae, semper tamen eo melius se cogitasse
gaudeant in sinu, quo minus hi ipsi spectatores ex proposita sibi tabula naturalis volup-
tatis, si vel artis ignari forent, haurire se potuisse fateantur. §. 623; 119–121.

§ 626. Horace, *Ars Poetica* 25, laughs in examples at the ape of natural splendor, false coloring.

*Often to beginnings that are grave and profess great things
one or another purple patch is sewn on, that it may shine far and wide,
when the grove and altar of Diana are described,
and the hurrying water through pleasant windings of fields,
or the river Rhine, or the rainy bow.
But now this was not the place for them.*

You have a mocking sign against such badly ordered painters, who choose for themselves material sufficiently beautiful and from which you would hope for things not only beautiful in a singular way, but also distinguished by novelty, and about which the author himself promises things almost greater than your hope.

But when one comes to the matter itself, the blind herd of imitators does not know how to set in full light some new thing which the nature of the matters at issue would most readily supply; it does not know how to illuminate it.

The things that would require chief splendor are neglected; instead, unity having been neglected, he twists attention toward some other thing wholly different or less connected, brought into the badly cohering work only so that this thing, already painted in brightness by truly beautiful talents, may now be painted again, if it please the gods, more brightly, truly through some obscure and Asiatic apparatus, I know not what. §. 325, 623.

*No man's house is better known to him than to me the grove
of Mars, and Vulcan's cave near the Aeolian cliffs.
What the winds do, what shades Aeacus torments,
whence another carries off the gold of the stolen fleece,
how many ash-trees Morychus hurls,
the plane-trees of Fronto and the convulsed marbles always cry out,
and the columns broken by the constant reader.*

You may expect the same things from the greatest and the least poet. Juvenal I. 8.

§ 627. Other painters, from the lesser ones about whom Juvenal speaks, are deceived by bold sayings of certain great talents, such as the one we noted at §. 125, such as Cicero's in the preface to the *Paradoxes*: *Nothing is so rough*, §. 621, *so uncultivated, that it does not shine by discourse and, as it were, become cultivated.*

For they do not perceive that men of this first rank, *relying* on their own powers, if we look more deeply into the assertions, *set down something false about the office of a person graceful in thinking, and set forth not what art can do, but what perhaps they themselves could do.*

Hence the rather pretty little micrologists of whom we speak, §. 356, usually thinking themselves something excellent, conclude that it is now theirs to fulfill those prophecies and to dare, if not with Minerva, yet with Fortune helping, the things which some Cicero, sometimes sleeping, declared could be done.

And so they seek materials which they can devise as admitting by their nature the least splendor, and these, even with all the gods unwilling, they dress with so many foreign little flowers, so many ornaments,

so that indeed they present to their principal spectators a theme not unlike Aesop's little crow proud in borrowed feathers; yet they always rejoice inwardly that they have thought so much better, the less these very spectators would confess that, from the picture set before them, they could have drawn natural pleasure, even if they were ignorant of art. §. 623; 119–121.

§ 628. Neque solus Heliconis pygmaeus naturae talis adscititium belle cogitandis fucum a splendore vere naturali vix ac ne vix quidem discernet: §. 359. mediocribus etiam ingeniis idem erit difficillimum, quando prava per adolescentiam contracta consuetudo naturam vere elegantem simulabit, §. 622. et temporum iniuriae, locorumque, quibus vixerint, barbaries intimam pulcerrimarum rerum naturam obtegens haerere semper in cortice coget, iisdemque satis depravatum apud aequales iudicium solas fucatas veneres, ut ipsius naturae filias, venerari consueverit, §. 622, 623. Interim felicius in aestheticis ingenium, S. II–VII. veluti Caesar apud Ciceronem de claris or. 261. rationem adhibens, §. 58. consuetudinem vitiosam et corruptam pura et incorrupta consuetudine emendat, quum ad dilucidam ubique cogitationum elegantiam §. 625. adiungit ornamenta quaedam singularia, tum videtur *tanquam tabulas bene pictas collocare in bono lumine* ac splendidam quandam, minimeque veteratoriam, rationem cogitandi tenet.

§ 629. Cogitationum nitor ac splendor quoniam est species, immo gradus quidam, perspicuitatis sensitivae, genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum aequae bene caret eodem, ac aestheticodogmaticum intensioribus perspicuitatis intellectualis gradibus, §. 617, 567. Quo magis erit illud genus cogitandi formaliter philosophicum, scientificum, et rationi solidiori, puriori intellectui, pervium ac perspicuum, hoc minus nitoris habebit et perspicuitatis etiam analogo rationis pellucidae. §. 578. Quo plus genus cogitandi dogmaticum vividi splendoris habet, hoc minus ad logica, hoc magis ad aethetica referendum est. §. 568. Hinc contra quosdam recentiorum miscelliones librorum suorum philosophicorum genus cogitandi Cicero iudicat ipse aestheticodogmaticum, dum de fin. I. 6. *Qui habent, inquit, ut graeca anteponant iis, (scriptis meis de philosophia) quae et splendide dicta sint, neque sint conversa de graecis?* Aperitius adhuc mentem exponit in prooemio parad. ubi: *Degustabis, ait, genus hoc exercitationum mearum, quibus uti consuevi, quum ea, quae in scholis dicuntur δεικτικά, ad nostrum hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus.* §. 569.

§ 630. Equidem cum Cicerone off. I. 6. existimo, *Demosthenem, si illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronunciare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisset.* §. 567. Si vero fecisset ornate, si fecisset splendide, si se in philosophico disputandi genere praestitisset Demosthenem: tunc ex mea sententia non tam rationem et intellectum, qua potest fieri, cum evidentia instructurus, quam analogon rationis ingenti persuasionis lumine collustraturus fuisset. §. 629, 568.

§ 628. Nor will only such a pygmy of Helicon scarcely, indeed hardly at all, distinguish adventitious false coloring in beautiful thinking from truly natural splendor, §. 359.

The same thing will be very difficult even for middling talents, when a depraved habit contracted through youth simulates a truly elegant nature, §. 622.

And when the injuries of the times and the barbarism of the places in which they have lived, covering over the innermost nature of the most beautiful things, compel them always to stick in the bark, and when a judgment sufficiently depraved among their contemporaries has accustomed them to venerate only false-colored charms as daughters of nature itself, §. 622, 623.

Meanwhile a happier talent in aesthetic matters, S. II–VII, like Caesar in Cicero, *On Famous Orators* 261, applying reason, §. 58, corrects a faulty and corrupt habit by a pure and uncorrupted habit.

When it joins certain singular ornaments to an everywhere clear elegance of thoughts, §. 625, then it seems *as if to place well-painted pictures in a good light*, and it holds a certain splendid and by no means crafty way of thinking.

§ 629. Since the brightness and splendor of thoughts is a species, indeed a certain degree, of sensory perspicuity, the logical-dogmatic kind of thinking lacks it just as properly as the aesthetic-dogmatic kind lacks the more intense degrees of intellectual perspicuity, §§ 617, 567.

The more that kind of thinking is formally philosophical, scientific, and accessible and perspicuous to sounder reason and purer intellect, the less brightness it will have, and the less perspicuity even for the analogue of clear reason, §. 578.

The more vivid splendor a dogmatic kind of thinking has, the less it is to be referred to logic, and the more to aesthetics, §. 568.

Hence, against certain more recent miscellaneous writers, Cicero himself judges the kind of thinking in his philosophical books to be aesthetic-dogmatic, when in *De finibus* I.6 he says: *What reason have they to prefer Greek things to those things (my writings on philosophy) which have both been splendidly expressed and have not been translated from the Greek?*

He sets out his mind still more openly in the preface to the *Paradoxa*, where he says: *You will taste this kind of my exercises, which I have been accustomed to use, when I transfer those things which in the schools are called δεικτικὰ to this oratorical kind of speaking of ours*, §. 569.

§ 630. I indeed, with Cicero, *De officiis* I.6, think that *Demosthenes, if he had retained and wished to pronounce those things which he had learned from Plato, could have done so ornately and splendidly*, §. 567.

But if he had done so ornately, if he had done so splendidly, if he had shown himself Demosthenes in the philosophical kind of disputing, then in my opinion he would not so much have been about to instruct reason and intellect with evidentness, insofar as that can be done, as to illuminate the analogue of reason with a huge light of persuasion, §§ 629, 568.

SECTIO XXXVIII

OBSCURITAS AESTHETICA

§ 631. Defectus et oppositum lucis ac claritatis quum sit *obscuritas*, lux autem et claritas vel sensitiva, vel intellectualis, S. XXXVII. rectissime iam veteres obscuritatem κατ' αἴσθησιν ab obscuritate κατὰ νόησιν distinxerunt. Res et cogitatio, quae sensitive percipienda non satis claritatis, extensivae scilicet, aestheticaeque lucis habet, est obscura κατ' αἴσθησιν. Hinc distinctiora, puriora, profundiora quaevis per scientias, quoniam ea non assequitur analogon rationis, per hoc solum si quis velit considerare, non queretur ea solum obscura, sed etiam sentiet, uti sunt κατ' αἴσθησιν.

§ 632. Res et cogitatio, quae per intellectum et rationem concipienda non tantum claritatis, intensivae scilicet, distinctionis, puritatis, ac profunditatis habet, quantum ad distinguendum ex notis claris et rationibus probe perspectis, vel enucleatus pronuntiandum, vel complete demonstrandum requiritur, est obscura κατὰ νόησιν. Hinc si quis bene multa non solum aesthetice dilucida, sed etiam pulcro nitore splendida, sicut eadem propinquantur soli rationis analogo, distinctius tamen concipere, ratione rimari profundius laboraverit, ea saepe numero non queretur solum obscura, sed etiam sentiet, uti sunt κατὰ νόησιν.

§ 633. Perspicuitatis ac lucis uti primaria laus est, ita turpe profecto huic laudabili claritati vere oppositae obscuritatis vituperium. §. 23. Haec etiam vel rerum et cogitationum, vel signorum, vocabulorum ac phrasium est obscuritas. De prima nunc nobis tantum agitur, §. 614. eiusque illa specie, quam olim dixerunt κατ' αἴσθησιν. §. 631. Sint per meditationem venustam non ita pauca κατὰ νόησιν obscura, quorum accurata sit repertu difficilis definitio, genesis in fundo lateat, nexus parum evidenter a ratione perspicatur; non curat hanc obscuritatem ad solas paene puras scientias relata ingenium vere pulcrum, §. 632. modo detur effugere OBSCURITATEM AESTHETICAM, defectum lucis aestheticae in suis (rebus ac cogitationibus) ad elegantiae leges examinandis. §. 632, 614.

§ 634. Obscuritas aesthetica vel erit defectus lucis in aestheticis absolutae, §. 617. quam CALIGINEM AESTHETICAM dicamus, et meram noctem, vel comparativae tantum, nitoris alicuius ac splendoris eximii, quae denuo vel nascetur per exceptionem non inelegantem, §. 25. defectus tantum apparens, UMBRA AESTHETICA, vel erit defectus vere talis et privatio vividitatis ad veram pulcritudinem requisitae, dabitque GENUS COGITANDI PLANE HORRIDUM cum aesthetica caligine. §. 621. Neque solam ipsam noctem horrebit ubique sedulo pulcre cogitaturus, sed etiam non minus, ac eos, quorum gratia fiat Aristarchus, horridulis quibusdam, dilucidis utique, §. 625. sed non sine macula comparative

parum claris, lucem dare coget,

umbras autem pro formae commodis nunc sequetur, nunc fugiet, §. 614.

SECTION XXXVIII

AESTHETIC OBSCURITY

§ 631. A thing and thought which, in order to be perceived sensitively, does not have enough clarity, namely extensive clarity and aesthetic light, is obscure *κατ' αἴσθησιν*. Hence any things that are more distinct, purer, and deeper through the sciences, since the analogue of reason does not attain them, if someone wishes to consider them through this alone, he will not only complain that they are obscure, but will also feel them as they are *κατ' αἴσθησιν*.

§ 632. A thing and thought which, in order to be conceived through intellect and reason, does not have as much clarity, namely intensive clarity, distinction, purity, and depth, as is required for distinguishing from clear marks and well-perceived reasons, or for pronouncing more fully, or for demonstrating completely, is obscure *κατὰ νόησιν*. Hence if someone has labored to conceive more distinctly, and to search more deeply by reason, very many things not only aesthetically clear but also splendid with beautiful brightness, just as those same things are offered to the mere analogue of reason, he will often not only complain that they are obscure, but will also feel them as they are *κατὰ νόησιν*.

§ 633. As perspicuity and light is a primary praise, so truly shameful is the blame of obscurity truly opposed to this laudable clarity, §. 23.

This also is either an obscurity of things and thoughts, or of signs, words, and phrases. Only the first kind now concerns us, §. 614, and that species of it which they formerly called *κατ' αἴσθησιν*, §. 631.

Let there be, through graceful meditation, not so few things obscure *κατὰ νόησιν*, whose accurate definition is difficult to find, whose genesis lies hidden in the depth, whose connection is perceived by reason with too little evidentness;

A truly beautiful talent does not care for this obscurity, related almost only to the pure sciences, §. 632, provided that it is granted to escape AESTHETIC OBSCURITY, the defect of aesthetic light in its own things and thoughts when they are to be examined according to the laws of elegance, §§ 632, 614.

§ 634. Aesthetic obscurity will be either a defect of absolute light in aesthetic things, §617, which we may call AESTHETIC DARKNESS and mere night; or only a defect of comparative light, of some brightness and exceptional splendor, which again either arises through a not inelegant exception, §25, as a merely apparent defect, AESTHETIC SHADE, or will be a truly such defect and privation of the vividness required for true beauty, and will give A PLAINLY ROUGH KIND OF THINKING together with aesthetic darkness, §621. One who will everywhere think beautifully with care will not only shudder at night itself, but also, no less than those for whose sake he becomes an Aristarchus, will compel certain rather rough things, clear indeed, §625, but not without a comparative blemish, "to give light to things insufficiently clear"; but he will now follow, now avoid, shades according to the advantages of form, §614.

§ 635. Umbrarum nomine complectimur omnia illa artificia, naturam imitantia, quibus quaedam inter venuste cogitandum non in tanta luce constituuntur, non tanta cum claritate extensiva dilatantur, ac fieri posset, ab ignaris venustae parsimoniae, §. 164. e. g. quando minus connexa themati velut e longinquo tantum ostenduntur, sensim magnitudine, sicut optice, decrescencia, quasi per nebulam. Sic enim per naturam rerum porticus aequae distantibus columnis ac aequalibus suffulta

*Longa, tamen parte ab summa si tota videtur,
Paullatim trahit angusti fastigia coni,
Tecta solo iungens, atque omnia dextera laeva
Donec in obscurum coni contraxit acumen,*
Lucret. IIII. 430.

Sic per *obscurum* coeptae lucis paullatim panditur brevis merides, quam inter et mediam noctem est media post solis occasum obscura lux.

§ 636. Turpem obscuritatem in pulcre cogitandis procreabit attentionis, quantam ab analogo rationis apud praecipuos tuos spectatores expectare possis, nimia 1) intensio, quando simulacra popularem aliquam cogitandi rationem, vere tamen ea concipis, eoque modo cum iisdem communicas, qui iam multum et eruditum intellectus et rationis usum requirat probe capiendus, quae soli rationis horizonti relinquenda videantur. §. 121, 615, 622. 2) extensio et 3) protensio si tentetur, M. 628. dum satis ad venustos fines iam aperta atque dilucida vel 1) splendore tamen circumfunduntur adhuc novo, praestringente oculos, §. 633. vividitate notarumque plurimarum variatione animum distrahente a pulchra totius, thematis et primariarum eius partium, consideratione, §. 629. M. §. 638. vel 2) luxurianti diffusionem §. 165. tamdiu illustrantur novis semper ac novis commentationibus, donec fatigatus mole rerum ac cogitationum animus satiscat et silva quadam obruatur potius, quam recreetur. §. 623.

§ 637. Secundam ac tertiam obscuritatis vitiosae genesin simul tangere videtur Cicero de Inv. II. 156. *Uniuscuiusque*, inquiens, *constitutionis exemplum supponere non gravemur, nisi illud videremur, quemadmodum res obscurae dicendo fierent apertiores, sic res apertas obscuriores fieri oratione.* Quid enim? Exempla illa alias illustrantia, vel satis breviter fulgentissimis exornasset luminibus, et praestringerent hoc loco, vel pluribus diducta longo ordine exposuisset, et fatigassent hic spectatores oculos. §. 636.

§ 638. Turpior nascetur obscuritas aesthetica, 4) si vel absolute et in se obscurum thema, chimaeram aliquam et merum nihil, quod videatur aliquid, eleganter aliquis explanandum sibi sumpserit, vel certe rem relative non ad spectatores solum, sed et ipsius auctoris captum adeo obscuram, ut eam nec sensibus ac imaginatione, nec intellectus vi consequatur ipse, quam tamen aliis pollicetur exponere. Huc magna pertinet, *neque ea naturalis*, §. 622, 623. *sed artificiosa* §. 110. *somniorum Antiphontis interpretatio.* Eodemque modo et oraculorum et vaticinationum bene multa mendacia, multaque verorum etiam *explanationes, in quibus multa obscura sunt ac ambigua.* Cic. de div. II. 116. cf. I. 115.

§ 635. By the name of shades we include all those nature-imitating devices by which, in beautiful thinking, certain things are not placed in so great a light, nor expanded with so great an extensive clarity, as could be done by those ignorant of graceful parsimony, §164: for example, when things less connected with the theme are shown only as if from far away, gradually decreasing in size, as optically, almost through a mist. Thus, by the nature of things, a portico supported by columns equally distant and equal, if it is seen whole from its highest part, gradually draws the summits of a narrow cone, joining roofs to ground and right things to left, until it has contracted the cone's point into obscurity, Lucretius IV.430. Thus through obscurity the brief noon of a begun light is gradually opened, between which and midnight there is, after sunset, a middle obscure light.

§ 636. Ugly obscurity in beautiful thinking will be produced by too much 1) intensity of the attention that you can expect from the analogue of reason among your principal spectators, when you simulate some popular way of thinking, but in fact conceive and communicate things in a way that already requires much and learned use of intellect and reason to be properly grasped, and that seems to be left to the horizon of reason alone, §§121, 615, 622. It is also produced if 2) extension and 3) protension are attempted, Metaphysics §628, while things already open and clear enough for beautiful ends are either 1) still surrounded with new splendor that dazzles the eyes, §633, with vividness and variation of very many marks distracting the mind from the beautiful consideration of the whole, the theme, and its primary parts, §629, Metaphysics §638; or 2) are illustrated by luxuriant diffusion, §165, with ever new commentaries for so long that the mind, fatigued by the mass of things and thoughts, is sated and overwhelmed by a kind of forest rather than refreshed, §623.

§ 637. Cicero seems to touch at once the second and third genesis of vicious obscurity in *De inventione* II.156, saying: *We would not be reluctant to add an example for each constitution, unless we seemed, just as obscure things are made clearer by speaking, so to make clear things more obscure by speech.* For what then? Those examples, otherwise illuminating, would either have adorned sufficiently brief things with most brilliant lights and would have dazzled here, or, drawn out through a long order with more words, would have fatigued the spectators' eyes, §636.

§ 638. A still uglier aesthetic obscurity will arise, 4) if someone undertakes elegantly to explain either an absolutely and in itself obscure theme, some chimera and mere nothing that seems to be something, or at least a thing so obscure relatively not only to the spectators' grasp but also to the author's own that he himself attains it neither by the senses and imagination nor by the force of intellect, while nevertheless promising to expound it to others. To this largely belongs that interpretation of Antiphon's dreams, *not natural*, §§622, 623, *but artificial*, §110. In the same way belong many lies of oracles and prophecies, and also many *explanations of true things in which there is much that is obscure and ambiguous*, Cicero, *De divinatione* II.116, cf. I.115.

§ 639. Duplex eorum genus est, qui de bonis rebus et in se probe perspicuis earum omnino ignari, belle tamen, disserere frustra conantur. Primum est sincerius ac simplicius, eoque facilius detegendae turpitudinis, qui stolide sibi persuadent, rem bene geri, quoties de re, quam norunt cum ignatissimis, audacter incipiant, magnis hiatibus, signa sine mente, sed non sine flumine, obscurum per obscurius exponere, crepuscula collustrare tenebris, quas intelligere nemo alias possit, quoniam ipsi sua cogitantes non intellexerant. Alterum est magis subdolum et quasi veteratorum, quod in eadem rerum optimarum inscitia per eandem impudentiam de quibusvis venustam scilicet meditationem aggreditur; sed callido satis consilio suae mentis caliginem ita tegens, ut ignorantiae suae culpam in ipsam materiam et rem, de qua agitur, commode devolvat, suisque spectatoribus, quorum aliquos aequae rerum ignaros invenire non est difficile, largiatur non apud ipsos, sed in rebus cogitandis quaerendam esse causam, cur illae nequeant intelligi. Sic enim dum fovet, et excusat suorum naevos auctor eiusmodi ab his denuo non excusatus solum abibit, sed etiam saepe numero collaudatus, qui solus rerum tenebras viderit, quas alii, doctiores qui videri velint, soli meridiano comparantes mentiantur. §. 638.

§ 640. Huius obscuritatis §. 636, 637. non unum exemplum nobis offerunt Ciceronis libri de natura deorum, quorum l. III. 94. Cotta dicendi finem facit: *Haec fere*, inquit, *dicere habui de natura deorum, non ut eam tollerem, sed ut intelligeretur, quam esset obscura, et quam difficiles explanationes haberet*. Quoniam enim per omnem eorum decursum evidentissimae religionis naturalis quaestiones, cum superstitionibus graecoromanis misere confunduntur, quarum plerasque Stoici sub tutelam philosophiae sinistris avibus receptum ibant, §. 636. quas omnes, sed cum veris verissimae religionis anticipationibus, in sinu certe, ridebant Epicurei: §. 637. Cotta academicus, dum illas impugnat, nunc obscuritatem porticus iure suo false ridet, quoties hi somniorum interpretamenta crepabant, §. 638. nunc Epicureorum vanas ambages, et impudentem audaciam bene perstringit, quando hi divinorum satis incurii, deorum tamen quasi carnem et quasi sanguinem, et intermundiorum otia multis exponebant, ne nihil omnino de diis dixisse viderentur, nunc autem et *vehementius invectus etiam in illam rationem, quae de Providentia sanctissime et providentissime constituta est*, multa per se obscura callide fingit, quae sunt aperta cuivis veriore religionem agnoscenti, §. 639.

§ 641. Turpioris obscuritatis §. 638. notatae dabunt exempla, nunc alterutro, nunc utroque morbo, de quo §. 639. laborantes veterum multi chemici, praesertim alchemistae, quibus arcana sunt omnia, praesertim philosophorum lapis, multi recentiorum etiam mystici, quoties vere divinis non contenti nova sibi ac suis excogitant mysteria, omnis magiam simulans et nocturnum cum daemonibus commercium, si

*obscurum verborum ambage novorum
Ter novies carmen magico demurmurat ore.*

Ov.

§ 639. There is a twofold kind of those who, wholly ignorant of good things and of things in themselves properly perspicuous, nevertheless try in vain to discuss them beautifully. The first is more sincere and simple, and for that reason its ugliness is easier to uncover: those who stupidly persuade themselves that the matter goes well whenever, about a thing they know among the most ignorant, they boldly begin, with great gaps, to explain the obscure by the more obscure, signs without mind but not without flow, and to illuminate twilight with shadows that no one else can understand because they themselves had not understood what they were thinking. The other kind is more deceitful and almost crafty: in the same ignorance of the best things, and with the same impudence, it attacks graceful meditation on anything whatever, but by a fairly cunning plan covers its own mental darkness so that it conveniently shifts the fault of its ignorance onto the very material and thing at issue. It grants its spectators, among whom it is not hard to find some equally ignorant of things, that the reason why these matters cannot be understood must be sought not in themselves but in the things being thought. Thus, while such an author supports and excuses the blemishes of his own people, he will depart not only excused by them in turn, but often praised as the only one who saw the darkness of things which others, wishing to seem more learned, falsely compare with the midday sun, §638.

§ 640. Cicero's books *On the Nature of the Gods* offer us more than one example of this obscurity, §§636–637. At III.94 Cotta ends his speech by saying: *This, roughly, is what I had to say about the nature of the gods, not in order to remove it, but so that it might be understood how obscure it was and what difficult explanations it had.* For through their whole course the most evident questions of natural religion are wretchedly confused with Greco-Roman superstitions, many of which the Stoics, under unlucky auspices, were trying to receive under the guardianship of philosophy, §636, while the Epicureans certainly laughed at them all inwardly, though also at the true anticipations of truest religion, §637. Cotta the Academic, while attacking them, now rightly laughs falsely at the obscurity of the Porch whenever the Stoics were rattling off dream-interpretations, §638; now he properly censures Epicurean empty windings and impudent boldness, when they, though rather careless about divine things, nevertheless explained at length the gods' quasi-flesh and quasi-blood and the leisure of the intermundia, lest they seem to have said absolutely nothing about the gods; but now also, *having attacked more vehemently even that account which has been most sacredly and providently established concerning Providence*, he cunningly invents many things obscure in themselves that are clear to anyone who acknowledges a truer religion, §639.

§ 641. Examples of the uglier obscurity noted in §638 will be given by many ancient chemists, especially alchemists, for whom everything is secret, especially the philosophers' stone, and by many modern mystics, whenever, not content with things truly divine, they devise new mysteries for themselves and their own, simulating all magic and nocturnal commerce with demons, if one "mutters darkly, with magical mouth, a charm three times ninefold in the winding of new words," Ovid.

§ 642. Primam obscuritatis causam aestheticae §. 636. cauturus sollicitus abstinere a discernendis a se invicem iis omnibus, quae singula quidem sunt dilucida, vel omnino nitida, §. 625. salva tamen pulcritudine totius, ad quod pertinent, confunduntur ac miscentur ab analogo rationis saepe numero. Sit in venusta quapiam pictura Cnidius aliquis Gyges salva pulcritudine totius

Quem si puellarum insereres choro,

Mire sagaces falleret hospites

Discrimen obscurum, solutis

Crinibus, ambiguoque vultu: Hor. l. V. oda V. 21.

Noli tunc proditorem agere, voluptatisque circulos turbare velle, superfluum potius distinguendi sagacitatem umbris tege commodis. §. 634. M. 645.

§ 643. Secundam obscuritatis vel optima deturpantis viam §. 636. temere ingreditur I) de suis praecipuis spectatoribus melius praeclariusque sentiens, ac debebat, iisque penetrantius acumen et uberiores attendendi perspicendiue vim tribuens, ac vere vel habent, vel exercent, adeoque, dum tantis ingeniis vix se putat satisfacturum ingenii sui modulo, quicquid est ubique nitoris, constipat et cogit, quantum potest, in unum, et hac ratione

plerumque modestus

Occupat obscuri speciem.

§ 644. Eandem in tenebras viam inibit II. de semet ipse, de sua suorumque cogitatorum auctoritate sentiens augustius, ac fas est, et hinc tacite postulans legi, velut aenigmata, relegi sua, quot verbis, tot ponderibus insignia, et haerentem in singulis picturae suae ductibus spectatorem subsistere, neque pedem ulterius, nec oculos proferre, nisi saepius volutatis animo, quae viderat, diuque perpensis, tandem assequutus sit, quid sibi velint. Ob hanc forte causam *valde obscurus est Heraclitus*, minime Democritus. Apophthegmatibus ille suis σκοτεινὸς sibi nomen promeritus est, huius composita oratio et ornata, et artificio captum lectoris, §. 643. ac suam auctoritatem metientium, et expositione distincta Ciceronis, immo lectorum hoc minus philosophicorum, calculum tulit. §. 251.

§ 645. Subobscurum hoc bivium §. 643, 644. cavebit aesthetica dynamica, §. 60. ita rationes virium et extendendae attentionis apud spectatores suos praecipuos subducens, ut in casu dubii, an hi belle cogitaturum satis assequuturi mentemque eius sint, ut ita dicam, exaequaturi, malit nimis apertus, quam opertus caligine videri, ita eiusdem auctoritatem apud eosdem dimensa, ut in casu dubii, an hi belle cogitantis lectionem decies repetituri sint, nec ne, malit prima lectione statim intelligi, quam ultima, §. 636. Praesertim hos sibi calculos recte commendatissimos habent caussarum patroni, a quibus *ius obscurum et ignotum aliquando patefaciendum est in iudiciis atque illustrandum*, §. 615, 616. Negligat has rationes auctoris sive modestia, §. 643. sive fastus et arrogantia, §. 644. conveniet illi cum Horatio queri:

Brevis esse laboro,

Obscurus fio.

Cavenda est, quae nimium omnia corripientes sequitur, obscuritas. Quint. l. III. 2.

§ 642. One who is anxious to guard against the first cause of aesthetic obscurity, §636, will abstain from distinguishing from one another all those things which, though individually clear or even bright, §625, are nevertheless, with the beauty of the whole to which they belong preserved, often confused and mingled by the analogue of reason. Let there be in some graceful picture a Cnidian Gyges, with the beauty of the whole preserved: “If you inserted him in a chorus of girls, he would wonderfully deceive keen guests, the distinction obscure, with loosened hair and ambiguous face,” Horace. Do not then act the betrayer or wish to disturb the circles of pleasure; rather cover superfluous sagacity of distinguishing with suitable shades, §634, Metaphysics §645.

§ 643. One rashly enters the second way of obscurity, which disfigures even the best things, §636, I) by thinking better and more splendidly of one’s principal spectators than one ought, and by attributing to them a sharper acuteness and richer power of attending and perceiving than they truly have or exercise. Thus, while one thinks that by the measure of one’s own talent one will scarcely satisfy such great minds, one crowds and compresses into one place whatever brightness there is anywhere, as much as one can, and in this way, “often modest, takes on the appearance of the obscure.”

§ 644. One will enter the same road into darkness II) by thinking more augustly of oneself and of the authority of oneself and one’s thoughts than is lawful, and hence silently demanding that one’s writings be read and reread as riddles, marked by as many weights as words, and that the spectator, fixed in each stroke of one’s picture, halt and move neither foot nor eyes farther until, after often turning over in mind and long weighing what he has seen, he finally grasps what they mean. Perhaps for this reason *Heraclitus is very obscure*, by no means Democritus. Heraclitus earned for himself the name σκοτεινός, “the obscure,” by his apophthegms; Democritus’ composed and ornate discourse won the vote of those measuring art by the reader’s capacity, §643, and by their own authority, and of Cicero’s distinct exposition, indeed of readers less philosophical for this very reason, §251.

§ 645. Aesthetic dynamics, §60, will avoid this somewhat obscure fork, §§643–644, by so calculating the ratios of powers and of attention to be extended among its principal spectators that, in a doubtful case whether they will sufficiently attain the beautiful thinker’s meaning and, so to speak, equal it, it prefers to seem too open rather than covered with darkness; and by so measuring the same author’s authority among the same spectators that, in a doubtful case whether they will repeat the beautiful thinker’s reading ten times or not, it prefers to be understood at once on the first reading rather than on the last, §636. Advocates of cases especially have these calculations rightly commended to them, since they must sometimes reveal and illuminate obscure and unknown law in judgments, §§615–616. If the author’s modesty, §643, or pride and arrogance, §644, neglects these ratios, it will suit him to complain with Horace: “I labor to be brief; I become obscure.” “One must avoid the obscurity that follows those who compress everything too much,” Quintilian III.2.

§ 646. Neque tamen cum omni sua latitudine potuit obscuritas notam omnem effugere Plato, ne faventem quidem apud iudicem, Ciceronem, quaest. ac. IIII. 123. Tantae molis est rotunda brevitās, §. 166. optimum antidoton contra tertiam obscuritatis vitandae causam, §. 636. Apud eundem Ciceronem de fin. II. 15. reprehenditur Epicurus, qui *nec nolit, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici*, §. 639. *aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri ac facili, etiam in vulgus pervulgata, voluptate, loquatur, neque tamen possit intelligi*. Si quid subest obiectionibus veri, quae satis suspectae sunt, dum vera voluptas putatur esse res facilis et in vulgus pervulgata: sane non aliud est Epicuri peccatum aestheticum, quam quod in diducendis suis acroasibus practicis per scripta a quibusvis legenda paullo verbosior, rotundaeque brevitatis negligentior fuit, unde factum, ut pauci totam voluptatis theoriam ex eodem hauserint, attentione satis protensa, plurimi quandam eius partem, quasi totum, arripuerint, nunc hanc, nunc illam ex plurimis Epicuri scriptis cursim attendendo laciniam. §. 636.

§ 647. Ad obturandum quartum turpioris obscuritatis fontem, §. 638. 1) ne quid aesthetice falsi, ne febriculosorum somnia, pulcris condecorare cogitationibus somnies, §. 456. Nec enim veri tantum amor, sed etiam perspicuitatis inde studium avocat, quoniam absolute obscuris eiusmodi vera semper deerit lux aethetica. §. 614. 2) in ipsis fictionibus mundi poetici nolis utopiam habitare, §. 514. per quam etiam peregrinanti via est,

*Quale per incertam lunam, sub luce maligna,
Est iter in silvis, ubi caelum condidit umbra
Iuppiter, ac rebus nox abstulit atra colorem.*

Virg.

§ 648. 3) Ne de quoquam themate splendide prius, quam dilucide cogitare mens sit. §. 619, 625. 4) quae ne dilucide quidem exponere possis, ne speres unquam naturali splendore collustrare, §. 622, 625. fucis autem commaculare nolis, §. 626, 627. 5) si quid tibi minus obscurum κατὰ νόησιν videatur, ne te iam eo ipso, dum illud venustatis ad regulas cogitaturus es, omnem obscuritatem aestheticam effugisse statuas §. 632, 633. 6) ne perspicuitatem singulorum tuorum conceptuum et totius a te ponendi confundens ex illa temere concludas ad hanc, apprime tamen necessariam, 7) caliginem ingenii tui ne fatagas rebus et materiis imputare. §. 639.

§ 649. *Omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus, eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas* (obiectiva), *et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas*, (obscuritas subiectiva,) *ut non sine caussa et doctissimi et antiquissimi invenire se posse, quod cuperent, diffisi sint*. Cic. quaest. ac. IIII. 7. Verum in ipsis rebus ubi latet absoluta obscuritas, ut sint in et per se inconceptibiles, illae non tangendae sunt, ultra limites, §. 647. Si qua materia talis esse videatur; ut in se clara et distincta nobis tamen per suam naturam esse ne dilucida quidem possit, multo minus splendescere: de ea non multum disputabo an ipsi rei, an potius infirmitati iudiciorum nostrorum adscribenda sit, qua circumvolvitur, caligo. Unum hoc urgeo, ne velut protestatione facto contraria rem ipsam multis dicamus obscuram, idque saepius, neque tamen eandem aptis potius umbris circumdemus, quam explicare vel etiam illustrare vanas per ambages nequicquam conemur. §. 634, 635.

§ 646. Yet even with all his breadth Plato could not escape every mark of obscurity, not even before Cicero as a favorable judge, *Academica* IV.123. Rounded brevity, §166, the best antidote against the third cause of obscurity to be avoided, §636, is of such great labor. In the same Cicero, *De finibus* II.15, Epicurus is criticized because he *neither would be unwilling, if he could, to speak plainly and openly, nor is speaking about an obscure thing, as physicists do, §639, or an artificial thing, as mathematicians do, but about pleasure, an illustrious and easy thing, even commonly familiar to the crowd, and yet he cannot be understood*. If there is any truth beneath these objections, which are quite suspect so long as true pleasure is thought to be an easy thing and commonly familiar to the crowd, Epicurus' aesthetic fault is surely no other than that, in drawing out his practical lectures through writings to be read by anyone, he was a little too verbose and too neglectful of rounded brevity. Hence few drew from him the whole theory of pleasure with sufficiently prolonged attention, while most, by attending cursorily now to this, now to that fragment from Epicurus' many writings, seized some part of it as if it were the whole, §636.

§ 647. To block the fourth source of uglier obscurity, §638: 1) do not dream of adorning anything aesthetically false, or the dreams of feverish people, with beautiful thoughts, §456. For not only love of truth but also the consequent zeal for perspicuity calls one away, since things of this sort, absolutely obscure, will always lack true aesthetic light, §614. 2) In the fictions of the poetic world itself, do not wish to inhabit utopia, §514, through which even for a traveler the road is "like a journey in the woods beneath an uncertain moon, under malignant light, where Jupiter has hidden the sky in shade and black night has taken color from things," Virgil.

§ 648. 3) Do not intend to think splendidly about any theme before thinking clearly about it, §§619, 625. 4) Do not hope ever to illuminate with natural splendor things you cannot even expound clearly, §§622, 625; but do not wish to stain them with false colorings, §§626–627. 5) If something seems less obscure to you *κατὰ νόησιν*, do not for that very reason suppose that, when you are about to think it according to the rules of grace, you have escaped all aesthetic obscurity, §§632–633. 6) Do not confuse the perspicuity of your individual concepts with that of the whole to be set forth by you, and rashly infer the latter, though it is especially necessary, from the former. 7) Do not grow weary of imputing the darkness of your own talent to things and materials, §639.

§ 649. *All cognition is obstructed by many difficulties, and there is both obscurity in the things themselves (objective obscurity) and weakness in our judgments (subjective obscurity), so that not without cause the most learned and most ancient men distrusted their ability to find what they desired*, Cicero, *Academica* IV.7. But where absolute obscurity lies hidden in the things themselves, so that they are in and through themselves inconceivable, they are not to be touched, beyond the limits, §647. If some material seems to be such that, though clear and distinct in itself, it nevertheless by its own nature cannot be even clear to us, much less shine, I shall not dispute much whether the darkness surrounding it must be ascribed to the thing itself or rather to the weakness of our judgments. This one thing I urge: let us not, as if by a protest contrary to the deed, repeatedly call the thing itself obscure for many, and yet try in vain to explain or even illuminate it through empty windings, rather than surround it with suitable shades, §§634–635.

§ 650. Obscuritatem aestheticam generatim cauturus non curat ille quidem subtilitates κατ' αἰσθησιν supervacaneas, eas dispulsuris obscuritatem omnem κατὰ νόησιν intactas relinquit. §. 631, 632. neque trepidat confundere, quae salva pulcritudine totius ulterius in frustula dissecari non opus est. §. 642: vitat tamen confusum atque PERTURBATUM COGITANDI GENUS, venustae distinctionis et analyseos nescium. Quam primum enim de toto certae materiae tot partes, tot varia videas animadvertenda per necessitatem aestheticam, quot in unum confusa, simul in eundem spectatoris obtutum congesta, huius oculos praestringerent, et mole sua vim attendendi obruerent, §. 636, 637. distincta requiritur argumentorum acies, quae intellectui pulcro sistat totum partium successivo splendore nitentium, §. 428, 618. cf. Quint. I. IIII. 2.

§ 651. Hinc longius si permittitur cogitationes protrahere, v. g. plures ad clepsydras, et singularis iure poscitur perspicuitas, ut a caussarum patronis, §. 616, 645. rectius intellectus pulcher extensivae distinctionis luce pascitur per contemplationem totius, dum partibus iam planissime dictis, iam nitore quodam ornatioribus recreatur analogon rationis, §. 617. quam si sequereris Fusi cuiusdam ac Pomponii meditandi rationem, quos Crassus apud Ciceronem de or. III. 50. *simulac agere coeperint, se negat intelligere, nisi admodum attenderit, ita confusam esse, ita perturbatam orationem, nihil ut sit primum, nihil secundum*, §. 650. *ut oratio, quae lumen adhibere rebus debeat, ea obscuritatem et tenebras afferat, atque ut quodammodo ipsi sibi in dicendo obstrepere videantur*.

§ 652. Quemadmodum autem lux aesthetica non est illa, qua potissimum genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum gaudeat atque collustretur: §. 629, 630. ita obscuritas, quam philosophis ac mathematicis scientificè commentantibus, veluti propriam ac naturalem, querunt lectores uno rationis analogo percipere laborantes huic non scripta rationis effata, κατ' αἰσθησιν quidem est obscuritas, §. 631. neque tamen aesthetica, §. 633. Neque prius solidior philosophia mathematicorum vel assequetur vel tuebitur evidentiam, quam *obscuritates eiusmodi non culpa scribentium, sed inscientiae vel inadvertentiae non assequentium assignaverimus*, eadem cum veri conscientia animique tranquillitate, ac, non Caecilius Gellii XX. 1. *duodecim tabularum obscurissima*, sed mathematici tenebras illas, quarum plebs pulverem et radium reos agit.

§ 653. Ipse Crassus apud Ciceronem, qui latissime profert oratoris, hinc et simul ingenii pulcri, pomperia, quando se fingit contra eos disputare, qui oratorem ab omni doctrina rerumque maiorum scientia excludant, de or. I. 68. *Quoniam, inquit, philosophia in tres partes est distributa, in naturae obscuritatem*, §. 639. *in disserendi subtilitatem, in vitam atque mores: duo illa relinquamus, idque largiamur inertiae nostrae, tertium vero, quod semper oratoris fuit, nisi tenebimus, nihil oratori, in quo magnus esse possit, relinquemus*. Equidem nec illa duo priora sic relinquo, ut negem illorum solidam scientiam oratori, et omni felicius elegantiora cogitaturum singulariter utilem, aliquibus autem omnino necessariam: nec tertium de moribus ac vita locum ita teneo, ut audeam ullis belle cogitaturis auctor esse nuda bene beateque vivendi praecepta, sicut intellectu comprehenduntur ac ratione demonstrantur, suis inferere, nisi plausum Antonii velint, §. 121. Neque tamen philosophus ubique meum putem de vita ac moribus ita cogitare, ne quid in meditationibus ad intellectus et rationis Cynosuram exactius directis obscuri superesse videatur ad earundem examen paene solum rationis analogon intensuris lectoribus, §. 652.

§ 650. One guarding generally against aesthetic obscurity does not indeed care about superfluous subtleties κατ' αἰσθησιν; he leaves untouched, for those who would dispel them, every obscurity κατὰ νόησιν, §§631–632. Nor is he afraid to confuse things that, with the beauty of the whole preserved, need not be dissected further into fragments, §642. Yet he avoids the confused and PERTURBED KIND OF THINKING, ignorant of graceful distinction and analysis. For as soon as, concerning the whole of a given material, you see by aesthetic necessity so many parts and so many various things to be noticed that, if they were confused into one and heaped together at the same glance of the spectator, they would dazzle his eyes and overwhelm his power of attention by their mass, §§636–637, then a distinct line of arguments is required, one that presents to the beautiful intellect a whole whose parts shine with successive splendor, §§428, 618; cf. Quintilian IV.2.

§ 651. Hence, if it is permitted to draw out thoughts rather longer, for example through several water-clocks, and a special perspicuity is rightly demanded, as from advocates of cases, §§616, 645, the beautiful intellect is more rightly fed by the light of extensive distinction through contemplation of the whole, while, with parts now very plainly stated and now adorned by some brightness, the analogue of reason is refreshed, §617, than if one followed the manner of meditation of a Fusius and Pomponius. Crassus in Cicero, *De oratore* III.50, says that as soon as they begin to plead he does not understand unless he attends very closely; so confused, so disturbed is the speech that nothing is first, nothing second, §650, so that speech, which ought to bring light to things, brings obscurity and darkness, and they seem in some way to make a noise against themselves in speaking.

§ 652. But just as aesthetic light is not that by which the logical-dogmatic kind of thinking especially rejoices and is illuminated, §§629–630, so the obscurity which readers laboring to perceive with the analogue of reason alone complain of as proper and natural to philosophers and mathematicians commenting scientifically, though indeed obscurity κατ' αἰσθησιν, §631, is nevertheless not aesthetic obscurity, §633. Nor will a more solid philosophy of mathematicians attain or preserve evidentness before we assign obscurities of this kind not to the fault of writers, but to the ignorance or inattention of those who do not attain them, with the same consciousness of truth and tranquillity of mind with which mathematicians assign those darkneses to the crowd that prosecutes dust and ray, and not Caecilius in Gellius XX.1 assigns the most obscure things of the Twelve Tables.

§ 653. Crassus himself in Cicero, who extends very widely the boundaries of the orator, and hence also of beautiful talent, when he imagines himself disputing against those who exclude the orator from all doctrine and knowledge of greater things, says in *De oratore* I.68: *Since philosophy is divided into three parts, into the obscurity of nature, §639, into the subtlety of disputing, and into life and morals: let us leave those two and grant this to our inertia; but if we do not hold the third, which has always belonged to the orator, we shall leave the orator nothing in which he can be great.* For my part, I do not leave the first two in such a way as to deny that solid knowledge of them is singularly useful to an orator and to anyone who will think more elegantly with better success, and altogether necessary to some. Nor do I hold the third place concerning morals and life in such a way that I would dare advise any who will think beautifully to insert bare precepts for living well and happily, just as they are comprehended by intellect and demonstrated by reason, unless they want Antonius' applause, §121. Yet I do not think the philosopher everywhere must think about life and morals in such a way that nothing obscure seems to remain in meditations directed more exactly toward the Cynosure of intellect and reason for readers who will bring almost only the analogue of reason to examine them, §652.

SECTIO XXXVIII

UMBRA AESTHETICA

§ 654. Fecit huc usque consideratae caliginis aestheticae turpitude, ut a multis vix veniam impetraret, cui vel imprudenti subobscuri non nihil, dum belle cogitare parat, videatur elapsus, *adhibens autem latebram obscuritati*, ut e. g. *iidem versus alias aliam in rem adhiberi possint*, dato consilio, calculis ille censorum paene omnium singulis condemnaretur. Verum neque sponte nascuntur, nec inducuntur ab artifice quibusdam rebus umbrae semper malis ominibus, §. 634. Possit quibusdam a te dilucide cogitatis §. 625. maius adhuc lumen §. 617. affundi, sed ita tamen, ut rotunda brevis, S. VIII–XIII, apta dignitas ac magnitudo, S. XV–XXVI, veritas amabilis, S. XXVII–XXXVI, perspicuitas totius elegantius concipiendi, S. XXXVII bonae fidei persuasio, motus ac incitatio animorum, inde sperandae, aut plures harum gratiarum §. 22. simul plus inde detrimenti capiant, ac ex gradu lucis nitorisque dato pulcritudo totius creverit: tunc lucis eiusmodi comparativae defectum vel natura ortum feres, vel limae studio curabis omnino, S. VI. per exceptionem non inelegantem. §. 25.

§ 655. Unum insigne sumamus exemplum ex Ciceronis libris de divinatione. Venuste cogitet eandem recens aliquis auctor nostrae aetatis hominibus, religionem Christi moresque nostros edoctis. Obiiciat et sibi, sicut Cicero, l. I. 35. *Non reperio caussam*. An etiam solvisse belle nodum iudicabitur sibi respondens ipse: *Latet fortasse obscuritate involuta naturae?* §. 649. Nonne plurimis eo ipso habebitur confessus eam esse qualitatem aliquam scholasticorum occultam? An plurimis ambagibus prudenter exponet, quicquid in extis tota deliravit Etruria? an multus erit, si sapit, in significationibus fulgurum et fallacissimis portentorum interpretationibus? An apte definit, quae terrae fremitus, mugitus, motus gravia ac vera civitatibus praedixerint? An omnem potius veterum manticam in superstitionum umbris relinquens solam naturae lucem melius sequetur? §. 654.

§ 656. Si qui sint in criticis, de quibus §. 654. quibuscum auctoritatibus pugnandum est, §. 79. evocant illi suum, immo nostrum in his; illum Top. 3. ubi narrat Trebatium a legendis Aristotelis topicorum *libris obscuritate revictum esse*, philosophis autem Aristotelem ignorantibus eo minus ignoscendum autumat, quod, *non modo rebus iis, quae ab illo dictae ac inventae sunt, alluci debuerint, sed dicendi quoque incredibili cum copia, tum etiam suavitate*. Est ergo quaedam obscuritas, vel doctum aliquem Trebatium a legendo absterrens, neque tamen tollens incredibilem suavitatem. Haec sane caligo non est, §. 614. erit igitur umbra aesthetica, §. 654.

SECTION XXXVIII

AESTHETIC SHADE

§ 654. The ugliness of aesthetic darkness considered up to this point has caused many scarcely to grant pardon to someone from whom, even imprudently, something rather obscure seems to have slipped out while he prepares to think beautifully; but one who *applies a hiding-place to obscurity*, so that, for example, *the same verses can be applied now to one thing, now to another*, by deliberate design, would be condemned by almost every individual vote of the censors. Yet shades neither arise of themselves nor are they introduced by the artist in certain things always under bad omens, §634. A greater light, §617, could be poured onto certain things thought clearly by you, §625, but in such a way that rounded brevity, Sections VIII–XIII, suitable dignity and magnitude, Sections XV–XXVI, lovable truth, Sections XXVII–XXXVI, the perspicuity of a whole to be conceived more elegantly, Section XXXVII, good-faith persuasion, movement and excitation of souls hoped for from it, or several of these graces, §22, would at the same time receive more harm from it than the beauty of the whole would grow from the given degree of light and brightness. Then you will either bear a defect of comparative light of this kind as arising from nature, or you will deliberately take care of it by the study of the file, Section VI, as a not inelegant exception, §25.

§ 655. Let us take one notable example from Cicero's books *On Divination*. Let some recent author think gracefully about the same matter for people of our age, instructed in the religion of Christ and in our morals. Let him object to himself, as Cicero does, I.35: *I do not find the cause*. Will he also be judged to have beautifully solved the knot if he answers himself: *Perhaps it lies hidden, wrapped in the obscurity of nature*? §649. Will he not by that very fact be held by very many to have confessed that it is some occult quality of the scholastics? Will he prudently expound through very many windings whatever all Etruria raved in entrails? Will he, if he is wise, be extensive about the significations of lightning and the most deceptive interpretations of portents? Will he suitably define what grave and true things for states the rumblings, bellowings, and motions of the earth foretold? Or, leaving all ancient mantic art in the shades of superstition, will he better follow the light of nature alone? §654.

§ 656. If there are critics of the sort mentioned in §654, with whom one must fight by authorities, §79, they summon their man, indeed ours in these matters: Cicero, *Topics* 3, where he reports that Trebatius was *overcome by obscurity from reading Aristotle's books of Topics*, but thinks philosophers ignorant of Aristotle are less to be forgiven because they *ought to have been allured not only by those things which were said and discovered by him, but also by his incredible abundance and also sweetness of speaking*. Therefore there is a certain obscurity that can deter even a learned Trebatius from reading, and yet not remove incredible sweetness. This surely is not darkness, §614; therefore it will be aesthetic shade, §654.

§ 657. I. Quae rotunda brevitatis nec illustrate permiserit, nec omnino reiicere, sunt obumbranda, §. 654. Nam iterationes quidem et *ταυτολογίας* et *περιττολογίας*, quas in narratione vitandas quidam scriptores artium tradiderunt, transeo, sunt enim, si vere sint otiosae, vitia non tantum in narrationibus, sed ubique, non tantum brevitatis causa fugienda, sed etiam quia supervacua cum taedio dicuntur, hinc attentionem auditoris etiam a necessariis cum periculo subtrahunt. Huc potius, *ars, qua efficiemus, ne nimis longa sit quaedam bellae meditationis portio, quae poterimus, differendo, non tamen sine mentione eorum, quae differemus.* e. g. *Quas occidendi causas habuerit, quos sibi conscios assumpserit, quemadmodum insidias disposuerit, probationis loco dicam.* Quint. III. 2.

§ 658. II. Quae comparata reliquis pulchrae meditationis partibus tanti non sunt, ut aequabilis cogitandi ratio §. 267. possit iisdem illustrandis immorari, licet omitti cum nugis ex dignitate non possint, §. 191, 193. obumbranda sunt, §. 654. e. g. *ut obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae, et ut interit magnitudine maris Aegaei stilla muriae, et ut in divitiis Croesi teruncii accessio, et gradus unus in ea via, quae est hinc in Indiam, sic quum sit is bonorum finis, quem Stoici dicunt, omnis rerum in corpore sitarum aestimatio, splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscuretur et obruat, atque intreat necesse est.* Cic. de Fin. III. 45. Hinc in pictura virtutis heroicae, et inter superiores ingenii dotes, si qua sit etiam de forma corporis iniicienda mentio, vix huius sine quadam umbra poterit aequabiliter cogitari venusta dignitas, §. 186, 299.

§ 659. III. Quae veritas aesthetice exacta praeterire vetat, eademque, §. 552. praesertim moralis, §. 433–436. illustrare prohibet, obumbrantur. §. 654. Maneamus in exemplo cognato §. 658. Si dicas, obscurari quaedam, ut apparere, quia valde parva sint, adeoque potius omittenda, quam obumbranda videri; *nos quoque concedimus,* e. g. *quod dicit Epicurus de voluptate, quae minimae sunt voluptates, eas obscurari saepe et obrui eo usque, ut pulcrum sit omnino de iisdem silere. Sed non sunt in eo genere tantae commoditates corporis, tam productae temporibus, tamque multae, ut eas ne dilucide quidem et plane §. 625. commemorari a virtutum praeconibus esset contra exactam, aestheticorum praesertim, §. 211–215. verisimilitudinem. Itaque in quibus, propter eorum exiguitatem, ignoratio consequitur, saepe accidit, ut nihil interesse nostra fateamur, sint illa, nec ne sint, nec interesse pulcritudinis in toto, cogitentur illa, necne; — Quibus autem in rebus obscuratio tanta non sit, fieri tamen potest, ut id ipsum, quod interest, non sit magnum, hinc res eiusmodi quasi per transennam strictim ostendere verisimilitudinis pulcritudo iubeat. Bona autem corporis his rebus sunt, quas posterius posui, similia. Habent enim accessionem dignam, in qua laboretur, etsi non dignissimam.* Cic. de Fin. III. 29. 30.

§ 657. I. Things which rounded brevity permits neither to be illustrated nor wholly rejected are to be shaded, §654. As for repetitions, *ταυτολογίας* and *περιττολογίας*, which certain writers of arts have taught should be avoided in narration, I pass them over; for if they are truly idle, they are faults not only in narrations but everywhere, to be fled not only for the sake of brevity but also because superfluous things are said with tedium; hence they also draw the auditor's attention away from necessary things with danger. Rather, to this belongs the art by which we shall bring it about that some portion of a beautiful meditation is not too long, by postponing what we can, yet not without mention of the things we shall postpone; for example: *What causes he had for killing, whom he took as accomplices, how he arranged the ambushes, I shall say in the place of proof*, Quintilian IV.2.

§ 658. II. Things which, compared with the remaining parts of a beautiful meditation, are not of such importance that an equable manner of thinking, §267, can linger in illustrating them, although they cannot be omitted with trifles from dignity, §§191, 193, are to be shaded, §654. For example: *as the light of a lamp is obscured and overshadowed by the light of the sun, and as a drop of brine perishes in the greatness of the Aegean Sea, and as the addition of a penny in the riches of Croesus, and one step on the road from here to India, so, since the end of goods is that which the Stoics name, every valuation of things placed in the body must necessarily be obscured and overwhelmed by the splendor and magnitude of virtue, and perish*, Cicero, *De finibus* III.45. Hence in the picture of heroic virtue, and among higher gifts of talent, if some mention must also be made of bodily form, the graceful dignity of this can scarcely be thought equably without a certain shade, §§186, 299.

§ 659. III. Things which aesthetically exact truth forbids one to pass over, and which the same truth, §552, especially moral truth, §§433–436, forbids one to illustrate, should be shaded, §654. Let us remain with the related example in §658. If you say that certain things are obscured so that they appear to be very small, and therefore seem rather to be omitted than shaded, *we too grant*, for example, *what Epicurus says about pleasure: that the smallest pleasures are often obscured and overwhelmed to such a point that it is altogether beautiful to be silent about them. But the advantages of the body are not in that class so great, so extended in time, and so many that it would be contrary to exact verisimilitude, especially of aesthetic matters, §§211–215, for preachers of the virtues even to mention them clearly and plainly, §625. Therefore in those things in which, because of their smallness, ignorance follows, it often happens that we admit it makes no difference to us whether they exist or not, nor does it matter to the beauty of the whole whether they are thought or not; but in things in which the obscuration is not so great, it can nevertheless happen that the very point at issue is not large*; hence the beauty of verisimilitude may order such things to be shown briefly, as if through a lattice. *The goods of the body are more similar to those things which I placed later. For they have an accession worthy of some labor; though not most worthy*, Cicero, *De finibus* III.29–30.

§ 660. IIII. Quae tantae lucis capacia sunt, ut in plena luce fulgentia, verendum sit, ne totius, ad quod pertinent, perspicuitatem in meditatione pulcra necessario maximam impedian, donec haec illorum lucem vicerit, obumbrantor. §. 654. *Obscurentur minora maioribus*. Cic. de Fin. V. 55. Quoniam autem totum qualibet sua parte maius est: splendor partis vel optimaeperspicuitatem totius obscurans pulcram meditationem deturparet. e. g. Habeas materiam tenuem, vel etiam unam ex mediis, delabaris autem eius occasione communes in locos actionum maximarum, honestatis ad severiorem naturae formulam conceptae, cognitionis de rebus coelestibus, ad quas

Flammeus et rapidi solis nitor obscuretur.

Cat.

Contemplationis rerum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes, indagare ratio potest, administrandae reipublicae, e. c. §. 642. Cave, ne tantum in haec splendoris, alias satis naturalis, §. 622, 623. congeras, ut eorum intuitu bonum tuum thema, velut tres Posthumi capellae, §. 222. perdatur ex oculis, aut evanescat, §. 265, 279.

Et cedunt certis sidera temporibus,

Ut Triviam furtim sub Latmia saxa relegans

Dulcis amor gyro devocat aërio. Cat.

§ 661. V. Impedimenta si qua clarius exposita fore suspiceris persuasionis illius, quam obtinere laboras, neque tamen omnino praeterire possis, obumbrantor. §. 654. Ita firmamenta ad fidem posita, aut per se diluenda, aut obscuranda, aut digressionibus obruenda censet Cicero in part. et 121. narrationem accusatoris vult esse *quasi membratim gesti negotii, suspiciosum explicationem, sparsis omnibus argumentis, obscuratis defensionibus*, defensorem autem iubet, *aut praeteritis, aut obscuratis suspicionum argumentis, rerum ipsarum eventus et casus narrare*. Hinc forte Theodori schola negavit dilucide exponere semper utile esse; §. 170. non ac si unquam omnem aestheticam liceret negligere perspicuitatem, §. 618. sed quia non omnia aequali in luce sistere comparativa §. 617. aequae conducat adversariorum utrique. Ex eadem hac regula diiudicari Quintilianus potest, cui III. 2. *ridiculum est quibusdam in caussis veritatem esse obscurandam, caussam interserenti, quia obscurare qui vult, narret falsa pro veris, et in iis, quae narrat falsa pro veris, laborare debeat, ut videantur, quam evidentissima*. Quoniam aliquam veritatem obumbrare, et loco eiusdem contrarium falsum narrare, quasi verum esset, prorsus non est unum idemque, immo subindicare quae verorum instar audeas, non est in iis prudenter semper omnibus elaborandum, ut videantur, quam evidentissima. §. 659.

§ 660. IV. Things capable of such great light that, shining in full light, they might be feared to impede the necessarily greatest perspicuity of the whole to which they belong in a beautiful meditation, until this whole has overcome their light, should be shaded, §654. *Let lesser things be obscured by greater*, Cicero, *De finibus* V.55. But since any whole is greater than any of its parts, the splendor of even the best part, if it obscured the perspicuity of the whole, would disfigure beautiful meditation. For example, you may have a slender material, or even one from the middle kind, but on its occasion you may slide into commonplaces of the greatest actions, of honor conceived according to the stricter formula of nature, of cognition concerning heavenly things, before which “the fiery brightness of the swift sun is obscured,” Catullus; of contemplation of things hidden and concealed by nature, which reason can investigate; of administering the republic, and so on, §642. Beware lest you heap so much splendor, otherwise quite natural, §§622–623, into these things that, in view of them, your good theme is lost from the eyes or vanishes, like Postumus’ three goats, §§222, 265, 279.

§ 661. V. If you suspect that any impediments, more clearly expounded, would hinder the persuasion you are laboring to obtain, and yet you cannot pass them over altogether, let them be shaded, §654. Thus in the *Partitiones*, 121, Cicero judges that supports placed for credibility must either be dissolved in themselves, obscured, or overwhelmed by digressions; and he wants the prosecutor’s narration to be *as it were member by member, an explanation of a suspicious deed, with all arguments scattered and defenses obscured*, while he orders the defender, *with arguments of suspicions either passed over or obscured, to narrate the events and accidents of the things themselves*. Hence perhaps the school of Theodorus denied that it is always useful to expound clearly, §170: not as if it were ever permissible to neglect all aesthetic perspicuity, §618, but because it does not equally serve either side of adversaries to place all things in equal comparative light, §617. From this same rule Quintilian may be judged, for whom, III.2, *it is ridiculous that in certain cases truth must be obscured*, adding the reason *because one who wishes to obscure should narrate false things as true, and in those false things which he narrates as true, he ought to labor that they seem as evident as possible*. For shading some truth and narrating the contrary falsehood in its place as if it were true are not at all one and the same thing; indeed, to hint at things which you may dare as if they were true does not mean that one must prudently labor in every case to make them appear as evident as possible, §659.

§ 662. VI. Quae prorsus omittere non licet, neque tamen eam animi commotionem speras excitatura, quam intendis, vel omnino contrariam, obumbrantor. §. 654. Parum aut nihil inde venerationis in heroem suum esse redundaturum praevidens Virgilius, si alienam urbem, inscia regina, iniecto praesidio, clanculum irrepens citato gradu templum adit, in quo tutus sit, et ecce!

Infert se tectus nebula. Mirabile dictu!

Aen. I. 443.

An heroicum omnes censebunt, videre suos rapi in ius, neque tamen vel adire, vel verbo iuvare, metuere potius, quia

res animos incognita turbat?

Hinc Aeneas et Achates, dum

Dissimulant, et nube cava speculantur amicti,

v. 520.

Foeminae autem

Postquam animum arrecti dictis et fortis Achates,

Et pater Aeneas, - - -

Omnia tuta vident, classem sociosque receptos,

coram videbimus iterum, quem quaerebamus, et desiderabant forsitan aliqui, heroa. Hinc

circumfusa repente

Scindit se nubes, et in aethera purgat apertum.

Restitit Aeneas, claraque in luce refulsit,

§. 619.

Os humerosque deo similis. Namque ipsa decoram

Caesariem nato genitrix, lumenque iuventae

Purpureum, et laetos oculis adflarat honores,

§. 659.

Quale manus addunt ebori decus, aut ubi flavo

Argentum Pariusve lapis circumdatur auro,

§ 663. Vidimus occasiones, in quibus per venustam meditationem

locus est et pluribus umbris. §. 654–662.

Quoniam autem has, non ordinarias cogitandi rationes, sed exceptiones, §. 654. a scriptoribus artis vel optimis, *obscuraciones* etiam dici vidimus: in iis etiam cogitationibus, ubi prorsus non opus erat exceptione, male captantur a pusillis ingeniis, nec in eas, sed in meram caliginem et genus cogitandi plane horridum incidentibus, §. 634. *Alii, dum communem loquendi morem reformidant, tunc etiam, quando servare eundem vera pulcritudo posceret, ducti specie nitoris, circumeunt omnia copiosa loquacitate, quae dicere volunt, ipsam deinde illam seriem cum alia simili iungentes miscentesque ultra, quam ullus spiritus durare possit, extendunt. §. 636.*

§ 662. VI. Things that it is not permissible to omit entirely, and yet which you do not hope will excite the emotion you intend, or which may excite the contrary emotion, should be shaded, §654. Virgil, foreseeing that little or no veneration for his hero would flow from Aeneas secretly creeping into another city, unknown to the queen, under an inserted guard, and going at quick pace to a temple in which he would be safe, writes: “He brings himself in, covered by a cloud. Wonderful to say!” *Aeneid* I.443. Will everyone judge it heroic to see one’s own men dragged into court and yet neither approach nor help by a word, but rather fear, because “an unknown thing troubles their minds”? Hence Aeneas and Achates, while they “dissemble and, clothed in hollow cloud, watch,” v.520. But after the woman has raised the minds of brave Achates and father Aeneas with her words, and they see all things safe, fleet and comrades received, we shall again see openly the hero whom we were seeking, and whom perhaps some missed. Hence the cloud suddenly poured around them splits and clears itself into open air; Aeneas stood forth and shone again in clear light, §619, like a god in face and shoulders, for his mother herself had breathed upon her son beautiful hair, the purple light of youth, and happy honors upon his eyes, §659, as hands add beauty to ivory, or when silver or Parian stone is enclosed in yellow gold.

§ 663. We have seen occasions in which, through graceful meditation, “there is room also for several shades,” §§654–662. Since, however, we have seen these also called “obscurations” by even the best writers on art, not as ordinary ways of thinking but as exceptions, §654, they are badly sought in thoughts where there was absolutely no need of exception by small talents, who do not fall into these shades but into mere darkness and a plainly rough kind of thinking, §634. *Others, while they dread the common manner of speaking even when true beauty would require preserving it, led by the appearance of brightness, circumambulate everything they wish to say with copious loquacity; and then, joining and mixing that very sequence with another like it, extend it beyond what any breath can endure, §636.*

§ 664. Alii, brevitatis aemuli, necessaria quoque orationi subtrahunt verba, et velut satis sit scire ipsos, quae dicere velint, quantum ad alios pertineat, nihil putant. *At ego otiosum sermonem dixerim, quem auditor suo ingenio non intelligit.* Auditor autem intelligitur et satis attentus, et talis, qualem et quantum sermocinans, ut praecipuum suum obiectum personale, sumere tenebatur. §. 615, 616. *At pervasit quidem iam multos ista persuasio, ut id demum eleganter atque exquisite dictum putent, quod interpretandum sit. Sed auditoribus etiam nonnullis grata sunt haec, quae quum intellexerint, acumine suo delectantur et gaudent, non quasi audierint, sed quasi invenerint,* §. 643–645. Hinc in hoc malum etiam a quibusdam laboratur. *Neque id novum vitium, quum iam apud Titum Livium inveniam fuisse praeceptorem aliquem, qui discipulos obscurare, quae dicerent, iuberet, graeco verbo utens σκοτίσθων.* Unde illa scilicet egregia laudatio: *Tanto melior. Ne ego quidem intellexi.* Quint. VIII. 2.

§ 665. Aridi huius magistri §. 255, 256. miserrimas laudes obscuratura nulla unquam est oblivio, quamdiu supererunt ex eius disciplina, velut ex equo Troiano, prodeuntes, quorum moliminibus, quoties ad eleganter cogitandum accinguntur, occinas illud Caici apud Virgilium, Aen. VIII. 36.

Quis globus, o cives! caligine volvitur atra?

Sint Proserpinae, nunquam erunt ullius Veneris

pingues multa caligine taedae! Lucr.

Prima potius Venus, Caelo ac Die nata, Cic. de nat. deorum III. 60. caelestis illa non vulgaris, atque

omnem, quae nunc obducta tuenti

Mortales hebetat visus tibi, et humida circum

Caligat, nubem eripiat. Tu ne qua parentis

Iussa time, nec praeceptis parere recusa,

§. 614, 662. Aen. II. 604.

Horum autem uti nullum prius, aut antiquius, ita nec evidentius cogitari potest, quam illud, ne gratiis litaturus aliquando Cacum imitetur, §. 635. quando ille

Faucibus ingentem fumum, mirabile dictu,

Evomit, involvitque domum caligine caeca,

Prospectum eripiens oculis, glomeratque sub antro

Fumiferam noctem, commistis igne tenebris,

Aen. VIII. v. 252.

§ 664. Others, rivals of brevity, subtract even words necessary to speech, and, as if it were enough for them themselves to know what they want to say, think nothing of what concerns others. *But I would call that speech idle which the auditor does not understand by his own talent.* The auditor, however, is understood to be sufficiently attentive and such in kind and degree as the speaker was bound to take as his principal personal object, §§615–616. *But this persuasion has already pervaded many: that they think only that to have been said elegantly and exquisitely which must be interpreted. Yet even to some auditors these things are pleasing, and when they have understood them, they take delight and rejoice in their own acuteness, not as if they had heard but as if they had discovered,* §§643–645. Hence some labor even toward this evil. *Nor is this a new vice, since already in Titus Livy I find there was a certain teacher who ordered his pupils to obscure what they said, using the Greek word σκοτίσθον. Hence, of course, that splendid praise: So much the better. I did not understand it either,* Quintilian VIII.2.

§ 665. No oblivion will ever obscure the most wretched praises of this dry teacher, §§255–256, as long as there survive from his discipline, as if coming out of the Trojan horse, men to whose efforts, whenever they gird themselves to think elegantly, you may sing Caicus' line in Virgil, *Aeneid* VIII.36: "What mass, citizens, is rolled in black darkness?" Let them be Proserpina's torches; they will never be any Venus' "torches fat with much darkness," Lucretius. Rather let the first Venus, born of Sky and Day, Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* III.60, that heavenly and not vulgar one, take away "all the cloud which now, drawn over you as you look, dulls mortal sight and gathers damp darkness around you. Do not fear any commands of your parent, nor refuse to obey her precepts," §§614, 662, *Aeneid* II.604. Of these precepts none can be thought prior, older, or more evident than this: that one who will sacrifice to the Graces should never imitate Cacus, §635, when he "vomits from his throat a huge smoke, marvelous to say, and wraps the house in blind darkness, snatching prospect from the eyes, and gathers under the cave a smoke-bearing night, with fire mingled with shadows," *Aeneid* VIII.252.

SECTIO XXXX

IUSTA LUCIS ET UMBRAE DISPENSATIO

§ 666. Belle cogitaturus perspicuitatis sensitivae tenacissimus est, §. 665. Verum cultu atque ornatu se commendare si simul voluerit, illi danda singularis est opera, 1) ut naturalis omnis meditationis, totiusque ponendi, sit nitor, neque minor, nec maior, ac natura permiserit, §. 622, 623. 2) ut ad hunc consequendum lux aesthetica comparativa sic per omnes pulchrae cogitationis totalis partes proportionate dividatur, tanta cuius tribuatur, neque minor, nec maior, 1) potiori, ne sequiorum compartium obscuratur lumine, sed illustretur, 2) sequiori, ne potiorum compartium luce illustretur, sed obumbretur. §. 634, 658. Utrumque dicamus IUSTAM ET CAUTAM LUCIS ET UMBRAE DISPENSATIONEM.

§ 667. Iustus lucis et umbrae dispensator I. naturalem toti, quod cogitare mens est, nitorem nitorisque gradum conciliaturus, §. 666. bene metietur, quantum illud fieri potest, 1) naturam thematis sui lectaeque vel praescriptae materiae, §. 623. quarum

Haec amat obscurum, volet haec sub luce videri, §. 624.

Nec universim considerare suaserim materiae naturam et in abstracto tantum; quod aiunt, verum perpensis simul pro virili circumstantibus iis omnibus, in quibus nunc erit concipienda, e. g. quo loco, quo tempore cogitanda sit, quantum per temporis intervallum vel protrahenda vel corripienda sit datae materiae satis plena meditatio. Longior enim plures umbras admittet, per relative brevior excludendas, §. 167.

§ 668. Porro ponderanda res est, et indaganda eius magnitudo ac dignitas relativa §. 178–183. Non solum modo, iam urbes et fora plerumque nesciunt

aptam pastoribus umbram, §. 368–572.

Idem heros admodum inaequalem naturaliter lucem postulat describendus, 1) dum dormit in cunis;

ubi mollis amaracus illum

Floribus et dulci aspirans complectitur umbra. Aen. I. 697.

2) dum vir patriam ab hostibus, tellurem a monstris liberat;

Tum silvis scena coruscis,

§. 203.

Desuper, horrentique atrum nemus imminet umbra. Aen. I. 168.

3) dum grandaevus in haerede suae gloriae virtutes etiam suas pacatus laetatur revirescere, sicut

Parnassa laurus -

Parva sub ingenti matris se subiicit umbra.

Virg. Georg. II. 19.

SECTION XXXX

JUST DISTRIBUTION OF LIGHT AND SHADE

§ 666. One who will think beautifully is most tenacious of sensory perspicuity, §665. But if he also wishes to commend himself by cultivation and ornament, singular care must be given: 1) that the natural brightness of every meditation and of the whole to be set forth be neither less nor greater than nature permits, §§622–623; 2) that, to obtain this, comparative aesthetic light be divided proportionately through all parts of the total beautiful thought, and so much be assigned to each, neither less nor more: 1) to the more important part, so that it is not obscured by the light of subordinate co-parts, but illuminated; 2) to the subordinate part, so that it is not illuminated by the light of the more important co-parts, but shaded, §§634, 658. Let us call both the JUST AND CAUTIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF LIGHT AND SHADE.

§ 667. The just distributor of light and shade, in order to secure for the whole he intends to think a natural brightness and degree of brightness, §666, will measure well, as far as possible, 1) the nature of his theme and of the material chosen or prescribed, §623, of which “this loves the obscure, that will wish to be seen under light,” §624. Nor would I advise considering the nature of the material only universally and in the abstract, as they say, but with all the surrounding circumstances weighed at the same time, as far as one can: for example, in what place and at what time it is to be thought, and through what interval of time a sufficiently full meditation on the given material is to be drawn out or compressed. For a longer meditation will admit more shades, which must be excluded by a relatively shorter one, §167.

§ 668. Further, the thing must be weighed, and its relative magnitude and dignity investigated, §§178–183. Not only the throne, but now cities and forums usually do not know “the shade suited to shepherds,” §§368–572. The same hero naturally requires very unequal light when he is to be described: 1) while he sleeps in the cradle, “where soft marjoram, breathing with flowers and sweet shade, embraces him,” *Aeneid* I.697; 2) while as a man he frees his fatherland from enemies and the earth from monsters: “Then the scene with flashing woods,” §203; “above, a black grove hangs with bristling shade,” *Aeneid* I.168; 3) while, aged, he peacefully rejoices that even his own virtues revive in the heir of his glory, as “the Parnassian laurel, small, places itself beneath the huge shade of its mother,” Virgil, *Georgics* II.19.

§ 669. Haec materiarum dimensio eo magis necessaria est, §. 668. quia non invenies foecundiores meteororum ac φάσματος caussam, ac nitoris studium in fucos et pigmenta desinens, §. 626, 627. praesertim in sublimibus, S. XXII. Quam primum occurrit malis inter poetas geometris silva, §. 203. pyrae cuidam construendae satis grandis, est illa subito;

*larga qua non opulentior umbrae
Argolicos inter saltusque educta Lycaeos
Extulerat super astra caput.* §. 322.

Quando caeditur, tantum est malum,

*Ut quum possessas avidis victoribus arces
Dux raptare dedit, vix signa audita, nec urbem
Invenias. Ducunt, sternunt, abiguntque, feruntque
Immodici. Minor ille fragor, quo bella geruntur.*

Stat. Theb. VI. 90–117.

§ 670. Verior naturalis nitoris est mathematicus §. 667. Longinus, quando per figuras illustrantes παρεμβολήν S. XVII. in vere grandibus non permittit, nisi lateat illud artificium in augustiori sublimitatis luce. Quemadmodum enim *lumina debiliora solis circumfusa radiis evanescent: sic alias rhetoricorum artes opacari sublimitate. Neque diversum, addit, illud est, quod accidit in pictura. Nam quum umbra et lux per colores in eodem tabulae plano parallelae iacent: tamen lux prius oculos ferit, neque tantum egregia magis, sed etiam propior videtur. Quare etiam affectus et sublimia, quum animabus propinquiora sint, ob naturalem cognitionem et splendorem praecellunt semper et eminent prae figuris pingentibus tantum* §. 142. earumque artem obumbrant et tegunt. Figura tantum illustrans tamen ita temperanda est, ut non sit, nisi quaedam umbra simul argentium, §. 329, et moventium, §. 666.

§ 671. Porro iustus et cautus lucis et umbrae dispensator naturam suae materiae dimensus attendat eius veritatem gradumque verisimilitudinis, §. 667. Lux veritatum generalium et singularium comparativa non ubique congruit et aequalis est. §. 440, 561. Genus cogitandi aesthetica dogmaticum quanquam non habet eam obscuritatem κατ' αἴσθησιν, §. 651. quam non reformidat logicodogmaticum et scientificum, §. 642, 566. abstinet tamen a multis, usu lucis temperatiore, quibus aestheticohistoricum nitet, et maxime poeticum, §. 566, 561. Iam vidimus Ciceronem in scriptis suis materialiter philosophicis non sequutum esse genus cogitandi acroamaticum, §. 629. tamen praevidet aestheticodogmatice philosophaturus, *quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos aliquando sibi disserendum sit.* quaest. ac. I. 7.

§ 672. L. de fin. II. 15. eo usque procedit, ut concedat duobus modis sine reprehensione fieri, *si quis ita loquatur, ut non intelligatur. Si aut de industria faciat; ut Heraclitus, qui de natura nimis obscure memoravit, aut quum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit, ut non intelligatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis.* Habes duos dogmaticos obscuros sine reprehensione. Si de industria obscurum interpreteris obscurum κατ' αἴσθησιν deliberato consilio, ne per meditationes scientificas et acroamaticas in obscuritatem κατὰ νόησιν incidat: §. 631, 632. si talem in scriptis suis physicis fuisse Heraclitum statuas: est ille quidem sine reprehensione, verum tunc non ita loquutus est, ut non intelligatur, sed ita, ut non intelligatur a lectoribus solum paene rationis analogon ad lectionem afferentibus, rationis autem nervos intendere recusantibus. §. 652.

§ 669. This measuring of materials is all the more necessary, §668, because you will find no more fertile cause of meteors and φάσματος than the pursuit of brightness ending in false colorings and pigments, §§626–627, especially in sublime matters, Section XXII. As soon as a forest occurs to bad geometers among poets, §203, large enough for the construction of some funeral pyre, it is suddenly one “than which no richer in abundant shade, raised among Argive glades and Lycaean groves, had lifted its head above the stars,” §322. When it is cut down, the evil is so great “as when a commander has given captured citadels to greedy conquerors to plunder; scarcely are the signals heard, and you would not find the city. Immoderate men lead, overthrow, drive off, and carry away. Less is the crash by which wars are waged,” Statius, *Thebaid* VI.90–117.

§ 670. Longinus is a truer mathematician of natural brightness, §667, when he does not allow παρεμβολήν among illustrative figures, Section XVII, in truly grand things, unless that artifice lies hidden in the more august light of sublimity. For just as *weaker lights vanish when surrounded by the rays of the sun, so other rhetorical arts are darkened by sublimity. Nor is that different, he adds, from what happens in painting. For although shade and light through colors lie parallel on the same plane of the tablet, nevertheless light strikes the eyes first, and seems not only more outstanding but also nearer. Therefore passions and sublime things also, since they are nearer to souls by natural kinship and splendor, always excel and stand out before figures that only paint*, §142, and *shade and cover their art*. Yet a merely illustrative figure must be so tempered that it is only a certain shade of figures that at the same time augment, §329, and move, §666.

§ 671. Further, the just and cautious distributor of light and shade, having measured the nature of his material, should attend to its truth and degree of verisimilitude, §667. The comparative light of general and singular truths is not everywhere fitting and equal, §§440, 561. Although the aesthetic-dogmatic kind of thinking does not have that obscurity κατ’ αἴσθησιν, §651, which the logical-dogmatic and scientific kind does not fear, §§642, 566, it nevertheless abstains, with a more temperate use of light, from many things by which the aesthetic-historical kind shines, and especially the poetic, §§566, 561. We have already seen that Cicero in his materially philosophical writings did not follow the acroamatic kind of thinking, §629. Yet, about to philosophize aesthetic-dogmatically, he foresees *how sharply and also how obscurely he must sometimes argue against the Stoics*, *Academica* I.7.

§ 672. In *De finibus* II.15 Cicero proceeds so far as to concede that in two ways it can happen without blame *if someone speaks so as not to be understood: either if he does it deliberately, as Heraclitus, who wrote too obscurely about nature, or when the obscurity of things, not of words, makes the speech not understood, as in Plato’s Timaeus*. You have two obscure dogmatists without blame. If you interpret deliberate obscurity as obscurity κατ’ αἴσθησιν by deliberate plan, lest through scientific and acroamatic meditations one fall into obscurity κατὰ νόησιν, §§631–632, and if you decide that Heraclitus was such in his physical writings, then he is indeed without blame. But then he did not speak so as not to be understood; rather, he spoke so as not to be understood by readers who bring almost only the analogue of reason to reading and refuse to tense the sinews of reason, §652.

§ 673. Si de industria obscurum interpreteris eum, qui spectatoribus, quales praesertim attendere tenetur, non oscitantibus et merito requisitam attentionem offerentibus, tamen tenebras offundere, fumumque vendere fixum animo habet et propositum: si Heraclitus aliquando saltim, ex atra bile, contemptuque civium, eo lapsus est; §. 644. non est sine reprehensione. §. 663–665. Si rerum obscuritatem interpreteris eam plerumque hominum infirmitatem, qua datam rem a sensibus suis natura remotiorem ne mente quidem assequuntur, licet eandem tum alii mentis aciem diligentius exercentes pulcre possint intelligere: tum ipse rem eandem tractaturus clare dilucideque perspicat; si Platonem in Timaeo de rebus hac ratione subobscuris loqui senseris: hanc ob causam obscurus est ille quidem sine reprehensione, verum nec ita loquutus est, ut non intelligatur, sed ita, ut non intelligatur, nisi ab iis, quibus volupe est aeque mentem acuere, rerum a sensibus per ipsam naturam remotarum contemplatione, nunc severiori, nunc remissa magis atque iucundiore, §. 671.

§ 674. Si rerum obscuritatem interpreteris vel eam absolutam solis chimaeris, somniis obiectivis, figmentis utopicis ac eorum interpretamentis propriam, vel istarum rerum, quas intuitu generis humani adeo

Caliginosa nocte premit deus,

ut earum quicquam ne probabili quidem aestheticis ratione possimus hariolari, ut eas ne tractaturus quidem de iisdem vel intellexerit, vel dilucide saltim animo perceperit unquam: si Platonem in Timaeo, saltim aliquando, res eiusmodi pictum ire concesseris, vel alia via vitabilem rerum obscuritatem incurrere, §. 646. hanc ob causam obscurus non est sine reprehensione, §. 638. nequicquam obscuritate rerum excusatus, §. 639, 647–649. Nam *pessima sunt αἰνύματα*, h. e. *quae verbis aperta occulto sensu sunt*. Quint. VIII. 2.

§ 675. Si tandem eum omnem neges intelligi, quem de rebus, etiam arduis, disserentem aliqui, vel omnium rerum ac artium, immo linguarum etiam, ignarissimi, non ita capiant, ut omnem singulis exhausisse rem, nihilque fecisse reliqui, iudicetur, quod clarius adhuc perspicere quisquam desiderare possit: tunc ita loqui, ut hac ratione non intelligaris, utique fit sine reprehensione, neque tamen his duobus tantum modis, sed pluribus,

et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim.

Debuit adhuc nasci ille coquus, qui noverit omnes

Sic condire cibos, sapidi ut sint omnibus aequae. Hor. Hoc significatu dogmaticus omnis inveniet multos, a quibus non intelligatur, §. 671. ad sola singularia, quasi glebae, adscriptos; §. 404. vel etiam solis heterocosmicis, ne dicam utopicis, animo volvendis assuetos, §. 441, 534.

§ 673. If by deliberate obscurity you understand someone who, for spectators of the kind he is especially bound to attend, not yawning and offering the deservedly required attention, nevertheless has fixed in mind and purpose to pour darkness over them and sell smoke; if Heraclitus at least sometimes slipped into this from black bile and contempt for his fellow citizens, §644, he is not without blame, §§663–665. If by the obscurity of things you understand that weakness of most human beings by which they do not attain in mind a given thing naturally more remote from their senses, although others, exercising the edge of mind more diligently, can beautifully understand the same thing, and although the author who will treat the same thing sees it clearly and lucidly; if you think Plato speaks in the *Timaeus* about things somewhat obscure in this way, then for this reason he is indeed obscure without blame. Yet neither did he speak so as not to be understood, but so as not to be understood except by those to whom it is pleasant equally to sharpen the mind by contemplation of things remote from the senses by their very nature, now more severe, now more relaxed and pleasant, §671.

§ 674. If by the obscurity of things you understand either the absolute obscurity proper only to chimeras, objective dreams, utopian fictions, and their interpretations, or the obscurity of those things which, with respect to the human race, God presses under such a “dark night” that we cannot even conjecture anything about them by a probable aesthetic reason, so that even the one about to treat them has never understood or at least lucidly perceived them in mind; if you grant that Plato in the *Timaeus*, at least sometimes, goes to paint things of this kind, or that he incurs in another way an avoidable obscurity of things, §646, for this reason he is not obscure without blame, §638, excused in vain by the obscurity of things, §§639, 647–649. For *the worst are αἰνίματα*, that is, *things open in words but hidden in sense*, Quintilian VIII.2.

§ 675. Finally, if you deny that anyone is understood when, discussing even arduous matters, some of the most ignorant people in all things and arts, indeed even in languages, do not grasp him in such a way that he is judged to have exhausted every single matter and left nothing remaining that anyone could desire to perceive still more clearly, then to speak so that you are not understood in this sense certainly happens without blame, and not only in these two ways but in more: “we both seek and give this pardon in turn.” “The cook is still to be born who knows how to season all foods so that they are equally tasty to all,” Horace. In this sense every dogmatic writer will find many by whom he is not understood, §671: people attached to singulars alone, like glebes, §404, or even accustomed to turn over in mind only heterocosmic things, not to say utopian ones, §§441, 534.

§ 676. Naturam materiae suae dimensus iustus lucis et umbrae dispensator, §. 667. attendat etiam internam eius turpitudinem vel pulcritudinem, §. 203, 204. quatenus a cogitationum pulcritudine differens facit; ut pulcra turpiter, turpia pulcerrime cogitari possint, §. 18. Quis enim dubitet, an pulcra turpitudinis imago, miscere debeat umbram et lucem aliter, ac non foeda solum pulcritudinis deformatio, sed etiam pulcra Veneris effigies? §. 666. Formaliter pulcrum foedissimae mulierculae picturam exhibens Ovidius, Am. I. 8. in aliis ferae ductibus,

*Hanc, ait, ego nocturnas versam volitare per urbes
Suspitor, et pluma corpus anile tegi.
Suspitor, et fama est. Oculis quoque pupula duplex
Fulminat, et gemino lumen ab orbe venit.*

Nonne hoc lumen, haec fulmina reticuisset in quavis matrona, quam laudare aggressus foret; etiamsi fuissent magis conspicua magis rubris in oculis, ac huius anus erant *lacrimosa vino lumina*?

§ 677. Denique materiae suae naturam prudenter perpendens, ut lucem et umbram caute dispenset, §. 667. de eo sit sollicitus, an ea iam per se satis certa videatur, an fulgentibus demum ex rationibus omnem suam evidentiam sperare debeat, an theoretica sit eadem, an practica. §. 576. In theoreticis enim et rebus eiusmodi, quae frustra probari, quarum rationes nequicquam recenseri videantur, multa nitere poterunt, quae vel omnino reiicienda, vel non nisi per umbras ostendenda sunt, ubi vel summa de veritate rei contentio, vel vehementiores animi commotiones excitandae praevidentur, §. 661, 662. vel atrocissimas accusatoris criminationes in foro, vel praesentissimum vitae periculum inter latrones a capite suo depulsurus, quis

*humum florentibus herbis
Spargeret? aut viridi fontes induceret umbra?*

§ 678. Cautus lucis et umbrae dispensator pro virili perpendet 2) naturam suam ipse, qualem §. 150. descripsimus, dynamometria naturali, sed severa, §. 457. cum considerata secundum §. 667–677. materiae datae natura collatam. §. 666, 622. Si quam vix agnoscit rem, ut primum iuxta stetit,

*qualem primo quis surgere mense
Aut videt, aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam,
Aen. VI. 454.*

eam numquam sibi leget, nec audebit exornare quam non posset, nisi fucis, illinere §. 626. §. 648. Praesertim hoc sibi dictum putet;

*Ad pugnam qui rhetorica descendit ab umbra.
Iuv. VII. 173.*

et suae nonnunquam artis topicis, argumentis, figuris, flosculis, chriis, periodis, e. c. adeo confidit, ut quamcunque materiam sibi temere sumens, vel incidat in battologiam §. 639. notatam, vel in fucos umbratiles, §. 109.

§ 676. The just distributor of light and shade, having measured the nature of his material, §667, should also attend to its internal ugliness or beauty, §§203–204, insofar as, differing from the beauty of thoughts, it makes it possible for beautiful things to be thought uglily and ugly things most beautifully, §18. Who would doubt that a beautiful image of ugliness ought to mix shade and light otherwise than not only an ugly deformation of beauty but also a beautiful image of Venus? §666. Ovid, exhibiting a formally beautiful picture of a most foul little woman, *Amores* I.8, says among other wild strokes: “I suspect that she, changed, flies through cities by night, and that her aged body is covered with feathers. I suspect it, and it is rumor. A double pupil also flashes from her eyes, and light comes from the twin orb.” Would he not have kept silent about this light, these flashes, in any matron whom he had undertaken to praise, even if they had been more conspicuous in redder eyes than were this old woman’s “eyes watery with wine”?

§ 677. Finally, prudently weighing the nature of his material so as to distribute light and shade cautiously, §667, he should be concerned whether it already seems sufficiently certain in itself, or whether it must hope for all its evidentness only from shining reasons; whether it is theoretical or practical, §576. For in theoretical matters and matters of this sort, which seem vainly proved and whose reasons seem recounted to no purpose, many things may shine that should either be wholly rejected or shown only through shades, where either the highest contention about the truth of the thing is foreseen or more vehement movements of the soul must be excited, §§661–662. When someone is about to repel from his head either the most atrocious accusations of an accuser in court or the most present danger of life among robbers, who would “scatter the ground with flowering grasses, or draw fountains under green shade?”

§ 678. The cautious distributor of light and shade will, as far as he can, weigh 2) his own nature, as we described it in §150, by a natural but severe dynamometry, §457, compared with the nature of the given material considered according to §§667–677, §§666, 622. If he scarcely recognizes a thing when he first stands near it, “as one sees, or thinks he has seen, the moon rising at the beginning of the month through clouds,” *Aeneid* VI.454, he will never choose it for himself, nor will he dare to adorn what he could only smear with false colorings, §§626, 648. Let him especially think this said to himself: “He who descends from the rhetorical shade to battle,” Juvenal VII.173, and sometimes trusts so much in the topics, arguments, figures, little flowers, chriae, periods, etc. of his art that, rashly taking up any material whatever, he falls either into the battology noted in §639 or into shadowy false colorings, §109.

§ 679. Iustus lucis et umbrae dispensator ponderabit 3) naturam eorum, quorum potissimum in gratiam venuste cogitare decet et mens est. §. 666, 623. Si vel maxime praeclarum in aestheticis ingenium

Non sibi, sed toti genitum se credidit orbi;

vix tamen inveniatur, quod omne genus mortalium sibi, pulcre cogitare dum volet, constituat obiectum personale, nullis inde praecipuis et propioribus lectis, vel minus animadvertendo, spectatoribus. Primae potius classis, inter venustos, auctores inscripserunt suos libros certis hominibus, ex quorum conditione metiri posses, quales ac quantos sibi lectores posuerint ob oculos, donec haec pulcra profecto consuetudo degeneravit in tritum dedicandi morem, ne dicam mercenarium. Quos sibi spectatores praesertim optat pulcre cogitaturus, horum naturam meditetur, uti suam, et materiae, easque comparatas inter se, quam fieri potest determinatissimis in circumstantibus et affectionibus, §. 667, 678.

§ 680. Elegantiarum in cogitando studiosus, cui sinistra fortuna laborandum est, ut se miretur turba, non poterit eos omnino negligere, quibus flumen nescio quod, instar omnis perspicuitatis est, et, quaecunque significet, clarus tamen ac limpidus nominatur uno tenore

Perpetuus sermo, nigrae noctis ad umbram

Aurorae perductus ab exoriente nitore,

Praesertim si cum summo est clamore profusus,

Lucr. III. 540.

Quibus dum satisfacit, quantum ubertas materiae, S. VIII. quantum ingenii flumen, S. XII. quantum latera pulmonesque permiserint; §. 678. non tamen pulcre eorum oblivisceretur in populo, quos non tam nugae, canorae quidem, sed inopes rerum delectant, quam locis speciosa et recte morata, si vel maxime veneribus aliis, pondere ac arte, destituerentur, §. 226. melius istos attendit simul in populo, qui horum omnium aliquid desiderant. §. 434.

§ 681. Cui datur esse contentum paucis lectoribus, sed saporis etiam magis eruditi, §. 275. horum naturam, captum, genium, consuetudines, anticipationes, eo curatius inquirat, ut, quoniam una res, diversis ex lateribus, diversae luci potest ab eiusdem satis gnaro exponi: ea potissimum rei facies, illique luci obvertatur, quam spectatoribus exspectes fore iucundissimam. Sic quaedam illustrationes aliquibus videbuntur tritae, ac proletariae, vel umbratiles et scholasticae, quae satis placerent aliis. Quaedam his exoptatissimae captum illorum transcenderent, et nitoris loco minarentur caliginem, e. g. ex antiquitatibus, certis historiis, vel interiori naturae contemplatione desumendae. §. 679, 666.

§ 679. The just distributor of light and shade will weigh 3) the nature of those chiefly for whose sake it is fitting and intended to think gracefully, §§666, 623. Even if a talent most outstanding in aesthetic matters “believed itself born not for itself but for the whole world,” there will scarcely be found one that, when wishing to think beautifully, sets every kind of mortal as its personal object, with no principal and nearer spectators chosen or, through lesser attention, noticed. Rather, first-class authors among the graceful have inscribed their books to definite persons, from whose condition you could measure what kind and how great readers they placed before their eyes, until this truly beautiful custom degenerated into the worn-out practice of dedication, not to say a mercenary one. Whoever will think beautifully should meditate on the nature of the spectators he especially desires, as he does on his own and on that of the material, and on these compared with one another in circumstances and affections as determinate as possible, §§667, 678.

§ 680. The student of elegances in thinking who, by adverse fortune, must labor so that the crowd marvels at him will not be able wholly to neglect those for whom some flow or other is the equivalent of all perspicuity, and who call “clear” and “limpid,” whatever it may signify, a continuous speech in one tenor “drawn from the shade of black night to the brightness of rising dawn, especially if poured out with the greatest shouting,” Lucretius IV.540. While he satisfies them as far as the richness of the material, Section IX, the flow of talent, Section XII, and his sides and lungs permit, §678, he nevertheless would not beautifully forget among the people those who are delighted not so much by trifles, though tuneful, yet poor in substance, as by things splendid in their places and rightly moral, even if they lacked other charms, weight, and art, §226. He better attends at the same time among the people to those who desire something of all these things, §434.

§ 681. One to whom it is granted to be content with few readers, but of more learned taste, §275, should inquire all the more carefully into their nature, capacity, genius, habits, and anticipations. Since one thing can be exposed by someone sufficiently knowledgeable from different sides to different light, that face of the thing should chiefly be turned toward that light which you expect will be most pleasant to the spectators. Thus some illustrations will seem worn out and plebeian, or shadowy and scholastic, to some, which would please others enough. Some illustrations most desired by these would transcend the capacity of those and threaten darkness in place of brightness, for example illustrations drawn from antiquities, definite histories, or the deeper contemplation of nature, §§679, 666.

§ 682. Iustus lucis et umbrae dispensator per pulcram meditationem II. singulis eius partibus tantum umbrae vel lucis affundet, quantum requiritur, ut principales minus principalium non obscurantur luce, sed umbra collustrentur. §. 666, 667. Haec est una ex principibus lucidae methodi regulis, quando ad huius tractationem deveniemus, uberius exponenda. §. 13. Nunc eiusdem generali quadam idea contenti sumus, secundum quam e. g. 1) partem aliquam ex principalibus si iustus, quem quaerimus, dispensator, pulciori luce perfudit, iamque timendum est, ne fatigatus spectantis oculus caliget hinc immediate traducendus ad aliam potiore adhuc, adeoque, maiore splendore dignam; imitator naturae sciat prioris partis

*Aestibus in mediis, umbrosam exquirere vallem,
Sicubi magna Iovis antiquo robore quercus
Ingentis tendat ramos, aut sicubi nigrum
Illicibus crebris sacra nemus accubet umbra,*
Georg. III. v. 330.

quia recreatus ipse cum suis ad novam lucem prodeat, §. 637. Aeneidos I. V. est hanc ob causam interiecta umbra libris quarto et sexto. §. 634, 635.

§ 683. 2) Quo propius abest a parte totius suae meditationis primaria, hinc summam lucem postulante cautus imitator naturae, de quo loquimur, hoc magis umbra contrahit, quemadmodum minimas meridies habet, 3) si devenerit in eas partes, in quibus vel singularis dignitas magnanimiter, vel evidentior persuasio solidius, vel vehementior animi motus ardentem exprimendus est, sane, non perdet otium pingentibus tantum

Spargere humum foliis, inducere fontibus umbram,

§. 670, 677. ante quam autem ad has fortiores decertationes devenit, aut, ubi pulcher ordo maioribus earum vocibus, veluti per concentus musicos, alicuius intervalli silentium imposuit §. 682. tunc ille meminit Veneris, §. 665.

*assuetae semper in umbra
Indulgere sibi, formamque augere colendo,*
Ov. Met. X. 534.

§ 684. Iustus lucis et umbrae dispensator 4) iam etiam perspicuitatis causa tenebitur nullam rem temere cogitare, velut abstractissimam et minime determinatam, quam non solum interne determinationem licet animo formare, sed etiam umbra quadam comitari; §. 440. Pulcre, Maecenas si sistendus est, adducit quasdam *umbras*, uti apud Horatium serm. II. 8, 21.

*cum Servilio Balatrone
Vibidium.*

Pulcre virtus si pingitur, eam, tanquam umbra, sequatur gloria, etsi haec nihil in se habet, cur expetatur. §. 212. *Totus hic locus si contemnendus est in nobis, non est negligendus in nostris.* Cic. tusc. quaest. I. 15. Ne turpis quidem Canidia Horatio est sine umbrarum magna comitante caterva. §. 676.

*Singula quid memorem? quo pacto alterna loquentes
Umbrae cum Sagana resonarint triste et acutum?*
Hor. Serm. I. 8. 40.

Haec iusta lucis et umbrae dispensatio non est unum ex primis et facillimis artificium; sicuti nec fuit in pictura, nec esse quotidianis adhuc documentis comprobatur. §. 666, 682.

§ 682. The just distributor of light and shade, through a beautiful meditation, II) will pour onto its individual parts only so much shade or light as is required so that principal parts are not obscured by the light of less principal parts, but illuminated by shade, §§666–667. This is one of the chief rules of lucid method, to be expounded more fully when we come to its treatment, §13. For now we are content with a certain general idea of it. According to this idea, for example, 1) if the just distributor we seek has poured a more beautiful light over some principal part, and now there is fear that the spectator's fatigued eye will grow dark when it must be led immediately from here to another still more important part, and therefore one worthy of greater splendor, the imitator of nature should know how, for the prior part, "in the midst of heat, to seek a shady valley, if anywhere the great oak of Jove with ancient strength stretches huge branches, or if anywhere a black sacred grove lies beneath dense holm-oaks in shade," *Georgics* III.330, so that he himself, refreshed with his audience, may come forth to a new light, §637. For this reason Book V of the *Aeneid* is an inserted shade between the fourth and sixth books, §§634–635.

§ 683. 2) The nearer the cautious imitator of nature of whom we speak is to a primary part of his whole meditation, and therefore to one demanding the greatest light, the more he contracts shade, just as midday has the smallest shadows. 3) If he has come to those parts in which either singular dignity must be expressed magnanimously, or more evident persuasion more solidly, or a more vehement movement of the soul more ardently, he certainly will not waste leisure merely painting "to scatter the ground with leaves, to draw shade over fountains," §§670, 677. But before these stronger contests have been reached, or where beautiful order, as if through musical harmonies, has imposed an interval of silence on their greater voices, §682, then he remembers Venus, §665, "accustomed always in the shade to indulge herself and increase her beauty by care," Ovid, *Metamorphoses* X.534.

§ 684. The just distributor of light and shade 4) will now also, for the sake of perspicuity, be bound not to think any thing rashly as if it were most abstract and least determinate when it is permissible not only to form it more determinately within the mind, but also to accompany it with a certain shade, §440. Beautifully, if Maecenas is to be presented, Horace introduces certain "shades" in *Satires* II.8.21, "with Servilius Balatro, Vibidius." Beautifully, if virtue is painted, let glory follow it as a shade, even if glory has nothing in itself for which it should be sought, §212. *If this whole topic is to be despised in ourselves, it is not to be neglected in our people*, Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* I.15. Not even ugly Canidia is without a great accompanying crowd of shades in Horace, §676: "Why should I recall each thing? how the shades, speaking alternately with Sagana, resounded sad and shrill?" Horace, *Satires* I.8.40. This just distribution of light and shade is not one of the first and easiest arts; just as it was not in painting, and is still proved not to be so by daily examples, §§666, 682.

§ 685. *Prima non erat pictura, nisi quae lineas modo extremas umbrae, quam corpora in sole fecissent, circumscriberet, Quint. X. 2. Secundam affirmant esse, singulis coloribus, et monochromaton dictam, postquam operosior inventa erat. Plin. hist. nat. XXXV. 3. Tandem se ars ipsa distinxit, et invenit lumen atque umbras, differentia colorum alterna vice sese excitante. Deinde adiectus est splendor; alius hic, quam lumen, quem quia inter hoc et umbram esset, appellaverunt tonon. C. 5.*

§ 686. Pars imaginis clarissima lumen, obscurissima umbra dicitur per eminentiam, inter has cauta dispensatione, quam hucusque commendavimus, nascitur splendor ille, qui TONUS dicitur. §. 685. Sic hoc idem, quod est in naturis rerum, *transferri potest etiam ad artes, e. g. fingendi, picturae, et, si hoc in his quasi mutis artibus est mirandum, et tamen verum, quanto admirabilius in oratione atque in lingua?* Cic. de or. III. 26. *Habet illa in dicendo summa laus ac admiratio umbram aliquam et recessum, quo magis id, quod illuminatum est, exstare atque eminere videatur.*

§ 687. Hinc et artificium umbram et lucem bene dispensandi nec sine doctrina quadam solet obtineri, nec observari, ubi adhibitum est, nisi a peritis et disciplina eo pertinente satis imbutis. §. 685. *Quam multa vident pictores in umbra et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus?* Cic. quaest. ac. III. 20. Plinius suum de laudibus Traiani librum mittens Voconio per brevissimam epistolam III. 13. huius tantum regulae mentionem iniicit: *Ut in pictura lumen, non alia res magis, quam umbra, commendat: ita orationem tam summittere, quam attollere decet.* Nec intuitu dignitatis tantum, sed etiam varie figurando. §. 619. Hinc votum eius: *Utinam ordo saltim et transitus figurae simul spectarentur a lectore!* §. 682. *Nam invenire praeclare, enunciare magnifice interdum etiam barbari solent: disponere apte, figurare varie, nisi eruditus, negatum est.*

SECTIO XXXXI

COLORES AESTHETICI

§ 688. Quemadmodum in physicis *color* est modificatio visae lucis: ita modificationes lucis aestheticae, §. 614. sunt COLORES AESTHETICI. Huc propius non spectat color de quo §. 545. licet nonnunquam probando, simul illustrans, esse possit in coloribus nunc nostris. §. 142, 143. Huc pertinet quidem tonus ille, de quo §. 685. non tamen exhaurit colores omnes aestheticos, sicuti iam non amplius tentabit temere quisquam physicorum omnes colores derivare ex quadam miscela lucis et umbrae, albi et nigri, materiae et privationis. Minime omnium huc pertinet FUCUS AESTHETICUS, affectata, §. 110. vividitas, §. 626, 627. Veneris nunc nostrae, §. 665. est

Verus color, corpus solidum et succi plenum.

§. 619, 622. Ter. Eun. II. 3.

§ 685. *The first painting was nothing except that which merely outlined the outer lines of the shade which bodies made in the sun, Quintilian X.2. They affirm that the second was in single colors and was called monochrome, after a more elaborate kind had been invented, Pliny, Natural History XXXV.3. At last art itself distinguished itself and discovered light and shades, the difference of colors exciting itself by alternate turn. Then splendor was added, different from light; because it was between light and shade, they called it tonon, chapter 5.*

§ 686. The clearest part of an image is called light, the darkest shade, by eminence; between these, by the cautious distribution commended thus far, that splendor is born which is called TONE, §685. Thus this same thing which exists in the natures of things can also be transferred to the arts, for example of sculpture and painting, and, if this is to be wondered at in these almost mute arts and yet is true, how much more wonderful in speech and language? Cicero, *De oratore* III.26. That highest praise and admiration in speaking has some shade and recess, by which what is illuminated seems to stand out and project more.

§ 687. Hence the artifice of distributing shade and light well is usually neither obtained without a certain doctrine nor observed, where it is applied, except by experts and those sufficiently imbued with the relevant discipline, §685. *How many things painters see in shade and prominence that we do not see?* Cicero, *Academica* IV.20. Pliny, sending his book on the praises of Trajan to Voconius in a very brief letter, III.13, mentions only this rule: *As in painting nothing commends light more than shade, so in speech it is fitting both to lower and to raise.* And not only with respect to dignity, but also by varied figuration, §619. Hence his wish: *Would that at least order and transition and figures were looked at together by the reader!* §682. *For even barbarians are sometimes accustomed to invent splendidly and utter magnificently; but to arrange aptly and figure variously is denied except to the learned.*

SECTION XXXXI

AESTHETIC COLORS

§ 688. Just as in physics *color* is a modification of seen light, so modifications of aesthetic light, §614, are AESTHETIC COLORS. The color mentioned in §545 does not more closely belong here, although sometimes, by proving and at the same time illustrating, it can be among our present colors, §§142–143. The tone mentioned in §685 does belong here, yet it does not exhaust all aesthetic colors, just as no physicist will now rashly try to derive all colors from some mixture of light and shade, white and black, matter and privation. Least of all does AESTHETIC FALSE COLORING belong here: an affected vividness, §§110, 626–627. Of our present Venus, §665, there is “true color, solid body and full of juice,” §§619, 622, Terence, *Eunuch* II.3.

§ 689. Omnes hoc colores commune inter se habeant aesthetici, ut iis pingenda dilucide saltim cogitentur, §. 648, 625.

*Qualis enim caecis poterit color esse tenebris,
Lumine qui mutatur in ipso propterea, quod
Recta aut obliqua percussus luce refulget?*

Lucr. II. 800.

Obiter hic quaeritur, an non Lucretius iam viderit veram colorum genesin, diversum refractionis gradum. Quemadmodum modificationes omnes vel qualitatum sunt, vel quantitatum, vel utrumque simul: sic et colores aesthetici primo qualitate differunt, deinde quodvis hac ratione discrepantium colorum genus habet denuo suam quantitatem, ut, ita dicam, specificam, qua variata novus semper novusque partialiter color producat, et ita videas totius alicuius

*in quovis uno puroque nitore, §. 619.
Dissimiles longe inter se variosque colores.*

§. 688. Lucr. II. 783. qua iucundam in unitate totius varietatem partium exhibentes

*varii rerum impediunt prohibentque
colores,
Quo minus esse uno possit res tota nitore.*
Lucr.

per aequalem monotoniam minus placituro. §. 688.

§ 690. Quemadmodum autem pictura monochromatos *singulis coloribus* usa non obstante sua simplicitate, tum primum placuit, tum *durat etiam nunc*, et in maiore saepe pretio est, quam coloribus satis superque variegata, cuius sola laus sit colorum varietas: ita et colores aestheticos qualitate differentes in omni pulcra meditatione plures sectari, aut omnino numerosam eorundem semper aucupari multitudinem opus non est. §. 685. Sit quibusdam pulcre cogitandis, praesertim brevioribus, unus tantum color respectu qualitatis, sed verus et naturalis, §. 688. quantitate differens ex iusta lucis et umbrae dispensatione, §. 666. aequabiliter ubique materiae temperatus §. 267. satis venusta potest esse cogitandi ratio per omnem cogitationis decursum una regnans, e. g. nunc aspera, nunc lenis, nunc submissa, nunc elata, nunc tristis, nunc ludicra. §. 688.

§ 691. Sicuti *quatuor coloribus solis immortalia opera fecere Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, Nicomachus, clarissimi pictores, quum tabulae eorum singulae oppidorum venirent opibus: Plinii autem, per aetatem, purpuris in parietes migrantibus et India conferente fluminum suorum limum et draconum et elephantorum saniem, nulla nobilis pictura erat*: Hist. nat. XXXV. 7. sic nec in ea pulcra meditatione, quae quosdam colores, etiam qualitate differentes coniungit, horum tam quaeratur copia variationisque prodigium, quam ut, pauciores forte, tamen *alterna vice sese excitent*, qui adhibentur, aptumque naturis pingendorum tonon servant, §. 685. neque coactas habeant *colorum commissuras ac transitus*, nec affectatam ἀρμολήν. §. 688. Plin. hist. nat. XXXV. c. 5.

§ 689. All aesthetic colors should have this in common: that the things to be painted by them be thought at least clearly, §§648, 625. “For what color can there be in blind darkness, color which is changed in the very light because it shines back when struck by straight or oblique light?” Lucretius II.800. Incidentally one may ask here whether Lucretius had already seen the true genesis of colors, the different degree of refraction. Just as all modifications are of qualities, quantities, or both at once, so aesthetic colors first differ in quality; then every genus of colors differing in this respect has again its own, so to speak, specific quantity, by whose variation a new and ever new partial color is produced. Thus in some whole’s “one and pure brightness,” §619, you see “colors widely unlike and various among themselves,” §688, Lucretius II.783. By exhibiting a pleasant variety of parts in the unity of the whole, “the various colors of things hinder and prevent the whole thing from being able to exist in one brightness,” Lucretius, through an equal monotony that would please less, §688.

§ 690. But just as monochrome painting, using *single colors*, first pleased despite its simplicity, and *endures even now*, and is often of greater value than a painting variegated more than enough with colors whose only praise is variety of colors; so it is not necessary in every beautiful meditation to pursue many aesthetic colors differing in quality, or always to hunt for a numerous multitude of them, §685. In some beautiful thoughts, especially shorter ones, there may be only one color with respect to quality, but true and natural, §688, differing in quantity from the just distribution of light and shade, §666, everywhere tempered equably to the material, §267. A single manner of thinking reigning through the whole course of thought can be sufficiently graceful: now rough, now gentle, now subdued, now elevated, now sad, now playful, §688.

§ 691. Just as *with only four colors Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, and Nicomachus, most famous painters, made immortal works, while individual paintings of theirs sold for the wealth of towns; but in Pliny’s age, when purples migrated onto walls and India supplied the mud of its rivers and the gore of dragons and elephants, there was no noble painting*, *Natural History* XXXV.7; so also in a beautiful meditation that joins certain colors, even colors differing in quality, one should not seek so much abundance and a prodigy of variation as that the colors used, perhaps fewer, nevertheless *excite one another by alternate turn* and preserve the tone suited to the natures of the things to be painted, §685. They should have no forced *joints and transitions of colors*, nor an affected ἀρμογή, §688; Pliny, *Natural History* XXXV.5.

§ 692. Ut physicom colorum, non eorum primitivorum solum, sed etiam derivativorum, non simplicium solum, sed etiam compositorum, et decompositorum praesertim si primitivorum et cognominum, e. g. rubri, silacei, viridis, caerulei gradus simul attendas, classes sunt indefinitae, in omnibus tamen maior nunc extensive, nunc intensive, qua robur et celeritatem, lucis quantitas genericam specificamque differentiam vel constituit, vel saltem ingreditur: §. 689. sic et aestheticorum colorum cum qualitate differentium, §. 690. tum gradu lucis et toni diversorum tot ordines paene sunt, quot rerum naturae, ac modi in rebus ac fines, quos ultra citraque nequeat vera lux subsistere, nec verus color. Modificationum tamen harum omnium differentias etiam certa lucis aestheticae quantitas ingreditur. §. 688.

§ 693. Quoniam itaque completam colorum enumerationem nemo temere suscipiat: subsistamus in divisione pliniana: Hist. nat. XXXV. 6. *Sunt autem colores aut austeri, aut floridi.* Concipiamus scalam toni a nigerrimis umbris, quas admittat lux aesthetica absoluta, §. 617. per diversos colorum aestheticorum gradus et ordines ad candidissimum usque nitorem aestheticum, §. 619. In hac scala erit quidam tonus medius. COLORES infra medium tonum subsistentes AUSTERI sunt, eum transcendentes FLORIDI.

§ 694. Quanquam itaque reiicimus genus cogitandi plane horridum, §. 634. tamen potest in ipsis venustis meditationibus locum suum tenere hinc recte conceptum GENUS COGITANDI HORRIDULUM ac austerum, in quo color vel colores austeri regnant, §. 690, 693. comparandum illi *picturae horridae, incultae, abdita ac opacae, in suo tamen genere praestanti*, §. 624. opponitur isti GENUS COGITANDI FLORIDUM, in quo color vel colores floridi regnant, s. potiores sunt, aut unici, comparandum illi *picturae nitidae, laetae atque collustratae*, non minus *praestanti in suo genere*, §. 624.

§ 695. Horridulum cogitandi genus non excludit aut horret lucem aestheticam et perspicuitatem sensitivam, immo ne nitorem quidem omnem, sed tantum maiorem, §. 694, 693. Potest esse, quod Antonius ait de Crassi oratione rhetorica, Cic. Or. III. 51. *de horridis rebus nitidum, de ieiunis plenum, de pervulgatis novum.* Horridarum interim rerum verus ac naturalis color non est, nisi austerus, et fucum faceret florida rerum horridarum cogitatio, §. 688. Crassi nitet oratio, sed quantum nitere potest genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum, quod comparatum aestheticohistoricis, aut omnino poeticis, horridulum semper est ac austerum, §. 671, 566.

§ 696. Austeram habes apud Virgilium Aen. IV. 247. descriptionem

*Atlantis duri, caelum qui vertice fulcit;
Atlantis, cinctum assidue cui nubibus atris
Piniferum caput, et vento pulsatur et imbri,
Nix humeros infusa tegit, tum flumina mento
Praecipitant senis, et glacie riget horrida
barba.*

Mox autem Aeneae floridam, §. 694. v. 261.

*Atque illi stellatus iaspide fulva
Ensis erat, tyrioque ardebat murice laena
Demissa ex humeris, dives quae munera Dido
Fecerat, et tenui telas discreverat auro.*

Ut hic colores iuxta se proxime positarum imaginum sese alterna vice excitant? In commissuris eorum ac transitu quam naturalis est ἀρμογή? §. 691.

§ 692. As the classes of physical colors, not only primitive but also derivative, not only simple but also composite and decomposite, especially if you attend at the same time to the degrees of primitive and cognate colors, for example red, ocher, green, and blue, are indefinite, yet in all of them a greater quantity of light, now extensive, now intensive, with respect to strength and speed, either constitutes or at least enters the generic and specific difference, §689; so too there are almost as many orders of aesthetic colors differing both in quality, §690, and in degree of light and tone as there are natures of things, modes in things, and ends beyond and short of which true light and true color cannot subsist. Yet a definite quantity of aesthetic light enters the differences of all these modifications, §688.

§ 693. Since, therefore, no one should rashly undertake a complete enumeration of colors, let us stand with Pliny's division, *Natural History* XXXV.6: *Colors are either austere or florid*. Let us conceive a scale of tone from the blackest shades admitted by absolute aesthetic light, §617, through the different degrees and orders of aesthetic colors, up to the whitest aesthetic brightness, §619. On this scale there will be a certain middle tone. COLORS remaining below the middle tone are AUSTERE; those transcending it are FLORID.

§ 694. Although, therefore, we reject the plainly rough kind of thinking, §634, nevertheless in graceful meditations themselves there can rightly hold its place a correctly conceived SOMEWHAT ROUGH and austere KIND OF THINKING, in which an austere color or austere colors reign, §§690, 693. It is to be compared with that *rough, uncultivated, hidden, and opaque painting, yet excellent in its own kind*, §624. Opposed to it is the FLORID KIND OF THINKING, in which a florid color or florid colors reign, or are the more important or the only ones; this is to be compared with that *bright, cheerful, and illuminated painting, no less excellent in its own kind*, §624.

§ 695. The somewhat rough kind of thinking neither excludes nor shudders at aesthetic light and sensory perspicuity, indeed not even at every brightness, but only at the greater brightness, §§694, 693. It can be what Antonius says of Crassus' rhetorical speech in Cicero, *De oratore* III.51: *bright about rough things, full about lean things, new about common things*. Meanwhile the true and natural color of rough things is only austere, and florid thinking about rough things would make false coloring, §688. Crassus' speech shines, but as much as the aesthetic-dogmatic kind of thinking can shine, which, compared with aesthetic-historical or wholly poetic kinds, is always somewhat rough and austere, §§671, 566.

§ 696. You have an austere description in Virgil, *Aeneid* IV.247, of "hard Atlas, who supports the sky with his head; Atlas, whose pine-bearing head, always girded with black clouds, is beaten by wind and rain; snow poured upon him covers his shoulders, then rivers rush down from the old man's chin, and his rough beard stiffens with ice." Soon, however, there is a florid description of Aeneas, §694, v.261: "And he had a sword starred with yellow jasper, and a cloak hanging down from his shoulders burned with Tyrian purple, rich gifts which Dido had made and had distinguished the webs with slender gold." How here the colors of images placed nearest to each other excite one another by alternate turn! How natural is the ἀρμολή in their joints and transition, §691!

§ 697. Austeram iungamus ex Ovidio descriptionem Boreae sibi coniugem rapientis, Met. VI. 702.

*Excussit pennas, quarum iactatibus omnis
Afflata est tellus, latumque perhorruit aequor;
Pulvereamque trahens per summa cacumina
pallam
Verrit humum, pavidamque metu, caligine
tectus,
Orithyian amans fulvis amplectitur alis.*

Floridam Aeneae descriptionem aliam v. §. 662. Utrumque coloris genus quasi e longinquo, qua solet, brevitate Tacitus ostendit, quando narrat *Pharasmanem simul horridam suorum aciem, picta auro Medorum agmina, hinc viros, inde praedam, ostendere*, Ann. VI. 34.

§ 698. Utrumque colorum aestheticorum genus vel pingitur in rebus naturalibus, quatenus a moralibus distinguuntur, vel in moralibus deprehenditur. Horum verus ac naturalis color dabit tertiam ἡθους speciem, §. 195, 495. qua moratum cogitandi genus, §. 226. moribus characteribusque personarum, actionum, e. c. moralibus non dilucide solum exprimendis sufficiat, sed cuilibet etiam ex his eum locum, eum tonum, id lucis et umbrae temperamentum, eum colorem tribuere noverit, qui decet, §. 195. Ita primum apparenti cuiusdam virtutis personae convenient austeri colores et genus cogitandi horridulum, omnis virtutis decor verus ac naturalis, at interior colores et genus cogitandi floridum admittit. Primum apparenti vitiorum quorundam larvae colores floridi laetumque cogitandi genus ac collustratum conveniunt; omnium vitiorum internae turpitudini colores austeri genusque cogitandi subfuscum, §. 676, 694.

§ 699. Videamus insigne exemplum in Horatii III. oda 24. ubi 1) luxuriam, uti primum apparet, genere cogitandi florido describens:

*Intactis opulentior
Thesauris Arabum et divitis Indiae
Caementis licet occupes
Tyrrhenum omne tuis et mare Apulicum;*

statim subausterus verum huius vitii statum interiorem pingit:

*Si figit adamantinos
Summis verticibus dira Necessitas
Clavos: non animum metu,
Non mortis laqueis expedit caput.*

Pergit eadem austeritate morum magis innocentium externum habitum primo apparentem horridius describere, v. 8–28. redit adhuc horridulus ad interiorem luxuria deformitatem sistendam ob oculos, v. 29–44.

§ 697. Let us join from Ovid an austere description of Boreas carrying off a wife for himself, *Metamorphoses* VI.702: he shook his wings, by whose beating all the earth was breathed upon, and the broad sea shuddered; dragging a dusty cloak over the highest summits, he swept the ground and, covered with darkness, loving Orithyia, embraced the fearful girl with tawny wings. For another florid description of Aeneas, see §662. Tacitus shows both kinds of color, as it were from far off and with his customary brevity, when he narrates that *Pharasmanes showed at once the rough battle-line of his own men and the ranks of the Medes painted with gold: men on one side, booty on the other*, *Annals* VI.34.

§ 698. Each kind of aesthetic color is either painted in natural things, insofar as they are distinguished from moral things, or is found in moral things. The true and natural color of moral things will give the third species of ῥθους, §§195, 495, by which the moralized kind of thinking, §226, suffices not only for clearly expressing the moral manners and characters of persons, actions, and so forth, but also knows how to assign to each of these that place, tone, temperament of light and shade, and color which is fitting, §195. Thus austere colors and a somewhat rough kind of thinking will suit the first appearance of the person of some virtue, the true and natural beauty of every virtue; but the interior admits florid colors and a florid kind of thinking. Florid colors and a cheerful and illuminated kind of thinking suit the first-appearing mask of certain vices; but austere colors and a dusky kind of thinking suit the inner ugliness of all vices, §§676, 694.

§ 699. Let us see a notable example in Horace, Ode III.24, where 1) describing luxury as it first appears by a florid kind of thinking, he says: “Though, richer than the untouched treasures of the Arabs and wealthy India, you occupy with your constructions all the Tyrrhenian and Apulian sea”; immediately, somewhat austere, he paints the true inner state of this vice: “If dire Necessity fixes adamantine nails in the highest summits, you will not free your mind from fear or your head from the snares of death.” He continues with the same austerity to describe the first-appearing external habit of more innocent manners more roughly, vv.8–28, and returns still somewhat roughly to place before the eyes the inner deformity of luxury, vv.29–44.

§ 700. Iam autem temperantiam suasurus ex vera huius virtutis natura, licet plerosque latente, divitiis renunciare iubet, subito floridus:

*Vel nos in Capitolium,
Quo clamor vocat et turba faventium,
Vel nos in mare proximum
Gemmae et lapides, aurum et inutile,
Summi materiam mali,
Mittamus.*

Probe praevidet, quam absonum hoc, quicquid erat consilii, debeat apparere potentiorum civium plurimis. Hinc sua se denuo virtute involvens illud probat austerus:

*Scelerum si bene poenitet,
Eradenda cupidinis
Pravi sunt elementa, et tenerae nimis
Mentes asperioribus
Firmandae studiis.*

Quoniam autem desperare videtur de consiliorum suorum fructu in severa austeraque vitiorum intus et in cute male sanorum imagine conquiescit. §. 698.

§ 701. Coniungit Ovidius naturalium moraliumque colores in enarrandis quatuor orbis, quas fingit, aetatibus, Met. I. Aetatis aureae statum florido quam maxime cogitandi genere prosecutus moralem v. 90–100. §. 594. transit ad naturalem iisdem floribus conspergendum:

*Per se dabat omnia tellus,
Ver erat aeternum, placidique tepentibus auris
Mulcebant Zephyri natos sine semine flores.
Flumina iam lactis, iam flumina nectaris ibant,
Flavaque de viridi stillabant ilice mella, v. 112.*

§ 702. Iam tonum remittit in argentea aetate pingenda, v. 112–124. magis adhuc in aeneae brevi commemoratione sensim cum aetatis illius hominibus

ad horrida promptior arma, v. 126.

In ferrea autem aetate describenda ut totus inhorrescit? §. 594.

*Vivitur ex raptō. Non hospes ab hospite
tutus,
Non socer a genero. Fratrum quoque gratia rara est.
Imminet exitio vir coniugis, illa mariti.
Lurida terribiles miscent aconita novercae,
Filius ante diem patrios inquirat in annos.
Victa iacet Pietas, et virgo caede madentes
Ultima caelestum terras Astraea reliquit.
Neve foret terris securior arduus aether,
Affectasse ferunt regnum caeleste Gigantas,
Altaque congestos struxisse ad sidera montes. 153.*

§ 700. But now, about to recommend temperance from the true nature of this virtue, though hidden from most, he suddenly becomes florid and orders riches to be renounced: “Let us either into the Capitol, where the shout and crowd of favorers calls, or into the nearest sea cast gems and stones, gold and useless material of the highest evil.” He foresees well how discordant this counsel, whatever it was, must appear to most of the more powerful citizens. Hence, wrapping himself again in his virtue, he proves it austerely: “If one truly repents of crimes, the elements of crooked desire must be rooted out, and minds too tender must be strengthened by harsher studies.” But since he seems to despair of the fruit of his counsels, he rests in the severe and austere image of vices diseased inside and on the skin, §698.

§ 701. Ovid joins colors of natural and moral things in narrating the four ages of the world which he imagines, *Metamorphoses* I. Having followed the moral condition of the golden age, vv.90–100, §594, with the most florid kind of thinking, he passes to the natural condition to be sprinkled with the same flowers: “The earth gave all things by itself; spring was eternal, and the gentle Zephyrs with warm breezes caressed flowers born without seed. Now rivers of milk, now rivers of nectar flowed, and yellow honeys dripped from the green holm-oak,” v.112.

§ 702. Now he lowers the tone in painting the silver age, vv.112–124, and still more in the brief commemoration of the bronze age, gradually with the men of that age “readier for rough arms,” v.126. But in describing the iron age, how wholly he grows rough, §594: “They live by plunder. Guest is not safe from host, nor father-in-law from son-in-law. The grace of brothers too is rare. The husband threatens the death of his wife, she of her husband. Pale stepmothers mix terrible aconites; the son inquires into his father’s years before the day. Piety lies defeated, and Astraea, last of the heavenly ones, left the earth wet with slaughter. And lest the lofty ether be safer than the lands, they say the Giants sought the heavenly kingdom and piled mountains heaped high to the stars,” v.153.

§ 703. Pauci sunt, vel nemo, quem deceat, sicut

Omnis Aristippum decuit status, et color, et res,
Hor. ep. I. 17, 23.

nisi Horatius in hoc etiam splendide mentitus est. Nihil magis principia negatae totalis similitudinis ac aequalitatis confirmat experientia, quam characterum et personarum, morum et modorum agendi diversitas. In quibus tamen ita exprimendis, ut distingui possint, naturam cuiusvis propriam ac suam imitari tanti est, ut, vel hoc unum qui nesciat, eum poetae neget nomine dignum Horatius, quando Artis Poet. v. 86.

*Descriptas, ait, servare vices, operumque
colores
Cur ego, si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor?
Cur nescire, pudens prave, quam discere, malo?
Versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult.
Indignatur item privatis ac prope socco
Dignis carminibus narrari caena Thyestae, §. 690.
Singula quaeque locum teneant sortita decentem.*

in naturalibus etiam et mechanicis, quod facilius, praesertim autem in moralibus, quod difficilius, §. 666, 691.

SECTIO XXXXII

FUCUS OPPOSITUS

§ 704. Fuci aesthetici tum definitionem iam vidimus §. 688. tum quaedam genera, §. 626, 627. Sed eius a veris coloribus discernendi difficultas simul, ac necessitas separatam de eodem tractationem videtur requirere. §. 628, 625. Sicut autem veri colores sunt vel austeri, vel floridi: §. 693. ita et fucus erit vel nimis austerus, non horridulus, sed horridus, §. 634. vel nimis floridus et Iridis instar,

Mille trahens varios adverso sole colores.

Horridulum iam aliquid sonat illud Virgilii,

Arma virumque cano.

Austerius illud est circa medium totius carminis:

*Bella, horrida bella,
Et Tyberim multo spumantem sanguine cerno.*

Interim rem, de qua agebatur, secundum naturam exprimit verus color, et austeritatis gradus diversus descriptas vices servat, locumque decentem sortitus est. §. 703.

§ 703. There are few, or none, whom, like Aristippus, “every state and color and thing suited,” Horace, *Epistles* I.17.23, unless Horace also lied splendidly in this. Experience confirms nothing more than the principles denying total likeness and equality: the diversity of characters and persons, manners and modes of acting. Yet in expressing these so that they can be distinguished, it is so important to imitate the proper and individual nature of each that Horace denies the name of poet to anyone who does not know this, when in the *Ars Poetica*, v.86, he says: “If I neither can nor know how to preserve the described roles and colors of works, why am I hailed as a poet? Why, perversely ashamed, do I prefer not to know rather than to learn? A comic subject does not wish to be expounded in tragic verses. Likewise the feast of Thyestes disdains to be narrated in songs private and almost worthy of the slipper,” §690. “Let each thing hold the place fittingly allotted to it,” in natural and mechanical matters too, which is easier, but especially in moral matters, which is harder, §§666, 691.

SECTION XXXXII

OPPOSED FALSE COLORING

§ 704. We have already seen both the definition of aesthetic false coloring, §688, and certain kinds of it, §§626–627. But the difficulty and necessity of distinguishing it from true colors seem to require a separate treatment of it, §§628, 625. As true colors are either austere or florid, §693, so false coloring will be either too austere, not somewhat rough but rough, §634, or too florid and, like Iris, “drawing a thousand varied colors against the sun.” Virgil’s “I sing arms and the man” already sounds somewhat rough. More austere is this around the middle of the whole poem: “Wars, rough wars, and the Tiber foaming with much blood I see.” Meanwhile true color expresses the matter at issue according to nature, and the different degree of austerity preserves the described roles and has been allotted the fitting place, §703.

§ 705. Huic horridulo colori compara fucum horridum Lucani:

*Bella per Emathios plus quam civilia campos,
Iusque datum sceleris canimus, populumque
potentem,
In sua victrici conversum viscera dextra,
Cognatasque acies, et rupto foedere regni
Certatum totis concussi viribus orbis
In commune nefas, infestisque obvia signis
Signa, pares aquilas, et pila minantia pilis.
Quis furor? o! vates! quae tanta licentia
ab ovo?*

Sic incipiat scriptor aliquis cyclicus. Color, non suum decenter locum nactus, iustoque saturator, fucus est. §. 703, 688.

§ 706. Silius Italicus iam auspicatur austerius Virgilio. §. 704.

*Ordiam arma, quibus caelo se gloria tollit
Aeneadum, patiturque ferox oenotria iura
Carthago.*

Initium, cui forte satur Horatius iam occlamet: Ohe! ampullas! Huic tamen satis naturalem colorem dixeris comparato cum principiis Claudiani de bello Gethico, quibus in ipso limine *furtivae aurum pelliculae*, tritus ille fucus, §. 626. illitus est:

*Intacti quum claustra freti coeuntibus aequor
Armatum scopulis audax irrumpere Argo
Oeteam Colchosque petens, propiore periclo,
Omnibus attonitis solus post numina Typhis
Incolumem tenui damno servasse carinam
Fertur et ancipitem montis vitasse ruinam,
Deceptoque vagae concursu rupis in altum
Victricem duxisse ratem. e. c. usque ad v. 35.*

§ 707. Horridus eiusmodi fucus, §. 704. non sola singularia potest deturpare, §. 708, 706 et genus cogitandi aestheticohistoricum, §. 566. pari ratione cavendus est aestheticodogmaticis, et utriusque tum naturalia, quatenus moralibus opponuntur, exhibentibus, tum moralia, §. 698. Potest in eum delabi genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum theoreticum, potest et practicum, nunc paraeneticum, nunc elencticum, §. 576. In his versatus eo magis esse debet sollicitus, ne descriptas migret vices, colorisque naturalis et fucorum limites, quoniam et omne iam dogmaticum meditandi genus habere videtur nonnihil horriduli, §. 695. et in moralium coloribus facilius lapsus est, dum duplex de iisdem, nunc exterius, et praecipitanter, nunc interius et penitius perspectis, solet iudicium ferri, §. 698. 703.

§ 705. Compare with this somewhat rough color Lucan's rough false coloring: "Wars more than civil through Emathian fields, and right given to crime, we sing; and a powerful people turned with victorious right hand against its own entrails, kindred battle-lines, and, with the treaty of rule broken, conflict with all the forces of the shaken world for common wickedness, standards meeting hostile standards, equal eagles, and javelins threatening javelins. What madness? O poet! what such license from the egg?" Thus some cyclic writer should begin. Color that has not found its own fitting place and is more saturated than is just is false coloring, §§703, 688.

§ 706. Silius Italicus already begins more austere than Virgil, §704: "I shall begin the arms by which the glory of the Aeneadae lifts itself to heaven, and fierce Carthage suffers Oenotrian laws." A beginning to which Horace, already sated, might perhaps shout: Enough! Bombast! Yet you would call this color sufficiently natural compared with Claudian's beginnings on the Gothic war, in which at the very threshold the gold of the stolen fleece, that worn false coloring, §626, has been smeared on: "When the waters of the untouched strait, with cliffs coming together, bold Argo seeking Oeta and Colchis burst into the armed sea, with nearer danger, and, while all were astonished, Typhis alone after the gods is said to have preserved the ship unharmed with slight loss and avoided the doubtful ruin of the mountain, and, deceiving the clash of the wandering rock, to have led the victorious ship into the deep," and so on to verse 35.

§ 707. Rough false coloring of this kind, §704, can disfigure not only singulars, §§708, 706, and the aesthetic-historical kind of thinking, §566; it must be avoided in the same way by aesthetic-dogmatic writings, and by both kinds when they exhibit natural things, insofar as these are opposed to moral things, and moral things, §698. The theoretical aesthetic-dogmatic kind of thinking can slip into it, and so can the practical, now paraenetic, now elenctic, §576. One occupied with these must be all the more anxious not to cross the assigned roles and the boundaries of natural color and false color, since every dogmatic kind of meditation already seems to have something somewhat rough in it, §695, and since the fall is easier in moral colors, where a double judgment is usually made about them, now from the outside and precipitately, now from the inside and more deeply perceived, §§698, 703.

§ 708. Fucum aestheticopracticum §. 707. non eum crassiorem nunc dissuadebimus, in quem invehitur Iuvenalis, sat. 2. quando

*Ultra Sauromatas fugere hinc libet, et glaciale
Oceanum, quoties aliquid de moribus audent,
Qui Curios simulant, et Bacchanalia vivunt, §. 362.*

Subtilior hic culpandus in cogitationibus fucus etiam eorum est, quorum forte nec mala mens, nec malus animus est, licet verioris beatitudinis non satis conscius. Quaeratur e. g. de vero felicitatis colore, quem naturalem et non fucatum explanet aestheticodogmaticus. Sequuntur tunc sui sapientis archetypum, et inde derivatas cogitandi loquendive formulas, Stoici quae *dum mordicus tenent, neque sibi evelli ex ore vel animo volunt: horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et oratione, et moribus, et ipsa cogitandi ratione.* Cic. de fin. III. 78. Hinc in eorum picturas boni, mali, virtutis, beatitudinis, felicitatis fucus inducitur nimis austerus. §. 704.

§ 709. Sub eadem hypothesi §. 708. sequetur Epicureus aliquis unicam voluptatem, quam si formaverit animo, sicuti facilis est, et in vulgus pervulgata, neque totum caelestis nostrae Veneris systema, sed eius aliquam modo particulam, mente comprehenderit, §. 646. temere mollescet in eam levitatem, ut mites forsitan aliquos Felicitatis ductus satis feliciter imitetur, quos autem graviores et austeros simul exprimere

*iubet horrida Virtus,
Armatumque Fide pectus, Rectique cupido,
Audita asperitate,
Sil. XI. 305.*

nolit laetioribus innectere, vel certe leviculo penicillo per male locatum spuriae lucis nitorem obducat, et hinc ponere totum nesciet sine fuco nimis florido. §. 704. Peripateticorum in his theoriam denique sequutus a vero Felicitatis colore propius aberit. §. 688.

§ 710. *Catholica, id est, (ut dicamus, quomodo possumus) universalis, vel perpetua.* (Quint. II. 14.) de moribus, virtutibus et vitiis, ex veritate coloris aethetici satis exacta, §. 552. sibi familiaria reddere pulcre cogitaturus non tantum tenetur, si quando practica dogmatice tangere mens sit, §. 707. sed etiam ideo, quia moratum de singularibus, quoque tum strictissime veris, tum heterocosmicis, cogitandi genus illis catholicis et generalibus, veluti notionibus directricibus, utitur in informandis singularium ideis §. 653, 547. Si quis Cynicorum ex disciplina virtutem ac mores generatim fucis vero austerioribus adperserit, virtutem etiam singularem certae personae, quam narrabit, vel finget, eam circumscribet, quae

*Sardois videatur amarior herbis,
Horridior rusco, proiecta vilior alga. Virg. Ecl. VII.*

§ 711. Si quis in Aristippi praecepta delapsus est, proptereaque virtutem et morum institutionem omnem fucis nimium floridis exprimit, §. 704. ex huius officina

Virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles,

in concreto etiam, et individuo singulari spectandus, §. 710. prodibit comtulus, venustulus, delicatulus, purpuram indutus, rosis coronatus, pastillos olens, uti *bibit Hymettia mella Falerno diluta,*

*inter lances mensasque nitentes,
Dum stupet insanis acies fulgoribus, et quum
Acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat. Hor. Sermon. II. 2. 4.*

§ 708. We shall not now dissuade from the coarser aesthetic-practical false coloring, §707, against which Juvenal inveighs in Satire 2, when “one wants to flee from here beyond the Sauromatae and the frozen Ocean whenever those who pretend to be Curii and live Bacchanals dare say anything about morals,” §362. The subtler false coloring to be blamed here in thoughts belongs even to those whose mind and soul perhaps are not bad, though they are not sufficiently conscious of truer happiness. Let the question be, for example, about the true color of happiness, which the aesthetic-dogmatic writer should explain as natural and not false-colored. The Stoics then follow the archetype of their wise man and the formulas of thinking and speaking derived from it; *while they hold these tooth and nail and do not wish them torn from mouth or mind, they become more rough, harsher, harder in speech, in morals, and in the very manner of thinking*, Cicero, *De finibus* IV.78. Hence false coloring that is too austere is introduced into their pictures of good, evil, virtue, blessedness, and happiness, §704.

§ 709. Under the same hypothesis, §708, some Epicurean will follow the single pleasure which, if he has formed it in mind as easy and commonly familiar to the crowd, and has comprehended not the whole system of our heavenly Venus but only some little part of it, §646, he will rashly soften into such lightness that perhaps he imitates fairly happily some gentle strokes of Happiness. But the graver and austere strokes which “rough Virtue commands, and a breast armed with Faith, and desire of the Right, once harshness has been heard,” Silius XI.305, he will not wish to weave in with the more cheerful ones, or at least will cover them with a rather light brush through the brightness of spurious light badly placed, and hence will not know how to set forth the whole without false coloring that is too florid, §704. Finally, one who follows the Peripatetic theory in these matters will be nearer to the true color of Happiness, §688.

§ 710. One who will think beautifully is bound to make *catholica*, that is, as we can say, universals or perpetuums, Quintilian II.14, concerning morals, virtues, and vices familiar to himself from truth of aesthetic color that is sufficiently exact, §552, not only if he intends at some time to touch practical matters dogmatically, §707, but also because the moralized kind of thinking about singulars, whether strictly true or heterocosmic, uses those catholic and general things as directive notions in forming ideas of singulars, §§653, 547. If someone from the discipline of the Cynics sprinkles virtue and morals generally with false colorings more austere than the true, he will also circumscribe the singular virtue of a definite person whom he narrates or invents as one that seems “more bitter than Sardinian herbs, rougher than butcher’s broom, cheaper than cast-off seaweed,” Virgil, *Eclogue* VII.

§ 711. If someone has slipped into the precepts of Aristippus and therefore expresses every institution of virtue and morals with false colorings too florid, §704, from this workshop even the “guardian and rigid attendant of true virtue,” to be contemplated in the concrete and in the individual singular too, §710, will come forth rather neat, rather pretty, rather delicate, dressed in purple, crowned with roses, smelling of lozenges, as he “drinks Hymettian honeys diluted with Falernian,” among shining dishes and tables, “while the sight is stunned by mad gleams, and when the mind, reclining on false things, refuses better things,” Horace, *Satires* II.2.4.

§ 712. Quemadmodum omnis quidem eruditio, cum practica, tum theoretica, verior ad veriores rebus ad eam pertinentibus, et singularibus, quae sub se continet, inducendos colores multum facit, §. 63–67; tamen nulla facilius fucum vitare dabit ingenio, quod natura mediocriter felix hanc solam imitabitur, quam corrupta praeconceptis opinionibus omnia falso colore tingentibus: §. 707–711. sic praesertim artis aestheticae tum verioris magnum adiumentum est ad veros in rebus colores quaerendos, fugiendos fucos, §. 68, 69. tum falsae praecepta plus nocent, quam si prorsus artem eiusmodi nescires, §. 73. quoniam dum ea sequeris, ut tibi videtur, omnino securus, deliberato consilio naturam deseris fucos et pigmenta captans, §. 688, 110. in quae forsitan impetu mere naturali non incidisses, §. 52.

§ 713. In deceptricibus artium aestheticarum, e. g. rhetoricarum, poeticarum, regulis non tanto cum periculo a veris coloribus ad fucos avocabunt omnino falsae, et adeo falsae, etiam aesthetice, ut ne pulcellam quidem aliquam veri speciem habeant, qua se tueantur: quam illae, quae tum magnis auctoritatibus defenduntur, tum in aliquibus locis exercentur commode, peccant autem in quantitate, quod logici dicunt, et catholicae cogitantur, quae tamen particulariter tantum verae sunt. §. 73. Hinc aestheticis tantopere distinguendae paucae venustatum *leges immutabili necessitate constrictae*, a consiliis aliquando bonis, *quae, velut si aliter fas non sit, quidam, tanquam iussi, sequuntur*, non raro praepostere. Nam *mutantur pleraque praeceptorum caussis, temporibus, necessitate, occasione. Nulla rogationibus plebisve scitis sancta sunt. Decet, ut in picturis atque statuvis videmus, variari habitus, vultus, status. Raro reperitur genus praeceptorum catholicorum, ut non labefactari parte aliqua et subruī possit.* Quint. II. 14.

§ 714. Quos regulae nimis laxae nondum satis a vero rerum colore deflectunt in fucos, horum multos eo contorquet caeca imitatio. Sentiant amari probarique, licet *horridulas, Catonis alicuius orationes.* Cic. de Or. 152. et ecce! quoties placere volunt, ut subito horrescant! §. 704.

*Quid? si quis vultu torvo ferus, et pede nudo,
Exiguaeque togae simulet textore Catonem,
Virtutemne repraesentet moresque Catonis?
Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile,* Hor. I. ep. 19. 12.

Sentiunt alii delectari non paucos floribus poetarum et Curtii; Hinc tunc demum se disertos putant, quando quibuscunque datis occasionibus efflorescendo lascivunt. §. 254.

*O! imitatores, servum pecus! ut mihi saepe
Bilem, saepe iocum vestri movere tumultus!*

§ 712. Just as all truer erudition, both practical and theoretical, greatly helps in introducing truer colors to the things belonging to it and to the singulars contained under it, §§63–67, yet none will more easily allow a talent moderately happy by nature to avoid false coloring, since it will imitate nature alone, than erudition corrupted by preconceived opinions that dye everything with false color, §§707–711; so especially a truer aesthetic art is a great aid both for seeking true colors in things and for fleeing false colorings, §§68–69. But the precepts of a false aesthetic art do more harm than if you knew no such art at all, §73, because while you follow them, as it seems to you, wholly secure, you deliberately desert nature while hunting false colorings and pigments, §§688, 110, into which perhaps by mere natural impulse you would not have fallen, §52.

§ 713. Among deceptive rules of aesthetic arts, for example rhetorical and poetic rules, those wholly false and so false, even aesthetically, that they do not have even some pretty appearance of truth by which to defend themselves, will not call one away from true colors to false colorings with so much danger as those which are both defended by great authorities and usefully exercised in some places, but err in quantity, as the logicians say, and are thought catholic although they are only particularly true, §73. Hence in aesthetics the few laws of *graces bound by immutable necessity* must be so carefully distinguished from counsels that are sometimes good, *which certain people follow, as if commanded, as if it were not permitted otherwise*, not rarely in a preposterous way. For *most precepts change with causes, times, necessity, and occasion. None are sanctioned by bills or plebiscites. It is fitting, as we see in paintings and statues, that posture, face, and stance be varied. A kind of catholic precepts is rarely found that cannot be weakened and undermined in some part*, Quintilian II. 14.

§ 714. Many whom rules too lax do not yet sufficiently deflect from the true color of things into false colorings are twisted into them by blind imitation. They perceive that *the somewhat rough speeches of some Cato* are loved and approved, Cicero, *De oratore* I.52, and behold! whenever they wish to please, how suddenly they grow rough, §704. “What if someone, fierce with grim face and bare foot, and in the weave of a scanty toga, imitates Cato: does he represent the virtue and morals of Cato? The model deceives when imitable in vices,” Horace, *Epistles* I.19.12. Others perceive that not a few are delighted by the flowers of poets and Curtius; hence they finally think themselves eloquent when, on any given occasions, they romp by blossoming forth, §254. “O imitators, servile herd! how often your uproars have moved my bile, often my laughter!”

§ 715. Laudabantur olim Atticorum venusta ingenia. *Quorum genera plura sunt, hi, caeci imitatores.* §. 714. *unum modo, quale sit, suspicabantur. Putabant enim, qui horride inculteque dicat, modo id eleganter enucleateque faciat, eum solum attice dicere. Errabant, quod solum,* §. 713. *quod attice, non fallebantur.* §. 694. Cic. or. 28. Interim, quantus eorum cunque fuerit error, non tamen potuit, quin iisdem aliquando fucos nimis horridos pro veris rerum floridarum coloribus commendaret. §. 704, 248, 260. Nunc laudantur ex graecis et romanis auctores suo iure classici, iam austeris, iam floridis usi commodissime coloribus. In quorum imitatione quoniam inprimis *considerandum est, ne quid perturbate, ne quid contorte cogitetur,* Cic. de Inv. I. 29. caeci imitatores, qui simile quantulumcumque suis deprehendisse per scripta classica satagunt, qui possent aliter, quam colores confundere, sicuti iura coqui, contortisque bellissimis ex Ciceronis alicuius aut omnino Demosthenis cogitandi rationibus ad alienissima fucum facere? §. 688.

§ 716. Colores floridi *maxime sensus nostros impellunt voluptate, et specie prima acerrime commovent. Saepe tamen ab iisdem celerrime fastidio quodam et satietate abalienamur.* §. 693. *Quanto colorum pulcritudine et varietate floridiora sunt in picturis novis pleraque, quam in veteribus? Quae tamen, etiamsi primo aspectu nos ceperunt, diutius non delectant, quum iidem nos in antiquis tabulis illo ipso horrido obsoletoque teneamur. Quanto molliores sunt et delicatiores in cantu flexiones et falsae voculae, quam certae et severae? quibus tamen non modo austeri, sed si saepius fiunt, multitudo ipsa reclamatur.* Cic. de or. III. 98. cf. 99–103. et habebis praeclarum in fucos nimis floridos antidoton. §. 704.

§ 717. Interim pluribus fucus nimis floridus est suspectus, quam nimis austerus. Minium his, cinnabaris, indicum et purpurissum, facilius fuci iudicantur, quam fucati etiam

peruncti faecibus ora.

Austeram accusationem qui parat, si vel omnes humanitatis terminos transiliat, veritatem odium parientem se pingere, non fucum, sibi videbitur, *austeram curationem* propinare, non nigrae loliginis succum et meram aeruginem. Austeritatem ut nimis tristem effugiat, vel removendo floridorum mentionem iniicit Ovidius, Trist. I. 1.

*Nec te purpureo velent vaccinia fuco,
Non est conveniens luctibus ille color.
Nec titulus minio, neque cedro charta notetur;
Candida nec nigra cornua fronte geras.
Felices ornent haec instrumenta libellos,
Fortunae memorem te decet esse meae.*

§ 715. The graceful talents of the Attics were once praised. *Since there are several kinds of these, these blind imitators, §714, suspected only one of what sort it is. For they thought that whoever spoke roughly and uncultivatedly, provided he did it elegantly and distinctly, was the only one to speak Attically. They erred, because it was only one kind, §713; that it was Attic, they were not deceived, §694, Cicero, Orator 28.* Meanwhile, however great their error was, it could not fail sometimes to commend to them colors too roughly false in place of true colors of florid things, §§704, 248, 260. Now Greek and Roman authors are rightly praised as classical, having very fittingly used now austere, now florid colors. Since in imitating them it must above all be considered *that nothing be thought confusedly, nothing twistedly*, Cicero, *De inventione* I.29, how could blind imitators, who are eager to detect some tiny similarity to their own writings in classical texts, do anything other than confuse colors like cooks' sauces, and from the most beautiful thinking-ratios of some Cicero or even Demosthenes, twisted to the most alien things, make false coloring, §688?

§ 716. Florid colors *especially strike our senses with pleasure and move them most keenly at first appearance. Yet we are often very quickly alienated from them by a certain disgust and satiety, §693. How much more florid are many things in new paintings than in old ones, by beauty and variety of colors? Yet even if they have captured us at first sight, they do not delight longer; while in ancient paintings we are held by that very rough and obsolete quality. How much softer and more delicate in song are the inflections and false little voices than the certain and severe ones? Yet against these not only the austere, but, if they are made too often, the crowd itself cries out*, Cicero, *De oratore* III.98; compare 99–103, and you will have a splendid antidote against false colorings too florid, §704.

§ 717. Meanwhile false coloring too florid is suspect to more people than false coloring too austere. Vermilion, cinnabar, indigo, and purple are more easily judged false color by them than faces, even false-colored, "smeared with dregs." One who prepares *an austere accusation*, even if he leaps over all boundaries of humanity, will seem to himself to paint truth that produces hatred, not false coloring; to offer *an austere cure*, not the juice of black cuttlefish and mere verdigris. To escape austerity as too sad, Ovid, even by removing them, introduces mention of florid things in *Tristia* I.1: "Nor let whortleberries veil you with purple dye; that color is not fitting for griefs. Let not the title be marked with vermilion, nor the paper with cedar, nor wear white horns on a black brow. Let these instruments adorn happy little books; it is fitting for you to be mindful of my fortune."

§ 718. Pari artificio Apelles excelluit, quod unum imitari nemo potuit. *Absoluta opera atramento illinebat ita tenui, ut id ipsum repercussu claritates colorum excitaret, custodiretque a pulvere et sordibus, ad manum intuenti demum appareret. Sed et tum ratione magna, ne colorum claritas oculorum aciem offenderet, veluti per lapidem specularem intuentibus e longinquo, et eadem res nimis floridis coloribus austeritatem occulte daret.* Plin. hist. nat. XXXV. 10. *Tantae molis est poetae fucum nimis austerum et tristem, pictori nimis floridum sollicito vitare.* §. 717. Vereor tamen, ne festivum illud, quod aiunt, apud Ovidium Trist. I. III. 10. habeat aliquid fucosi lenocinii:

*Clauda quod alterno subsidunt carmina versu,
Vel pedis hoc ratio, vel via longa facit.
Adspicis exsanguis chartam pallere colore?
Immo vero, quia non erubescunt epistolae.*

§ 719. Vitiosum et corruptum cogitandi genus, quod huc usque fucum appellavimus, §. 688. Quintilianus dicit *casuris, si leviter excutiantur, flosculis nitens, evanescens ac moriens*, ut reliqua vitiosa cogitandi genera, comparatione meliorum, *quemadmodum lana tincta fuco citra purpuras placet, ac, si contuleris etiam lacernae, conspectu melioris obruitur. Si vero iudicium his corruptis acrius adhibeas, ut fucinis sulphura, iam illud, quod fefellerat, exuat mentitum colorem, et quadam vix enarrabili foeditate pallescat. Luceat igitur haec citra solem, et ut quaedam exigua animalia igniculi videntur in tenebris.* XII. 10. Si protraxeris fucatam eiusmodi Venerem ex angulis et umbra in solem et maioris theatri celebritatem, nec illi,

*iam manet humida creta, colorque
Stercore fucatus crocodili.* Hor. ep. od. XII.

§ 720. Pulcre cogitandis insidere quidam venustatis, non fuco illitus, sed sanguine diffusus debet color, i. e. per ipsam materiae, cogitantis et obiectorum in personalibus praecipuorum naturam determinata lucis aestheticae modificatio. §. 688, 622, 623. Cic. de or. III. 199. *Ipsa formae dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda est.* §. 188. Cic. off. I. 30. *Hic autem est quidam sine ullo fuco veritatis color.* §. 423. Cic. de cl. orator. 162. *cuius liniamentis flos pigmentorum recentium: defuit potius, quam adsit nimius.* 298. §. 691. Neque tamen desit naturam sequens variatio, §. 689. quia naturalis color ultra terminos a natura constitutos protractus et uno tenore continuatus tandem non nisi fucus est. Hinc intelligo Quintilianum, qui Cassio Severo tribuit *ingenii plurimum, acerbiter miram, summam urbanitatem*, tamen in eodem non gravitatem solum, sed etiam *colorem orationis desiderat*, quoniam *stomacho et amaris salibus plus, quam consilio, dederit.* X. 1.

§ 718. Apelles excelled by a similar artifice, which *no one could imitate. He used to smear completed works with ink so thinly that this very thing, by reflection, would excite the clarities of colors and guard them from dust and dirt, and would appear only to one looking close at hand. But also then with great reason, lest the clarity of colors offend the edge of the eyes, as if for those looking from afar through specular stone, and the same thing secretly gave austerity to colors too florid*, Pliny, *Natural History* XXXV.10. Of such great labor it is for the poet anxiously to avoid false coloring too austere and sad, and for the painter too florid, §717. Yet I fear that the festive line, as they call it, in Ovid, *Tristia* I.3.10, has something of false-colored charm: “Because my limping poems sink down in alternate verse, either the rule of the foot or the long road causes this. Do you see the paper pale with bloodless color? Indeed, because letters do not blush.”

§ 719. The vicious and corrupt kind of thinking which up to this point we have called false coloring, §688, Quintilian calls *shining with little flowers that will fall if lightly shaken, vanishing and dying*; like the other vicious kinds of thinking, by comparison with better things, *just as wool dyed with false color pleases short of purples, and, if you compare it even with a cloak, is overwhelmed by the sight of the better thing. But if you apply sharper judgment to these corrupt things, as sulphurs to dyed cloths, then what had deceived will put off its false color and grow pale with a certain scarcely describable ugliness. Therefore let this shine short of the sun, and as certain tiny animals seem like little fires in the darkness*, XII.10. If you drag such a false-colored Venus from corners and shade into the sun and the crowdedness of a greater theater, there no longer remains for her “moist chalk and color false-dyed with crocodile dung,” Horace, *Epodes* XII.

§ 720. In beautiful thinking there ought to reside *a certain color of grace, not smeared on with false coloring, but diffused through the blood*, that is, a modification of aesthetic light determined through the very nature of the material, of the thinker, and of the principal personal objects, §§688, 622, 623; Cicero, *De oratore* III.199. *The dignity of form itself must be preserved by goodness of color*, §188, Cicero, *De officiis* I.30. This, moreover, *is a certain color of truth without any false coloring*, §423, Cicero, *Brutus* 162, for whose *lineaments the flower of fresh pigments is more lacking than excessively present*, 298, §691. Yet variation following nature should not be lacking, §689, because natural color drawn beyond the boundaries established by nature and continued in one tenor finally is nothing but false coloring. Hence I understand Quintilian, who grants Cassius Severus *very much talent, marvelous sharpness, the highest urbanity*, yet misses in him not only gravity but also *color of speech*, because *he gave more to bile and bitter wit than to counsel*, X.1.

§ 721. Veniamus ad aliquas colorum oppositque coloribus fuci species, exempli gratia. I. A Cicerone desideratur in caeternis oratoribus *urbanitate quadam colorata oratio*. Quaesitusque: *Quis est ille tandem urbanitatis color? Nescio*, inquit, *tantum esse quendam scio. Id tu, Brute, intelliges, quum in Galliam veneris. — In vocibus nostrorum oratorum recinit quoddam et resonat urbanius. Nec hoc in oratoribus modo apparet, sed etiam in caeteris.* de cl. orat. 170. An hic est color idem illud, nescio quid, quod nunc Galli suis solis quidam tribuunt, externis denegant? Fucum illius similem ostendit Catulli Suffenus,

*Homo venustus, et dicax, et urbanus,
qui modo scurra,
Aut si quid hac re tritius, videbatur.*

Idem miram fucorum et apertae foeditatis miscelam exhibet; in poematibus quando

*bellus ille et urbanus
Suffenus, unus caprimulgus ac fossor
Rursus videtur. Tantum abhorret ac mutat.*

§ 722. II. Coniungam, uti coniunctum in Rutilii dicendi genere fuisse apud Ciceronem est. de cl. or. 113. colorem tristem et severum, acrem atque vehementem. Primus est color luctibus conveniens, non ita reliqui, nisi quibusdam tragicis. Est tamen verus quidam *severitatis color, non modo non invidiosus, sed etiam popularis*. Severitatem enim lego apud Ciceronem Fam. VIII. ep. 14. *non veritatem animadversionis tum bonis omnibus, tum infimo cuique gratissimam*. Est verus quidam color ex pudore relucens acrimoniae, cuius *totum genus excelleat e. g. in caussis, in quibus potest inflammari animus iudicis acri et vehementi quadam incitatione*. Cic. Or. II. 185. *Quamquam dubium non est, quin exordium dicendi vehemens et pugnax non saepe esse debeat*. 317. Cicero tamen, operum colores qui satis norat, *vehementer se agere fatetur, iracunde*, negat. Philipp. VIII. 16.

§ 723. Hos colores mentiuntur fuci e. g. eorum qui fronte gravi et tristi supercilio utilitatibus fisci contumaciter adsunt, quos nunquam principibus defuisse putat Plinius Pan. 41. et omnis non iocis tantum ac hilaritati; sed etiam humanitati contraria severitas in cogitando iudicandoque. Acerbam eiusmodi severitatem amet una

Eumenidum intento turba severa foro.
Prop. III. 11.

Veram et fucatam acrimoniam pingit una Cicero, mores pulcre cogitaturi formans de Or. I. 182. quando: *Haec, ait, adjuvant in oratore: lenitas vocis, vultus, pudoris significatio, verborum comitas. Si quid persequere acrius, (hic habes verum colorem, §. 722.) ut invitatus et coactus facere videare. — Ea omnia, quae proborum, demissorum, non acrium, non pertinacium, non litigiosorum, non acerborum sunt, (habes fucum pertinacis et acerbi litigatoris) valde benevolentiam conciliant*. Quemadmodum *vehemens* proprie et recte Macrobio VI. 8. *nimio impetu ac vi mentis instructum* significat, M. §. 699: ita genus cogitandi vehemens et atrox fucum potius, quam verum ac laudabilem colorem, prae se feret, nisi admisceatur eidem genus lenitatis atque mansuetudinis. Cic. de or. II. 200.

§ 721. Let us come to some species of colors and of the false coloring opposed to colors, for the sake of example. I. Cicero misses in certain orators *speech colored by a certain urbanity*. Asked, *What finally is that color of urbanity?* *I do not know*, he says, *only that I know there is a certain one. You, Brutus, will understand it when you come into Gaul. In the voices of our orators something more urban rings and resounds. Nor does this appear only in orators, but also in the rest, Brutus* 170. Is this color the same “I know not what” which some French now attribute only to themselves and deny to foreigners? Catullus’ Sufferus shows a false coloring similar to it: “A graceful man, witty and urban, who only seemed a clown, or if anything is more worn than this.” The same man exhibits a marvelous mixture of false colorings and open ugliness; in poems, when “that pretty and urban Sufferus again seems one goat-milker and ditcher. So much does he differ and change.”

§ 722. II. I shall join, as they were joined in Rutilius’ manner of speaking in Cicero, *Brutus* 113, the sad and severe, sharp and vehement colors. The first is a color fitting for griefs; not so the rest, except in certain tragic matters. Yet there is a true *color of severity, not only not hateful but even popular*. For I read severity in Cicero, *Fam.* IX.14, not as *truth of punishment then most pleasing both to all good men and to the lowest person*. There is a true color of sharpness shining from modesty, whose whole kind excels, for example, in cases in which the judge’s mind can be inflamed by a certain sharp and vehement incitation, Cicero, *De oratore* II.185. Although there is no doubt that a vehement and combative beginning of speaking ought not often to occur, 317, Cicero nevertheless, who knew the colors of works well enough, confesses that he acts vehemently, but denies that he acts angrily, *Philippics* VIII.16.

§ 723. False colorings imitate these colors, for example those of men *who with grave brow and sad eyebrow stubbornly attend to the interests of the treasury*, whom Pliny thinks have never been lacking to princes, *Panegyric* 41; and every severity in thinking and judging contrary not only to jokes and cheerfulness but also to humanity. Let the severe crowd of the Eumenides alone love such bitter severity in the stretched court, Propertius IV.11. Cicero paints true and false sharpness together, forming the manners of one who will think beautifully in *De oratore* I.182, when he says: *These things help in an orator: gentleness of voice, countenance, signification of modesty, courtesy of words. If you pursue something more sharply* (here you have true color, §722), *so that you seem to do it unwillingly and compelled. All those things that belong to upright, modest, not sharp, not stubborn, not litigious, not bitter men* (you have the false coloring of the stubborn and bitter litigant) *very much conciliate goodwill*. Just as *vehement*, properly and rightly in Macrobius VI.8, means *instructed with too great an impulse and force of mind*, *Metaphysics* §699, so a vehement and fierce kind of thinking will display false coloring rather than true and praiseworthy color unless a kind of gentleness and mildness is mixed with it, Cicero, *De oratore* II.200.

§ 724. Hinc *mollienda est in plerisque alio colore asperitas orationis*. Quint. XI. 1. Unde colligas et asperum cogitandi genus colorem esse, et genus illud lenitatis atque mansuetudinis, §. 723. quo gnarus aliquis *animorum tractandorum artifex assequatur, ut aliquid eorum quoque causa videatur facere, contra quos armatus est*. Iungamus luctibus convenienti colori, §. 722. *necessarium periclitanti sollicitudinis colorem*, eumque, quem *sola habet poenitentia, si nulla contingit iis, qui peccaverant, excusatio*. l. c.

Adspice, quot submittat humus formosa colores! Prop.

At cave, ne in fucum degenerent vel nimium *trucis atque violenti*, vel effaeminati, cogitandi generis, ne in foedam desperantium trepidationem, aut vilem ac humilem ante factorum execrationem ac palinodian.

§ 725. III. Est SUBMISSUM COGITANDI GENUS, animi viribus ac impetui parcentis propter reverentiam. Quod quamdiu tantum sibi temperat ab affectanda ubertate, dignitate, exacto veri studio, nitore, ac ornatu, argumentationibus et contentione vehementioribus, quantum vel debita cogitanti, si qua debetur ipsi, reverentia, vel ea, quam ipse debeat nunc rebus ac personis, de quibus aut contra quas meditatatur, nunc futuris suae meditationis spectatoribus praecipuis, κατ' ἤθη, §. 698. postulaverit: verum et naturalem colorem servat, §. 622, 623. Neque negliget moratum hoc, §. 226, 227. et aequabile, §. 267. et strictius etiam temperatum cogitandi genus, §. 270. regulam illam apud Ciceronem, Off. I. 90; *Recte videntur praecipere, qui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos submissius geramus*.

§ 726. Quam primum autem submissum cogitandi genus eo deprimitur, ut vel obliviscatur pulcre cogitaturus suae dignitatis, vel falsam et superstitiosam reverentiam, nescio quibus, nunc rebus, nunc personis exhibens rependove simulans, eadem retrahi se patiatur ab illa copia, dignitate, professione veritatis, ornatu, reprehensione, contentione tandem et impetu animi, quae prae se ferre decenter eleganterque potuisset: tunc idem *humile, submissum, molle, effaeminatum, fractum atque abiectum* cogitandi genus, uti βάθος, §. 217. ita fucus est. §. 688, 725.

§ 727. Hinc Quintilianus, XI. 1. in vitiis numerat *submissum cogitandi genus concitatis in caussis*, i. e. quas salva decori verioris reverentia tamen omni animi impetu diligentiaeque nervis, omni cum copia, dignitate, ornatu ac ardore agi non oporteat solum, sed etiam necesse sit. Ibidem in aliis huc admodum facientibus exemplum adfert Socratis *cuius ad absolutionem profuisset, si conciliasset oratione submissa*, §. 726. *iudicum animos sibi, qui tamen, quoniam id eum minime decuisset, sic egerit, ut, qui poenam suam honoribus summis esset aestimaturus*. Hic addit: *Quando ab hominibus sui temporis parum intelligebatur, posterorum se iudiciis reservavit, brevi detrimento iam ultimae senectutis aevum, omnium saeculorum consequitur*.

§ 728. Pergit Quintilianus l. c. Scipionem Africanum commemorare, qui *patria cedere, quam cum Tribuno plebis, humillimo homine, de innocentia sua contendere maluit*. Tanti putavit heros genus cogitandi male submissum cavere, §. 726. Fontes eius, auctore Quintiliano, sunt, *humiliora illa vitia, submissa adulatio, vilis pudor; in omni negotio neglecta auctoritas, quae fere accidunt his, qui nimium blandi esse volunt*. Adeo gravis submissi cogitandi generis adversarius, quando fucus est, quaerit tamen: *Quis vero nesciat, quin nonnunquam, summittenda sit et contrahenda oratio, ne iudex eam vel intelligere, vel capere non possit?* §. 725. Idem in Cicerone laudat, qui *ne in caussa Cluentii quidem, etsi mater huius palam caput filii petebat, oblitus est reverentiae, quae parentibus debetur, iubetque ipsa re minore ac minus infesta orationem adhuc leniorem et submissiorem*.

§ 724. Hence in most cases the harshness of speech must be softened by another color, Quintilian XI.1. From this you may gather both that the rough kind of thinking is a color, and that the kind of gentleness and mildness, §723, by which some expert artist of handling souls attains that he seems to do something also for the sake of those against whom he is armed, is a color. Let us join to the color fitting griefs, §722, the color of anxiety necessary to one in danger, and that which repentance alone has, if no excuse falls to those who had sinned, cited place. “See how many colors the beautiful earth casts down!” Propertius. But beware lest these degenerate into false coloring either of an excessively grim and violent kind of thinking, or of an effeminate one, or into the foul trepidation of despairing people, or a cheap and low execration and palinode of deeds already done.

§ 725. III. There is a SUBDUED KIND OF THINKING, sparing the powers and impulse of the soul because of reverence. So long as it restrains itself from affected abundance, dignity, exact zeal for truth, brightness and ornament, more vehement arguments and contention, only as much as either reverence owed to the thinker, if any is owed to him, or that reverence which he himself owes now to things and persons about which or against which he meditates, now to the future principal spectators of his meditation, κατ’ ἤθει, §698, requires, it preserves true and natural color, §§622–623. Nor will this moralized, §§226–227, equable, §267, and even more strictly tempered kind of thinking, §270, neglect Cicero’s rule in *De officiis* 1.90: *Those seem rightly to prescribe who advise that the higher we are, the more submissively we should conduct ourselves.*

§ 726. But as soon as the subdued kind of thinking is depressed so far that one who will think beautifully either forgets his own dignity, or, exhibiting or pretending in return false and superstitious reverence to I know not what things or persons, allows himself to be drawn back by the same from that abundance, dignity, profession of truth, ornament, refutation, contention, and finally impulse of soul which he could fittingly and elegantly have displayed, then this same low, subdued, soft, effeminate, broken, and abject kind of thinking, like βάθος, §217, is false coloring, §§688, 725.

§ 727. Hence Quintilian, XI.1, counts among faults a subdued kind of thinking in excited cases, that is, in cases which, with reverence for truer decorum preserved, nevertheless ought and must be handled with every impulse of soul, every sinew of diligence, every abundance, dignity, ornament, and ardor. In the same place, among other examples very relevant here, he adduces Socrates, for whose acquittal it would have helped if he had conciliated the judges’ minds to himself by subdued speech, §726; yet because this least of all became him, he acted in such a way as one who would value his punishment at the highest honors. Here he adds: *When he was little understood by the men of his own time, he reserved himself for the judgments of posterity, about to gain the age of all centuries by a brief loss at the very end of old age.*

§ 728. Quintilian continues in the cited place to mention Scipio Africanus, who preferred to leave his country rather than contend about his innocence with a tribune of the people, a very low man. The hero considered it so important to avoid a badly subdued kind of thinking, §726. Its sources, according to Quintilian, are those lower vices: subdued flattery, base shame, authority neglected in every business, which usually happen to those who wish to be too pleasing. So grave an opponent of the subdued kind of thinking, when it is false coloring, nevertheless asks: *Who does not know that sometimes speech must be lowered and contracted, lest the judge be unable either to understand or grasp it?* §725. The same praises Cicero, who not even in the case of Cluentius, although this man’s mother openly sought her son’s head, forgot the reverence owed to parents, and he orders that when the matter itself is smaller and less hostile, speech be still gentler and more subdued.

§ 729. IIII. Et ERECTUM ET AUDAX COGITANDI GENUS animi vim ac impetum intendentis propter dignitatem, quo elate cogitatur et dicitur, licet non semper sublimiter, §. 287. In hoc cavendus est fucus arrogantiae, V. Est ludicrum et iocosum, in quo vitetur affectata scurrilitas, praesertim *in parum modestis ac pudicis*, et generatim, *ne nimium ridiculus videri velis*. VI. Est grave, in quo ne qua senilis auctoritas immatura deprehendatur. VII. Est dulce, cuius decoctam aversatur dulcedinem Cicero. Sed satis de his. §. 692.

SECTIO XXXXIII

ARGUMENTA ILLUSTRANTIA

§ 730. Argumenta quorum (vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime considerata;) vis est, lucem datae perceptioni affundere, sunt DECLARANTIA (explicantia). Dabunt itaque perspicuitatem vel intellectualem, RESOLVENTIA (analytice) quale est *definitio propriam cuiusvis rei vim declarans*, Cic. de Or. I. 190. vel sensitivam, §. 614, 618. nunc absolutam certe, §. 617, 625, nunc omnino nitorem aliquem exhibent, et a potiori dicuntur ILLUSTRANTIA (pingentia). Cicero, Fam. V. ep. 13. *saepius dicendum, et non significandum modo, quod fieri potest obscurius, sed etiam declarandum* iudicat, quod optat Luceium clare perspicere.

§ 731. Iustissima vitandi fuci cautio, S. XXXXII. suadebit in argumentis et figuris pingentibus ac illustrantibus §. 730; 26, praesertim ea tantum ornamenta sectari, quae praeter illustrationem simul ubertati, dignitati, verisimilitudini, reliquisque cogitandorum gratiis, vel singulis serviant, vel saltim aliquibus, §. 142. quae vero tantum pinxerint, praeterea nihil ad totius pulcritudinem conferre videantur, parca manu adspargere, vel ambitiosa recidere, §. 164.

§ 729. IV. There is also an ERECT AND BOLD KIND OF THINKING, intensifying the force and impulse of the soul because of dignity, by which one thinks and speaks loftily, although not always sublimely, §287. In this the false coloring of arrogance must be avoided. V. There is the playful and joking kind, in which affected buffoonery must be avoided, especially *in things insufficiently modest and chaste*, and generally, *lest you wish to seem too ridiculous*. VI. There is the grave kind, in which no immature aged authority should be detected. VII. There is the sweet kind, whose overcooked sweetness Cicero rejects. But enough about these, §692.

SECTION XXXXIII

ILLUSTRATIVE ARGUMENTS

§ 730. Arguments whose force, whether sole, more important, or now chiefly to be considered, is to pour light onto a given perception are DECLARATIVE (explanatory). Therefore they will give either intellectual perspicuity, RESOLVING analytically, such as *a definition declaring the proper force of any thing*, Cicero, *De oratore* I.190; or sensory perspicuity, §§614, 618, now certainly absolute, §§617, 625, and now wholly exhibiting some brightness. From the more important part they are called ILLUSTRATIVE (pictorial). Cicero, *Fam.* V.13, judges that what he wants Luceius to see clearly must be *said more often, and not only signified, which can be done more obscurely, but also declared*.

§ 731. The most just caution for avoiding false coloring, Section XLII, will advise that in pictorial and illustrative arguments and figures, §§730, 26, one especially pursue only those ornaments which, besides illustration, also serve abundance, dignity, verisimilitude, and the remaining graces of things to be thought, either individually or at least some of them, §142. Those which only paint and seem to contribute nothing further to the beauty of the whole should be sprinkled with a sparing hand or cut away as ambitious, §164.

§ 732. Perceptiones praegnant, M. §. 517. et complexae, M. §. 530. et ipsae, caetera si fuerint paria, magis splendent, quam minus complexae; et totius quam ingrediuntur, meditationis possunt argumenta fieri illustrantia, §. 730. Hinc minus praegnantibus, minus complexis pulcre praeferuntur, praesertim quando ipsae adhaerentes perceptiones tamen aliquid simul probant, vel movent, §. 731. Hinc magnum epithetorum bene lectorum artificium. Exemplis abundant pulcra omnia. Virgilii sumamus eclogam in primis eius poematibus primam. Ibi non dicit: Amaryllida canta, sed:

Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas,

non dicit:

Haec urbs multum alias inter caput extulit urbes,

sed tantum,

Quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi.

Non dicit libertatem sibi venisse seni, sed:

Candidior postquam tondenti barba cadebat.

Non scribit: Nunquam illius obliviscemur, sed:

*Ante leves pascentur in aethere cervi,
Et freta destituent nudos in littore pisces;
Ante pererratis amborum finibus exsul
Aut Ararim Parthus bibet, aut Germania Tygrim,
Quam nostro illius labatur pectore vultus.*

Tandem non ait: iam vesper adest, sed:

*Iam summa procul villarum culmina fumant
Maioresque cadunt altis de montibus umbrae.*

§ 733. Quoniam HYPOTYPOSIS, vivida alicuius descriptio, non illustrat solum, §. 618, sed etiam probat, §. 550, 551. inter meliora pingentium argumenta merito refertur, §. 731. DIATYPOSIS est hypotyposis ardentior. Hinc diatyposis est in argumentis illustrantium optimis, §. 731, cuius species est CHARACTERISMUS, diatyposis morator. §. 226. Exemplum dabit Lucianus, et Theophrastus, et huius imitator in Gallis princeps.

§ 734. Una perceptionum connexarum et coniunctarum, s. sociarum alteram potest declarare, imo etiam illustrare, §. 730, si simul cum hac attendatur vivide, M. §. 516, i. e. comparetur. M. §. 626. Hinc substitutio illius pro hac pulcre cogitanda, vel coniunctio illius cum hac, non sine vividitate, dabit ARGUMENTUM illustrans A COMPARATIS; quod aliqui dicunt A MEDITATIONE, §. 730, nos dicamus figuram, §. 26, COMPARATIONEM et collationem LATIUS, quae complectitur assimilationem, sed in multa etiam alia argumentorum genera diffunditur, quam quae petantur a simili. e. g.

Tantaene animis caelestibus irae? Aen. I. 15.

et Carthaginis statim sequens illustratio 1) ab aetate 2) ab incolis 3) a situ 4) a divitiis 5) a studiis belli 6) a favore Iunonis, v. 16–22. Hinc odium in Aeneam, comparatis caussis aliis, v. 23–36. Tandem meditationis epiphonema:

Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem.

§ 732. Pregnant perceptions, Metaphysics §517, and complex perceptions, Metaphysics §530, themselves, other things being equal, shine more than less complex ones; and they can become illustrative arguments of the whole meditation into which they enter, §730. Hence they are beautifully preferred to less pregnant and less complex perceptions, especially when the adhering perceptions themselves at the same time prove or move something, §731. Hence the great artifice of well-chosen epithets. All beautiful things abound in examples. Let us take Virgil's first eclogue among his earliest poems. There he does not say: sing Amaryllis, but "you teach the woods to resound beautiful Amaryllis"; he does not say, "this city has raised its head much among other cities," but only, "as cypresses are accustomed to do among pliant viburnums." He does not say that freedom came to him as an old man, but "after my beard, whiter, fell as I was clipping it." He does not write, "we shall never forget him," but "sooner will light deer graze in the air and seas leave fish naked on the shore; sooner, after the boundaries of both have been wandered through, will the Parthian exile drink the Arar or Germany the Tigris, than his face slip from our heart." Finally he does not say, "evening is now here," but "now the distant tops of villas smoke, and greater shadows fall from high mountains."

§ 733. Since HYPOTYPOSIS, a vivid description of something, not only illustrates, §618, but also proves, §§550–551, it is deservedly counted among the better pictorial arguments, §731. DIATYPOSIS is a more ardent hypotyposis. Hence diatyposis is among the best illustrative arguments, §731, whose species is CHARACTERISMUS, a more moral diatyposis, §226. Lucian and Theophrastus, and the chief imitator of the latter among the French, will give examples.

§ 734. One of connected and conjoined perceptions, or associated perceptions, can declare another, indeed also illustrate it, §730, if it is vividly attended together with this one, that is, compared, Metaphysics §§516, 626. Hence the substitution of that perception for this one to be beautifully thought, or its conjunction with this one, not without vividness, will give an illustrative ARGUMENT FROM COMPARABLES, which some call FROM MEDITATION, §730. Let us call it, as a figure, §26, COMPARISON and collation BROADLY SPEAKING. This includes assimilation, but also spreads into many other kinds of arguments than those drawn from likeness. For example, "Can there be such great anger in heavenly minds?" and the immediately following illustration of Carthage 1) from age, 2) from inhabitants, 3) from position, 4) from wealth, 5) from studies of war, 6) from Juno's favor, *Aeneid* I.15–22. Hence hatred against Aeneas, with other causes compared, vv.23–36. Finally the epiphonema of the meditation: "So great a burden it was to found the Roman race."

§ 735. Sicut in argumentis augmentibus augmentum, §. 330, in probantibus aetiologiam, §. 545. figuram vidimus ita principem, ut reliquas ad augendum probandumve pertinentes sinu suo comprehendere videantur singulas: ita comparisonem latius dictam in figuris illustrantibus generalem habeamus et principem, §. 734, sine qua ne hypotyposis quidem esse potest, §. 733. et ad quam, velut fontem, reliquae tandem altius consideratae concurrunt. Nam quoniam ex uno simili, aequali, congruente, generatim, notabilius eodem, cognosci, hinc et vividius cognosci, illustrarique potest, §. 730. alterum simile, aequale, congruens, et notabilius idem: M. §. 70, 572. comparatio latius dicta sub se comprehendet argumentum illustrans 1) a simili, aequali, congruente, notabilius eodem, quod figura dicitur a potiori ASSIMILATIO, §. 734. si similia, aequalia, congruentia, notabilius eadem coniungantur. Potest et earundem unum cogitando substitui pro altero.

§ 736. Assimilatio quo similiora, quo minus inaequalia, quo magis congruentia, et proportionata, secundum analogi rationis trutinam, inter se comparabit, hoc erit illa pulcrior, §. 735. Praedicata assimilatis I. comparatis communia TERTIUM COMPARATIONIS dicuntur. In diiudicando tertio comparationis quantitatis etiam est quaedam dimensio, §. 314, 315. Argumentum illustrans a simili non potest a sanae mentis homine ideo proferri, ut unum in comparatis habeatur pro totaliter eodem cum altero, M. §. 269. hinc inter haec detecta quadam differentia perperam omne simile claudicare dicitur. Si in cogitatione A velis illustrare C, hinc assumas B simile ipsi A, in quo idem C belle possis et nitide contemplari, A SUBIECTUM ASSIMILATIONIS per B, TERMINUM ASSIMILATIONIS; simile non claudicans, illustratur, qua tertium comparationis C, etiamsi B possit habere D praedicatum quoddam, quod non est in A. Si vero C illud ipsum tertium comparationis constitutum, cuius gratia omnis peragitur assimilatio, longe se tamen aliter habeat, vel qualitate, vel quantitate, vel utraque, secundum ipsam analogi rationis trutinam, in B, quam in A, tunc laborare pulcritudinem assimilationis non negaverim, §. 315.

§ 737. Assimilatorum in tertiis comparationis detecta quantitatis differentia saltem excusationi locum dabit, §. 736; qualis est:

Si magna licet componere parvis,

et Ovidii Trist. I. 5. pietatem uxoris suae comparantis cum pietate Liviae matronali:

Grandia si parvis assimilare licet.

Assimilationis exemplum dabit Ciceronis Hortensius: *Ut ii, qui combibi purpuram volunt, sufficiunt prius lanam medicamentis quibusdam: sic litteris talibusque doctrinis ante excoli animus et ad sapientiam concipiendam imbui et praeparari debet.* Idem pro Roscio: *Ut ignis, inquit, in aquam coniectus continuo restinguitur et refrigeratur: sic recens falsum crimen, in purissimam et castissimam vitam collatum, statim concidit et exstinguitur.* Item: *Ut non frugem, neque arborem in omni agro reperire possit; sic non omne facinus in omni vita nascitur.*

§ 735. Just as in augmenting arguments we saw augmentation, §330, and in proving arguments aetiology, §545, as principal figures that seem to include within themselves the individual figures belonging to augmenting and proving, so let us take comparison broadly so called as the general and principal figure among illustrative figures, §734. Without it not even hypotyposis can exist, §733, and to it, as to a source, the others finally run back when considered more deeply. For since, from one thing similar, equal, congruent, or generally more notably the same, another similar, equal, congruent, and more notably the same can be known, and hence more vividly known and illustrated, §730; Metaphysics §§70, 572, comparison broadly so called will contain under itself the illustrative argument 1) from the similar, equal, congruent, or more notably the same. This figure is called chiefly ASSIMILATION, §734, if similar, equal, congruent, or more notably same things are joined. One of them can also be substituted in thought for the other.

§ 736. The more similar, less unequal, more congruent and proportionate, according to the scale of the analogue of reason, the things compared by assimilation are, the more beautiful the assimilation will be, §735. Predicates common to the assimilated or compared things are called the THIRD OF COMPARISON. In judging this third of comparison there is also a certain measure of quantity, §§314–315. An illustrative argument from the similar cannot be put forward by a sane person so that one of the compared things is taken as totally the same as the other, Metaphysics §269. Hence, when some difference is discovered between them, it is wrongly said that every likeness limps. If, in thought A, you wish to illustrate C, and therefore assume B, similar to A, in which you can beautifully and brightly contemplate the same C, A is the SUBJECT OF ASSIMILATION through B, the TERM OF ASSIMILATION. The likeness does not limp, insofar as it is illustrated according to the third of comparison C, even if B may have some predicate D that is not in A. But if that very C, established as the third of comparison for whose sake the whole assimilation is carried out, nevertheless behaves very differently in B than in A, in quality, quantity, or both, according to the very scale of the analogue of reason, then I will not deny that the beauty of the assimilation suffers, §315.

§ 737. A discovered difference of quantity in the thirds of comparison of assimilated things will at least leave room for excuse, §736, such as “if it is permitted to compare great things with small,” and Ovid’s phrase in *Tristia* 1.5, comparing his wife’s devotion with Livia’s maternal devotion: “If it is permitted to assimilate great things to small.” Cicero’s *Hortensius* will give an example of assimilation: *As those who want wool to drink in purple first prepare it with certain medicines, so the mind ought first to be cultivated by such letters and doctrines and imbued and prepared for conceiving wisdom.* Likewise, *Pro Roscio*: *As fire thrown into water is immediately put out and cooled, so a fresh false charge, brought against the purest and chastest life, at once collapses and is extinguished.* Again: *As one cannot find grain or a tree in every field, so not every crime is born in every life.*

§ 738. Regulam, quae iubet argumentis tantum illustrantibus praeferre simul aliam utilitatem exhibentia, §. 731. sic illustrat assimilando Quintilianus VIII. 3: *An ego fundum cultiorem putem, in quo mihi quis ostenderit lilia et violas et amoenos fontes scaturientes, quam ubi plena messis aut graves fructu vites erunt? Sterilem platanum, et tonsas myrtos, quam maritatam vitem, et uberes oleas, praeoptaverim? Habeant illa divites, licet, quid essent, si aliud nihil haberent? — Et ego in ordinem et certa intervalla meas arbores redigam. Quid enim, quaeso, illo quincunce speciosius? quid, in quamcumque partem spectaveris, rectius? Sed protinus in id quoque prodest, ut terrae succum aequaliter trahant. Oleae cacumina in altum exsurgentia ferro coercebo, in orbem se formosius fundet, et protinus fructum ramis pluribus feret. Decentior equus, cui adstricta ilia, si idem velocior. Pulcer adspectu si athleta est, cuius lacertos exercitatio expressit, idem est certamini paratior. Nunquam vera species ab utilitate dividitur.*

§ 739. Assimilationis hoc §. 735. in genere id est praecipue custodiendum: *ne id, quod similitudinis gratia adscivimus, aut obscurum sit, aut ignotum. Debet enim, quod illustrandae alterius rei gratia assumitur, ipsum esse clarius eo, quod illuminat. Quare poetis quidem permittamus sane huiusmodi exempla:*

*Qualis ubi hibernam Lyciam Xanthique fluenta
Deserit, aut Delon maternam invisit Apollo.*

Non idem decebit oratorem, ut occultis aperta demonstret. Quint. I. c. Efferamus legem generalius: Terminus comparationis et illustrationis omnis, hinc et assimilationis, spectatoribus nostris, quos praecipue debemus accendere, sit notior ac vividior subiecto comparationis, illustrationis, et hinc etiam assimilationis, §. 736. Hinc poeta, qualis Virgilius, lectores suos potissimum attendendos per mundum graecae mythologiae poeticum versatissimos qui potuit supponere, recte potest assimilationem instituere, quam habet Quintilianus, sicut et illam Didus in templum venientis, Aen. I. 502:

*Qualis in Eurotae ripis, aut per iuga Cynthi
Exercet Diana choros, quam mille secutae
Hinc atque hinc glomerantur Oreades; illa pharetram
Fert humero, gradiensque deas supereminet omnes,
Latonae tacitum pertentant gaudia pectus;
Talis erat Dido, talem se laeta ferebat
Per medios instans operi regnisque futuris.*

§ 740. Orator, populum praesertim auditorem qui tenetur animadvertere, neque mythologum, neque geographum affatim, his assimilationibus abstinere, cum poeta Christianis scribente, §. 600. In bucolicis assimilatio pulchra est:

Alba ligustra cadunt, vaccinia nigra leguntur;

licet possit esse lectori, neque ruris neque botanices perito, subobscurus assimilationis terminus, quoniam eiusmodi lectorem non habent obiectum suum personale primum bucolica.

§ 738. Quintilian VIII.3 illustrates by assimilation the rule that merely illustrative arguments should be subordinated to those that also exhibit another use, §731: *Would I think a farm more cultivated where someone showed me lilies and violets and pleasant bubbling springs than where there will be a full harvest or vines heavy with fruit? Would I prefer a sterile plane tree and clipped myrtles to a married vine and rich olives? Let the rich have those things, if they like; what would they be if they had nothing else? And I too shall arrange my trees in order and at fixed intervals. For what, I ask, is more beautiful than that quincunx? what more straight, whichever way you look? But immediately it is also useful, so that they draw the juice of the earth equally. I shall restrain with iron the tops of the olive trees rising upward; it will pour itself out more beautifully in a circle, and immediately bear fruit on more branches. A horse whose flanks are tight is more becoming, if the same horse is swifter. If an athlete whose arms exercise has marked is beautiful to look at, he is also more ready for the contest. True beauty is never divided from utility.*

§ 739. In this kind of assimilation, §735, this must chiefly be observed: *that what we have brought in for the sake of likeness be neither obscure nor unknown. For what is assumed for the sake of illustrating another thing must itself be clearer than what it illuminates. Therefore let us indeed allow poets examples of this sort: "As when Apollo leaves winter Lycia and the streams of Xanthus, or visits maternal Delos." The same will not become the orator, to show open things by hidden ones*, Quintilian, cited place. Let us state the law more generally: every term of comparison and illustration, and hence of assimilation, should be better known and more vivid to our spectators, whom we especially ought to inflame, than the subject of comparison, illustration, and hence assimilation, §736. Therefore a poet such as Virgil, who could suppose his chiefly intended readers to be very well versed in the poetic world of Greek mythology, can rightly institute the assimilation Quintilian has, as also that of Dido coming into the temple, *Aeneid* I.502.

§ 740. The orator, who is bound to notice especially the people as audience, and who does not have a mythologist or geographer in abundance before him, abstains from these assimilations, together with the poet writing to Christians, §600. In bucolics the assimilation is beautiful: "White privets fall, black hyacinths are gathered," although the term of assimilation can be somewhat obscure to a reader skilled neither in the country nor in botany, because bucolic poetry does not have such a reader as its primary personal object.

§ 741. *Illud, de quo dixi, similitudinis genus ornat orationem, facitque sublimem, §. 336. floridam, §. 693. nunc mirabilem. Nam quo quaeque longius petita est, hoc plus affert novitatis atque inexpectata magis est.* Quint. l. c. Longius petitam opponit vulgaribus. Nihil profecto magis absonum, quam illustrationes tritas ac vulgares propinare pulcra exspectantibus. Quoniam enim, quam primum coeperis, nauseam movent, et audiendi spectandive, generatim attendendi fastidium; qui possint intendere claritatem illustraturae, quam tamen extinguunt et opprimunt? His autem decantatis et tritis a Phoebis, ab Alexandro M. a sole comparisonibus novas potius et inusitatas opponerem, quam longius petitas. LONGIUS PETITUM est ARGUMENTUM, in quo committitur saltus aesthetice illegitimus, cuius elegans scilicet combinatio cum re praesertim cogitanda difficulter est aut prorsus non est observabilis analogo rationis praecipuorum, quos attendere debes, spectatorum, ob perceptionum intermediarum, sed omissarum, multitudinem. Argumenta, hinc figurae, illustrationes, comparationes, et similitudines longius petitae, quia circa patulum orbem morantur, §. 138. rotunditati inimicae, dum hiatum pandunt, §. 166. contra unitatem aestheticam, §. 439. quoniam terminus et subiectum comparationis adeo distant, ut nulla possit eleganter in iisdem deprehendi inseparabilitas, hinc attentionem distrahunt potius, quam aequabiliter diffundunt, haerere potius et desperare iubent, quam ad ἔξοχον usque continuare, quamcunque novitatis speciem mentiantur, cavendae potius et recidendae sunt, quam admirationis gratia captandae.

SECTIO XXXXIII

COMPARATIO MAIORIS ET MINORIS

§ 742. Comparatio latius dicta, figura princeps illustrantium, §. 735. comprehendit sub se 2) comparisonem partis cum toto, totius cum partibus, superioris, generum, specierum cum inferioribus generibus, speciebus et individuis, inferioris, individui, speciei, generis cum superiore, specie, vel genere, sub quibus contineatur. Quis enim nescit ex toto partem, ex ungue leonem, ex generibus species et individua, ex Sinone Pelasgos, ex Graecis homines cognosci, vividius etiam, hinc illustrari posse? §. 730. Quoniam autem totum maius suis partibus, et conceptus superior maior ac latior est, et plura sub se comprehendens, quam inferior, sub eodem cum aliis comprehensus, descriptam hanc comparisonem eiusmodi conceptuum liceat dicere COMPARATIONEM MAIORIS AC MINORIS, si subiectum comparationis fuerit minus, pars, vel inferior quidam conceptus, ADSCENDENTEM; si subiectum comparationis fuerit maius, totum vel superior quidam conceptus, DESCENDENTEM.

§ 741. *That kind of likeness about which I have spoken adorns speech and makes it sublime*, §336, *florid*, §693, *and now marvelous*. *For the farther each thing is sought, the more novelty it brings and the more unexpected it is*, Quintilian. He opposes what is sought from farther away to commonplaces. Nothing is more discordant than offering worn and vulgar illustrations to those expecting beautiful things. As soon as they begin, they produce nausea and disgust at hearing, seeing, or generally attending; how can they intensify the clarity they were to illustrate, when they extinguish and crush it? To these hackneyed comparisons from Phoebus, Alexander the Great, and the sun, I would oppose new and unusual comparisons rather than ones fetched from farther away. A FAR-FETCHED ARGUMENT is one in which an aesthetically illegitimate leap is committed, whose elegant combination with the thing chiefly to be thought is difficult or impossible for the analogue of reason of the principal spectators to observe, because of the multitude of intermediate perceptions omitted. Far-fetched arguments, figures, illustrations, comparisons, and likenesses, because they linger around an open circuit, §138, hostile to roundedness, while they open a gap, §166, against aesthetic unity, §439, since the term and subject of comparison are so distant that no inseparability can be elegantly detected in them, distract attention rather than spread it equably. They command one rather to stick fast and despair than to continue up to the ἔξοχον. Whatever appearance of novelty they feign, they should be avoided and cut away rather than sought for admiration's sake.

SECTION XXXXIII

COMPARISON OF GREATER AND LESSER

§ 742. Comparison broadly so called, the principal figure of illustrations, §735, contains under itself 2) comparison of part with whole, whole with parts, superior, genera, and species with inferior genera, species, and individuals, and of inferior, individual, species, and genus with the superior, species, or genus under which it is contained. For who does not know that from the whole the part, from the claw the lion, from genera species and individuals, from Sinon the Pelasgians, from Greeks human beings, can be known, and even known more vividly, and hence illustrated? §730. Since the whole is greater than its parts, and the superior concept is greater and broader and contains more under itself than the inferior contained under it together with others, it is permissible to call this described comparison of such concepts COMPARISON OF GREATER AND LESSER: ASCENDING if the subject of comparison is the lesser, a part, or some inferior concept; DESCENDING if the subject of comparison is the greater, the whole, or some superior concept.

§ 743. Comparatio adscendens est a) si partem et varium aliquod certi totius ex eiusdem toto reddamus illustrius. Virgilius Georg. I. in primis coloni regulis legit, praediscere:

*patrios cultusque habitusque locorum,
Et quid quaeque ferat regio, quid quaeque recuset.*

Quoniam de cultu et habitu unius loci loquitur, quem unus aliquis avarus agricola, v. 46. possideat, minutulam telluris partem habet subiectum comparationis, quid per huius patrios cultus et habitus praediscendos intelligat, illustraturus terminum comparationis sibi sumit, huius agri totum, omnem tellurem, per quam ubique

*Hic segetes, illic veniunt felicius uvae,
Arborei foetus alibi, atque iniussa virescunt
Gramina.
Continuo has leges aeternaque foedera certis
Imposuit natura locis, quo tempore primum
Deucalion vacuum lapides iactavit in orbem.*

§ 744. Comparatio adscendens est b) si perceptionem aliquam inferius et magis determinatum sistentem illustremus per perceptionem, quae distinctius inferioris superius, ac minus determinatum exhibeat. Erit hinc comparatio adscendens huius indolis illustratio α) individui per suam speciem vel genus aliquod, sub quo datum individuum contineatur. Mercurius ipse Didonem metuendam Aeneae persuasurus: comparat cum eadem eius sexum, veluti genus:

*Varium, inquiens, et mutabile semper
Foemina.*

Aen. III. 569. β) speciei per suum quoddam genus. Species oeconomiae rusticae, agricultura:

curis acuens mortalia corda,

Georg. I. 123. illustratur a suis generibus:

*labor omnia vincit
Improbis et duris urgens in rebus egestas.*

γ) genus per genus suum superius. Genus seminum degenerantium post aliquot annos ibidem illustratur a genere suo tantum non supremo:

*Sic omnia fatis
In peius ruere ac retro sublapsa referri.*

§ 745. Hanc comparationem adscendentem in speciem vel genus aliquando dicunt illustrationem a loco communi, nunc a sententia, §. 526. nunc per praedicamentorum 10 loculos quaerere suadent, et spondent inventum iri. §. 133, 134. Nobis naturali ratione si quid argumentorum eiusmodi se pulcre cogitaturis offerat, eo faciemus idem maioris, quia sic illustrat, ut 1) semper simul probet, §. 547–549. quod elegans est, §. 731. 2) medium heuristicum elegantioris comparationis esse possit, quoties cogitato A individuo, specie, vel genere quodam primo venerit in mentem B, sub quo A contineatur, velut ipsi A superior species, vel genus subalternans. Hoc ipsum autem B deinde secundum associationem idearum notionumve naturalem reproducat perceptiones alias, praeter A, sub se contentas, C, D, E. e. c. vel individuorum sub eadem specie, vel conspicerum cum A sub eodem genere, vel congenerum cum A sub eodem genere superiore contentorum, nunc unius, nunc plurium. Tunc enim illustratio ipsius A per B erit comparatio adscendens, unde nascatur illustratio ipsius A per C, vel D, vel E, unum vel plura, assimilatio. §. 735.

§ 743. Ascending comparison is a) if we make a part and some variety of a definite whole more illustrious from the whole itself. In *Georgics* I, among the first rules for the farmer, Virgil chooses to learn beforehand “the ancestral cultivations and habits of places, and what each region bears, what each refuses.” Since he speaks of the cultivation and habit of one place, which some one greedy farmer may possess, v.46, he has as the subject of comparison a tiny part of the earth. To illustrate what he means by learning beforehand the ancestral cultivations and habits of this place, he takes as the term of comparison the whole of this field, the entire earth, through which everywhere “here crops come more happily, there grapes, elsewhere tree-fruits, and unbidden grasses grow green. Immediately nature imposed these laws and eternal covenants on fixed places, at the time when Deucalion first cast stones into the empty world.”

§ 744. Ascending comparison is b) if we illustrate a perception presenting something lower and more determinate through a perception that more distinctly exhibits the superior and less determinate of the lower. Hence an illustration of this character will be ascending comparison: α) of an individual through its species or some genus under which the given individual is contained. Mercury himself, wishing to persuade Aeneas that Dido is to be feared, compares with her her sex as a genus: “Woman is always variable and changeable,” *Aeneid* IV.569. β) Of a species through some genus of its own. The species of rural economy, agriculture, “sharpening mortal hearts with cares,” *Georgics* I.123, is illustrated from its genera: “relentless labor conquers all, and want pressing in hard circumstances.” γ) Of a genus through its superior genus. The genus of seeds degenerating after some years is illustrated there by its almost highest genus: “Thus all things by fates rush into the worse and are borne backward, sliding down.”

§ 745. This ascending comparison into species or genus is sometimes called illustration from a common place, now from a sententia, §526; now they advise seeking it through the ten little boxes of the predicaments and promise that it will be found, §§133–134. If any argument of this kind naturally offers itself to those who will think beautifully, we shall value it more because it illustrates in such a way that 1) it always also proves, §§547–549, which is elegant, §731; 2) it can be a heuristic means of more elegant comparison, whenever, after thinking A, some individual, species, or genus, B first comes to mind, under which A is contained as a superior species or subalternating genus. This B then, according to the natural association of ideas or notions, reproduces other perceptions contained under itself besides A, C, D, E, and so forth: now one or several individuals under the same species, now co-species with A under the same genus, now co-genera with A under the same superior genus. Then the illustration of A through B will be an ascending comparison, from which is born the illustration of A through C, D, E, one or several: assimilation, §735.

§ 746. Comparatio descendens §. 742. erit a) si totum aliquod illustretur α) vel aliqua eiusdem ex parte, β) vel enumeratione plurium in eodem toto contentarum partium et notarum, quam PARTITIONEM logici vocant. Aeneas illustraturus:

Instar montis, equum,

ut ex partis data magnitudine metiantur secum auditores partium reliquarum molem et totius amplitudinem, comparatione descendente in unam partem addit:

sectaque intexunt abiete costas.

Aen. II. 16.

§ 747. Partitio §. 746. vel occultior latet in omni definitione, descriptione, et hypotyposi, cum suis speciebus, §. 733. quoniam definiendum describendumve totum omne quarundam notarum et partium illustratur inter definiendum et describendum recensione, qua simul argumentum probans nanciscimur. §. 550, 731. vel apertior et elegantius elaborata peculiaris figurae nomen strictius retinet, donec communi mox indicanda denominatione cum alia comparatione descendente, quae sequetur, comprehendatur. Poterit involvi praeteritionibus et synathroismi quadam congerie, copiae documentum. §. 148. Poterit illi, quod partimur, quaesitam magnitudinem et dignitatem conciliare satis gravium partium ἐξαρπίμῃσις, §. 298, 348. praeter illustrationem §. 731. Quantum analogo rationis decedit intensivae lucis et distinctionis in singulis notis et partibus, tanto magis numero partium notarumve gaudet extensiva claritate, §. 730. Unde primarium pulchrae meditationis obiectum totum aliquod, non temere, si belle cogitare volueris, sine quadam illius partium declaratione dimittatur. Hanc tamen completam explicite ponere ob oculos vix suaserim. Praestat inchoatam nonnihil continuare, neque tamen ante absolvere, quam quasdam eius partes ita in umbram conieceris, ut videatur spectator adhuc habere, quae sibi ipse tractet, quae latent, forte meliora putaturus et plura, quam si totum partiundo videaris exhausisse. §. 654.

§ 746. Descending comparison, §742, will be a) if some whole is illustrated α) either by one of its parts, β) or by an enumeration of several parts and marks contained in the same whole, which logicians call PARTITION. When Aeneas is about to illustrate “the horse, like a mountain,” so that from the given size of a part the hearers may measure within themselves the mass of the remaining parts and the amplitude of the whole, he adds, by a descending comparison into one part, “and they weave its ribs with cut fir,” *Aeneid* II.16.

§ 747. Partition, §746, either lies more hidden in every definition, description, and hypotyposis with their species, §733, because every whole to be defined or described is illustrated, while being defined and described, by a listing of certain marks and parts, by which we at the same time obtain a proving argument, §§550, 731; or, more open and more elegantly elaborated, it retains the stricter name of a particular figure until it is included under a common denomination soon to be indicated with the other descending comparison that follows. It can be wrapped in praeteritions and in some heap of synathroismus as proof of abundance, §148. The ἐξαρτίθμησις of sufficiently weighty parts can conciliate to the thing we partition the magnitude and dignity sought, §§298, 348, besides illustration, §731. The more intensive light and distinction in individual marks and parts withdraws from the analogue of reason, the more it rejoices in extensive clarity by the number of parts or marks, §730. Hence, if you wish to think beautifully, let not the primary object of a beautiful meditation, some whole, be dismissed rashly without some declaration of its parts. Yet I would scarcely advise placing the complete declaration explicitly before the eyes. It is better to continue it somewhat begun, and yet not finish it before you have thrown some of its parts into shade, so that the spectator seems still to have things to handle for himself, things hidden, perhaps thinking them better and more numerous than if you seemed to have exhausted the whole by partitioning, §654.

§ 748. Virgilium euntem per partes clipei, quem Aeneae mater donabat, iam vidimus.
§. 459. Catullum c. 63. ubi partitur:

*Vestem, quae priscis hominum variata figuris
Heroum mira virtutes indicat arte,*

sequatur, qui volet, a v. 52–265. ubi tamen *Talibus pergens*, non his, indicat se partitionem nondum absolvisse, §. 747. Suppartitionem aliquam, ut cum schola barbare loquar, excerptamus:

*At parte ex alia florens volitabat Iacchus,
Cum thiaso Satyrorum et Nysigenis Silenis,
Te quaerens, Ariadna, tuoque incensus amore.
Qui tum alacres passim lymphata mente furebant,
Euoe bacchantes, euoe capita inflectentes.
Horum pars tecta quatiebant cuspide thyrsos,
Pars e divulso iactabant membra iuvenco,
Pars sese tortis serpentibus inungebant,
Pars obscura cavis celebrabant orgia cistis,
Orgia, quae frustra cupiunt audire profani.
Plangebant alii proceris tympana palmis,
Aut tereti tenues tinnitus aere ciebant,
Multi raucisonis efflabant cornua bombis, e. c.*

Confer Ovidii descriptionem regiae solis, Met. II. 5–18, et Corynnae cum suo:

Singula quid referam?

inchoatam potius, quam omnibus partibus absolutam explicite.

§ 749. Comparatio descendens §. 742. erit b) si superius quoddam, vel genus, vel species, illustretur per inferiora, quae sub se continet, vel unum, vel plura. In priori casu erit exemplum, §. 526. in posteriori divisio, quam ad completionem saltem ultra dimidium processisse si aesthetice verisimile est, INDUCTIO AESTHETICA. DIVISIO, enumeratio perceptionum sub aliqua data contentarum, aesthetica cum partitione, vel completae vel incompletae, si cogitentur elegantius, ut figurae, nomine DISTRIBUTIONIS insignantur. §. 747. Huius igitur indolis comparatio descendens illustrabit α) genus quoddam superius per inferius, quod sub se contineat, genus, vel speciem, vel individuum, nunc unum, nunc plura; β) genus infimum per suam speciem et individuum, et perceptionem sub eo contentam vel unam, vel plures; γ) speciem per individuum, quod illa sub se continet, vel unum, vel plura.

§ 748. We have already seen Virgil going through the parts of the shield which Aeneas' mother gave him, §459. Let whoever wishes follow Catullus, poem 63, where he partitions "the garment, varied with ancient figures of men, which with marvelous art shows the virtues of heroes," from vv.52–265; yet *Talibus pergens*, "proceeding with such things," not "with these," indicates that he has not yet completed the partition, §747. Let us extract some subpartition, to speak barbarously with the school: "But on another part flourishing Iacchus was flying with a band of Satyrs and Nysigenian Sileni, seeking you, Ariadne, and inflamed with love of you. Then they, eager, raved everywhere with frenzied mind, Bacchantes crying Euoe, bending their heads. Part of them shook thyrsi with hidden point, part tossed limbs from a torn bull, part girded themselves with twisted serpents, part celebrated dark orgies in hollow chests, orgies which the profane vainly desire to hear. Others beat drums with outstretched palms, or stirred thin tinklings from rounded bronze; many blew horns with hoarse-sounding blasts," and so on. Compare Ovid's description of the palace of the sun, *Metamorphoses* II.5–18, and Corinna's with its "Why should I recount each thing?" begun rather than explicitly completed in all parts.

§ 749. Descending comparison, §742, will be b) if some superior, either genus or species, is illustrated through inferiors which it contains under itself, one or several. In the former case there will be an example, §526; in the latter a division which, if it is aesthetically probable that it has proceeded at least beyond the halfway point toward completion, is AESTHETIC INDUCTION. DIVISION, an enumeration of perceptions contained under some given perception, together with aesthetic partition, whether complete or incomplete, if they are thought more elegantly as figures, are marked with the name DISTRIBUTION, §747. A descending comparison of this character will therefore illustrate α) some superior genus through an inferior contained under it, genus, species, or individual, now one, now several; β) the lowest genus through its species and individual, and through one or several perceptions contained under it; γ) a species through one or several individuals which it contains under itself.

§ 750. Exemplorum exempla maiora sint omnes primo fabulae, §. 526. Aeneis splendide declarat:

*tot volvere casus
Insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores.*

Pluribus Ilias exemplis illustrat illud:

Si quid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.

Lucretius Veneris imperium declarat exemplis primo satis generalibus:

*Per te quoniam genus omne animantum
Concipitur, visitque exortum lumina solis.
Aeriae primum volucres te, diva, tuumque
Significant initum percussae corda tua vi.
Inde ferae pecudes persultant pabula laeta,
Et rapidos tranant amnes. Ita capta lepore
Illecebrisque tuis omnis natura animantum
Te sequitur cupide, quo quamque inducere pergis.*

Neque tamen acquiescere prius potuisse videatur, quam donec exemplis imperium Veneris illustrando descendit usque ad singularem personam, et suppositum Mavortis:

*in gremium qui saepe tuum se
Reiicit aeterno devinctus vulnere amoris,
Atque ita suspiciens tereti cervice reposta
Pascit amore avidos inhians in te, dea, visus, e. c.*

v. 38.

§ 751. Idem generalibus suis assertis:

*saepius olim
Religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta,
Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum,*

non species superstitionum innumeras includit exempli gratia, sed unum aliquod atrox factum:

*Aulide quo pacto Triviai virginis aram
Iphianassai turparunt sanguine foede
Ductores Danaum delecti, e. c.*

Nec Homerus subsistit in enarrandis navium Troiam petentium aliquibus speciebus singularum in enumerationem descendens. Virgilius sibi non satisfacit generali quadam distributione per Italiam bellum Aeneae parantium:

*Ardet inexcita Ausonia atque immobilis ante.
Pars pedes ire parat campis, pars arduus altis
Pulverulentus equis furit; omnes arma requirunt.
Pars laeves clipeos et spicula lucida tergent
Arvina pingui, subiguntque in cote secures,
Signaque ferre iuvat sonitusque audire tubarum.*

VII. 628. Sed progreditur descendendo ad singularia, v. 630–817.

§ 750. Let the greater examples of examples first be all fables, §526. The *Aeneid* splendidly declares “that a man remarkable for piety should roll through so many misfortunes and approach so many labors.” The *Iliad* illustrates by many examples the saying: “If kings rave, the Achaeans are punished.” Lucretius declares the dominion of Venus first by sufficiently general examples: “Through you every race of living things is conceived and, born, sees the lights of the sun. First the birds of air, goddess, struck in heart by your force, signify you and your approach. Then wild herds leap over happy pastures and swim across rushing rivers. Thus captured by your charm and enticements, all nature of living things follows you eagerly wherever you go on leading each.” Yet he does not seem able to rest before, in illustrating Venus’ power by examples, he descends to a singular person and the suppositum of Mars: “who often throws himself back into your lap, bound by the eternal wound of love, and thus looking up, with smooth neck thrown back, feeds his greedy eyes upon you, goddess, gaping with love,” and so on, v.38.

§ 751. The same Lucretius, for his general assertions, “often in the past religion produced criminal and impious deeds” and “so great evils could religion persuade,” does not include innumerable species of superstitions by way of example, but one atrocious deed: “how at Aulis the chosen leaders of the Greeks foully defiled the altar of Trivia’s virgin with Iphianassa’s blood,” and so on. Nor does Homer stop in narrating some species of ships seeking Troy, descending into enumeration of individual ones. Virgil does not satisfy himself with a certain general distribution through Italy of those preparing war against Aeneas: “Ausonia, unexcited and unmoved before, burns. Part prepares to go on foot in the fields, part, dusty, rages high on horses; all seek arms. Part polish smooth shields and bright spears with rich fat, and sharpen axes on the whetstone; it pleases them to carry standards and hear the sounds of trumpets,” VII.628. But he proceeds by descending to singulars, vv.630–817.

§ 752. Cuius altius rimati sumus rationem, §. 556–565. ex qua deduximus, §. 569, 575. quam genus cogitandi tum simpliciter dilucidum in aestheticis, tum splendidum inprimis postulat §. 625. regulam illam heic, suo maxime loco, liceat denuo commendare, generatim et terminis in schola receptis expressam: Si genus cogitandi logicum et scientificum obiecta sua primaria, ne exceptis ipsis quidem individuis, ubi caetera paria sint, lubentius in abstracto considerat: pulcre cogitaturus analogo rationis suas materias praecipuas non in concreto solum, sed etiam in determinatissimis, in quibus potest, hinc in singularibus, suppositis, personis, factis, quoties datur, lubentissime contempletur. M. §. 149.

§ 753. Hinc comparatio adscendens non temere penetrabit sese in tota maxima, et summa rerum genera, quando subiectum comparisonis aequae bene non illustrari solum, sed etiam probari potest comparato toto quodam propiori, specie, vel genere minus remotis, §. 575, 752; quoniam haec sine ratione transiliendo produceres argumentum longius petitus, §. 741. et primariis tuis spectatoribus forte minus cognitum eligeres terminum comparisonis, ac huius subiectum est. §. 736, 739. quoniam superiorum generum, totorumque maximorum notitia plerumque scientiis in abstractiones considerantibus solum acquiritur. §. 567. Sic in comparatione adscendente, quam §. 743. exhibet, Virgilius non provocat ad necessariam rerum omnium diversitatem, M. §. 269–272. quae ne tunc quidem erat incognita, sed in tellure subsistit, eiusque diversitate fructuum.

§ 754. Hinc comparatio adscendens commemorato toto vel superiori lubentissime suam facit occasionem ex hoc toto vel universali descendendi denuo in quasdam partes subiecti comparisonis et alia congenera, vel conspecies, §. 745. quoniam sic totum et genus magis in concreto sistitur, §. 752. Abstractis suis quantuliscunque l. c. Virgilius statim subnectit determinatiora, quibuscum, ut ita dicam, possint intra mentem in vividius quoddam concrelescere:

*Nonne vides, croceos ut Tmolus odores,
India mittat ebur, molles sua thura Sabaei,
At Chalybes nudi ferrum, virosoque Pontus
Castorea, Eliadum palmas Epiros equarum?*

§ 755. Hinc §. 752. comparatio descendens partibus in abstracto tantum distinguendis, e. g. per limites mensoria ratione constitutos, notis et characteribus mente sola per intellectum concipiendis, differentiis genericis, vel etiam specificis, quae semper aliquid relinquunt indeterminati, caetera si fuerint paria, praeferet partes in concreto sensibus ipsis observabiles, quales in agris arcifiniis, notas et characteres sentiendo imaginandoque simul probe assequendos, differentias generis inferioris, prae differentiis superioris, speciei s. specificas prae differentiis genericis, et his omnibus numericas praeferet, si pulcre cogitari volet, ut barbare loquar, haecceitatis apprime studiosa. M. §. 517.

§ 752. We have examined more deeply the reason for this, §§556–565, and from it deduced, §§569, 575, the rule that the kind of thinking both simply clear in aesthetics and especially splendid requires, §625. Let it be permitted here, in its most proper place, to commend that rule again, expressed generally and in terms received in the schools: if the logical and scientific kind of thinking considers its primary objects more willingly in the abstract, not even excepting individuals where other things are equal, one who will think beautifully should contemplate his principal materials for the analogue of reason not only in the concrete, but also in the most determinate things in which he can, and hence in singulars, supposits, persons, and deeds, whenever possible, *Metaphysics* §149.

§ 753. Hence ascending comparison will not rashly press itself into the greatest wholes and highest genera of things when the subject of comparison can equally well not only be illustrated but also proved by some nearer compared whole, species, or less remote genus, §§575, 752. By leaping over these without reason you would produce a far-fetched argument, §741, and choose a term of comparison perhaps less known to your principal spectators than the subject of comparison is, §§736, 739, since knowledge of superior genera and greatest wholes is usually acquired only by sciences considering things more abstractly, §567. Thus, in the ascending comparison which §743 exhibits, Virgil does not appeal to the necessary diversity of all things, *Metaphysics* §§269–272, which even then was not unknown, but stops in the earth and its diversity of fruits.

§ 754. Hence, when an ascending comparison has mentioned the whole or the superior, it most willingly takes occasion from this whole or universal to descend again into certain co-parts of the subject of comparison and other co-genera or co-species, §745, because in this way the whole and genus are set forth more concretely, §752. To his abstractions, such as they are in the cited place, Virgil immediately subjoins more determinate things, with which they can, so to speak, grow together within the mind into something more vivid: “Do you not see how Tmolus sends saffron odors, India ivory, the soft Sabaeans their incense, but the naked Chalybes iron, Pontus reeking castor, Epirus palms of Elean mares?”

§ 755. Hence, §752, descending comparison, if it wishes to be beautifully thought, will prefer to parts distinguished only in the abstract, for example by boundaries established by measurement, parts observable in concrete by the senses themselves, such as in unfenced fields; to marks and characters conceived by the mind alone through intellect, it will prefer marks and characters to be well attained by sensing and imagining together; to generic differences, or even specific differences, which always leave something indeterminate, it will prefer differences of the lower genus before those of the superior, species or specific differences before generic differences, and before all these numerical differences, as I may speak barbarously, especially zealous for haecceities, *Metaphysics* §517.

§ 756. Exempla, inductiones, divisiones et distributiones, §. 749. genus superius illustrantes per inferius, sunt bonae; per species, sunt meliores; per individua, sunt optimae, §. 755. Apud Ovidium habes Metam. III. 206:

Dum dubitat, videre canes.

Horum sunt genera, sunt species, sed genera negliguntur, species determinatissimae, neque tamen nisi propriis innexae nominibus recensentur:

primusque Melampus

Ichnobatesque sagax latratu signa dedere,

Gnossius Ichnobates, Spartana gente Melampus.

Ad hos postquam 35 nominaverat, non sine differentiis quibusdam numericis, tamen addit:

Quosque referre mora est.

225. §. 747.

§ 757. Utinam tot antiquorum exemplis, quae sane non inadvertentibus excidisse difficultas idem ausum satis docebit, excitari possint pulchra ingenia, ut in hac potissimum arte quaerant excellere, si rationibus minus moveantur §. 752. Nobis ad alias exemplorum distributionumque regulas festinandum est. Exempla, divisiones, inductiones et distributiones si recte notiora postulantur, ac illustrandum per easdem superius, §. 739. relative ad obiectum pulcre cogitatur personalium primarium legem intellectam tantum admittimus, §. 740. Ovidius bene suo voto, Trist. I. 1. 2, 3:

Neve, precor; magni subscribe Caesaris irae

primo comparisonem adscendentem, quae simul color sit, §. 745, 545. adiungit:

Saepe premente deo fert deus alter opem.

Nunc dictum suum illustrat exemplorum inductione, quae voti fiunt similia:

Mulciber in Troiam, pro Troia stabat Apollo,

Aequaque Venus Teucris, Pallas iniqua fuit.

Oderat Aenean propior Saturnia Turno,

Ille tamen Veneris numine tutus erat.

Saepe ferox cautum petiit Neptunus Ulyssem,

Eripuit patruo saepe Minerva suo.

Et nobis aliquod, quamvis distamus ab illis,

Quid vetat irato numen adesse deo?

Suis enim primariis spectatoribus quid rebus Troianis notius erat, et deorum per easdem ministeriis? §. 740.

§ 756. Examples, inductions, divisions, and distributions, §749, illustrating a superior genus through an inferior, are good; through species, better; through individuals, best, §755. In Ovid, *Metamorphoses* III.206, you have: “While he hesitates, the dogs saw him.” Of these there are genera and species, but the genera are neglected; the most determinate species are counted, and yet only joined with their proper names: “first Melampus and keen Ichnobates gave signs by barking, Gnossian Ichnobates, Melampus of Spartan race.” After he had named thirty-five, not without certain numerical differences, he nevertheless adds: “and those whom it is delay to recount,” v.225, §747.

§ 757. Would that beautiful talents could be aroused by so many examples of the ancients, which the difficulty of the same attempt proves certainly did not slip out inadvertently, so that they might seek to excel especially in this art, if they are less moved by reasons, §752. We must hasten to other rules of examples and distributions. If examples, divisions, inductions, and distributions are rightly required to be better known than the superior to be illustrated by them, §739, we admit this rule understood only relatively to the primary personal object of the beautiful thinker, §740. Ovid well, in his wish, *Tristia* I.1.2–3, “And do not, I pray, subscribe to great Caesar’s anger,” first adds an ascending comparison which is also color, §§745, 545: “Often, when one god presses, another god brings help.” Now he illustrates his saying by an induction of examples which become similar to the wish: “Muciber stood against Troy, Apollo for Troy, and Venus was fair to the Teucrians, Pallas unfair. Saturnia, nearer to Turnus, hated Aeneas; yet he was safe by Venus’ deity. Often fierce Neptune attacked cautious Ulysses; often Minerva rescued him from her uncle. And what prevents some deity from being present for us, although we are distant from them, when a god is angry?” For what was better known to his primary spectators than Trojan affairs and the offices of the gods through them? §740.

§ 758. Quoniam nova antiquis, loco propiora remotioribus notiora exemplis supponi generatim possunt, M. §. 512. caetera si sint paria, praeferantur antiquis recentia, peregrinis patria, et spectatori, quem inprimis optas, domestica. §. 757. Dialogus de oratoribus, quem alii Tacito, Quintiliano quidam tribuunt, 8. *Lubentius*, ait, *novis et recentibus, quam remotis ac oblitteratis exemplis utor*. Quae ita sunt antiqua, simul ut obsoleta, oblitterata, vel usu longo trita et antiquata videri possint, pulcre postponuntur ita novis, ut simul habeant, quo iustum novitatis studium excitare queant, ac alere. §. 741. Virgilius laudes vitae rusticae illustraturus exemplis non graeca petit, nec Asiam, nec Aegyptum, sed romanis potissimum scribens patrias antiquitates consulit, Georg. II. 532:

*Hanc olim veteres vitam coluere Sabini,
Hanc Remus et frater. Sic fortis Hetruria crevit,
Scilicet, et rerum facta est pulcherrima Roma,
Septemque una sibi muro circumdedit arces.
Aureus hanc vitam in terris Saturnus agebat.*

§ 759. In hac lege probe notandum est, adiectum illi: caetera si sint paria. §. 758. In recentibus enim exemplis multae possunt esse rationes non raro, cur postponenda sint auctori prudenti vetustioribus. e. g. 1) si recentia vel vere non habeant eximium illud, quod per eadem illustrandum est, in tanta luce, in quanta vetustas habuerat, vel saltem ob invidiam nondum intermortuam et solitas acti temporis laudationes aequare prisca statueretur contra verisimilitudinem, saltem eam, de qua §. 486. Hinc est apud Virgilium loco citato satis altum silentium de agricultura italica sui temporis, simul autem consilium, ut in tali casu domestica tamen, licet olim facta, praeferantur, si potest fieri, vetustis et peregrinis simul. Tempore praesentia beatae vitae rusticae exempla prolaturus, in ecstasi philosophicopoetica, v. 475–485. quoniam aulae proxima non potest optare, tamen optat minus remota:

*Rura mihi et rigui placeant in vallibus amnes,
Flumina amem silvasque inglorius. O! ubi campi,
Sperchiusque et virginibus bacchata Lacaenis
Taygeta! O! qui me gelidis in montibus Haemi
Sistat, et ingenti ramorum protegat umbra.*

§ 760. Exempla recentia sunt aliquando 2) periculosa, quorum veritas odium parit, et calumnia potius et conspurcatio nominum illustrissimorum falsissima diceretur, quam illustratio.

*Cervius iratus leges minitatur et urnam,
Canidia Albuci, quibus est inimica, venenum,
Grande malum Turius, si quid se iudice certos.*

Hor. Sat. I. 1. 49. Nec hic semper licet ad artificium Virgilii recurrere, §. 759. et in mortuos quidem, sed cives tamen et loco propiores scribere vel acriter, at venustius, irasci:

*maiorum ne quis amicus
Frigore te feriat.*

Hanc ob caussam in legendis exemplis suis aliquando satyricos ultra Sauromatas fugere libet, in mundum poeticum, §. 513. in quo tamen fictiones prorsus ignotas denuo, §. 518. analogicis postponunt. §. 516.

§ 758. Since new examples can generally be supposed better known than ancient ones, nearer places than remote ones, *Metaphysics* §512, other things being equal, recent examples should be preferred to ancient, native to foreign, and domestic to the spectator whom you especially desire, §757. The *Dialogue on Orators*, which some attribute to Tacitus, some to Quintilian, says in chapter 8: *I use new and recent examples more willingly than remote and forgotten ones*. Things that are so ancient that at the same time they can seem obsolete, forgotten, or worn and antiquated by long use are beautifully postponed to new ones, provided the new examples also have what can excite and nourish a just zeal for novelty, §741. Virgil, about to illustrate the praises of rural life by examples, does not seek Greek examples, nor Asia, nor Egypt, but, writing chiefly for Romans, consults native antiquities, *Georgics* II.532: “This life the old Sabines once cultivated, this Remus and his brother. Thus strong Etruria grew, of course, and Rome became the most beautiful thing of the world and alone surrounded seven citadels with a wall. Golden Saturn lived this life on earth.”

§ 759. In this law one must carefully note the added condition: other things being equal, §758. For in recent examples there can often be many reasons why a prudent author should postpone them to older ones: for example, 1) if recent examples either truly do not have that excellence which is to be illustrated through them in so great a light as antiquity had, or if, because envy has not yet died away and because of the usual praises of time past, to set them equal to ancient examples would be contrary to verisimilitude, at least that mentioned in §486. Hence in Virgil’s cited place there is a sufficiently deep silence about the Italian agriculture of his own time, and at the same time the counsel that in such a case domestic examples, even if done long ago, be preferred, if possible, to examples both ancient and foreign. When he would bring forward present-time examples of blessed rural life, in a philosophical-poetic ecstasy, vv.475–485, since he cannot wish for those closest to court, he nevertheless wishes for less remote ones: “May fields and rivers flowing in valleys please me; may I love rivers and woods, inglorious. O where are the plains, Sperchius, and Taygeta revelled in by Laconian maidens! O who would set me in the cold mountains of Haemus and protect me with the huge shade of branches!”

§ 760. Recent examples are sometimes 2) dangerous, because their truth produces hatred, and they would be called calumny and a most false smearing of most illustrious names rather than illustration: “Angry Cervius threatens laws and urn; Canidia, poison to those to whom she is hostile; Turius, a great evil if you contest anything with him as judge,” Horace, *Satires* I.1.49. Nor is it always permissible here to return to Virgil’s artifice, §759, and to write, indeed against the dead, yet still citizens and nearer in place, sharply but more gracefully, in anger: “lest some friend of your ancestors strike you with cold.” For this reason, in choosing their examples, satirists sometimes wish to flee beyond the Sauromatae into the poetic world, §513, in which nevertheless they again postpone wholly unknown fictions, §518, to analogical ones, §516.

§ 761. Exempla recentia et domestica sunt 3) satis nonnunquam incognita, etiam relative, §. 757. quoties scilicet, vel eius sunt indolis, quam non nisi longa dies plurium ob oculos ponere soleat, e. g. praesentia principum consilia; vel ipsi spectatorum nostrorum primarii domestica negligere solent exterorum avidissimi, vel recentia et ante pedes posita fastidire, toti in eruendis quibusvis antiquissimis. Quanquam enim hic mos non est optimi saporis, tamen obiectum suum personale debet attendere pulcre cogitaturus, uti est, non uti debeat esse, hinc anticipationibus destitutum et cognoscendi studio, si domestica protuleris et

Antiquis non exaudita Cethegis.

§. 484.

§ 762. Exempla, divisiones, inductiones, distributionesque sic satis notae sint, neque tritae ac usitatae illustrationes §. 741. nec e contrario adeo vividae, ut fortiori luce perceptionem suam superiorem obscurant potius, quam illustrent, contra pulcrum lucis et umbrae dispensationem. §. 682. In ultima lege praesertim cavendum est, ne differentia, et id in conceptu inferiori, quod non est determinatum in superiori, tantum lucis accipiat, ut tertia comparationis, et ea, quae superiori convenientia vividius in concreto inferioris pingere laborabas, obumbrentur, adeoque minus exemplum quadrare videatur, ac discrepare ab eo, cuius declarandi gratia proferebatur. §. 670. Non dissuadeo differentiam tangere, sed umbra sit exempli, §. 684. non lumen, §. 686. Ne seducente sub eruditionis specie transcendat horizonem aestheticum exempla, multo minus inductiones et distributiones, §. 121. ne illustrando vel βάθος, vel tumorem concilient, §. 329, 331. sint potius, quantum eius fieri potest, ex quibus simul exemplum ratiocinans et inductio persuasoria formari possit, et practice s. pragmatica, foecunda deducendis inde porismatibus ad agendum impellentibus. §. 721.

SECTIO XXXV

ANTITHESIS

§ 763. Comparatio latius dicta, §. 735. sub se continet 3) comparationem oppositorum, M. §. 549. quae figura §. 26. sit ANTITHESIS. In antithesibus numero primam dissimilitudinem, illustrandum cum dissimili comparantem, ut illius ab hoc differentia magis eluceat. Cat. 5.

*Soles occidere et redire possunt,
Nobis quum semel occidit brevis lux,
Nox est perpetuo una dormienda.*

Hac collatione totam suam odam I. 1. 1. Horatius illustravit, et eiusdem libri frontem ode 7.

*Laudabunt alii claram Rhodon, aut Mitylenen,
Aut Ephesum bimarive Corinthi
Moenia, vel Baccho Thebas, vel Apolline Delphos
Insignes, aut Thessala Tempe.*

§ 761. Recent and domestic examples are 3) sometimes not sufficiently known, even relatively, §757, whenever they are of a kind that only long time usually places before the eyes of many, for example the present counsels of princes; or when our own primary spectators usually neglect domestic things, greedy for foreign ones, or disdain recent and nearby things, wholly occupied with digging up the most ancient things. Although this custom is not of the best taste, nevertheless one who will think beautifully must attend to his personal object as it is, not as it ought to be. Hence, lacking anticipations and zeal for knowing, they may fail you if you bring forward domestic things “not heard by the ancient Cethegi,” §484.

§ 762. Examples, divisions, inductions, and distributions should be sufficiently known in this way, neither worn and customary illustrations, §741, nor, on the contrary, so vivid that by stronger light they obscure rather than illustrate their superior perception, contrary to the beautiful distribution of light and shade, §682. In this last law one must especially beware lest the difference, and that in the inferior concept which is not determined in the superior, receive so much light that the third of comparison, and the things suitable to the superior which you were laboring to paint more vividly in the concrete of the inferior, are shaded over, and thus the lesser example seems less to fit and to differ from that for whose declaration it was brought forward, §670. I do not dissuade touching the difference, but let it be the shade of the example, §684, not the light, §686. Let examples, much less inductions and distributions, not transcend the aesthetic horizon under the seductive appearance of erudition, §121; let them not, in illustrating, conciliate either βάθος or swelling, §§329, 331. Rather, as far as possible, let them be such that from them at the same time a reasoning example and a persuasive induction can be formed, and a practical or pragmatic one, fertile in deriving corollaries that impel to action, §721.

SECTION XXXXV

ANTITHESIS

§ 763. Comparison broadly so called, §735, contains under itself 3) comparison of opposites, *Metaphysics* §549, which as a figure, §26, is ANTITHESIS. Among antitheses I number first dissimilarity, comparing what is to be illustrated with what is dissimilar, so that its difference from this may shine out more. Catullus 5: “Suns can set and return; when once our brief light has set, one perpetual night must be slept.” By this collation Horace illustrated his whole ode I.1.1, and the front of the same book with Ode 7: “Others will praise bright Rhodes, or Mytilene, or Ephesus, or the walls of Corinth between two seas, or Thebes distinguished by Bacchus, Delphi by Apollo, or Thessalian Tempe.”

§ 764. Deinde huc pertinet ANTAGOGE, quam compensationem dicunt, confessionis species, quae collustrandi quaedam praedicata, quae primario videantur contraria, sic in umbram locat, iuxta hoc primarium, ut eorum perceptiones heterogeneae, sed debiliores, praegressae subito sequens heterogeneum, sed maius ac illustrius, splendide pingant, et novitatis luce veluti circumfundant. §. 659, 683. M. §. 549. Jarbas apud Virgilium, Aen. IIII. furtivos Didonis et Aeneae amores primum satis honorifice videtur describere, tegens honestatis umbra, quicquid in iis indignum et turpe iudicabat: Dido

dominum Aenean in regna recepit,

214. ut non ita multo post hoc acerbius in eundem Aenean, collectis quasi viribus, invehatur:

*Et nunc ille Paris, cum semiviro comitatu,
Maeonia mentum mitra, crinemque madentem
Subnexus, rapto potitur.*

217.

§ 765. Antagogen si continuaveris, pulcrum inde nascetur CRAMA, quod mistam vituperio laudem dicunt; vere est congeries praedicatorum, apparenter saltim contrariorum, quorum una classis, mala, bona censeatur altera, sic tamen dispositorum, per artificium lucem et umbram bene dispensans, S. XXXX. ut secundum intentionem calide bona malis miscentium, vel haec ex oppositorum pulcritudine turpitudinis, vel illa ex oppositorum foeditate pulcritudinis incrementa nanciscantur, magnaue veracitatis, moralis veritatis, similitudo simul obtineatur. §. 731, 455. Quantum materia permittit, laborat in effigenda hac figura Nasonis Trist. II. omnis paene prima elegia, culpam auctoris concedens ad illustriorem Caesaris veniam eo efficacius sollicitandam, e. g.

*Cur modo damnatas repeto, mea crimina, Musas?
An semel est poenam commeruisse parum?
Deme mihi studium, vitae quoque crimina demes,
Acceptum refero versibus esse nocens.
Ira quidem iusta est, nec me meruisse negabo,
Non adeo nostro fugit ab ore pudor.
Sed tamen, ut fuso taurorum sanguine centum,
Sic capitur minimo thuris honore deus.
Et pia thura dedi pro te, cumque omnibus unus
Ipse quoque adiuvī publica vota meis.*

§ 766. Non est, cur antithesin et antitheton, vel antitheta distinguere velimus, quoties antitheta comparantur elegantius, quod tunc plerumque fit, *si fiat sine industria, naturalique quadam necessitate, sic fieri debere videatur*. Cic. or. 166. Alias si studiosius quaesita lucernam olent, fucus erunt, inanius argutantium, §. 688. M. §. 576. in quem vere Persius et graviter:

*Nonne pudet capiti non posse pericula cano
Pellere, quin lepidum hoc optet audire: decenter?
Fur es, ait Pedius; Pedius quid? crimina rasis
Librat in antithetis. Doctas posuisse figuras
Laudatur: bellum hoc! Hoc bellum?*

§ 764. Next belongs here ANTAGOGE, which they call compensation, a species of confession. It places certain predicates to be illuminated, which at first seem contrary, into shade beside this primary one, so that their heterogeneous but weaker perceptions, having gone before, suddenly paint the following heterogeneous but greater and more illustrious one splendidly and pour around it, as it were, the light of novelty, §§659, 683; *Metaphysics* §549. In Virgil, *Aeneid* IV, Iarbas at first seems to describe the secret loves of Dido and Aeneas rather honorably, covering with a shade of honor whatever he judged unworthy and shameful in them: Dido “received lord Aeneas into her realms,” v.214, so that not much later, having gathered his powers, he may inveigh more bitterly against the same Aeneas: “And now that Paris, with a half-manly retinue, bound beneath his chin and wet hair with Maonian cap, enjoys his plunder,” v.217.

§ 765. If you continue antagoge, from it will be born a beautiful CRAMA, which they call praise mixed with blame. Truly it is a heap of predicates, at least apparently contrary, of which one class, the bad, is judged good by the other, arranged in such a way, through an art distributing light and shade well, Section XXXX, that, according to the intention of those cunningly mixing good things with bad, either the bad receive increase of ugliness from the beauty of opposites or the good receive increase of beauty from the foulness of opposites, and at the same time a great likeness of truth, of moral truth, is obtained, §§731, 455. As far as the material allowed, almost the whole first elegy of Ovid’s *Tristia* II labors in forming this figure, conceding the author’s fault in order to solicit Caesar’s pardon more effectively, for example: “Why do I now return to my condemned Muses, my crimes? Is it too little to have deserved punishment once? Take study from me, and you will also take away the crimes of life; I count it received from verses that I am guilty. The anger indeed is just, and I shall not deny that I have deserved it; shame has not so fled from my mouth. Yet, as a god is won by the smallest honor of incense as by the poured blood of a hundred bulls, I too gave pious incense for you, and with all others I myself aided public vows with my own.”

§ 766. There is no reason for us to want to distinguish antithesis and antitheton or antitheta whenever antitheta are compared more elegantly, which usually happens *if it is done without effort and seems by a certain natural necessity to have had to be done*, Cicero, *Orator* 166. Otherwise, if they are too studiously sought and smell of the lamp, they will be false coloring of empty cleverness, §688; *Metaphysics* §576, against which Persius speaks truly and gravely: “Are you not ashamed that you cannot drive dangers from a gray head without wishing to hear this neat thing: prettily? Pedius says, You are a thief; what does Pedius do? He weighs charges in shaved antitheses. He is praised for having set learned figures: this is fine! This fine?”

§ 767. *Hoc genere antiqui iam ante Isocratem delectabantur, et maxime Gorgias. Cic. or. 167. Antithetis delectabantur, sed non male locatis, non anxie contractis, non re-
 cectis sexcentis, quorum cautus imitator esto, non simia. Quod si quis parce et quum
 res poscet, utetur; velut adperso quodam condimento, iucundior erit. At, qui nim-
 ium affectaverit, ipsam illam gratiam varietatis amittet.* Quemadmodum illustrantes
 omnes figurae, sic antitheses secretae et extra vulgarem usum positae, ideoque magis
 nobiles, *ut novitate aurem excitant, ita copia satiant, nec se obvias fuisse dicenti, sed
 conquisitas, et ex omnibus latebris extractas congestasque declarant.* Quint. VIII. 3.
 Fabius hoc ipso capite mentionem etiam antitheti iniicit, quod *contrapositum* dicit, et
 ab aliis nominari *contentionem*. De quo praesertim verum est eius, quod iam legimus,
 iudicium, et tunc maxime, quando simul idem figura quaedam dictionis comitatur vo-
 cabulorum vel similitudine, vel repetitione, vel transpositione. §. 26.

§ 768. Nam et hic locum habet, quod iam §. 145. monuimus, schema vocabulorum
 et habitum vel situm extraordinarium, si figuris utaris masculine, nonnunquam acces-
 sorium tantum esse, ac veluti fortuitum in figuris, quae non ideo contemnendae sunt,
 quia sint figurae dictionis, sed ideo, quia cogitationibus ipsis et praecipuum quidem
 elegantiam conciliant, non fuissent in figuris dictionis habendae. Sic non pauci totam
 ad figuras dictionis referunt antithesin, quasi vero vocabulorum esset praecipua, non
 significatum oppositio. Aliis quaedam saltem antitheseos species in meris dictionum
 figuris collocantur a non minus iniquis elegantiarum arbitris, §. 15. Proferam exempla.

§ 769. Antitheton cum aliqua perceptionum occurrentium in utroque oppositorum
 conversione, s. ANTIMETABOLE, sane ideo non potest excludi ex figuris sententiae,
 §. 765. quoniam inter eloquendum potest contingere, ut vocabula, quibus utrumque
 membrum oppositionis exprimitur, aliquam etiam conversionem subeant. In figuris
 autem dictionis ipse Quintilianus habet *illam figuram, qua verba declinata repetuntur:*
Non, ut edam, vivo, sed, ut vivam, edo. Bella, profecto, non tam dictio, quam senten-
 tia Epicuri est, quam vere dicas philosopham: Esse sapienter infortunatum satius est,
 quam fortunatum insipienter esse. Huc, qua materiam, etiam dictum Simonidis, quod
 est apud Plutarchum: Poesis est pictura loquens, et pictura est tacita poesis. Huc il-
 lud Salviani de Bagoardis: Malunt sub specie captivitatis esse liberi, quam sub specie
 libertatis esse captivi. Huc tandem dictum Catonis et post eum Musonii: Si quid per
 laborem recte feceris, laborabit; recte factum tecum permanet; si quid turpiter feceris
 cum voluptate, turpe manet; voluptas perit. Gell. XVI. 1.

§ 767. *The ancients were already delighted by this kind before Isocrates, and especially Gorgias, Cicero, Orator 167. They delighted in antitheses, but not badly placed, not anxiously scraped together, not cooked over six hundred times; be a cautious imitator of them, not an ape. But if someone uses it sparingly and when the matter demands, as if with some seasoning sprinkled on, he will be more pleasing. But he who affects it too much will lose that very grace of variety.* Like all illustrative figures, so also antitheses that are hidden and set outside common use, and therefore nobler, *as they excite the ear by novelty, so by abundance they satiate, and declare that they were not obvious to the speaker but searched out, dragged from every hiding place, and heaped up,* Quintilian VIII.3. In this very chapter Fabius also mentions the antitheton, which he calls *counterposition*, and which others call *contention*. His judgment just read is especially true of this, and above all when at the same time some figure of diction accompanies it by likeness, repetition, or transposition of words, §26.

§ 768. Here too there is room for what we already warned in §145: an extraordinary pattern of words, habit, or position, if you use figures manfully, is sometimes only accessory and as it were accidental in figures. They are not to be despised because they are figures of diction, but because they conciliate a principal elegance to the thoughts themselves, they should not have been counted among mere figures of diction. Thus not a few refer the whole of antithesis to figures of diction, as if the opposition of words, not of meanings, were chief. Others place at least certain species of antithesis among mere verbal figures, being no less unjust judges of elegances, §15. I shall bring forward examples.

§ 769. An antitheton with some conversion of the perceptions occurring in both opposites, or ANTIMETABOLE, certainly cannot for that reason be excluded from figures of thought, §765, because in expression it can happen that the words by which each member of the opposition is expressed undergo some conversion too. Among figures of diction Quintilian himself has *that figure by which inflected words are repeated: I do not live in order to eat, but I eat in order to live.* This is indeed a beautiful saying of Epicurus, not so much diction as thought, and truly philosophical. It is better to be wise and unfortunate than to be fortunate and foolish. To this belongs, in material, Simonides' saying in Plutarch: poetry is speaking painting, and painting is silent poetry. To this belongs Salvian on the Bagaudae: they prefer to be free under the appearance of captivity than to be captives under the appearance of freedom. Finally to this belongs the saying of Cato and after him Musonius: if you do something rightly through labor, the labor will depart; the right deed remains with you. If you do something shamefully with pleasure, the shameful thing remains; the pleasure perishes, Gellius XVI.1.

§ 770. Collatio pulcre cogitandi cum diversis ab eodem, quibuscum facile confundi posset, ad illustrandam eius differentiam, s. PARADIASTOLE, et contradistinctio, est antithesis non vocabulorum tantum perperam habitorum in synonymis, sed etiam, et maxime quidem, significatum, vere differentium, quorum tamen attendi plerumque non solet, hinc eleganter indicatur aliquando, si momentum habet, diversitas. §. 768. *Contentioni*, §. 767. *commodissime subiicitur et illa species, quam distinctionem diximus*. Quint. I. c. Ovidius de edicto, quo Tomos adire iubebatur:

*Quippe relegatus, non exsul, dicor in illo,
Parcaeque fortunae sunt data verba meae.*

Trist. II. 1. 137. *Nec semper, quod adversum est, contraponitur*. Quint. I. c. Non opus est ad antithesin, ut vera adsit oppositio, quam logici contradictionem vere talem dicimus; sufficit ut apparens contradictio, ut contrarietas, subcontrarietas adsit, et quicquid vel aesthetice, primo saltem obtutu pugnare frontibus adversis sit verisimile. In dictis: Homo potuit non mori, potuit mori, nunc non potest non mori naturaliter, sed in stat tempus, quo non poterit mori, contradictionis nihil est, elegantius tamen exornata dare possent antithesin. §. 763.

§ 771. Quo vero iam nomine commendem oxymoron? Ennii: *memet dementem*; Terentii: *cum ratione insanire*, et: *id aliquid nihil est*; Ciceronis: *dum tacent, clamant*; Virgilii:

Num capti potuere capi?

Horatii, sed et heic iocati:

*Insanientis dum sapientiae
Consultus erro.*

Ovidii *iniusta iusta* et:

*Ut quaeque pia est, hortatibus impia prima est,
Et, ne sit scelerata, facit scelus,*

quod miserrimum est fatum errantis conscientiae,

Impietate pia est.

illud multorum: male olent, qui semper bene olent; haec, inquam, omnia, quantis auctoritatibus bellam figuram, si taceo, clamant? Interim ingenue fateor, in omnibus figuris sententiae quae mihi minime placeat, hanc esse. Caussam puto frigidissimum abusum eiusdem, et trita exempla, tritissimorumque parodias magis inficetas, quibus circumsonant, qui nesciunt acumen aliud, quam paradoxes huius furfuris foecundum.

§ 770. The collation of beautiful thinking with things different from it, with which it could easily be confused, to illustrate its difference, or PARADIASTOLE and contradistinction, is an antithesis not merely of words wrongly taken as synonyms, but also, and especially, of meanings truly different, whose difference is usually not attended to; hence the diversity is sometimes elegantly indicated if it has weight, §768. *To contention*, §767, *that species which we called distinction is most conveniently subordinated*, Quintilian. Ovid on the edict by which he was ordered to go to Tomis: “Indeed I am called relegated, not exile, in it, and sparing words were given to my fortune,” *Tristia* II.1.137. *Nor is what is adverse always counterposed*, Quintilian. For antithesis there is no need for true opposition, which logicians call contradiction truly such; apparent contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety, and whatever aesthetically, at least at first glance, is likely to fight with opposed brows, suffice. In the sayings: man could not die, could die, now cannot not die naturally, but a time approaches when he will not be able to die, there is no contradiction; yet more elegantly adorned they could give an antithesis, §763.

§ 771. By what name shall I now commend oxymoron? Ennius’ *myself mad*; Terence’s *to be insane with reason*, and *that something is nothing*; Cicero’s *while they are silent, they shout*; Virgil’s “Could the captured be captured?”; Horace’s, though joking here, “while I, adviser of insane wisdom, wander”; Ovid’s *unjust justice* and “as each woman is pious, she is first impious by exhortations, and, lest she be wicked, she commits wickedness,” which is the most miserable fate of erring conscience, “she is pious by impiety”; the saying of many: those smell bad who always smell good. All these, I say, with how many authorities would cry out, if I were silent, that this is a beautiful figure? Meanwhile I honestly confess that among all figures of thought this is the one that pleases me least. I think the cause is the very cold abuse of it, and the worn examples and still more tasteless parodies of the most worn examples with which those resound who know no other acuteness than one fertile in paradoxes of this bran.

§ 772. Simpliciores ad antithesin liceat relabi, quam sub dissimilitudine, §. 763. complecti solent, vere tamen inaequalitatem potius dicere deberemus, quando convenientia inter se in aliquo tertio, ideo comparantur, ut eorum illustretur inaequalitas, aut, hac concessa, declaretur illud minus esse, quod obiecto meo personali videbatur maius, vel vice versa. Talem antithesin Romuli et Augusti Ovidius habet, ad hunc illi praefendum, Fast. II.

*Romule, concedas. Facit hic tua magna tuendo
Moenia, tu dederas transilienda Remo.
Te Tatius, parvique Cures, Caeninaque sensit,
Hoc duce romanum est solis utrumque latus.
Tu breve, nescio quid, victae telluris habebas,
Quodcunque est alto sub Iove, Caesar habet.
Tu raptas, hic castas duce se iubet esse maritas;
Tu recipis luco, submovet ille nefas.
Vis tibi grata fuit, florent sub Caesare leges,
Tu domini nomen, principis ille tenet.
Te Remus accusat, veniam dedit hostibus ille,
Caelestem fecit te pater, ille patrem.*

Sic Cicero iuris et armorum peritum inter se comparat, ut huius illustret excellentiam.

SECTIO XXXXVI

COMPARATIO STRICTIUS DICTA

§ 773. Comparatio latius dicta, §. 734. cum illustrando conferens ideam quamcunque sociam, coniunctam et connexam, quae neque simile, §. 735. nec pars, nec totum, nec illius superius, nec inferius, S. XXXXIII. nec oppositum sit, S. XXXV. quoniam peculiare nomen non acceperit, generale retineat: 4) COMPARATIO STRICTIUS DICTA. Iam hinc patet iniri numerum huc pertinentium illustrationum non posse, nec diversis insigniri quamlibet denominationibus. Satius est apertos servari quosdam carceres, quibus includi queant promotura rem venustae meditationis, in oclusos iam et limitibus suis circumscriptos locos non intromittenda. Huc ergo refer exempli gratia comparisonem a) caussatorum cum caussis, quas schola dicit externas, efficientibus et finalibus. Internas enim materiam et formam comparatio maioris ac minoris sibi vindicaverit, §. 742.

§ 772. Let it be permitted to fall back to a simpler antithesis, which they usually include under dissimilarity, §763, though truly we ought rather to call it inequality, when things agreeing with one another in some third are compared so that their inequality may be illustrated, or, once this is conceded, so that what seemed greater to my personal object may be declared lesser, or vice versa. Ovid has such an antithesis of Romulus and Augustus in order to prefer Augustus to Romulus, *Fasti* II: “Romulus, yield. He makes your great walls by guarding them; you had given them to Remus to leap over. Tatius felt you, and little Cures, and Caenina; under this leader each side of the sun is Roman. You had some brief bit of conquered earth; whatever is under high Jove, Caesar has. You seize women; he orders wives to be chaste under his leadership. You receive guilt in the grove; he removes wickedness. Force was pleasing to you; laws flourish under Caesar. You hold the name of lord, he of prince. Remus accuses you; he gave pardon to enemies. Your father made you heavenly; he made his father so.” Thus Cicero compares the expert in law and the expert in arms so as to illustrate the excellence of the latter.

SECTION XXXXVI

COMPARISON MORE STRICTLY SO CALLED

§ 773. Comparison broadly so called, §734, when in illustrating it brings together any associated, conjoined, and connected idea which is neither similar, §735, nor part, whole, superior or inferior of it, Section XXXXIII, nor opposite, Section XXXV, should retain the general name because it has received no special one: 4) COMPARISON STRICTLY SO CALLED. From this it is already clear that the number of illustrations belonging here cannot be counted, nor each marked with different names. It is better that certain open starting gates be preserved, within which things that will advance the business of graceful meditation can be included, than that they be excluded from places already closed and circumscribed by their limits. Refer here, therefore, for example, comparison a) of effects with causes, which the school calls external, efficient and final. Internal causes, matter and form, comparison of greater and lesser will claim for itself, §742.

§ 774. Habes hinc illustrationem α) effectus a causa efficiente:

Pocula, caelatum divini opus Alcimedontis.

Virg. ecl. 3. 37. β) causae efficientis ab effectu:

*Conon, et quis fuit alter,
Descriptis radio totum qui gentibus orbem,
Tempora quae messor, quae curvus arator haberet?*

v. 42. γ) medii a fine:

*Daphnidi, arcum
Fregisti et calamos, quae tu, perverse Menalca,
Et quum vidisti puero donata, dolebas,
Et, si non aliqua nocuisses, mortuus esses.*

v. 15. δ) finis a medio:

*Parta meae Veneri sunt munera. Namque notavi
Ipse locum, aerae quo congersere palumbes.
M. Quod potui, puero silvestri ex arbore lecta
Aurea mala decem misi, cras altera mittam.*

71. En! tibi pastores, qui

Felices poterant rerum cognoscere causas!

§ 775. Comparatio strictius dicta est b) signi et signati, §. 773. Unde illustratio α) signi ex signato. Signa mortem Caesaris portendentia descripserat Virgilius Georg. I. 464–488, et illustrat ex signato, secundum verisimilitudinem aestheticam:

*Ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis
Romanas acies iterum videre Philippi,
Nec fuit indignum superis, bis sanguine nostro
Emathiam et latos Haemi pinguescere campos.*

Addit statim illustrationem poeta huius β) signati ex signo iam rememorativo s. mnemonico, tunc futuro:

*Scilicet et tempus veniet, quum finibus illis
Agricola, incurvo terram molitus aratro,
Exesa inveniet scabra rubigine pila,
Aut gravibus rastris galeas pulsabit inanes
Grandiaque effossis mirabitur ossa sepulcris.*

§ 774. Hence you have illustration α) of an effect from the efficient cause: “cups, carved work of divine Alcimedon,” Virgil, *Eclogue* 3.37. β) Of the efficient cause from the effect: “Conon, and who was the other who described with his rod the whole orb for nations, what times the reaper, what times the bent plowman should have?” v.42. γ) Of the means from the end: “For Daphnis you broke the bow and reeds, which you, perverse Menalcas, both grieved when you saw them given to the boy, and, if you had not somehow harmed him, you would have died,” v.15. δ) Of the end from the means: “Gifts have been acquired for my Venus. For I myself marked the place where airy wood-pigeons gathered. M. What I could, ten golden apples picked from a woodland tree, I sent to the boy; tomorrow I shall send another ten,” v.71. Behold shepherds for you, who “could have known the happy causes of things!”

§ 775. Strict comparison is b) of sign and signified, §773. Hence illustration α) of the sign from the signified. Virgil had described the signs portending Caesar’s death, *Georgics* I.464–488, and illustrates them from the signified according to aesthetic verisimilitude: “Therefore Philippi saw Roman battle-lines clash again with equal weapons, nor was it unworthy of the gods above that Emathia and the broad fields of Haemus grow fat twice with our blood.” The poet immediately adds an illustration β) of the signified from a sign, now recollective or mnemonic, then future: “Surely a time will come when in those lands the farmer, having worked the earth with curved plow, will find javelins eaten by rough rust, or with heavy rakes strike empty helmets, and wonder at huge bones dug from graves.”

§ 776. Comparatio strictius dicta e. g. c) animarum affectiones vel mutationes illustraturis suggerit ideas socias membrorum corporis, quae quoniam affectionibus datis, inter mutationes eiusmodi praesertim affici propiusque tangi verisimile est, veluti sedes horum in anima variorum considerantur. Sic ingenium illustratur capite et cerebro, sensationes externae organisi sensorii, appetitiones corde, inferiores iecinore, pudor fronte ac ore e. c. illustrantur. §. 773, 752.

*Istis, qui linguam avium intelligunt,
Plusque ex alieno iecore sapiunt, quam suo,
Magis audiendum, quam auscultandum, censeo,*

Pac. ap. Cic. de div. I. c.

*Pudorem
Ferreo canit exprimamus ore.*

Cat.

*Vides, quae maxima credis
Esse mala, exiguum censum, turpemque repulsam,
Quanto devites animi capitisque labore?*

Hor. ep. I. 44.

§ 777. Porro comparatio stricte dicta d) eventum factumque, singulare quodvis, illustrat a loco et tempore, per ideas socias eodem loco, eodem tempore perceptorum. §. 773, 742.

*O cives! cives! quaerenda pecunia primum est,
Virtus post nummos: haec Ianus summus ab imo
Prodocet, haec recinunt iuvenes dictata, senesque,
Laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto.*

*Solvitur acris hiems grata vice veris et Favoni,
Trahuntque siccas machinae carinas,
Ac neque iam stabulis gaudet pecus, aut arator igni,
Nec prata canis albicant pruinis.
Iam Cytherea choros ducit Venus, imminente luna,
Iunctaeque Nymphis Gratiae decentes
Alterno terram quatiunt pede, dum gravis Cyclopum
Vulcanus ardens urget officinas.
Nunc decet aut viridi nitidum caput impedire myrto,
Aut flore, terrae quem ferunt solutae.*

od. I. 4.

§ 776. Strict comparison, for example c), suggests to those who will illustrate affections or changes of souls associated ideas of members of the body. Since these are likely to be especially affected and more closely touched by the given affections among such changes, they are considered as seats of these various things in the soul. Thus talent is illustrated by head and brain, external sensations by sensory organs, appetitions by heart, lower ones by liver, shame by forehead and face, and so on, §§773, 752. “Those who understand the language of birds, and know more from another’s liver than their own, I judge should be heard rather than obeyed,” Pacuvius in Cicero, *De divinatione*. “Let us sing that we express shame with iron face,” Catullus. “You see the things you believe to be the greatest evils, small property and disgraceful defeat, with how much labor of mind and head you avoid them?” Horace, *Epistles* I.44.

§ 777. Further, strict comparison d) illustrates an event, fact, or any singular from place and time, through associated ideas of things perceived in the same place and same time, §§773, 742. “O citizens, citizens! money must first be sought, virtue after coins: this Janus teaches from top to bottom, these dictations young men and old repeat, with moneybags and tablets hanging from the left arm.” “Sharp winter is loosened by the pleasing change of spring and Favonius, and machines draw dry keels; now neither cattle rejoice in stalls, nor plowman in fire, nor meadows grow white with hoary frosts. Now Cytherean Venus leads dances under the overhanging moon, and the graceful Graces joined to Nymphs strike the earth with alternating foot, while heavy Vulcan burns and urges the workshops of the Cyclopes. Now it is fitting to bind the shining head with green myrtle, or with a flower which the loosened earths bear,” Horace, *Ode* I.4.

§ 778. Comparatio stricte dicta e) rem et personam, quae in alicuius potestate est, eumque confert, qui illius dominus, dux, imperans est, vel possessor. Unde illustratio α) rei a possessore, domino, deo, qua ratione describit Virgilius Aeoliam:

*Hic vasto rex Aeolus antro
Luctantes ventos tempestatesque sonoras
Imperio premit, ac vinclis et carcere frenat.*

Aen. I. 58. β) personae a superiore, duce, principe, rege, cui subiicitur. Ventos in personas mutarat Virgilius, hinc illustrantur per suum regem:

*celsa sedet Aeolus arce
Sceptra tenens, mollitque animos et temperat iras.
a Iove datus,
qui foedere certo
Et premere et laxas sciret dare iussus habenas.*

67.

§ 779. Comparatio possessoris et possessi dat illustrationem γ) possessoris a re possessa:

*Non illi imperium pelagi, saevumque tridentem
Sed mihi sorte datum. Tenet ille immania saxa,
Vestras, Eure, domos. Illa se iacet in aula
Aeolus, et clauso ventorum carcere regnet.*

145. δ) ducis, principis, imperantis, dei a subditis et personis, in illius potestate constitutis. §. 778. Horatius ad Augustum:

*Praesenti tibi maturos largimur honores,
Iurandasque tuum per numen ponimus aras,
Nil oriturum alias, nil ortum tale fatentes.
Sed tuus hoc populus sapiens et iustus in uno,
Te nostris ducibus, te Graiis antefерendo,
Caetera nequaquam simili ratione modoque
Aestumat.*

ep. II. 1. 20.

SECTIO XXXXVII

TROPI

§ 780. TROPUM hic non attendo tantum, quatenus est verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione in aliam cum virtute mutatio, Quint. VIII. 6. multo minus, quem necessitas et linguae paupertas necessarium facit, quoties significandum est, cuius non est in data lingua proprium vocabulum, minime, quem ignorantia proprietatis in loquendo proculdit: sed omnem elegantem perceptionis unius pro altera substitutionem, sive vocabulis translatis significetur, quod notissimum, sive sonis sibi invicem substitutis a musico, sive coloribus a pictore, sive per aliud quodcunque signorum genus eleganter te pro uno aliud cogitasse exprimas.

§ 778. Strict comparison e) brings together a thing or person that is in someone's power and the one who is its lord, leader, commander, or possessor. Hence illustration α) of a thing from possessor, lord, or god. In this way Virgil describes Aeolia: "Here in a vast cave king Aeolus presses the struggling winds and sounding storms by command, and bridles them with chains and prison," *Aeneid* I.58. β) Of a person from a superior, leader, prince, or king to whom he is subject. Virgil had changed the winds into persons; hence they are illustrated through their king: "Aeolus sits on the high citadel, holding scepters, and softens their spirits and tempers their angers," "given by Jove," "who by fixed covenant should know, when ordered, both to press and to give loose reins," v.67.

§ 779. Comparison of possessor and possessed gives illustration γ) of the possessor from the thing possessed: "The rule of the sea and the savage trident were not given by lot to him, but to me. He holds huge rocks, your homes, Eurus. Let Aeolus boast in that court and reign in the closed prison of the winds," v.145. δ) Of leader, prince, commander, or god from subjects and persons placed in his power, §778. Horace to Augustus: "To you present we grant mature honors and set up altars to be sworn by your divinity, confessing that nothing else will arise, nothing like this has arisen. But your people, wise and just in this one thing, by preferring you to our leaders and to Greek ones, by no means values other things by like reason and manner," *Epistles* II.1.20.

SECTION XXXXVII

TROPES

§ 780. Here I do not attend to TROPUS only insofar as it is a *change of a word or speech from its proper signification into another with virtue*, Quintilian VIII.6; much less to the trope which necessity and poverty of language make necessary whenever something must be signified for which there is no proper word in a given language; least of all to the one which ignorance of propriety in speaking hammers out. Rather, I attend to every elegant substitution of one perception for another, whether it is signified by transferred words, the best-known case, or by sounds substituted for one another by a musician, or by colors by a painter, or through any other kind of signs by which you elegantly express that you have thought one thing for another.

§ 781. Venustam intueamur troporum genesin, et pulveris exigui iactu componi potest inexplicabilis, quam Fabius praefatur l. c. *nisi grammaticorum inter ipsos, philosophorum certe pugna circa tropum, quae sint genera, quae species, qui numerus, quis cuique subiiciatur? An sit figura* e. c. In certo pulchrae tuae meditationis loco vividitas postulet comparationem aliquam, §. 734. quam tamen ibidem diductam, amplam et copiosam, explicite cogitantis 1) subiectum 2) terminum comparationis, §. 736. non admittat rotunda brevitās, §. 166: habebis locum excipiendi, §. 24. Exceptio, qua sic satisfiat vividitati, ne quid inde detrimenti capiat rotunda brevitās, erit possibilium minima, §. 24. sane non inelegans, §. 25. Quod si iam omittas, nec explicite cogites, nec peculiari termino significes, subiectum comparationis, sed eidem substituas, eiusdemque loco solum explicite cogites, solum significes terminum comparationis, auditori spectatori relinquens, ut inde tacitus ille secum evolvat subiectum comparationis, ita satisfacisti vividitati comparationem poscenti, ne quid inde detrimenti ceperit rotunda brevitās, quoniam seriem explicite cogitatorum ne uno quidem auxisti signo vel verbulo. Unde nascitur substitutio termini comparationis pro subiecto eiusdem non inelegans, tropus. §. 780.

§ 782. Quae sunt ergo troporum genera? quae species? Eaedem, quae comparationis latius dictae. §. 734–779. Qui fit numerus? innumerabilis. Quis cuique subiicitur? Qui non est METAPHORA, contracta assimilatio, §. 735–741. nec SYNECDOCHE, contracta comparatio maioris et minoris, S. XXXXIII. nec IRONIA, contracta antithesis, S. XXXV. erit ille sane METONYMIA, contracta comparatio strictius dicta, S. XXXVI. quemadmodum eruditus, qui nec theologus, nec iureconsultus, nec medicus nominatur, eo ipso philosophicum in ordinem amandatur per academias.

§ 783. An figurae tropi sunt, an tropi figurae? *Plerique hos tropos esse existimaverunt – ius est idem. Nam et vim rebus adiiciunt, M. §. 515. et gratiam praestant, §. 780, 26. Nec desunt, qui tropis figurae nomen imponant, quorum est C. Artorius Proculus. Quin adeo similitudo manifesta, ut eam discernere non sit in promptu – Haec scio, quam multiplicem habeant, quamque scrupulosam disputationem. – Haec de quibus loquimur, sive tropi, sive figurae dicuntur, idem efficient – Illud tamen notandum, coire frequenter in easdem sententias, et tropon, et figuram. Tam enim translatis, quam propriis figuratur oratio. Est autem non mediocris inter auctores dissensio, et quae vis nominis eius, et quot genera, et quam multae sint species.* Quint. VIII. 1.

Grammatici certant, et adhuc sub iudice lis est.

Hor.

§ 784. Philosopho nodus in scirpo quaeri videatur. §. 781. Non omnes figurae tropi sunt, §. 26, 780. Rectius autem bonus ille Proculus, si tropon ex notione Quintiliani paullisper extensa sumas, §. 780. nec eo necessarias quascunque, multo minus inficetas ignorantium linguam, quam loquuntur, translationes referas. Omnis tropus, quem definivi, est FIGURA, sed CRYPTICA, cuius genuina forma non statim apparet, quoniam est figura contracta per substitutionem. §. 782.

§ 781. Let us look at the graceful genesis of tropes, and with a tiny toss of dust the inexplicable battle which Fabius prefaces in the cited place can be settled: *if not among grammarians themselves, certainly among philosophers, concerning trope: what are the genera, what species, what number, what is subordinated to what? whether it is a figure*, and so on. In a certain place of your beautiful meditation vividness may demand some comparison, §734, yet rounded brevity, §166, may not admit comparison there drawn out, ample, and copious, explicitly thinking 1) subject and 2) term of comparison, §736. You will have a place for exception, §24. The exception by which vividness is satisfied without damaging rounded brevity will be the least possible, §24, and certainly not inelegant, §25. If now you omit and neither explicitly think nor signify by a special term the subject of comparison, but substitute for it the term of comparison, and in its place explicitly think and signify only that term, leaving the hearer or spectator silently to unfold the subject of comparison from it, you have satisfied vividness demanding comparison without damaging rounded brevity, since you have not increased the series of explicit thoughts by even one sign or little word. From this is born the not inelegant substitution of the term of comparison for its subject: trope, §780.

§ 782. What, then, are the genera of tropes? What are the species? The same as those of comparison broadly so called, §§734–779. How is the number made? Innumerable. What is subordinated to what? Whatever is not METAPHOR, contracted assimilation, §§735–741, nor SYNECDOCHE, contracted comparison of greater and lesser, Section XXXXIII, nor IRONY, contracted antithesis, Section XXXXV, will surely be METONYMY, contracted comparison strictly so called, Section XXXXVI; just as a learned man who is called neither theologian, nor jurist, nor physician is by that very fact banished into the philosophical order throughout the academies.

§ 783. Are figures tropes, or tropes figures? *Most have thought these to be tropes; the right is the same. For they both add force to things*, Metaphysics §515, *and provide grace*, §§780, 26. *Nor are there lacking those who impose the name of figure on tropes, among whom is C. Artorius Proculus. Indeed the likeness is so manifest that to discern it is not easy. I know how multiple and how scrupulous a dispute these things have. These things of which we speak, whether they are called tropes or figures, will accomplish the same thing. Yet this must be noted: trope and figure often come together in the same thoughts. For speech is figured both by transferred and by proper words. But there is no small disagreement among authors both about the force of the name, how many genera, and how many species there are*, Quintilian VIII.1. “The grammarians contend, and the case is still before the judge,” Horace.

§ 784. To the philosopher this may seem to seek a knot in a rush, §781. Not all figures are tropes, §26, 780. But that good Proculus is more correct if you take trope from Quintilian’s notion extended a little, §780, and do not refer to it any necessary transfers whatever, much less tasteless transfers of those ignorant of the language they speak. Every trope that I have defined is a FIGURE, but a CRYPTIC one, whose genuine form does not immediately appear, because it is a figure contracted by substitution, §782.

§ 785. Logici scholasticorum docent PROPOSITIONEM EXPONIBILEM, ex affirmanti et negante cryptice compositam, quales exclusivae, exceptivae, restrictivae, e. c. Nisi vereretur latinis incommodus esse auribus, tropos figuras dicerem exponibiles. Quemadmodum enim barbaram propositionibus denominationem dedit schola, quoniam expositione indigent, ut appareat genuina utriusque partis forma, ex quibus coaluerunt; sic tropus, ut grammaticis etiam, qui non sunt philosophi, figura appareat, expositione indiget. Si ex termino comparationis, qui solus in tropo cogitatur explicite, significatus proprius, eruas omissum subiectum comparationis, significatum improprium, et hoc, neglecto brevitate amore, explicite manifestoque penes terminum comparationis cogites, et utrumque te cogitare peculiaribus cuiusvis terminis et signis declares, TROPUS EXPONITUR.

§ 786. Metaphoram exponens habebis manifestam assimilationem, §. 735. Synecdochen exponens videbis comparationem maioris et minoris. Est ergo vel ADSCENDENS SYNECDOCHE, vel DESCENDENS, §. 742. Expone ironiam: habebis antithesin, §. 763. Metonymia denique resolvitur in aliquam comparationem strictius dictam. §. 773, 782. Quicquid itaque de figuris commemoratis huc usque dictum est, §. 730–779. illud ut de tropis, earum crypsesi, repetamus, non est necesse.

§ 787. *In totum metaphora brevior est similitudine* (assimilatione manifesta et explicata, §. 735.) §. 781, 782. *quod illa comparatur* (explicite) *rei, quam volumus exprimere* (subiecto comparationis) *haec pro ipsa re dicitur. Comparatio est, quum dico facere quid hominem, ut leonem. Translatio est, quum dico de homine leo est.* (et quidem metaphora) Quint. VIII. 6. Sed est etiam audacior metaphora, quam comparatio; hinc ausi hominem cum leone comparare, saporis eruditi homines non audent temere leonem eundem dicere, §. 313. Non tango species metaphorae, quoniam *iam non pueris praecipimus, ut, accepto genere, species intelligere non possint.* ib. Caveantur 1) *quarum frequens usus obscurat, et taedio complet,* §. 731. 2) *humiles, sordidae, deformes,* §. 736, 762. 3) *nimio maiores aut, quod saepius accidit, minores,* §. 737. unde tumor vel βάθος. 4) *dissimiles,* quarum ipsum comparationis tertium notabiliter differt in termino et subiecto assimilationis, §. 736. 5) *durae,* i. e. a longinqua similitudine ductae, §. 741. *Metaphora, sicut omnis tropus,* §. 781. *si in alienum locum venit, debet plus valere,* §. 26. *eo, quod expellit.* Quint. ib.

§ 785. The school logicians teach the EXPONIBLE PROPOSITION, cryptically composed of affirming and denying, such as exclusive, exceptive, restrictive propositions, and so forth. Unless I feared being inconvenient to Latin ears, I would call tropes exponible figures. For just as the school gave a barbarous denomination to propositions because they need exposition so that the genuine form of both parts from which they coalesced may appear, so a trope needs exposition so that it may appear as a figure even to grammarians who are not philosophers. If from the term of comparison, which alone is explicitly thought in a trope, you draw out the omitted subject of comparison, the improper signification, and, neglecting the love of brevity, explicitly and manifestly think this beside the term of comparison and declare that you think both by special terms and signs for each, THE TROPE IS EXPOUNDED.

§ 786. Expounding metaphor, you will have manifest assimilation, §735. Expounding synecdoche, you will see comparison of greater and lesser. Therefore it is either ASCENDING SYNECDOCHE or DESCENDING, §742. Expound irony: you will have antithesis, §763. Finally, metonymy will be resolved into some comparison strictly so called, §§773, 782. Whatever has therefore been said up to this point about figures, §§730–779, need not be repeated about tropes and their cryptic character.

§ 787. *On the whole metaphor is shorter than simile*, that is, manifest and explicit assimilation, §735, §§781–782, *because the latter is compared explicitly with the thing we wish to express, the subject of comparison, while the former is said for the thing itself. It is comparison when I say a man acts like a lion. It is transfer when I say of a man, he is a lion*, and indeed metaphor, Quintilian VIII.6. But metaphor is also bolder than comparison; hence educated people who have dared to compare a man with a lion do not rashly dare to call the same man a lion, §313. I do not touch the species of metaphor, *because we are no longer instructing children, as if, once the genus is received, they could not understand the species*. Let these be avoided: 1) metaphors whose frequent use obscures and fills with tedium, §731; 2) low, sordid, deformed ones, §§736, 762; 3) those too great or, as more often happens, too small, §737, whence swelling or *πάθος*; 4) dissimilar ones, whose third of comparison differs notably in term and subject of assimilation, §736; 5) hard ones, that is, drawn from remote likeness, §741. *Metaphor*, like every trope, §781, *if it comes into an alien place, ought to be worth more than what it expels*, Quintilian.

§ 788. Expositionis §. 786. et diiudicationis §. 787. ad exercitium haec exempla sunt:

Homo homini deus est, si suum officium sciat.

Caecil.

Egomet credidi

Homini docto mandare, id indocto mando maximo.

Plaut.

Te quia rugae

Turpant, et capitis nives.

Hor.

Aut porcus Umber, aut obesus Etruscus.

Nec ullius natantis impetum trabis

Nequisse praeterire, sive palmulis

Opus foret volare, sive linteo.

Ille, post phaselus, antea fuit

Comata silva. Nam Cytherio in iugo

Loquente saepe sibilum edidit coma.

Cat.

§ 789. Synecdoche adscendens §. 786. erit elegans substitutio 1) totius pro parte, §. 780, 743. Plautus *ulmorum Acheronta* per iocum dicit servum vimeis saepe virgis vapulantem.

Serviet aeternum, qui parvo nesciet uti.

Hor. Vel ipsa scilicet aeviternitas pars tantum aeternitatis est. Virgilius aliquando elephantum pro ebore, dente elephanti, ponit. §. 753. 2) superioris pro inferiori, §. 744. Huc εὐφημισμοί, quibus ad mortem pertinentia circumscribebant huius non lubenter memores: *si quid illi gravius acciderit*, e. c. pro consolatione lugentium:

Paullum quidlibet alloquutionis

Moestius lacrumis Simonideis,

Cat. quibus Venerea solebant obumbrare.

Tibi ultro supplicatum advenio ob stultitiam meam.

Plaut. (stuprum illatum filiae).

§ 790. Synecdoche descendens, §. 786. est venusta substitutio 1) partis pro toto, §. 746.

Plotius et Varius Sinuessae, Virgiliusque

Occurrunt, animae, quales neque candidiores

Terra tulit, neque queis me sit devinctior alter.

Hor. I. sat. V.

Sic forsan tener ausus est Catullus

Magno mittere passerem Maroni.

Mart. III. ep. 14. (poema de passere pro toto libro, quo continetur.) 2) inferioris pro superiori perceptione, §. 749.

Nulla fata loco possis excludere, quum mors

Venerit, in medio Tibure Sardinia est.

Mart. 60. Illud pro saluberrimo, haec pro loco, qui pestilens habebatur, est posita.

§ 788. For exercise in exposition, §786, and judgment, §787, let these be examples: “Man is a god to man, if he knows his duty,” Caecilius; “I myself believed I was entrusting it to a learned man; I entrust it to the greatest unlearned one,” Plautus; “because wrinkles and the snows of the head disfigure you,” Horace; “either an Umbrian pig, or a fat Etruscan,” and Catullus’ boat that could outstrip any floating timber, whether it needed to fly with oars or sail, and which, after being a skiff, before had been a long-haired forest, often giving a whistle with speaking foliage on the Cytherian ridge.

§ 789. Ascending synecdoche, §786, will be the elegant substitution 1) of the whole for the part, §§780, 743. Plautus jokingly calls a slave often beaten with elm switches “an Acheron of elms.” “He will serve forever who does not know how to use a little,” Horace. Aeviternity itself, of course, is only part of eternity. Virgil sometimes puts elephant for ivory, the elephant’s tooth, §753. 2) Of the superior for the inferior, §744. Here belong εὐφημοσμοί, euphemisms, by which people not gladly mindful of death would circumlocute things pertaining to death: *if anything more serious should happen to him*, and so on; for consolation of mourners, “a little bit of address, somewhat sadder than Simonidean tears,” Catullus; by which they used to shade sexual matters: “I come of my own accord to beg you because of my stupidity,” Plautus, that is, rape inflicted on a daughter.

§ 790. Descending synecdoche, §786, is the graceful substitution 1) of part for whole, §746: “Plotius and Varius meet us at Sinuessa, and Virgil, souls than whom the earth has borne none brighter, nor any to whom I am more bound,” Horace, *Satires* I.5. “Thus perhaps tender Catullus dared send a sparrow to great Maro,” Martial IV.14, that is, the poem about the sparrow for the whole book in which it is contained. 2) Of the inferior for the superior perception, §749: “You could exclude the fates from no place; when death comes, Sardinia is in the middle of Tibur,” Martial 60. The former is put for the most healthful place, the latter for a place considered pestilential.

§ 791. Ironiam Ciceronis illusionem habet *C. Verres, praetor urbanus, homo sanctus et diligens*, et illud in Clodium: *Integritas tua te purgavit, mihi crede, pudor eripuit, vita ante acta servavit*. Nec irrisione caret, uti Fabius recte notat, initium orationis pro Ligario: *Novum crimen, C. Caesar, et ante hunc diem inauditum*.

*Inserere nunc, Meliboe, pyros, pone ordine vites!
Scilicet is superis labor est, ea cura quietos
Exagitat!*

Virg.

§ 792. Metonymia erit venusta substitutio, §. 782. 1) efficientis causae pro effectu:

Rarae sine Mentore mensae.

Iuv. VIII. 2) effectus pro causa:

Pallentes habitant morbi, tristisque senectus.

Virg.

Donec virenti canities abest.

Hor. I. 9. Senectutis effectus est canities. 3) medii pro fine:

Phyllida mitte mihi, meus est natalis, Iola!

Virg. 4) finis pro medio. §. 774.

Meritos aris mactavit honores.

Virg.

§ 793. 5) Signi pro signato:

Dum pueris omnis pater et matercula pallet.

Hor. Pallor signum timoris est. 6) Signati pro signo, §. 775.

*Nunc te marmoreum pro tempore fecimus, at tu,
Quum fuerit gregem suppleverit, aureus esto.*

Virg. 7) Phaenomenorum in corpore pro simultaneis eorum in anima contingere solitis, §. 776.

*O! te, Bollane, cerebri
Felicem!
O! ego laevus,
Qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam!*

Hor. 8) affectionum animae pro correspondente cum iisdem corporis statu:

*Si mihi non animo fixum immotumque sederet,
Ne cui me vinclo vellem sociare iugali,
Postquam primus amor deceptam morte fefellit,
Huic uni forsitan potui succumbere culpae.*

Aen. IV. 15.

§ 791. Cicero has an ironic illusion in “Gaius Verres, urban praetor, a holy and diligent man,” and that against Clodius: “Your integrity cleared you, believe me; modesty snatched you away, your earlier life saved you.” Nor is the beginning of the speech *Pro Ligario* without mockery, as Fabius rightly notes: “A new charge, Gaius Caesar, and unheard before this day.” Virgil: “Now graft pears, Meliboeus, set vines in order! Surely that is labor for the gods above, that care agitates the quiet ones!”

§ 792. Metonymy will be a graceful substitution, §782: 1) of efficient cause for effect, “tables rare without Mentor,” Juvenal VIII; 2) of effect for cause, “pale diseases dwell, and sad old age,” Virgil; “while grayness is absent from the green,” Horace I.9, for gray hair is an effect of old age; 3) of means for end, “Send Phyllis to me, Iola, it is my birthday,” Virgil; 4) of end for means, §774, “he sacrificed deserved honors at the altars,” Virgil.

§ 793. 5) Of sign for signified: “while every father and little mother grows pale for the boys,” Horace, pallor being a sign of fear. 6) Of signified for sign, §775: “Now we have made you marble for the time; but when he has filled the flock, be golden,” Virgil. 7) Of bodily phenomena for the simultaneous states that usually occur in the soul, §776: “O Bollandus, happy in brain!” and “O I, left-sided, who purge bile under the hour of springtime!” Horace. 8) Of affections of the soul for the corresponding bodily state: “If it did not sit fixed and immovable in my mind not to wish to join myself to anyone by the bond of marriage, after first love deceived me, cheated by death, perhaps I could have yielded to this one fault alone,” *Aeneid* IV.15.

§ 794. 9) Loci vel aetatis, temporis, horae, continentis pro re vel persona isto loco, vel tempore contenta. §. 777.

*Quinque adeo magnae, positis incudibus, urbes
Tela novant, Atina potens, Tiburque superbum,
Ardea, Crustumerique et turrigeræ Antemnae.*

Aen. VII. 630.

Aspice, venturo laetentur ut omnia saeclo!

Ecl. III. 52. 10) Contenti in tempore locove pro tempore et loco:

*Nunc etiam pecudes umbras et frigora captant,
Nunc virides etiam occultant spineta lacertos,
Thestylis et rapido fessis messoribus aestu
Allia serpillumque herbas contundit olentes.*

Ecl. II. 10.

*Te campo quaesivimus in minore,
Te in circo, te in omnibus libellis.*

Cat. (pro tabernis librariis.)

§ 795. 11) Dei, domini, ducis, imperantis pro re possessa vel persona, quae in eius est potestate: *Sine Cerere et Baccho friget Venus.*

*Iam proximus ardet
Ucalegon.*

Virg.

*Ubi is homo est?
Iam devorandum censes, si conspexeris?
Dum datur, dum calet, devorari decet.*

Plaut. Confer, §. 141. sis, Catulli locum citatum. 12) rei, vel personae, quae alicui, tanquam possessori, vel imperanti, competunt, pro hoc homine, possessore vel imperante. §. 778.

Cedant arma togae.

Cic.

*Flerunt Rhodopeiae arces,
Altaque Pangaea, et Rhesi Mavortia tellus.*

Georg. IV. 461.

*Ille seu Parthos Latio imminentes
Egerit iusto domitos triumpho,*

Hor. I. od. 12.

§ 794. 9) Of place, age, time, hour, or container for the thing or person contained in that place or time, §777: “Five great cities, with anvils set down, renew weapons: powerful Atina, proud Tibur, Ardea, Crustumeri, and tower-bearing Antemnae,” *Aeneid* VII.630; “Look, how all things rejoice in the coming age!” *Eclogue* IV.52. 10) Of what is contained in time or place for the time and place: “Now even the flocks seek shades and coolness, now the bramble-thickets hide green lizards, and Thestylis pounds garlic and wild thyme, fragrant herbs, for reapers weary with rapid heat,” *Eclogue* II.10; “We sought you in the lesser campus, you in the circus, you in all the little books,” Catullus, that is, in the booksellers’ shops.

§ 795. 11) Of god, lord, leader, or commander for the thing possessed or person in his power: *Without Ceres and Bacchus Venus grows cold*; “Now nearest Ucalegon burns,” Virgil; “Where is that man? Do you think he must already be devoured if you see him? While he is given, while he is hot, it is fitting he be devoured,” Plautus. Compare, if you please, the cited place of Catullus, §141. 12) Of a thing or person belonging to someone as possessor or commander for this man, possessor, or commander, §778: “Let arms yield to the toga,” Cicero; “The Rhodopeian citadels wept, and high Pangaea, and Rhesus’ martial land,” *Georgics* IV.461; “Whether he has driven the Parthians threatening Latium, subdued in just triumph,” Horace I.12.

§ 796. Quam metalepsin antecedentis pro consequente dicunt, et consequentis pro antecedente, quamque suo iure ac merito comitatur metalepsis concomitantium, quando simultaneorum unum ponitur pro altero: est ea metonymia, §. 782, 773; quoniam substituit perceptiones sibi mutuo socias, quarum vel utraque dato tempore fuerant sensationes, vel altera imaginatio, altera sensatio, vel altera sensatio, altera praevisio, M. §. 576. Sic antecedens ponitur pro consequente in euphemismo Catulli de pomo Atalantae:

Quod zonam solvit diu ligatam,

et apud Virgilium, quando Silenum antiquissima cantantem narrat, Ecl. VI.

Tum Phaetontidas musco circumdat amarae

Corticis, atque solo proceras erigit alnos.

Consequens pro antecedente:

Caeduntur tumidae, medico ridente, mariscae.

Iuv. II. 13. unum concomitantium pro altero:

Vos lanam trahitis, calathisque peracta refertis

Vellera, vos tenui praegnantem stamine fusum

Penelope melius, levius torquetis Arachne.

§ 797. ANTONOMASIA, qua pro idea, conceptu singularium et individuorum, et famosiori vel usitatori, eiusdem signo, quod in oratione solet esse nomen, nunc proprium dici solitum, substituitur conceptus alius, vel plures conceptus in periphrasin et circumscriptionem combinati, nunc cum priore reciproci, nunc latiores eodem, aut vice versa, est synecdoche, nunc adscendens speciei, vel generis pro individuo, §. 789. nunc descendens, individui pro specie vel genere, §. 790, 786. nunc tandem descriptio propria, quae scilicet describendo non sit latior, manifesta potius est figura, §. 550, 733. quam tropus. §. 780. *Magnanimus Anchisiades* apud Virgilium V. est antonomasia adscendens. Patronymicum enim, etiamsi unicus sit tantum filius, aut unica filia, tamen horum individuus latius patet in regno possibilium heterocosmice, quia plures esse potuissent filii filiaeve, immo in hoc etiam mundo, quoniam non solis filiis filiabusve convenit, sed posteris etiam:

Natorum natis, et qui nascentur ab illis.

Antonomasia descendens est apud Plautum:

I hac mecum, ut videas simul

Tuam Alcumenam pellicem, Iuno mea;

Debetur magnus patinae subitusque Prometheus

Iuv. 4. (pro figulo.)

Nec surdum, nec Tiresiam quemquam esse deorum.

14.

§ 796. What they call metalepsis of antecedent for consequent and consequent for antecedent, and which is rightly and deservedly accompanied by metalepsis of concomitants, when one simultaneous thing is put for another, is metonymy, §§782, 773, because it substitutes perceptions mutually associated with one another, of which either both at a given time had been sensations, or one imagination and the other sensation, or one sensation and the other foresight, *Metaphysics* §576. Thus the antecedent is put for the consequent in Catullus' euphemism about Atalanta's apple: "which loosened the girdle long tied," and in Virgil, when he tells that Silenus sings the oldest things, *Eclogue* VI: "Then he surrounds the Phaethontides with the moss of bitter bark and raises tall alders from the ground." The consequent for antecedent: "The swollen figs are cut, while the doctor laughs," Juvenal II.13. One concomitant for another: "You draw wool and bring back fleeces finished in baskets, you turn the spindle pregnant with fine thread better than Penelope, lighter than Arachne."

§ 797. ANTONOMASIA, by which for the idea or concept of singulars and individuals and for its more famous or more usual sign, which in speech is usually a name now called proper, another concept is substituted, or several concepts combined into periphrasis and circumlocution, now reciprocal with the former, now broader than it, or vice versa, is synecdoche: now ascending, species or genus for individual, §789; now descending, individual for species or genus, §§790, 786; finally, proper description, which in describing is not broader, is rather a manifest figure, §§550, 733, than a trope, §780. "Great-hearted son of Anchises" in Virgil V is ascending antonomasia. For a patronymic, even if there is only one son or daughter, nevertheless extends more broadly than their individuals in the kingdom of possibles heterocosmically, because there could have been several sons or daughters, indeed also in this world, since it belongs not only to sons and daughters but also to descendants: "sons of sons, and those who will be born from them." Descending antonomasia appears in Plautus: "Go with me, that you may see your Alcumena rival, my Juno"; Juvenal: "A great and sudden Prometheus is owed to the dish," that is, a potter; "Nor is any god deaf, nor a Tiresias."

§ 798. Haec antonomasia descendens praecipue placuit multis venustatum amatoribus, §. 797, 755. Clodium in sorores etiam ardentem Cicero Romanum Iovem dicit, §. 756, 754.

Quae autem hic insidiae sunt? aut quis nobis Hannibal navigat?

Petr.

*Consulit ictericae lento de funere matris,
Ante tamen de te, Tanaquil tua.*

Iuv. 2. Hac ratione totam periodi platonicae fabulam explicari debere reor, et locum Virgiliti:

*Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera, quae vehat, Argo,
Delectos heroas, erunt etiam altera bella,
Atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles.*

ecl. 4.

§ 799. Antonomasian, quae figura potius, quam tropus sit, habes in circumscriptione Socratis ipsi tamen propria: §. 797.

*Aethereusque Platon, et qui fabricaverat illum,
Damnatusque suae melius damnavit Athenas,*

Man.

*barbatum hoc crede magistrum
Dicere, sorbitio tollit quem dira cicutae.*

Pers. Ad antonomasian adscendentem refero sermonis illam communicationem, qua pulcre cogitaturus favorabilia, sibi soli forsitan convenientia, suis simul spectatoribus auditoribusve simul tribuit, et odiosa, his forte solis propria, sibi tamen simul adscribit, in persona, quam vocant pluralis numeri primam; ponit enim speciem praesentium pro certis individuis.

§ 800. Euphemismi, quaeque κατὰ λιτότητα belle cogitantur cum aliqua extenuatione, §. 329. non tam tropi sunt peculiares, quam casus aliqui, quorum obventu moratum cogitandi genus, §. 227. ad aliquam potius figurarum e. g. periphrasin, vel tropum ex allatis quemcunque suaserit confugere, quam rem nude et explicite, qualis cogitanti primum in mentem forte venerit, minus eleganter vel concipere, vel efferre, §. 789, 796. Sic extenuat synecdoche partis pro toto, nisi loqui velis de rebus ad te pertinentibus, instar gloriosi militis; extenuat laudabilis illius, quod tibi tuisve velles adscribere, negare potius oppositum, quam illud ipsum affirmare.

Nec sum adeo informis, nuper me in litore vidi.

Si quid mihi humanius acciderit, est synecdoche adscendens §. 789. *vixisse* est metalepsis antecedentis pro consequente, §. 796. uti et illa loquendi formula, qua vivere iubentur et valere, quae missa facimus, quibus nuncium mittimus, in posterum aspernaturi:

Omnia vel medium fiant mare. Vivite, silvae!

§ 798. This descending antonomasia especially pleased many lovers of graces, §§797, 755. Cicero calls Clodius, burning even for his sisters, a Roman Jove, §§756, 754. Petronius: “What ambushes are here? or what Hannibal sails against us?” Juvenal: “Your Tanaquil consults about the slow funeral of her jaundiced mother, but first about you.” I think the whole fable of the Platonic period must be explained in this way, and Virgil’s place: “Then there will be another Tiphys and another Argo to carry chosen heroes; there will also be other wars, and again great Achilles will be sent to Troy,” *Eclogue* IV.

§ 799. You have antonomasia which is rather a figure than a trope in the circumlocution proper to Socrates himself, §797: “Aetherial Plato, and he who had fashioned him, and the condemned man who better condemned his Athens,” Manilius; “believe this bearded master to say it, whom the dire draught of hemlock carried off,” Persius. To ascending antonomasia I refer that communication of speech by which one who will think beautifully attributes favorable things, perhaps suited to himself alone, also to his spectators or hearers, and assigns hateful things, perhaps proper to them alone, also to himself, in what they call the person of the first person plural. For he puts the species of those present for certain individuals.

§ 800. Euphemisms, and things beautifully thought κατὰ λιτότητα, with some attenuation, §329, are not so much peculiar tropes as certain cases in which the moralized kind of thinking, §227, will advise taking refuge in some figure, for example periphrasis, or in any trope from those brought forward, rather than less elegantly conceiving or uttering the thing nakedly and explicitly as it perhaps first came into the thinker’s mind, §§789, 796. Thus synecdoche of part for whole attenuates, unless you wish to speak about things concerning yourself like a braggart soldier; it attenuates what is praiseworthy and what you would wish to ascribe to yourself and yours, by denying the opposite rather than affirming the thing itself: “Nor am I so deformed; recently I saw myself on the shore.” *If anything more human should happen to me* is ascending synecdoche, §789. *To have lived* is metalepsis of antecedent for consequent, §796, as is also the formula by which things we dismiss and send away, which we intend to scorn in the future, are ordered to live and be well: “Let all things become even the middle sea. Farewell, woods!”

§ 801. Tropus, uti humana omnia, gradus etiam admittit, et maius ac minus, dum potest crescere. 1) extensive, continuando tropum dati generis per plures cogitationes explicite pingendas aut significandas, et haec cuiuscunque tropi continuatio dabit ALLEGORIAN; 2) intensive, quando non unicum solum et immediatum subiectum comparationis omittitur et occultatur, substituto per tropum termino comparationis, sed ille ponitur comparationis terminus, ex quo debeas, exponendo tropum, eruere primo certum aliquod subiectum comparationis, quod dein, quam primum erutum ac inventum est, subito transit in novum et tacitum etiam terminum relationis, nunc demum expositione repetita pandentem subiectum illud comparationis, quod primario nunc cogitandum, et extra tropum explicite ponendum proprieque significandum fuisset. Haec troporum intensio, tropus, ut ita dicam, interne duplicatus, vel omnino multiplicatus, METALEPSIS est, si metalepsin, de qua §. 796. metonymian potius, uti est, denomine-
mus.

§ 802. Allegorian latius non omni solum troporum generi tribuimus, ironiae etiam, §. 801. uniformiter decurrenti, qualis esset congeries metaphorarum, quarum et inter terminos comparationis est nexus quidam arctior analogo rationis observandus, congeries metonymiarum eiusmodi, e. c. sed etiam crama quoddam et miscelam troporum diversi generis serie continua sese excipientium, ita, ut allegorumena sint, quibuscunque subest sensus mysticus. Iam clarum est, quanta hic pateat ianua in caliginem aestheticam, quanta sit opus cura, ne longius petatum videatur, obscuritatis potius, quam illustrationis, argumentum, §. 634, 741. Hinc umbram qui malunt, quam noctem, ALLEGORIIS PURIS, quarum subiecta comparationis omittuntur omnia, saepe praeferunt MIXTAS, quibus saltim aliquando, clavium instar, subiecta comparationis, explicite etiam cogitata, interseruntur. §. 736.

§ 803. Allegoria pura Ciceronis est pro Quintio: *Ita fit, ut ego, qui tela depellere, et vulneribus mederi debeam, tum id facere cogar, quum etiam telum adversarius nulum iecerit; illis autem id tempus impugnandi detur, quum et vitandi istorum impetus potestas adempta nobis erit, et, si qua in re, quod parati sunt facere, venenatum aliquod telum iecerint, medicinae faciendae locus non erit.* Mistam habet pro Milone: *Equidem caeteras tempestates et procellas in illis duntaxat fluctibus concionum semper putavi Miloni esse subeundas.* Huc fabulae, §. 526. apologii, §. 537. et AENIGMATA, complexus praedicatorum non bene convenientium, et vix in una sede, uno subiecto, morantium; quorum subiectum, clavis, vel reticetur, vel occultitur. Iustus lucis et umbrae dispensator Virgilius, imitatus oracula, §. 671. non abhorruit ab allegoria descendens antonomasiae, §. 798, 801:

*Non Simois tibi, nec Xanthus, nec Dorica castra
Defuerint. Alius Latio iam partus Achilles
Natus et ipse dea.*

§ 801. Trope, like all human things, also admits degrees and more and less, since it can grow. 1) Extensively, by continuing a trope of a given kind through several thoughts explicitly to be painted or signified; this continuation of any trope will give ALLEGORY. 2) Intensively, when not only the single and immediate subject of comparison is omitted and hidden, with the term of comparison substituted through trope, but that term of comparison is put from which, in expounding the trope, you must first draw out some definite subject of comparison, which then, as soon as it is drawn out and found, suddenly passes into a new and tacit term of relation, now at last, by repeated exposition, revealing that subject of comparison which was primarily to be thought and, outside the trope, explicitly set forth and properly signified. This intensification of tropes, a trope internally doubled, so to speak, or even multiplied, is METALEPSIS, if we name the metalepsis discussed in §796 rather as metonymy, as it is.

§ 802. We attribute allegory broadly not only to every kind of trope, even to irony, §801, running uniformly, such as a heap of metaphors among whose terms of comparison there is also a rather close connection to be observed by the analogue of reason, a heap of such metonymies, and so forth, but also to a certain crama and mixture of tropes of different kinds following one another in a continuous series, so that the allegorized things are whatever have a mystical sense beneath them. It is now clear how great a door is opened here into aesthetic darkness, and how much care is needed lest it seem far-fetched, an argument of obscurity rather than illustration, §§634, 741. Hence those who prefer shade to night often prefer MIXED allegories, into which, at least sometimes, the subjects of comparison explicitly thought are inserted like keys, to PURE ALLEGORIES, whose subjects of comparison are all omitted, §736.

§ 803. A pure allegory of Cicero is in *Pro Quinctio*: *Thus it happens that I, who ought to repel weapons and heal wounds, am forced to do this when the adversary has not even thrown any weapon; but to them is given the time of attack when both the power of avoiding their assaults will have been taken from us, and, if in any matter, as they are ready to do, they throw some poisoned weapon, there will be no place for making medicine.* He has a mixed allegory in *Pro Milone*: *Indeed I always thought that Milo had to undergo the other tempests and storms only in those waves of assemblies.* Here belong fables, §526, apologies, §537, and AENIGMATA, riddles, complexes of predicates not well agreeing and scarcely dwelling in one seat or one subject, whose subject, the key, is either suppressed or hidden. Virgil, just distributor of light and shade, imitating oracles, §671, did not shrink from an allegory of descending antonomasia, §§798, 801: “Neither Simois nor Xanthus nor Doric camps will fail you. Another Achilles is already born for Latium, himself also born of a goddess.”

§ 804. Quem protendit tropum allegoria, nisi serio caveas, in turpem obscuritatem, intendit metalepsis, §. 801. Sed videamus bonas. In primo §. 789. exemplo habes synecdochen duplicatam 1) adscendentem totius pro parte, *ulmorum* pro virgis, et 2) descendentem inferioris pro superiori ulmearum virgarum pro quibusvis ligneis. In *passere* Catulli est, §. 790. 1) metonymia signati pro signo, vel contenti pro continente, et deinde 2) synecdoche partis pro toto. In illo: *Integritas tua te purgavit*, §. 791. est metaphora et ironia complicatae. In primo §. 794. exemplo est metalepsis primo metonymiam continentis pro contento, et dein synecdochen totius pro parte sistens, nisi omnes earum urbium cives fabros ferrarios, instar Cyclopum, iudicaveris. Quando pro: nunc meridies est, dicitur: *Nunc pecudes frigora captant*, habes metalepsin metonymiae, qua 1) contentum, phaenomenon rusticum, pro continente tempore et 2) contentum frigus pro continente aura ventove dicitur, nisi malis ultimum tropum synecdochen partis pro toto dicere, quo pertinet tropus abstracti pro concreto. §. 794. *ove frigido*.

§ 805. Durat adhuc allegoria, §. 801. metonymiae contentorum phaenomenorum rusticorum pro continente tempore, §. 794. et tamen accedit per metalepsin antonomasia descendens, quando *Thestylis* pro quavis muliere rustica ponitur, §. 798. Quum *homo, dum calet*, devorandus censetur, §. 795. metonymiae possessoris pro re, quam habet, per metalepsin additur altera, qua phaenomena corporis in anima simultaneous solent substitui. *Iupiter* §. 141. pro vento est metalepsis ex metonymia dei pro re, cui praeest, et ex synecdoche generis superioris pro inferiori, concrescens. Praesit enim aeri iam Iupiter, non Iuno, non tamen aerem generatim, sed aerem vehementius commotum indicare poeta voluit. Pari ratione *fax* in hoc Catulli loco dictus est per metalepsin metaphoram et synecdochen partis pro toto comprehendentem.

§ 806. Ad metalepsin referri poterunt pleraeque syllepses, uti vocant casus, in quibus unum signum duos significatus, utrumque primarium, sustinere videatur. §. 801.

Nerine Galatea, thymo mihi dulcior Hyblae.

ecl. 7. Hic in *dulcior* syllepsin deprehendunt, quae concrescens ex metaphora et synecdoche speciei pro genere metalepsis est. Si tropum durum et longius petium CATACHRESIN et abusionem dicamus, fallor, an eius, quid tropus sit, non satis meminimus? §. 780. Est dura, est longius petita perceptionis pro perceptione, signi improprii pro proprio, vocabuli translati in locum proprii substitutio, sed eo ipso, quia dura, quia longius est petita, quamquam excusari nonnunquam ipsa necessitate potest, tamen tropus nunquam est, saepe tropis opposita cogitationum deformatio. De tropis etiam valent observata de figuris, §. 339. quoniam sunt figurae crypticae, §. 783.

§ 807. Potest etiam hyperbole, si lateat in substitutione perceptionis minoris pro maiore, vel maioris pro minore, tropus esse, §. 339, 780. Neque tamen omnis hyperbole tropus est, neque peculiare troporum genus constituit, ad synecdochen, comparisonem maioris et minoris, totius et partis, crypticam, §. 742, 782. referenda. Multo minus omnem emphasisin possum tropum dicere, M. §. 517. minime peculiarem troporum classem fingere. Sane tropus omnis, sed etiam omnis figura, bene locata, pulcre significata, suam habet comitem emphasisin. §. 26, 783.

§ 804. The trope which allegory extends into ugly obscurity unless you take serious care, metalepsis intensifies, §801. But let us see good ones. In the first example of §789 you have doubled synecdoche: 1) ascending, whole for part, *elms* for switches, and 2) descending, inferior for superior, elm switches for any wooden ones. In Catullus' *sparrow*, §790, there is 1) metonymy of signified for sign, or contained for container, and then 2) synecdoche of part for whole. In "Your integrity cleared you," §791, metaphor and irony are complicated together. In the first example of §794 there is metalepsis first presenting metonymy of container for contained, and then synecdoche of whole for part, unless you judge all the citizens of those cities to be blacksmiths like Cyclopes. When for "it is now midday" one says "now the cattle seek coolness," you have metalepsis of metonymy by which 1) the content, a rustic phenomenon, is said for the containing time, and 2) the content coolness for the containing air or wind, unless you prefer to call the final trope synecdoche of part for whole, to which belongs the trope of abstract for concrete, §794: "with cold sheep."

§ 805. The allegory of metonymy of contained rustic phenomena for containing time, §794, still endures, and yet by metalepsis descending antonomasia is added when *Thestylis* is put for any rustic woman, §798. When a *man*, while he is hot, is judged fit to be devoured, §795, another metonymy is added by metalepsis to the metonymy of possessor for the thing he has, by which bodily phenomena are usually substituted for things simultaneous in the soul. *Jupiter*, §141, for wind is metalepsis growing together from metonymy of god for the thing over which he presides and from synecdoche of superior genus for inferior. For Jupiter may preside over air now, not Juno, but the poet wished to indicate not air generally but air more vehemently moved. In the same way *torch* in this place of Catullus is said by metalepsis comprehending metaphor and synecdoche of part for whole.

§ 806. Most syllepses, as they call the cases in which one sign seems to sustain two meanings, each primary, can be referred to metalepsis, §801: "Nerine Galatea, sweeter to me than the thyme of Hybla," *Eclogue* 7. Here they detect in *sweeter* a syllepsis which, growing from metaphor and synecdoche of species for genus, is metalepsis. If we call a hard and far-fetched trope CATACHRESIS and abuse, am I mistaken, or have we not sufficiently remembered what a trope is? §780. It is a hard, far-fetched substitution of perception for perception, of improper sign for proper, of transferred word in place of proper; but by that very fact, because it is hard and fetched from far away, although it can sometimes be excused by necessity itself, it is never a trope, but often a deformation of thoughts opposed to tropes. The observations about figures, §339, also hold of tropes, since they are cryptic figures, §783.

§ 807. Hyperbole too can be a trope if it lies hidden in substitution of a lesser perception for a greater, or a greater for a lesser, §§339, 780. Yet not every hyperbole is a trope, nor does it constitute a peculiar kind of tropes; it must be referred to synecdoche, to cryptic comparison of greater and lesser, whole and part, §§742, 782. Much less can I call every emphasis a trope, *Metaphysics* §517, and least of all invent a peculiar class of tropes for it. Surely every trope, but also every figure, if well placed and beautifully signified, has its accompanying emphasis, §§26, 783.

SECTIO XXXVIII

THAUMATURGIA AESTHETICA

§ 808. Lux novitatis perceptiones illustrat egregie, M. §. 549, 550. Novitatis intuitus, ADMIRATIO curiositatem excitat, M. §. 688. curiositas attentionem, M. §. 625, 529. attentio ad rem vivide sibi pingendam novam lucem affert. M. §. 629, 531. Pulcre hinc cogitanda, quando illustranda sunt, §. 730. bene sistuntur admirationem novitate, clarius cognoscendi studium admiratione, tandem attentionem studio clarius rem cognoscendi conciliantia. Conciliatio novitatis, per hanc admirationis, per hanc curiositatis, per hanc attentionis AESTHETICA, brevitatis caussa, dicatur a nobis THAUMATURGIA.

§ 809. Crassus apud Ciceronem de or. I. 137. quando statim a limine suae dissertationis excusatione dignum iudicat, se nova non dicturum, hoc ipso tacite concedit, quam scripsimus, regulam, §. 808. *Quum audieris, inquires, non tam arbitror te haec admiraturum, quam existimaturum tum, cum ea audire cupiebas, caussam, cur cupere, non fuisse. Nihil enim dicam reconditum, nihil exspectatione vestra dignum, nihil aut inauditum vobis, aut cuiquam novum.* Pastores ipsi laudavere, quando

Pollio et ipse facit nova carmina.

Ecl. 3. 86. *Novitates si spem afferunt, ut tanquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat,* §. 731. *non sunt illae repudiandae,* Cic. de am. 70. Quid aliud Quintilianus, quando dissuadet *non multum ab initio orationis omnem in reliquum novitatis gratiam praecerpere?* IV. 5. Assentitur Horatius l. c. §. 294. Novas res boni cives, novos homines contemnant, qui nil nisi Cecropidae: nos recte novam pulcre cogitandi materiem, et gratam in ipsis cogitationum elegantis novitatem amabimus, §. 808.

§ 810. *Qui libenter audiunt, et magis attendunt, et facilius credunt, plerumque ipsa delectatione capiuntur, nonnunquam admiratione auferuntur.* – Recte Cicero his ipsis ad Brutum verbis quadam in epistola scribit: *Nam eloquentiam, quae admirationem non habet, nullam iudico. Aristoteles quoque eandem petendam maxime putat.* Quint. VIII. 3. Sed quae potest esse, nisi novitatis, admiratio? §. 808. Obiecerit forsitan aliquis: esse praestantem illam et divinam sapientiam: *nil admirari.* Cic. Tusc. III. 30.

*Nil admirari, prope res est una, Numici,
Solaque quae possit facere ac servare beatum.*

Hor. I. ep. 6. Unde colligas admirationis studium ad fucos potius, §. 688. et mendacia vere non splendida, §. 625. relegandum esse, quam naturali accensendum ornatui. §. 622, 623.

§ 811. Verum salva res est. Qui fuit veterum sive mos, sive morbus, etiam tunc, quum distinctissime rationem instruere docendo debuissent philosophi, captare tropis paradoxa, et apophthegmatibus in ipsa saepius aenigmata, praecipitare liberum spiritum, §. 803. aut hic etiam iubentes *nil admirari* per hyperbolen volunt a vehementiori tantum quotidianarum curarum, ignoranti ac stupida, admiratione revocare; aut metonymia consequentis pro antecedente, §. 796. rerum humanarum oblii, caecitatisque mortalibus inevitabilis divinam sapientiam ab omni ignorantia, matre admirationis, cecinerunt immunem; aut tandem fallacem potius, et fucatam, quam veram et homini naturalem professi sunt sapientiam, cui summi numinis in admiratione sapientissima transigetur, si sapit, aeternitas.

SECTION XXXXVIII

AESTHETIC THAUMATURGY

§ 808. The light of novelty illustrates perceptions exceptionally, Metaphysics §§549–550. The intuition of novelty, ADMIRATION, excites curiosity, Metaphysics §688. Curiosity excites attention, Metaphysics §§625, 529. Attention brings new light to the thing to be vividly painted for itself, Metaphysics §§629, 531. Hence things to be beautifully thought, when they are to be illustrated, §730, are well set forth when they conciliate admiration by novelty, the zeal for knowing more clearly by admiration, and finally attention by zeal for knowing the thing more clearly. The AESTHETIC conciliation of novelty, through this of admiration, through this of curiosity, through this of attention, for brevity's sake, let us call THAUMATURGY.

§ 809. Crassus in Cicero, *De oratore* I.137, when at the very threshold of his discussion he judges it worthy of excuse that he will not say new things, by this very fact tacitly concedes the rule we have written, §808. *When you have heard*, he says, *I think you will not so much admire these things as judge that then, when you desired to hear them, there was no cause why you should desire it. For I shall say nothing hidden away, nothing worthy of your expectation, nothing unheard by you or new to anyone.* The shepherds themselves praised it when “Pollio himself makes new songs,” *Eclogue* 3.86. *If novelties bring hope, so that, as in herbs not deceptive, fruit appears*, §731, *they are not to be rejected*, Cicero, *De amicitia* 70. What else does Quintilian mean when he advises not to pluck *from the beginning of the speech all grace of novelty for the rest?* IV.5. Horace agrees in the cited place, §294. Let good citizens despise new things and new men, those who are nothing but Cecropidae; we shall rightly love new material for beautiful thinking and pleasing novelty in the very elegances of thoughts, §808.

§ 810. *Those who listen gladly both attend more and believe more easily; they are usually captured by delight itself, sometimes carried away by admiration. Cicero rightly writes in these very words to Brutus in a certain letter: For I judge eloquence which has no admiration to be nothing. Aristotle too thinks the same should chiefly be sought*, Quintilian VIII.3. But what admiration can there be except admiration of novelty? §808. Perhaps someone will object that there is that excellent and divine wisdom: *to admire nothing*, Cicero, *Tusculans* III.30: “To admire nothing, Numicius, is almost the one and only thing that can make and keep one happy,” Horace, *Epistles* I.6. From this you may conclude that zeal for admiration should be relegated to false colorings, §688, and to lies truly not splendid, §625, rather than added to natural ornament, §§622–623.

§ 811. But the matter is safe. Whether it was a custom or disease of the ancients, even when philosophers ought to have instructed reason most distinctly by teaching, to chase paradoxes in tropes and apophthegms and often to hurl the free spirit into riddles themselves, §803; either those who here also order us *to admire nothing* mean by hyperbole to recall us only from the more vehement, ignorant, and stupid admiration of daily cares; or by metonymy of consequent for antecedent, §796, forgetful of human things and of the blindness unavoidable for mortals, they sang divine wisdom as immune from all ignorance, the mother of admiration; or finally they professed a wisdom fallacious and false-colored rather than true and natural to human beings, for whom, if it is wise, eternity will be spent in the wisest admiration of the highest divinity.

§ 812. Licet itaque non fucatae, sed Gratiis litanti, sapientiae, neque rudes tantum et agrestes, sed hominum, animos admiratione mulcere, §. 808. Ne tamen novitatis studio nimium abripiamur, hae cautelae sunt. 1) Novitatem obiecti et materiae cum novitate rerum et cogitationum ne temere confundas, §. 18. Haec in primis quaeritur, non illa, §. 808. De novis nova meditari non nego facilius, neque gratiam novitati materiae denego, nec lucem. Interim de antiquissimis non solum, sed etiam de dudum cognitis, animo tamen volvere potest

carmina non prius

Audita Musarum sacerdos

non usitata nec tenui laturus penna per aethera; potest de recentissimis negotiis, dum calent,

indoctus in triviis

Stridenti miserum stipula disperdere carmen.

§ 813. 2) Neque materias, neque cogitationes captare velis absolute novas, nondum unquam cogitata, quibus non abripiaris solum a strictissime veris, §. 441. sed etiam fictionibus poeticis prorsus ignotis, §. 518. certissime tandem deferaris in turpem utopiam, §. 514, 469. verisimilitudine destitutam omni, meram caliginem, §. 638. M. §. 889. Memento Phaetontis, quem absolutae novitatis et admirationis studiosum, licet relativa iam

rerum novitate paventem,

pater admonet, venustorum ingeniorum communis pater, §. 82:

Sors tua mortalis, non est mortale, quod optas,

Plus etiam, quam quod superis contingere possit,

Nescius affectas.

Nate, cave, dum resque sinit, tua corrige vota.

Denique quicquid habet dives circumspice mundus,

Eque tot ac tantis caeli, terraeque marisque,

Posce boni aliquid. Nullam patiēte repulsam.

Deprecor hoc unum, quod vero nomine poena,

Non honor est. Poenam, Phaeton, pro munere poscis.

§. 810.

§ 814. 3) In relative novis primario tuo obiecto personali, quae tibi novitas sufficiat, §. 813. ne satis tibi denuo sit, partim materiam eligendam, partim significanda de eadem fuisse huc usque, partialiter saltem, incognita, maxima sit in hoc cura, num ea sint hactenus incognita, quae a te nota reddita nunc demum lucem et gratiam novitatis per te sint acceptura, et admirationem motura, quando vix antea subobscurae percepta nunc intueamur. §. 808. Inventor non est incognitorum venditor, sed olim incognita nota reddens. Neque venustum cognoscendi studium movebit, multo minus explebit, aut admirationem merebitur ultra plebem sapientium, multus in incognitis, quorum ipse suam tantum prodit ignorantiam, novam ipsis potius inducens caliginem, quam ut ea novam in lucem noverit protrahere, §. 627. Vix quisquam incognita crepando, quae nesciat tandem illustrare, spectatorem, ut

corvum, deludet, hiantem,

impune, quin occinatur miserabili thaumaturgo:

Num furis, an prudens ludis me obscura canendo?

Hor. II. 5. 5, 58.

§ 812. Therefore wisdom that is not false-colored but sacrifices to the Graces is permitted to soothe with admiration not only rude and rustic minds, but human minds, §808. Yet lest we be carried away too much by zeal for novelty, let these cautions stand. 1) Do not rashly confuse novelty of object and material with novelty of things and thoughts, §18. The latter is chiefly sought, not the former, §808. I do not deny that it is easier to meditate new things about new things, nor do I deny grace and light to novelty of material. Meanwhile, about the most ancient things and also about things long known, the priest of the Muses can turn over in mind “songs not heard before,” about to be carried through the air “on an unwonted and not slender wing”; and about the most recent affairs, while they are warm, an unlearned man at the crossroads can “scatter a wretched song with shrieking straw.”

§ 813. 2) Do not wish to hunt either materials or thoughts absolutely new, never before thought, by which you will not only be torn away from the most strictly true, §441, but also from poetic fictions wholly unknown, §518, and will most certainly be carried into ugly utopia, §514, 469, destitute of all verisimilitude, mere darkness, §638; Metaphysics §§889. Remember Phaethon, zealous for absolute novelty and admiration, although already relatively “fearing by the novelty of things,” whom his father, the common father of graceful talents, §82, warns: “Your lot is mortal; what you desire is not mortal. Ignorant, you seek even more than what could fall to the gods. Son, beware; while the matter allows, correct your vows. Finally, look around at whatever the rich world has, and from so many and so great goods of sky, earth, and sea, ask for something. You will suffer no refusal. I deprecate this one thing, which by its true name is punishment, not honor. Phaethon, you ask punishment as a gift,” §810.

§ 814. 3) In things relatively new to your primary personal object, let not the novelty that suffices you, §813, be only that the material to be chosen and the things to be signified about it have hitherto been at least partially unknown. Let your greatest care be whether these are the things hitherto unknown which, once made known by you, will now finally receive light and grace of novelty through you and move admiration, when we now behold things scarcely perceived before except somewhat obscurely, §808. An inventor is not a seller of unknown things, but one who makes once-unknown things known. Nor will one who is verbose about unknown things, by which he only betrays his own ignorance and brings new darkness upon them rather than knowing how to draw them into new light, move graceful zeal for knowing, much less satisfy it or deserve admiration beyond the crowd of wise men, §627. Scarcely anyone, by rattling off unknown things he does not know how finally to illustrate, will deceive the spectator, like a gaping crow, with impunity, without being sung at as a miserable thaumaturge: “Are you mad, or do you knowingly mock me by singing obscure things?” Horace II.5.5, 58.

§ 815. 4) Ne relative novorum ea tibi legas cogitanda, quae cognitu vel indigna vere sunt, vel saltem primariis tuis spectatoribus videantur attentionem suam adeo non mereri, prudens ut praevidere possis dotium tuarum aestimator opis tuae non fore, curiositatem tuorum in haec dirigere. §. 808. Sint spectatores tibi, qui videantur etiam primarii, male seriati minutiarum amatores, quorum aures vili venustae cogitationis lenocinio lubentissime titillarentur, quales §. 184. tanguntur, primaria tamen lex dignitatis aethetica, quam absoluta iam poscit et involvit magnitudo, §. 185, 178. turpiter cederet inferiori curiositatem observandi regulae, §. 808. quae subordinatur demum legi lucis aetheticae. §. 614. nec id quidem necessario, §. 617, 625. Maius erit, et quo rarius, eo ipso recentius, curiosius, admirabilius et attentione dignum, si possis spectatorem alia omnia, et levissima quaevis exspectantem initiare maioribus, deviamque mentem sensim in graviorum nobiliorumque contemplationem allicere, ducere, defigere. Tentat artificium Horatius I. od. 27.

*Natis in usum laetitiae scyphis
Pugnare Thracum est. Tollite barbarum
Morem
ah! miser,
Quanta laboras in Charybdi,
Digne puer meliore flamma!*

§ 816. In absolute dignis, etiamsi spectatores habeas in primariis etiam, qui satis amarent, vel in graviorum tractatione relativae te dignitatis minus anxium observatorem, vel iisdem omnino praeferri levicula, comparative saltem, §. 197–201: ne nimium des placentiae, quoniam relativa demum, non absoluta catholica, dignitas est admirabilis illa, §. 187. quam sectari iubent, §. 808–810. An in solis piorum sedibus contingeret, quod narrat Horatius II. od. 13?

*Aeoliis fidibus querentem
Sappho puellis de popularibus,
Et te sonantem plenius aureo,
Alcaeae, plectro dura navis,
Dura fugae mala, dura belli,
Utrumque sacro digna silentio
Mirantur umbrae dicere. Sed magis
Pugnas et exactos tyrannos
Densum humeris bibit aure vulgus.*

§ 817. Verum 2) possunt quaedam, attentione mortalium dignissima, tamen aliquibus, qui forte tui sint spectatores primarii, certis in locis, temporibus, et occasionibus, minus opportuna, minus tempestiva vere esse, quibus nunc advertant animum, pro gravitate rei; b) possunt aliis, quorum causa potissimum cogitas, talia videri, per errorem, largior, sed per errorem tamen, datis tuis viribus, dato tempore, non vincibilem. In utroque casu proferes tuis inaudita forsitan, immerito forsitan incognita, neque tamen admirationem moveres, sed taedium. Nova dare cogitares, sed gratia novitatis excideres, §. 815. Quo graviora sunt, quae cogitare parabas, hoc maiori opus erit sollicitudine, ne iis ea, qui fruge inventa, quicquid egeris, glandibus vesci malunt, contemtim proculcanda temere proicias.

§ 815. 4) Do not choose among relatively new things those to be thought which are truly unworthy to know, or at least seem to your principal spectators not to deserve their attention, so that as a prudent estimator of your gifts you can foresee that it will not be within your power to direct their curiosity to these things, §808. Suppose you have spectators, even primary ones, badly arranged lovers of minutiae, whose ears would most gladly be tickled by the cheap charm of beautiful thought, such as are touched in §184. Yet the primary law of aesthetic dignity, which absolute magnitude already demands and involves, §§185, 178, would shamefully yield to the lower rule of observing curiosity, §808, which is at last subordinated to the law of aesthetic light, §614, and not even necessarily, §§617, 625. It will be greater, and, the rarer it is, by that very fact fresher, more curious, more admirable, and more worthy of attention, if you can initiate the spectator expecting everything else and any lightest things into greater matters, and gradually entice, lead, and fix the wandering mind in contemplation of graver and nobler things. Horace attempts the art in Ode I.27: “To fight with cups born for the use of joy is Thracian. Remove the barbarous custom,” and “ah, wretched boy, in what a Charybdis you labor, worthy of a better flame!”

§ 816. In things absolutely worthy, even if among your primary spectators you have some who would sufficiently love you as a less anxious observer of relative dignity in treating graver things, or who would wholly prefer little things to them, at least comparatively, §§197–201, do not give too much to pleasingness, since only relative, not absolute catholic dignity, is that admirable dignity, §187, which they order us to pursue, §§808–810. Would what Horace narrates in Ode II.13 happen only in the seats of the pious? “The shades marvel at Sappho complaining on Aeolian strings about girls of her people, and you, Alcaeus, sounding more fully with golden plectrum the hardships of ship, the hard evils of exile, the hardships of war, both worthy of sacred silence. But the dense crowd drinks in with packed shoulders and ear more of battles and expelled tyrants.”

§ 817. But 2) certain things most worthy of mortal attention can nevertheless be truly less opportune and less timely for some who perhaps are your primary spectators, in certain places, times, and occasions, for them now to turn the mind toward them according to the gravity of the matter; b) they can seem such to others for whose sake you chiefly think, by error, I grant, but nevertheless by error not conquerable with your given powers and given time. In both cases you will bring forward things perhaps unheard by your people and perhaps undeservedly unknown, and yet you would not move admiration but tedium. You would think to give new things, but you would fall away from the grace of novelty, §815. The graver the things you were preparing to think, the greater care will be needed lest you rashly throw them out to be contemptuously trampled by those who, once grain has been found, prefer to feed on acorns, whatever you have done.

§ 818. 5) Ne eo in gradu inaudita quaeras, ut non sapientum solum fidem transcendant, §. 424. non solum logica, et aesthetica, quam requirunt, nunc hypothetica, §. 439. nunc generali, §. 440. nunc strictissima, nunc heterocosmica, §. 441. verisimilitudine destituta tuis obiectis personalibus praecipuis videri debeant, §. 483. sed etiam dynamometria praevidere possis aesthetica, §. 60. non fore tuarum virium, dato tempore, datis capitibus, seu spectatoribus, ea reddere vel aesthetice, quantum necesse sit, verisimilia, §. 555. Alias, nova quidem, proferre videberis, sed nuces cassas, vitra fracta, somniorum interpretamenta, portenta Thessala, fabulas aniles, absurda, recens aliquis nugivendulus, neque curiositatem tuis concilians, nec admirationem, nisi quam irrisio comitem habet, et quae nunc sane non quaerebatur, §. 808–810. Pone spectatores tuos praecipuos, qualis erat Iuvenalis, pene sibi neque vires, neque tempus esse legis hebraeae maximam illis ob oculos ponendi verisimilitudinem, ne quid nunc certius dicam; pone te tamen iisdem exponere,

Tradidit arcano quodcunque volumine Moses.

loqueris illis nova, inaudita multa romanis legibus, sed metuentem sabbata, nil praeter nubes, et caeli numen adorantem, cui suilla ac humana caro nil distet, cui septima quaeque lux ignava sit, pro egregia ponente, ea, quae optaras, nec curiositate prosequuntur, nec admiratione.

§ 819. 6) Ne facile cogitanda venustius speres spectatorum gratia, quibus tractandorum et totum et partes, immo vero partium etiam partes forsitan, ita nova sint, ut non nisi longe petitis aliquantulum illustranda possis praevidere, §. 741. Saltem enim dura videbitur spectatoribus tractatio, §. 787. nisi omnino non satis protensionis et simul intensionis in attendendo secum ferentes de te capiendi desperent, et sic omnis simul et curiositas concidat, et admiratio lucem et gratiam pulcris meditationibus circumfundens, §. 808. Belle cogitans nec omnem *παραινέσις* a Paradiso, nec:

gemino bellum Troianum orditur ab ovo,

sed ut possit

in medias res

Non secus, ac notas, auditorem rapere,

res eligit, quarum, totum ubi novum fuerit, sint tamen partium apud auditores anticipationes quaedam, quarum partes si novae creantur, totius tamen iam adsit praeconcepta quaedam animis imago. §. 484.

§ 820. MATERIAS ABSOLUTE EXHAUSTAS, de quibus nemo mortalium cuiquam aliquid venuste novi propinare possit amplius, alias ad horizontem aestheticum pertinentes, §. 119. vix reor ullas esse. RESPECTIVE autem exhaustae videri possint, de quibus datum ingenium datis obiectis personalium primariis vix aliquid venuste novi possit exponere. Hinc dissuaserim, si tecum est materiarum optio 7) ne temere thema tibi constituas, quod respectu tui tuorumque spectatorum ipsi tibi iusto te pede metienti possit exhaustum videri. Quoniam illud nihilominus aggressus aut pulcrum novitatis studium desperabundus, abiicies contra §. 808. trita quaevis et dicta sexcenties repetere satagens; aut illius tenax in magno periculo versaberis novi quidem, sed non naturalis, §. 622, 623. non coloris, sed fuci §. 688. rebus tuis inducendi. §. 706, 324.

§ 818. 5) Do not seek unheard things to such a degree that they not only transcend the trust of the wise, §424, and must seem to your principal personal objects destitute not only of logical verisimilitude but also of the aesthetic verisimilitude they require, now hypothetical, §439, now general, §440, now strictest, now heterocosmic, §441, §483, but also so that you can foresee by aesthetic dynamometry, §60, that it will not be within your powers, given the time and given heads or spectators, to make them aesthetically probable as much as necessary, §555. Otherwise you will seem indeed to bring forward new things, but empty nuts, broken glass, dream interpretations, Thesalian portents, old women's tales, absurdities, some recent dealer in trifles, conciliating neither curiosity nor admiration for your people, except that which has ridicule as companion, and which certainly was not now being sought, §§808–810. Suppose your principal spectators are such as Juvenal was; suppose that you have almost neither powers nor time to place before their eyes the greatest verisimilitude of Hebrew law, to say nothing now more certain; suppose nevertheless you expound to them “whatever Moses handed down in his secret scroll.” You will speak to them many new things unheard in Roman laws, but they will not pursue with curiosity or admiration things that set as excellent a man who fears Sabbaths, worships nothing but clouds and the deity of heaven, to whom pork and human flesh do not differ, and to whom every seventh light is idle.

§ 819. 6) Do not easily hope that things can be thought more gracefully for the sake of spectators for whom the whole of what is to be treated and its parts, indeed perhaps even the parts of parts, are so new that you can foresee they can be illustrated only somewhat by far-fetched things, §741. For the treatment will at least seem hard to the spectators, §787, unless, bringing with them not enough extension and at the same time intensity in attending, they wholly despair of grasping you, and thus all curiosity collapses together, and admiration, which pours light and grace around beautiful meditations, §808. Beautiful thinking does not begin every *παραινέσις* from Paradise, nor the Trojan war “from the twin egg,” but, so that it can snatch the hearer “into the middle of things, no otherwise than as if known,” it chooses things of which, when the whole is new, there are nevertheless certain anticipations of the parts among the hearers, or, if parts are newly created, some preconceived image of the whole is already present in their minds, §484.

§ 820. I scarcely think there are any ABSOLUTELY EXHAUSTED MATERIALS, otherwise belonging to the aesthetic horizon, §119, about which no mortal could offer anyone anything gracefully new any longer. But materials can seem RESPECTIVELY exhausted, about which a given talent, for given primary personal objects, could scarcely set forth anything gracefully new. Hence I would advise, if the choice of materials is yours, 7) do not rashly establish for yourself a theme which, with respect to you and your spectators, can seem exhausted to you as you measure yourself with a just foot. For if you nevertheless undertake it, either you will despairingly cast away beautiful zeal for novelty, contrary to §808, striving to repeat worn things and things said six hundred times; or, holding fast to novelty, you will be in great danger of introducing into your matters something new indeed, but not natural, §§622–623, not color but false coloring, §§688, 706, 324.

§ 821. 8) Ne tantum novitatis et inopinati tuam in meditationem congeras, ut nova rerum et cogitationum frequentia ac constipatione tollatur omnis ille iucundus eleganter cogitatorum color, quo subito potius fusa, naturalique facilitate fluentia videantur nunc demum, quo ponuntur, tempore, quam multo cum sudore iam ante excussa per artem et longos labores ingenio, velut Minerva Iovis capiti. Tunc enim nimia novitate suspecta redditur novitas, et acute dictum unum vel alterum si placuit, ut novum, decem uno halitu effata vetera credimus et praeparata. §. 788. *Pleraque gratiora sunt, si inventa subito, nec domo allata, sed inter dicendum ex ipsa re nata videantur. Unde illa non iniucunda schemata: paene excidit mihi, et: fugerat me, et: bene admones*, Quint. III. 5. Hinc diiudica to rem verba honoris coram loquentium et gratiarum actiones pro praesenti beneficio tamen domi praeparatas afferentium non solum, sed etiam palam legentium, ne quis nesciat, se iam gratias egisse voti nondum compotes.

§ 822. In primis autem amabilem suis novitatem conciliaturus omni ope caveat, 9) ne facile nova omnia et inaudita se prolaturum spondeat, qualia promissa plerumque relinquenda sunt circumforaneae circulatorum eloquentiae. Quum enim propter ἔξοχον necessarium sit nota miscere incognitis, §. 819. periculosum est, non sine specie saltim arrogantiae totalem utilium rerum ignorantiam, in qua huc usque versati sint, non ita tecte suis obiectis primariis spectatoribus exprobrare, et simul offensos erigere in tot sui iudices criticosque severiores, qui primo secum:

Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatus?

et dein, si vere ἔξοχον neglexeris, magna cum verisimilitudine queant reprehendere non stetisse promissis, qui novis suis multa ante cognita intexuerit. Quid autem, si quis inter eos minus tibi forte cognitus adsit, qui, vel ex veritate rei, vel saltim in poenam visae arrogantiae, non sine verisimilitudine, queat omnino, plausus loco, tibi regerere, se iam ista dudum novisse melius omnia, quam a te prolata sint?

§ 823. Quanto rectius hic, qui nil molitur inepte, Crassus §. 809. qui nihil inauditi promittit, et eo ipso, quum dudum cognita tantum revocaturus in animum videri vult, tecte studio novitatis arripit, impetraturus, ut quae forte iam noveris, ea audias lubenter, quoniam promissa sint; quae minus noveris, eaque ratione, qua proferuntur, nunquam antea conceperas, eo percipias nunc lubentius, quoniam nova deprehendis oblata inopinato; simulque vere tibi nova tibi recludens modeste dissimulat auditoris ignorantiam. Thaumaturgia aesthetica, sed sobria, consentit cum illo:

Non satis est dixisse: Ego mira poemata pango.

Hinc nec ubique laborat in eum admirationis gradum coniiicere, quo vel

Obstupui, steteruntque comae, vox faucibus haesit,

vel blandior animum extra se rapit ecstasis, qualem ex Catullo vidimus, §. 87. Ad quantamcunque suis novitatem, et huius proportionatum intuitum, aliquantulum saltim, admirationis, quodque sollicitationem ad mirandum malis forte dicere, quam ipsum mirari, procurandum iuvabit.

§ 821. 8) Do not heap so much novelty and the unexpected into your meditation that, by the frequency and crowding of new things and thoughts, all that pleasing color of elegantly thought things is removed, by which they seem to have been poured out suddenly and to flow with natural ease at the very time in which they are set forth, rather than already shaken out with much sweat by art and long labors of talent, like Minerva from Jove's head. For then novelty made excessive becomes suspect, and if one or another sharp saying has pleased as new, ten uttered in one breath we believe old and prepared, §788. *Many things are more pleasing if they seem to have been found suddenly, not brought from home, but born from the matter itself while speaking. Hence those not unpleasant figures: it almost escaped me; and: it had fled me; and: you remind me well*, Quintilian IV.5. Hence judge the matter and words of those speaking honors in person, and bringing thanks for a present benefit prepared at home, not only bringing them but even reading them openly, lest anyone not know that he has already given thanks while not yet in possession of his wish.

§ 822. Above all, one who will conciliate lovable novelty for his own should take every care 9) not easily to promise that he will bring forward all new and unheard things. Such promises are usually to be left to the marketplace eloquence of mountebanks. Since, because of the ἔξοχον, it is necessary to mix known things with unknown, §819, it is dangerous, with at least an appearance of arrogance, not very covertly to reproach one's primary spectator objects for total ignorance of useful things in which they have thus far been occupied, and at the same time to set up the offended as so many stricter judges and critics of oneself, who first ask themselves, "What worthy thing will this promiser bring with so great a gape?" and then, if you have truly neglected the ἔξοχον, can with great probability criticize you for not having stood by your promises, since you wove into your novelties many things already known. But what if among them there is someone perhaps less known to you who, either from the truth of the matter or at least as punishment for perceived arrogance, can with probability reply to you instead of applause that he already knew all those things long ago better than they were brought forward by you?

§ 823. How much more rightly does Crassus proceed here, who attempts nothing ineptly, §809, who promises nothing unheard, and by that very fact, while he wishes to seem about to recall only things long known into the mind, secretly creeps toward zeal for novelty. He will obtain that what you perhaps already know you hear gladly because it has been promised as known; what you know less, and had never before conceived in the way in which it is brought forward, you perceive now all the more gladly because you find new things offered unexpectedly; and at the same time, by opening things truly new to you, he modestly conceals the auditor's ignorance. Aesthetic thaumaturgy, but sober, agrees with this: "It is not enough to have said: I compose marvelous poems." Hence it does not everywhere labor to cast one into that degree of admiration by which either "I stood amazed, my hair stood up, my voice stuck in my throat," or a gentler ecstasy snatches the mind outside itself, such as we saw from Catullus, §87. It will help to procure, for whatever novelty belongs to one's material and the proportionate intuition of it, at least some admiration, and what you may perhaps prefer to call solicitation toward wondering rather than wonder itself.

§ 824. 1) Antiquissima nonnunquam animo recolere, quae tamen immerito paene deperdita doceas. Ferunt ipsi archaismi bene recteque locati suam secum novitatem, et dudum cognita, quae quotidie menti recurrere debebant, si clarius aliquando, veluti iure postliminii revocantur ad animum, iterata sua eundem novitate percellunt, idipsum mirantem, qui potuerit eorum tantum non oblivisci. 2) Non novis, uti non diffitearis, novam lucem si dare cogites, derelicta materiarum et obiectorum novitate, §. 812. immo expresse negata, id unice intendas, ut ista, quae videantur obsoleta, tamen ea ratione nunc deducas, tuisque spectatoribus ob oculos sistas, ut hoc ipsum illis aliquantum mirum videatur, rem et materiem toties a se cogitatam hac tamen ratione modo ac via, hac serie et iunctura, sibi nunquam observatam esse huc usque. Quo tunc nova tua de satis cognitis cogitandi ratio magis ad naturam accedet, quo pronior, facilior, et cuiusvis parabilior videatur, hoc spondere tibi maiorem admirationem poteris.

§ 825. 3) Circa materias dudum cognitatas occupatus prudenter ab initio statim venustae meditationis subindicabit, novam easdem lucem utique mereri, forsitan et ipse mirabitur: unde fiat, ut in adeo notis tam infrequens tamen, tam inusitata sit ea res eiusmodi declarandi ratio, quae nisi sit optima, negligi tamen et omnino contemni, profecto, non mereatur, ea scilicet, quam dein ipse meditatur ingredi, §. 823. 4) Quae minus videantur verisimilia, largiri saepe decet, ea non videri, addere etiam rationes dubitandi, si vacat, et sic sensim auditorem in istam spem inducere, videnda sibi forte post hanc ipsam tractationem, quae nunc non videantur, non veri solum similia, sed etiam omnino vera; liberandum eius noviter animum esse iam inveteratis contra datam materiem dubiis, e. c. 5) Sint etiam perceptiones tuae partiales notae, tu modo novum inde totum apte compone, nec laude novitatis excides. Quid coloribus, quid floribus plerisque notius? quot inde tamen novi Venerum nostrarum habitus, quot nova sarta puellarum

saevis in iuvenes unguibus acrium?

6) Sit totum iam cognitum, tu vero tecum illud circumspice, si qua sit eius pars, si qua facies aut latus aliquod minus aliis observatum, spectandum tamen, §. 815. Iustranti oculis omnia se tandem offerat. Hanc notissimae rei partem, faciem, vel latus ex comparativis tenebris protrahere, hoc potissimum in punctum visus spectatoribus tuis loca, et reliqua sic superadde, uti cum hoc arctius connectuntur, vel remotius. Quam urbem sexcenties vidi e longinquo nonnihil a plaga septentrionali, si mihi eam primus ex plaga meridionali prospiciendam exhibueris, specula non inepte locata, novum exhibuisse mihi spectaculum grato videberis. §. 823. Agnoscere tunc veteres, quas dudum novi, turres, palatia, vicos, sed aliud oculis latus obvertentes, aliam iuncturam, augebit voluptatem potius, quam minuet.

§ 826. 7) Utile est, si fieri potest, in tractandis ostendere, sed sine iactantia, multa superesse nondum culta novalia; prae se ferentem plus sollicitudinis, quid ex tot novis potissimum eligat, quam unde nonnihil novi possit corradere. Hinc denuo colligas, quam necessaria venustis ingeniis pulcra sit eruditio, §. 65. qua noverint terras in republica litteraria cognitatas et incognitas, ac harum et terminos inter se, et incognitarum sensim colenda latifundia. 8) Aut vere tractata a paucis sibi obiecta legere, saltem non temere post Homerum Iliada, Aeneida post Virgilium scribere, aut consilii erit mox auditoris declarare, cur ea, quae videantur exhausta, pro nunc et sic, et his circumstantibus, in quibus nunc versemur, vere non sint, §. 820. sed largum et novum nonnihil post messem promittant spicilegium, e. c.

§ 824. 1) It is sometimes useful to recall to mind the most ancient things which nevertheless you teach as almost undeservedly lost. Even archaisms, well and rightly placed, carry their novelty with them; and things long known, which ought to have recurred daily to the mind, if sometimes recalled more clearly to the mind as if by right of return, strike it by their repeated novelty, making it wonder how it could have almost forgotten them. 2) If you think to give new light to things you do not deny are not new, abandoning novelty of materials and objects, §812, indeed expressly denying it, intend this alone: that those things which seem obsolete you now nevertheless deduce in such a way and set before your spectators' eyes in such a way that this very thing seems somewhat marvelous to them, that a thing and material so often thought by them had nevertheless never been observed by them in this way, by this mode and path, this series and joining, up to now. The more your new way of thinking about sufficiently known things approaches nature, the more ready, easy, and available to anyone it seems, the greater admiration you can promise yourself.

§ 825. 3) Occupied with matters long known, the prudent writer will immediately from the beginning of the beautiful meditation indicate that these nevertheless deserve a new light, and perhaps he himself will wonder why in matters so well known this way of declaring such a thing is nevertheless so infrequent and unusual, a way which, even if it is not best, certainly does not deserve to be neglected and wholly despised, namely the way he then meditates entering, §823. 4) It is often fitting to grant that things which seem less probable do not seem probable, and also to add reasons for doubting, if there is leisure, and so gradually lead the auditor into this hope: perhaps after this treatment things that now do not seem true-like will seem not only similar to truth, but altogether true; his mind, newly, must be freed from doubts already grown old against the given material. 5) Let your partial perceptions even be known, provided you aptly compose from them a new whole, and you will not fall from praise of novelty. What is better known than colors and most flowers? Yet how many new garments of our Venuses, how many new garlands of girls "sharp with savage nails against young men" arise from them? 6) Let the whole already be known; you, however, look around it with yourself to see whether some part, some face or side less observed than others, yet worth seeing, finally offers itself to the eyes as they survey all, §815. Draw this part, face, or side of the most familiar thing from comparative darkness; place your spectators especially at this point of view, and add the remaining things as they are more closely or more remotely connected with it. If you first display for me from the southern side a city I have seen six hundred times from far away somewhat on the northern side, you will seem to me, by a not ineptly placed lookout, to have exhibited a new spectacle with pleasure. Then recognizing old towers, palaces, and streets which I long knew, but turned with another side to the eyes and in another joining, will increase pleasure rather than diminish it.

§ 826. 7) It is useful, if it can be done, in treating matters to show, but without boasting, that many fallow fields not yet cultivated remain; displaying more anxiety about what especially to choose from so many new things than about where he can scrape together something new. From this again you may gather how necessary beautiful erudition is for graceful talents, §65, by which they know the known and unknown lands in the republic of letters, both the boundaries among these and the broad estates of the unknown gradually to be cultivated. 8) It will be counsel either to choose objects truly treated by few, at least not rashly to write an *Iliad* after Homer or an *Aeneid* after Virgil, or soon to declare to those about to hear why things that seem exhausted, for now and in this way and in these circumstances in which we now are, are truly not exhausted, §820, but promise some generous and new gleanings after the harvest, and so forth.

§ 827. Optimum tandem novitatis impetrandae consilium erit iis, qui uti eodem poterunt: 9) Quae dives vena de cogitando, sibi iam probe perspecto, §. 639. didicit olim et ipsa secum est meditata, veluti provisionaliter, nunc potius ipsa secundum naturales pulcritudinis regulas cogitet, disponat, exprimat, quam ut caecus imitator sequatur archetypum, §. 714, 715. Tunc enim, non inepta, quae fiat aliquibus minorum gentium ingeniis exemplar et originale, naturalem suum, sibi proprium, genium sequens, solis aeternis venustatum legibus restrictum, caetera liberum,

non imitabitur arum,

Unde referre pedem vetet aut pudor; aut operis lex,

naturae potius in omnibus et subiectis et obiectis nonnihil diversae non coacto, non affectato, ingenio novitatem, velut aliud agendo, sine anxia sollicitudine, quantum satis est, impetrabit, §. 823. Non vitae humanae picturas iam arte factas, non exempla saeculi cuiusdam pristini iam expressa nescio cuius penicillo potissimum, sed ipsam rerum naturam, suique, quod vivit, saeculi

Respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo

Doctum imitorem, ac veras hinc ducere voces,

§. 613. quae non esse simul non poterunt novae, quoniam scena saeculi mutatur assidue, dum

Nil sub sole novi est.

§. 813.

§ 828. Novitatis post procurationem altera thaumaturgiae cura sit spectatorum vel auditorum curiositas, §. 808. quam obtinebunt argumenta ad eandem moventia, de quibus supra, §. 22, 26. Quibus duobus positus orietur admiratio, quam primum antiqua fors in tuis meditationibus occurrant, neque tamen obsoleta videantur, et nova non tantum symbolice cognoscantur audianturve talia, sed etiam obiecta tua personalia intueantur illa, ut talia, M. §. 620. Hinc denuo colligas, quam utilis ad naturalem pulcritudinem sit penitior cognitio sui obiecti personalis primarii, quoniam, quae sunt uni hominum admirabilia maxime, non possunt eadem alterius etiam semper et certo ferre secum admirationem. §. 679–681.

SECTIO XXXXVIII

PERSUASIO AESTHETICA

§ 829. Praesentium cogitationum in primariis §. 113, 177, 423, 614. quintam numeramus, §. 22. certudinem sensitivam, analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis conscientiam et lucem, PERSUASIONEM, sed AESTHETICAM, §. 22. M. §. 531. Haec enim etiamsi nonnunquam simul impulsionem ad agendum et incitationem involvat: habet tamen et in theoreticis locum, et singula probe perpen-
suris cum fructu distinguetur a vita cognitionis in sequentibus animadvertenda, cuius est conditio antecedens persuasio, quae nonnunquam pro consequente ponitur, §. 796.

§ 827. The best counsel for obtaining novelty will finally belong to those who can use it: 9) what a rich vein concerning thought, already well examined by itself, §639, once learned and meditated with itself, as if provisionally, let it now rather think, arrange, and express according to natural rules of beauty, than follow an archetype as a blind imitator, §§714–715. Then, following its own natural, proper genius, not an inept one that becomes an example and original for some talents of lesser nations, restricted only by the eternal laws of graces and otherwise free, it “will not imitate an altar from which either shame or the law of the work forbids one to move the foot back.” Rather, in all subjects and objects, by nature somewhat different, by a genius not forced and not affected, it will obtain novelty enough, as if doing something else, without anxious solicitude, §823. I shall order the learned imitator to look not chiefly at pictures of human life already made by art, not examples of some past age already expressed by I know not whose brush, but at the very nature of things and at the living model of life and morals of his own age, and from there draw true voices, §613, which cannot fail also to be new, since the scene of the age changes constantly, while “nothing is new under the sun,” §813.

§ 828. After procuring novelty, the second care of thaumaturgy should be the curiosity of spectators or hearers, §808, which arguments moving it will obtain, about which above, §§22, 26. Once these two are posited, admiration will arise as soon as perhaps ancient things occur in your meditations and nevertheless do not seem obsolete, and new things are not only symbolically known or heard as such, but your personal objects also intuit them as such, *Metaphysics* §620. Hence again you may gather how useful for natural beauty is a deeper knowledge of one’s primary personal object, because the things that are most admirable to one person cannot always and certainly carry admiration for another too, §§679–681.

SECTION XXXXVIII

AESTHETIC PERSUASION

§ 829. Among the primary matters of present thoughts, §§113, 177, 423, 614, we count as fifth, §22, sensory certitude, the consciousness and light of truth and verisimilitude also to be obtained by the analogue of reason: PERSUASION, but AESTHETIC persuasion, §22; *Metaphysics* §531. For although this sometimes also involves impulse to action and incitation, it nevertheless has place in theoretical matters too, and, for those weighing individual things well, it will fruitfully be distinguished from the life of cognition to be noticed in what follows, of which persuasion is the antecedent condition, sometimes put for the consequent, §796.

§ 830. Plato tantum apud Dionysium auctoritate potuit, valuitque eloquentia, *ut persuaserit tyrannidis finem facere, libertatemque reddere Syracusanis*. Persuasio aderat, §. 829. quanquam Dionysius, ab hac voluntate deterritus Philisti consilio, aliquanto crudelior esse coepit. Corn. in Dione. Persuasionem aliqui nunc logici dicunt erroneam certitudinis opinionem, eum animi statum, quo nos certos per errorem putamus. Ex qua vocabulorum ambiguitate, sunt, qui sibi fenestram aperiunt, orationem ad persuadendum idoneam omnem lenociniis potius et fuco, §. 688. quam veris accensendi venustatibus. Neque negandum est errore descripto laborantes persuasos non raro dici. Sic apud Ciceronem de nat. deorum I. 61. Cotta, ipse pontifex, *qui ceremonias religionisque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitratur, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi sibi, non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velit*. Pari ratione Virg.

*Nec tibi iam prudens quisquam persuadeat auctor
Tellurem Borea rigidam spirante movere,*

Georg. II. 316. *Si in anteacta vita aliquae turpitudines erunt: aut falso venisse in eam existimationem dicentur, aut ex aliquorum invidia, aut obreptione, aut falsa opinione, aut imprudentiae, necessitudini, persuasioni, adolescentiae; aut alicui non malitiosae animi affectioni tribuentur*, Cic. de Inv. II. 37. Heic etiam persuasioni sinistrum esse significatum quis negaverit?

§ 831. Idem tamen Cicero I. 6. officium oratoriae facultatis dicit, *dicere apposite ad persuasionem, finem, dictione persuadere*, illius nempe facultatis oratoriae, cui *moderatrix omnium rerum praesto sit sapientia*, 4. sane non ferens scopum alterius errorem. Quis autem non videt hic Ciceronem in ultimo loco persuasionem veram intendere, qualis illa de qua Horatius Serm. I. 6. 8.

*persuade hoc tibi vere,
Ante potestatem Tulli, atque ignobile regnum,
Multos saepe viros nullis maioribus ortos
Et vixisse probos, amplis et honoribus auctos.*

§ 832. Quam autem in primo §. 831. citato loco persuasionem adolescentiae vocaverat Cicero, huius exemplum Quintilianus habet II. 4. ex extemporali garrulitate derivans parentum imperitorum inane gaudium, adolescentibus autem *contemptum operis, invecundam frontem, consuetudinem pessime dicendi, malarum exercitationem, et, quod magnos quoque profectus frequenter perdiderit, arrogantem de se persuasionem*. Neque melior est persuasio, de qua I. 1. *Nihil, inquit, peius est iis, qui paullulum aliquid ultra primas litteras progressi falsam sibi scientiae persuasionem induerunt*. Habemus itaque facilem viam ambiguitatis tollendae. Conscientia veritatis distincta, convictio est; indistincta et sensitiva, persuasio. Haec indistincta veritatis conscientia est, quemadmodum omnis cognitio, vel vera, vera persuasio, §. 831. vel falsa, falsa persuasio.

§ 833. Persuasio generatim est phaenomenon animae, quo se veritatem appercipere putat, sicuti viator novam

videt, aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam.

De hac Quintilianus I. 2. quando negat *esse dissimulandum, nonnullos esse, qui ab hoc prope publico more, praeceptores publicos adeundi, privata persuasionem dissentiant*. Nunc enim ponit hanc persuasionem tantum, ut constantem usu et experientia. Dein deum examinaturus, an vera sit, an falsa, §. 832. Quando vero per hoc examen scholas publicas vitantium *haerere aut languescere mentem, aut quendam velut in opaco situm ducere, aut contra tumescere inani persuasionem* asserit, non persuasionis simpliciter, sed definite et accuratius inanis i. e. falsae persuasionis meminit, §. 832.

§ 830. Plato had so much authority with Dionysius, and eloquence had such force, *that he persuaded him to make an end of tyranny and restore freedom to the Syracusans*. Persuasion was present, §829, although Dionysius, deterred from this will by Philistus' counsel, began to be somewhat crueler, Cornelius in *Dion*. Some logicians now call persuasion an erroneous opinion of certitude, that state of mind in which we think ourselves certain through error. From this ambiguity of words there are some who open a window for themselves to count every speech suitable for persuading among enticements and false coloring, §688, rather than among true graces to be kindled. Nor must it be denied that people laboring under the described error are not rarely called persuaded. Thus in Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* I.61, Cotta, himself a pontiff, *who thinks public ceremonies and religions must be most sacredly protected, would wish this first point, that gods exist, to be persuaded to himself not by opinion only, but also plainly according to truth*. In the same way Virgil: "Let no prudent authority now persuade you to move the earth when Boreas breathes stiffly," *Georgics* II.316. Cicero, *De inventione* II.37: *If there will be any shameful things in the prior life, they will be said either to have come into that estimation falsely, or from someone's envy, detraction, false opinion, imprudence, necessity, persuasion, youth, or some not malicious affection of mind*. Who would deny that here too persuasion has an unfavorable meaning?

§ 831. Yet the same Cicero, book I.6, says that the office of the oratorical faculty is *to speak suitably for persuasion*, and its end *to persuade by speaking*, namely of that oratorical faculty for which *wisdom, moderator of all things, should stand ready*, 4, certainly not bearing another's error as its aim. Who does not see that here Cicero in the latter place intends true persuasion, such as that about which Horace, *Satires* I.6.8, says: "Persuade yourself of this truly: before the power of Tullus and ignoble rule, many men born from no ancestors often both lived upright and were increased with ample honors."

§ 832. But the persuasion of youth which Cicero had named in the first passage cited in §831 has an example in Quintilian II.4, who derives from extemporaneous garrulity the empty joy of unskilled parents, but for adolescents *contempt of work, shameless face, habit of speaking very badly, exercise of bad things, and, what has frequently ruined great progress too, arrogant persuasion about themselves*. Nor is the persuasion better about which in book I he says: *Nothing is worse than those who, having advanced a little beyond first letters, have put on a false persuasion of knowledge*. Therefore we have an easy way of removing the ambiguity. Distinct consciousness of truth is conviction; indistinct and sensory consciousness is persuasion. This indistinct consciousness of truth, like all cognition, is either true, true persuasion, §831, or false, false persuasion.

§ 833. Persuasion generally is a phenomenon of the soul by which it thinks that it perceives truth, just as the traveler "sees, or thinks he has seen, the new moon through clouds." Quintilian I.2 speaks of this when he denies *that it should be concealed that there are some who, from private persuasion, dissent from this almost public custom of going to public teachers*. For now he posits this persuasion only as constant by use and experience. Only then, about to examine whether it is true or false, §832. But when through this examination he asserts that the minds of those avoiding public schools *stick fast or grow weak, or draw a kind of position as if in the dark, or on the contrary swell with empty persuasion*, he is not mentioning persuasion simply, but definitely and more accurately empty, that is, false persuasion, §832.

§ 834. Perlegenti Quintiliani II. 15. apparebit, quot controversias evitemus et ictus per latus rhetorices aestheticam etiam vel vim, vel scientiam, vel usum, vel artem petentes, exigua corporis declinatione, quando non generatim persuasionem, §. 833. sed aestheticam a pulcre cogitaturis postulamus, §. 829. nec hanc solam solius rhetorices finem, sed in finibus primariis omnium venustius cogitandorum constituimus, §. 5. Nec rhetorica, nec eius mater aesthetica, pravitas quaedam artis est, i. e. κακοτεχνία, dum utraque sit opifex persuadendi, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, ac, si liceat cum Ennio canere,

Suadae medulla.

Aesthetica, quam minus inadaequate, ac Plato rhetoricen, describas, nec, ut Plato, non artem, sed peritiam verum et peritiam, et artem quandam gratiae ac voluptatis, §. 1. non qualemcunque persuasionem fabricatur, sed, quae se deceat, bonam, et vere elegantem, nec est, quam Athenaeus rhetoricen dicit, *ars fallendi*, §. 830. Nec enim est, nec esse rhetoricam iubet, 1) vim dicendi cogitandive, qua in quaque re possit esse persuadibile, si per hunc titulum omnia oratori subiecisse videtur Aristoteles. S. VIII. Aversatur potius inanem quorundam sophistarum iactantiam, qui non solum de rebus omnibus, sed etiam de unaquaque re partem in utramque contrariarum aequali cum auditorum persuasionem se mentem suam exposituros circulatorie promittunt. §. 818.

§ 835. Nec ipsa persuadet, nec persuadere patitur rhetoricen, matris consiliorum tenacem, §. 835. 2) uti persuadent, vel ducunt in id, quod volunt, meretrices, adulatores, corruptores, S. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nec est tantum, nec esse suam tantum patitur rhetoricen, 3) quam Ariston, Critolai peripatetici discipulus, affirmat, scientiam videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis, si popularem persuasionem contumeliosius interpreteris in auditores, quam nihil putes doctis profuturam. Surgit altius, suamque post se trahit rhetoricen, ultra quaestiones civiles in magis sublimia, S. XXI. et transcendentem aurae popularis arbitrium, §. 397. caecusque vulgares, §. 396. in persuadendo magnanimitatem, S. XXVI.

§ 836. Aesthetica nec ipsa sectatur, neque suam concedit rhetoricen ita sectari persuasibilia, ut 4) veris credibilia praeferat, S. XXVII, XXXIII. licet nonnunquam veris aliquibus, §. 429–430. praeferat alia, etiam vera, et simul ex ἔξοχον illud, §. 484. prae se ferentia, quo facilius inveniant fidem. Nec enim persuasurus aestheticus, nec ex huius academia profectus, orator, ut sunt Corn. Celsi verba: *simile tantum veri petit*, sed veritatem ipsam, saepius etiam strictissimam, §. 566. S. XXXV. licet modestus inventa sua malit a potiori verisimilia nuncupare, §. 483. quam vera mortalibus, quorum norunt paucissimi, quae sit et quotuplex veritas, semper una, S. XXXVIII.

§ 837. 5) Uti mangones, qui colorem fuco, et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur. S. XXXXI, XXXXII.

§ 838. Recte itaque reiiciant logici persuasionem falsam et falsi, seu de falso, §. 830. Recte tamen amabit bellum ingenium veram persuasionem, §. 831. et veri vel verisimilis, §. 837. aestheticam, §. 834–837. eiusque habitum, suadam et SUADELAM; non illam volgivagam §. 831–837. sed aestheticam, §. 829. Nec enim eam,

Quae bene nummatum decorat Suadela Venusque,

Hor. ep. 16, 36. sed, quam in Periclis labris scripsit Eupolis *sedisse*, Cic. de cl. or. 59.

Te facimus, Suadela, deam, caeloque locamus.

§ 834. To one reading Quintilian II.15 it will appear how many controversies we avoid, and how many blows, aimed through the side of rhetoric also at aesthetics as power, science, use, or art, we evade by a slight inclination of the body, when we require from those about to think beautifully not persuasion in general, §833, but aesthetic persuasion, §829; nor do we establish this alone as the sole end of rhetoric, but place it among the primary ends of all things to be thought more gracefully, §5. Neither rhetoric nor its mother aesthetics is some depravity of art, that is, *κακοτεχνία*, since each is a maker of persuading, *πειθοῦς δημιουργός*, and, if it is permitted to sing with Ennius, “the marrow of Suada.” Aesthetics, which you would describe less inadequately than Plato described rhetoric, not, as Plato did, as not an art but a skill, but rather as both skill and a certain art of grace and pleasure, §1, does not fashion persuasion of any kind whatsoever, but one that befits it, good and truly elegant; nor is it what Athenaeus calls rhetoric, an *art of deceiving*, §830. For it neither is, nor orders rhetoric to be, 1) a power of speaking or thinking by which in any matter something persuasive can be found, if by this title Aristotle seems to have subjected all things to the orator, Sect. VIII. Rather, it turns away from the empty boasting of certain sophists, who promise, like showmen, to set forth their mind not only on all matters, but also on each side of every contrary, with equal persuasion of their hearers, §818.

§ 835. Nor does aesthetics itself persuade, nor does it allow rhetoric, tenacious of its mother’s counsels, §835, to persuade 2) as prostitutes, flatterers, and corrupters persuade, or lead into what they wish, Sects. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nor is it only, nor does it allow its rhetoric to be only, 3) what Ariston, a pupil of Critolaus the Peripatetic, affirms: the science of seeing and acting in civil questions through speech of popular persuasion, if you interpret popular persuasion more insultingly toward hearers, as something you think will profit the learned nothing. It rises higher, and draws its rhetoric after itself, beyond civil questions into more sublime things, Sect. XXI, and, transcending the judgment of the popular breeze, §397, and the blind common people, §396, into magnanimity in persuading, Sect. XXVI.

§ 836. Aesthetics neither itself pursues, nor grants that its rhetoric should so pursue, persuadable things that 4) it prefers credible things to true things, Sects. XXVII, XXXIII, although sometimes, before certain truths, §§429–430, it prefers other things, also true, which at the same time display that *ἔξοχον*, §484, by which they more easily find belief. For neither the aesthetic persuader, nor the orator who has gone forth from this academy, in the words of Cornelius Celsus, *seeks merely the likeness of truth*, but truth itself, often even the strictest truth, §566, Sect. XXXV, although modestly he would rather name his discoveries, for the most part, verisimilar, §483, than true for mortals, of whom very few know what truth is, and how manifold, though always one, Sect. XXXVIII.

§ 837. 5) As hucksters do, who feign color by false coloring and true strength by empty fattening, Sects. XXXXI, XXXXII.

§ 838. Rightly, therefore, may logicians reject false persuasion and persuasion of the false, or concerning the false, §830. Yet rightly will a beautiful mind love true persuasion, §831, and aesthetic persuasion of the true or of the verisimilar, §837, §§834–837, and its habit, *suada* and *SUADELA*; not that common, wandering persuasion of §§831–837, but aesthetic persuasion, §829. For not that one “which Suadela and Venus adorn when a man is well-moneyed,” Horace, *Epistles* I.6.36, but that one which Eupolis wrote had *sat* on the lips of Pericles, Cicero, *Brutus* 59: “We make you, Suadela, a goddess, and place you in heaven.”

§ 839. Aesthetice persuasurus dare noverit suis 1) verisimilitudinem secundum §. 423–613, et huic lucem necessariam, §. 624–824. His enim datis dabitur quaesita persuasio, §. 829. Verisimilitudo, quantam studium veritatis absolutum ubique postulat, §. 555. absoluta saltem luce §. 617. simpliciter dilucida, §. 625. PERSUASIONEM in aestheticis ABSOLUTAM, quantam autem verisimilitudinem studium veritatis comparativum in data meditatione requisiverit, S. XXXV. proportionate nitens, §. 625, persuasionem COMPARATIVAM exhibebit. Utramque, quantam pulcritudo totius desiderat, accurate praestans est AESTHAETICE SOLIDUS, vel hanc negligens, vel illius omnino contemptae reus est AESTHETICE SUPERFICIARIUS.

§ 840. Est pygmaeorum §. 559. quaedam natio, quae se nunc philosopham putat, nunc mathematicam, cuique sua sunt omnia, sed sua sola, sicut inferorum porta Virgilio, VI.

*Solido: ex adamante columnae,
Vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi exscindere ferro
Caelicolae valeant. Stat ferrea turris ad auras.*

Illi suo vivant abundantes ingenio, nobis autem, logicam soliditatem suo loco plurimi facientibus, nunc

Florescant solido Paphiae de robore myrtus.

ACCURATUM est leges suas exactius sequens, et accurate probans SOLIDUS est. Veritatem itaque, quam debebat secundum regulas verisimilitudinis exactius exponens luci secundum huius regulas accurate, prout aestheticum decet, cur ille non sit solidus in suo genere, in sua sphaera, ac horizonte?

§ 841. Nolim vere venustos tela retorquere in philosophos illos vel quasi, aut mathematicos, quibus sola sua solida videntur, uti Epicureus ille apud Ciceronem de fin. I, 61. qui *se melius et verius ait perspicere, neque stultorum quemquam beatum, neque sapientium non esse beatum*, ac Stoici, qui *negent quicquam esse bonum, nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum, non tam solido, quam splendido, nomine*. Idem Torquatus, quam soliditatem negarat Stoicis, eandem poetis denegat; et mathematicis 71. *In ille tempus in evoluendis poetis, uti ego et Triarius, te hortatore, fecimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas, omnisque puerilis delectatio? aut, sicut Plato, se in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret? quae a falsis profecta initiis, vera esse nequeunt, et, si vera essent, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus?*

§ 842. Quid enim? dum eruditi cavillatores sibi vicissim obiiciunt, rebus illius, quem adversarium aliquis sibi legit, nihil subesse solidi, patitur interim veritas, et distrahuntur spectatores neutrarum partium in vere molestam circa vera tantum non omnia fluctuationem, sicut aegrotus inter medicorum rixas exspirans. Est sua philosophis, est mathematicis soliditas, sed est etiam, alius quidem generis, §. 829. sicuti veritas proponenda, historicis, oratoribus, poetis, §. 423, 424. sicut lux huic veritati circumfundenda, §. 614, 617. sic etiam ex his resultans certitudo, quae convictionem pariens logicam et intellectualem soliditatem, persuasionem producens aestheticam soliditatem auctoris demonstrabit. §. 839.

§ 839. One who is going to persuade aesthetically should know how to give his own hearers 1) verisimilitude according to §§423–613, and to this the necessary light, §§624–824. For when these are given, the persuasion sought will be given, §829. Verisimilitude, as much as the absolute study of truth everywhere demands, §555, simply clear with at least absolute light, §§617, 625, will exhibit ABSOLUTE PERSUASION in aesthetics; but verisimilitude, as much as the comparative study of truth in a given meditation has required, Sect. XXXV, shining proportionately, §625, will exhibit COMPARATIVE persuasion. One who accurately furnishes both, as much as the beauty of the whole desires, is AESTHETICALLY SOLID; one who neglects the latter, or is guilty of utterly despising the former, is AESTHETICALLY SUPERFICIAL.

§ 840. There is a certain nation of pygmies, §559, which now thinks itself philosophical, now mathematical, and to which all its own things, but only its own, are solid, like the gate of the underworld in Virgil VI: “solid; its columns are of adamant, so that no force of men, nor even the heavenly ones themselves, could uproot them with iron; an iron tower stands to the breezes.” Let them live abounding in their own genius. For us, however, who value logical solidity highly in its own place, now “let myrtle flourish from the solid wood of Paphos.” What follows its laws more exactly is ACCURATE, and what proves accurately is SOLID. Therefore, if someone expounds the truth which he owed according to the rules of verisimilitude more exactly, and accurately according to the rules of light, as befits the aesthetic, why should he not be solid in his own kind, in his own sphere and horizon?

§ 841. I would not wish the truly graceful to hurl weapons back at those philosophers, or quasi-philosophers, or mathematicians, to whom only their own things seem solid, as with that Epicurean in Cicero, *De finibus* I.61, who says that *he sees better and more truly both that no fool is happy and that no wise person is not happy*, and as with the Stoics, who *deny that anything is good except some shadow; I know not what, which they call the honorable, by a name not so much solid as splendid*. The same Torquatus denies to poets the solidity he had denied to the Stoics, and to mathematicians, 71: *Would he spend that time in turning over poets, as I and Triarius did at your urging, in whom there is no solid utility and all delight is childish? Or, like Plato, would he wear himself out in music, geometry, numbers, and stars, which, having set out from false beginnings, cannot be true, and, even if they were true, would bring nothing by which we might live more pleasantly, that is, better?*

§ 842. For what happens? While learned cavillers mutually object that nothing solid underlies the matters of the person each has chosen as adversary, truth meanwhile suffers, and spectators of neither party are distracted into a truly troublesome fluctuation about almost all truths, like a sick person dying amid the quarrels of physicians. Philosophers have their solidity, mathematicians have theirs, but historians, orators, and poets also have another kind, §829: just as truth is to be proposed, §§423, 424, and just as light is to be poured around this truth, §§614, 617, so also the certitude resulting from these, which, by producing conviction, will show the logical and intellectual solidity of an author, and, by producing persuasion, will show his aesthetic solidity, §839.

§ 843. Aesthetica persuasio 1) occupatur circa ea, de quibus completa datur et scientifica certitudo, de quibus auctor forsitan habeat, et utiliter, intellectualem etiam convictionem, immo et circa argumenta materialium eiusmodi rigide ac severe demonstrantia, quae et quatenus sunt simul persuasibilia, §. 425, 617, 829. horizonti logico et aethetico communia, §. 125. quatenus supra hunc non adscendunt, §. 121, 485. Hinc optime diiudicatur toties agitata quaestio, num philosophica, et probationes, ex natura rerum petitae, deceant oratorem, e. g. sacrum, nec rotunde neganda, nec affirmanda, quoniam quaedam satis facilem admittentia persuasionem in philosophicis occurrunt et quaestionibus et argumentationibus: quaedam autem vix idoneis ad persuadendum includi rationibus poterunt, et omnia pari ratione modoque, ac ad convictionem scientificam propinantur, nequicquam turbis auditorum promiscuuus occinerentur.

§ 844. Persuasio aethetica 2) dum directo sensitivam tractandorum certitudinem intendit, nonnunquam persuadendo de partibus per indirectum intellectui pulcro rationisque sagacitati totum obiiacet, non sine convictione simul, certum, §. 428, 617. Erit eiusmodi tunc convictio extensive nonnunquam maior, et poterit numero notarum fortior esse, ac alia intensive distinctior, et scientiis aptior, M. §. 532. Neque tamen ab aethetico primario intenditur, quatenus est convictio, sed quatenus ad eam persuasionibus partium aptime necessariis deducebamur. Horatio Troiani belli scriptor

*Quid sit pulcrum; quid turpe, quid utile, quid non;
Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit,*

Non haerebimus in comparationibus, §. 842. Sufficit exemplum obiecta demonstrationum moralium esse etiam obiecta poetae; qui persuadeat de iisdem, de quibus illae convincant, imo convincat intellectum tandem pulcrum et rationis sagacitatem de iisdem, de quibus illae convicerant intellectum purum et rationis soliditatem, M. §. 637, 645.

§ 845. Persuasio aethetica 3) occupatur circa aethetice probabilia, sive logice simul sint probabilia, sive minus, §. 485. modo tanta non sit improbabilitas logica, nunc etiam animis tuorum praesens, ut omnem destruens probabilitatem aetheticam persuasionem simul omnem auferat. §. 486. Huc argumenta Horatii persuasibilia ad navem I. od. 3.

*Sic te diva potens Cypri,
Sic fratres Helenae, lucida sidera,
Ventorumque regat pater
Obstrictis aliis, praeter Iapyga.*

Logice improbabile est, et navim bonis votis verbisque moveri, et tutelam navis navim regere, et gemellos illos ignes, qui boni sunt instar ominis apud nautas, fratres esse Helenae, et esse lucida sidera, et esse ventorum patrem. Neque tamen erant aethetice improbabilia Virgilio, poetae adeo mythologiae gnaro, ut ex navibus etiam nymphas fabricaverit, in quas utique cadit persuasio passiva et activa, §. 836.

§ 843. Aesthetic persuasion 1) is occupied with those things concerning which complete and scientific certitude is given, concerning which the author perhaps has, and usefully has, intellectual conviction too; indeed it is occupied even with arguments that demonstrate matters of this kind rigorously and severely, insofar as they are at the same time persuadable, §§425, 617, 829, common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, §125, insofar as they do not ascend above this horizon, §§121, 485. Hence the often-agitated question, whether philosophical matters and proofs drawn from the nature of things befit an orator, for example a sacred orator, is best judged neither by a flat denial nor by an affirmation, since some things admitting persuasion readily enough occur in philosophical questions and argumentations; but some could hardly be included in reasons fit for persuading, and all of them, in the same ratio and mode in which they are offered for scientific conviction, would be sung in vain to mixed crowds of hearers.

§ 844. Aesthetic persuasion 2), while it directly aims at sensory certitude of the things being treated, will sometimes, by persuading concerning the parts, indirectly present the whole as certain, not without conviction as well, to the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason, §§428, 617. Such conviction will then sometimes be greater extensively, and can be stronger by the number of marks, than another conviction more distinct intensively and more apt for the sciences, *Metaphysics* §532. Yet it is not primarily intended by the aesthetician insofar as it is conviction, but insofar as we were most suitably led to it by persuasions of the parts. For Horace, the writer of the Trojan War “says what is beautiful, what shameful, what useful, what not, more plainly and better than Chrysippus and Crantor.” We shall not linger over comparisons, §842. The example is enough: the objects of moral demonstrations are also objects of the poet, who persuades concerning the same things about which those demonstrations convince, indeed finally convinces the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason concerning the same things about which they had convinced pure intellect and the solidity of reason, *Metaphysics* §§637, 645.

§ 845. Aesthetic persuasion 3) is occupied with aesthetically probable things, whether they are also logically probable or not, §485, provided there is not such logical improbability, now also present to the minds of your hearers, that, by destroying every aesthetic probability, it also removes every persuasion, §486. To this belong Horace’s persuasible arguments to the ship in Ode I.3: “So may the mighty goddess of Cyprus guide you, so may Helen’s brothers, bright stars, and the father of the winds, with all others bound except Iapyx.” It is logically improbable both that a ship is moved by good wishes and words, and that the tutelary power of the ship guides the ship, and that those twin fires, which are like a good omen among sailors, are Helen’s brothers, and are bright stars, and that there is a father of the winds. Yet they were not aesthetically improbable to Virgil, a poet so skilled in mythology that he even fashioned nymphs from ships, to whom passive and active persuasion certainly applies, §836.

§ 846. Persuasio aesthetica lubentissime propter thaumaturgiam, §. 824, occupatur 4) in iis, quae fuerant tuis etiam aesthetice dubia et improbabilia; si vires tibi noveris ad tuos de iisdem nihilo minus aesthetice certos reddendos. §. 818. Hanc hypothesin quia negligunt plerique declamatores suasoriarum, morem eorum paradoxa sectandi ridet in se ipso Iuvenalis. Sat. I.

et nos

Consilium Sullae dedimus, privatus ut altum

Dormiret.

Nunc autem eadem Satyra felicius persuadet de morum corruptione, ne iudiciis quidem et poenis coercenda, aesthetice improbabili:

Quum populum gregibus comitum premat hic spoliator

Pupilli prostantis, et hic damnatus inani

Iudicio. Quid enim salvis infamia nummis?

Exsul ab octava Marius bibit, et fruitur Dis

Iratis. At tu, victrix provincia, ploras.

SECTIO L

EVIDENTIA AESTHETICA

§ 847. Verisimilibus eiusmodi, §. 843–846. dum aesthetica suada, §. 838. circumfundit perspicuitatem sensitivam, §. 618. nascitur inde evidentia, M. §. 531. sensitiva, quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum, ad sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis analogon. Hanc evidentiam, quoniam immediatam, intuitivam et per se patentem plurimi iudicant, non raro praeferunt argumentando demum eliciendae, si vel illa maxime tandem intellectum convincat. Plurimorum sententiam Cotta profert apud Ciceronem de nat. deor. III. 9. *Ego neque in caussis, si quid est evidens (sensitive) de quo inter omnes convenit* (nec enim de evidentibus intellectui omnibus inter omnes convenit, neque sunt omnia de quibus inter omnes convenire dicitur, intellectualiter evidentia) *argumentari soleo. Perspicuitas enim (sensitiva) argumentatione elevatur* (quum intellectualis potius intendatur) *nec si id facerem in causis forensibus, idem facerem in hac subtilitate sermonis — Sed quia non confidebas, tam esse id perspicuum, quam tu velis, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. Mihi enim unum satis erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse; Sed tu auctoritates omnes contemnens, ratione pugnans. Patere igitur, rationem meam cum tua ratione contendere. Affers haec omnia argumenta, cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam, argumentando dubiam facis.*

§ 848. Eandem in sententiam exorsus erat orationem suam Lucilius. II. 4. *Quid potest, inquit, esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum caelum suspeximus, caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis? — Quod qui dubitat, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius?* Consentiant in hoc, numinis existentiam esse hominibus, sensitive etiam, evidentem, in hoc dissentiant, quod hanc evidentiam cum intellectuali coniungere non male laborat Lucilius, argumentorum autem evidentiam minus bene Cotta reiicit. §. 847.

§ 846. Aesthetic persuasion, most willingly because of thaumaturgy, §824, is occupied 4) with those things that had been aesthetically doubtful and improbable even to your own hearers, if you know your powers for nevertheless making them aesthetically certain about the same things, §818. Because most declaimers of *suasoriae* neglect this hypothesis, Juvenal mocks in himself their custom of chasing paradoxes, *Satires* I: “and we gave Sulla counsel, as a private man, to sleep deeply.” But now the same satire more happily persuades concerning a corruption of morals, not to be checked even by judgments and penalties, aesthetically improbable: “When this plunderer of a ward exposed for sale weighs down the people with troops of attendants, and that man, condemned by an empty judgment. For what is infamy, if the money is safe? Marius drinks from the eighth hour as an exile and enjoys the angry gods. But you, victorious province, weep.”

SECTION L

AESTHETIC EVIDENCE

§ 847. When aesthetic *suada*, §838, pours sensory perspicuity, §618, around verisimilitudes of this kind, §§843–846, there arises sensory evidence, *Metaphysics* §531, which others have called demonstration to the eye, to the senses, and palpable, the analogue of intellectually convincing demonstration. Because many judge this evidence immediate, intuitive, and self-evident, they often prefer it to evidence finally elicited by arguing, even if the latter at last convinces the intellect. Cotta gives the opinion of many in Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* III.9: *In cases, if something is evident sensibly, about which all agree*, for not all things evident to the intellect are agreed upon by all, nor are all things about which all are said to agree intellectually evident, *I am not accustomed to argue. For perspicuity sensory is weakened by argumentation*, when intellectual perspicuity is rather intended, *nor; if I did this in forensic cases, would I do the same in this subtlety of discussion. But because you did not trust that it was as perspicuous as you wished, you therefore wanted to teach by many arguments that gods exist. For one thing was enough for me: that our ancestors handed it down to us. But you despise all authorities; you fight by reason. Allow, therefore, my reason to contend with yours. You bring all these arguments why gods exist, and by arguing you make a matter, in my judgment by no means doubtful, doubtful.*

§ 848. Lucilius had begun his speech in the same opinion, II.4, saying: *What can be so open and so perspicuous, when we have looked up at the sky and contemplated the heavenly things, as that there is some divine power of most excellent mind? And if anyone doubts this, I truly do not understand why he cannot also doubt whether there is a sun or none. For what is more evident than this?* They agree in this, that the existence of deity is evident to human beings, even sensibly; they disagree in this, that Lucilius works not badly to join this evidence with intellectual evidence, while Cotta less well rejects the evidence of arguments, §847.

§ 849. Quemadmodum autem vel mathematice convicti sibi videntur aliqui per evidentiam intellectualem, falsa tamen aliquando persuasione: sic et sensitivam evidentiam veram a falsa distinguere necesse est. §. 832. Illam sequitur aesthetica, §. 835, 838. licet nonnunquam per humanum errorem in evidentiam possit deducere; cui non parum admixtum sit falsae persuasionis, §. 830. Ἀυτομάτηρον Livius, VIII. 9. bellum huius rei exemplum exhibet narrans Decium *se pro legionibus devoventem, incinctumque cinctu Gabino se in medios hostes immittentem*. Postquam enim quaedam ex persuasione spectatorum falsa retulit: *Evidentissimum, pergit, id fuit, quod, quacunque equo invectus est, ibi haud secus, quam pestifero sidere icti, pavebant: ubi vero corruit obrutus telis, inde iam haud dubie consternatae cohortes Latinorum fugam ac vastitatem late fecerunt*.

§ 850. Hanc ob caussam Cicero top. 97. postulat, narratione: *ut ad suos fines spectent, i. e. ut planae sint, ut breves*, §. 170. *ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae, ut cum dignitate. Quae quanquam in tota oratione (omni venusta meditatione) esse debent, tamen magis sunt propria narrandi*. Plana heic credibilitas multos evidentiae numeros absolvet. §. 847. Idem de am. 27. quando ait amicitiam oriri *magis applicatione quadam animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione, quantum illa utilitatis sit habitura, quod quidem, quale sit, in bestiis etiam quibusdam deprehendi posse, multo tamen evidentius in homine*: multo verius et clarius, hinc etiam ipso sensu certius evidentioris nomine complectitur.

§ 851. Conciliabimus itaque venustis meditationibus pulcrum illam evidentiam, de qua huiusque, 1) vero nostro §. 423–613. suam lucem dando §. 614–828. 2) oppositis huic vero falsis et erroribus fucum veritatis detrahendo. §. 763. *Quum duae caussae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt animum atque intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut, quanta ea luce circumfusa sint, possint agnoscere. Alterum est, quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti, atque decepti quidam, quum ea dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus, et captiones discutere*. Cic. quaest. ac. IIII. 46.

§ 852. Perspicuum et evidens saepe Ciceroni sunt in synonymis. Ita enim sub aliena persona latens. 17. ἐνάρχειαν, inquit, *graecarum perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus, fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba*. Quoniam autem philosophis non opus est synonymis, veri demum perspicuitatem evidentiam dicimus: ita, ut omnia quidem evidentia simul concedamus esse perspicua; propterea quod *nihil est clarius ἐνάρχεια*, neque tamen omnia perspicua iam hoc ipso largiamur esse simul evidentia. §. 614. ἐνάρχεια a Cicerone *illustratio et evidentia* nominatur, quae *non tam dicere videtur, quam ostendere*. Quint. VI. 2. Nos quidem evidentiam omnem illustrare non negabimus, §. 730. quoniam et nos putamus *orationem nullam illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse*, neque tamen omni illustrationi suam evidentiam inesse concedimus. §. 731. *Plus est evidentia, vel, ut alii dicunt ἐνάρχεια, repraesentatio, quam perspicuitas et illustratio. Magna virtus est res, de quibus loquimur, clare, atque ut cerni videantur, cum experientiae consueta certitudine, enunciare*. Quint. VIII. 3.

§ 849. But just as some people seem to themselves mathematically convinced through intellectual evidence, yet sometimes by false persuasion, so it is necessary to distinguish true sensory evidence from false, §832. Aesthetics follows the former, §§835, 838, although sometimes through human error it can lead into evidence in which no small amount of false persuasion is mixed, §830. Livy VIII.9 presents a fine self-witnessing example of this matter when he narrates Decius *devoting himself for the legions, girded in Sabine fashion, and throwing himself into the midst of the enemies*. After he reported certain things false from the spectators' persuasion, he continues: *Most evident was this: wherever he was carried on his horse, there, just as if struck by a pestilential star, they trembled; but when he fell, overwhelmed with weapons, from there now, without doubt, the cohorts of the Latins, thrown into confusion, made flight and devastation widely*.

§ 850. For this reason Cicero, *Topics* 97, requires in narration *that they look to their own ends*, that is, *that they be plain, brief, §170, evident, credible, moderate, and with dignity*. *Although these things ought to be in the whole speech or in every graceful meditation, they are nevertheless more proper to narration*. Plain credibility here will complete many counts of evidence, §847. Likewise in *On Friendship* 27, when he says that friendship arises *more by a certain application of the mind with a certain sense of loving than by thinking how much utility it will have; and what this is can indeed be observed even in certain beasts, but much more evidently in the human being*, he embraces under the name of the more evident what is much truer and clearer, and hence also more certain to sense itself.

§ 851. Therefore we shall reconcile to graceful meditations that beautiful evidence discussed so far, 1) by giving our truth, §§423–613, its own light, §§614–828; 2) by stripping the falsehoods and errors opposed to this truth of the false coloring of truth, §763. *Since two causes oppose perspicuous and evident things, just as many aids must be prepared against them. For first there is opposition because people fix and stretch their mind too little upon the things that are perspicuous, so that they can recognize how great a light is poured around them. The second is that certain people, surrounded and deceived by fallacious and captious questions, when they cannot dissolve them, withdraw from truth. Therefore both those things that can be answered on behalf of perspicuity must be ready, and we must be armed so that we can meet questions and shake off traps*, Cicero, *Academic Questions* IV.46.

§ 852. The perspicuous and the evident are often synonyms for Cicero. Thus, hiding under another person, 17, he says: *Let us, if you please, call the Greek ἐνάργεια perspicuity or evidence, and let us make words if there is need*. But since philosophers do not need synonyms, we call only the perspicuity of the true evidence: in such a way that we indeed concede that all evident things are also perspicuous, because *nothing is clearer than ἐνάργεια*, but we do not therefore grant that all perspicuous things are at once evident, §614. ἐνάργεια is named by Cicero *illustration and evidence*, which *seems not so much to say as to show*, Quintilian VI.2. We indeed will not deny that all evidence illustrates, §730, since we too think *no speech can be found more illustrative than evidence itself*; yet we do not concede that every illustration has its own evidence, §731. *Evidence, or as others say ἐνάργεια, representation, is more than perspicuity and illustration. It is a great virtue to state clearly the things about which we speak, and as if they seem to be seen*, with the customary certitude of experience, Quintilian VIII.3.

§ 853. Quo clarius, sensitive tamen, §. 614. hinc quo vividius, §. 619. quo plures, quo maiores veritates persuadendo sistuntur obiectis tuis personalibus ob oculos mentis: hoc maior erit persuasio, hoc maior eam comitabitur evidentia, M. §. 880. Hinc ob persuasionem, quam praestare possis, maximam nova nascitur ingeniis venustis obligatio legendi sibi, quae possint, verissima themata, quoniam, caetera si fuerint paria, quo quid est verius, hoc idem erit persuasibilis et ostendi poterit evidentiis. §. 555.

§ 854. Persuasio aesthetica etiam, sicut logica, vel erit directa et ostensiva, qua verum esse, quod ponimus, vel admodum verisimile declaremus evidenter, ad oppositum illi falsum minus attendentes; vel apogogica et per indirectum procedens, deducens ad aesthetice falsum et falso simile, vel incongruum, qua circumdamus nostris, quae ponimus, veritatis verisimilitudinisque lucem, detecta falsitate his repugnantium, §. 851.

SECTIO LI

CONFIRMATIO

§ 855. Persuasio directa et ostensiva CONFIRMATIO est, sicut apogogica, persuadens falsitatem oppositi, logicae refutationis analogon, REPREHENSIO, quam et infirmationem contrarii dixeris. Ita coniungit hanc duplicem persuadendi viam Cicero de Div. II. 38. *Tu quidem, inquit, non hostiarum casum confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortes collatione hostiarum.* Immo iam citra artem ipsa natura facultatem utramque coniunctam iudicat, quoniam *ita nati sumus, ut ea, quae intenderemus, confirmare, et id, quod contra diceretur, refellere possemus.* de or. I. 90. Rhetores idem narrat iubere ut, inter alia, *nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus, deinde contraria refutare.* I. 90.

§ 856. Poetarum non minus est, ac oratorum, persuadere, §. 829. Hinc persuasurus, licet infelicitur, Lucretius, et reprehendit, II. 174.

*generis humani
omnia caussa
Constituisse deos dum fingunt, omnibus rebus
Magnopere a vera lapsi ratione videntur*

et confirmat. 177.

*Nam quamvis rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam
Naturam mundi, quae tanta est praedita culpa.
Quae tibi posterius, Memmi, faciemus aperta.
Nunc locus est, ut opinor, in his illud quoque rebus
Confirmare tibi, nullam rem posse sua vi
Corpoream sursum ferri, sursumque meare.
Nec tibi dent in eo flammaram corpora fraudem,*

et ita pergit refellendo.

§ 853. The more clearly, though sensibly, §614, and hence the more vividly, §619, the more and the greater truths are set by persuasion before the mental eyes of your personal objects, the greater the persuasion will be, and the greater the evidence accompanying it, *Metaphysics* §880. Hence, because of the persuasion you can furnish, a very great new obligation arises for graceful talents to choose for themselves the truest themes they can, since, other things being equal, the truer something is, the more persuasible it will be and the more evidently it can be shown, §555.

§ 854. Aesthetic persuasion too, like logical persuasion, will be either direct and ostensive, by which we evidently declare that what we posit is true or highly verisimilar, attending less to the false thing opposed to it; or it will be apagogic and proceed indirectly, leading down to what is aesthetically false and like the false, or incongruous, by which we surround the things we posit with the light of truth and verisimilitude, once the falsity of things opposed to them has been detected, §851.

SECTION LI

CONFIRMATION

§ 855. Direct and ostensive persuasion is CONFIRMATION, just as apagogic persuasion, persuading the falsity of the opposite, the analogue of logical refutation, is REPREHENSION, which you may also call the weakening of the contrary. Cicero joins this double way of persuading in *On Divination* II.38: *You indeed*, he says, *do not confirm the chance of entrails by the likeness of lots, but weaken lots by comparison with entrails*. Indeed nature itself, already before art, judges both faculties joined, because *we were born in such a way that we could confirm the things we intended and refute what was said against them*, *On the Orator* I.90. He reports that rhetoricians likewise command that, among other things, *we confirm our own things by arguments and reasons, then refute the contrary*, I.90.

§ 856. It belongs no less to poets than to orators to persuade, §829. Hence Lucretius, about to persuade, although unhappily, both reprehends, II.174: “while they imagine that the gods established all things for the sake of the human race, they seem in all things to have fallen greatly from true reason,” and confirms, 177: “For although I do not know what the first-beginnings of things are, nevertheless from the very relations of the sky I would dare to confirm this, and from many other things to render it, that the nature of the world, endowed as it is with so great a fault, was by no means divinely created for us. These things later, Memmius, we shall make open to you. Now the place is, as I think, in these matters also to confirm this to you, that no bodily thing can by its own force be carried upward and move upward. Nor let the bodies of flames deceive you in this,” and so he proceeds by refuting.

§ 857. Primum heic postulatum est, si quid intendis, ut illud sine dubitatione confirmes, etiamsi non semper omnis tolli possit incertitudo. Licet aliquando deesse non nihil plenae persuasioni, vel analogo rationis patere possit, ille tamen status, quo rationes in utramque contrariorum partem compares videantur et aequales, animo prius tuo, dein tuorum animis evellendus omnino est, nisi irritum persuadendi conatum in te rideri velis. Certitudo quaedam cum quadam incertitudine potest consistere, sed nulla certitudo, hinc nulla persuasio, nulla evidentia, confirmatio nulla cum incertitudine totali dubitantium. Hinc ipsi dubitationis catholicae patroni quam primum belle volunt aliquem in hanc aleam inducere, consiliorum suorum eo usque solent oblivisci, ut de nulla re minus dubitare videantur, ac de eo, dubitandum esse de omnibus.

§ 858. Deinde ne rationibus et argumentis unquam aggrediaris confirmare, de quibus se iam satis immediate certos esse tui sibi persuaserunt. §. 847. Persuasorie negat Epicurus *opus esse ratione, neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas appetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri hoc putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel, quorum nil oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. Altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta et aperta indicari*. §. 851. Cic. de fin. I. 30. Quemadmodum demonstrator identicas indemonstrabiles ex nullis amplius argumentis efficit, ita persuasionem confirmaturus in iudiciis, quae suorum sensibus aut analogo rationis per se satis evidentia videantur, ulterioris probationis incurius, acquiescit.

§ 859. Porro, si rationibus evincenda sunt, quae confirmare lubet, argumentis a priori petitis, vel praeferas eleganter persuasurus, vel saltem adiungas, quoties illud fieri potest, rationes a posteriori. Potest a priori confirmari divinatio, tamen, modo ad persuadendum magis idoneo, *ex ipsis exemplis verarum vaticinationum et somniorum Cratippus solet rationem concludere hoc modo: Si sine oculis non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere: qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. Item igitur, si sine divinatione non potest et officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem quis, quum divinationem habeat, aliquando errare, nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel ita esse aliquid divinatum, ut nihil fortuito cecidisse videatur. Sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia. Esse igitur divinationem confitendum est*. Cic. de div. I. 71.

§ 860. Si tuis in meditationibus admittant aliquam argumentorum etiam confirmationem 1) generaliora quaedam et abstractiora 2) magis determinata, individua, et singularia, utraque tamen confirmare tempus et locus non permittant: illa lemmatum instar ex disciplinis intellectualibus quasi nota sumas potius, et in horum probationem operam impendas, quam vice versa. §. 677, 752. Plinius I. XXXVII. in prooemio sumens *gemmas in arctum coactam rerum naturae maiestatem, Ismeniae aetate scalpi smaragdolos solitos* confirmat *edicto Alexandri M. quo vetuit in gemma se ab alio scalpi, quam a Pyrgotele*, non dubie, §. 857. clarissimo artis eius. c. I.

§ 857. The first requirement here is that, if you intend something, you confirm it without doubt, even if all uncertainty cannot always be removed. Although at times it may be clear, even to the analogue of reason, that something is lacking for full persuasion, nevertheless that state in which the reasons seem compared on either side of contraries and equal must be altogether torn first from your own mind, then from the minds of your hearers, unless you wish the vain attempt at persuading to be laughed at in you. A certain certitude can coexist with a certain uncertainty, but no certitude, hence no persuasion, no evidence, no confirmation, can coexist with the total uncertainty of doubters. Hence even the patrons of universal doubt, as soon as they wish beautifully to lead someone into this hazard, usually forget their counsels to such a degree that they seem to doubt nothing less than this: that one must doubt everything.

§ 858. Next, never attempt by reasons and arguments to confirm things about which your hearers have persuaded themselves that they are already sufficiently immediately certain, §847. Epicurus persuasively denies that *there is need of reason or disputation why pleasure is to be sought and pain avoided. He thinks this is sensed, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which ought to be confirmed by refined reasons, but that admonition alone is enough. For there is a difference between an argument and conclusion of reason and a moderate noticing and admonition. By the former certain hidden and, as it were, enfolded things are opened; by the latter things ready and open are indicated*, §851; Cicero, *De finibus* I.30. Just as a demonstrator does not produce indemonstrable identities from further arguments, so one who will confirm persuasion rests, unconcerned with further proof, in judgments that seem sufficiently evident in themselves to the senses or analogue of reason of his hearers.

§ 859. Furthermore, if the things you want to confirm must be proved by reasons, then, when you are about to persuade elegantly, either prefer arguments sought *a posteriori* to those sought *a priori*, or at least add them whenever this can be done. Divination can be confirmed *a priori*; nevertheless, in a way more suitable for persuading, Cratippus is accustomed to conclude the reason from the very examples of true prophecies and dreams as follows: *If without eyes the office and function of eyes cannot exist, but eyes can sometimes fail to perform their function, then one who has used his eyes even once so as to see true things has the sense of eyes seeing true things. Likewise, therefore, if without divination the office and function of divination cannot exist, but someone, when he has divination, can sometimes err and not see true things, it is enough for confirming divination that something was once so divined that nothing seems to have happened by chance. But there are innumerable things of that kind. Therefore one must confess that divination exists*, Cicero, *On Divination* I.71.

§ 860. If in your meditations certain more general and abstract things and certain more determinate, individual, and singular things admit some confirmation of arguments, yet time and place do not permit both to be confirmed, take the former rather as lemmas, as though known from intellectual disciplines, and spend your labor on proving the latter, rather than the reverse, §§677, 752. Pliny, book XXXVII, in the preface, assuming that *gems are the majesty of nature compressed into a narrow space* and that *emeralds were accustomed to be engraved in the age of Ismenias*, confirms this by *the edict of Alexander the Great by which he forbade himself to be engraved on a gem by anyone other than Pyrgoteles*, no doubt, §857, the most famous artist of that craft, chapter I.

§ 861. ARGUMENTATIO completam certitudinem exhibens est NECESSARIA, incompletam, in aliquantulum incertis, quae praestet, sola est probabilis. Dubias enim et multo magis improbabilis nullam certitudinem, nullam persuasionem secum ferre, confirmationem nullam iam vidimus. §. 857, 485. Hinc recte Cicero de inv. I. 44. *Omnis argumentatio aut probabilis aut necessaria debet esse.* Nisi fallitur in describenda necessaria: *necessario*, pergens, *demonstrantur ea, quae aliter, ac dicuntur, nec fieri, nec probari possunt*, labitur saltem in adiuncto exemplo: *Si peperit, cum viro concubuit.*

§ 862. Si confirmaturus eleganter tibi permiseris aliquando necessariam aliquam etiam argumentationem tangere, quae scilicet ad logices formulam exacta formae simul completam certitudinem intellectui approbaret: ab huius tamen, formae scilicet legitimae, venustis occultationibus nunc minus abstinere tuum est, quoniam tibi sufficere potest argumenti scientifici satis evidentem analogo rationis propinare verisimilitudinem §. 483, 829. Ad hanc autem completa formae convictio non requiritur. Hinc Cicero *genus etiam argumentandi, quod in necessaria* §. 861. *demonstratione* §. 847. *versatur*, suadet tractare maxime aut per complexionem, dilemma enthymematico-crypticum, aut per enumerationem, syllogismum disiunctivum tollendo ponentem, sed denuo satis crypticum, aut per simplicem conclusionem, cuius exemplum ponit syllogismum hypotheticum modi ponentis enthymematicum. 45.

§ 863. Addit quidem Cicero: *sive hoc diligenter videre oportebit, ne quo pacto genus hoc refelli possit, ut ne confirmatio modum in se argumentationis habeat et quandam similitudinem necessariae conclusionis, verum ipsa argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat.* Verum, aequus interpretes animadvertet 1) diligentiam in foro aethetico debitam postulari, non accurationem logicorum mathematicam, 2) sicuti confirmatio tantum intenditur persuasoria, ita nec cavendum esse, ut ne logicis quidem subtilitatibus et purioris rationis intensissima vi tua possit argumentatio refelli, sed ut ne possit reprehendi, §. 855. ut ne vel ad sensum et coram analogi rationis tribunali falsitatem in eadem aliquam aetheticam S. XXVIII, detegere sit in promptu, 3) paralogismos utique et mera sophismata reiici, quibus nihil insit virium ad persuadendum, sed inanis tantum certitudinis species, §. 837. sufficere tamen Ciceroni, ut argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat, nec eum requirere, ut omnis haec et sufficiens inter argumentandum ratio, qua pote, manifestissime rationis ipsius perspicientiae subiiciatur, §. 862, 843.

§ 864. Incidas eleganter meditaturus in iudicium, quale logici demonstrativum dicimus, quodque hinc utique per scientias indiget demonstratione, sit tamen idem, quantum noveris, apud tuos in confesso, de quo constet inter omnes, sit etiam in promptu necessaria quaedam argumentatio, cuius tamen praevideas vel omnem ambitum, vel aliquam partem, quam resecare nequeas, tuis minus perspicuam ac evidentem futuram, ac ipsa iam est conclusio. Hoc in casu totam illam tuam argumentationem necessariam lubens omitte iudicii tui demonstrativi, sed simul per se satis nunc evidenter animadversione mediocri contentus acquiesce, §. 858, 847. Eadem regula modum et fines praescribet, quousque in analysi argumentorum per prosyllogismos adscendere e re sit eleganter confirmaturi.

§ 861. ARGUMENTATION exhibiting complete certitude is NECESSARY; argumentation that furnishes incomplete certitude, in somewhat uncertain matters, is only probable. For we have already seen that doubtful things, and much more improbable things, bring no certitude, no persuasion, no confirmation with them, §§857, 485. Hence Cicero rightly says, *De inventione* I.44: *Every argumentation will have to be either probable or necessary*. Unless he errs in describing the necessary: *By necessity*, he continues, *those things are demonstrated which cannot be otherwise than they are said, nor be proved otherwise*; at least he slips in the example added: *If she has given birth, she has lain with a man*.

§ 862. If, when about to confirm elegantly, you have sometimes allowed yourself to touch some necessary argumentation, which, if examined according to the formula of logic, would also approve complete certitude of form to the intellect, nevertheless it is now less your business to abstain from graceful concealments of this, namely of legitimate form, since it can be enough for you to offer to the analogue of reason a sufficiently evident verisimilitude of a scientific argument, §§483, 829. For complete conviction of form is not required for this. Hence Cicero advises treating *even the kind of arguing that is concerned with necessary demonstration*, §861, §847, especially either by complexio, an enthymematic-cryptic dilemma, or by enumeration, a disjunctive syllogism that, by denying, affirms, but again sufficiently cryptic, or by simple conclusion, for which he sets down as example an enthymematic hypothetical syllogism in the affirming mode, 45.

§ 863. Cicero indeed adds: *Whether it will be necessary to see this carefully, lest this kind can in any way be refuted, so that confirmation may not have in itself a mode of argumentation and a certain likeness of necessary conclusion, but the argumentation itself may stand from necessary reason*. But a fair interpreter will notice 1) that diligence due in the aesthetic forum is required, not the mathematical accuracy of logicians; 2) that, just as only persuasive confirmation is intended, so one need not beware lest one's argumentation be refuted even by logical subtleties and the most intense force of pure reason, but lest it be reprehended, §855, lest some aesthetic falsity in it, even to sense and before the tribunal of the analogue of reason, Sect. XXVIII, be ready to be detected; 3) that paralogisms and mere sophisms are indeed rejected, since they contain no force for persuading, but only an empty appearance of certitude, §837, yet it is enough for Cicero that the argumentation stand from necessary reason, and he does not require that all this reason, sufficient during argumentation, be subjected, as far as possible, most manifestly to the clear view of reason itself, §§862, 843.

§ 864. When meditating elegantly, you may fall upon a judgment of the sort we logicians call demonstrative, and which therefore certainly needs demonstration through the sciences, yet the same judgment, so far as you know, is admitted among your hearers, agreed upon by all, and there is also at hand some necessary argumentation whose whole circuit, or some part which you cannot cut away, you foresee will be less perspicuous and evident to your hearers than the conclusion itself already is. In this case gladly omit that whole necessary argumentation, and rest content with a moderate noticing of your demonstrative judgment, which is at the same time sufficiently evident in itself for now, §§858, 847. The same rule will prescribe the measure and limits up to which it is useful for one confirming elegantly to ascend in the analysis of arguments through prosyllogisms.

§ 865. Incidas in meditationibus aestheticis in propositionem demonstrativam, quam indigere confirmationibus argumentorum probe praevideas, habeas autem argumentationem necessariam in promptu, sed simul aliam aliquam probabilem tantum. Interim in illa praesagiat animus haesuros tuos, obiectum tuum personale primum, in ipso probationis cardine, velut oblato quodam nodo Gordio, defuturam illi necessario tuo argumento relativam vel omni, vel magna ex parte, sensitivam evidentiam, intellectualem autem horizontem tuorum, nunc certe, transcendere. Hanc autem, probabilem scilicet, alteram probationem planam sperare possis et perspicuam fore tuis et oppido evidentem vel ipsi rationis analogo. Hic praefer argumentationem probabilem necessariae. Incertum certo? certo veris credibilia? §. 837. Utique. Verum non ideo, quia praeferendum incertum est, sed quia tuis est sensitive certius intellectualiter certis, quae nunc certe, non intelligunt. Non ideo, quia credibile non est certo verum, sed quia tuis tamen hoc probabile est credibilis, ac illa certo vera, quorum ipsos, nunc certe, transcendit evidentia. §. 839.

§ 866. Probabile, quando Cicero dicit, 46. *quod fieri solet*, §. 484. exhibet occasionem observandi quartam ἤθους speciem; §. 195, 495, 698. qua moratum cogitandi genus §. 226. 1) velut aliud agendo, tacite suos de probatis auctoris moribus intimius semper intimiusque persuadeat, §. 227. ita, ut illi suo sibi marte tandem personam cogitantis et characterem moralem, ut amabilem absolute, sic nunc simpliciter honestum, nunc nobilem, nunc omnino grandem, prouti materiis, obiectis et dynamometriae suae naturali proportionate se pingere voluerit, §. 462. evidenter deprehendisse videantur. §. 213.

§ 867. ἤθους persuasorium §. 866. 2) memor illorum, qui *nihil rectum, nisi quod ipsorum moribus conveniat*, putabunt, Corn. pr. quos noveris non esse paucissimos, si qua cum iisdem congruant, quae velit persuadere, ea more maiorum et institutis sacrosanctis ritibus, ipsis gentium consuetudinibus, diuturnoque moratorium usu commendando triumphabit; si qua persuadenda dissentire videantur ab iisdem, ea sibi non sumit tractanda, nisi sub hypothesis §. 846. 3) de morum optimorum verissima pulcritudine, de vera vitiorum turpitudine per naturales maxime colores utrorumque laborat intime suos persuadere, §. 574. 4) in moribus strictissime veris scapham scapham non dicit solum, sed etiam confirmat, quando pulcre potest et vitiis pulcella, et foeda virtutibus larva detrahi, §. 580.

§ 868. ἤθους persuasorium 5) mores et facta, de quibus dubitari potest, nunc in bonam, nunc in malam partem interpretatur, non sine probabilitate, saltim aethetica, secundum regulas veritatis moralis, de qua §. 435, 467. secundum easdem 6) historice fingendis moribus et factis eam probabilitatem circumdabit, ut, licet, quomodo acta res sit, ignoremus, ius tamen iurandae credulitatis vix perhorresceremus persuasi non aliter agi potuisse, §. 509. 7) in ipsis fictionibus moralium poeticis observabit certitudinem ex analogia cum mundo poetico §. 511, 513. et earundem interna verisimilitudine resultantem, §. 589. ut spectator tuus persuadeatur, non quidem, quae facta sunt, tamen verissime narrari, qualia fieri debent, heterocosmica; §. 586. 8) ubique lucem et umbram in nuda veritate moralium pingenda sic temperabit, §. 666. ut haec aliquando plena in luce refulgeat, §. 625. nunc subindicetur tantum pluribus ad cogitandum spectatori relictis, §. 654–662. nunc strictissime vera pateant analogo rationis et fidei historicae, §. 441. nunc in ipsis fabulis dominari veritatem, §. 556. vivide sentiens in admirationem simul, splendorum mendaciorum, §. 477. rapiatur spectator bene locata thaumaturgia, §. 808.

§ 865. You may fall in aesthetic meditations upon a demonstrative proposition which you clearly foresee to need confirmations of arguments, and you may have at hand a necessary argumentation, but at the same time another that is only probable. Meanwhile, in the necessary one, your mind foresees that your hearers, your primary personal object, will stick at the very hinge of the proof, as if some Gordian knot were offered, that relative sensory evidence, either altogether or in great part, will be lacking to that necessary argument of yours, and that for now it will transcend the intellectual horizon of your hearers. But you can hope that this other proof, namely the probable one, will be plain and perspicuous to your hearers and very evident even to the analogue of reason. Here prefer the probable argumentation to the necessary. The uncertain to the certain? credible things to certainly true things? §837. Indeed. But not because the uncertain is to be preferred, but because for your hearers it is sensibly more certain than intellectually certain things which, for now, they do not understand. Not because the credible is not certainly true, but because this probable thing is nevertheless more credible to your hearers than those certainly true things whose evidence, for now, transcends them, §839.

§ 866. When Cicero calls probable what *is accustomed to happen*, 46, §484, he presents an occasion for observing a fourth species of ἥθος, §§195, 495, 698, by which the moralized kind of thinking, §226, 1) as though doing something else, tacitly persuades its hearers ever more intimately about the approved morals of the author, §227, so that they at last seem to have discovered by their own effort the person of the thinker and his moral character, as lovable absolutely, so now simply honorable, now noble, now altogether grand, according as he wished to paint himself proportionately to his materials, objects, and natural dynamometry, §462, §§213.

§ 867. Persuasive ἥθος, §866, 2) mindful of those who will think *nothing right except what agrees with their own customs*, Cornelius, preface, and whom you know are not very few, will triumph, if the things it wants to persuade agree with them, by commending them through ancestral custom, sacred rites, the very practices of nations, and the long usage of the more moral; if the things to be persuaded seem to dissent from these, it does not take them up for treatment except under the hypothesis of §846. 3) It labors most intimately to persuade its hearers, through the natural colors of each, concerning the truest beauty of the best morals and the true ugliness of vices, §574. 4) In morals strictly true, it not only calls a skiff a skiff, but also confirms it, when the pretty mask can beautifully be torn from vices and the foul mask from virtues, §580.

§ 868. Persuasive ἥθος 5) interprets morals and deeds about which one can doubt now in a good part, now in a bad part, not without probability, at least aesthetic probability, according to the rules of moral truth discussed in §§435, 467. According to the same rules, 6) it will pour such probability around morals and deeds to be historically invented that, although we do not know how the thing happened, we would scarcely shudder at the right of sworn credulity, persuaded that it could not have been done otherwise, §509. 7) In poetic fictions of morals themselves it will observe the certitude resulting from analogy with the poetic world, §§511, 513, and from their internal verisimilitude, §589, so that your spectator is persuaded that, not indeed things that happened, but heterocosmic things such as ought to happen, are most truly narrated, §586. 8) Everywhere it will so temper light and shade in painting the naked truth of morals, §666, that this truth sometimes shines in full light, §625, now is only hinted, with more things left for the spectator to think, §§654–662, now things strictly true lie open to the analogue of reason and historical faith, §441, now, even in fables, truth rules, §556, and the spectator, vividly sensing this, is at the same time carried into admiration by a well-placed thaumaturgy of splendid fictions, §§477, 808.

§ 869. Probabile porro Ciceroni est, *quod est in opinione positum*, de inv. I. 46. Nos illud concessimus verisimile, §. 484. neque tamen eidem generatim probabilitatem tribuere possumus, ne aestheticam quidem semper. §. 485. Exempla Ciceronis sunt: *Impiis apud inferos poenas esse praeparatas, eos, qui philosophiae dent operam, non arbitrari deos esse*. Primum est adhuc plurimorum opinio, neque tamen probabilitatem vel aestheticam apud aliquos auditorum nancisceretur argumentis ex inferno petitis, apud eos scilicet, qui futura post hanc vitam omnia negare magnum aliquid perperam opinantur. Nec apud alios nunc in confirmando plus proficerem, Sisyphi lapidem et aquas Tantali fugientes minatus, quoniam has inferorum poenas non amplius in suis habent opinionibus. Secundum est opinio verissima, si de diis et exactius philosophantibus loquaris, sin atheismum imputes philosophis, multos nunc invenies auditores, quibus eiusmodi criminationes non amplius imponant.

§ 870. Assensus noster nobis incerto datus est OPINIO NOSTRA. Opiniones suas frustra persuadendis obtruderet aliquis confirmandi gratia, nisi sint eadem simul opiniones eorum, quibus potissimum cogitat. Hinc ante omnia videndum in opinionum usu, an sint opiniones obiecti tui personalis primarii, an forsitan aliorum tantum. Opinamur vel non ponderatis ad assensum rationibus OPINIONE PRAEIUDICATA, vel opinione nunc logice, nunc saltim aesthetice probabili, vel nobis etiam dubiae, vel omnino improbabilis opinioni assentimur, quoniam id vel licere, vel omnino moraliter necessarium putamus, vel ponimus verosimilem nobis donec an probabilis sit, nec ne magis liqueat, ut ita dicam, interimistice et provisionaliter. Ad quam classem quaedam opinio intra mentem tuorum pertineat quum vix et raro certus esse poteris, post id, an in opinione eorum positum sit, quod ad confirmandum afferri possit, potior cura tuum erit, an opinio tuorum ex animi tui sententia sit error, an minus, ut agere possis ex §. 574.

§ 871. Si tandem Ciceroni probabilia dicuntur omnia, *quae habent ad mores et opiniones aliquam similitudinem, contraria, paria, quaeque cadant sub eandem rationem*, de inv. I. 46. vereor, ne verisimile et probabile, perspicuum et evidens, si sequaris, saepenumero confuderis. §. 852. In ipsis exquisitis ab eloquentissimo viro exemplis fallor, an parva satis vis ad persuadendum analogo rationis deprehendatur, splendidum et oculos primo obtutu praestringens, ab evidenti si doctum est distinguere? Interim qui semper non dabunt, aliquando saltim probabilem confirmationem suggerent loculi; §. 132.

§ 872. Pari sunt in pretio, qui sequuntur, 48. probabilium loci, *signum, credibile, iudicatum, comparabile*. Signum esse dicit, *quod quiddam significat*. e. c. Hactenus quis neget? Quando vero de signis generatim addit, *indigere ea testimonii et gravioris confirmationis*, de signis illud omnibus eo minus concesserim, quo minus, 1) omnia signa tantum probabilia sunt, quoniam ex aliquibus persuasio completa, e. g. ex putrefactione totius corporis certitudo mortis, 2) probabilia etiam, si vere sint, quae dicuntur, semper gravioris confirmationis indigent, §. 861, 865. Miseros medicorum filios, qui in sua prognosi probabili collatis signis morborum omnibus, tamen indigent ubique testimonii aut gravioris confirmationis!

§ 869. Further, for Cicero the probable is what *is placed in opinion*, *De inventione* I.46. We have conceded that this is verisimilar, §484, yet we cannot generally attribute probability to it, not even always aesthetic probability, §485. Cicero's examples are: *that punishments have been prepared for the impious in the underworld*, and *that those who devote themselves to philosophy do not think gods exist*. The first is still the opinion of very many, and yet I would not obtain even aesthetic probability among some hearers by arguments drawn from hell, namely among those who wrongly suppose it something great to deny all future things after this life. Nor among others would I now accomplish more in confirming by threatening the stone of Sisyphus and the fleeing waters of Tantalus, since they no longer have these punishments of the underworld in their opinions. The second is a very true opinion, if you speak about gods and those who philosophize more exactly; but if you impute atheism to philosophers, you will now find many hearers on whom accusations of this kind no longer impose.

§ 870. Our assent given by us to something uncertain is OUR OPINION. Someone would thrust his opinions upon those to be persuaded in vain for the sake of confirming, unless the same opinions are also the opinions of those for whom he chiefly thinks. Hence, before all else, in the use of opinions one must see whether they are opinions of one's primary personal object, or perhaps only of others. We opine either without weighed reasons for assent, by PREJUDICED OPINION, or by an opinion now logically, now at least aesthetically probable; or we assent to an opinion doubtful even to us, or altogether improbable, because we think this either permitted or altogether morally necessary, or we place it as verisimilar to us, until it becomes clearer whether it is probable or not, as I might say, intermistically and provisionally. Since you will scarcely and rarely be certain to which class a given opinion belongs within the mind of your hearers, after determining whether what can be brought for confirmation is placed in their opinion, your greater care will be whether your hearers' opinion, according to your own mind's judgment, is error or not, so that you can act according to §574.

§ 871. If finally Cicero calls probable all things *that have some likeness to morals and opinions, contraries, equals, and things that fall under the same reason*, *De inventione* I.46, I fear that, if you follow him, you will quite often confuse the verisimilar and the probable, the perspicuous and the evident, §852. In the examples sought out by the most eloquent man himself, am I wrong, or will a rather small force for persuading be detected by the analogue of reason, if one has learned to distinguish what is splendid and dazzling to the eyes at first glance from what is evident? Meanwhile, these little places will not always give, but at least sometimes suggest, a probable confirmation, §132.

§ 872. The following places of probabilities, 48, have the same value: *sign, credible, judged, comparable*. He says that a sign is *what signifies something*, and so forth. Thus far, who would deny it? But when he adds concerning signs generally that *they need testimony and heavier confirmation*, I would grant this of all signs so much the less because 1) not all signs are only probable, since complete persuasion can arise from some, for example certainty of death from the putrefaction of the whole body; 2) even probable signs, if they truly are what they are said to be, do not always need heavier confirmation, §§861, 865. Miserable children of physicians, who in their probable prognosis, after all signs of diseases have been compared, nevertheless everywhere need testimony or heavier confirmation!

§ 873. Credibile non tam *sine ullo teste auditoris opinione firmatur*, §. 869, 870. quam ob internam suam probabilitatem etiam tunc persuadet, quando testium etiam auctoritatem minus perspectam habeamus. *Iudicatum est* Ciceroni *res assensione, aut auctoritate, aut iudicio, alicuius aut aliquorum comprobata, idque vel religiosum, vel commune, vel approbatum. Comparabile* dividit idem in imaginem, collationem et exemplum. §. 871.

§ 874. Haec §. 861–873. atque his similia postquam enarravit Cicero, 49. ita concludit: *At fons quidem confirmationis, ut facultas tulit, apertus est nec minus dilucide, quam rei natura ferebat, demonstratus est.* §. 659. Neque tamen ipse sibi satisfecisse videtur, quando statim addit: *In praesentia tantum modo numeros, et modos et partes argumentandi confuse et permissse dispersimus.* Dicamus enim, quod res est, fontem confirmationis cuiuslibet non generalia quaedam aperient topica, sed natura thematis penitus cognita, confirmandorumque veritas, quam fieri potest, clarissime perspecta. Ipsa scientifica pulcre meditaturs convictio, rigoroſeque demonstrandi habitus multum ipsi proderit, si vim rationis temperare, vim argumenta splendide collustrandi noverit excitare. Neque demonstrabit hos tam varios fontes rhetor ullus, ullus aestheticus, sed pulcra potius eruditio, §. 63. et experientia, quae in rebus facti signis exsistentiam maxime probabilibus exponendi suppeditabit usum. Hausturis ex fontibus iam descriptis quaedam forte topica nonnumquam ansam aliquam dabunt, alias confirmationum aesthetice solidarum erunt arena pro fundamento. §. 839.

§ 875. Post inventionem argumenti absolutionem argumentandi praecipit Cicero, 50. eamque ex inductione, vel ratiocinatione fieri putat. Nunc semestres etiam logici norunt inductionem esse ratiocinationis speciem. Idem evinci potest, si sumamus ipsam Ciceronis de ratiocinatione descriptionem, 57. *Est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquod eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmat.* Sed longaeus error est inductionem a ratiocinatione, tanquam opposito aliquo ac plane diverso seiungendi, quoniam ratiocinatio et eius genus ad ordinarios syllogismos propius accedens paene ad haec usque tempora confusum est. Nos nunc de forma pulcrarum argumentationum multi non erimus, quoniam est aptior in aestheticis locus de eadem exponendi.

§ 876. Ad locum aesthetices de pulcris ratiocinationibus rite formandis ablegemus excutienda, quae Cicero habet de inductionibus n. 51–56. et tractationem de ratiocinationibus venustis tam simplicibus, quam concatenatis, qua patebit illas esse posse ac solere tripertitas, neque tamen semper vel tot constare partibus necessario: has vel trium tantum partium esse posse, solere tamen quatuor, vel quinque partibus absolvi, quanquam plures etiam articulos non omnino reformident. Unde diiudicari poterit controversia, de qua Cicero l. c. 57–76. Nunc solum notemus eiusdem iudicium, quo abhorrire censet ab usu oratorio (hinc multo magis a poetico, generatim aethetico) *multa et obscura* (κατ' αἰσθησιν, §. 631.) *de quibus certum est artificium constitutum, (logicum) quibus scilicet rationibus tractentur argumentationes in philosophia.*

§ 873. The credible is established not so much *without any witness by the opinion of the hearer*, §§869, 870, as it persuades by its internal probability even when we have less fully inspected the authority of witnesses. For Cicero, *a judged thing is a matter approved by the assent, authority, or judgment of one person or of several, and this either religious, common, or approved*. The same man divides the *comparable* into image, comparison, and example, §871.

§ 874. After Cicero has narrated these things, §§861–873, and similar things, he concludes, 49: *But the source of confirmation has indeed been opened, as far as ability allowed, and demonstrated no less clearly than the nature of the matter bore*, §659. Yet he does not seem to have satisfied himself, when he immediately adds: *For the present we have only scattered confusedly and indiscriminately the numbers, modes, and parts of arguing*. For let us say what the matter is: the source of any confirmation will not be opened by certain general topics, but by the more inwardly known nature of the theme and by the truth of the things to be confirmed, seen as clearly as possible. The very scientific conviction of one who will meditate beautifully, and his habit of demonstrating rigorously, will profit him much, if he knows how to temper the force of reason and to excite the force of splendidly illuminating arguments. No rhetorician, no aesthetician, will demonstrate these so various sources, but rather beautiful erudition, §63, and experience, which will supply practice in expounding the signs most probable for existence in matters of fact. For those about to draw from the sources already described, certain topics will perhaps sometimes give some occasion; at other times they will be sand for the foundation of aesthetically solid confirmations, §839.

§ 875. After the invention of the argument Cicero prescribes the completion of arguing, 50, and thinks it is done from induction or ratiocination. Nowadays even half-year logicians know that induction is a species of ratiocination. The same can be proved if we take Cicero's own description of ratiocination, 57: *It is speech eliciting something probable from the matter itself, which, once set forth and known through itself, confirms itself by its own force and reason*. But it is a long-lived error to separate induction from ratiocination as from something opposed and plainly diverse, because ratiocination and its genus, approaching nearer to ordinary syllogisms, have been confused almost up to these times. We shall not now say much about the form of beautiful argumentations, since there is a more fitting place in aesthetics for expounding it.

§ 876. Let us send away to the place in aesthetics concerning the right formation of beautiful ratiocinations the things to be examined which Cicero has concerning inductions, numbers 51–56, and the treatment of graceful ratiocinations, both simple and concatenated. There it will become clear that the former can be and usually are tripartite, and yet do not always necessarily consist of so many parts; the latter can be of only three parts, but usually are completed by four or five parts, although they do not altogether fear more joints. From this the controversy about which Cicero speaks there, 57–76, can be judged. Now let us note only his judgment, by which he thinks that *many and obscure things* obscure according to sense, §631, *about which a certain art has been established*, namely logical art, *by what reasons argumentations are handled in philosophy*, are abhorrent from oratorical use, and hence much more from poetic and generally aesthetic use.

§ 877. Praebet enim occasionem concessae §. 862, 863. libertati nunc adiungendi consilium expresse dissuasorium, in venustis confirmationibus ne adhibeas ratiocinationes, quarum forma secundum logices artificium legitima logicorum gnaris sine ulla crypsi, sine ullo saltu, sine ullis additamentis variationibusve retenta statim appareat, quosque formales logici dicunt. Logices imperitis formales eiusmodi syllogismos qualemcunque, maiorem tamen, certitudinem, ac alios, dare, nunquam expertus sum, nec a priori convictus, si cum vere persuasoriis, uti fas est, comparentur. Periti logices aut operae pretium iudicabunt aliquam tuarum ratiocinationum etiam in formali rationis certitudine maiori contemplari, et tunc ipsi formam tuis logicam induere poterunt: aut certitudinem eiusmodi, nunc certe, non desiderant, hinc nec his proderis, vel placebis singulariter. Interim horizontem nunc tuum transcendens, §. 121. manca, §. 159. μέλος aestheticum negligens, §. 193, 194. male tenuia, §. 232. sicca, exilia, arida, exsanguia, ieiuna, §. 246. studium veri male locatum, nunc tuo, verisimilitudinis aestheticae studio praeferens, §. 555, 561. probans non persuadens, §. 541. aesthetice obscura, §. 633, 636. cogitare, neque tamen aesthetice solidus iudicaberis. §. 840, 842.

§ 878. Confirmaturus potius materiam suarum probationum curans, secundum S. XII. poterit hylen quandam et quasi silvam rationum aliquando detegere 1) coordinatarum plurium, quaeque singulae connectantur quidem satis belle cum confirmando, videantur tamen a se invicem satis independentes, 2) subordinatarum inter se, sic, ut totae quidem et integrae series ad confirmandum usque diductae non ita multae sint, ad harum autem singulas multae tanquam ultiores probationes concurrant, et in bene longam plurium membrorum probantium concatenationem possint concreescere. Si brevitates quasdam relinquere iusserit, posteriores venustius; ac primo loco descriptae, recidentur. Numerus enim et quasi synathroismus quidam novorum semper novorumque argumentorum plus gratiae, plus vividitatis habebit, ac unius argumenti transcendens forte patientiam analogi rationis protensio. Haec intensivam veri conscientiam, certitudinem rationis amabilem sagacitati, maiorem exhiberet, fateor, sed illa copiosius probare visa rationis analogo nunc quaerendam maiorem extensivam veri conscientiam pollicetur, sensitivam evidentiam, §. 847.

§ 879. Neque tamen argumenta confirmaturus numeret solum, §. 878, sed etiam ponderet, §. 177. quantum ex quovis veritas et verisimilitudo confirmandi patere possit, iudicans, M. §. 697. ut digna relatu possit adhibere secundum iustam lucis et umbrae dispensationem singula collocando, §. 666. reiectis omnino FRIVOLIS; quorum vis dilucide probandi vel nulla, vel infinite parva. §. 839, 191. Nec ea temere speres, saltem ut umbras, graviora comitari posse. §. 661. Quid enim? si vel unius eiusmodi probationis ex umbra protrahatur admirabilis imbecillitas, et evidenter ponatur ob oculos, quam ineptum sit ad persuadendum? Tunc sane vel optimis aliis meras contemptus et oblivionis tenebras poterit adspargere. §. 665. *Satius est, omni ante actae vitae se abstinere convicio, quam levibus, aut frivolis, aut manifesto falsis reum incessere, quia fides caeteris detrahitur, et qui nihil obiicit, omisisse credi potest maledicta, tanquam supervacua, qui vana congerit, confitetur vanum in anteactis argumentum, in quibus vinci, quam tacere, maluerit.* Quintilianus Inst. or. L. VII, c. 2. de coniectura.

§ 877. For this gives occasion to add now to the liberty conceded in §§862, 863 an expressly dissuasive counsel: in graceful confirmations do not use ratiocinations whose form, legitimate according to the art of logic, appears at once to those skilled in logic, retained without any concealment, without any leap, without any additions or variations, and which logicians call formal. I have never experienced that formal syllogisms of this kind give to those unskilled in logic any certitude, or greater certitude than others, nor have I been convinced *a priori*, if they are compared, as is proper, with truly persuasive ones. Those skilled in logic will either judge it worthwhile to contemplate one of your ratiocinations also in the greater formal certitude of reason, and then they themselves can put logical form upon your arguments; or they do not, for now, desire certitude of this kind, and hence you will not help or please these people especially. Meanwhile, by thinking in a way that transcends your present horizon, §121, is maimed, §159, neglects aesthetic μέλος, §§193, 194, is badly plain, §232, dry, thin, arid, bloodless, and meager, §246, prefers a badly placed study of truth to your present study of aesthetic verisimilitude, §§555, 561, proves but does not persuade, §541, and is aesthetically obscure, §§633, 636, you will still not be judged aesthetically solid, §§840, 842.

§ 878. One who will confirm, caring rather for the matter of his proofs according to Sect. XII, will sometimes be able to uncover a certain matter, and as it were forest, of reasons: 1) several coordinate reasons, each of which is indeed joined beautifully enough with what is to be confirmed, yet seem sufficiently independent of one another; 2) reasons subordinated among themselves, so that whole and complete series led out to what is to be confirmed are not very many, but many further proofs converge upon each of these and can grow together into a long concatenation of several proving members. If brevity orders that some be left out, the later kind just described will be more gracefully cut away than the first. For a number, and as it were a certain gathering, of always new arguments will have more grace and more vividness than the extension of one argument, perhaps beyond the patience of the analogue of reason. I admit that this latter would exhibit a greater intensive consciousness of the true, a certitude of reason lovable to sagacity; but the former, seeming to prove more abundantly, promises to the analogue of reason the greater extensive consciousness of the true now to be sought, sensory evidence, §847.

§ 879. Yet one who will confirm should not merely count arguments, §878, but also weigh them, §177, judging how much the truth and verisimilitude of what is to be confirmed can lie open from each, *Metaphysics* §697, so that he can use those worthy of being related by placing each according to the just distribution of light and shade, §666, and rejecting altogether FRIVOLOUS arguments, whose force for clearly proving is either none or infinitely small, §§839, 191. Nor should you rashly hope that such arguments can accompany weightier ones even as shadows, §661. For what if the admirable weakness of even one proof of this kind should be drawn out from the shade and placed evidently before the eyes, showing how unfit it is for persuading? Then indeed it could sprinkle even the best other proofs with sheer darkness of contempt and oblivion, §665. *It is better to abstain from every reproach concerning the previous life than to attack the defendant with light, frivolous, or manifestly false charges, because credibility is taken from the rest; and one who objects nothing can be believed to have omitted insults as superfluous, but one who heaps up empty things confesses that the argument in the previous life is empty, in which he preferred to be defeated rather than silent*, Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* VII.2, on conjecture.

§ 880. Confirmaturus si solam verisimilitudinem §. 483. illustrantibus §. 730. in argumentis eligendis acquieverit; me quidem arbitro, satisfecit officio nunc suo, §. 839, 855. eam tamen verisimilitudinis speciem vel gradum, quem promiserat, vel res, vel obiectum ipsius personale praesertim attendendum rite postulaverit, illustrare quum per naturam ipsam iubeatur, §. 104. argumenta tantum heterogeneam a quaesita verisimilitudinem, vel eodem gradu minorem illustratura, vel omittet omnino, vel in umbras saltem coniiciet, luci his unice reservatis, quae talem et tantam verisimilitudinem exhibent, qualis et quanta poscebatur, S. XXXV. Exempla legem generalem declarabunt, §. 730. determinatiores regulae.

§ 881. Si de possibilitate naturali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, §. 432. aut de morali latius dicta, §. 435. argumentis absolutam tantum confirmaturis, vel nullus, vel in umbra tantum locus est, §. 431, 880. Si de veritate morali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, §. 435. argumentis possibilitatem eiusdem moralem latius dictam §. 433. tantum confirmaturis vel nullus, vel in umbris unice locus est. §. 880. Si quaeritur unitas actionis, loci, temporis hypothetica, §. 439. argumentis unitatem generalium absolutam confirmaturis nullus, nisi forsitan in umbris, locus est. §. 880. Si de veritate obiecti singulari, s. existentia quaeritur, argumentis veritatem generalium, sub quibus obiectum contineatur, unice confirmaturis, aut nullus, aut unicus in umbris, locus est. §. 440, 880. Si quaeritur, an aliquid sit strictissime verum, argumentis quamcunque possibilitatem eiusdem tantum, vel veritatem heterocosmicam declaraturis, aut nullus, aut umbra sola, locus est. §. 441, 880.

§ 882. Confirmaturus fictiones strictissime veras, §. 506. si meras strictius historicas §. 509. vel omnino poeticas, §. 511. ad persuadendum afferret, etiamsi vel nostro illae, vel poetarum mundo hae non viderentur contradicere, §. 513. nec Utopiam saperent, §. 514. analogicae §. 476. nec prorsus ignotae, §. 518. nec anomala figmenta, §. 520. immo si fictis huiusmodi lucem potissimam affuderit, iure censebitur mendacium mendacio tegere, ne perpluat, §. 881.

§ 883. Si de verisimilitudine strictissime dicta dati obiecti quaeritur, §. 530. confirmaturus omittat fabulas, §. 526. historicas etiam, multo magis poeticas, §. 527. saltem ne multum in iis haereat, §. 881. nisi forsitan aliquando in strictius probabilibus, §. 532. aut narrationibus eiusmodi, quae strictissime vera continere, fabulosis immixta, §. 526, 527. potest aesthetice saltem probabile reddere, §. 583. In ultimo casu confirmaturus provocans ad ea, quae in narrationibus, quae fabulae dicuntur, strictissime vera esse satis ostendit, §. 485, 847. non habet, generatim caussam, cur haec argumenta vel taceat, vel obumbret, §. 880.

§ 880. If one who will confirm has acquiesced, in choosing arguments, in arguments that illustrate only verisimilitude, §483, §730, in my judgment he has satisfied his present office, §§839, 855. Yet since through nature itself he is ordered to illustrate that species or degree of verisimilitude which he had promised, or which the matter or especially the personal object of it to be attended rightly required, §104, he will either omit altogether or at least cast into shadows arguments that would illustrate only a verisimilitude heterogeneous to the one sought, or lesser in the same degree, reserving light only for those that exhibit such and so great a verisimilitude as was demanded, Sect. XXXV. Examples will declare the general law, §730, and more determinate rules.

§ 881. If the natural possibility of some object is in question, §432, or moral possibility broadly so called, §435, arguments that would confirm only absolute possibility have either no place or only a place in shade, §§431, 880. If the moral truth of some object is in question, §435, arguments that would confirm only its moral possibility broadly so called, §433, have either no place or only a place in the shadows, §880. If the hypothetical unity of action, place, or time is in question, §439, arguments that would confirm the absolute unity of generalities have no place, unless perhaps in the shadows, §880. If the singular truth of an object, or its existence, is in question, arguments that would confirm only the truth of the generalities under which the object is contained have either no place or a single one in the shadows, §§440, 880. If the question is whether something is true in the strictest sense, arguments that would declare only any possibility of it, or its heterocosmic truth, have either no place or only the shade, §§441, 880.

§ 882. One who will confirm fictions that are true in the strictest sense, §506, if he were to bring forward merely stricter historical fictions, §509, or altogether poetic ones, §511, for persuading, even if the former did not seem to contradict our world, or the latter the poets' world, §513, nor tasted of Utopia, §514, being analogical, §476, nor entirely unknown, §518, nor anomalous fictions, §520; indeed, if he has poured the principal light upon fictions of this kind, he will rightly be judged to cover a lie with a lie, lest it rain through, §881.

§ 883. If the question concerns verisimilitude strictly so called of a given object, §530, the one confirming should omit fables, §526, even historical fables, and much more poetic ones, §527, or at least should not linger much in them, §881, unless perhaps sometimes in stricter probabilities, §532, or in narratives of such a kind that what they contain as strictly true, mixed with fabulous things, can make them at least aesthetically probable, §§526, 527, §583. In the last case, one confirming by appealing to those things which he has sufficiently shown to be strictly true in narratives called fables, §§485, 847, generally has no reason why he should either be silent about these arguments or cast them into shade, §880.

§ 884. Aestheticodogmatica confirmaturus quum satisfaciatur officio, nunc suo, licet non adscendat ultra verisimilitudinem dogmaticam, §. 577. dilucide propinandam, §. 839. non est generatim, cur absteineat a commemorandis, vel etiam in aliquo nitore sistendis argumentis persuasoriis logice forsitan dubiis aut improbabilibus, probabilibus tamen aesthetice, vel ab ipso commode ad hanc probabilitatem evehendis, §. 486. Genus cogitandi strictius aesthetico-historicum studiosum veri ac solidi nec patietur sua confirmaturum vel intra possibilitatum quarumcunque rationes, §. 881. vel intra nitide pingendam aliquam poeticam verisimilitudinem subsistere, §. 880, nec ad rationales credibilitatis, auctoritatis testium, interpretationis locorum ambiguum, diiudicationis contradictionum apparentium, geographiae, chronologiae, genealogiae, e. c. calculos et discussiones assurgere, §. 580, 583. Hinc historicorum, venustae simul soliditati, §. 839. ac logicae criticorum accurationi litare volentium, tot prodromi, notae, marginalia, appendices, e. c. §. 584, 847.

§ 885. Confirmaturus habeat argumenta persuasionis satis multa: non sufficit inde frivola, nec quaesitam verisimilitudinem promittentia reiicere: cogitandum explicite cuiusvis satis etiam pro dignitate lucis, vividitatis, et claritatis affundendum est extensivae, §. 618. quo collustrentur ipsae res, quae ad persuadendum adhibentur, ea potissimum parte sui, latere, vel facie, quae NERVUM PROBANDI contineat, necessitatem positam his admittendi simul veritatem confirmandi, §. 855, 839. Hinc coordinatarum etiam rationum, §. 878. nec ineptarum ob §. 879–884. si plures in hyle persuasurorum argumentorum adhuc supersint, quam ut quaevis per brevitatem rotundam satis luci suae possit exponi: praestat aliquas earundem aesthetice firmiores in omni suo naturali nitore proferre, §. 625, 622. ne neglectis quidem veris coloribus, §. 688. vel floridissimis, §. 693. ad non mediocrem usque, si fieri potest, thaumaturgiam, §. 808. quam omnibus nimium cumulatis, singulis punctim et concisim, aut tamen iusto brevius, expositis obruere forsitan et obtundere lectores e. c. primarios, non vere persuadere. §. 839, 634.

SECTIO LII

REPREHENSIO

§ 886. Quanquam reprehensio nonnunquam tantum animo confirmandi thesin per indirectam probationem tentari potest; §. 854. nos tamen eam heic considerabimus in gravioribus illis casibus, ubi contrarium a nobis confirmando, huic oppositum, et theses nostrae antithesis obiecto nostro primario posset aliquid veritatis in se continens videri, vel multum. §. 855. Dissidentes enim aesthetice refutare, vel reprehendere pulcre cogitaturis magis est necessarium, ac demonstratori logico refutare conclusionibus suis rigide demonstratis contradicentes, quia 1) est in opinione multorum, licet praeiudicata, positum, contra quae multa possint obiici (quomodocunque, quantalacunque,) certa non videri, §. 870.

§ 884. When one about to confirm aesthetic-dogmatic matters satisfies his present office, although he does not ascend beyond dogmatic verisimilitude, §577, to be offered clearly, §839, there is generally no reason why he should abstain from commemorating, or even setting in some brightness, persuasive arguments perhaps logically doubtful or improbable, yet aesthetically probable, or conveniently raised by him to this probability, §486. The more strictly aesthetic-historical kind of thinking, studious of the true and solid, will not allow its confirmer either to remain within reasons of any possibilities whatever, §881, or within some poetic verisimilitude to be brightly painted, §880, nor to rise to rational calculations and discussions of credibility, authority of witnesses, interpretation of ambiguous passages, judging apparent contradictions, geography, chronology, genealogy, and so forth, §§580, 583. Hence so many prolegomena, notes, marginalia, appendices, and so forth from historians who wish to sacrifice at once to graceful solidity, §839, and to the logical accuracy of critics, §§584, 847.

§ 885. One who will confirm should have sufficiently many arguments of persuasion. It is not enough, then, to reject frivolous arguments and those not promising the verisimilitude sought; enough extensive light, vividness, and clarity must also be poured, according to the dignity of each thing explicitly to be thought, §618, so that the very things used for persuading may be illuminated, especially in that part, side, or face of themselves which contains the NERVE OF PROVING: the necessity, once these things are posited, of at the same time admitting the truth of what is to be confirmed, §§855, 839. Hence even among coordinate reasons, §878, and reasons not inept by §§879–884, if more arguments still remain in the matter of things to be persuaded than each can be exposed sufficiently to its light through rounded brevity, it is better to bring forward some of the aesthetically stronger ones in all their natural brightness, §§625, 622, not even neglecting true colors, §688, even the most florid, §693, up to no moderate thaumaturgy, if it can be done, §808, than by too great a heap of all, each set out point by point and concisely, or yet more briefly than is just, perhaps to overwhelm and blunt the primary readers and not truly persuade, §§839, 634.

SECTION LII

REPREHENSION

§ 886. Although reprehension can sometimes be attempted only with the mind of confirming a thesis by indirect proof, §854, nevertheless we shall consider it here in those graver cases where, while we confirm the contrary, the opposite to it, the antithesis of our thesis, could seem to our primary object to contain some truth in itself, or much, §855. For to refute dissenters aesthetically, or to reprehend them, is more necessary for those about to think beautifully than it is for a logical demonstrator to refute those contradicting his rigorously demonstrated conclusions, because 1) it is placed in the opinion of many, although prejudiced, that things against which many objections can be made, however and however small, do not seem certain, §870.

§ 887. 2) Vere etiam probabilitas omnis, tam logica, quam aesthetica, non tantum auctis rationibus pro tua sententia pugnantibus, sed etiam imminutis et dilutis rationibus, contra eandem quae fecissent, crescit et intenditur. §. 485. Hinc et probabilitatibus logicis magis necessarium est rationes dubitandi infirmare, vel intellectui falsitatem contradicendorum exponere, quam demonstrationibus, quas completas et mathematicas dixeris. 3) Non adeo levi momento tuas in partes probabilitatis aestheticae pertrahetur trutina, ac logicae, nec adeo acutum cernimus sensitive, ac intellectualiter, quae pars rationum superponderet. Hinc persuasioni aestheticae consulitur, non addendo solum pondera parti, quae subsidere, sed et demendo parti, quae debeat notabilius alleviari, quo haec videbitur falsis, hoc illa videbitur sensitive veris similior. §. 483, 489.

§ 888. Vere Columella dixerit: *Reprehendisse peccantem non satis est, si non et recti viam doceas*, et recte iungat utrumque belle cogitaturus, §. 854, 855. tamen §. 886, 887. rationes nobis dedisse videmur, ex quibus ex parte possit intelligi, qui fiat, ut in sensitivae cognitionis sphaera paedagogos facilius invenias, quam patres; qui tentent,

ab exitio possint reprehendere cunctos,

quam qui nondum in devia lapsos directe ducant in amorem optimi, satyricos tandem facilius, quam paraeneticos. Optimum est, quod Cicero virtuti tribuit, si sensibus nostris Aristippi voluptas blandiatur, Qu. ac. I. 139. si similibus in casibus, ut practicis, ita etiam theoreticis, viri boni suada, revocat, vel potius reprehendit manu. *Pecudum illos esse maturos* dicit. *Hominem iungit deo*. §. 829, 838.

§ 889. Reprehensioni fontes aperire hoc minus necessarium est, si vere Salustius ad Caesarem: *Ad reprehendenda aliena facta, aut dicta, ardet omnibus animus. Vix satis apertum os, aut lingua prompta videtur, quae meditata pectore evoluat*. Vix tamen eandem definiverat Cicero de inv. I. 61. *per quam argumentando adversariorum confirmatio*, §. 886, 855. *diluitur aut infirmatur, aut allevatur*, §. 887, 854. quum eundem huic fontem tribuit, quo utitur confirmatio, 62. de quo §. 861–873. et praesertim §. 874. ubi dicta verissime simul omni reprehensionum fonti conveniunt. §. 65.

§ 890. Sint interim haec reprehensuris consilia: 1) non argumentorum solum, et praemissarum, sed conclusionis etiam primario impugnandae pingatur falsitas. §. 839. Quod in ipsis logicis refutationibus est utile: heic magis iudico necessarium, §. 887. quoniam multi sic comparati sumus, ut tacite nobiscum statuamus, etiamsi vel perperam, vel ex minus idoneis praemissis, hucusque probata sit quaedam conclusio; nondum tamen eandem iam ideo falsam esse, posse satis veram, et nobis adhuc ignota ratione vel iam probatam esse rite, vel a nobis doctiore probandam propediem. Huic non ita falsae multorum opinioni succus in dato reprehensionis exemplo subducitur, si non subsistamus in subruendis antitheseos argumentis, sed et ipsam hanc conclusionem ita declaremus esse falsam aesthetice S. XXVIII. ut obiectum nostrum primum, non datis solum, sed et forsitan inveniendis quibuscunque fulcris, tamen eandem sustineri posse desperet. §. 455.

§ 887. 2) In truth, every probability, both logical and aesthetic, grows and is intensified not only by increasing the reasons fighting for your opinion, but also by diminishing and dissolving the reasons that would have made against it, §485. Hence even for logical probabilities it is more necessary to weaken reasons for doubting, or to expose to the intellect the falsity of things contradicted, than for demonstrations that you would call complete and mathematical. 3) The scale of aesthetic probability will not be drawn to your side by so light a weight as the scale of logic, nor do we discern sensibly, as sharply as intellectually, which part of the reasons weighs more. Hence aesthetic persuasion is helped not only by adding weights to the side that ought to sink, but also by removing them from the side that ought to be lightened more noticeably; the more this side appears false, the more that side will appear sensibly like the true, §§483, 489.

§ 888. Columella may truly have said: *It is not enough to have reprehended the one erring, if you do not also teach the right way*, and one who will think beautifully rightly joins both, §§854, 855. Yet §§886, 887 seem to have given us reasons from which it can partly be understood how it happens that, in the sphere of sensory cognition, you find pedagogues more easily than fathers, those who attempt “to reprehend all from destruction” more easily than those who directly lead those not yet fallen into byways into love of the best; finally satirists more easily than paraenetics. What Cicero attributes to virtue is best, if Aristippus’ pleasure flatters our senses, *Academic Questions* I.139, if in similar cases, both practical and theoretical, the persuasion of a good man *recalls, or rather reprehends, by the hand*. It says *they are ripe for cattle*. It *joins the human being to god*, §§829, 838.

§ 889. It is less necessary to open sources for reprehension, if Sallust truly says to Caesar: *For reprehending the deeds or words of others, everyone’s mind burns. A mouth open enough, or a tongue ready enough, scarcely seems sufficient to unfold what has been meditated in the breast*. Yet Cicero had scarcely defined the same thing, *De inventione* I.61, as that *by which, through arguing, the confirmation of adversaries*, §§886, 855, *is dissolved or weakened or lightened*, §§887, 854, when he attributes to it the same source which confirmation uses, 62, concerning which §§861–873 speak, and especially §874, where the things said most truly fit at the same time every source of reprehensions, §65.

§ 890. Meanwhile let these be counsels for those who will reprehend: 1) the falsity not only of the arguments and premises, but also of the conclusion, must primarily be painted as something to be attacked, §839. This is useful even in logical refutations; here I judge it more necessary, §887, because many of us are so disposed that we tacitly decide with ourselves that, even if some conclusion has been proved up to now wrongly or from less suitable premises, it is not yet therefore false, and can be true enough, and by a reason still unknown to us either already rightly proved or soon to be proved by someone more learned than we are. The sap is withdrawn from this not entirely false opinion of many people in a given example of reprehension if we do not stop at undermining the arguments of the antithesis, but also declare that the conclusion itself is aesthetically false, Sect. XXVIII, so that our primary object despairs that it could be sustained not only by the supports given, but perhaps by any supports to be found, §455.

§ 891. Huic consilio §. 890. satisfacit partim iam ipsa confirmatio, partim artificium nostrae directae probationi, et antitheseos praemissarum, vel formae probandi, vel utrarumque subversioni iungendi ex ipsa sumta eadem conclusione et antithesi deducta, dilucide, vel etiam splendide deducta, magnam tamen analogo rationis falsitatem et incongruentiam eiusdem tandem et velut ex improvise ob oculos ponentia, §. 853, 884. Cicero de Inv. I. 63. *omnis argumentatio reprehenditur; si aut ex iis, quae sumta sunt, non conceditur unum, plurave*, (negando praemissas) *aut his concessis complexio confici ex his negatur: aut si genus ipsum argumentationis vitiosum esse ostenditur* (negando formam vel certam, vel legitimam omnino) *aut si contra firmam argumentationem alia aequae firma, aut firmior, ponitur*.

§ 892. In eadem reprehensione possunt plura membra disiunctionis a Cicerone posita post se invicem tentari, §. 891. modo 2) armis adversarii semper parentur contraria arma, quae plus verae lucis fundere videantur, ut nostrorum lumen maius obscuret illa. S. XXXX. Non aequae firma placent tantum, quantum firmiora, §. 891. Huc praeiudicia in reprehendis latentia detegere, §. 870. eadem cum praemissis aliis falsis per instantias evidetiores infringere. S. L. comparationibus paralogramas reprehendorum eludere, quorum evidentes praemissae tamen aperte falsam dent conclusionem; S. XXVIII. saltus illegitimos et supplendi impossibilitatem ob oculos ponere, e. c. quae logici docent, eleganter et ad analogi rationis modulos exsequi. §. 844.

§ 893. In primis 3) utiliter, ad hominem quae dicuntur argumenta, quem reprehendis, armis propriis aggrediendo adhibebuntur, quoniam hominem ipsi sibi contradicentem tanquam auctorem veritatis sequi, vix est, qui sibi persuadere possit, hinc labefactatur hoc modo certe praeiudicium auctoritatis, quod pro patronis antitheseos pugnare potuisset, tanquam aesthetice saltim solidis, §. 839. *Artificis est invenire in actione adversarii, quae in semet ipsa pugnent, aut pugnare videantur*. Quint. inst. V. 13. quod totum caput heic legi meretur. 4) In reprehendendo hoc magis sollicitus esto de genere cogitandi satis digno, §. 223. quo minus aestheticus cum logico suadere potest abstinere ab omnibus affectiones animi moventibus, §. 22. quo difficilius est aliquando vehementer, neque tamen iracunde agere, §. 722–725.

§ 894. Ultimum dignitatis consilium §. 182. heic etiam, tanquam ex ipsis eleganter cogitandi fontibus §. 866. fluens considerari velim, non tantum, quatenus idem virtus et pietas postulant, §. 183. Quod in obscoenis sibi permiserunt antiquorum non pauci, §. 184. in reprehendendo paene plures similem eidem licentiam sumserunt, ut adeo rationibus impugnare veterem, sed malum, morem eo magis necessarium videatur, quo pluribus eum, alioquin satis insignibus, exemplis hodierni imitatores eiusdem facile tueantur. Quomodo reprehendat apud Homerum heros heroa, quis nescit? Sed quanto iam in hoc Aeneis Virgilii moratior est? *In hoc ipso* (Demosthene) *diligenter examinans verborum omnium pondera reprehendit Aeschines quaedam et exagitat, illudensque dura, odiosa, intolerabilia esse dicit. Quinetiam quaerit ab ipso, quum quidem eum bellum appellet, utrum illa verba, an portenta sint: ut Aeschini ne Demosthenes quidem videatur Attice dicere*. Cic. Or. 26. Ad reprehensionem hanc belluae cuius est erubescere? Demosthenis, an potius Aeschinis?

§ 891. The counsel of §890 is satisfied partly already by confirmation itself, partly by the art of joining to our direct proof the subversion of the antithesis' premises, or of the form of proving, or of both, things taken from that very conclusion and drawn from the antithesis, drawn clearly or even splendidly, yet finally and almost unexpectedly placing before the eyes of the analogue of reason the great falsity and incongruity of the same thing, §§853, 884. Cicero, *De inventione* I.63: *Every argumentation is reprehended if either one or more of the things taken is not granted*, by denying the premises, or, *if these are granted, it is denied that the conclusion is made from them; or if the very kind of argumentation is shown to be faulty*, by denying the form, whether a certain form or a legitimate form altogether, or *if another equally firm or firmer argumentation is set against a firm argumentation*.

§ 892. In the same reprehension several members of the disjunction set down by Cicero can be tried one after another, §891, provided that 2) contrary weapons are always prepared from the weapons of the adversary, which may seem to pour out more true light, so that the greater light of our weapons obscures theirs, Sect. XXXX. Equally firm weapons do not please as much as firmer ones, §891. To this belongs detecting prejudices hidden in the things to be reprehended, §870, breaking them together with other false premises by more evident instances, Sect. L, eluding by comparisons the paralogisms of those to be reprehended, whose evident premises nevertheless openly give a false conclusion, Sect. XXVIII, setting before the eyes illegitimate leaps and the impossibility of supplementing them, and so forth: to execute elegantly and according to the measures of the analogue of reason the things logicians teach, §844.

§ 893. Especially 3) arguments called *ad hominem* will usefully be employed by attacking the person you reprehend with his own weapons, since there is scarcely anyone who can persuade himself to follow as an author of truth a person contradicting himself; hence in this way at least the prejudice of authority is shaken, which could have fought for the patrons of the antithesis as at least aesthetically solid, §839. *It is the artist's part to find in the action of the adversary things that fight, or seem to fight, with themselves*, Quintilian, *Institutio* V.13; that whole chapter deserves to be read here. 4) In reprehending, be the more solicitous about a sufficiently dignified kind of thinking, §223, because the aesthetician, no more than the logician, can advise abstinence from all things that move the affections of the mind, §22, and because it is sometimes difficult to act vehemently and yet not angrily, §§722–725.

§ 894. I would wish the final counsel of dignity, §182, to be considered here also, as flowing from the very sources of elegant thinking, §866, and not only insofar as virtue and piety demand the same thing, §183. What not a few of the ancients permitted themselves in obscene matters, §184, almost more permitted themselves a similar license in reprehending, so that to attack the old, but bad, custom by reasons seems all the more necessary, since modern imitators of it can easily defend it with many examples, otherwise distinguished enough. Who does not know how hero reprehends hero in Homer? But how much more moral in this very respect is Virgil's *Aeneid*? *In this very man Demosthenes, Aeschines, carefully examining the weights of all the words, reprehends and attacks certain things, mocking them as harsh, hateful, intolerable. Indeed he asks him, since he even calls him a beast, whether those are words or monsters, so that not even Demosthenes seems to Aeschines to speak Attically*, Cicero, *Orator* 26. In this reprehension of the beast, whose part is it to blush? Demosthenes', or rather Aeschines'?

§ 895. Quanto rectius hic, qui nil molitur inique, Cassius contra Plancium et huius patronum, Ciceronem, cui tamen iam graviora atque magna videntur, quod *Ciceronis discessum, quem saepe deflerat Cassius, nunc quasi reprehendere et subaccusare voluit, dicens non Ciceroni auxilium, sed Ciceronem auxilio defuisse?* Cic. pro Plancio 86. Quis nescit eundem discessum non reprehendi, sed etiam exagitari potuisse duris, odiosis, quaeque Ciceroni visa essent intolerabilia, verbis illudendo tam facta, quam non facta, nisi belle, §. 893. praetulisset accusator Plancii submissum dicendi genus in illius patronum? §. 725. Utinam ipse Cicero in Pisonem, virum censorium, in ipsum Antonium, eleganti modestia vehementiam ubique temperasset. §. 722–724.

§ 896. Non iambos Archilochi, non hendecasyllabos Catulli, non Nasonis Ibin, aut alia, caeteroquin venusta, sed ob neglectum bene moratum cogitandi genus turpiter reprehendentium

Tincta Lycambaeo sanguine tela moror.

§. 893, 186. Si non itur, qua eundum est, nec eundum est gravitati aestheticae, qua itur §. 189. Nondum audeo praecipere generatim pulcre reprehensuris, ut abstineant omnino ab omnibus, quae personalia vel magis barbare personalitates dicunt, ab omnibus, quae singularem illum hominem, cui contradixeris, proxime tangunt, eiusque patriam, genus, ingenium, mores, vitam, adolescentiam, et si qua sunt alia, §. 752–757. fidenter tamen procul esse iubeo, si quis gratis litare voluerit, vel in adversariis ipsis rimari obiecta humillima et abiecta, §. 195. quoniam omnino non possunt exponi §. 224, 225. strictius morato cogitandi genere §. 227, vel absolute tantum tali. §. 228.

§ 897. Ne peccem ipse praestans, quod dissuadeo, non abiecta vel obtutu primo iuvat, exempla proferre. Sufficiat una Senecae apocolocyntosis in Claudium, qua Stolicus ille minus decantatam, forte tamen minus eluendam laudi virtutis suae maculam inussit, quam avaritia. Quis crederet? Philosophus, quantus Seneca videtur, exsul in Sardinia descenderat ad lacrimas et supplicationes in Polybium Claudii libertum profusus; in quibus sapientiae Claudii plus, quam satis est, adulatur, revocatus ab eodem Claudio, non tam malo, quam simplici, multisque beneficiis cumulatus, quantum ab eodem aliquid proficisci poterat, quod eius nomine fiebat, eundem imperatorem suum post eius mortem ore Neronis laudat propter sapientiam adeo, ut risum moverit audientibus, et idem sub tempus, urgente nulla ratione politica, tamen tam acerbe ridet, veneno extinctum, ut nec ab hoc sibi temperare ioco posset, quem nunquam sine indignatione legi: *Ultima vox eius haec inter homines audita est, quum maiorem sonitum emisisset illa parte, qua facilius loquebatur: Vae me! puto, concacavi me.* Paene pudet haec scripsisse post Senecam.

§ 898. Iniuriae verbales, quae vel simplicem honorem laedunt, turpissimae quidem in reprehensionibus sunt, quae maiestatem sublimium tueri debeant §. 317. turpiores in medio cogitandi genere, quod civilitatem et mores intensi iam honoris postulat, §. 278. neque tamen in ipso tenui cogitandi genere carent turpitudine, §. 262. Prius impetitus eiusmodi luto si fueris, nec a retorsionibus abstinere debeas aggressori, debes tibi, debes spectatoribus, et ipsi magnanimitati aestheticae. §. 189, 275. SS. XXIII–XXVI. Ad hunc lapidem Lydium argumentum ab invidia, consequentiarum synathroismos, immeritas vel immodicas irrationes examinemus, memores nationis et saeculi, §. 867. quorum huic ferenda quae videantur, illi tamen ἥθος omnino iam laedere iudicabuntur. §. 213, 212.

§ 895. How much more rightly here Cassius, who contrives nothing unfairly, against Plancius and his patron Cicero, to whom nevertheless these things already seem rather grave and great, because *Cassius wished now, as if to reprehend and subaccuse, Cicero's departure, which he had often lamented, saying that help was not lacking to Cicero, but Cicero to help*, Cicero, *Pro Plancio* 86. Who does not know that the same departure could not only have been reprehended but even attacked with harsh, hateful words, which would have seemed intolerable to Cicero, by mocking both things done and not done, unless, beautifully, §893, the accuser of Plancius had preferred a subdued kind of speaking against that man's patron? §725. Would that Cicero himself, against Piso, a man of censorial rank, and against Antony himself, had everywhere tempered vehemence with elegant modesty, §§722–724.

§ 896. Not the iambics of Archilochus, not the hendecasyllables of Catullus, not Ovid's *Ibis*, or other things otherwise graceful, but shamefully reprehending through neglect of a well-moralized kind of thinking: "I delay weapons stained with Lycambes' blood," §§893, 186. If one does not go where one must go, one must not go by the aesthetic gravity by which one goes, §189. I do not yet dare to prescribe generally to those who will reprehend beautifully that they abstain altogether from all things called personalia, or more barbarously personalities, from all things that most nearly touch the singular person whom you have contradicted, his country, family, genius, morals, life, youth, and whatever else there may be, §§752–757. Yet confidently I order them to stay far away, if one wishes to sacrifice to the Graces, from searching out the lowest and most abject objects even in adversaries themselves, §195, since they absolutely cannot be displayed, §§224, 225, by a more strictly moralized kind of thinking, §227, or by one only absolutely such, §228.

§ 897. Lest I myself commit what I dissuade by performing it, it is useful to bring forward examples that are not abject at first glance. Let one example suffice: Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* against Claudius, by which that Stoic branded upon the praise of his own virtue a stain less often recited, yet perhaps less washable, than avarice. Who would believe it? A philosopher, as great as Seneca seems, had descended as an exile in Sardinia to tears and supplications poured out to Polybius, Claudius' freedman; in these he flatters Claudius' wisdom more than enough; recalled by the same Claudius, not so much bad as simple, and heaped with many benefits, as much as anything could proceed from him which was done in his name, he praises the same emperor, after his death, by the mouth of Nero, so much for wisdom that he moved laughter in his hearers, and at the same time, with no political reason pressing, nevertheless laughs so bitterly at him, extinguished by poison, that he could not even temper himself from this joke, which I have never read without indignation: *This was his last utterance heard among human beings, when he had emitted a greater sound from that part by which he spoke more easily: Alas for me! I think I have shit myself*. I am almost ashamed to have written these things after Seneca.

§ 898. Verbal injuries, which wound even simple honor, are certainly most shameful in reprehensions that ought to guard the majesty of sublime things, §317; more shameful in the middle kind of thinking, which demands civility and the manners of already intensified honor, §278; and yet they do not lack shamefulness even in the plain kind of thinking itself, §262. If you have first been attacked with mud of this kind, you owe it not to the aggressor, but to yourself, to the spectators, and to aesthetic magnanimity itself, that you abstain from retorts, §§189, 275, Sects. XXIII–XXVI. Let us examine by this touchstone the argument from envy, gatherings of consequences, and undeserved or immoderate mockeries, mindful of nation and century, §867; things that seem bearable to one nation and age will nevertheless be judged altogether to wound ἥθος in another, §§213, 212.

§ 899. Et bonis moribus facilius obedies, et inanem operam insumere saepius super-sedeabis, si tibi dictum putes 5) neutiquam reprehendenda tibi esse omnia, quae contra tuas sententias, vel dicta sint, vel dici possint, sed ea tantum, quae suspicaris obiecto tuo personali primario verisimilia, nisi reprehendas, quaeque speraveris post reprehensionem tuam ab eodem in aesthetice falsis habenda; §. 887. Par ratio responsionum ad reprehensiones aliorum in nos nostraque directarum; §. 886, 898. *Quemadmodum illud stultissime praecipitur, quod defendi non possit, silentio dissimulandum, siquidem est id, de quo iudex pronunciaturus est: ita alii, diligentia lapsi, verbis etiam, vel sententiosis omnibus respondendum putant, quae contra dici posse autumant, quod est et infinitum et supervacuum* §. 171. *Sit, cui respondeas. Cave vitium nimium solliciti, et circa omnia momenta luctantis.* Quint. inst. V. XIII. Quot scriptis galeatus ille prologus aptari potuisset minus eleganter, quem belle praemisit Cicero l. I. de finibus bonorum et malorum?

SECTIO LIII

ARGUMENTA PERSUASORIA

§ 900. ARGUMENTA, quorum (vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime considerata) vis est sensitivam datae perceptioni certitudinem conciliare, sunt PERSUASORIA §. 829. Ergo omnia argumenta, omnes figurae vivide probantes, S. XXXIII. verisimilitudinemque pulcram illustrantes, Sect. XXXIII. erunt persuasoriae, §. 26. Habes ansam intendendi tuorum argumentorum efficaciam eleganter, §. 142. si probantia potissimum illustres, et pingentia veritati consecres aestheticae, quoniam tunc illa non probabunt solum, haec non splendorem solum afferent, sed utraque simul persuadebunt. §. 143. Sic pleonasmus apparens, cuius otiose positum ad dandam alterius hypothesin et determinationem, vel omnino medium terminum, negotiosum est, confirmabit, §. 145, 855. e. g. *Hisce meis oculis vidi*, contra id:

Vidimus? an qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt?

§ 901. Pari artificio, quae videantur synonymiae, vel exergasiae, coniungi possunt, tanquam aequipollentes, quarum tamen acutior lector vel auditor, unam videat rationem, in elegantibus, sufficientem alterius, §. 900, 146. Confirmaturus, §. 878–885. satisfactorius et reprehendens §. 899. memor, probantia quaedam vel refellentia in umbras coniecturus, venuste nonnunquam recurret ad praeteritionem, §. 148. Nec poenitet huc INTERROGATIONEM retulisse, §. 332. seu crypticam declarationem nos optare, ut aliquis conscientiam suam de veritate alicuius rei dicat, vel cogitet. Prudens enim si caveris modo, ne interroges, ubi personale tuum obiectum primum vel haesurum, vel omnino dissensurum, praevideri poterat, sine ulteriori addita persuasionem: una apta interrogatione multum obtinebis, ut auditor e. c. ipse sibi tradat, et in mentem denuo revocet, quicquid rationum de re, quam afferis, iam noverat, et simul tibi concilietur non raro, quem suae iam scientiae non parum confidere non invitus animadvertit, §. 840. aliquando sensibilibus moveatur, quem invites intra se descendere sensus animi scrutaturum intimos, et ea certa sibi iam dudum deprehendere, quae nunc bona vel mala dicuntur. §. 142.

§ 899. You will both obey good morals more easily and more often refrain from spending empty labor if you think this said to you, 5) that you are by no means to reprehend all things that have been said, or can be said, against your opinions, but only those things that you suspect will be verisimilar to your primary personal object if you do not reprehend them, and which you hope, after your reprehension, will be held by the same object among aesthetically false things, §887. The same ratio applies to responses to the reprehensions of others directed against us and our things, §§886, 898. *Just as that is very foolishly prescribed, that what cannot be defended should be concealed in silence, if indeed it is something about which the judge is going to pronounce, so others, through slipped diligence, think one must answer all words and even little sentences that they suppose can be said against them, which is both infinite and superfluous*, §171. *Let there be something to which you respond. Beware the vice of one too anxious and wrestling around every detail*, Quintilian, *Institutio* V.13. To how many writings could that helmeted prologue have been less elegantly fitted which Cicero beautifully placed before book I of *On the Ends of Goods and Evils*?

SECTION LIII

PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS

§ 900. ARGUMENTS whose force, whether sole, stronger, or now especially to be considered, is to reconcile sensory certitude to a given perception, are PERSUASIVE, §829. Therefore all arguments, all figures vividly proving, Sect. XXXIII, and illustrating beautiful verisimilitude, Sect. XXXIII, will be persuasive, §26. You have an opportunity to intensify the efficacy of your arguments elegantly, §142, if you especially illustrate the proving arguments and consecrate the painting arguments to aesthetic truth, since then the former will not only prove, and the latter not only bring splendor, but both will also persuade, §143. Thus an apparent pleonasm, whose thing placed idly for giving another's hypothesis and determination, or altogether a middle term, is busy, will confirm, §§145, 855; for example, *I saw it with these very eyes of mine*, against this: "Did we see? Or do those who love fashion dreams for themselves?"

§ 901. By a similar art, things that seem to be synonymies or exergasiae can be joined as equivalent, while nevertheless a sharper reader or hearer sees one reason, in elegant things, sufficient for the other, §§900, 146. One who will confirm, §§878–885, satisfy, and reprehend, §899, mindful that he will cast certain proving or refuting things into shadows, will sometimes gracefully recur to praeterition, §148. Nor do I regret having referred INTERROGATION here, §332, or the cryptic declaration that we desire someone to say or think his consciousness of the truth of some matter. For if you prudently take care not to interrogate where your primary personal object could be foreseen to stick fast or altogether dissent, without further persuasion added, by one apt interrogation you will obtain much: that the hearer, for example, gives himself and recalls again to mind whatever reasons about the matter you bring forward he had already known; and at the same time he will not rarely be reconciled to you, since he notices not unwillingly that you trust his knowledge not a little, §840; sometimes he is moved more sensibly, when you invite him to descend within himself to search the inmost senses of the mind and to find there, already long ago certain to him, the things that are now called good or evil, §142.

§ 902. Repetitio; cum multis suis speciebus heic etiam repetatur, vel ob id ipsum, quod non solum persuadet, §. 333. sed tamen magnam persuadendi vim habet, non inepta quaevis, et tautologica, sed aetiologiarum praecipuarum in rotundam aliquam brevitatem contractarum. §. 545. Omnis enim aetiologia vivide cogitata quum sit argumentum persuasorium, §. 839. illarum eam, sine qua non posse videatur absolvi persuasio posse, dicamus cum veteribus RATIONEM per eminentiam, et aetiologiarum rationumve potissimam, FIRMAMENTUM, cf. Cicero de Inv. I. 18, 19. Rationem et firmamentum vel iisdem, vel paullulum inflexis cogitandi modis breviter, sed iterato cogitandam sistere, vel hoc habet efficaciae ad persuadendum, ut firmius haereat animis obiecti tui personalis, cui potissimum argumento confidis. §. 342–345. Non sine persuadendi lenocinio pervigilium Veneris toties repetit:

Nunc amet, qui nunquam amavit. Quique amavit, nunc amet.

§ 903. In his argumentis commendetur probationum climax et ea gradatio, §. 334. qua totum certissima sua parte certius esse redditum, non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinatum videatur, §. 250, 879. Cauturus vel umbram anticlimacis in probando, ne facile persuadearis eorum consiliis, qui debilius argumentum fortioribus interferere suadent, quod praemittere non audeas. §. 879. An unquam venustus a certioribus in incertiora decursus, nisi forsitan in iocis pyrrhonicis? In hyperbolis confirmantium e. g. *sole meridiano clarius est*, et reprehendentium e. g. *contra solem loquutos* praeferantur crypticae, quae sic limites certitudinis improbabilitatisque assignandae transgrediantur, ut id ipsum factum esse vix ac ne vix quidem appareat. §. 339.

§ 904. Non nego Quintiliani regulam §. 903. *Fiduciam orator* (pulcre persuasurus omnis) *prae se ferat, semperque ita dicat* (significanda cogitet) *tanquam de casu optime cogitet* (de persuadendis suis obiectis personalibus probe persuasus). Inst. V. 13. Moneo tantum, ne nimiae certitudinis ostentator de fide periclitetur. Hinc agnosco casus, in quibus belle ad confirmandum reprehendendumve possit adhiberi DUBITATIO, narratio vel simulatio status animi, cui rationes pro quadam sententia pugnantes et contra eandem connumeranti censentur aequales, praesertim si venuste transeas ab hac ad bellam evidentiae parrhesiam. §. 349. S. L.

§ 902. Repetition, with its many species, should also be repeated here, if only because it not only persuades, §333, but nevertheless has great force for persuading; not any inept and tautological repetition, but repetition of principal aetiologies contracted into some rounded brevity, §545. For since every vividly thought aetiology is a persuasive argument, §839, let us call that one of them without which persuasion seems unable to be completed, with the ancients, REASON by eminence, and the most powerful of aetiologies or reasons, FIRMAMENT; compare Cicero, *De inventione* I.18–19. To present the reason and firmament briefly, but repeatedly, either in the same modes of thinking or in slightly inflected ones, has this much efficacy for persuading: that the argument in which you chiefly trust sticks more firmly in the minds of your personal object, §§342–345. Not without persuasive charm does the *Pervigilium Veneris* repeat so often: “Let him love now who has never loved; and let him who has loved, love now.”

§ 903. In these arguments let the climax of proofs and that gradation be commended, §334, by which the whole seems to have been rendered more certain by its most certain part, examined not by a goldsmith’s balance but by a certain popular scale, §§250, 879. About to beware even the shadow of anticlimax in proving, do not easily be persuaded by the counsels of those who advise inserting a weaker argument among stronger ones because you do not dare put it first, §879. Has there ever been a graceful descent from more certain things into less certain ones, unless perhaps in Pyrrhonian jokes? In the hyperboles of confirmers, for example *it is clearer than the midday sun*, and of reproachers, for example *they spoke against the sun*, cryptic ones should be preferred, which so transgress the limits of certitude and improbability to be assigned that this very fact scarcely, and not even scarcely, appears to have happened, §339.

§ 904. I do not deny Quintilian’s rule, §903: *Let the orator* and every person who will persuade beautifully *display confidence, and always speak* or think the things to be signified *as if he thinks best of the case*, being well persuaded concerning his personal objects to be persuaded, *Institutio* V.13. I only warn that the exhibitor of too much certitude should not endanger his credibility. Hence I recognize cases in which DUBITATION can beautifully be used for confirming or reproaching: the narration or simulation of a state of mind in which the reasons fighting for a certain opinion and those counted against it are judged equal, especially if you gracefully pass from this to the beautiful parrhesia of evidence, §349, Sect. L.

