§ 426
Communis est logicis aestheticisque meditationibus, quam Cicero off. II. 18. paene genetice describit, virtus, quae vertitur
Common to logical and aesthetic meditations is that virtue which Cicero, De officiis II.18, describes almost genetically: the virtue that is engaged
in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique (convenientiam cum principio contradictionis), quid consequens, (convenientiam cum principio rationati, M. § 23.). ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei sit caussa,
"the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes"
(convenientiam cum principiis rationis, M. § 20. et rationis sufficientis, M. § 22.) Verum quando nituntur illae distinctam et intellectualem ad harum rerum perspicentiam, hae subsistentes intra suum horizontem, easdem sensibus et analogo rationis eleganter intueri satagunt. § 424.
The three elements correspond, respectively, to agreement with the principle of contradiction; the principle of the rationatum, M. § 23; and the principles of reason, M. § 20, and sufficient reason, M. § 22. But whereas the former strive toward distinct and intellectual insight into these things, the latter, remaining within their own horizon, strive to intuit the same things elegantly through the senses and the analogue of reason. § 424.
Communis est logicis aestheticisque meditationibus, quam Cicero off. II. 18. paene genetice describit, virtus, quae vertitur
Common to logical and aesthetic meditations is that virtue which Cicero, De officiis II.18, describes almost genetically: the virtue that is engaged
in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique (convenientiam cum principio contradictionis), quid consequens, (convenientiam cum principio rationati, M. § 23.). ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei sit caussa,
"the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes"
(convenientiam cum principiis rationis, M. § 20. et rationis sufficientis, M. § 22.) Verum quando nituntur illae distinctam et intellectualem ad harum rerum perspicentiam, hae subsistentes intra suum horizontem, easdem sensibus et analogo rationis eleganter intueri satagunt. § 424.
The three elements correspond, respectively, to agreement with the principle of contradiction; the principle of the rationatum, M. § 23; and the principles of reason, M. § 20, and sufficient reason, M. § 22. But whereas the former strive toward distinct and intellectual insight into these things, the latter, remaining within their own horizon, strive to intuit the same things elegantly through the senses and the analogue of reason. § 424.
Communis est logicis aestheticisque meditationibus, quam Cicero off.
Common to logical and aesthetic meditations is that virtue which Cicero, De
II. 18. paene genetice describit, virtus, quae vertitur
officiis II.18, describes almost genetically: the virtue that is engaged
in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique (convenientiam cum principio contradictionis), quid consequens, (convenientiam cum principio rationati, M. § 23.). ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei sit caussa,
"the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes"
(convenientiam cum principiis
The three elements correspond, respectively, to agreement with the principle of contradiction;
rationis, M. § 20.
the principle of the rationatum, M. § 23; and the principles of reason, M. § 20,
et rationis sufficientis, M. § 22.)
and sufficient reason, M. § 22.
Verum quando nituntur illae distinctam et intellectualem
But whereas the former strive toward distinct and intellectual
ad harum rerum perspicentiam, hae subsistentes intra suum horizontem,
insight into these things, the latter, remaining within their own horizon,
easdem
strive to intuit the same things elegantly through the
sensibus et analogo rationis eleganter intueri satagunt. § 424.
senses and the analogue of reason. § 424.
Communis est logicis aestheticisque meditationibus, quam Cicero off. II. 18. paene genetice describit, virtus, quae vertitur / Common to logical and aesthetic meditations is that virtue which Cicero, De officiis II.18, describes almost genetically: the virtue that is engaged
in perspiciendo, quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique (convenientiam cum principio contradictionis), quid consequens, (convenientiam cum principio rationati, M. § 23.). ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei sit caussa,
"the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes"
(convenientiam cum principiis rationis, M. § 20. et rationis sufficientis, M. § 22.) Verum quando nituntur illae distinctam et intellectualem ad harum rerum perspicentiam, hae subsistentes intra suum horizontem, easdem sensibus et analogo rationis eleganter intueri satagunt. § 424. / The three elements correspond, respectively, to agreement with the principle of contradiction; the principle of the rationatum, M. § 23; and the principles of reason, M. § 20, and sufficient reason, M. § 22. But whereas the former strive toward distinct and intellectual insight into these things, the latter, remaining within their own horizon, strive to intuit the same things elegantly through the senses and the analogue of reason. § 424.
§ 427
Si Veritatem mentalem et subiectivam, veritatem repraesentationum omnem, quae huc usque logica tantum dicta est, dicamus Aestheticologicam: non ea distinguentium est sententia, ac si 1) aesthetice vera quaedam, immo multa, non essent simul logice vera, quod lubenter concedimus. In ea Naturae alloquutione ad mori detrectantem; quam Lucretius fingit: III. 940–957. cuique vere satis subiicit:
If we call mental and subjective truth, every truth of representations, which up to this point has been called only logical, Aestheticological: this is not the opinion of those making the distinction, as if 1) certain things aesthetically true, indeed many things, were not at the same time logically true; this we gladly concede. In that address of Nature to one refusing to die, which Lucretius imagines, III.940–957, and to which he quite truly adds:
Quid respondeamus, nisi iustam intendere litem
Naturam, et veram verbis exponere caussam?
"What were our answer, but that Nature here
Urges just suit and in her words lays down
True cause of action?"
sunt omnia fere simul logice vera, M. § 265. E. § 252.
nearly everything is at the same time logically true, M. § 265, E. § 252.
Si Veritatem mentalem et subiectivam, veritatem repraesentationum omnem, quae huc usque logica tantum dicta est, dicamus Aestheticologicam: non ea distinguentium est sententia, ac si 1) aesthetice vera quaedam, immo multa, non essent simul logice vera, quod lubenter concedimus.
If we call mental and subjective truth, every truth of representations, which up to this point has been called only logical, Aestheticological: this is not the opinion of those making the distinction, as if 1) certain things aesthetically true, indeed many things, were not at the same time logically true; this we gladly concede.
In ea Naturae alloquutione ad mori detrectantem; quam Lucretius fingit: III. 940–957. cuique vere satis subiicit:
In that address of Nature to one refusing to die, which Lucretius imagines, III.940–957, and to which he quite truly adds:
Quid respondeamus, nisi iustam intendere litem
Naturam, et veram verbis exponere caussam?
"What were our answer, but that Nature here
Urges just suit and in her words lays down
True cause of action?"
sunt omnia fere simul logice vera, M. § 265. E. § 252.
nearly everything is at the same time logically true, M. § 265, E. § 252.
Si Veritatem mentalem et subiectivam,
If we call mental and subjective truth,
veritatem repraesentationum omnem, quae huc usque
every truth of representations, which up to this point
logica tantum dicta est, dicamus Aestheticologicam:
has been called only logical, Aestheticological: this is
non ea distinguentium
not the opinion of those making the distinction,
est sententia, ac si 1) aesthetice vera
as if 1) certain things aesthetically true,
quaedam, immo multa, non essent simul logice vera,
indeed many things, were not at the same time logically true;
quod lubenter concedimus.
this we gladly concede.
In ea Naturae alloquutione ad mori detrectantem;
In that address of Nature to one refusing to
quam Lucretius fingit: III. 940–957.
die, which Lucretius imagines, III.940–957,
cuique vere satis subiicit:
and to which he quite truly adds:
Quid respondeamus, nisi iustam intendere litem
Naturam, et veram verbis exponere caussam?
"What were our answer, but that Nature here
Urges just suit and in her words lays down
True cause of action?"
sunt omnia fere simul logice vera, M.
nearly everything is at the same time logically true, M.
§ 265. E. § 252.
§ 265, E. § 252.
Si Veritatem mentalem et subiectivam, veritatem repraesentationum omnem, quae huc usque logica tantum dicta est, dicamus Aestheticologicam: non ea distinguentium est sententia, ac si 1) aesthetice vera quaedam, immo multa, non essent simul logice vera, quod lubenter concedimus. / If we call mental and subjective truth, every truth of representations, which up to this point has been called only logical, Aestheticological: this is not the opinion of those making the distinction, as if 1) certain things aesthetically true, indeed many things, were not at the same time logically true; this we gladly concede.
In ea Naturae alloquutione ad mori detrectantem; quam Lucretius fingit: III. 940–957. cuique vere satis subiicit: / In that address of Nature to one refusing to die, which Lucretius imagines, III.940–957, and to which he quite truly adds:
Quid respondeamus, nisi iustam intendere litem
Naturam, et veram verbis exponere caussam?
"What were our answer, but that Nature here
Urges just suit and in her words lays down
True cause of action?"
sunt omnia fere simul logice vera, M. § 265. E. § 252. / nearly everything is at the same time logically true, M. § 265, E. § 252.
§ 428
Neque negamus, neque nescimus, 2) veritatem aestheticam in pulcre pingendis partibus saepe dare veritatem totius logicam, et vix aliter fieri posse, si partium absolvatur et ad finem perducatur enumeratio. Hoc unum observamus, veritatem ab aesthetico, quatenus intellectualis est, non directo intendi, si per indirectum ex veritatibus aestheticis pluribus una prodeat, aut cum aesthetice vero coincidat, de illo sibi gratulari aestheticum rationalem, § 38. neque tamen illud esse, quod nunc potissimum quaerebatur; § 423.
Nor do we deny, nor are we ignorant, that 2) aesthetic truth, in beautifully painting the parts, often gives the logical truth of the whole, and that it can scarcely happen otherwise if the enumeration of the parts is completed and carried through to its end. We observe only this: truth, insofar as it is intellectual, is not directly aimed at by the aesthetician; if indirectly one truth comes forth from several aesthetic truths, or coincides with what is aesthetically true, the rational aesthetician may congratulate himself on that, § 38, and yet that is not what was chiefly being sought here, § 423.
Neque negamus, neque nescimus, 2) veritatem aestheticam in pulcre pingendis partibus saepe dare veritatem totius logicam, et vix aliter fieri posse, si partium absolvatur et ad finem perducatur enumeratio.
Nor do we deny, nor are we ignorant, that 2) aesthetic truth, in beautifully painting the parts, often gives the logical truth of the whole, and that it can scarcely happen otherwise if the enumeration of the parts is completed and carried through to its end.
Hoc unum observamus, veritatem ab aesthetico, quatenus intellectualis est, non directo intendi, si per indirectum ex veritatibus aestheticis pluribus una prodeat, aut cum aesthetice vero coincidat, de illo sibi gratulari aestheticum rationalem, § 38. neque tamen illud esse, quod nunc potissimum quaerebatur; § 423.
We observe only this: truth, insofar as it is intellectual, is not directly aimed at by the aesthetician; if indirectly one truth comes forth from several aesthetic truths, or coincides with what is aesthetically true, the rational aesthetician may congratulate himself on that, § 38, and yet that is not what was chiefly being sought here, § 423.
Neque negamus, neque nescimus,
Nor do we deny, nor are we ignorant,
2) veritatem aestheticam in pulcre pingendis partibus
that 2) aesthetic truth, in beautifully painting the parts,
saepe dare veritatem totius logicam,
often gives the logical truth of the whole,
et vix aliter fieri posse, si
and that it can scarcely happen otherwise if
partium absolvatur et
the enumeration of the parts is completed and carried
ad finem perducatur enumeratio.
through to its end.
Hoc unum observamus, veritatem ab aesthetico, quatenus intellectualis
We observe only this: truth, insofar as it is intellectual,
est, non directo intendi, si per
is not directly aimed at by the aesthetician;
indirectum ex veritatibus aestheticis pluribus una
if indirectly one truth comes forth from several aesthetic truths,
prodeat, aut cum aesthetice vero coincidat,
or coincides with what is aesthetically true, the
de illo sibi gratulari aestheticum rationalem, § 38.
rational aesthetician may congratulate himself on that, § 38,
neque tamen illud esse, quod nunc potissimum quaerebatur; § 423.
and yet that is not what was chiefly being sought here, § 423.
Neque negamus, neque nescimus, 2) veritatem aestheticam in pulcre pingendis partibus saepe dare veritatem totius logicam, et vix aliter fieri posse, si partium absolvatur et ad finem perducatur enumeratio. / Nor do we deny, nor are we ignorant, that 2) aesthetic truth, in beautifully painting the parts, often gives the logical truth of the whole, and that it can scarcely happen otherwise if the enumeration of the parts is completed and carried through to its end.
Hoc unum observamus, veritatem ab aesthetico, quatenus intellectualis est, non directo intendi, si per indirectum ex veritatibus aestheticis pluribus una prodeat, aut cum aesthetice vero coincidat, de illo sibi gratulari aestheticum rationalem, § 38. neque tamen illud esse, quod nunc potissimum quaerebatur; § 423. / We observe only this: truth, insofar as it is intellectual, is not directly aimed at by the aesthetician; if indirectly one truth comes forth from several aesthetic truths, or coincides with what is aesthetically true, the rational aesthetician may congratulate himself on that, § 38, and yet that is not what was chiefly being sought here, § 423.
§ 429
Si qua vero sit veritas logica, strictius dicta scilicet, § 424. non nisi per intellectum cogitanda; vel illi subiecto, quod pulcre cogitaturum supponitur, vel iis obiectis personalibus, quorum gratia potissimum cogitas, et utrumque denuo, vel semper, vel certis nunc sane rebus circumstantibus: est ea supra horizontem aestheticum constituta, et recte, saltim praesens in tempus, omittitur. § 15, 121. Eclipsin annularem anni praeterlapsi cogita tecum astronomus, non physicus solum, sed et mathematicus, aut cum astronomis, eandem autem cogita pastor, vel sodalibus, vel tuae Neaerae: ohe! quot vera cogitasti prius, nunc omnino praetermittenda!
But if there is some logical truth, namely truth more strictly so called, § 424, to be thought only through the intellect; either for that subject who is supposed to be about to think beautifully, or for those personal objects for whose sake you chiefly think, and each again either always or certainly now under definite present circumstances: it is placed above the aesthetic horizon, and rightly, at least for the present time, is omitted. §§ 15, 121. Think with yourself about the annular eclipse of last year as an astronomer, not only as a physicist but also as a mathematician, or with astronomers; but think of the same thing as a shepherd, or with companions, or with your Neaera: ah! how many true things you had thought before must now be passed over entirely!
Si qua vero sit veritas logica, strictius dicta scilicet, § 424. non nisi per intellectum cogitanda; vel illi subiecto, quod pulcre cogitaturum supponitur, vel iis obiectis personalibus, quorum gratia potissimum cogitas, et utrumque denuo, vel semper, vel certis nunc sane rebus circumstantibus: est ea supra horizontem aestheticum constituta, et recte, saltim praesens in tempus, omittitur. § 15, 121. Eclipsin annularem anni praeterlapsi cogita tecum astronomus, non physicus solum, sed et mathematicus, aut cum astronomis, eandem autem cogita pastor, vel sodalibus, vel tuae Neaerae: ohe! quot vera cogitasti prius, nunc omnino praetermittenda!
But if there is some logical truth, namely truth more strictly so called, § 424, to be thought only through the intellect; either for that subject who is supposed to be about to think beautifully, or for those personal objects for whose sake you chiefly think, and each again either always or certainly now under definite present circumstances: it is placed above the aesthetic horizon, and rightly, at least for the present time, is omitted. §§ 15, 121. Think with yourself about the annular eclipse of last year as an astronomer, not only as a physicist but also as a mathematician, or with astronomers; but think of the same thing as a shepherd, or with companions, or with your Neaera: ah! how many true things you had thought before must now be passed over entirely!
Si qua vero sit veritas logica,
But if there is some logical truth,
strictius dicta scilicet, § 424.
namely truth more strictly so called, § 424,
non nisi per intellectum cogitanda;
to be thought only through the intellect; either
vel illi subiecto, quod pulcre
for that subject who is supposed to be about to think beautifully,
cogitaturum supponitur, vel iis obiectis personalibus, quorum gratia potissimum cogitas,
or for those personal objects for whose sake you chiefly think,
et utrumque denuo, vel semper, vel certis nunc sane rebus circumstantibus:
and each again either always or certainly now under definite present circumstances:
est ea supra horizontem aestheticum constituta, et
it is placed above the aesthetic horizon, and rightly,
recte, saltim praesens in tempus, omittitur.
at least for the present time, is omitted.
§ 15, 121. Eclipsin
§§ 15, 121. Think with yourself about the annular eclipse
annularem anni praeterlapsi cogita tecum astronomus,
of last year as an astronomer,
non physicus solum, sed et mathematicus,
not only as a physicist but also as a mathematician,
aut cum astronomis, eandem autem
or with astronomers; but think of the same thing as a shepherd,
cogita pastor, vel sodalibus, vel tuae Neaerae: ohe!
or with companions, or with your Neaera: ah! how
quot vera cogitasti prius,
many true things you had thought before must
nunc omnino praetermittenda!
now be passed over entirely!
Si qua vero sit veritas logica, strictius dicta scilicet, § 424. non nisi per intellectum cogitanda; vel illi subiecto, quod pulcre cogitaturum supponitur, vel iis obiectis personalibus, quorum gratia potissimum cogitas, et utrumque denuo, vel semper, vel certis nunc sane rebus circumstantibus: est ea supra horizontem aestheticum constituta, et recte, saltim praesens in tempus, omittitur. § 15, 121. Eclipsin annularem anni praeterlapsi cogita tecum astronomus, non physicus solum, sed et mathematicus, aut cum astronomis, eandem autem cogita pastor, vel sodalibus, vel tuae Neaerae: ohe! quot vera cogitasti prius, nunc omnino praetermittenda! / But if there is some logical truth, namely truth more strictly so called, § 424, to be thought only through the intellect; either for that subject who is supposed to be about to think beautifully, or for those personal objects for whose sake you chiefly think, and each again either always or certainly now under definite present circumstances: it is placed above the aesthetic horizon, and rightly, at least for the present time, is omitted. §§ 15, 121. Think with yourself about the annular eclipse of last year as an astronomer, not only as a physicist but also as a mathematician, or with astronomers; but think of the same thing as a shepherd, or with companions, or with your Neaera: ah! how many true things you had thought before must now be passed over entirely!
§ 430
Sunt veritates quaedam adeo parvae, ut eas sectari vel commemorare sit infra horizontem aestheticum, saltim infra pulcram magnitudinem, nunc absolutam omnino, nunc relativam certe. § 120, 178. Has veritates infinite parvas non curat aestheticus. § 191, 221. Nec historico quidem severam hanc sine exceptione legem scriptam putat:
There are certain truths so small that to pursue or commemorate them is below the aesthetic horizon, at least below beautiful magnitude, now altogether absolutely, now certainly relatively. §§ 120, 178. The aesthetician does not care for these infinitely small truths. §§ 191, 221. Nor even for the historian does he think this strict law has been written without exception:
Ne quid veri non dicat,
"and the next, that he must be bold enough to tell the whole truth?"
ipse legens Aen. VI.
he himself reading Aeneid VI:
Iuvenum manus emicat ardens
Littus in Hesperium. –
At pius Aeneas arces, quibus altus Apollo
Praesidet, horrendaeque simul secreta Sibyllae,
Antrum immane, petit.
"Impetuously
The eager warriors leap forth to land
Upon Hesperian soil. [...]
Aeneas, servant of the gods, ascends
The templed hill where lofty Phoebus reigns,
And that far-off, inviolable shrine
Of dread Sibylla, in stupendous cave,"
nec curat, nec cogitat, quo pede primum Aeneas Italiam tetigerit, et verissimum interim est, aut sinistro, aut dextro, nisi utroque, quod minus decorum.
Nor does he care or think about with which foot Aeneas first touched Italy, while meanwhile it is most true that it was either the left or the right, unless both, which is less decorous.
Sunt veritates quaedam adeo parvae, ut eas sectari vel commemorare sit infra horizontem aestheticum, saltim infra pulcram magnitudinem, nunc absolutam omnino, nunc relativam certe. § 120, 178. Has veritates infinite parvas non curat aestheticus. § 191, 221. Nec historico quidem severam hanc sine exceptione legem scriptam putat:
There are certain truths so small that to pursue or commemorate them is below the aesthetic horizon, at least below beautiful magnitude, now altogether absolutely, now certainly relatively. §§ 120, 178. The aesthetician does not care for these infinitely small truths. §§ 191, 221. Nor even for the historian does he think this strict law has been written without exception:
Ne quid veri non dicat,
"and the next, that he must be bold enough to tell the whole truth?"
ipse legens Aen. VI.
he himself reading Aeneid VI:
Iuvenum manus emicat ardens
Littus in Hesperium. –
At pius Aeneas arces, quibus altus Apollo
Praesidet, horrendaeque simul secreta Sibyllae,
Antrum immane, petit.
"Impetuously
The eager warriors leap forth to land
Upon Hesperian soil. [...]
Aeneas, servant of the gods, ascends
The templed hill where lofty Phoebus reigns,
And that far-off, inviolable shrine
Of dread Sibylla, in stupendous cave,"
nec curat, nec cogitat, quo pede primum Aeneas Italiam tetigerit, et verissimum interim est, aut sinistro, aut dextro, nisi utroque, quod minus decorum.
Nor does he care or think about with which foot Aeneas first touched Italy, while meanwhile it is most true that it was either the left or the right, unless both, which is less decorous.
Sunt veritates quaedam adeo parvae,
There are certain truths so small
ut eas sectari vel commemorare sit infra horizontem
that to pursue or commemorate them is below the aesthetic horizon,
aestheticum, saltim infra pulcram magnitudinem, nunc absolutam omnino, nunc relativam
at least below beautiful magnitude, now altogether absolutely, now certainly relatively.
certe. § 120, 178. Has veritates infinite parvas non
§§ 120, 178. The aesthetician does not care
curat aestheticus. § 191, 221.
for these infinitely small truths. §§ 191, 221.
Nec historico quidem severam hanc
Nor even for the historian does he think this
sine exceptione legem scriptam putat:
strict law has been written without exception:
Ne quid veri non dicat,
"and the next, that he must be bold enough to tell the whole truth?"
ipse legens Aen. VI.
he himself reading Aeneid VI:
Iuvenum manus emicat ardens
Littus in Hesperium. –
At pius Aeneas arces, quibus altus Apollo
Praesidet, horrendaeque simul secreta Sibyllae,
Antrum immane, petit.
"Impetuously
The eager warriors leap forth to land
Upon Hesperian soil. [...]
Aeneas, servant of the gods, ascends
The templed hill where lofty Phoebus reigns,
And that far-off, inviolable shrine
Of dread Sibylla, in stupendous cave,"
nec curat, nec cogitat,
Nor does he care or think
quo pede primum Aeneas Italiam tetigerit,
about with which foot Aeneas first touched Italy, while
et verissimum interim est, aut sinistro,
meanwhile it is most true that it was either
aut dextro, nisi utroque, quod minus decorum.
the left or the right, unless both, which is less decorous.
Sunt veritates quaedam adeo parvae, ut eas sectari vel commemorare sit infra horizontem aestheticum, saltim infra pulcram magnitudinem, nunc absolutam omnino, nunc relativam certe. § 120, 178. Has veritates infinite parvas non curat aestheticus. § 191, 221. Nec historico quidem severam hanc sine exceptione legem scriptam putat: / There are certain truths so small that to pursue or commemorate them is below the aesthetic horizon, at least below beautiful magnitude, now altogether absolutely, now certainly relatively. §§ 120, 178. The aesthetician does not care for these infinitely small truths. §§ 191, 221. Nor even for the historian does he think this strict law has been written without exception:
Ne quid veri non dicat,
"and the next, that he must be bold enough to tell the whole truth?"
ipse legens Aen. VI. / he himself reading Aeneid VI:
Iuvenum manus emicat ardens
Littus in Hesperium. –
At pius Aeneas arces, quibus altus Apollo
Praesidet, horrendaeque simul secreta Sibyllae,
Antrum immane, petit.
"Impetuously
The eager warriors leap forth to land
Upon Hesperian soil. [...]
Aeneas, servant of the gods, ascends
The templed hill where lofty Phoebus reigns,
And that far-off, inviolable shrine
Of dread Sibylla, in stupendous cave,"
nec curat, nec cogitat, quo pede primum Aeneas Italiam tetigerit, et verissimum interim est, aut sinistro, aut dextro, nisi utroque, quod minus decorum. / Nor does he care or think about with which foot Aeneas first touched Italy, while meanwhile it is most true that it was either the left or the right, unless both, which is less decorous.
§ 431
Veritas aesthetica postulat obiectorum eleganter cogitandorum 1. possibilitatem, § 426. 1) absolutam, M. §§ 15, 90. quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est. § 423. i. e. ne in obiecto, dum illud vel in se spectare placet, iam aliquid notarum sibi invicem contradicentium, vel a sensibus et analogo rationis, observetur. M. § 8. Quaedam peccatorum inaequalitas habet hanc possibilitatem, et hinc etiam aesthetice vera est. M. § 272. E contrario
Aesthetic truth demands, for objects to be thought elegantly, 1. possibility, § 426; 1) absolute possibility, M. §§ 15, 90, insofar as it is to be known sensitively, § 423; that is, lest in the object, when one chooses to view it even in itself, something of marks contradicting one another already be observed by the senses and the analogue of reason. M. § 8. A certain inequality of sins has this possibility, and hence is also aesthetically true. M. § 272. On the contrary:
Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant,
Quum ventum ad verum est. Sensus moresque repugnant,
Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi,
"They who are pleased [to rank all] faults nearly on an equality, are troubled when they come to the truth of the matter: sense and morality are against them, and utility itself, the mother almost of right and of equity."
Hor. Serm. I. 3.
Horace, Sermones I.3.
Veritas aesthetica postulat obiectorum eleganter cogitandorum 1. possibilitatem, § 426. 1) absolutam, M. §§ 15, 90. quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est. § 423. i. e. ne in obiecto, dum illud vel in se spectare placet, iam aliquid notarum sibi invicem contradicentium, vel a sensibus et analogo rationis, observetur.
Aesthetic truth demands, for objects to be thought elegantly, 1. possibility, § 426; 1) absolute possibility, M. §§ 15, 90, insofar as it is to be known sensitively, § 423; that is, lest in the object, when one chooses to view it even in itself, something of marks contradicting one another already be observed by the senses and the analogue of reason.
M. § 8. Quaedam peccatorum inaequalitas habet hanc possibilitatem, et hinc etiam aesthetice vera est.
M. § 8. A certain inequality of sins has this possibility, and hence is also aesthetically true.
M. § 272. E contrario
M. § 272. On the contrary:
Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant,
Quum ventum ad verum est. Sensus moresque repugnant,
Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi,
"They who are pleased [to rank all] faults nearly on an equality, are troubled when they come to the truth of the matter: sense and morality are against them, and utility itself, the mother almost of right and of equity."
Hor. Serm. I. 3.
Horace, Sermones I.3.
Veritas aesthetica postulat obiectorum eleganter cogitandorum 1.
Aesthetic truth demands, for objects to be thought elegantly, 1.
possibilitatem, § 426. 1) absolutam, M. §§ 15, 90.
possibility, § 426; 1) absolute possibility, M. §§ 15, 90,
quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est. § 423.
insofar as it is to be known sensitively, § 423;
i. e. ne in obiecto,
that is, lest in the object,
dum illud vel in se spectare placet,
when one chooses to view it even in itself,
iam aliquid notarum sibi invicem contradicentium,
something of marks contradicting
vel a sensibus et
one another already be observed by the senses and
analogo rationis, observetur.
the analogue of reason.
M. § 8. Quaedam peccatorum inaequalitas habet hanc possibilitatem,
M. § 8. A certain inequality of sins has this possibility,
et hinc etiam aesthetice vera est.
and hence is also aesthetically true.
M. § 272. E contrario
M. § 272. On the contrary:
Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant,
Quum ventum ad verum est. Sensus moresque repugnant,
Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi,
"They who are pleased [to rank all] faults nearly on an equality, are troubled when they come to the truth of the matter: sense and morality are against them, and utility itself, the mother almost of right and of equity."
Hor. Serm. I. 3.
Horace, Sermones I.3.
Veritas aesthetica postulat obiectorum eleganter cogitandorum 1. possibilitatem, § 426. 1) absolutam, M. §§ 15, 90. quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est. § 423. i. e. ne in obiecto, dum illud vel in se spectare placet, iam aliquid notarum sibi invicem contradicentium, vel a sensibus et analogo rationis, observetur. / Aesthetic truth demands, for objects to be thought elegantly, 1. possibility, § 426; 1) absolute possibility, M. §§ 15, 90, insofar as it is to be known sensitively, § 423; that is, lest in the object, when one chooses to view it even in itself, something of marks contradicting one another already be observed by the senses and the analogue of reason.
M. § 8. Quaedam peccatorum inaequalitas habet hanc possibilitatem, et hinc etiam aesthetice vera est. / M. § 8. A certain inequality of sins has this possibility, and hence is also aesthetically true.
M. § 272. E contrario / M. § 272. On the contrary:
Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant,
Quum ventum ad verum est. Sensus moresque repugnant,
Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi,
"They who are pleased [to rank all] faults nearly on an equality, are troubled when they come to the truth of the matter: sense and morality are against them, and utility itself, the mother almost of right and of equity."
Hor. Serm. I. 3. / Horace, Sermones I.3.
§ 432
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum suorum, § 431. 2) hypotheticam, § 426. M. § 16. et hanc quidem denuo A.) naturalem, M. § 469. quatenus cum certa libertate propius non connectitur, et ab analogo rationis diiudicari potest. § 423. Hanc deprehendo in Aen. IX. 100,
Aesthetic truth requires the possibility of its objects, § 431; 2) hypothetical possibility, § 426, M. § 16; and this indeed again A.) natural possibility, M. § 469, insofar as it is not more closely connected with a determinate freedom, and can be judged by the analogue of reason, § 423. I find this in Aeneid IX.100:
Tum pater omnipotens, rerum cui summa potestas,
Infit. Eo dicente, deum domus alta silescit,
Et tremefacta solo tellus, silet arduus aether.
"Then Jupiter omnipotent, whose hands
have governance supreme, began reply;
deep silence at his word Olympus knew,
Earth's utmost cavern shook; the realms of light
were silent;"
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum suorum, § 431. 2) hypotheticam, § 426. M. § 16. et hanc quidem denuo A.) naturalem, M. § 469. quatenus cum certa libertate propius non connectitur, et ab analogo rationis diiudicari potest. § 423. Hanc deprehendo in Aen. IX. 100,
Aesthetic truth requires the possibility of its objects, § 431; 2) hypothetical possibility, § 426, M. § 16; and this indeed again A.) natural possibility, M. § 469, insofar as it is not more closely connected with a determinate freedom, and can be judged by the analogue of reason, § 423. I find this in Aeneid IX.100:
Tum pater omnipotens, rerum cui summa potestas,
Infit. Eo dicente, deum domus alta silescit,
Et tremefacta solo tellus, silet arduus aether.
"Then Jupiter omnipotent, whose hands
have governance supreme, began reply;
deep silence at his word Olympus knew,
Earth's utmost cavern shook; the realms of light
were silent;"
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum suorum, § 431.
Aesthetic truth requires the possibility of its objects, § 431;
2) hypotheticam, § 426. M. § 16. et hanc quidem denuo A.)
2) hypothetical possibility, § 426, M. § 16; and this indeed again A.)
naturalem, M. § 469. quatenus cum certa libertate propius
natural possibility, M. § 469, insofar as it is
non connectitur,
not more closely connected with a determinate freedom,
et ab analogo rationis diiudicari potest.
and can be judged by the analogue of reason,
§ 423. Hanc deprehendo in Aen. IX. 100,
§ 423. I find this in Aeneid IX.100:
Tum pater omnipotens, rerum cui summa potestas,
Infit. Eo dicente, deum domus alta silescit,
Et tremefacta solo tellus, silet arduus aether.
"Then Jupiter omnipotent, whose hands
have governance supreme, began reply;
deep silence at his word Olympus knew,
Earth's utmost cavern shook; the realms of light
were silent;"
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum suorum, § 431. 2) hypotheticam, § 426. M. § 16. et hanc quidem denuo A.) naturalem, M. § 469. quatenus cum certa libertate propius non connectitur, et ab analogo rationis diiudicari potest. § 423. Hanc deprehendo in Aen. IX. 100, / Aesthetic truth requires the possibility of its objects, § 431; 2) hypothetical possibility, § 426, M. § 16; and this indeed again A.) natural possibility, M. § 469, insofar as it is not more closely connected with a determinate freedom, and can be judged by the analogue of reason, § 423. I find this in Aeneid IX.100:
Tum pater omnipotens, rerum cui summa potestas,
Infit. Eo dicente, deum domus alta silescit,
Et tremefacta solo tellus, silet arduus aether.
"Then Jupiter omnipotent, whose hands
have governance supreme, began reply;
deep silence at his word Olympus knew,
Earth's utmost cavern shook; the realms of light
were silent;"
§ 433
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem in obiectis suis B.) moralem a) latius dictum, M. § 723. ut non nisi a libertate derivanda, talia etiam et tanta sint, qualia et quanta ex data libertate, data persona et charactere e.g. hominis certi morali fluere videantur analogo rationis. Hoc est illud ad veritatem vitae propius accedere, secundum quod sane non perinde est,
Aesthetic truth requires in its objects B.) moral possibility a) more broadly so called, M. § 723, so that things to be derived only from freedom are also such and so great as, from a given freedom, a given person, and a given moral character, for example of a particular human being, they seem to flow to the analogue of reason. This is that coming nearer to the truth of life, according to which it is certainly not all the same
Maturusne senex, an adhuc florente iuventa
Fervidus, et matrona potens, an sedula nutrix
Mercatorne vagus, cultorne virentis agelli,
Colchus, an Assyrius, Thebis nutritus, an Argis
"a man well-stricken in years, or a hot young fellow in his bloom; and a matron of distinction, or an officious nurse; a roaming merchant, or the cultivator of a verdant little farm; a Colchian, or an Assyrian; one educated at Thebes, or one at Argos."
loquatur, aut obiectum occupationis, aut personale sic. Hor. A. P. 115.
or whether the object is thus occupational or personal. Horace, Ars poetica 115.
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem in obiectis suis B.) moralem a) latius dictum, M. § 723. ut non nisi a libertate derivanda, talia etiam et tanta sint, qualia et quanta ex data libertate, data persona et charactere e.g. hominis certi morali fluere videantur analogo rationis.
Aesthetic truth requires in its objects B.) moral possibility a) more broadly so called, M. § 723, so that things to be derived only from freedom are also such and so great as, from a given freedom, a given person, and a given moral character, for example of a particular human being, they seem to flow to the analogue of reason.
Hoc est illud ad veritatem vitae propius accedere, secundum quod sane non perinde est,
This is that coming nearer to the truth of life, according to which it is certainly not all the same
Maturusne senex, an adhuc florente iuventa
Fervidus, et matrona potens, an sedula nutrix
Mercatorne vagus, cultorne virentis agelli,
Colchus, an Assyrius, Thebis nutritus, an Argis
"a man well-stricken in years, or a hot young fellow in his bloom; and a matron of distinction, or an officious nurse; a roaming merchant, or the cultivator of a verdant little farm; a Colchian, or an Assyrian; one educated at Thebes, or one at Argos."
loquatur, aut obiectum occupationis, aut personale sic.
or whether the object is thus occupational or personal.
Hor. A. P. 115.
Horace, Ars poetica 115.
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem in obiectis suis B.)
Aesthetic truth requires in its objects B.)
moralem a) latius dictum, M. § 723.
moral possibility a) more broadly so called, M. § 723,
ut non nisi a libertate derivanda,
so that things to be derived only from freedom are
talia etiam et tanta sint, qualia
also such and so great as,
et quanta ex data libertate, data persona
from a given freedom, a given person,
et charactere e.g.
and a given moral character, for example of a particular human
hominis certi morali fluere videantur analogo rationis.
being, they seem to flow to the analogue of reason.
Hoc est illud ad veritatem vitae propius accedere,
This is that coming nearer to the truth of life,
secundum quod sane non perinde est,
according to which it is certainly not all the same
Maturusne senex, an adhuc florente iuventa
Fervidus, et matrona potens, an sedula nutrix
Mercatorne vagus, cultorne virentis agelli,
Colchus, an Assyrius, Thebis nutritus, an Argis
"a man well-stricken in years, or a hot young fellow in his bloom; and a matron of distinction, or an officious nurse; a roaming merchant, or the cultivator of a verdant little farm; a Colchian, or an Assyrian; one educated at Thebes, or one at Argos."
loquatur, aut obiectum occupationis, aut personale sic.
or whether the object is thus occupational or personal.
Hor. A. P. 115.
Horace, Ars poetica 115.
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem in obiectis suis B.) moralem a) latius dictum, M. § 723. ut non nisi a libertate derivanda, talia etiam et tanta sint, qualia et quanta ex data libertate, data persona et charactere e.g. hominis certi morali fluere videantur analogo rationis. / Aesthetic truth requires in its objects B.) moral possibility a) more broadly so called, M. § 723, so that things to be derived only from freedom are also such and so great as, from a given freedom, a given person, and a given moral character, for example of a particular human being, they seem to flow to the analogue of reason.
Hoc est illud ad veritatem vitae propius accedere, secundum quod sane non perinde est, / This is that coming nearer to the truth of life, according to which it is certainly not all the same
Maturusne senex, an adhuc florente iuventa
Fervidus, et matrona potens, an sedula nutrix
Mercatorne vagus, cultorne virentis agelli,
Colchus, an Assyrius, Thebis nutritus, an Argis
"a man well-stricken in years, or a hot young fellow in his bloom; and a matron of distinction, or an officious nurse; a roaming merchant, or the cultivator of a verdant little farm; a Colchian, or an Assyrian; one educated at Thebes, or one at Argos."
loquatur, aut obiectum occupationis, aut personale sic. / or whether the object is thus occupational or personal.
Hor. A. P. 115. / Horace, Ars poetica 115.
§ 434
Tu, quid ego et populus mecum desideret, audi:
Si fautoris eges aulaea manentis, et usque
Sessuri donec cantor: vos plaudite, dicat:
Aetatis cuiusque notandi sunt tibi mores,
Mobilibusque decor naturis dandus et annis.
"Do you attend to what I, and the public in my opinion, expect from you [as a dramatic writer]. If you are desirous of an applauding spectator, who will wait for [the falling of] the curtain, and till the chorus calls out “your plaudits”; the manners of every age must be marked by you, and a proper decorum assigned to men's varying dispositions and years."
153.
153.
Semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis,
"we must dwell upon those qualities which are joined and adapted to each person's age."
178.
Hinc Horatius commendabat et philosophiam practicam, ut ita dicam, applicatam §§ 126. 361. 212. quia eam probe tenens ille, profecto,
178. Hence Horace was commending also practical philosophy - applied, as I may call it - §§ 126, 361, 212, because one who thoroughly possesses it certainly
Reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.
"he, [I say,] certainly knows how to give suitable attributes to every
character."
§ 433.
et artis aut notitiae illius, quam Theophrasti characteres morum inchoarunt, et Gallicus posthinc Theophrastus locupletavit, utilitatem suo tempore iam perspiciens,
Respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebat
v. 317.
§ 433. And, already perceiving in his own time the usefulness of that art or knowledge which Theophrastus' characters of morals began, and which the later Gallic Theophrastus enriched, he ordered
Doctum imitatorem, et veras hinc ducere voces.
"I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life."
verse 317.
Tu, quid ego et populus mecum desideret, audi:
Si fautoris eges aulaea manentis, et usque
Sessuri donec cantor: vos plaudite, dicat:
Aetatis cuiusque notandi sunt tibi mores,
Mobilibusque decor naturis dandus et annis.
"Do you attend to what I, and the public in my opinion, expect from you [as a dramatic writer]. If you are desirous of an applauding spectator, who will wait for [the falling of] the curtain, and till the chorus calls out “your plaudits”; the manners of every age must be marked by you, and a proper decorum assigned to men's varying dispositions and years."
153.
153.
Semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis,
"we must dwell upon those qualities which are joined and adapted to each person's age."
178.
Hinc Horatius commendabat et philosophiam practicam, ut ita dicam, applicatam §§ 126. 361. 212. quia eam probe tenens ille, profecto,
178. Hence Horace was commending also practical philosophy - applied, as I may call it - §§ 126, 361, 212, because one who thoroughly possesses it certainly
Reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.
"he, [I say,] certainly knows how to give suitable attributes to every
character."
§ 433.
et artis aut notitiae illius, quam Theophrasti characteres morum inchoarunt, et Gallicus posthinc Theophrastus locupletavit, utilitatem suo tempore iam perspiciens,
Respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebat
v. 317.
§ 433. And, already perceiving in his own time the usefulness of that art or knowledge which Theophrastus' characters of morals began, and which the later Gallic Theophrastus enriched, he ordered
Doctum imitatorem, et veras hinc ducere voces.
"I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life."
verse 317.
Tu, quid ego et populus mecum desideret, audi:
Si fautoris eges aulaea manentis, et usque
Sessuri donec cantor: vos plaudite, dicat:
Aetatis cuiusque notandi sunt tibi mores,
Mobilibusque decor naturis dandus et annis.
"Do you attend to what I, and the public in my opinion, expect from you [as a dramatic writer]. If you are desirous of an applauding spectator, who will wait for [the falling of] the curtain, and till the chorus calls out “your plaudits”; the manners of every age must be marked by you, and a proper decorum assigned to men's varying dispositions and years."
153.
153.
Semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis,
"we must dwell upon those qualities which are joined and adapted to each person's age."
178. Hinc Horatius commendabat et philosophiam practicam,
178. Hence Horace was commending also practical philosophy -
ut ita dicam, applicatam §§ 126. 361.
applied, as I may call it - §§ 126, 361,
212. quia eam probe tenens ille, profecto,
212, because one who thoroughly possesses it certainly
Reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.
"he, [I say,] certainly knows how to give suitable attributes to every
character."
§ 433. et artis aut notitiae illius,
§ 433. And, already perceiving in his
quam Theophrasti characteres morum inchoarunt,
own time the usefulness of that
et Gallicus posthinc Theophrastus locupletavit, utilitatem suo tempore
art or knowledge which Theophrastus' characters of morals began,
iam perspiciens, Respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebat v. 317.
and which the later Gallic Theophrastus enriched, he ordered
Doctum imitatorem, et veras hinc ducere voces.
"I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life."
verse 317.
Tu, quid ego et populus mecum desideret, audi:
Si fautoris eges aulaea manentis, et usque
Sessuri donec cantor: vos plaudite, dicat:
Aetatis cuiusque notandi sunt tibi mores,
Mobilibusque decor naturis dandus et annis.
"Do you attend to what I, and the public in my opinion, expect from you [as a dramatic writer]. If you are desirous of an applauding spectator, who will wait for [the falling of] the curtain, and till the chorus calls out “your plaudits”; the manners of every age must be marked by you, and a proper decorum assigned to men's varying dispositions and years."
153. / 153.
Semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis,
"we must dwell upon those qualities which are joined and adapted to each person's age."
178. Hinc Horatius commendabat et philosophiam practicam, ut ita dicam, applicatam §§ 126. 361. 212. quia eam probe tenens ille, profecto, / 178. Hence Horace was commending also practical philosophy - applied, as I may call it - §§ 126, 361, 212, because one who thoroughly possesses it certainly
Reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.
"he, [I say,] certainly knows how to give suitable attributes to every
character."
§ 433. et artis aut notitiae illius, quam Theophrasti characteres morum inchoarunt, et Gallicus posthinc Theophrastus locupletavit, utilitatem suo tempore iam perspiciens, Respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebat v. 317. / § 433. And, already perceiving in his own time the usefulness of that art or knowledge which Theophrastus' characters of morals began, and which the later Gallic Theophrastus enriched, he ordered
Doctum imitatorem, et veras hinc ducere voces.
"I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life."
/ verse 317.
§ 435
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem moralem b) strictius dictam, M. § 723. in cogitante non solum ipso, S. XXIIII–XXVI. sed et obiectis explicite vel implicite probandis ab eodem, brevius, in pulcris cogitationibus, si vel Acheronta describant, § 422. sed eam tantum, quae cadat in sensus et analogi rationis sub trutinam. § 211. Haec est illa Veritas Moralis, qua, secundum Horatium,
Aesthetic truth requires moral possibility b) more strictly so called, M. § 723, not only in the thinker himself, Sections XXIIII–XXVI, but also in the objects explicitly or implicitly to be approved by him; more briefly, in beautiful thoughts, even if they should describe Acheron, § 422 - but only that moral possibility which falls under the scale of the senses and the analogue of reason, § 211. This is that moral truth by which, according to Horace,
Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est.
"It is a truth, that every one ought to measure himself by his own proper foot and standard."
Quemadmodum §§ 433, 434. postulatam ego dicerem Veritatem Moralem Latius Dictam; sic hanc lubentius Strictius Dictam, appellarem veritatem moralem, ac illam Strictissime Dictam, convenientiam signorum cum mente nostra, quae si virtus sit, iam habet sinceritatis titulum, si vitium sit, iam secum fert rimositatis ignominiam. E. § 339.
Just as I would call what was demanded in §§ 433, 434 moral truth more broadly so called, so I would more gladly call this moral truth more strictly so called; and that moral truth most strictly so called, the agreement of signs with our mind, which, if it is a virtue, already has the title of sincerity, but if it is a vice, already carries with it the disgrace of leakiness. E. § 339.
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem moralem b) strictius dictam, M. § 723. in cogitante non solum ipso, S. XXIIII–XXVI. sed et obiectis explicite vel implicite probandis ab eodem, brevius, in pulcris cogitationibus, si vel Acheronta describant, § 422. sed eam tantum, quae cadat in sensus et analogi rationis sub trutinam. § 211. Haec est illa Veritas Moralis, qua, secundum Horatium,
Aesthetic truth requires moral possibility b) more strictly so called, M. § 723, not only in the thinker himself, Sections XXIIII–XXVI, but also in the objects explicitly or implicitly to be approved by him; more briefly, in beautiful thoughts, even if they should describe Acheron, § 422 - but only that moral possibility which falls under the scale of the senses and the analogue of reason, § 211. This is that moral truth by which, according to Horace,
Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est.
"It is a truth, that every one ought to measure himself by his own proper foot and standard."
Quemadmodum §§ 433, 434. postulatam ego dicerem Veritatem Moralem Latius Dictam; sic hanc lubentius Strictius Dictam, appellarem veritatem moralem, ac illam Strictissime Dictam, convenientiam signorum cum mente nostra, quae si virtus sit, iam habet sinceritatis titulum, si vitium sit, iam secum fert rimositatis ignominiam.
Just as I would call what was demanded in §§ 433, 434 moral truth more broadly so called, so I would more gladly call this moral truth more strictly so called; and that moral truth most strictly so called, the agreement of signs with our mind, which, if it is a virtue, already has the title of sincerity, but if it is a vice, already carries with it the disgrace of leakiness.
E. § 339.
E. § 339.
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem moralem b) strictius dictam,
Aesthetic truth requires moral possibility b) more strictly so called,
M. § 723. in cogitante non solum ipso, S.
M. § 723, not only in the thinker himself, Sections
XXIIII–XXVI. sed et obiectis explicite vel implicite
XXIIII–XXVI, but also in the objects explicitly or implicitly
probandis ab eodem, brevius, in pulcris
to be approved by him; more briefly, in beautiful thoughts,
cogitationibus, si vel Acheronta describant, § 422.
even if they should describe Acheron, § 422
sed eam tantum, quae cadat
- but only that moral possibility which falls
in sensus et analogi rationis
under the scale of the senses and the analogue of reason,
sub trutinam. § 211. Haec est illa Veritas Moralis,
§ 211. This is that moral
qua, secundum Horatium,
truth by which, according to Horace,
Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est.
"It is a truth, that every one ought to measure himself by his own proper foot and standard."
Quemadmodum §§ 433, 434.
Just as I would call what was demanded in §§ 433, 434
postulatam ego dicerem Veritatem Moralem Latius Dictam;
moral truth more broadly so
sic hanc lubentius Strictius Dictam,
called, so I would more gladly call this
appellarem veritatem moralem,
moral truth more strictly so called;
ac illam Strictissime Dictam, convenientiam
and that moral truth most strictly so called,
signorum cum mente nostra, quae
the agreement of signs with our mind, which,
si virtus sit, iam habet sinceritatis
if it is a virtue, already has the title of sincerity,
titulum, si vitium sit,
but if it is a vice,
iam secum fert rimositatis ignominiam.
already carries with it the disgrace of leakiness.
E. § 339.
E. § 339.
Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem moralem b) strictius dictam, M. § 723. in cogitante non solum ipso, S. XXIIII–XXVI. sed et obiectis explicite vel implicite probandis ab eodem, brevius, in pulcris cogitationibus, si vel Acheronta describant, § 422. sed eam tantum, quae cadat in sensus et analogi rationis sub trutinam. § 211. Haec est illa Veritas Moralis, qua, secundum Horatium, / Aesthetic truth requires moral possibility b) more strictly so called, M. § 723, not only in the thinker himself, Sections XXIIII–XXVI, but also in the objects explicitly or implicitly to be approved by him; more briefly, in beautiful thoughts, even if they should describe Acheron, § 422 - but only that moral possibility which falls under the scale of the senses and the analogue of reason, § 211. This is that moral truth by which, according to Horace,
Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est.
"It is a truth, that every one ought to measure himself by his own proper foot and standard."
Quemadmodum §§ 433, 434. postulatam ego dicerem Veritatem Moralem Latius Dictam; sic hanc lubentius Strictius Dictam, appellarem veritatem moralem, ac illam Strictissime Dictam, convenientiam signorum cum mente nostra, quae si virtus sit, iam habet sinceritatis titulum, si vitium sit, iam secum fert rimositatis ignominiam. / Just as I would call what was demanded in §§ 433, 434 moral truth more broadly so called, so I would more gladly call this moral truth more strictly so called; and that moral truth most strictly so called, the agreement of signs with our mind, which, if it is a virtue, already has the title of sincerity, but if it is a vice, already carries with it the disgrace of leakiness.
E. § 339. / E. § 339.
§ 436
Huius veritatis moralis, sed aestheticae, huius dignitatis in cogitando venustius, §§ 35, 182. limites aestheticos belle monstrat Cicero pro Mur. quando 74.
Of this moral truth, but aesthetic truth, of this dignity in thinking more gracefully, §§ 35, 182, Cicero beautifully shows the aesthetic limits in Pro Murena, when at 74 he says:
At enim agit, inquit, mecum austere et Stoice Cato, negat verum esse, allici benevolentiam cibo,
"But I must change my tone for Cato argues with me on rigid and stoic principles. He says that it is not true that good-will is conciliated by food."
e.c. et pro veritate aesthetica morum, in quos invectus erat Cato, velut in ambitum, respondet:
etc.; and on behalf of the aesthetic truth of manners, against which Cato had inveighed, as if against electoral canvassing, Cicero replies:
Horribilis oratio, sed eam usus, vita, mores, civitas ipsa respuit.
"An extraordinary sort of speech! but our usages, our way of living, our manners, and the constitution itself rejects it."
e.c. 75.
etc., 75.
Quare noli, Cato, maiorum instituta, quae res ipsa publica, quae diuturnitas imperii comprobat, nimium severa oratione reprehendere.
"Do not, then, O Cato, blame with too great severity of language the principles of our ancestors, which facts, and the length of time that our power has flourished under them, justify."
e.c. 76.
etc., 76.
Quod ais: Nulla re allici hominum mentes oportere ad magistratus mandandum, nisi dignitate (quatenus intellectualiter unice concipitur a philosophis, §§ 211, 212.): hoc tu ipse, in quo summa est dignitas, non servas. Cur enim quemquam, ut studeat tibi, ut te adiuvet, rogas?
"For as to what you say, that it is not right for men's minds to be influenced, in appointing magistrates, by any other consideration than that of the worth of the candidates, this principle even you yourself—you, a man of the greatest worth—do not in every case adhere to. For why do you ask any one to take pains for you, to assist you?"
e.c. 77. Quid? quod habes nomenclatorem. e.c.
(insofar as it is conceived only intellectually by philosophers, §§ 211, 212): etc., 77. "What of the fact that you have a nomenclator?" etc.
Huius veritatis moralis, sed aestheticae, huius dignitatis in cogitando venustius, §§ 35, 182. limites aestheticos belle monstrat Cicero pro Mur. quando 74.
Of this moral truth, but aesthetic truth, of this dignity in thinking more gracefully, §§ 35, 182, Cicero beautifully shows the aesthetic limits in Pro Murena, when at 74 he says:
At enim agit, inquit, mecum austere et Stoice Cato, negat verum esse, allici benevolentiam cibo,
"But I must change my tone for Cato argues with me on rigid and stoic principles. He says that it is not true that good-will is conciliated by food."
e.c. et pro veritate aesthetica morum, in quos invectus erat Cato, velut in ambitum, respondet:
etc.; and on behalf of the aesthetic truth of manners, against which Cato had inveighed, as if against electoral canvassing, Cicero replies:
Horribilis oratio, sed eam usus, vita, mores, civitas ipsa respuit.
"An extraordinary sort of speech! but our usages, our way of living, our manners, and the constitution itself rejects it."
e.c. 75.
etc., 75.
Quare noli, Cato, maiorum instituta, quae res ipsa publica, quae diuturnitas imperii comprobat, nimium severa oratione reprehendere.
"Do not, then, O Cato, blame with too great severity of language the principles of our ancestors, which facts, and the length of time that our power has flourished under them, justify."
e.c. 76.
etc., 76.
Quod ais: Nulla re allici hominum mentes oportere ad magistratus mandandum, nisi dignitate (quatenus intellectualiter unice concipitur a philosophis, §§ 211, 212.): hoc tu ipse, in quo summa est dignitas, non servas. Cur enim quemquam, ut studeat tibi, ut te adiuvet, rogas?
"For as to what you say, that it is not right for men's minds to be influenced, in appointing magistrates, by any other consideration than that of the worth of the candidates, this principle even you yourself—you, a man of the greatest worth—do not in every case adhere to. For why do you ask any one to take pains for you, to assist you?"
e.c. 77. Quid? quod habes nomenclatorem. e.c.
(insofar as it is conceived only intellectually by philosophers, §§ 211, 212): etc., 77. "What of the fact that you have a nomenclator?" etc.
Huius veritatis moralis, sed aestheticae,
Of this moral truth, but aesthetic truth,
huius dignitatis in cogitando venustius, §§ 35, 182.
of this dignity in thinking more gracefully, §§ 35, 182,
limites aestheticos belle monstrat Cicero pro Mur.
Cicero beautifully shows the aesthetic limits in Pro Murena, when
quando 74.
at 74 he says:
At enim agit, inquit, mecum austere et Stoice Cato, negat verum esse, allici benevolentiam cibo,
"But I must change my tone for Cato argues with me on rigid and stoic principles. He says that it is not true that good-will is conciliated by food."
e.c. et pro veritate aesthetica morum,
etc.; and on behalf of the aesthetic truth
in quos invectus erat Cato,
of manners, against which Cato had inveighed,
velut in ambitum, respondet:
as if against electoral canvassing, Cicero replies:
Horribilis oratio, sed eam usus, vita, mores, civitas ipsa respuit.
"An extraordinary sort of speech! but our usages, our way of living, our manners, and the constitution itself rejects it."
e.c. 75.
etc., 75.
Quare noli, Cato, maiorum instituta, quae res ipsa publica, quae diuturnitas imperii comprobat, nimium severa oratione reprehendere.
"Do not, then, O Cato, blame with too great severity of language the principles of our ancestors, which facts, and the length of time that our power has flourished under them, justify."
e.c. 76.
etc., 76.
Quod ais: Nulla re allici hominum mentes oportere ad magistratus mandandum, nisi dignitate (quatenus intellectualiter unice concipitur a philosophis, §§ 211, 212.): hoc tu ipse, in quo summa est dignitas, non servas. Cur enim quemquam, ut studeat tibi, ut te adiuvet, rogas?
"For as to what you say, that it is not right for men's minds to be influenced, in appointing magistrates, by any other consideration than that of the worth of the candidates, this principle even you yourself—you, a man of the greatest worth—do not in every case adhere to. For why do you ask any one to take pains for you, to assist you?"
e.c. 77. Quid? quod habes nomenclatorem. e.c.
(insofar as it is conceived only intellectually by philosophers, §§ 211, 212): etc., 77. "What of the fact that you have a nomenclator?" etc.
Huius veritatis moralis, sed aestheticae, huius dignitatis in cogitando venustius, §§ 35, 182. limites aestheticos belle monstrat Cicero pro Mur. quando 74. / Of this moral truth, but aesthetic truth, of this dignity in thinking more gracefully, §§ 35, 182, Cicero beautifully shows the aesthetic limits in Pro Murena, when at 74 he says:
At enim agit, inquit, mecum austere et Stoice Cato, negat verum esse, allici benevolentiam cibo,
"But I must change my tone for Cato argues with me on rigid and stoic principles. He says that it is not true that good-will is conciliated by food."
e.c. et pro veritate aesthetica morum, in quos invectus erat Cato, velut in ambitum, respondet: / etc.; and on behalf of the aesthetic truth of manners, against which Cato had inveighed, as if against electoral canvassing, Cicero replies:
Horribilis oratio, sed eam usus, vita, mores, civitas ipsa respuit.
"An extraordinary sort of speech! but our usages, our way of living, our manners, and the constitution itself rejects it."
e.c. 75. / etc., 75.
Quare noli, Cato, maiorum instituta, quae res ipsa publica, quae diuturnitas imperii comprobat, nimium severa oratione reprehendere.
"Do not, then, O Cato, blame with too great severity of language the principles of our ancestors, which facts, and the length of time that our power has flourished under them, justify."
e.c. 76. / etc., 76.
Quod ais: Nulla re allici hominum mentes oportere ad magistratus mandandum, nisi dignitate (quatenus intellectualiter unice concipitur a philosophis, §§ 211, 212.): hoc tu ipse, in quo summa est dignitas, non servas. Cur enim quemquam, ut studeat tibi, ut te adiuvet, rogas?
"For as to what you say, that it is not right for men's minds to be influenced, in appointing magistrates, by any other consideration than that of the worth of the candidates, this principle even you yourself—you, a man of the greatest worth—do not in every case adhere to. For why do you ask any one to take pains for you, to assist you?"
e.c. 77. Quid? quod habes nomenclatorem. e.c. / (insofar as it is conceived only intellectually by philosophers, §§ 211, 212): etc., 77. "What of the fact that you have a nomenclator?" etc.
§ 437
Veritas aesthetica requirit obiectorum pulcre cogitandorum, II. nexum, cum rationibus et rationatis §§ 426, 431. quatenus ille sensitive cognoscendus est, § 423. M. § 24. per analogon rationis, M. § 640. Exemplum esto Coriolanus Livii. II. ipsius nominis, et auctoritatis primae ratio est, c. 33. hinc altiores spiritus in tribuniciam potestatem, c. 34. unde plebis ira, ex hac exsilium Coriolani, et hostilis eum ad Volscos, non sine ratione ex antecedentibus manifesta, rapiens animus, communicata hinc cum hospite Tullo consilia belli in romanos, c. 35. horum consectarium callidum Tulli artificium, et nova Volscae plebis indignatio in romanos, c. 37.
Aesthetic truth requires, for objects to be thought beautifully, II. a connection with reasons and things reasoned from them, §§ 426, 431, insofar as that connection is to be known sensitively, § 423, M. § 24, through the analogue of reason, M. § 640. Let the example be Livy's Coriolanus, book II. The first reason for his very name and authority is chapter 33; hence his loftier spirit against the tribunician power, chapter 34; from this the anger of the plebs; from this the exile of Coriolanus, and his hostile spirit, carrying him off to the Volsci - not without a reason manifest from what preceded; hence, after plans for war against the Romans had been shared with his host Tullus, chapter 35, there follows as their consequence the cunning device of Tullus, and a new indignation of the Volscian plebs against the Romans, chapter 37.
Veritas aesthetica requirit obiectorum pulcre cogitandorum, II. nexum, cum rationibus et rationatis §§ 426, 431. quatenus ille sensitive cognoscendus est, § 423. M. § 24. per analogon rationis, M. § 640. Exemplum esto Coriolanus Livii. II. ipsius nominis, et auctoritatis primae ratio est, c. 33. hinc altiores spiritus in tribuniciam potestatem, c. 34. unde plebis ira, ex hac exsilium Coriolani, et hostilis eum ad Volscos, non sine ratione ex antecedentibus manifesta, rapiens animus, communicata hinc cum hospite Tullo consilia belli in romanos, c. 35. horum consectarium callidum Tulli artificium, et nova Volscae plebis indignatio in romanos, c. 37.
Aesthetic truth requires, for objects to be thought beautifully, II. a connection with reasons and things reasoned from them, §§ 426, 431, insofar as that connection is to be known sensitively, § 423, M. § 24, through the analogue of reason, M. § 640. Let the example be Livy's Coriolanus, book II. The first reason for his very name and authority is chapter 33; hence his loftier spirit against the tribunician power, chapter 34; from this the anger of the plebs; from this the exile of Coriolanus, and his hostile spirit, carrying him off to the Volsci - not without a reason manifest from what preceded; hence, after plans for war against the Romans had been shared with his host Tullus, chapter 35, there follows as their consequence the cunning device of Tullus, and a new indignation of the Volscian plebs against the Romans, chapter 37.
Veritas aesthetica requirit obiectorum pulcre cogitandorum, II.
Aesthetic truth requires, for objects to be thought beautifully, II.
nexum, cum rationibus et rationatis §§ 426, 431.
a connection with reasons and things reasoned from them, §§ 426, 431,
quatenus ille sensitive cognoscendus est, § 423.
insofar as that connection is to be known sensitively, § 423,
M. § 24. per analogon rationis, M. § 640.
M. § 24, through the analogue of reason, M. § 640.
Exemplum esto Coriolanus Livii. II.
Let the example be Livy's Coriolanus, book II.
ipsius nominis, et auctoritatis primae ratio est,
The first reason for his very name and authority is
c. 33. hinc altiores spiritus in tribuniciam potestatem, c.
chapter 33; hence his loftier spirit against the tribunician power, chapter
34. unde plebis
34; from this the anger of the plebs;
ira, ex hac exsilium Coriolani,
from this the exile of Coriolanus,
et hostilis eum ad Volscos,
and his hostile spirit, carrying him off to the Volsci
non sine ratione ex antecedentibus manifesta, rapiens animus, communicata
- not without a reason manifest from what preceded;
hinc
hence, after plans for war against the Romans had
cum hospite Tullo consilia belli in romanos, c.
been shared with his host Tullus, chapter
35. horum consectarium callidum Tulli
35, there follows as their consequence the cunning device of Tullus,
artificium, et nova Volscae plebis indignatio in romanos,
and a new indignation of the Volscian plebs against the Romans,
c. 37.
chapter 37.
Veritas aesthetica requirit obiectorum pulcre cogitandorum, II. nexum, cum rationibus et rationatis §§ 426, 431. quatenus ille sensitive cognoscendus est, § 423. M. § 24. per analogon rationis, M. § 640. Exemplum esto Coriolanus Livii. II. ipsius nominis, et auctoritatis primae ratio est, c. 33. hinc altiores spiritus in tribuniciam potestatem, c. 34. unde plebis ira, ex hac exsilium Coriolani, et hostilis eum ad Volscos, non sine ratione ex antecedentibus manifesta, rapiens animus, communicata hinc cum hospite Tullo consilia belli in romanos, c. 35. horum consectarium callidum Tulli artificium, et nova Volscae plebis indignatio in romanos, c. 37. / Aesthetic truth requires, for objects to be thought beautifully, II. a connection with reasons and things reasoned from them, §§ 426, 431, insofar as that connection is to be known sensitively, § 423, M. § 24, through the analogue of reason, M. § 640. Let the example be Livy's Coriolanus, book II. The first reason for his very name and authority is chapter 33; hence his loftier spirit against the tribunician power, chapter 34; from this the anger of the plebs; from this the exile of Coriolanus, and his hostile spirit, carrying him off to the Volsci - not without a reason manifest from what preceded; hence, after plans for war against the Romans had been shared with his host Tullus, chapter 35, there follows as their consequence the cunning device of Tullus, and a new indignation of the Volscian plebs against the Romans, chapter 37.
§ 438
Hinc decernitur bellum, duces Tullus et Marcius, Coriolanus noster, exsul romanus. Ob huius fortitudinem prosperum Volscis initium, plebis Romanae trepidatio, hinc prima romanorum legatio, atrox responsum quae retulit, reversa ad hostem non recipitur. Hinc sacerdotes supplices. Quoniam et hi frustra, iam paene muliebris timor pervadit Romam, c. 39. Mater, coniux, et turba mulierum tandem movent durum animum, quod ne sine ratione fieri videatur, fingit matris orationem sane patheticam historicus. Hinc castra hostilia retro moventur, neque tamen disparet Coriolanus, nisi post aliquam reliquorum eius fatorum mentionem. Romae autem exigitur Fortunae muliebris monumentum. c. 40. Quanta in his harmonia concinit alendo recreandoque legentium analogo saltim rationis? § 437.
Hence war is decreed, with Tullus and Marcius, our Coriolanus, "a Roman exile," as leaders. On account of his courage the Volsci have a prosperous beginning; the Roman plebs trembles; hence the first Roman embassy, which brought back "a harsh answer," is not received when it returns to the enemy. Hence suppliant priests. Since they too are in vain, an almost womanly fear now pervades Rome, chapter 39. Mother, wife, and the crowd of women at last move his hard spirit; and lest this seem to happen without reason, the historian fashions the mother's speech as truly pathetic. Hence the hostile camp is moved back; and yet Coriolanus does not disappear except after some mention of the rest of his fates. At Rome, moreover, a monument to Fortuna Muliebris is erected, chapter 40. How much harmony sounds together in these things, nourishing and refreshing at least the analogue of reason of the readers? § 437.
Hinc decernitur bellum, duces Tullus et Marcius, Coriolanus noster, exsul romanus.
Hence war is decreed, with Tullus and Marcius, our Coriolanus, "a Roman exile," as leaders.
Ob huius fortitudinem prosperum Volscis initium, plebis Romanae trepidatio, hinc prima romanorum legatio, atrox responsum quae retulit, reversa ad hostem non recipitur.
On account of his courage the Volsci have a prosperous beginning; the Roman plebs trembles; hence the first Roman embassy, which brought back "a harsh answer," is not received when it returns to the enemy.
Hinc sacerdotes supplices.
Hence suppliant priests.
Quoniam et hi frustra, iam paene muliebris timor pervadit Romam, c. 39. Mater, coniux, et turba mulierum tandem movent durum animum, quod ne sine ratione fieri videatur, fingit matris orationem sane patheticam historicus.
Since they too are in vain, an almost womanly fear now pervades Rome, chapter 39. Mother, wife, and the crowd of women at last move his hard spirit; and lest this seem to happen without reason, the historian fashions the mother's speech as truly pathetic.
Hinc castra hostilia retro moventur, neque tamen disparet Coriolanus, nisi post aliquam reliquorum eius fatorum mentionem.
Hence the hostile camp is moved back; and yet Coriolanus does not disappear except after some mention of the rest of his fates.
Romae autem exigitur Fortunae muliebris monumentum. c. 40. Quanta in his harmonia concinit alendo recreandoque legentium analogo saltim rationis? § 437.
At Rome, moreover, a monument to Fortuna Muliebris is erected, chapter 40. How much harmony sounds together in these things, nourishing and refreshing at least the analogue of reason of the readers? § 437.
Hinc decernitur bellum, duces Tullus et Marcius,
Hence war is decreed, with Tullus and Marcius,
Coriolanus noster, exsul romanus.
our Coriolanus, "a Roman exile," as leaders.
Ob huius fortitudinem prosperum Volscis initium, plebis
On account of his courage the Volsci have a prosperous beginning;
Romanae trepidatio, hinc prima romanorum legatio,
the Roman plebs trembles; hence the first Roman embassy,
atrox responsum quae retulit,
which brought back "a harsh answer," is
reversa ad hostem non recipitur.
not received when it returns to the enemy.
Hinc sacerdotes supplices.
Hence suppliant priests.
Quoniam et hi frustra,
Since they too are in vain,
iam paene muliebris timor pervadit Romam, c. 39.
an almost womanly fear now pervades Rome, chapter 39.
Mater, coniux, et turba mulierum tandem
Mother, wife, and the crowd of women at last
movent durum animum, quod ne sine ratione
move his hard spirit; and lest this seem to happen without reason,
fieri videatur, fingit matris orationem sane patheticam historicus.
the historian fashions the mother's speech as truly pathetic.
Hinc castra hostilia retro moventur,
Hence the hostile camp is moved back;
neque tamen disparet Coriolanus,
and yet Coriolanus does not disappear except
nisi post aliquam reliquorum eius fatorum mentionem.
after some mention of the rest of his fates.
Romae autem exigitur Fortunae muliebris monumentum.
At Rome, moreover, a monument to Fortuna Muliebris is erected,
c. 40. Quanta in his harmonia
chapter 40. How much harmony sounds together in these things,
concinit alendo recreandoque legentium analogo saltim rationis?
nourishing and refreshing at least the analogue of reason
§ 437.
of the readers? § 437.
Hinc decernitur bellum, duces Tullus et Marcius, Coriolanus noster, exsul romanus. / Hence war is decreed, with Tullus and Marcius, our Coriolanus, "a Roman exile," as leaders.
Ob huius fortitudinem prosperum Volscis initium, plebis Romanae trepidatio, hinc prima romanorum legatio, atrox responsum quae retulit, reversa ad hostem non recipitur. / On account of his courage the Volsci have a prosperous beginning; the Roman plebs trembles; hence the first Roman embassy, which brought back "a harsh answer," is not received when it returns to the enemy.
Hinc sacerdotes supplices. / Hence suppliant priests.
Quoniam et hi frustra, iam paene muliebris timor pervadit Romam, c. 39. Mater, coniux, et turba mulierum tandem movent durum animum, quod ne sine ratione fieri videatur, fingit matris orationem sane patheticam historicus. / Since they too are in vain, an almost womanly fear now pervades Rome, chapter 39. Mother, wife, and the crowd of women at last move his hard spirit; and lest this seem to happen without reason, the historian fashions the mother's speech as truly pathetic.
Hinc castra hostilia retro moventur, neque tamen disparet Coriolanus, nisi post aliquam reliquorum eius fatorum mentionem. / Hence the hostile camp is moved back; and yet Coriolanus does not disappear except after some mention of the rest of his fates.
Romae autem exigitur Fortunae muliebris monumentum. c. 40. Quanta in his harmonia concinit alendo recreandoque legentium analogo saltim rationis? § 437. / At Rome, moreover, a monument to Fortuna Muliebris is erected, chapter 40. How much harmony sounds together in these things, nourishing and refreshing at least the analogue of reason of the readers? § 437.
§ 439
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum et absolutam et hypotheticam, qua sensitive perspicitur, §§ 431–436. omnis possibilitas postulat unitatem, M. § 73. absoluta absolutam, hypothetica hypotheticam, M. § 76. Hinc et veritas aesthetica utramque poscit unitatem in cogitandis suis, quatenus sensitive deprehendi potest, inseparabilitatem determinationum in cogitandis, salva perceptionis totalis pulcritudine. § 73. Erit haec obiectorum Unitas, quatenus phaenomenon fit, Aesthetica, vel determinationum internarum, M. § 37. quo unitas Actionis, si obiectum pulcrae meditationis actio sit, vel externarum et relationum, M. § 37. circumstantium, M. § 323. quo unitas Loci et Temporis, M. § 325. § 281.
Aesthetic truth demands both absolute and hypothetical possibility of objects, insofar as it is perceived sensitively, §§ 431–436. Every possibility demands unity, M. § 73: absolute possibility demands absolute unity, hypothetical possibility hypothetical unity, M. § 76. Hence aesthetic truth also demands each unity in its things to be thought, insofar as it can be detected sensitively: the inseparability of determinations in what is thought, with the beauty of the total perception preserved, § 73. This unity of objects, insofar as it becomes a phenomenon, will be aesthetic: either a unity of internal determinations, M. § 37, whence the unity of action, if the object of beautiful meditation is an action; or of external determinations and relations, M. § 37, of circumstances, M. § 323, whence the unity of place and time, M. § 325, § 281.
Sit, quod vis, simplex duntaxat et unum,
"In a word, be your subject what it will, let it be merely simple and
uniform."
et placentem simul rotundam illam brevitatem S. XIII. XIV. et pulcram obtinebis cohaerentiam, § 437. Hinc Augustino placuit adeo unitas, ut eam omnis pulcritudinis formam diceret.
and you will obtain at the same time that pleasing rounded brevity, Sections XIII and XIV, and beautiful coherence, § 437. Hence unity so pleased Augustine that he called it the form of all beauty.
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum et absolutam et hypotheticam, qua sensitive perspicitur, §§ 431–436. omnis possibilitas postulat unitatem, M. § 73. absoluta absolutam, hypothetica hypotheticam, M. § 76. Hinc et veritas aesthetica utramque poscit unitatem in cogitandis suis, quatenus sensitive deprehendi potest, inseparabilitatem determinationum in cogitandis, salva perceptionis totalis pulcritudine. § 73. Erit haec obiectorum Unitas, quatenus phaenomenon fit, Aesthetica, vel determinationum internarum, M. § 37. quo unitas Actionis, si obiectum pulcrae meditationis actio sit, vel externarum et relationum, M. § 37. circumstantium, M. § 323. quo unitas Loci et Temporis, M. § 325. § 281.
Aesthetic truth demands both absolute and hypothetical possibility of objects, insofar as it is perceived sensitively, §§ 431–436. Every possibility demands unity, M. § 73: absolute possibility demands absolute unity, hypothetical possibility hypothetical unity, M. § 76. Hence aesthetic truth also demands each unity in its things to be thought, insofar as it can be detected sensitively: the inseparability of determinations in what is thought, with the beauty of the total perception preserved, § 73. This unity of objects, insofar as it becomes a phenomenon, will be aesthetic: either a unity of internal determinations, M. § 37, whence the unity of action, if the object of beautiful meditation is an action; or of external determinations and relations, M. § 37, of circumstances, M. § 323, whence the unity of place and time, M. § 325, § 281.
Sit, quod vis, simplex duntaxat et unum,
"In a word, be your subject what it will, let it be merely simple and
uniform."
et placentem simul rotundam illam brevitatem S. XIII. XIV. et pulcram obtinebis cohaerentiam, § 437. Hinc Augustino placuit adeo unitas, ut eam omnis pulcritudinis formam diceret.
and you will obtain at the same time that pleasing rounded brevity, Sections XIII and XIV, and beautiful coherence, § 437. Hence unity so pleased Augustine that he called it the form of all beauty.
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum et absolutam et hypotheticam,
Aesthetic truth demands both absolute and hypothetical
qua sensitive perspicitur, §§ 431–436.
possibility of objects, insofar as it is perceived sensitively, §§ 431–436.
omnis possibilitas postulat unitatem, M. § 73.
Every possibility demands unity, M. § 73:
absoluta absolutam, hypothetica hypotheticam, M.
absolute possibility demands absolute unity, hypothetical possibility hypothetical unity, M.
§ 76. Hinc et veritas aesthetica utramque poscit
§ 76. Hence aesthetic truth also demands each
unitatem in cogitandis suis,
unity in its things to be thought,
quatenus sensitive deprehendi potest,
insofar as it can be detected sensitively:
inseparabilitatem determinationum in cogitandis,
the inseparability of determinations in what is thought, with
salva perceptionis totalis pulcritudine. § 73.
the beauty of the total perception preserved, § 73.
Erit haec obiectorum Unitas,
This unity of objects,
quatenus phaenomenon fit, Aesthetica,
insofar as it becomes a phenomenon, will be aesthetic:
vel determinationum internarum, M. § 37.
either a unity of internal determinations, M. § 37,
quo unitas Actionis, si obiectum pulcrae
whence the unity of action, if the object of
meditationis actio sit, vel externarum et relationum, M.
beautiful meditation is an action; or of external determinations and relations, M.
§ 37. circumstantium, M. § 323. quo unitas Loci et Temporis,
§ 37, of circumstances, M. § 323, whence the unity of place and time,
M. § 325. § 281.
M. § 325, § 281.
Sit, quod vis, simplex duntaxat et unum,
"In a word, be your subject what it will, let it be merely simple and
uniform."
et placentem simul
and you will obtain at the same time that
rotundam illam brevitatem S. XIII. XIV.
pleasing rounded brevity, Sections XIII and XIV,
et pulcram obtinebis cohaerentiam, § 437. Hinc
and beautiful coherence, § 437. Hence unity so pleased
Augustino placuit adeo unitas, ut eam omnis
Augustine that he called it the
pulcritudinis formam diceret.
form of all beauty.
Veritas aesthetica poscit possibilitatem obiectorum et absolutam et hypotheticam, qua sensitive perspicitur, §§ 431–436. omnis possibilitas postulat unitatem, M. § 73. absoluta absolutam, hypothetica hypotheticam, M. § 76. Hinc et veritas aesthetica utramque poscit unitatem in cogitandis suis, quatenus sensitive deprehendi potest, inseparabilitatem determinationum in cogitandis, salva perceptionis totalis pulcritudine. § 73. Erit haec obiectorum Unitas, quatenus phaenomenon fit, Aesthetica, vel determinationum internarum, M. § 37. quo unitas Actionis, si obiectum pulcrae meditationis actio sit, vel externarum et relationum, M. § 37. circumstantium, M. § 323. quo unitas Loci et Temporis, M. § 325. § 281. / Aesthetic truth demands both absolute and hypothetical possibility of objects, insofar as it is perceived sensitively, §§ 431–436. Every possibility demands unity, M. § 73: absolute possibility demands absolute unity, hypothetical possibility hypothetical unity, M. § 76. Hence aesthetic truth also demands each unity in its things to be thought, insofar as it can be detected sensitively: the inseparability of determinations in what is thought, with the beauty of the total perception preserved, § 73. This unity of objects, insofar as it becomes a phenomenon, will be aesthetic: either a unity of internal determinations, M. § 37, whence the unity of action, if the object of beautiful meditation is an action; or of external determinations and relations, M. § 37, of circumstances, M. § 323, whence the unity of place and time, M. § 325, § 281.
Sit, quod vis, simplex duntaxat et unum,
"In a word, be your subject what it will, let it be merely simple and
uniform."
et placentem simul rotundam illam brevitatem S. XIII. XIV. et pulcram obtinebis cohaerentiam, § 437. Hinc Augustino placuit adeo unitas, ut eam omnis pulcritudinis formam diceret. / and you will obtain at the same time that pleasing rounded brevity, Sections XIII and XIV, and beautiful coherence, § 437. Hence unity so pleased Augustine that he called it the form of all beauty.
§ 440
Veritas Aestheticologica, § 424. vel est universalium et notionum, iudiciorumque generalium, vel singularium et idearum, M. § 148. Illa Generalis, Haec Singularis esto. Veritatis generalis in obiecto nunquam tantum veritatis metaphysicae detegitur, praesertim sensitive, quantum in obiecto veritatis singularis, M. § 184. Quoque generalior est veritas aestheticologica hoc minus veritatis metaphysicae in eiusdem obiecto, et omnino, et praesertim analogo rationis, repraesentatur, M. §§ 150, 184. Habes rationem unam, ob quam aestheticus veritatis, quam observare possit, maximae studiosus, § 22, veritatibus generalioribus, abstractissimis et maxime universalibus, determinatiores, minus generales, minus abstractas, et generalibus omnibus singulares praeferat, quantum potest. Idem ubertas suadet § 115. quia quo magis determinatum habes obiectum, hoc plures simul differentias, M. § 151. hoc itaque plura pulcre cogitare de eodem conceditur. Idem magnitudo, et naturalis, et dignitas aesthetica iubet, si connumeres ad magnitudinem universalis quamcunque accedens in eius inferiori differentiae simul pondus, gravitatem, foecunditatem, § 177.
Aestheticological truth, § 424, is either of universals and notions, and of general judgments, or of singulars and ideas, M. § 148. Let the former be general, the latter singular. In the object of general truth there is never detected so much metaphysical truth, especially sensitively, as in the object of singular truth, M. § 184. And the more general an aestheticological truth is, the less metaphysical truth is represented in its object, both altogether and especially to the analogue of reason, M. §§ 150, 184. You have one reason why the aesthetician, zealous for the greatest truth he can observe, § 22, prefers, so far as he can, truths that are more determinate, less general, less abstract, and, before all general truths, singular truths, to truths that are more general, most abstract, and maximally universal. Abundance advises the same, § 115, because the more determinate an object you have, the more differences you have together, M. § 151, and therefore the more things you are allowed to think beautifully about the same object. Magnitude, too - both natural magnitude and aesthetic dignity - commands the same, if you count into the magnitude of any universal the weight, gravity, and fruitfulness that accede at the same time in its lower difference, § 177.
Veritas Aestheticologica, § 424. vel est universalium et notionum, iudiciorumque generalium, vel singularium et idearum, M. § 148. Illa Generalis, Haec Singularis esto.
Aestheticological truth, § 424, is either of universals and notions, and of general judgments, or of singulars and ideas, M. § 148. Let the former be general, the latter singular.
Veritatis generalis in obiecto nunquam tantum veritatis metaphysicae detegitur, praesertim sensitive, quantum in obiecto veritatis singularis, M. § 184. Quoque generalior est veritas aestheticologica hoc minus veritatis metaphysicae in eiusdem obiecto, et omnino, et praesertim analogo rationis, repraesentatur, M. §§ 150, 184. Habes rationem unam, ob quam aestheticus veritatis, quam observare possit, maximae studiosus, § 22, veritatibus generalioribus, abstractissimis et maxime universalibus, determinatiores, minus generales, minus abstractas, et generalibus omnibus singulares praeferat, quantum potest.
In the object of general truth there is never detected so much metaphysical truth, especially sensitively, as in the object of singular truth, M. § 184. And the more general an aestheticological truth is, the less metaphysical truth is represented in its object, both altogether and especially to the analogue of reason, M. §§ 150, 184. You have one reason why the aesthetician, zealous for the greatest truth he can observe, § 22, prefers, so far as he can, truths that are more determinate, less general, less abstract, and, before all general truths, singular truths, to truths that are more general, most abstract, and maximally universal.
Idem ubertas suadet § 115. quia quo magis determinatum habes obiectum, hoc plures simul differentias, M. § 151. hoc itaque plura pulcre cogitare de eodem conceditur.
Abundance advises the same, § 115, because the more determinate an object you have, the more differences you have together, M. § 151, and therefore the more things you are allowed to think beautifully about the same object.
Idem magnitudo, et naturalis, et dignitas aesthetica iubet, si connumeres ad magnitudinem universalis quamcunque accedens in eius inferiori differentiae simul pondus, gravitatem, foecunditatem, § 177.
Magnitude, too - both natural magnitude and aesthetic dignity - commands the same, if you count into the magnitude of any universal the weight, gravity, and fruitfulness that accede at the same time in its lower difference, § 177.
Veritas Aestheticologica, § 424. vel est universalium et notionum,
Aestheticological truth, § 424, is either of universals and notions,
iudiciorumque generalium, vel singularium et idearum, M.
and of general judgments, or of singulars and ideas, M.
§ 148. Illa Generalis, Haec Singularis esto.
§ 148. Let the former be general, the latter singular.
Veritatis generalis in obiecto nunquam tantum veritatis
In the object of general truth there
metaphysicae detegitur, praesertim sensitive,
is never detected so much metaphysical truth, especially sensitively,
quantum in obiecto veritatis singularis, M. § 184.
as in the object of singular truth, M. § 184.
Quoque generalior est
And the more general an aestheticological truth is,
veritas aestheticologica hoc minus veritatis metaphysicae in eiusdem obiecto,
the less metaphysical truth is represented in its object,
et omnino, et praesertim analogo rationis, repraesentatur, M.
both altogether and especially to the analogue of reason, M.
§§ 150, 184. Habes rationem unam,
§§ 150, 184. You have one reason why the aesthetician,
ob quam aestheticus veritatis, quam observare possit, maximae
zealous for the greatest truth he can observe,
studiosus, § 22, veritatibus generalioribus,
§ 22, prefers, so far as he can,
abstractissimis et maxime universalibus, determinatiores, minus generales, minus abstractas,
truths that are more determinate, less general, less abstract,
et generalibus omnibus singulares
and, before all general truths, singular truths,
praeferat, quantum potest.
to truths that are more general, most abstract, and maximally universal.
Idem ubertas suadet § 115.
Abundance advises the same, § 115,
quia quo magis determinatum habes obiectum, hoc
because the more determinate an object you have,
plures simul differentias, M. § 151.
the more differences you have together, M. § 151,
hoc itaque plura
and therefore the more things you are allowed to
pulcre cogitare de eodem conceditur.
think beautifully about the same object.
Idem magnitudo, et naturalis,
Magnitude, too - both natural
et dignitas aesthetica iubet,
magnitude and aesthetic dignity - commands the same,
si connumeres ad magnitudinem universalis quamcunque
if you count into the magnitude of any universal the weight,
accedens in eius inferiori differentiae simul pondus,
gravity, and fruitfulness that accede at the same time in
gravitatem, foecunditatem, § 177.
its lower difference, § 177.
Veritas Aestheticologica, § 424. vel est universalium et notionum, iudiciorumque generalium, vel singularium et idearum, M. § 148. Illa Generalis, Haec Singularis esto. / Aestheticological truth, § 424, is either of universals and notions, and of general judgments, or of singulars and ideas, M. § 148. Let the former be general, the latter singular.
Veritatis generalis in obiecto nunquam tantum veritatis metaphysicae detegitur, praesertim sensitive, quantum in obiecto veritatis singularis, M. § 184. Quoque generalior est veritas aestheticologica hoc minus veritatis metaphysicae in eiusdem obiecto, et omnino, et praesertim analogo rationis, repraesentatur, M. §§ 150, 184. Habes rationem unam, ob quam aestheticus veritatis, quam observare possit, maximae studiosus, § 22, veritatibus generalioribus, abstractissimis et maxime universalibus, determinatiores, minus generales, minus abstractas, et generalibus omnibus singulares praeferat, quantum potest. / In the object of general truth there is never detected so much metaphysical truth, especially sensitively, as in the object of singular truth, M. § 184. And the more general an aestheticological truth is, the less metaphysical truth is represented in its object, both altogether and especially to the analogue of reason, M. §§ 150, 184. You have one reason why the aesthetician, zealous for the greatest truth he can observe, § 22, prefers, so far as he can, truths that are more determinate, less general, less abstract, and, before all general truths, singular truths, to truths that are more general, most abstract, and maximally universal.
Idem ubertas suadet § 115. quia quo magis determinatum habes obiectum, hoc plures simul differentias, M. § 151. hoc itaque plura pulcre cogitare de eodem conceditur. / Abundance advises the same, § 115, because the more determinate an object you have, the more differences you have together, M. § 151, and therefore the more things you are allowed to think beautifully about the same object.
Idem magnitudo, et naturalis, et dignitas aesthetica iubet, si connumeres ad magnitudinem universalis quamcunque accedens in eius inferiori differentiae simul pondus, gravitatem, foecunditatem, § 177. / Magnitude, too - both natural magnitude and aesthetic dignity - commands the same, if you count into the magnitude of any universal the weight, gravity, and fruitfulness that accede at the same time in its lower difference, § 177.
§ 441
Veritas aestheticologica generis est perceptio magnae veritatis metaphysicae; veritas aestheticologica speciei est perceptio maioris, veritas individui, seu singularis, aestheticologica est perceptio maximae, qua genus, veritatis metaphysicae. Prima veri, secunda verioris, tertia verissimi. § 440. Veritas singularis vel est internorum entis optimi maximi, vel absolute contingentium. Contingentia non repraesentantur, ut singularia, nisi ut possibilia integri alicuius universi. Hinc veritas singularis de contingentibus aut ea sistit, ut possibilia et partes huius universi, M. § 377. et haec veritas cum veritate absolute necessariorum maxima dicitur Strictissime, popularique sermone simpliciter, Veritas, aut ut possibilia alterius universi, eiusque partes, cognitioni hominum mediae, M. § 876. Veritas Heterocosmica.
Aestheticological truth of a genus is the perception of great metaphysical truth; aestheticological truth of a species is the perception of greater truth; aestheticological truth of an individual, or singular, is the perception of the greatest metaphysical truth, as compared with the genus. The first is of the true, the second of the truer, the third of the truest, § 440. Singular truth is either of the internal things of the best and greatest being, or of absolutely contingent things. Contingent things are not represented as singulars except as possible parts of some whole universe. Hence singular truth concerning contingent things either presents them as possible things and as parts of this universe, M. § 377, and this truth, together with the greatest truth of absolutely necessary things, is called Strictest truth, and in popular speech simply Truth; or it presents them as possible things of another universe and as parts of it, for the middle cognition of human beings, M. § 876: Heterocosmic Truth.
Veritas aestheticologica generis est perceptio magnae veritatis metaphysicae; veritas aestheticologica speciei est perceptio maioris, veritas individui, seu singularis, aestheticologica est perceptio maximae, qua genus, veritatis metaphysicae.
Aestheticological truth of a genus is the perception of great metaphysical truth; aestheticological truth of a species is the perception of greater truth; aestheticological truth of an individual, or singular, is the perception of the greatest metaphysical truth, as compared with the genus.
Prima veri, secunda verioris, tertia verissimi. § 440. Veritas singularis vel est internorum entis optimi maximi, vel absolute contingentium.
The first is of the true, the second of the truer, the third of the truest, § 440. Singular truth is either of the internal things of the best and greatest being, or of absolutely contingent things.
Contingentia non repraesentantur, ut singularia, nisi ut possibilia integri alicuius universi.
Contingent things are not represented as singulars except as possible parts of some whole universe.
Hinc veritas singularis de contingentibus aut ea sistit, ut possibilia et partes huius universi, M. § 377. et haec veritas cum veritate absolute necessariorum maxima dicitur Strictissime, popularique sermone simpliciter, Veritas, aut ut possibilia alterius universi, eiusque partes, cognitioni hominum mediae, M. § 876. Veritas Heterocosmica.
Hence singular truth concerning contingent things either presents them as possible things and as parts of this universe, M. § 377, and this truth, together with the greatest truth of absolutely necessary things, is called Strictest truth, and in popular speech simply Truth; or it presents them as possible things of another universe and as parts of it, for the middle cognition of human beings, M. § 876: Heterocosmic Truth.
Veritas aestheticologica generis est perceptio
Aestheticological truth of a genus is the perception
magnae veritatis metaphysicae; veritas aestheticologica
of great metaphysical truth; aestheticological truth of
speciei est perceptio maioris,
a species is the perception of greater truth;
veritas individui, seu singularis,
aestheticological truth of an individual, or singular,
aestheticologica est perceptio maximae, qua genus, veritatis
is the perception of the greatest metaphysical truth,
metaphysicae.
as compared with the genus.
Prima veri, secunda verioris, tertia verissimi.
The first is of the true, the second of the truer, the
§ 440. Veritas singularis vel est
third of the truest, § 440. Singular truth is
internorum entis optimi maximi,
either of the internal things of the best and greatest
vel absolute contingentium.
being, or of absolutely contingent things.
Contingentia non repraesentantur, ut singularia,
Contingent things are not represented as singulars
nisi ut possibilia integri alicuius universi.
except as possible parts of some whole universe.
Hinc veritas singularis de contingentibus aut ea sistit,
Hence singular truth concerning contingent things either presents them
ut possibilia et partes huius universi, M.
as possible things and as parts of this universe, M.
§ 377. et haec veritas cum
§ 377, and this truth, together with the greatest truth
veritate absolute necessariorum maxima dicitur Strictissime,
of absolutely necessary things, is called Strictest truth,
popularique
and in popular speech simply Truth;
sermone simpliciter, Veritas, aut ut possibilia alterius universi,
or it presents them as possible things of another universe
eiusque partes, cognitioni hominum mediae,
and as parts of it, for the middle cognition of human
M. § 876. Veritas Heterocosmica.
beings, M. § 876: Heterocosmic Truth.
Veritas aestheticologica generis est perceptio magnae veritatis metaphysicae; veritas aestheticologica speciei est perceptio maioris, veritas individui, seu singularis, aestheticologica est perceptio maximae, qua genus, veritatis metaphysicae. / Aestheticological truth of a genus is the perception of great metaphysical truth; aestheticological truth of a species is the perception of greater truth; aestheticological truth of an individual, or singular, is the perception of the greatest metaphysical truth, as compared with the genus.
Prima veri, secunda verioris, tertia verissimi. § 440. Veritas singularis vel est internorum entis optimi maximi, vel absolute contingentium. / The first is of the true, the second of the truer, the third of the truest, § 440. Singular truth is either of the internal things of the best and greatest being, or of absolutely contingent things.
Contingentia non repraesentantur, ut singularia, nisi ut possibilia integri alicuius universi. / Contingent things are not represented as singulars except as possible parts of some whole universe.
Hinc veritas singularis de contingentibus aut ea sistit, ut possibilia et partes huius universi, M. § 377. et haec veritas cum veritate absolute necessariorum maxima dicitur Strictissime, popularique sermone simpliciter, Veritas, aut ut possibilia alterius universi, eiusque partes, cognitioni hominum mediae, M. § 876. Veritas Heterocosmica. / Hence singular truth concerning contingent things either presents them as possible things and as parts of this universe, M. § 377, and this truth, together with the greatest truth of absolutely necessary things, is called Strictest truth, and in popular speech simply Truth; or it presents them as possible things of another universe and as parts of it, for the middle cognition of human beings, M. § 876: Heterocosmic Truth.
§ 442
Veritas strictissime dicta § 441. est, quam describit Cicero de Inv. II. 162.
Truth in the strictest sense, § 441, is what Cicero describes in De inventione II.162 as follows:
per quam immutata (non mutata) ea, quae sunt, aut ante fuerunt, aut futura sunt, dicuntur
Truth is that by which those things which are, or which have been
previously, or which are about to happen, are spoken of without any
alteration.
(percipiuntur), quamque conferre videtur cum veritatibus minoribus Quaest. Tusc. V. 13.
Here "without any alteration" means "not changed," and "spoken of" means "perceived"; and he seems to compare it with lesser truths in Tusculan Questions V.13, saying:
Chorus ille virtutum, inquiens, (constantia, gravitas, fortitudo, sapientia, reliquae) in equuleum impositus (veritate vel generali et abstracta, uti Stoicorum ista gustata magis, quam potata, delectant, vel heterocosmica, §§ 441, 440.) imagines constituit ante oculos cum amplissima dignitate,
"while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered up to the executioner [...] As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes,"
S. XXI.
(by truth either general and abstract, as those Stoic things delight more when tasted than when drunk, or by heterocosmic truth, §§ 441, 440), Section XXI,
ut ad eas cursim perrectura, nec eas a se beata vita desertas passura videatur (cognitioni mediae § 441.) Quum autem animum ab ista pictura imaginibusque virtutum (vel generalibus et abstractis, vel heterocosmicis) ad rem veritatemque (strictissimam) traduxeris: hoc nudum (heterocosmicis mediae cognitionis obiectis spoliatum et ab iis omnibus separatum) relinquitur, possitne (in hoc universo singulariter et in concreto numerico) quis beatus esse, quam diu torqueatur.
"happiness seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her. But when you take your attention off from this picture and these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in torment?"
The opening picture belongs to middle cognition (§ 441), whether general and abstract or heterocosmic; "truth and reality" indicate truth in the strict sense; "without disguise" strips away the heterocosmic objects of middle cognition; and the final question concerns happiness singularly, in this universe and in numerical concreteness.
Veritas strictissime dicta § 441. est, quam describit Cicero de Inv. II. 162.
Truth in the strictest sense, § 441, is what Cicero describes in De inventione II.162 as follows:
per quam immutata (non mutata) ea, quae sunt, aut ante fuerunt, aut futura sunt, dicuntur
Truth is that by which those things which are, or which have been
previously, or which are about to happen, are spoken of without any
alteration.
(percipiuntur), quamque conferre videtur cum veritatibus minoribus Quaest. Tusc. V. 13.
Here "without any alteration" means "not changed," and "spoken of" means "perceived"; and he seems to compare it with lesser truths in Tusculan Questions V.13, saying:
Chorus ille virtutum, inquiens, (constantia, gravitas, fortitudo, sapientia, reliquae) in equuleum impositus (veritate vel generali et abstracta, uti Stoicorum ista gustata magis, quam potata, delectant, vel heterocosmica, §§ 441, 440.) imagines constituit ante oculos cum amplissima dignitate,
"while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered up to the executioner [...] As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes,"
S. XXI.
(by truth either general and abstract, as those Stoic things delight more when tasted than when drunk, or by heterocosmic truth, §§ 441, 440), Section XXI,
ut ad eas cursim perrectura, nec eas a se beata vita desertas passura videatur (cognitioni mediae § 441.) Quum autem animum ab ista pictura imaginibusque virtutum (vel generalibus et abstractis, vel heterocosmicis) ad rem veritatemque (strictissimam) traduxeris: hoc nudum (heterocosmicis mediae cognitionis obiectis spoliatum et ab iis omnibus separatum) relinquitur, possitne (in hoc universo singulariter et in concreto numerico) quis beatus esse, quam diu torqueatur.
"happiness seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her. But when you take your attention off from this picture and these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in torment?"
The opening picture belongs to middle cognition (§ 441), whether general and abstract or heterocosmic; "truth and reality" indicate truth in the strict sense; "without disguise" strips away the heterocosmic objects of middle cognition; and the final question concerns happiness singularly, in this universe and in numerical concreteness.
Veritas strictissime dicta § 441.
Truth in the strictest sense, § 441,
est, quam describit Cicero de Inv. II. 162.
is what Cicero describes in De inventione II.162 as follows:
per quam immutata (non mutata) ea, quae sunt, aut ante fuerunt, aut futura sunt, dicuntur
Truth is that by which those things which are, or which have been
previously, or which are about to happen, are spoken of without any
alteration.
(percipiuntur), quamque conferre videtur
Here "without any alteration" means "not changed," and "spoken of" means "perceived";
cum veritatibus minoribus Quaest.
and he seems to compare it with lesser truths in
Tusc. V. 13.
Tusculan Questions V.13, saying:
Chorus ille virtutum, inquiens, (constantia, gravitas, fortitudo, sapientia, reliquae) in equuleum impositus (veritate vel generali et abstracta, uti Stoicorum ista gustata magis, quam potata, delectant, vel heterocosmica, §§ 441, 440.) imagines constituit ante oculos cum amplissima dignitate,
"while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered up to the executioner [...] As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes,"
S.
(by truth either general and abstract, as
XXI.
those Stoic things delight more when tasted than when drunk, or by heterocosmic truth, §§ 441, 440), Section XXI,
ut ad eas cursim perrectura, nec eas a se beata vita desertas passura videatur (cognitioni mediae § 441.) Quum autem animum ab ista pictura imaginibusque virtutum (vel generalibus et abstractis, vel heterocosmicis) ad rem veritatemque (strictissimam) traduxeris: hoc nudum (heterocosmicis mediae cognitionis obiectis spoliatum et ab iis omnibus separatum) relinquitur, possitne (in hoc universo singulariter et in concreto numerico) quis beatus esse, quam diu torqueatur.
"happiness seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her. But when you take your attention off from this picture and these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in torment?"
The opening picture belongs to middle cognition (§ 441), whether general and abstract or heterocosmic; "truth and reality" indicate truth in the strict sense; "without disguise" strips away the heterocosmic objects of middle cognition; and the final question concerns happiness singularly, in this universe and in numerical concreteness.
Veritas strictissime dicta § 441. est, quam describit Cicero de Inv. II. 162. / Truth in the strictest sense, § 441, is what Cicero describes in De inventione II.162 as follows:
per quam immutata (non mutata) ea, quae sunt, aut ante fuerunt, aut futura sunt, dicuntur
Truth is that by which those things which are, or which have been
previously, or which are about to happen, are spoken of without any
alteration.
(percipiuntur), quamque conferre videtur cum veritatibus minoribus Quaest. Tusc. V. 13. / Here "without any alteration" means "not changed," and "spoken of" means "perceived"; and he seems to compare it with lesser truths in Tusculan Questions V.13, saying:
Chorus ille virtutum, inquiens, (constantia, gravitas, fortitudo, sapientia, reliquae) in equuleum impositus (veritate vel generali et abstracta, uti Stoicorum ista gustata magis, quam potata, delectant, vel heterocosmica, §§ 441, 440.) imagines constituit ante oculos cum amplissima dignitate,
"while constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered up to the executioner [...] As when that assemblage of virtues is committed to the rack, it raises so reverend a spectacle before our eyes,"
S. XXI. / (by truth either general and abstract, as those Stoic things delight more when tasted than when drunk, or by heterocosmic truth, §§ 441, 440), Section XXI,
ut ad eas cursim perrectura, nec eas a se beata vita desertas passura videatur (cognitioni mediae § 441.) Quum autem animum ab ista pictura imaginibusque virtutum (vel generalibus et abstractis, vel heterocosmicis) ad rem veritatemque (strictissimam) traduxeris: hoc nudum (heterocosmicis mediae cognitionis obiectis spoliatum et ab iis omnibus separatum) relinquitur, possitne (in hoc universo singulariter et in concreto numerico) quis beatus esse, quam diu torqueatur.
"happiness seems to hasten on towards them, and not to suffer them to be deserted by her. But when you take your attention off from this picture and these images of the virtues to the truth and the reality, what remains without disguise is, the question whether any one can be happy in torment?"
/ The opening picture belongs to middle cognition (§ 441), whether general and abstract or heterocosmic; "truth and reality" indicate truth in the strict sense; "without disguise" strips away the heterocosmic objects of middle cognition; and the final question concerns happiness singularly, in this universe and in numerical concreteness.
§ 443
Veritatum aestheticologicarum generalium eae tantum aestheticae sunt, quae et quatenus analogo rationis, salva venustate, sensitive repraesentari possunt, §§ 440, 423. vel manifesto, et explicite, vel cryptice in omissis enthymematum enunciationibus, vel in exemplis, in quibus, tanquam concretis, haec abstracta deprehendantur. Hac ratione ipsum identitatis principium, M. § 11. est in Plauti, quis crederet? prologo
Of general aestheticological truths, only those are aesthetic which, and insofar as they, can be represented sensitively to the analogue of reason with grace preserved, §§ 440, 423: either manifestly and explicitly, or cryptically in the omitted propositions of enthymemes, or in examples in which, as in concrete things, these abstractions are detected. In this way the principle of identity itself, M. § 11, is found in Plautus' prologue to the Captivi - who would believe it?
Captiv.:
Hos, quos videtis stare hic captivos duos,
Illi, qui adstant, hi stant ambo, non sedent,
Vos, vos mihi testes estis me verum loqui.
"THESE two captives (pointing to PHILOCRATES and TYNDARUS), whom you see standing here, are standing here because—they are both standing, and are not sitting. That I am saying this truly, you are my witnesses."
Veritatum aestheticologicarum generalium eae tantum aestheticae sunt, quae et quatenus analogo rationis, salva venustate, sensitive repraesentari possunt, §§ 440, 423. vel manifesto, et explicite, vel cryptice in omissis enthymematum enunciationibus, vel in exemplis, in quibus, tanquam concretis, haec abstracta deprehendantur.
Of general aestheticological truths, only those are aesthetic which, and insofar as they, can be represented sensitively to the analogue of reason with grace preserved, §§ 440, 423: either manifestly and explicitly, or cryptically in the omitted propositions of enthymemes, or in examples in which, as in concrete things, these abstractions are detected.
Hac ratione ipsum identitatis principium, M. § 11. est in Plauti, quis crederet? prologo
In this way the principle of identity itself, M. § 11, is found in Plautus' prologue to the Captivi - who would believe it?
Captiv.:
Hos, quos videtis stare hic captivos duos,
Illi, qui adstant, hi stant ambo, non sedent,
Vos, vos mihi testes estis me verum loqui.
"THESE two captives (pointing to PHILOCRATES and TYNDARUS), whom you see standing here, are standing here because—they are both standing, and are not sitting. That I am saying this truly, you are my witnesses."
Veritatum aestheticologicarum generalium eae tantum aestheticae sunt,
Of general aestheticological truths, only those are
quae et quatenus
aesthetic which, and insofar as they,
analogo rationis,
can be represented sensitively to the analogue of reason
salva venustate, sensitive repraesentari possunt, §§ 440, 423.
with grace preserved, §§ 440, 423:
vel manifesto, et explicite, vel cryptice in omissis enthymematum
either manifestly and explicitly, or cryptically in the omitted propositions of enthymemes,
enunciationibus, vel in exemplis, in quibus, tanquam concretis,
or in examples in which, as in concrete
haec abstracta deprehendantur.
things, these abstractions are detected.
Hac ratione ipsum identitatis principium, M.
In this way the principle of identity itself, M.
§ 11. est in Plauti, quis crederet?
§ 11, is found in Plautus' prologue to the Captivi - who would
prologo
believe it?
Captiv.:
Hos, quos videtis stare hic captivos duos,
Illi, qui adstant, hi stant ambo, non sedent,
Vos, vos mihi testes estis me verum loqui.
"THESE two captives (pointing to PHILOCRATES and TYNDARUS), whom you see standing here, are standing here because—they are both standing, and are not sitting. That I am saying this truly, you are my witnesses."
Veritatum aestheticologicarum generalium eae tantum aestheticae sunt, quae et quatenus analogo rationis, salva venustate, sensitive repraesentari possunt, §§ 440, 423. vel manifesto, et explicite, vel cryptice in omissis enthymematum enunciationibus, vel in exemplis, in quibus, tanquam concretis, haec abstracta deprehendantur. / Of general aestheticological truths, only those are aesthetic which, and insofar as they, can be represented sensitively to the analogue of reason with grace preserved, §§ 440, 423: either manifestly and explicitly, or cryptically in the omitted propositions of enthymemes, or in examples in which, as in concrete things, these abstractions are detected.
Hac ratione ipsum identitatis principium, M. § 11. est in Plauti, quis crederet? prologo / In this way the principle of identity itself, M. § 11, is found in Plautus' prologue to the Captivi - who would believe it?
Captiv.:
Hos, quos videtis stare hic captivos duos,
Illi, qui adstant, hi stant ambo, non sedent,
Vos, vos mihi testes estis me verum loqui.
"THESE two captives (pointing to PHILOCRATES and TYNDARUS), whom you see standing here, are standing here because—they are both standing, and are not sitting. That I am saying this truly, you are my witnesses."
§ 444
Strictissime verorum eatenus est, veritas aesthetica, quatenus ea sensitive percipiuntur vera, sensationibus vel imaginationibus, vel etiam praevisionibus non sine praesagio, nec amplius, et sub eadem hypothesi veritates heterocosmicae sunt veritates aestheticae, neque plures, neque pauciores, quam analogo rationis percipiendae. § 441. Leibnitianam putas distinctionem, iam est Tibulli, qui in Messallae pan. L. IV. 1. de erroribus Ulyssis multa narrarat, ita ea finiens, v. 80:
The truth of things true in the strictest sense is aesthetic truth to this extent: insofar as those things are sensitively perceived as true, by sensations or imaginations, or even by foresights not without presentiment, and no further. Under the same hypothesis, heterocosmic truths are aesthetic truths - neither more nor fewer - insofar as they are to be perceived by the analogue of reason, § 441. You think the distinction Leibnizian; it is already Tibullus', who in the panegyric of Messalla, book IV, 1, after narrating many things about the wanderings of Ulysses, ended them thus, verse 80:
Atque haec seu nostras inter sunt cognita terras,
(strictissime vera, § 442.)
Fabula sive novum dedit his erroribus orbem.
"And whether these adventures were encountered amid the lands we know or report has placed his wanderings in some new world"
(heterocosmice vera, § 441.)
The first alternative is true in the strict sense (§ 442), the second heterocosmically true (§ 441).
Strictissime verorum eatenus est, veritas aesthetica, quatenus ea sensitive percipiuntur vera, sensationibus vel imaginationibus, vel etiam praevisionibus non sine praesagio, nec amplius, et sub eadem hypothesi veritates heterocosmicae sunt veritates aestheticae, neque plures, neque pauciores, quam analogo rationis percipiendae. § 441. Leibnitianam putas distinctionem, iam est Tibulli, qui in Messallae pan. L. IV. 1. de erroribus Ulyssis multa narrarat, ita ea finiens, v. 80:
The truth of things true in the strictest sense is aesthetic truth to this extent: insofar as those things are sensitively perceived as true, by sensations or imaginations, or even by foresights not without presentiment, and no further. Under the same hypothesis, heterocosmic truths are aesthetic truths - neither more nor fewer - insofar as they are to be perceived by the analogue of reason, § 441. You think the distinction Leibnizian; it is already Tibullus', who in the panegyric of Messalla, book IV, 1, after narrating many things about the wanderings of Ulysses, ended them thus, verse 80:
Atque haec seu nostras inter sunt cognita terras,
(strictissime vera, § 442.)
Fabula sive novum dedit his erroribus orbem.
"And whether these adventures were encountered amid the lands we know or report has placed his wanderings in some new world"
(heterocosmice vera, § 441.)
The first alternative is true in the strict sense (§ 442), the second heterocosmically true (§ 441).
Strictissime verorum eatenus est,
The truth of things true in the strictest sense is
veritas aesthetica,
aesthetic truth to this extent:
quatenus ea sensitive percipiuntur vera,
insofar as those things are sensitively perceived as true,
sensationibus vel imaginationibus, vel etiam praevisionibus non sine praesagio,
by sensations or imaginations, or even by foresights not without
nec amplius, et sub eadem hypothesi
presentiment, and no further. Under the same hypothesis,
veritates heterocosmicae sunt veritates aestheticae, neque plures,
heterocosmic truths are aesthetic truths - neither more nor
neque pauciores, quam
fewer - insofar as they are to be perceived
analogo rationis percipiendae. § 441.
by the analogue of reason, § 441.
Leibnitianam putas distinctionem, iam est Tibulli,
You think the distinction Leibnizian; it is already Tibullus',
qui in Messallae pan. L. IV.
who in the panegyric of Messalla, book IV,
1. de erroribus Ulyssis
1, after narrating many things about the wanderings of Ulysses,
multa narrarat, ita ea finiens, v. 80:
ended them thus, verse 80:
Atque haec seu nostras inter sunt cognita terras,
(strictissime vera, § 442.)
Fabula sive novum dedit his erroribus orbem.
"And whether these adventures were encountered amid the lands we know or report has placed his wanderings in some new world"
(heterocosmice vera,
The first alternative is true in the strict
§ 441.)
sense (§ 442), the second heterocosmically true (§ 441).
Strictissime verorum eatenus est, veritas aesthetica, quatenus ea sensitive percipiuntur vera, sensationibus vel imaginationibus, vel etiam praevisionibus non sine praesagio, nec amplius, et sub eadem hypothesi veritates heterocosmicae sunt veritates aestheticae, neque plures, neque pauciores, quam analogo rationis percipiendae. § 441. Leibnitianam putas distinctionem, iam est Tibulli, qui in Messallae pan. L. IV. 1. de erroribus Ulyssis multa narrarat, ita ea finiens, v. 80: / The truth of things true in the strictest sense is aesthetic truth to this extent: insofar as those things are sensitively perceived as true, by sensations or imaginations, or even by foresights not without presentiment, and no further. Under the same hypothesis, heterocosmic truths are aesthetic truths - neither more nor fewer - insofar as they are to be perceived by the analogue of reason, § 441. You think the distinction Leibnizian; it is already Tibullus', who in the panegyric of Messalla, book IV, 1, after narrating many things about the wanderings of Ulysses, ended them thus, verse 80:
Atque haec seu nostras inter sunt cognita terras,
(strictissime vera, § 442.)
Fabula sive novum dedit his erroribus orbem.
"And whether these adventures were encountered amid the lands we know or report has placed his wanderings in some new world"
(heterocosmice vera, § 441.) / The first alternative is true in the strict sense (§ 442), the second heterocosmically true (§ 441).
§ 445
Sectio XXVIII. Falsitas Aesthetica.
Falsitas Aesthetica est falsitas subiectiva et disconvenientia cogitationum cum veritate rerum cogitandarum, quatenus illa sensitive percipi potest. §§ 423, 426. Optime Cicero:
Section XXVIII. Aesthetic Falsity.
Aesthetic falsity is subjective falsity and the disagreement of thoughts with the truth of the things to be thought, insofar as that disagreement can be perceived sensitively, §§ 423, 426. Cicero says very well:
Falsum est, in quo perspicue est mendacium,
"That is false in which there is evidently a lie;"
si de aesthetica falsitate intelligatur, et perspicuitas sensitiva cogitetur. M. § 531. Quando autem exemplo vult notionem suam illustrare, num illud ad rem probe faciat, nostrorum sapientes temporum viderint.
if this is understood of aesthetic falsity and if sensate evidentness is thought. M. § 531. But when he wishes to illustrate his notion with an example, whether it properly serves the matter, let the wise people of our times see. "In this way," he says:
Hoc, ait, modo: Non potest esse sapiens, qui pecuniam negligat.
"in this manner:—“That man cannot be wise who neglects money.”"
Sectio XXVIII. Falsitas Aesthetica.
Section XXVIII. Aesthetic Falsity.
Falsitas Aesthetica est falsitas subiectiva et disconvenientia cogitationum cum veritate rerum cogitandarum, quatenus illa sensitive percipi potest. §§ 423, 426. Optime Cicero:
Aesthetic falsity is subjective falsity and the disagreement of thoughts with the truth of the things to be thought, insofar as that disagreement can be perceived sensitively, §§ 423, 426. Cicero says very well:
Falsum est, in quo perspicue est mendacium,
"That is false in which there is evidently a lie;"
si de aesthetica falsitate intelligatur, et perspicuitas sensitiva cogitetur.
if this is understood of aesthetic falsity and if sensate evidentness is thought.
M. § 531. Quando autem exemplo vult notionem suam illustrare, num illud ad rem probe faciat, nostrorum sapientes temporum viderint.
M. § 531. But when he wishes to illustrate his notion with an example, whether it properly serves the matter, let the wise people of our times see. "In this way," he says:
Hoc, ait, modo: Non potest esse sapiens, qui pecuniam negligat.
"in this manner:—“That man cannot be wise who neglects money.”"
Sectio XXVIII. Falsitas Aesthetica.
Section XXVIII. Aesthetic Falsity.
Falsitas Aesthetica est falsitas subiectiva et
Aesthetic falsity is subjective falsity and the
disconvenientia cogitationum cum veritate rerum cogitandarum,
disagreement of thoughts with the truth of the things to be thought,
quatenus illa sensitive percipi potest. §§ 423, 426.
insofar as that disagreement can be perceived sensitively, §§ 423, 426.
Optime Cicero:
Cicero says very well:
Falsum est, in quo perspicue est mendacium,
"That is false in which there is evidently a lie;"
si de aesthetica falsitate intelligatur,
if this is understood of aesthetic falsity
et perspicuitas sensitiva cogitetur.
and if sensate evidentness is thought.
M. § 531. Quando autem exemplo vult
M. § 531. But when he wishes to illustrate his
notionem suam illustrare, num illud
notion with an example, whether it properly serves the matter,
ad rem probe faciat, nostrorum
let the wise people of our times see.
sapientes temporum viderint.
"In this way," he says:
Hoc, ait, modo: Non potest esse sapiens, qui pecuniam negligat.
"in this manner:—“That man cannot be wise who neglects money.”"
Sectio XXVIII. Falsitas Aesthetica. / Section XXVIII. Aesthetic Falsity.
Falsitas Aesthetica est falsitas subiectiva et disconvenientia cogitationum cum veritate rerum cogitandarum, quatenus illa sensitive percipi potest. §§ 423, 426. Optime Cicero: / Aesthetic falsity is subjective falsity and the disagreement of thoughts with the truth of the things to be thought, insofar as that disagreement can be perceived sensitively, §§ 423, 426. Cicero says very well:
Falsum est, in quo perspicue est mendacium,
"That is false in which there is evidently a lie;"
si de aesthetica falsitate intelligatur, et perspicuitas sensitiva cogitetur. / if this is understood of aesthetic falsity and if sensate evidentness is thought.
M. § 531. Quando autem exemplo vult notionem suam illustrare, num illud ad rem probe faciat, nostrorum sapientes temporum viderint. / M. § 531. But when he wishes to illustrate his notion with an example, whether it properly serves the matter, let the wise people of our times see. "In this way," he says:
Hoc, ait, modo: Non potest esse sapiens, qui pecuniam negligat.
"in this manner:—“That man cannot be wise who neglects money.”"
§ 446
Non, qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro
Nescit Aquinatem potantia vellera fucum,
Certius accipiet damnum, propiusque medullis,
Quam qui non poterit vero distinguere falsum.
"Not he who is unable to compare the fleeces that drink up the dye of Aquinum with the Sidonian purple, will receive a more certain damage and nearer to his marrow, than he who shall not be able to distinguish false from true."
Hor. l. ep. 10. 26. §§ 423, 448. Neque tamen huc omnis subiectiva falsitas § 424. pertinet, sed qualem pingit Horatius ad caput artis poeticae:
Horace, book I, epistle 10, line 26, §§ 423, 448. Yet not every subjective falsity, § 424, belongs here, but the sort that Horace paints at the beginning of the Ars poetica:
Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
Addere si velit, et varias inducere plumas
Undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne:
Spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?
Credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
Persimilem, cuius, velut aegri somnia, vanae
Finguntur species, ut nec pes, nec caput uni
Reddatur formae.
"If a painter should wish to unite a horse's neck to a human head, and spread a variety of plumage over limbs [of different animals] taken from every part [of nature], so that what is a beautiful woman in the upper part terminates unsightly in an ugly fish below; could you, my friends, refrain from laughter, were you admitted to such a sight? Believe, ye Pisos, the book will be perfectly like such a picture, the ideas of which, like a sick man's dreams, are all vain and fictitious: so that neither head nor foot can correspond to any one form."
Non, qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro
Nescit Aquinatem potantia vellera fucum,
Certius accipiet damnum, propiusque medullis,
Quam qui non poterit vero distinguere falsum.
"Not he who is unable to compare the fleeces that drink up the dye of Aquinum with the Sidonian purple, will receive a more certain damage and nearer to his marrow, than he who shall not be able to distinguish false from true."
Hor. l. ep. 10. 26. §§ 423, 448. Neque tamen huc omnis subiectiva falsitas § 424. pertinet, sed qualem pingit Horatius ad caput artis poeticae:
Horace, book I, epistle 10, line 26, §§ 423, 448. Yet not every subjective falsity, § 424, belongs here, but the sort that Horace paints at the beginning of the Ars poetica:
Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
Addere si velit, et varias inducere plumas
Undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne:
Spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?
Credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
Persimilem, cuius, velut aegri somnia, vanae
Finguntur species, ut nec pes, nec caput uni
Reddatur formae.
"If a painter should wish to unite a horse's neck to a human head, and spread a variety of plumage over limbs [of different animals] taken from every part [of nature], so that what is a beautiful woman in the upper part terminates unsightly in an ugly fish below; could you, my friends, refrain from laughter, were you admitted to such a sight? Believe, ye Pisos, the book will be perfectly like such a picture, the ideas of which, like a sick man's dreams, are all vain and fictitious: so that neither head nor foot can correspond to any one form."
Non, qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro
Nescit Aquinatem potantia vellera fucum,
Certius accipiet damnum, propiusque medullis,
Quam qui non poterit vero distinguere falsum.
"Not he who is unable to compare the fleeces that drink up the dye of Aquinum with the Sidonian purple, will receive a more certain damage and nearer to his marrow, than he who shall not be able to distinguish false from true."
Hor. l. ep. 10. 26. §§ 423, 448.
Horace, book I, epistle 10, line 26, §§ 423, 448.
Neque tamen huc omnis subiectiva falsitas § 424.
Yet not every subjective falsity, § 424,
pertinet, sed qualem pingit
belongs here, but the sort that Horace paints at
Horatius ad caput artis poeticae:
the beginning of the Ars poetica:
Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
Addere si velit, et varias inducere plumas
Undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne:
Spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?
Credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
Persimilem, cuius, velut aegri somnia, vanae
Finguntur species, ut nec pes, nec caput uni
Reddatur formae.
"If a painter should wish to unite a horse's neck to a human head, and spread a variety of plumage over limbs [of different animals] taken from every part [of nature], so that what is a beautiful woman in the upper part terminates unsightly in an ugly fish below; could you, my friends, refrain from laughter, were you admitted to such a sight? Believe, ye Pisos, the book will be perfectly like such a picture, the ideas of which, like a sick man's dreams, are all vain and fictitious: so that neither head nor foot can correspond to any one form."
Non, qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro
Nescit Aquinatem potantia vellera fucum,
Certius accipiet damnum, propiusque medullis,
Quam qui non poterit vero distinguere falsum.
"Not he who is unable to compare the fleeces that drink up the dye of Aquinum with the Sidonian purple, will receive a more certain damage and nearer to his marrow, than he who shall not be able to distinguish false from true."
Hor. l. ep. 10. 26. §§ 423, 448. Neque tamen huc omnis subiectiva falsitas § 424. pertinet, sed qualem pingit Horatius ad caput artis poeticae: / Horace, book I, epistle 10, line 26, §§ 423, 448. Yet not every subjective falsity, § 424, belongs here, but the sort that Horace paints at the beginning of the Ars poetica:
Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
Addere si velit, et varias inducere plumas
Undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne:
Spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?
Credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
Persimilem, cuius, velut aegri somnia, vanae
Finguntur species, ut nec pes, nec caput uni
Reddatur formae.
"If a painter should wish to unite a horse's neck to a human head, and spread a variety of plumage over limbs [of different animals] taken from every part [of nature], so that what is a beautiful woman in the upper part terminates unsightly in an ugly fish below; could you, my friends, refrain from laughter, were you admitted to such a sight? Believe, ye Pisos, the book will be perfectly like such a picture, the ideas of which, like a sick man's dreams, are all vain and fictitious: so that neither head nor foot can correspond to any one form."
§ 447
Non ab ovo, sed a falsis orditur Horatius, quodque lepidum videatur, ab iisdem Antonius apud Ciceronem de or. II. 30. Ille tamen ab aesthetico, §§ 445, 446. Hic ab aestheticologico generatim, § 427, quoniam in caussarum patronis, quales Crassus et ipse, affirmat aliquando necessarium esse alterutri falsum dicere, et utrumque eorundem eadem de re alias aliud defendere, quum plus uno verum (in se, et obiective, et strictissime) esse non possit. Hinc concedit omnem bene disserendi in foro rem mendacio nixam, neque male fert Catulum eum exagitantem, quod non magis gloriose putarit a veritate ordiri, quam a nescio qua dignitate.
Horace begins not from the egg, but from false things; and, in what may seem witty, Antonius in Cicero's De oratore II.30 begins from the same things. The former, however, begins from the aesthetic false, §§ 445, 446; the latter from the aestheticological false generally, § 427, since, in advocates of causes such as Crassus and himself, he affirms that it is sometimes necessary for one or the other to speak falsely, and for both of the same persons to defend different things at different times about the same matter, since there cannot be more than one truth (in itself, objectively, and in the strictest sense). Hence he grants that the whole business of speaking well in court rests on a lie, and he does not take it badly when Catulus chides him because he thought it more glorious to begin not from truth, but from some dignity or other.
Non ab ovo, sed a falsis orditur Horatius, quodque lepidum videatur, ab iisdem Antonius apud Ciceronem de or. II. 30. Ille tamen ab aesthetico, §§ 445, 446. Hic ab aestheticologico generatim, § 427, quoniam in caussarum patronis, quales Crassus et ipse, affirmat aliquando necessarium esse alterutri falsum dicere, et utrumque eorundem eadem de re alias aliud defendere, quum plus uno verum (in se, et obiective, et strictissime) esse non possit.
Horace begins not from the egg, but from false things; and, in what may seem witty, Antonius in Cicero's De oratore II.30 begins from the same things. The former, however, begins from the aesthetic false, §§ 445, 446; the latter from the aestheticological false generally, § 427, since, in advocates of causes such as Crassus and himself, he affirms that it is sometimes necessary for one or the other to speak falsely, and for both of the same persons to defend different things at different times about the same matter, since there cannot be more than one truth (in itself, objectively, and in the strictest sense).
Hinc concedit omnem bene disserendi in foro rem mendacio nixam, neque male fert Catulum eum exagitantem, quod non magis gloriose putarit a veritate ordiri, quam a nescio qua dignitate.
Hence he grants that the whole business of speaking well in court rests on a lie, and he does not take it badly when Catulus chides him because he thought it more glorious to begin not from truth, but from some dignity or other.
Non ab ovo, sed a falsis orditur
Horace begins not from the egg, but from false things;
Horatius, quodque lepidum videatur, ab iisdem Antonius apud Ciceronem de or.
and, in what may seem witty, Antonius in Cicero's De oratore II.30
II. 30. Ille tamen
begins from the same things. The former, however,
ab aesthetico, §§ 445, 446.
begins from the aesthetic false, §§ 445, 446;
Hic ab aestheticologico generatim, § 427, quoniam
the latter from the aestheticological false generally, § 427, since,
in caussarum patronis, quales Crassus et
in advocates of causes such as Crassus and himself,
ipse, affirmat aliquando necessarium
he affirms that it is sometimes necessary for one
esse alterutri falsum dicere,
or the other to speak falsely,
et utrumque eorundem eadem
and for both of the same persons to defend
de re alias aliud
different things at different times about the same matter,
defendere, quum plus uno verum (in se,
since there cannot be more than one truth (in
et obiective, et strictissime) esse non possit.
itself, objectively, and in the strictest sense).
Hinc concedit omnem bene disserendi
Hence he grants that the whole business of speaking
in foro rem mendacio nixam,
well in court rests on a lie,
neque male fert Catulum eum exagitantem,
and he does not take it badly when Catulus chides him
quod non magis gloriose putarit a veritate ordiri,
because he thought it more glorious to begin not from truth,
quam a nescio qua dignitate.
but from some dignity or other.
Non ab ovo, sed a falsis orditur Horatius, quodque lepidum videatur, ab iisdem Antonius apud Ciceronem de or. II. 30. Ille tamen ab aesthetico, §§ 445, 446. Hic ab aestheticologico generatim, § 427, quoniam in caussarum patronis, quales Crassus et ipse, affirmat aliquando necessarium esse alterutri falsum dicere, et utrumque eorundem eadem de re alias aliud defendere, quum plus uno verum (in se, et obiective, et strictissime) esse non possit. / Horace begins not from the egg, but from false things; and, in what may seem witty, Antonius in Cicero's De oratore II.30 begins from the same things. The former, however, begins from the aesthetic false, §§ 445, 446; the latter from the aestheticological false generally, § 427, since, in advocates of causes such as Crassus and himself, he affirms that it is sometimes necessary for one or the other to speak falsely, and for both of the same persons to defend different things at different times about the same matter, since there cannot be more than one truth (in itself, objectively, and in the strictest sense).
Hinc concedit omnem bene disserendi in foro rem mendacio nixam, neque male fert Catulum eum exagitantem, quod non magis gloriose putarit a veritate ordiri, quam a nescio qua dignitate. / Hence he grants that the whole business of speaking well in court rests on a lie, and he does not take it badly when Catulus chides him because he thought it more glorious to begin not from truth, but from some dignity or other.
§ 448
Sint quaedam aestheticologice falsa, § 427. immo etiam hoc significatu mendacia, § 447. tunc tamen erunt demum aesthetice falsa, si sint ipsi analogo rationis perspicue mendacia, § 445. Exempli loco sit ipsa de veritate disputatio. Contendant inter se philosophi dogmatici ex hac, academici scepticique ex altera parte subtiliter, de vero et falso (logice et metaphysice) de eius regula et criterio (primo, abstracto et scientifico) de notione utriusque, qua possint internosci (distincte, complete, scientifice) Digrediantur in id, quod interest inter rectum et pravum (universalius et logice conceptum) Redeant ad catholicam et primam veritatis notam, et logicum iudicium. Pone partem utramque, quam fieri potest, curatissime suam defendere sententiam. Ambos analogon rationis suspiciet attonitum nonnihil, veluti tacitus spectator, nisi forsitan aliquando scepticorum applaudat ingenio versatili. Finge tamen academicorum aliquos eo tandem procedere, ut omnino tollant, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo (et gradu evidentiae) falsum etiam ita possit videri. Tunc forsitan cum durius iusto iam commotis dogmaticis concinet:
Let certain things be aestheticologically false, § 427, indeed even lies in this meaning, § 447. Still, they will then finally be aesthetically false if they are clearly lies to the analogue of reason itself, § 445. Let the example be the very dispute about truth. Let dogmatic philosophers from one side, Academics and skeptics from the other, contend subtly with one another about the true and the false (logically and metaphysically), about its rule and criterion (first, abstract, and scientific), about the notion of each by which they can be distinguished (distinctly, completely, scientifically). Let them go aside into what lies between right and wrong (conceived more universally and logically). Let them return to the catholic and first mark of truth, and to logical judgment. Suppose each side defends its position as carefully as can be done. The analogue of reason will look upon both somewhat astonished, like a silent spectator, unless perhaps it sometimes applauds the flexible talent of the skeptics. Yet imagine that some of the Academics at last proceed so far that they utterly remove the possibility that anything can seem in such a way that the false cannot also seem in the same way (and with the same degree of evidence). Then perhaps the analogue of reason, joining with the dogmatists who are now disturbed more harshly than is just, will sing along:
faciunt pueriliter.
"For when they say, that they take away nothing but the idea of anything being able to appear in such a manner that it cannot possibly appear false in the same manner but that they admit everything else, they are acting childishly."
Cic. quaest. ac. IV. 33. Ultimum enim est et aesthetice falsum. § 445.
Cicero, Academica quaestiones IV.33. For this last claim is also aesthetically false, § 445.
Sint quaedam aestheticologice falsa, § 427. immo etiam hoc significatu mendacia, § 447. tunc tamen erunt demum aesthetice falsa, si sint ipsi analogo rationis perspicue mendacia, § 445. Exempli loco sit ipsa de veritate disputatio.
Let certain things be aestheticologically false, § 427, indeed even lies in this meaning, § 447. Still, they will then finally be aesthetically false if they are clearly lies to the analogue of reason itself, § 445. Let the example be the very dispute about truth.
Contendant inter se philosophi dogmatici ex hac, academici scepticique ex altera parte subtiliter, de vero et falso (logice et metaphysice) de eius regula et criterio (primo, abstracto et scientifico) de notione utriusque, qua possint internosci (distincte, complete, scientifice) Digrediantur in id, quod interest inter rectum et pravum (universalius et logice conceptum) Redeant ad catholicam et primam veritatis notam, et logicum iudicium.
Let dogmatic philosophers from one side, Academics and skeptics from the other, contend subtly with one another about the true and the false (logically and metaphysically), about its rule and criterion (first, abstract, and scientific), about the notion of each by which they can be distinguished (distinctly, completely, scientifically). Let them go aside into what lies between right and wrong (conceived more universally and logically). Let them return to the catholic and first mark of truth, and to logical judgment. Suppose each side defends its position as carefully as can be done.
Pone partem utramque, quam fieri potest, curatissime suam defendere sententiam.
The analogue of reason will look upon both somewhat astonished, like a silent spectator, unless perhaps it sometimes applauds the flexible talent of the skeptics.
Ambos analogon rationis suspiciet attonitum nonnihil, veluti tacitus spectator, nisi forsitan aliquando scepticorum applaudat ingenio versatili. Finge tamen academicorum aliquos eo tandem procedere, ut omnino tollant, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo (et gradu evidentiae) falsum etiam ita possit videri.
Yet imagine that some of the Academics at last proceed so far that they utterly remove the possibility that anything can seem in such a way that the false cannot also seem in the same way (and with the same degree of evidence).
Tunc forsitan cum durius iusto iam commotis dogmaticis concinet:
Then perhaps the analogue of reason, joining with the dogmatists who are now disturbed more harshly than is just, will sing along:
faciunt pueriliter.
"For when they say, that they take away nothing but the idea of anything being able to appear in such a manner that it cannot possibly appear false in the same manner but that they admit everything else, they are acting childishly."
Cic. quaest. ac.
Cicero, Academica quaestiones IV.33.
IV. 33. Ultimum enim est et aesthetice falsum. § 445.
For this last claim is also aesthetically false, § 445.
Sint quaedam aestheticologice falsa, § 427.
Let certain things be aestheticologically false, § 427,
immo etiam hoc significatu mendacia, § 447.
indeed even lies in this meaning, § 447.
tunc tamen erunt demum aesthetice falsa,
Still, they will then finally be aesthetically false
si sint ipsi analogo rationis perspicue mendacia,
if they are clearly lies to the analogue of reason itself,
§ 445. Exempli loco sit ipsa de veritate disputatio.
§ 445. Let the example be the very dispute about truth.
Contendant inter se philosophi dogmatici ex hac,
Let dogmatic philosophers from one side,
academici scepticique ex altera parte subtiliter,
Academics and skeptics from the other, contend subtly with one another
de vero et falso (logice et metaphysice)
about the true and the false (logically and metaphysically),
de eius regula et criterio (primo, abstracto et scientifico)
about its rule and criterion (first, abstract, and scientific),
de notione utriusque,
about the notion of each by
qua possint internosci (distincte, complete, scientifice)
which they can be distinguished (distinctly, completely, scientifically).
Digrediantur in id,
Let them go aside into what
quod interest inter rectum et pravum (universalius et logice
lies between right and wrong (conceived more universally and logically).
conceptum) Redeant ad catholicam et primam veritatis
Let them return to the catholic and first mark of truth,
notam, et logicum
and to logical judgment. Suppose each side defends
iudicium.
its position as carefully as can be done.
Pone partem utramque,
The analogue of reason will look upon both somewhat
quam fieri potest, curatissime
astonished, like a silent spectator, unless perhaps it sometimes
suam defendere sententiam.
applauds the flexible talent of the skeptics.
Ambos analogon rationis suspiciet attonitum nonnihil, veluti tacitus spectator,
Yet imagine that some of the Academics at last
nisi forsitan aliquando scepticorum applaudat ingenio versatili.
proceed so far that they utterly remove
Finge tamen academicorum aliquos eo tandem procedere, ut omnino tollant,
the possibility that anything
ut quicquam possit ita videri,
can seem in such a way
ut non eodem modo
that the false cannot also seem in the same
(et gradu evidentiae) falsum etiam ita possit videri.
way (and with the same degree of evidence).
Tunc forsitan
Then perhaps the analogue of reason,
cum durius iusto iam
joining with the dogmatists who are now disturbed more
commotis dogmaticis concinet:
harshly than is just, will sing along:
faciunt pueriliter.
"For when they say, that they take away nothing but the idea of anything being able to appear in such a manner that it cannot possibly appear false in the same manner but that they admit everything else, they are acting childishly."
Cic. quaest. ac.
Cicero, Academica quaestiones IV.33.
IV. 33. Ultimum enim est et aesthetice falsum. § 445.
For this last claim is also aesthetically false, § 445.
Sint quaedam aestheticologice falsa, § 427. immo etiam hoc significatu mendacia, § 447. tunc tamen erunt demum aesthetice falsa, si sint ipsi analogo rationis perspicue mendacia, § 445. Exempli loco sit ipsa de veritate disputatio. / Let certain things be aestheticologically false, § 427, indeed even lies in this meaning, § 447. Still, they will then finally be aesthetically false if they are clearly lies to the analogue of reason itself, § 445. Let the example be the very dispute about truth.
Contendant inter se philosophi dogmatici ex hac, academici scepticique ex altera parte subtiliter, de vero et falso (logice et metaphysice) de eius regula et criterio (primo, abstracto et scientifico) de notione utriusque, qua possint internosci (distincte, complete, scientifice) Digrediantur in id, quod interest inter rectum et pravum (universalius et logice conceptum) Redeant ad catholicam et primam veritatis notam, et logicum iudicium. / Let dogmatic philosophers from one side, Academics and skeptics from the other, contend subtly with one another about the true and the false (logically and metaphysically), about its rule and criterion (first, abstract, and scientific), about the notion of each by which they can be distinguished (distinctly, completely, scientifically). Let them go aside into what lies between right and wrong (conceived more universally and logically). Let them return to the catholic and first mark of truth, and to logical judgment. Suppose each side defends its position as carefully as can be done.
Pone partem utramque, quam fieri potest, curatissime suam defendere sententiam. / The analogue of reason will look upon both somewhat astonished, like a silent spectator, unless perhaps it sometimes applauds the flexible talent of the skeptics.
Ambos analogon rationis suspiciet attonitum nonnihil, veluti tacitus spectator, nisi forsitan aliquando scepticorum applaudat ingenio versatili. Finge tamen academicorum aliquos eo tandem procedere, ut omnino tollant, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo (et gradu evidentiae) falsum etiam ita possit videri. / Yet imagine that some of the Academics at last proceed so far that they utterly remove the possibility that anything can seem in such a way that the false cannot also seem in the same way (and with the same degree of evidence).
Tunc forsitan cum durius iusto iam commotis dogmaticis concinet: / Then perhaps the analogue of reason, joining with the dogmatists who are now disturbed more harshly than is just, will sing along:
faciunt pueriliter.
"For when they say, that they take away nothing but the idea of anything being able to appear in such a manner that it cannot possibly appear false in the same manner but that they admit everything else, they are acting childishly."
Cic. quaest. ac. / Cicero, Academica quaestiones IV.33.
IV. 33. Ultimum enim est et aesthetice falsum. § 445. / For this last claim is also aesthetically false, § 445.
§ 449
Quaere ex Lucretio, § 448. an
Ask Lucretius, § 448,
Notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit,
Et dubium certo quae res differre probarit,
"And what created concept of the truth,
And what device has proved the dubious
To differ from the certain?"
respondebit, aesthetice verum, § 423.
and he will answer what is aesthetically true, § 423:
Invenies primis a sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli,
Sponte sua veris quod possint vincere falsa.
An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
Dicere eos contra, quae tota a sensibus orta est?
Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa sit omnis.
"Thou'lt find
That from the senses first hath been create
Concept of truth, nor can the senses be
Rebutted. For criterion must be found
Worthy of greater trust, which shall defeat
Through own authority the false by true;
What, then, than these our senses must there be
Worthy a greater trust? Shall reason, sprung
From some false sense, prevail to contradict
Those senses, sprung as reason wholly is
From out the senses?- For lest these be true,
All reason also then is falsified."
Et contrarium ostendet aesthetice falsum, § 445: Sensui diffidere
And he will show the opposite to be aesthetically false, § 445: to distrust sense
Est manibus manifesta suis emittere quicquam,
Et violare fidem primam, et convellere tota
Fundamenta, quibus nixatur vita salusque,
Non modo enim ratio ruat omnis: vita quoque ipsa
Concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis,
Praecipitesque locos vitare.
"than to let
From out our hands escape the obvious things
And injure primal faith in sense, and wreck
All those foundations upon which do rest
Our life and safety. For not only reason
Would topple down; but even our very life
Would straightaway collapse, unless we dared
To trust our senses and to keep away
From headlong heights and places to be shunned"
e.c. S. II.
etc., Section II.
Quaere ex Lucretio, § 448. an
Ask Lucretius, § 448,
Notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit,
Et dubium certo quae res differre probarit,
"And what created concept of the truth,
And what device has proved the dubious
To differ from the certain?"
respondebit, aesthetice verum, § 423.
and he will answer what is aesthetically true, § 423:
Invenies primis a sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli,
Sponte sua veris quod possint vincere falsa.
An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
Dicere eos contra, quae tota a sensibus orta est?
Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa sit omnis.
"Thou'lt find
That from the senses first hath been create
Concept of truth, nor can the senses be
Rebutted. For criterion must be found
Worthy of greater trust, which shall defeat
Through own authority the false by true;
What, then, than these our senses must there be
Worthy a greater trust? Shall reason, sprung
From some false sense, prevail to contradict
Those senses, sprung as reason wholly is
From out the senses?- For lest these be true,
All reason also then is falsified."
Et contrarium ostendet aesthetice falsum, § 445: Sensui diffidere
And he will show the opposite to be aesthetically false, § 445: to distrust sense
Est manibus manifesta suis emittere quicquam,
Et violare fidem primam, et convellere tota
Fundamenta, quibus nixatur vita salusque,
Non modo enim ratio ruat omnis: vita quoque ipsa
Concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis,
Praecipitesque locos vitare.
"than to let
From out our hands escape the obvious things
And injure primal faith in sense, and wreck
All those foundations upon which do rest
Our life and safety. For not only reason
Would topple down; but even our very life
Would straightaway collapse, unless we dared
To trust our senses and to keep away
From headlong heights and places to be shunned"
e.c. S. II.
etc., Section II.
Quaere ex Lucretio, § 448. an
Ask Lucretius, § 448,
Notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit,
Et dubium certo quae res differre probarit,
"And what created concept of the truth,
And what device has proved the dubious
To differ from the certain?"
respondebit, aesthetice verum, § 423.
and he will answer what is aesthetically true, § 423:
Invenies primis a sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli,
Sponte sua veris quod possint vincere falsa.
An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
Dicere eos contra, quae tota a sensibus orta est?
Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa sit omnis.
"Thou'lt find
That from the senses first hath been create
Concept of truth, nor can the senses be
Rebutted. For criterion must be found
Worthy of greater trust, which shall defeat
Through own authority the false by true;
What, then, than these our senses must there be
Worthy a greater trust? Shall reason, sprung
From some false sense, prevail to contradict
Those senses, sprung as reason wholly is
From out the senses?- For lest these be true,
All reason also then is falsified."
Et contrarium ostendet aesthetice falsum, § 445:
And he will show the opposite to be aesthetically false, § 445:
Sensui diffidere
to distrust sense
Est manibus manifesta suis emittere quicquam,
Et violare fidem primam, et convellere tota
Fundamenta, quibus nixatur vita salusque,
Non modo enim ratio ruat omnis: vita quoque ipsa
Concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis,
Praecipitesque locos vitare.
"than to let
From out our hands escape the obvious things
And injure primal faith in sense, and wreck
All those foundations upon which do rest
Our life and safety. For not only reason
Would topple down; but even our very life
Would straightaway collapse, unless we dared
To trust our senses and to keep away
From headlong heights and places to be shunned"
e.c. S. II.
etc., Section II.
Quaere ex Lucretio, § 448. an / Ask Lucretius, § 448,
Notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit,
Et dubium certo quae res differre probarit,
"And what created concept of the truth,
And what device has proved the dubious
To differ from the certain?"
respondebit, aesthetice verum, § 423. / and he will answer what is aesthetically true, § 423:
Invenies primis a sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli,
Sponte sua veris quod possint vincere falsa.
An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
Dicere eos contra, quae tota a sensibus orta est?
Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa sit omnis.
"Thou'lt find
That from the senses first hath been create
Concept of truth, nor can the senses be
Rebutted. For criterion must be found
Worthy of greater trust, which shall defeat
Through own authority the false by true;
What, then, than these our senses must there be
Worthy a greater trust? Shall reason, sprung
From some false sense, prevail to contradict
Those senses, sprung as reason wholly is
From out the senses?- For lest these be true,
All reason also then is falsified."
Et contrarium ostendet aesthetice falsum, § 445: Sensui diffidere / And he will show the opposite to be aesthetically false, § 445: to distrust sense
Est manibus manifesta suis emittere quicquam,
Et violare fidem primam, et convellere tota
Fundamenta, quibus nixatur vita salusque,
Non modo enim ratio ruat omnis: vita quoque ipsa
Concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis,
Praecipitesque locos vitare.
"than to let
From out our hands escape the obvious things
And injure primal faith in sense, and wreck
All those foundations upon which do rest
Our life and safety. For not only reason
Would topple down; but even our very life
Would straightaway collapse, unless we dared
To trust our senses and to keep away
From headlong heights and places to be shunned"
e.c. S. II. / etc., Section II.
§ 450
Si cui mirum videatur, non omne falsum in aestheticis falsum esse, § 448. desinet forte mirari, si multo restrictiorem adhuc falsi significationem iure, quod perfectissimum fertur, comprobatam legerit, D. tit. de L. Corn. de falsis, l. 23:
If it seems strange to someone that not every false thing in aesthetic matters is false, § 448, perhaps he will cease to wonder if he reads that a much more restricted meaning of the false is approved in law, which is said to be most perfect, Digest, title on the Lex Cornelia concerning forgeries, law 23:
Quid sit falsum quaeritur? et videtur id esse, si quis alienum chirographum imitetur, aut libellum, vel rationes intercidat, vel describat, non, qui alias in computatione, vel in ratione, mentiuntur.
"The question is asked, what is a forgery? It is held to occur where anyone imitates the handwriting of another, or omits anything from a document, or an account, when he copies it; and not where a false result is given in a calculation, or an account."
En! aestheticum § 15. in diiudicandis falsis tamen ipso Paullo ICto severiorem! § 445.
Behold! the aesthetician, § 15, is nevertheless stricter than Paulus the jurist himself in judging false things, § 445.
Si cui mirum videatur, non omne falsum in aestheticis falsum esse, § 448. desinet forte mirari, si multo restrictiorem adhuc falsi significationem iure, quod perfectissimum fertur, comprobatam legerit, D. tit. de L. Corn. de falsis, l. 23:
If it seems strange to someone that not every false thing in aesthetic matters is false, § 448, perhaps he will cease to wonder if he reads that a much more restricted meaning of the false is approved in law, which is said to be most perfect, Digest, title on the Lex Cornelia concerning forgeries, law 23:
Quid sit falsum quaeritur? et videtur id esse, si quis alienum chirographum imitetur, aut libellum, vel rationes intercidat, vel describat, non, qui alias in computatione, vel in ratione, mentiuntur.
"The question is asked, what is a forgery? It is held to occur where anyone imitates the handwriting of another, or omits anything from a document, or an account, when he copies it; and not where a false result is given in a calculation, or an account."
En! aestheticum § 15. in diiudicandis falsis tamen ipso Paullo ICto severiorem! § 445.
Behold! the aesthetician, § 15, is nevertheless stricter than Paulus the jurist himself in judging false things, § 445.
Si cui mirum videatur,
If it seems strange to someone
non omne falsum in aestheticis falsum esse, § 448.
that not every false thing in aesthetic matters is false, § 448,
desinet forte mirari,
perhaps he will cease to wonder
si multo restrictiorem adhuc
if he reads that a much more restricted meaning
falsi significationem iure, quod perfectissimum fertur, comprobatam legerit, D.
of the false is approved in law, which is said to
tit. de L. Corn.
be most perfect, Digest, title on the Lex Cornelia
de falsis, l. 23:
concerning forgeries, law 23:
Quid sit falsum quaeritur? et videtur id esse, si quis alienum chirographum imitetur, aut libellum, vel rationes intercidat, vel describat, non, qui alias in computatione, vel in ratione, mentiuntur.
"The question is asked, what is a forgery? It is held to occur where anyone imitates the handwriting of another, or omits anything from a document, or an account, when he copies it; and not where a false result is given in a calculation, or an account."
En! aestheticum § 15. in diiudicandis falsis tamen ipso
Behold! the aesthetician, § 15, is nevertheless stricter than
Paullo ICto severiorem! § 445.
Paulus the jurist himself in judging false things, § 445.
Si cui mirum videatur, non omne falsum in aestheticis falsum esse, § 448. desinet forte mirari, si multo restrictiorem adhuc falsi significationem iure, quod perfectissimum fertur, comprobatam legerit, D. tit. de L. Corn. de falsis, l. 23: / If it seems strange to someone that not every false thing in aesthetic matters is false, § 448, perhaps he will cease to wonder if he reads that a much more restricted meaning of the false is approved in law, which is said to be most perfect, Digest, title on the Lex Cornelia concerning forgeries, law 23:
Quid sit falsum quaeritur? et videtur id esse, si quis alienum chirographum imitetur, aut libellum, vel rationes intercidat, vel describat, non, qui alias in computatione, vel in ratione, mentiuntur.
"The question is asked, what is a forgery? It is held to occur where anyone imitates the handwriting of another, or omits anything from a document, or an account, when he copies it; and not where a false result is given in a calculation, or an account."
En! aestheticum § 15. in diiudicandis falsis tamen ipso Paullo ICto severiorem! § 445. / Behold! the aesthetician, § 15, is nevertheless stricter than Paulus the jurist himself in judging false things, § 445.