Aesthetica

In mundo tamen metamorphoseon Ovidianarum est, per preces Phaetontis, l. II.35.

Yet in the world of the Ovidian metamorphoses there is, through Phaethon's prayers, Book II, line 35:

strictissime verum, et simul heterocosmice, § 441.

most strictly true, and at the same time heterocosmically, § 441.

heterocosmice verum, § 441. licet ex mundo fabuloso somnium, tamen iis, quibus vixit, Ovidius locis et temporibus, quibusque praesertim scripsit personis, non falsum aesthetice § 455.

true heterocosmically, § 441. Although, from the fabulous world, it is a dream, nevertheless for those places and times in which Ovid lived, and especially for the persons for whom he wrote, it was not aesthetically false, § 455.

hoc in dicto Ovidii mundo falsum fuisset, supposita Phaetontis fabula, etiam aestheticum.

would have been false in this stated world of Ovid, once the fable of Phaethon is supposed, and even aesthetically false.

Verum habes heterocosmicum, quod nec aesthetice tunc falsum erat et iis, quum et quibus Ovidius potissimum scribebat.

You have a heterocosmic truth, which was not then aesthetically false, and not false for those when and for whom Ovid chiefly wrote.

In mundo tamen metamorphoseon Ovidianarum est, per preces Phaetontis, l. II.35.

Yet in the world of the Ovidian metamorphoses there is, through Phaethon's prayers, Book II, line 35:

strictissime verum, et simul heterocosmice, § 441.

most strictly true, and at the same time heterocosmically, § 441.

heterocosmice verum, § 441. licet ex mundo fabuloso somnium, tamen iis, quibus vixit, Ovidius locis et temporibus, quibusque praesertim scripsit personis, non falsum aesthetice § 455.

true heterocosmically, § 441. Although, from the fabulous world, it is a dream, nevertheless for those places and times in which Ovid lived, and especially for the persons for whom he wrote, it was not aesthetically false, § 455.

hoc in dicto Ovidii mundo falsum fuisset, supposita Phaetontis fabula, etiam aestheticum.

would have been false in this stated world of Ovid, once the fable of Phaethon is supposed, and even aesthetically false.

Verum habes heterocosmicum, quod nec aesthetice tunc falsum erat et iis, quum et quibus Ovidius potissimum scribebat.

You have a heterocosmic truth, which was not then aesthetically false, and not false for those when and for whom Ovid chiefly wrote.

Iamque reor aliqua ex parte manifestum esse pulcre cogitaturum veritatis amicum esse quidem semper, S. XXVI. neque tamen vel illius abstractissimae de universalibus, § 440. vel illius strictissimae servum esse, § 441.

And now I think it is to some extent manifest that one who is going to think beautifully is indeed always a friend of truth, Section XXVI, and yet is not the slave either of that most abstract truth concerning universals, § 440, or of that most strict truth concerning things, § 441.

Ov. Am. III. 12.
ubi multa exempla congeruntur confirmatura sententiam huc facientem:

Ovid, Amores III.12. There many examples are heaped up that will confirm the opinion relevant here:

Ut enim tandem omnibus videar perspicue scribere, § 471. venustius ingenium,

For that at last I may seem to everyone to write clearly, § 471: the more graceful genius,

illius Musa memor § 467, censoribus aestheticis est

mindful of that Muse, § 467, is, for aesthetic censors,

Iamque reor aliqua ex parte manifestum esse pulcre cogitaturum veritatis amicum esse quidem semper, S. XXVI. neque tamen vel illius abstractissimae de universalibus, § 440. vel illius strictissimae servum esse, § 441.

And now I think it is to some extent manifest that one who is going to think beautifully is indeed always a friend of truth, Section XXVI, and yet is not the slave either of that most abstract truth concerning universals, § 440, or of that most strict truth concerning things, § 441.

Ov.

Ovid, Amores III.12.

Am. III. 12.
ubi multa exempla congeruntur confirmatura sententiam huc facientem:

There many examples are heaped up that will confirm the opinion relevant here:

Ut enim tandem omnibus videar perspicue scribere, § 471. venustius ingenium,

For that at last I may seem to everyone to write clearly, § 471: the more graceful genius,

illius Musa memor § 467, censoribus aestheticis est

mindful of that Muse, § 467, is, for aesthetic censors,

Tune vero magister veritatis logicae ac ethicae publice constitutus mendacia commendes, velut aliquando splendida, et falsa veris miscere, tanquam operam maximopere nobilem? Hac ego circiter ratione videor audire mihi quosdam obloquentes ex schola, quam pinxi, § 279. Sed sedatis animis, boni viri, revertamur ad nostrum, quod vos nonnunquam male habet; phlegma philosophicum. De salute Graeciae res non agitur. Interim tamen

Do you, truly, publicly established as a master of logical and ethical truth, recommend lies, as sometimes splendid, and mixing false things with true ones, as a work especially noble? In about this manner I seem to hear certain men objecting to me from the school which I painted, § 279. But with spirits calmed, good men, let us return to our philosophical phlegm, which sometimes troubles you. The matter is not about the safety of Greece. Meanwhile, however,

Tune vero magister veritatis logicae ac ethicae publice constitutus mendacia commendes, velut aliquando splendida, et falsa veris miscere, tanquam operam maximopere nobilem?

Do you, truly, publicly established as a master of logical and ethical truth, recommend lies, as sometimes splendid, and mixing false things with true ones, as a work especially noble?

Hac ego circiter ratione videor audire mihi quosdam obloquentes ex schola, quam pinxi, § 279. Sed sedatis animis, boni viri, revertamur ad nostrum, quod vos nonnunquam male habet; phlegma philosophicum.

In about this manner I seem to hear certain men objecting to me from the school which I painted, § 279. But with spirits calmed, good men, let us return to our philosophical phlegm, which sometimes troubles you.

De salute Graeciae res non agitur.

The matter is not about the safety of Greece.

Interim tamen

Meanwhile, however,

Adeone facile putatis, ac Claudiani panegyris Honorio, rationis etiam analogo,

Do you think it so easy, as in Claudian's panegyric to Honorius, even for the analogue of reason,

v. 513. Ut et ego vobiscum magnis auctoritatibus agam, nonne meministis veritatem esse Democrito sitam in fundo, unde difficulter protrahatur? Audietis certe Ciceronem, qui, dum plura dicit, ac ego probaverim; illud tamen illustrabit, de quo nunc quaeritur in fine l. de Or:

verse 513. That I too may deal with you by great authorities: do you not remember that, for Democritus, truth lies situated in the depths, from which it is drawn out with difficulty? You will surely hear Cicero, who, while he says more than I would approve, will nevertheless illustrate that about which we are now asking, at the end of Book I of On the Orator:

The "present case" concerns the orator and hence the aesthetician; the judgment of the ear extends to the analogue of reason, which is at issue here.

Adeone facile putatis, ac Claudiani panegyris Honorio, rationis etiam analogo,

Do you think it so easy, as in Claudian's panegyric to Honorius, even for the analogue of reason,

v. 513. Ut et ego vobiscum magnis auctoritatibus agam, nonne meministis veritatem esse Democrito sitam in fundo, unde difficulter protrahatur?

verse 513. That I too may deal with you by great authorities: do you not remember that, for Democritus, truth lies situated in the depths, from which it is drawn out with difficulty?

Audietis certe Ciceronem, qui, dum plura dicit, ac ego probaverim; illud tamen illustrabit, de quo nunc quaeritur in fine l. de Or:

You will surely hear Cicero, who, while he says more than I would approve, will nevertheless illustrate that about which we are now asking, at the end of Book I of On the Orator:

The "present case" concerns the orator and hence the aesthetician; the judgment of the ear extends to the analogue of reason, which is at issue here.

Non solum adversus Ciceronem, § 479. et scepticos academicosque, vel veteres, vel recentes, lubenter admitto dari rationi et intellectui puriori ac distinctiori per scientias assurgere nonnunquam ultra verisimilitudinem, non ad plenam quidem et omnibus numeris absolutissimam, completam tamen et eam, quae omnem oppositi formidinem excludat, veri notitiam et perspicientiam: sed id etiam addo, quod pauci recentiorum dogmaticorum forte concedant, inesse iam ipsis sensitivis et confusis animae perceptionibus nonnihil completae tamen certitudinis, et conscientiae vera quaedam ab omnibus falsis distinguendi sufficientiam.

Not only against Cicero, § 479, and against the sceptics and Academics, whether old or recent, do I willingly admit that it is granted to reason and to the purer and more distinct intellect, through the sciences, sometimes to rise beyond verisimilitude; not indeed to a full and in every respect most absolute knowledge and insight of the true, but nevertheless to a complete one, and to one that excludes every fear of the opposite; but I also add this, which perhaps few of the more recent dogmatists would concede: that there is already in the very sensitive and confused perceptions of the soul something of complete certainty, nevertheless, and a sufficiency of consciousness for distinguishing certain true things from all false ones.

Non solum adversus Ciceronem, § 479. et scepticos academicosque, vel veteres, vel recentes, lubenter admitto dari rationi et intellectui puriori ac distinctiori per scientias assurgere nonnunquam ultra verisimilitudinem, non ad plenam quidem et omnibus numeris absolutissimam, completam tamen et eam, quae omnem oppositi formidinem excludat, veri notitiam et perspicientiam: sed id etiam addo, quod pauci recentiorum dogmaticorum forte concedant, inesse iam ipsis sensitivis et confusis animae perceptionibus nonnihil completae tamen certitudinis, et conscientiae vera quaedam ab omnibus falsis distinguendi sufficientiam.

Not only against Cicero, § 479, and against the sceptics and Academics, whether old or recent, do I willingly admit that it is granted to reason and to the purer and more distinct intellect, through the sciences, sometimes to rise beyond verisimilitude; not indeed to a full and in every respect most absolute knowledge and insight of the true, but nevertheless to a complete one, and to one that excludes every fear of the opposite; but I also add this, which perhaps few of the more recent dogmatists would concede: that there is already in the very sensitive and confused perceptions of the soul something of complete certainty, nevertheless, and a sufficiency of consciousness for distinguishing certain true things from all false ones.

Veritas quaedam, etiam aesthetica, § 423. tamen complete cognoscatur ab analogo rationis, ut talis, § 480. id est completa cum certitudine et persuasione, M. § 531. Sed quaenam haec erit? 1) prima et maxime universalia quaedam cognitionis humanae principia, quae sic insevit iam ingeniis tantum non omnibus natura, metaphysicis naturalibus, M. § 3. ut ea sensus communis aliquando titulo condecorata satis superque sint evidentia, M. § 531. Sed ob hanc ipsam suam evidentiam, quae per se patere cuilibet videntur, eadem uberius, non sine ponderibus, in omni veritatis suae luce, multis cum argumentis et sollicitationibus ad assensum ea cogitare expresse et manifesto, vel raro licet, vel nunquam. Plerumque supponuntur, quod aiunt, et omissa per venustum enthymema relinquuntur spectatori inter ea, quae ipse sibi tradat.

A certain truth, even aesthetic truth, § 423, is nevertheless known completely by the analogue of reason, as such, § 480; that is, with complete certainty and persuasion, Metaphysics § 531. But what will this be? 1) Certain first and maximally universal principles of human cognition, which nature has already so sown into almost all talents, as natural metaphysicians, Metaphysics § 3, that these, sometimes adorned with the title of common sense, are sufficiently and more than sufficiently evident, Metaphysics § 531. But because of this very evidence of theirs, since they seem to lie open of themselves to anyone, to think them more fully, not without weights, in all the light of their truth, with many arguments and solicitations to assent, expressly and manifestly, is rarely permitted, or never. For the most part they are, as they say, presupposed, and, omitted through a graceful enthymeme, are left to the spectator among those things which he may hand over to himself.

Veritas quaedam, etiam aesthetica, § 423. tamen complete cognoscatur ab analogo rationis, ut talis, § 480. id est completa cum certitudine et persuasione, M. § 531. Sed quaenam haec erit? 1) prima et maxime universalia quaedam cognitionis humanae principia, quae sic insevit iam ingeniis tantum non omnibus natura, metaphysicis naturalibus, M. § 3. ut ea sensus communis aliquando titulo condecorata satis superque sint evidentia, M. § 531. Sed ob hanc ipsam suam evidentiam, quae per se patere cuilibet videntur, eadem uberius, non sine ponderibus, in omni veritatis suae luce, multis cum argumentis et sollicitationibus ad assensum ea cogitare expresse et manifesto, vel raro licet, vel nunquam.

A certain truth, even aesthetic truth, § 423, is nevertheless known completely by the analogue of reason, as such, § 480; that is, with complete certainty and persuasion, Metaphysics § 531. But what will this be? 1) Certain first and maximally universal principles of human cognition, which nature has already so sown into almost all talents, as natural metaphysicians, Metaphysics § 3, that these, sometimes adorned with the title of common sense, are sufficiently and more than sufficiently evident, Metaphysics § 531. But because of this very evidence of theirs, since they seem to lie open of themselves to anyone, to think them more fully, not without weights, in all the light of their truth, with many arguments and solicitations to assent, expressly and manifestly, is rarely permitted, or never.

Plerumque supponuntur, quod aiunt, et omissa per venustum enthymema relinquuntur spectatori inter ea, quae ipse sibi tradat.

For the most part they are, as they say, presupposed, and, omitted through a graceful enthymeme, are left to the spectator among those things which he may hand over to himself.

2) Paucissima illa intuitiva vere talia, quae immediate sentimus nullis subreptionum vitiis temerata. Stricte dictam experientiam huc unam voco, non illam late dictam, complexum omnis cognitionis, cui aliquid inest sensationum, quamque parum habere certitudinis vel ii probant, qui sibi vere repugnantes ad eandem tamen uterque confidenter provocant. Experientia stricte dicta multis reliquarum animae facultatum inferiorum perceptionibus praeter sensationes aliis est interstinguenda, si pulcrius aliquid excogitare sit animus, § 140. Haec ipsa, quae concessi esse posse complete certa rationis etiam analogo, non sunt illa semper et omnibus, sed fides eorum saepe prorsus non attenditur, aliquando sophismatibus et argutationibus, licet inanibus, labefactatur tamen et paene convellitur, nisi rationis et intellectus notionibus confirmetur.

2) Those very few intuitive things truly such, which we immediately sense, corrupted by no faults of surreption. Here I call only strictly so-called experience by this name, not that broadly so called, the complex of all cognition in which there is something of sensations, and which even those prove to have little certainty who, truly contradicting one another, nevertheless both confidently appeal to it. Strictly so-called experience must be distinguished from many other perceptions of the remaining lower faculties of the soul besides sensations, if the mind is to think out something more beautifully, § 140. These very things, which I have conceded can be completely certain even to the analogue of reason, are not always such for all persons; rather, trust in them is often not attended to at all, and sometimes by sophisms and quibblings, although empty ones, is nevertheless shaken and almost torn down, unless it is confirmed by notions of reason and intellect.

2) Paucissima illa intuitiva vere talia, quae immediate sentimus nullis subreptionum vitiis temerata.

2) Those very few intuitive things truly such, which we immediately sense, corrupted by no faults of surreption.

Stricte dictam experientiam huc unam voco, non illam late dictam, complexum omnis cognitionis, cui aliquid inest sensationum, quamque parum habere certitudinis vel ii probant, qui sibi vere repugnantes ad eandem tamen uterque confidenter provocant.

Here I call only strictly so-called experience by this name, not that broadly so called, the complex of all cognition in which there is something of sensations, and which even those prove to have little certainty who, truly contradicting one another, nevertheless both confidently appeal to it.

Experientia stricte dicta multis reliquarum animae facultatum inferiorum perceptionibus praeter sensationes aliis est interstinguenda, si pulcrius aliquid excogitare sit animus, § 140. Haec ipsa, quae concessi esse posse complete certa rationis etiam analogo, non sunt illa semper et omnibus, sed fides eorum saepe prorsus non attenditur, aliquando sophismatibus et argutationibus, licet inanibus, labefactatur tamen et paene convellitur, nisi rationis et intellectus notionibus confirmetur.

Strictly so-called experience must be distinguished from many other perceptions of the remaining lower faculties of the soul besides sensations, if the mind is to think out something more beautifully, § 140. These very things, which I have conceded can be completely certain even to the analogue of reason, are not always such for all persons; rather, trust in them is often not attended to at all, and sometimes by sophisms and quibblings, although empty ones, is nevertheless shaken and almost torn down, unless it is confirmed by notions of reason and intellect.

Iam apertissimo putaverim calculo constare plurima inter venuste cogitandum appercipienda, non esse complete certa, neque luce completa veritatem eorum conspici, §§ 481, 482. Nec in ullo tamen falsitatis aliquid sensitivae deprehendi potest sine turpitudine, S. XXVIII. Talia autem, de quibus non complete quidem certi sumus, neque tamen falsitatem aliquam in iisdem appercipimus, sunt Verisimilia. Est ergo veritas aesthetica S. XXVII. a potiori dicta Verisimilitudo, ille veritatis gradus, qui, etiamsi non evectus sit ad completam certitudinem, tamen nihil contineat falsitatis observabilis.

I would now think it established by a most open calculation that very many things to be apperceived while thinking gracefully are not completely certain, nor is their truth seen in complete light, §§ 481, 482. And yet in none of them can anything of sensitive falsity be detected without ugliness, Section XXVIII. But such things, concerning which indeed we are not completely certain, and yet in which we apperceive no falsity, are verisimilar. Therefore aesthetic truth, Section XXVII, is, by denomination from the stronger part, called verisimilitude: that grade of truth which, even if it has not been raised to complete certainty, nevertheless contains nothing of observable falsity.

Iam apertissimo putaverim calculo constare plurima inter venuste cogitandum appercipienda, non esse complete certa, neque luce completa veritatem eorum conspici, §§ 481, 482. Nec in ullo tamen falsitatis aliquid sensitivae deprehendi potest sine turpitudine, S. XXVIII. Talia autem, de quibus non complete quidem certi sumus, neque tamen falsitatem aliquam in iisdem appercipimus, sunt Verisimilia.

I would now think it established by a most open calculation that very many things to be apperceived while thinking gracefully are not completely certain, nor is their truth seen in complete light, §§ 481, 482. And yet in none of them can anything of sensitive falsity be detected without ugliness, Section XXVIII. But such things, concerning which indeed we are not completely certain, and yet in which we apperceive no falsity, are verisimilar.

Est ergo veritas aesthetica S. XXVII. a potiori dicta Verisimilitudo, ille veritatis gradus, qui, etiamsi non evectus sit ad completam certitudinem, tamen nihil contineat falsitatis observabilis.

Therefore aesthetic truth, Section XXVII, is, by denomination from the stronger part, called verisimilitude: that grade of truth which, even if it has not been raised to complete certainty, nevertheless contains nothing of observable falsity.

Cuius habent spectatores auditoresve intra animum, quum vident audiuntve, quasdam anticipationes, quod plerumque fit, quod fieri solet, quod in opinione positum est, quod habet ad haec in se quandam similitudinem, sive id falsum (logice, et latissime,) sive verum sit (logice et strictissime) quod non sit facile a nostris sensibus abhorrens: hoc illud est eikos et verisimile, quod, Aristotele et Cicerone assentiente, sectetur aestheticus, § 483. In rebus enim eiusmodi non solet analogon rationis quicquam falsitatis observare, licet non omnino de veritate eorundem convictum sit. Hinc Ciceroni describitur inventio:

Of it spectators or hearers have within the mind, when they see or hear, certain anticipations: what for the most part happens, what is accustomed to happen, what is placed in opinion, what has in itself a certain likeness to these things, whether that is false (logically and in the broadest sense) or true (logically and in the strictest sense), provided it is not easily abhorrent from our senses: this is that eikos and verisimilar thing which, with Aristotle and Cicero assenting, the aesthetician should pursue, § 483. For in things of this sort the analogue of reason is not accustomed to observe any falsity, although it is not altogether convinced concerning their truth. Hence invention is described for Cicero as

(aesthetically).

Cuius habent spectatores auditoresve intra animum, quum vident audiuntve, quasdam anticipationes, quod plerumque fit, quod fieri solet, quod in opinione positum est, quod habet ad haec in se quandam similitudinem, sive id falsum (logice, et latissime,) sive verum sit (logice et strictissime) quod non sit facile a nostris sensibus abhorrens: hoc illud est eikos et verisimile, quod, Aristotele et Cicerone assentiente, sectetur aestheticus, § 483. In rebus enim eiusmodi non solet analogon rationis quicquam falsitatis observare, licet non omnino de veritate eorundem convictum sit.

Of it spectators or hearers have within the mind, when they see or hear, certain anticipations: what for the most part happens, what is accustomed to happen, what is placed in opinion, what has in itself a certain likeness to these things, whether that is false (logically and in the broadest sense) or true (logically and in the strictest sense), provided it is not easily abhorrent from our senses: this is that eikos and verisimilar thing which, with Aristotle and Cicero assenting, the aesthetician should pursue, § 483. For in things of this sort the analogue of reason is not accustomed to observe any falsity, although it is not altogether convinced concerning their truth.

Hinc Ciceroni describitur inventio:

Hence invention is described for Cicero as

(aesthetically).

Erunt itaque aesthetice vera, id est, verisimilia, § 484. 1) sensitive et intellectualiter complete certa, qua sunt prius, §§ 480–482. 2) sensitive tantum complete certa, § 482. in quibus adhuc intellectus suam non exercuit operam, 3) logice et aesthetice probabilia, qua sunt posterius. Probabilia quoniam sunt, quibus ad dandum assensum plus rationis est, quam ad denegandum; et Improbabilia, quibus ad denegandum assensum plus rationis est, quam ad dandum: quando rationes dubitandi et decidendi, pro assensu et contra eundem distincte cognoscuntur, oritur Probabilitas Logica, si sensitive, Aesthetica. A potiori desumitur denominatio, quoties est quaedam probabilitas aestheticologica. Par est ratio improbabilitatis. Patent ergo verisimilitudinum campi latius, quam probabilitatis territorium, etiamsi sit omne probabile simul verisimile. § 483.

Therefore the aesthetically true, that is, the verisimilar, § 484, will be: 1) things sensitively and intellectually completely certain, insofar as they are prior, §§ 480–482. 2) things completely certain sensitively only, § 482, in which the intellect has not yet exercised its own work; 3) things logically and aesthetically probable, insofar as they are posterior. For probable things are those for which there is more reason for giving assent than for denying it; and improbable things are those for which there is more reason for denying assent than for giving it: when the reasons for doubting and deciding, for assent and against it, are distinctly known, logical probability arises; if sensitively, aesthetic probability. The denomination is taken from the stronger part whenever there is a certain aestheticological probability. The account of improbability is equal. Therefore the fields of verisimilitudes lie open more widely than the territory of probability, even if every probable thing is at the same time verisimilar, § 483.

Erunt itaque aesthetice vera, id est, verisimilia, § 484. 1) sensitive et intellectualiter complete certa, qua sunt prius, §§ 480–482. 2) sensitive tantum complete certa, § 482. in quibus adhuc intellectus suam non exercuit operam, 3) logice et aesthetice probabilia, qua sunt posterius.

Therefore the aesthetically true, that is, the verisimilar, § 484, will be: 1) things sensitively and intellectually completely certain, insofar as they are prior, §§ 480–482. 2) things completely certain sensitively only, § 482, in which the intellect has not yet exercised its own work; 3) things logically and aesthetically probable, insofar as they are posterior.

Probabilia quoniam sunt, quibus ad dandum assensum plus rationis est, quam ad denegandum; et Improbabilia, quibus ad denegandum assensum plus rationis est, quam ad dandum: quando rationes dubitandi et decidendi, pro assensu et contra eundem distincte cognoscuntur, oritur Probabilitas Logica, si sensitive, Aesthetica.

For probable things are those for which there is more reason for giving assent than for denying it; and improbable things are those for which there is more reason for denying assent than for giving it: when the reasons for doubting and deciding, for assent and against it, are distinctly known, logical probability arises; if sensitively, aesthetic probability.

A potiori desumitur denominatio, quoties est quaedam probabilitas aestheticologica.

The denomination is taken from the stronger part whenever there is a certain aestheticological probability. The account of improbability is equal.

Par est ratio improbabilitatis. Patent ergo verisimilitudinum campi latius, quam probabilitatis territorium, etiamsi sit omne probabile simul verisimile. § 483.

Therefore the fields of verisimilitudes lie open more widely than the territory of probability, even if every probable thing is at the same time verisimilar, § 483.

Verisimilia aesthetica erunt 4) logice forte dubia, immo improbabilia, modo sint aesthetice probabilia § 485. 5) aesthetice etiam dubia et improbabilia, non aliis solum, quam quibus potissimum venuste cogites, sed etiam his ipsis forsan alias, quando rationes contra assensum largius imbiberint, modo nunc et inter meditationis tuae seriem vel habeant, de iis, quae propinas, aut probabilitatem aestheticam, aut saltim in oppositum superponderantes rationes non habeant animo satis praesentes, ut obscurent id omne, quod tuis superest elegantis verisimilitudinis. § 484.

Aesthetically verisimilar things will be: 4) perhaps logically doubtful, indeed improbable, provided they are aesthetically probable, § 485; 5) also aesthetically doubtful and improbable, not only to others than those for whom you especially think gracefully, but perhaps even to these very persons at another time, when they have more largely imbibed reasons against assent, provided that now and within the sequence of your meditation they either have, concerning those things which you offer, some aesthetic probability, or at least do not have reasons overbalancing toward the opposite sufficiently present in the mind to obscure all that remains in your things of elegant verisimilitude, § 484.

Verisimilia aesthetica erunt 4) logice forte dubia, immo improbabilia, modo sint aesthetice probabilia § 485. 5) aesthetice etiam dubia et improbabilia, non aliis solum, quam quibus potissimum venuste cogites, sed etiam his ipsis forsan alias, quando rationes contra assensum largius imbiberint, modo nunc et inter meditationis tuae seriem vel habeant, de iis, quae propinas, aut probabilitatem aestheticam, aut saltim in oppositum superponderantes rationes non habeant animo satis praesentes, ut obscurent id omne, quod tuis superest elegantis verisimilitudinis. § 484.

Aesthetically verisimilar things will be: 4) perhaps logically doubtful, indeed improbable, provided they are aesthetically probable, § 485; 5) also aesthetically doubtful and improbable, not only to others than those for whom you especially think gracefully, but perhaps even to these very persons at another time, when they have more largely imbibed reasons against assent, provided that now and within the sequence of your meditation they either have, concerning those things which you offer, some aesthetic probability, or at least do not have reasons overbalancing toward the opposite sufficiently present in the mind to obscure all that remains in your things of elegant verisimilitude, § 484.