§ 101
Neglectum correctionis, de qua loquimur, Horatius unicam caussam iudicat esse, cur Romani Graecis in scribendo cedant, A. P. v. 291, reprehendens eum in Lucilio peculiariter, Serm. I, 10. Quam necessaria sit ultima lima, doceat Apelles post tabulam, Virgilius Aeneida flammis per testamentum legans, Ovidius, qui malis exsilii solis excusat eius neglectum, de Ponto I. ep. V. 17. Romae non semel lituras a se fieri meminit, II. ep. XIV. et in ipso oratore laudat, si sua limet tenui cura, IV. ep. VI. consentiente Cicerone, cuius oratori ne minuta quidem negligenter tractanda sunt, limatumque dicendi genus exemplo ac praeceptis commendatur.
Horace judges the neglect of correction, of which we are speaking, to be the single cause why the Romans yield to the Greeks in writing, Ars Poetica, verse 291, especially reproving it in Lucilius, Satires I.10. How necessary the final file is may be taught by Apelles after the painting, by Virgil bequeathing the Aeneid to the flames in his will, by Ovid, who excuses neglect of it only by the evils of exile, Ex Ponto I.5.17. More than once he remembers that erasures were made by him at Rome, II.14, and he praises it in the orator himself, if he "files his own things with fine care," IV.6, with Cicero agreeing; for in Cicero's orator not even minute things are to be handled negligently, and a polished mode of speaking is commended by example and precepts.
Neglectum correctionis, de qua loquimur, Horatius unicam caussam iudicat esse, cur Romani Graecis in scribendo cedant, A. P. v. 291, reprehendens eum in Lucilio peculiariter, Serm.
Horace judges the neglect of correction, of which we are speaking, to be the single cause why the Romans yield to the Greeks in writing, Ars Poetica, verse 291, especially reproving it in Lucilius, Satires I.10.
I, 10. Quam necessaria sit ultima lima, doceat Apelles post tabulam, Virgilius Aeneida flammis per testamentum legans, Ovidius, qui malis exsilii solis excusat eius neglectum, de Ponto I. ep. V. 17. Romae non semel lituras a se fieri meminit, II. ep. XIV. et in ipso oratore laudat, si sua limet tenui cura, IV. ep. VI. consentiente Cicerone, cuius oratori ne minuta quidem negligenter tractanda sunt, limatumque dicendi genus exemplo ac praeceptis commendatur.
How necessary the final file is may be taught by Apelles after the painting, by Virgil bequeathing the Aeneid to the flames in his will, by Ovid, who excuses neglect of it only by the evils of exile, Ex Ponto I.5.17. More than once he remembers that erasures were made by him at Rome, II.14, and he praises it in the orator himself, if he "files his own things with fine care," IV.6, with Cicero agreeing; for in Cicero's orator not even minute things are to be handled negligently, and a polished mode of speaking is commended by example and precepts.
Neglectum correctionis, de qua loquimur,
Horace judges the neglect of correction, of which
Horatius unicam caussam iudicat esse, cur
we are speaking, to be the single cause why
Romani Graecis in scribendo cedant, A.
the Romans yield to the Greeks in writing, Ars
P. v. 291, reprehendens eum in Lucilio peculiariter, Serm.
Poetica, verse 291, especially reproving it in Lucilius, Satires I.10.
I, 10. Quam necessaria sit ultima lima,
How necessary the final file is may be taught
doceat Apelles post tabulam,
by Apelles after the painting, by
Virgilius Aeneida flammis
Virgil bequeathing the Aeneid to the flames in his will,
per testamentum legans, Ovidius, qui malis exsilii solis excusat eius neglectum,
by Ovid, who excuses neglect
de Ponto I.
of it only by the evils of exile, Ex Ponto
ep. V. 17. Romae non semel
I.5.17. More than once he remembers that
lituras a se fieri meminit, II. ep.
erasures were made by him at Rome, II.14,
XIV. et in ipso oratore laudat,
and he praises it in the orator himself,
si sua limet tenui cura, IV. ep.
if he "files his own things with fine care,"
VI. consentiente Cicerone, cuius oratori
IV.6, with Cicero agreeing; for in Cicero's orator not
ne minuta quidem negligenter
even minute things are to be handled negligently,
tractanda sunt, limatumque dicendi genus exemplo ac praeceptis commendatur.
and a polished mode of speaking is commended by example and precepts.
Neglectum correctionis, de qua loquimur, Horatius unicam caussam iudicat esse, cur Romani Graecis in scribendo cedant, A. P. v. 291, reprehendens eum in Lucilio peculiariter, Serm. / Horace judges the neglect of correction, of which we are speaking, to be the single cause why the Romans yield to the Greeks in writing, Ars Poetica, verse 291, especially reproving it in Lucilius, Satires I.10.
I, 10. Quam necessaria sit ultima lima, doceat Apelles post tabulam, Virgilius Aeneida flammis per testamentum legans, Ovidius, qui malis exsilii solis excusat eius neglectum, de Ponto I. ep. V. 17. Romae non semel lituras a se fieri meminit, II. ep. XIV. et in ipso oratore laudat, si sua limet tenui cura, IV. ep. VI. consentiente Cicerone, cuius oratori ne minuta quidem negligenter tractanda sunt, limatumque dicendi genus exemplo ac praeceptis commendatur. / How necessary the final file is may be taught by Apelles after the painting, by Virgil bequeathing the Aeneid to the flames in his will, by Ovid, who excuses neglect of it only by the evils of exile, Ex Ponto I.5.17. More than once he remembers that erasures were made by him at Rome, II.14, and he praises it in the orator himself, if he "files his own things with fine care," IV.6, with Cicero agreeing; for in Cicero's orator not even minute things are to be handled negligently, and a polished mode of speaking is commended by example and precepts.
§ 102
Si quis interim cum Nasone senserit:
If, meanwhile, someone has felt with Naso:
Nec tamen emendo, labor hic, quam scribere, maior. Mensque pati durum sustinet aegra nihil, Scilicet incipiam lima mordacius uti, Et sub iudicium singula verba vocem?
"And yet I correct them not: this were a greater labour than to write them, and the mind that is sick, is able to endure no hardship. Should I, forsooth, begin to use polished language with more attention, and should I repeat every word according to rule?"
confundit ille, plus taedii secum ferens, et plus virium postulans. Prius concedo quadrare in emendationem, non posterius, § 98. Devorandum autem est, quicquid sit taedii ob reverentiam, quae tua probaturis Maxima debetur, § 100.
he confuses the matter, bringing with him more tedium and demanding more strength. I grant that the former applies to emendation, not the latter, § 98. But whatever tedium there is must be swallowed down because of the reverence which is "owed most greatly" to those who will approve your work, § 100.
Si quis interim cum Nasone senserit:
If, meanwhile, someone has felt with Naso:
Nec tamen emendo, labor hic, quam scribere, maior. Mensque pati durum sustinet aegra nihil, Scilicet incipiam lima mordacius uti, Et sub iudicium singula verba vocem?
"And yet I correct them not: this were a greater labour than to write them, and the mind that is sick, is able to endure no hardship. Should I, forsooth, begin to use polished language with more attention, and should I repeat every word according to rule?"
confundit ille, plus taedii secum ferens, et plus virium postulans.
he confuses the matter, bringing with him more tedium and demanding more strength.
Prius concedo quadrare in emendationem, non posterius, § 98. Devorandum autem est, quicquid sit taedii ob reverentiam, quae tua probaturis Maxima debetur, § 100.
I grant that the former applies to emendation, not the latter, § 98. But whatever tedium there is must be swallowed down because of the reverence which is "owed most greatly" to those who will approve your work, § 100.
Si quis interim cum Nasone senserit:
If, meanwhile, someone has felt with Naso:
Nec tamen emendo, labor hic, quam scribere, maior. Mensque pati durum sustinet aegra nihil, Scilicet incipiam lima mordacius uti, Et sub iudicium singula verba vocem?
"And yet I correct them not: this were a greater labour than to write them, and the mind that is sick, is able to endure no hardship. Should I, forsooth, begin to use polished language with more attention, and should I repeat every word according to rule?"
confundit ille, plus taedii secum ferens,
he confuses the matter, bringing with him more
et plus virium postulans.
tedium and demanding more strength.
Prius concedo quadrare in emendationem, non posterius, § 98.
I grant that the former applies to emendation, not the latter, § 98.
Devorandum autem est, quicquid
But whatever tedium there is must be swallowed down
sit taedii ob reverentiam, quae
because of the reverence which is "owed most greatly"
tua probaturis Maxima debetur, § 100.
to those who will approve your work, § 100.
Si quis interim cum Nasone senserit: / If, meanwhile, someone has felt with Naso:
Nec tamen emendo, labor hic, quam scribere, maior. Mensque pati durum sustinet aegra nihil, Scilicet incipiam lima mordacius uti, Et sub iudicium singula verba vocem?
"And yet I correct them not: this were a greater labour than to write them, and the mind that is sick, is able to endure no hardship. Should I, forsooth, begin to use polished language with more attention, and should I repeat every word according to rule?"
confundit ille, plus taedii secum ferens, et plus virium postulans. / he confuses the matter, bringing with him more tedium and demanding more strength.
Prius concedo quadrare in emendationem, non posterius, § 98. Devorandum autem est, quicquid sit taedii ob reverentiam, quae tua probaturis Maxima debetur, § 100. / I grant that the former applies to emendation, not the latter, § 98. But whatever tedium there is must be swallowed down because of the reverence which is "owed most greatly" to those who will approve your work, § 100.
§ 103
Sunt, quibus assuevimus pueri, volentes etiam viri, scilicet, ut alius sua corrigat, quem deesse sibi queruntur:
There are things to which we grew accustomed as boys, and willingly even as men: namely, that another should correct his own things, and they complain that such a person is lacking to them:
Suus cuique attributus est error; Sed non videmus, manticae quod in tergo est.
"Each of us has his assigned delusion: but we see not what's in the wallet on our back."
Concedo recitationem veterum, nisi corrumpatur et haec adulationibus, saluberrimum esse consilium, et iuste queri, cui desit vir bonus et prudens, qui rogatus in nostris diiudicandis, dum adhuc nonum forsan in annum premuntur, Fiat Aristarchus. Neque tamen ab eiusmodi censore plura postulanda sunt, quam ut vel dicat: Corrige, sodes, hoc et hoc, vel ut
I grant that the recitation of the ancients, unless even this is corrupted by flatteries, is a very healthy counsel, and that he rightly complains who lacks a good and prudent man who, when asked to judge our things while perhaps they are still being pressed into the ninth year, "may become an Aristarchus." Yet no more is to be asked from a censor of this kind than either that he say,
incomtis allinat atrum Transverso calamo signum.
"A wise and faithful counsellor will blame
Weak verses, note the rough, condemn the lame,"
Ut ipse meliora suggerat, non aequus est, qui rogat virum vir. Est cuilibet sua cogitandi ratio, in quibusdam propria. Si circiter aequales viribus sumus ego, mihique recitans, facilius utique mihi nonnunquam esset mea cogitandi ratione totum opus absolvere, § 78, quam remissiori animo, § 98, per cogitationes alienas ita meas interferere, ut meliores sint in auctoris impetu ab eodem fusis, conducant tamen et haereant apte reliquis, a me meaque cogitandi ratione non profectis.
or that "he mark the rough passages with a black sign by a crosswise pen." That he himself should suggest better things is not fair, when a man asks a man. Each has his own way of thinking, in some matters a proper one. If the person reciting to me and I are roughly equal in powers, it would certainly sometimes be easier for me to complete the whole work by my own way of thinking, § 78, than with a more relaxed mind, § 98, to insert my thoughts among another's thoughts in such a way that they are better than those poured out by the author's own impulse, yet still conduct themselves well and adhere suitably to the rest, which did not proceed from me and my way of thinking.
Si defendere delictum, quam vertere malis; Nullum ultra verbum aut operam insumamus inanem, Quin sine rivali teque et tua solus ames.
"But if you chose to vindicate the crime,
Not mend it, he would waste no further time,
But let you live, untroubled by advice,
Sole tenant of your own fool's paradise."
Hor.
Horace.
Sunt, quibus assuevimus pueri, volentes etiam viri, scilicet, ut alius sua corrigat, quem deesse sibi queruntur:
There are things to which we grew accustomed as boys, and willingly even as men: namely, that another should correct his own things, and they complain that such a person is lacking to them:
Suus cuique attributus est error; Sed non videmus, manticae quod in tergo est.
"Each of us has his assigned delusion: but we see not what's in the wallet on our back."
Concedo recitationem veterum, nisi corrumpatur et haec adulationibus, saluberrimum esse consilium, et iuste queri, cui desit vir bonus et prudens, qui rogatus in nostris diiudicandis, dum adhuc nonum forsan in annum premuntur, Fiat Aristarchus.
I grant that the recitation of the ancients, unless even this is corrupted by flatteries, is a very healthy counsel, and that he rightly complains who lacks a good and prudent man who, when asked to judge our things while perhaps they are still being pressed into the ninth year, "may become an Aristarchus."
Neque tamen ab eiusmodi censore plura postulanda sunt, quam ut vel dicat: Corrige, sodes, hoc et hoc, vel ut
Yet no more is to be asked from a censor of this kind than either that he say,
incomtis allinat atrum Transverso calamo signum.
"A wise and faithful counsellor will blame
Weak verses, note the rough, condemn the lame,"
Ut ipse meliora suggerat, non aequus est, qui rogat virum vir.
or that "he mark the rough passages with a black sign by a crosswise pen."
Est cuilibet sua cogitandi ratio, in quibusdam propria.
That he himself should suggest better things is not fair, when a man asks a man.
Si circiter aequales viribus sumus ego, mihique recitans, facilius utique mihi nonnunquam esset mea cogitandi ratione totum opus absolvere, § 78, quam remissiori animo, § 98, per cogitationes alienas ita meas interferere, ut meliores sint in auctoris impetu ab eodem fusis, conducant tamen et haereant apte reliquis, a me meaque cogitandi ratione non profectis.
Each has his own way of thinking, in some matters a proper one. If the person reciting to me and I are roughly equal in powers, it would certainly sometimes be easier for me to complete the whole work by my own way of thinking, § 78, than with a more relaxed mind, § 98, to insert my thoughts among another's thoughts in such a way that they are better than those poured out by the author's own impulse, yet still conduct themselves well and adhere suitably to the rest, which did not proceed from me and my way of thinking.
Si defendere delictum, quam vertere malis; Nullum ultra verbum aut operam insumamus inanem, Quin sine rivali teque et tua solus ames.
"But if you chose to vindicate the crime,
Not mend it, he would waste no further time,
But let you live, untroubled by advice,
Sole tenant of your own fool's paradise."
Hor.
Horace.
Sunt, quibus assuevimus pueri,
There are things to which we grew accustomed
volentes etiam viri,
as boys, and willingly even as men:
scilicet, ut alius sua corrigat,
namely, that another should correct his own things,
quem deesse sibi queruntur:
and they complain that such a person is lacking to them:
Suus cuique attributus est error; Sed non videmus, manticae quod in tergo est.
"Each of us has his assigned delusion: but we see not what's in the wallet on our back."
Concedo recitationem veterum,
I grant that the recitation of the ancients,
nisi corrumpatur et haec adulationibus, saluberrimum
unless even this is corrupted by flatteries,
esse consilium, et iuste queri,
is a very healthy counsel, and that he
cui desit vir bonus et prudens,
rightly complains who lacks a good and prudent
qui rogatus in nostris diiudicandis,
man who, when asked to judge our things
dum adhuc nonum forsan in annum
while perhaps they are still being pressed into the ninth year,
premuntur, Fiat Aristarchus.
"may become an Aristarchus."
Neque tamen ab eiusmodi censore plura postulanda sunt,
Yet no more is
quam ut vel dicat:
to be asked from a
Corrige, sodes, hoc et hoc, vel ut
censor of this kind than either that he say,
incomtis allinat atrum Transverso calamo signum.
"A wise and faithful counsellor will blame
Weak verses, note the rough, condemn the lame,"
Ut ipse meliora suggerat, non aequus est,
or that "he mark the rough passages with a
qui rogat virum vir.
black sign by a crosswise pen."
Est cuilibet sua cogitandi
That he himself should suggest better things is not fair,
ratio, in quibusdam propria.
when a man asks a man.
Si circiter aequales viribus sumus ego, mihique recitans,
Each has his own way of thinking, in some matters a proper one. If the person reciting
facilius utique mihi nonnunquam esset mea
to me and I are roughly equal in powers,
cogitandi ratione totum opus absolvere, § 78,
it would certainly sometimes be easier
quam remissiori animo, § 98,
for me to complete the whole work
per
by my own way of thinking, § 78,
cogitationes alienas ita meas interferere,
than with a more relaxed mind, § 98,
ut meliores sint in
to insert my thoughts among another's thoughts in such
auctoris impetu ab eodem fusis,
a way that they are better than those poured out by the author's own impulse, yet still
conducant tamen et haereant apte reliquis,
conduct themselves well and adhere suitably to the rest,
a me meaque cogitandi ratione non profectis.
which did not proceed from me and my way of thinking.
Si defendere delictum, quam vertere malis; Nullum ultra verbum aut operam insumamus inanem, Quin sine rivali teque et tua solus ames.
"But if you chose to vindicate the crime,
Not mend it, he would waste no further time,
But let you live, untroubled by advice,
Sole tenant of your own fool's paradise."
Hor.
Horace.
Sunt, quibus assuevimus pueri, volentes etiam viri, scilicet, ut alius sua corrigat, quem deesse sibi queruntur: / There are things to which we grew accustomed as boys, and willingly even as men: namely, that another should correct his own things, and they complain that such a person is lacking to them:
Suus cuique attributus est error; Sed non videmus, manticae quod in tergo est.
"Each of us has his assigned delusion: but we see not what's in the wallet on our back."
Concedo recitationem veterum, nisi corrumpatur et haec adulationibus, saluberrimum esse consilium, et iuste queri, cui desit vir bonus et prudens, qui rogatus in nostris diiudicandis, dum adhuc nonum forsan in annum premuntur, Fiat Aristarchus. / I grant that the recitation of the ancients, unless even this is corrupted by flatteries, is a very healthy counsel, and that he rightly complains who lacks a good and prudent man who, when asked to judge our things while perhaps they are still being pressed into the ninth year, "may become an Aristarchus."
Neque tamen ab eiusmodi censore plura postulanda sunt, quam ut vel dicat: Corrige, sodes, hoc et hoc, vel ut / Yet no more is to be asked from a censor of this kind than either that he say,
incomtis allinat atrum Transverso calamo signum.
"A wise and faithful counsellor will blame
Weak verses, note the rough, condemn the lame,"
Ut ipse meliora suggerat, non aequus est, qui rogat virum vir. / or that "he mark the rough passages with a black sign by a crosswise pen."
Est cuilibet sua cogitandi ratio, in quibusdam propria. / That he himself should suggest better things is not fair, when a man asks a man.
Si circiter aequales viribus sumus ego, mihique recitans, facilius utique mihi nonnunquam esset mea cogitandi ratione totum opus absolvere, § 78, quam remissiori animo, § 98, per cogitationes alienas ita meas interferere, ut meliores sint in auctoris impetu ab eodem fusis, conducant tamen et haereant apte reliquis, a me meaque cogitandi ratione non profectis. / Each has his own way of thinking, in some matters a proper one. If the person reciting to me and I are roughly equal in powers, it would certainly sometimes be easier for me to complete the whole work by my own way of thinking, § 78, than with a more relaxed mind, § 98, to insert my thoughts among another's thoughts in such a way that they are better than those poured out by the author's own impulse, yet still conduct themselves well and adhere suitably to the rest, which did not proceed from me and my way of thinking.
Si defendere delictum, quam vertere malis; Nullum ultra verbum aut operam insumamus inanem, Quin sine rivali teque et tua solus ames.
"But if you chose to vindicate the crime,
Not mend it, he would waste no further time,
But let you live, untroubled by advice,
Sole tenant of your own fool's paradise."
Hor. / Horace.
§ 104
Naturale cogitandi genus si dicatur naturalibus animae cogitaturae viribus, obiectorum eorumque naturae proportionatum, quibus et quorum in usus vel delectationem cogitatio suscepta praesumenda est, seu brevius has naturas imitatum, adeo necessarium est pulcre cogitaturo naturale cogitandi genus, § 14, ut minus adhuc cognita animae pulcre cogitaturae, multorumque obiectorum natura, omne venustae cogitationis artificium hac unica regula comprehendi videretur: Naturam imitare.
If the natural mode of thinking is said to be one proportioned to the natural powers of the soul that is going to think, and to the objects and their nature, for whom and for whose use or delight the thought undertaken must be presumed, or more briefly one imitating these natures, then the natural mode of thinking is so necessary for one about to think beautifully, § 14, that, while the nature of the soul about to think beautifully and of many objects is still less known, the whole art of graceful thought would seem to be comprehended in this single rule: imitate nature.
Naturale cogitandi genus si dicatur naturalibus animae cogitaturae viribus, obiectorum eorumque naturae proportionatum, quibus et quorum in usus vel delectationem cogitatio suscepta praesumenda est, seu brevius has naturas imitatum, adeo necessarium est pulcre cogitaturo naturale cogitandi genus, § 14, ut minus adhuc cognita animae pulcre cogitaturae, multorumque obiectorum natura, omne venustae cogitationis artificium hac unica regula comprehendi videretur: Naturam imitare.
If the natural mode of thinking is said to be one proportioned to the natural powers of the soul that is going to think, and to the objects and their nature, for whom and for whose use or delight the thought undertaken must be presumed, or more briefly one imitating these natures, then the natural mode of thinking is so necessary for one about to think beautifully, § 14, that, while the nature of the soul about to think beautifully and of many objects is still less known, the whole art of graceful thought would seem to be comprehended in this single rule: imitate nature.
Naturale cogitandi genus si dicatur
If the natural mode of thinking is said to
naturalibus animae cogitaturae viribus,
be one proportioned to the natural powers of the
obiectorum eorumque
soul that is going to think,
naturae proportionatum,
and to the objects and their nature, for
quibus et quorum in usus vel delectationem cogitatio suscepta
whom and for whose use or delight the thought
praesumenda est, seu brevius has naturas imitatum,
undertaken must be presumed, or more briefly one imitating
adeo necessarium est pulcre cogitaturo naturale cogitandi
these natures, then the natural mode of thinking
genus,
is so necessary for one about to think beautifully,
§ 14, ut minus adhuc cognita animae
§ 14, that, while the nature of the soul about
pulcre cogitaturae, multorumque obiectorum natura,
to think beautifully and of many objects is
omne venustae cogitationis artificium hac
still less known, the whole art of graceful thought
unica regula comprehendi videretur: Naturam imitare.
would seem to be comprehended in this single rule: imitate nature.
Naturale cogitandi genus si dicatur naturalibus animae cogitaturae viribus, obiectorum eorumque naturae proportionatum, quibus et quorum in usus vel delectationem cogitatio suscepta praesumenda est, seu brevius has naturas imitatum, adeo necessarium est pulcre cogitaturo naturale cogitandi genus, § 14, ut minus adhuc cognita animae pulcre cogitaturae, multorumque obiectorum natura, omne venustae cogitationis artificium hac unica regula comprehendi videretur: Naturam imitare. / If the natural mode of thinking is said to be one proportioned to the natural powers of the soul that is going to think, and to the objects and their nature, for whom and for whose use or delight the thought undertaken must be presumed, or more briefly one imitating these natures, then the natural mode of thinking is so necessary for one about to think beautifully, § 14, that, while the nature of the soul about to think beautifully and of many objects is still less known, the whole art of graceful thought would seem to be comprehended in this single rule: imitate nature.
§ 105
Hinc pulcre cogitaturus caveat, 1) ne laudem ingenii venusti affectet, nisi omnino, tamen insigniter, destitutus ea, quam § 11 descripsimus, natura, contra naturam, asinus ad lyram; 2) ne forsitan habens naturae generatim, quantum satis est, specialem tamen characterem et naturae quandam inflexionem, ut ita dicam, peculiarem requirentia sibi cogitare sumat, ante quam viderit, an speciali suo etiam characteri has naturae dotes indiderit, alias cogitaturus praeter naturam; Suffenus,
Hence one about to think beautifully should beware 1) lest he seek the praise of charming talent, if, though not wholly, yet notably, deprived of that nature which we described in § 11, he thinks against nature, an ass at the lyre; 2) lest perhaps, while having nature generally as much as is enough, he nevertheless take up for himself things to be thought that require a special character and, so to speak, a peculiar inflection of nature, before he has seen whether nature has also placed these gifts in his special character; otherwise he will think beyond nature. Suffenus,
Homo venustus, et dicax et urbanus,
"That Suffenus, Varus, whom thou know'st right well, is a man fair spoken, witty and urbane,"
cuius si versus legas
if you read his verses,
Tum bellus ille, et urbanus Suffenus unus caprimulgus, aut fossor Rursus videtur; tantum abhorret ac mutat.
"But when thou readest these, that refined and urbane Suffenus is seen on the contrary to be a mere goatherd or ditcher-lout, so great and shocking is the change."
Cat. Utrumque cogitandi genus est invita Minerva susceptum:
Catullus. Each mode of thinking is one undertaken with Minerva unwilling:
Tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva.
"You will not fly in queen Minerva's face
In action or in word."
Hor. Cic. Off. L. I, 110.
Horace; Cicero, On Duties I.110.
Hinc pulcre cogitaturus caveat, 1) ne laudem ingenii venusti affectet, nisi omnino, tamen insigniter, destitutus ea, quam § 11 descripsimus, natura, contra naturam, asinus ad lyram; 2) ne forsitan habens naturae generatim, quantum satis est, specialem tamen characterem et naturae quandam inflexionem, ut ita dicam, peculiarem requirentia sibi cogitare sumat, ante quam viderit, an speciali suo etiam characteri has naturae dotes indiderit, alias cogitaturus praeter naturam; Suffenus,
Hence one about to think beautifully should beware 1) lest he seek the praise of charming talent, if, though not wholly, yet notably, deprived of that nature which we described in § 11, he thinks against nature, an ass at the lyre; 2) lest perhaps, while having nature generally as much as is enough, he nevertheless take up for himself things to be thought that require a special character and, so to speak, a peculiar inflection of nature, before he has seen whether nature has also placed these gifts in his special character; otherwise he will think beyond nature. Suffenus,
Homo venustus, et dicax et urbanus,
"That Suffenus, Varus, whom thou know'st right well, is a man fair spoken, witty and urbane,"
cuius si versus legas
if you read his verses,
Tum bellus ille, et urbanus Suffenus unus caprimulgus, aut fossor Rursus videtur; tantum abhorret ac mutat.
"But when thou readest these, that refined and urbane Suffenus is seen on the contrary to be a mere goatherd or ditcher-lout, so great and shocking is the change."
Cat.
Catullus.
Utrumque cogitandi genus est invita Minerva susceptum:
Each mode of thinking is one undertaken with Minerva unwilling:
Tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva.
"You will not fly in queen Minerva's face
In action or in word."
Hor. Cic. Off. L. I, 110.
Horace; Cicero, On Duties I.110.
Hinc pulcre cogitaturus caveat,
Hence one about to think beautifully should beware
1) ne laudem ingenii venusti affectet, nisi omnino, tamen
1) lest he seek the praise of charming talent,
insigniter, destitutus ea,
if, though not wholly, yet notably, deprived
quam § 11 descripsimus,
of that nature which we described in § 11, he
natura, contra naturam, asinus ad lyram;
thinks against nature, an ass at the lyre;
2) ne forsitan habens naturae generatim,
2) lest perhaps, while having nature generally
quantum satis est, specialem tamen
as much as is enough, he nevertheless take up
characterem et
for himself things to be thought that require a special character and,
naturae quandam inflexionem, ut ita dicam, peculiarem requirentia sibi cogitare
so to speak, a peculiar inflection of nature,
sumat, ante quam viderit, an speciali suo etiam
before he has seen whether nature has also placed
characteri
these gifts in his special character;
has naturae dotes indiderit, alias cogitaturus praeter naturam; Suffenus,
otherwise he will think beyond nature. Suffenus,
Homo venustus, et dicax et urbanus,
"That Suffenus, Varus, whom thou know'st right well, is a man fair spoken, witty and urbane,"
cuius si versus legas
if you read his verses,
Tum bellus ille, et urbanus Suffenus unus caprimulgus, aut fossor Rursus videtur; tantum abhorret ac mutat.
"But when thou readest these, that refined and urbane Suffenus is seen on the contrary to be a mere goatherd or ditcher-lout, so great and shocking is the change."
Cat.
Catullus.
Utrumque cogitandi genus est invita Minerva susceptum:
Each mode of thinking is one undertaken with Minerva unwilling:
Tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva.
"You will not fly in queen Minerva's face
In action or in word."
Hor. Cic. Off. L. I, 110.
Horace; Cicero, On Duties I.110.
Hinc pulcre cogitaturus caveat, 1) ne laudem ingenii venusti affectet, nisi omnino, tamen insigniter, destitutus ea, quam § 11 descripsimus, natura, contra naturam, asinus ad lyram; 2) ne forsitan habens naturae generatim, quantum satis est, specialem tamen characterem et naturae quandam inflexionem, ut ita dicam, peculiarem requirentia sibi cogitare sumat, ante quam viderit, an speciali suo etiam characteri has naturae dotes indiderit, alias cogitaturus praeter naturam; Suffenus, / Hence one about to think beautifully should beware 1) lest he seek the praise of charming talent, if, though not wholly, yet notably, deprived of that nature which we described in § 11, he thinks against nature, an ass at the lyre; 2) lest perhaps, while having nature generally as much as is enough, he nevertheless take up for himself things to be thought that require a special character and, so to speak, a peculiar inflection of nature, before he has seen whether nature has also placed these gifts in his special character; otherwise he will think beyond nature. Suffenus,
Homo venustus, et dicax et urbanus,
"That Suffenus, Varus, whom thou know'st right well, is a man fair spoken, witty and urbane,"
cuius si versus legas / if you read his verses,
Tum bellus ille, et urbanus Suffenus unus caprimulgus, aut fossor Rursus videtur; tantum abhorret ac mutat.
"But when thou readest these, that refined and urbane Suffenus is seen on the contrary to be a mere goatherd or ditcher-lout, so great and shocking is the change."
Cat. / Catullus.
Utrumque cogitandi genus est invita Minerva susceptum: / Each mode of thinking is one undertaken with Minerva unwilling:
Tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva.
"You will not fly in queen Minerva's face
In action or in word."
Hor. Cic. Off. L. I, 110. / Horace; Cicero, On Duties I.110.
§ 106
Genus cogitandi naturale rectissime sequutus, § 104, ne, nubem pro Iunone, amplectatur pinguem et crassam Minervam, Rusticus, abnormis sapiens, non tam iuvenilia, quam puerilia sua, si quid non aspernandae naturae, § 11, pelluceat, iam omnibus numeris absoluta statuens, S. III, aut etiam rudi ingenio contentus per omnem vitam, pro naturali laudando, sequatur rude cogitandi genus, cuius ad naturam saepe satis mediocrem, nihil doctrinae, nihil artis accesserit, S. IV.
Having followed the natural mode of thinking most rightly, § 104, let him not, embracing a cloud for Juno, embrace a fat and coarse Minerva, "rustic, abnormally wise," judging his own things not so much youthful as childish, if anything of a nature not to be despised, § 11, shines through, to be already finished in every respect, Section III; or, even content with crude talent through his whole life, under the name of a natural mode to be praised, follow a rude mode of thinking, to whose often rather mediocre nature nothing of doctrine, nothing of art, has been added, Section IV.
Genus cogitandi naturale rectissime sequutus, § 104, ne, nubem pro Iunone, amplectatur pinguem et crassam Minervam, Rusticus, abnormis sapiens, non tam iuvenilia, quam puerilia sua, si quid non aspernandae naturae, § 11, pelluceat, iam omnibus numeris absoluta statuens, S. III, aut etiam rudi ingenio contentus per omnem vitam, pro naturali laudando, sequatur rude cogitandi genus, cuius ad naturam saepe satis mediocrem, nihil doctrinae, nihil artis accesserit, S. IV.
Having followed the natural mode of thinking most rightly, § 104, let him not, embracing a cloud for Juno, embrace a fat and coarse Minerva, "rustic, abnormally wise," judging his own things not so much youthful as childish, if anything of a nature not to be despised, § 11, shines through, to be already finished in every respect, Section III; or, even content with crude talent through his whole life, under the name of a natural mode to be praised, follow a rude mode of thinking, to whose often rather mediocre nature nothing of doctrine, nothing of art, has been added, Section IV.
Genus cogitandi naturale rectissime sequutus,
Having followed the natural mode of thinking most rightly,
§ 104, ne, nubem pro Iunone, amplectatur pinguem
§ 104, let him not, embracing a cloud for Juno,
et crassam Minervam, Rusticus, abnormis sapiens,
embrace a fat and coarse Minerva, "rustic, abnormally wise,"
non tam iuvenilia, quam puerilia sua,
judging his own things not so much youthful as childish,
si quid non aspernandae naturae,
if anything of a nature not to be despised,
§ 11, pelluceat, iam omnibus numeris absoluta statuens, S.
§ 11, shines through, to be already finished in every respect,
III, aut etiam rudi ingenio contentus
Section III; or, even content with crude talent
per omnem vitam, pro naturali laudando,
through his whole life, under the name of a natural mode
sequatur rude cogitandi
to be praised, follow a rude mode of thinking,
genus, cuius ad naturam saepe satis mediocrem,
to whose often rather mediocre
nihil doctrinae, nihil artis accesserit, S. IV.
nature nothing of doctrine, nothing of art, has been added, Section IV.
Genus cogitandi naturale rectissime sequutus, § 104, ne, nubem pro Iunone, amplectatur pinguem et crassam Minervam, Rusticus, abnormis sapiens, non tam iuvenilia, quam puerilia sua, si quid non aspernandae naturae, § 11, pelluceat, iam omnibus numeris absoluta statuens, S. III, aut etiam rudi ingenio contentus per omnem vitam, pro naturali laudando, sequatur rude cogitandi genus, cuius ad naturam saepe satis mediocrem, nihil doctrinae, nihil artis accesserit, S. IV. / Having followed the natural mode of thinking most rightly, § 104, let him not, embracing a cloud for Juno, embrace a fat and coarse Minerva, "rustic, abnormally wise," judging his own things not so much youthful as childish, if anything of a nature not to be despised, § 11, shines through, to be already finished in every respect, Section III; or, even content with crude talent through his whole life, under the name of a natural mode to be praised, follow a rude mode of thinking, to whose often rather mediocre nature nothing of doctrine, nothing of art, has been added, Section IV.
§ 107
Rude cogitandi genus duplici ratione fit satis deforme phaenomenon, § 14. 1) inscito (indocto, inerudito) cogitandi genere; quando vel in eum gradum eruditionis pulcrae, quem generatim in omni requirimus ultra plebem sapere auso, gravius impingitur, vel apparet speciatim de aliquibus efferre suas cogitationes aliquem, ceu venustas, voluisse, quorum naturam vel mediocri doctrina potuisset nosse penitius, § 104, de quibus tamen ignoret, quicquid
The rude mode of thinking becomes a sufficiently deformed phenomenon in two ways, § 14. 1) By an ignorant (untaught, unerudite) mode of thinking; when either someone stumbles seriously against that degree of beautiful erudition which, in general, we require in everyone who dares to be wise beyond the crowd, or when it appears that someone specifically wanted to bring forth his thoughts about certain things as charming, whose nature he could have known more deeply even by moderate learning, § 104, yet about which he is ignorant of whatever
Non omnis fricti ciceris sciat ac nucis emtor,
"For those who have a father or a horse
Or an estate will take offence of course,
Nor think they're bound in duty to admire
What gratifies the vetch-and-chestnut-buyer."
§§ 66, 67.
§§ 66, 67.
Rude cogitandi genus duplici ratione fit satis deforme phaenomenon, § 14. 1) inscito (indocto, inerudito) cogitandi genere; quando vel in eum gradum eruditionis pulcrae, quem generatim in omni requirimus ultra plebem sapere auso, gravius impingitur, vel apparet speciatim de aliquibus efferre suas cogitationes aliquem, ceu venustas, voluisse, quorum naturam vel mediocri doctrina potuisset nosse penitius, § 104, de quibus tamen ignoret, quicquid
The rude mode of thinking becomes a sufficiently deformed phenomenon in two ways, § 14. 1) By an ignorant (untaught, unerudite) mode of thinking; when either someone stumbles seriously against that degree of beautiful erudition which, in general, we require in everyone who dares to be wise beyond the crowd, or when it appears that someone specifically wanted to bring forth his thoughts about certain things as charming, whose nature he could have known more deeply even by moderate learning, § 104, yet about which he is ignorant of whatever
Non omnis fricti ciceris sciat ac nucis emtor,
"For those who have a father or a horse
Or an estate will take offence of course,
Nor think they're bound in duty to admire
What gratifies the vetch-and-chestnut-buyer."
§§ 66, 67.
§§ 66, 67.
Rude cogitandi genus duplici ratione fit satis deforme phaenomenon,
The rude mode of thinking becomes a sufficiently deformed phenomenon
§ 14. 1) inscito (indocto,
in two ways, § 14. 1) By an ignorant (untaught,
inerudito) cogitandi genere; quando vel in
unerudite) mode of thinking; when either someone stumbles seriously
eum gradum eruditionis pulcrae, quem generatim
against that degree of beautiful erudition which, in general,
in omni requirimus ultra plebem sapere auso,
we require in everyone who dares to be wise beyond
gravius impingitur, vel apparet speciatim
the crowd, or when it appears that someone specifically
de aliquibus efferre suas cogitationes aliquem,
wanted to bring forth his thoughts about certain
ceu venustas, voluisse, quorum naturam vel mediocri
things as charming, whose nature he could have known
doctrina potuisset nosse penitius, § 104,
more deeply even by moderate learning, § 104,
de quibus tamen ignoret, quicquid
yet about which he is ignorant of whatever
Non omnis fricti ciceris sciat ac nucis emtor,
"For those who have a father or a horse
Or an estate will take offence of course,
Nor think they're bound in duty to admire
What gratifies the vetch-and-chestnut-buyer."
§§ 66, 67.
§§ 66, 67.
Rude cogitandi genus duplici ratione fit satis deforme phaenomenon, § 14. 1) inscito (indocto, inerudito) cogitandi genere; quando vel in eum gradum eruditionis pulcrae, quem generatim in omni requirimus ultra plebem sapere auso, gravius impingitur, vel apparet speciatim de aliquibus efferre suas cogitationes aliquem, ceu venustas, voluisse, quorum naturam vel mediocri doctrina potuisset nosse penitius, § 104, de quibus tamen ignoret, quicquid / The rude mode of thinking becomes a sufficiently deformed phenomenon in two ways, § 14. 1) By an ignorant (untaught, unerudite) mode of thinking; when either someone stumbles seriously against that degree of beautiful erudition which, in general, we require in everyone who dares to be wise beyond the crowd, or when it appears that someone specifically wanted to bring forth his thoughts about certain things as charming, whose nature he could have known more deeply even by moderate learning, § 104, yet about which he is ignorant of whatever
Non omnis fricti ciceris sciat ac nucis emtor,
"For those who have a father or a horse
Or an estate will take offence of course,
Nor think they're bound in duty to admire
What gratifies the vetch-and-chestnut-buyer."
§§ 66, 67. / §§ 66, 67.
§ 108
Rude cogitandi genus est, 2) iners cogitandi genus, denuo vel generatim probe fundatarum eleganter cogitandi regularum, vel speciatim eius artis peculiaris aut ignorantiam prodens, cuius tamen specimen profitearis, §§ 106, 68, 60, aut neglectum exceptionibus, quibus nihil insit elegantiae, §§ 25, 72.
The rude mode of thinking is, 2) an inert mode of thinking, again betraying either ignorance of well-founded rules for thinking elegantly in general, or specifically ignorance of that particular art of which nevertheless you profess a specimen, §§ 106, 68, 60, or neglect through exceptions in which there is nothing of elegance, §§ 25, 72.
Rude cogitandi genus est, 2) iners cogitandi genus, denuo vel generatim probe fundatarum eleganter cogitandi regularum, vel speciatim eius artis peculiaris aut ignorantiam prodens, cuius tamen specimen profitearis, §§ 106, 68, 60, aut neglectum exceptionibus, quibus nihil insit elegantiae, §§ 25, 72.
The rude mode of thinking is, 2) an inert mode of thinking, again betraying either ignorance of well-founded rules for thinking elegantly in general, or specifically ignorance of that particular art of which nevertheless you profess a specimen, §§ 106, 68, 60, or neglect through exceptions in which there is nothing of elegance, §§ 25, 72.
Rude cogitandi genus est,
The rude mode of thinking is,
2) iners cogitandi genus,
2) an inert mode of thinking,
denuo vel generatim probe fundatarum eleganter cogitandi regularum,
again betraying either ignorance of well-founded rules for thinking elegantly
vel speciatim eius artis peculiaris aut ignorantiam
in general, or specifically ignorance of that
prodens, cuius tamen specimen
particular art of which nevertheless you profess a specimen,
profitearis, §§ 106, 68, 60, aut neglectum exceptionibus,
§§ 106, 68, 60, or neglect through exceptions
quibus nihil insit elegantiae, §§ 25, 72.
in which there is nothing of elegance, §§ 25, 72.
Rude cogitandi genus est, 2) iners cogitandi genus, denuo vel generatim probe fundatarum eleganter cogitandi regularum, vel speciatim eius artis peculiaris aut ignorantiam prodens, cuius tamen specimen profitearis, §§ 106, 68, 60, aut neglectum exceptionibus, quibus nihil insit elegantiae, §§ 25, 72. / The rude mode of thinking is, 2) an inert mode of thinking, again betraying either ignorance of well-founded rules for thinking elegantly in general, or specifically ignorance of that particular art of which nevertheless you profess a specimen, §§ 106, 68, 60, or neglect through exceptions in which there is nothing of elegance, §§ 25, 72.
§ 109
Duplicis huius, §§ 107, 108, duplex
Of this twofold fault, §§ 107, 108, there is a twofold
In vitium ducit culpae fuga, dum caret arte
"Thus zeal to 'scape from error, if unchecked
By sense of art, creates a new defect."
vera naturam belle supplente, S. IV. Primum est umbratile et scholasticum cogitandi genus, quando in iis, quae pulcram cogitandi rationem requirunt, adeoque naturam, etiam alteram, consuetudinem elegantioris inter moratiores vivendi generis imitari sequi que debent, § 104, aut tantum constipatur eruditionis reconditioris, ut desinat esse pulcritudo, § 15, aut omnino speciem eruditionis tantum apud pueros et grammaticorum aliquos mentientia congeruntur.
truly and beautifully supplying nature, Section IV. The first is a shadowy and scholastic mode of thinking, when, in matters that require a beautiful way of thinking and therefore nature, even a second nature, and ought to imitate and follow the habit of a more elegant kind of living among the more polished, § 104, either so much of more recondite erudition is packed in that beauty ceases, § 15, or things are heaped up that altogether merely feign the appearance of erudition among boys and some grammarians.
Duplicis huius, §§ 107, 108, duplex
Of this twofold fault, §§ 107, 108, there is a twofold
In vitium ducit culpae fuga, dum caret arte
"Thus zeal to 'scape from error, if unchecked
By sense of art, creates a new defect."
vera naturam belle supplente, S. IV. Primum est umbratile et scholasticum cogitandi genus, quando in iis, quae pulcram cogitandi rationem requirunt, adeoque naturam, etiam alteram, consuetudinem elegantioris inter moratiores vivendi generis imitari sequi que debent, § 104, aut tantum constipatur eruditionis reconditioris, ut desinat esse pulcritudo, § 15, aut omnino speciem eruditionis tantum apud pueros et grammaticorum aliquos mentientia congeruntur.
truly and beautifully supplying nature, Section IV. The first is a shadowy and scholastic mode of thinking, when, in matters that require a beautiful way of thinking and therefore nature, even a second nature, and ought to imitate and follow the habit of a more elegant kind of living among the more polished, § 104, either so much of more recondite erudition is packed in that beauty ceases, § 15, or things are heaped up that altogether merely feign the appearance of erudition among boys and some grammarians.
Duplicis huius, §§ 107, 108, duplex
Of this twofold fault, §§ 107, 108, there is a twofold
In vitium ducit culpae fuga, dum caret arte
"Thus zeal to 'scape from error, if unchecked
By sense of art, creates a new defect."
vera naturam belle supplente, S. IV.
truly and beautifully supplying nature, Section IV.
Primum est umbratile et scholasticum cogitandi
The first is a shadowy and scholastic mode of thinking,
genus, quando in iis,
when, in matters that require a
quae pulcram cogitandi rationem requirunt, adeoque naturam,
beautiful way of thinking and therefore nature,
etiam alteram,
even a second nature, and ought to
consuetudinem elegantioris
imitate and follow the habit of a more elegant
inter moratiores vivendi generis imitari sequi que debent,
kind of living among the more polished,
§ 104, aut tantum constipatur eruditionis reconditioris,
§ 104, either so much of more recondite erudition is
ut desinat esse pulcritudo, § 15,
packed in that beauty ceases, § 15,
aut omnino speciem
or things are heaped up that altogether merely feign
eruditionis tantum apud pueros et grammaticorum aliquos mentientia congeruntur.
the appearance of erudition among boys and some grammarians.
Duplicis huius, §§ 107, 108, duplex / Of this twofold fault, §§ 107, 108, there is a twofold
In vitium ducit culpae fuga, dum caret arte
"Thus zeal to 'scape from error, if unchecked
By sense of art, creates a new defect."
vera naturam belle supplente, S. IV. Primum est umbratile et scholasticum cogitandi genus, quando in iis, quae pulcram cogitandi rationem requirunt, adeoque naturam, etiam alteram, consuetudinem elegantioris inter moratiores vivendi generis imitari sequi que debent, § 104, aut tantum constipatur eruditionis reconditioris, ut desinat esse pulcritudo, § 15, aut omnino speciem eruditionis tantum apud pueros et grammaticorum aliquos mentientia congeruntur. / truly and beautifully supplying nature, Section IV. The first is a shadowy and scholastic mode of thinking, when, in matters that require a beautiful way of thinking and therefore nature, even a second nature, and ought to imitate and follow the habit of a more elegant kind of living among the more polished, § 104, either so much of more recondite erudition is packed in that beauty ceases, § 15, or things are heaped up that altogether merely feign the appearance of erudition among boys and some grammarians.
§ 110
Alterum est affectatum et coactum cogitandi genus, naturam per artem male supplens, quando artes, nescio quae, nimia subtilitatis affectatione frangunt atque concidunt, quod Quintilianus docet, quicquid est in meditationum elegantiis generosius. Peius haec naturale cogitandi genus, § 105, enecans se exserit 1) quando naturalis unice decor et non fucatus suffecisset, artis tamen cuiuscunque pigmenta vocantur in subsidium superfluum, hic nocens; 2) ubi satis infelix aliquis fuit, ut in malas deceptricis artis regulas incideret; 3) ubi bonae artis regulae applicantur, ubi locum habent, sed inepte, § 105. E. § 336.
The other is an affected and forced mode of thinking, badly supplying nature by art, when certain "arts," I know not what, by excessive affectation of subtlety break and cut to pieces whatever is more generous in the elegances of meditations, as Quintilian teaches. This shows itself worse, killing the natural mode of thinking, § 105: 1) when a natural and unpainted grace alone would have sufficed, yet the pigments of some art are called in as a superfluous aid, here a harmful one; 2) where someone was unfortunate enough to fall into the bad rules of a deceptive art; 3) where the rules of a good art are applied where they have a place, but ineptly, § 105, Ethics, § 336.
Alterum est affectatum et coactum cogitandi genus, naturam per artem male supplens, quando artes, nescio quae, nimia subtilitatis affectatione frangunt atque concidunt, quod Quintilianus docet, quicquid est in meditationum elegantiis generosius.
The other is an affected and forced mode of thinking, badly supplying nature by art, when certain "arts," I know not what, by excessive affectation of subtlety break and cut to pieces whatever is more generous in the elegances of meditations, as Quintilian teaches.
Peius haec naturale cogitandi genus, § 105, enecans se exserit 1) quando naturalis unice decor et non fucatus suffecisset, artis tamen cuiuscunque pigmenta vocantur in subsidium superfluum, hic nocens; 2) ubi satis infelix aliquis fuit, ut in malas deceptricis artis regulas incideret; 3) ubi bonae artis regulae applicantur, ubi locum habent, sed inepte, § 105. E. § 336.
This shows itself worse, killing the natural mode of thinking, § 105: 1) when a natural and unpainted grace alone would have sufficed, yet the pigments of some art are called in as a superfluous aid, here a harmful one; 2) where someone was unfortunate enough to fall into the bad rules of a deceptive art; 3) where the rules of a good art are applied where they have a place, but ineptly, § 105, Ethics, § 336.
Alterum est affectatum et coactum cogitandi
The other is an affected and forced mode of thinking,
genus, naturam per artem male supplens, quando artes,
badly supplying nature by art, when certain "arts,"
nescio quae, nimia subtilitatis affectatione frangunt atque concidunt,
I know not what, by excessive affectation of subtlety break and
quod Quintilianus docet, quicquid est in meditationum
cut to pieces whatever is more generous in the elegances of meditations,
elegantiis generosius.
as Quintilian teaches.
Peius haec naturale cogitandi
This shows itself worse, killing the natural mode of thinking,
genus, § 105, enecans se exserit 1) quando naturalis
§ 105: 1) when a natural
unice decor et non fucatus suffecisset, artis
and unpainted grace alone would have sufficed,
tamen cuiuscunque pigmenta vocantur in subsidium superfluum,
yet the pigments of some art are called in as a superfluous
hic nocens; 2) ubi satis infelix aliquis fuit,
aid, here a harmful one; 2) where someone was unfortunate enough
ut in malas deceptricis artis regulas incideret;
to fall into the bad rules of a deceptive art;
3) ubi bonae artis regulae applicantur,
3) where the rules of a good art are
ubi locum habent, sed inepte, § 105. E. § 336.
applied where they have a place, but ineptly, § 105, Ethics, § 336.
Alterum est affectatum et coactum cogitandi genus, naturam per artem male supplens, quando artes, nescio quae, nimia subtilitatis affectatione frangunt atque concidunt, quod Quintilianus docet, quicquid est in meditationum elegantiis generosius. / The other is an affected and forced mode of thinking, badly supplying nature by art, when certain "arts," I know not what, by excessive affectation of subtlety break and cut to pieces whatever is more generous in the elegances of meditations, as Quintilian teaches.
Peius haec naturale cogitandi genus, § 105, enecans se exserit 1) quando naturalis unice decor et non fucatus suffecisset, artis tamen cuiuscunque pigmenta vocantur in subsidium superfluum, hic nocens; 2) ubi satis infelix aliquis fuit, ut in malas deceptricis artis regulas incideret; 3) ubi bonae artis regulae applicantur, ubi locum habent, sed inepte, § 105. E. § 336. / This shows itself worse, killing the natural mode of thinking, § 105: 1) when a natural and unpainted grace alone would have sufficed, yet the pigments of some art are called in as a superfluous aid, here a harmful one; 2) where someone was unfortunate enough to fall into the bad rules of a deceptive art; 3) where the rules of a good art are applied where they have a place, but ineptly, § 105, Ethics, § 336.
§ 111
Alii naturale cogitandi genus recte sequuti, § 104, cum natura confundunt ordinarium eius statum, et vires, aliqua licet doctrina promotas, S. IV, mortuas tamen et remissas, ex quibus nullum per impetum, nullam per inflammationem viventibus languidum (frigidum, somnolentum, oscitans) cogitandi genus contra S. V.
Others, having rightly followed the natural mode of thinking, § 104, confuse with nature its ordinary state and powers, although advanced by some doctrine, Section IV, yet dead and slack; from these powers, living through no impulse and no inflammation, comes a languid (cold, sleepy, yawning) mode of thinking, contrary to Section V.
Alii naturale cogitandi genus recte sequuti, § 104, cum natura confundunt ordinarium eius statum, et vires, aliqua licet doctrina promotas, S. IV, mortuas tamen et remissas, ex quibus nullum per impetum, nullam per inflammationem viventibus languidum (frigidum, somnolentum, oscitans) cogitandi genus contra S. V.
Others, having rightly followed the natural mode of thinking, § 104, confuse with nature its ordinary state and powers, although advanced by some doctrine, Section IV, yet dead and slack; from these powers, living through no impulse and no inflammation, comes a languid (cold, sleepy, yawning) mode of thinking, contrary to Section V.
Alii naturale cogitandi
Others, having rightly followed the natural mode of thinking,
genus recte sequuti, § 104, cum natura confundunt ordinarium eius statum,
§ 104, confuse with nature its ordinary state
et vires, aliqua licet doctrina promotas, S.
and powers, although advanced by some doctrine, Section
IV, mortuas tamen et remissas, ex quibus
IV, yet dead and slack; from these powers,
nullum per impetum, nullam per inflammationem
living through no impulse and no inflammation,
viventibus languidum (frigidum, somnolentum, oscitans) cogitandi
comes a languid (cold, sleepy, yawning) mode of thinking,
genus contra S. V.
contrary to Section V.
Alii naturale cogitandi genus recte sequuti, § 104, cum natura confundunt ordinarium eius statum, et vires, aliqua licet doctrina promotas, S. IV, mortuas tamen et remissas, ex quibus nullum per impetum, nullam per inflammationem viventibus languidum (frigidum, somnolentum, oscitans) cogitandi genus contra S. V. / Others, having rightly followed the natural mode of thinking, § 104, confuse with nature its ordinary state and powers, although advanced by some doctrine, Section IV, yet dead and slack; from these powers, living through no impulse and no inflammation, comes a languid (cold, sleepy, yawning) mode of thinking, contrary to Section V.
§ 112
Dum vitant stolidi vitia, in contraria currunt,
"While fools shun [one sort of] vices, they fall upon their opposite
extremes."
ieiunumque languorem in cogitando cauturi incidunt in parenthyrsum et effraene cogitandi genus, quod excusso non intellectus solum et rationis iugo, sed spicerioris etiam saporis negligens, citra ullam rationem phaenomenon, quae circiter sufficeret, tantum furorem prae se ferent, qui naturam, sed male sani sincipitis, unice videatur imitari, § 104. Tali vesano deridendo Horatius artis suae dedicavit epilogum:
and, intending to guard against meagre languor in thinking, they fall into parenthyrsus and an unbridled mode of thinking; this, having shaken off not only the yoke of intellect and reason, but also neglecting a more seasoned taste, displays, without any reason that would approximately suffice for the phenomenon, only such fury as seems to imitate nature alone, but the nature of an unsound head, § 104. To mock such a madman Horace dedicated the epilogue of his art:
Certe furit, ac velut ursus, Obiectos caveae valuit si frangere clathros, Indoctum doctumque fugat.
"So much is plain, he's mad: like bear that beats
His prison down and ranges through the streets,
This terrible reciter puts to flight
The learned and unlearned left and right."
Dum vitant stolidi vitia, in contraria currunt,
"While fools shun [one sort of] vices, they fall upon their opposite
extremes."
ieiunumque languorem in cogitando cauturi incidunt in parenthyrsum et effraene cogitandi genus, quod excusso non intellectus solum et rationis iugo, sed spicerioris etiam saporis negligens, citra ullam rationem phaenomenon, quae circiter sufficeret, tantum furorem prae se ferent, qui naturam, sed male sani sincipitis, unice videatur imitari, § 104. Tali vesano deridendo Horatius artis suae dedicavit epilogum:
and, intending to guard against meagre languor in thinking, they fall into parenthyrsus and an unbridled mode of thinking; this, having shaken off not only the yoke of intellect and reason, but also neglecting a more seasoned taste, displays, without any reason that would approximately suffice for the phenomenon, only such fury as seems to imitate nature alone, but the nature of an unsound head, § 104. To mock such a madman Horace dedicated the epilogue of his art:
Certe furit, ac velut ursus, Obiectos caveae valuit si frangere clathros, Indoctum doctumque fugat.
"So much is plain, he's mad: like bear that beats
His prison down and ranges through the streets,
This terrible reciter puts to flight
The learned and unlearned left and right."
Dum vitant stolidi vitia, in contraria currunt,
"While fools shun [one sort of] vices, they fall upon their opposite
extremes."
ieiunumque languorem in cogitando
and, intending to guard against meagre languor in thinking,
cauturi incidunt in parenthyrsum et effraene cogitandi
they fall into parenthyrsus and an unbridled mode of thinking;
genus, quod excusso non
this, having shaken off not only the yoke of
intellectus solum et rationis iugo, sed spicerioris etiam saporis negligens,
intellect and reason, but also neglecting a
citra ullam rationem phaenomenon,
more seasoned taste, displays, without any reason that
quae circiter sufficeret, tantum furorem prae se ferent,
would approximately suffice for the phenomenon, only such fury as seems
qui naturam, sed male sani sincipitis, unice videatur imitari, § 104.
to imitate nature alone, but the nature of an unsound head, § 104.
Tali vesano deridendo Horatius artis suae dedicavit epilogum:
To mock such a madman Horace dedicated the epilogue of his art:
Certe furit, ac velut ursus, Obiectos caveae valuit si frangere clathros, Indoctum doctumque fugat.
"So much is plain, he's mad: like bear that beats
His prison down and ranges through the streets,
This terrible reciter puts to flight
The learned and unlearned left and right."
Dum vitant stolidi vitia, in contraria currunt,
"While fools shun [one sort of] vices, they fall upon their opposite
extremes."
ieiunumque languorem in cogitando cauturi incidunt in parenthyrsum et effraene cogitandi genus, quod excusso non intellectus solum et rationis iugo, sed spicerioris etiam saporis negligens, citra ullam rationem phaenomenon, quae circiter sufficeret, tantum furorem prae se ferent, qui naturam, sed male sani sincipitis, unice videatur imitari, § 104. Tali vesano deridendo Horatius artis suae dedicavit epilogum: / and, intending to guard against meagre languor in thinking, they fall into parenthyrsus and an unbridled mode of thinking; this, having shaken off not only the yoke of intellect and reason, but also neglecting a more seasoned taste, displays, without any reason that would approximately suffice for the phenomenon, only such fury as seems to imitate nature alone, but the nature of an unsound head, § 104. To mock such a madman Horace dedicated the epilogue of his art:
Certe furit, ac velut ursus, Obiectos caveae valuit si frangere clathros, Indoctum doctumque fugat.
"So much is plain, he's mad: like bear that beats
His prison down and ranges through the streets,
This terrible reciter puts to flight
The learned and unlearned left and right."
§ 113
Sicut pigri philosophi ac medici nonnunquam naturam, quasi deum ex machina, legunt asylum suae desidiae, sunt etiam, qui naturale cogitandi genus appellant, nisi omnino rude, inscitum ac iners, §§ 106–108, incomtum tamen et incompositum, quando non in ipso solum impetu animi, de quo S. V, non satis lente festinas, et quicquid occurrit primo, tanquam optimum, adoptas, sed etiam postea, quae satis cito fudisti, vel nunquam animo castigandi retractas, vel non sine blanda parentum indulgentia, qua quicquid eradicandum esset vitii, vix tangunt, ne naturam suorum perdant, veriti. Cavendum hoc malum genus cogitandi, secundum S. VI, limato cogitandi genere.
Just as lazy philosophers and physicians sometimes choose nature, as if a god from the machine, as the refuge of their idleness, there are also those who call a mode of thinking natural which, if not altogether rude, ignorant, and inert, §§ 106–108, is nevertheless unadorned and uncomposed; when not only in the very impulse of the soul, of which Section V spoke, you do not hasten slowly enough and adopt whatever first occurs as best, but even afterward either never review with a mind to correct the things you poured out quickly enough, or review them with the flattering indulgence of parents, by which they scarcely touch whatever fault should be rooted out, fearing lest they lose the nature of their own works. This bad mode of thinking must be guarded against, according to Section VI, by a polished mode of thinking.
Sicut pigri philosophi ac medici nonnunquam naturam, quasi deum ex machina, legunt asylum suae desidiae, sunt etiam, qui naturale cogitandi genus appellant, nisi omnino rude, inscitum ac iners, §§ 106–108, incomtum tamen et incompositum, quando non in ipso solum impetu animi, de quo S. V, non satis lente festinas, et quicquid occurrit primo, tanquam optimum, adoptas, sed etiam postea, quae satis cito fudisti, vel nunquam animo castigandi retractas, vel non sine blanda parentum indulgentia, qua quicquid eradicandum esset vitii, vix tangunt, ne naturam suorum perdant, veriti.
Just as lazy philosophers and physicians sometimes choose nature, as if a god from the machine, as the refuge of their idleness, there are also those who call a mode of thinking natural which, if not altogether rude, ignorant, and inert, §§ 106–108, is nevertheless unadorned and uncomposed; when not only in the very impulse of the soul, of which Section V spoke, you do not hasten slowly enough and adopt whatever first occurs as best, but even afterward either never review with a mind to correct the things you poured out quickly enough, or review them with the flattering indulgence of parents, by which they scarcely touch whatever fault should be rooted out, fearing lest they lose the nature of their own works.
Cavendum hoc malum genus cogitandi, secundum S. VI, limato cogitandi genere.
This bad mode of thinking must be guarded against, according to Section VI, by a polished mode of thinking.
Sicut pigri philosophi ac medici nonnunquam naturam,
Just as lazy philosophers and physicians sometimes choose nature,
quasi deum ex machina,
as if a god from the machine,
legunt asylum suae desidiae, sunt etiam,
as the refuge of their idleness, there are also
qui naturale cogitandi genus appellant,
those who call a mode of thinking natural which,
nisi omnino rude, inscitum ac iners, §§ 106–108,
if not altogether rude, ignorant, and inert, §§ 106–108,
incomtum tamen et incompositum, quando non in
is nevertheless unadorned and uncomposed; when not only in
ipso solum impetu animi, de quo S.
the very impulse of the soul, of which Section
V, non satis lente festinas,
V spoke, you do not hasten slowly enough
et quicquid occurrit primo, tanquam optimum, adoptas,
and adopt whatever first occurs as best,
sed etiam postea,
but even afterward either never review with a mind
quae satis cito fudisti, vel nunquam
to correct the things you poured out quickly enough,
animo castigandi retractas, vel non sine blanda parentum
or review them with the flattering indulgence of parents,
indulgentia, qua quicquid eradicandum esset vitii,
by which they scarcely touch whatever fault should be rooted
vix tangunt, ne naturam suorum perdant, veriti.
out, fearing lest they lose the nature of their own works.
Cavendum hoc malum genus cogitandi,
This bad mode of thinking must be guarded against,
secundum S. VI, limato cogitandi genere.
according to Section VI, by a polished mode of thinking.
Sicut pigri philosophi ac medici nonnunquam naturam, quasi deum ex machina, legunt asylum suae desidiae, sunt etiam, qui naturale cogitandi genus appellant, nisi omnino rude, inscitum ac iners, §§ 106–108, incomtum tamen et incompositum, quando non in ipso solum impetu animi, de quo S. V, non satis lente festinas, et quicquid occurrit primo, tanquam optimum, adoptas, sed etiam postea, quae satis cito fudisti, vel nunquam animo castigandi retractas, vel non sine blanda parentum indulgentia, qua quicquid eradicandum esset vitii, vix tangunt, ne naturam suorum perdant, veriti. / Just as lazy philosophers and physicians sometimes choose nature, as if a god from the machine, as the refuge of their idleness, there are also those who call a mode of thinking natural which, if not altogether rude, ignorant, and inert, §§ 106–108, is nevertheless unadorned and uncomposed; when not only in the very impulse of the soul, of which Section V spoke, you do not hasten slowly enough and adopt whatever first occurs as best, but even afterward either never review with a mind to correct the things you poured out quickly enough, or review them with the flattering indulgence of parents, by which they scarcely touch whatever fault should be rooted out, fearing lest they lose the nature of their own works.
Cavendum hoc malum genus cogitandi, secundum S. VI, limato cogitandi genere. / This bad mode of thinking must be guarded against, according to Section VI, by a polished mode of thinking.
§ 114
Neque tamen commendatur lima magis atterens, quam poliens, excessus in corrigendo, vel in foetus ingenii, qui subiti et extemporales postulantur, tantum studii diligentiaeque impendens, ut lucernam olentes male non habeant pulcram subitaneorum verisimilitudinem, § 96, vel impetus ad maiora dati prodigus, qui in minutulis eundem moratur aut distrahit, contra § 95, vel ita sua retractans, quando
Yet the file is not commended when it wears down more than it polishes: an excess in correcting, either spending so much study and diligence on offspring of talent that are required to be sudden and extemporaneous that, smelling of the lamp, they badly fail to have the beautiful likelihood of spontaneous things, § 96; or being prodigal with impulse given for greater things, delaying or distracting it in tiny details, against § 95; or reviewing one's own works in such a way, when
motus omnis animi, tanquam ventus, cogitantem deseruit, et omnis ardor consedit,
"But afterwards, when he took up the pen in his leisure hours, and his passion had sunk into a calm, his Elocution became dull and languid. ... But no man can revive at pleasure the ardour of his passions; and when that has once subsided, the fire and pathos of his language will be extinguished."
ut flaccescant non sine aliqua vi primum fusa, reiectisque quibusdam, aliis, velut ornamentis, adiectis, omnis incitatio et quasi flamma pulcre cogitandorum simul exstinguatur, § 111. Eiusmodi lima minorem maiori praefert elegantiam exceptione non eleganti, § 25, quia
that things first poured forth not without some force grow slack, and, with certain things rejected and others added like ornaments, all incitement and as it were the flame of things to be thought beautifully is extinguished at once, § 111. Such a file prefers lesser elegance to greater by an inelegant exception, § 25, because
festantem levia nervi Deficiunt animique.
"Attempts at ease emasculate my verse."
Hor.
Horace.
Neque tamen commendatur lima magis atterens, quam poliens, excessus in corrigendo, vel in foetus ingenii, qui subiti et extemporales postulantur, tantum studii diligentiaeque impendens, ut lucernam olentes male non habeant pulcram subitaneorum verisimilitudinem, § 96, vel impetus ad maiora dati prodigus, qui in minutulis eundem moratur aut distrahit, contra § 95, vel ita sua retractans, quando
Yet the file is not commended when it wears down more than it polishes: an excess in correcting, either spending so much study and diligence on offspring of talent that are required to be sudden and extemporaneous that, smelling of the lamp, they badly fail to have the beautiful likelihood of spontaneous things, § 96; or being prodigal with impulse given for greater things, delaying or distracting it in tiny details, against § 95; or reviewing one's own works in such a way, when
motus omnis animi, tanquam ventus, cogitantem deseruit, et omnis ardor consedit,
"But afterwards, when he took up the pen in his leisure hours, and his passion had sunk into a calm, his Elocution became dull and languid. ... But no man can revive at pleasure the ardour of his passions; and when that has once subsided, the fire and pathos of his language will be extinguished."
ut flaccescant non sine aliqua vi primum fusa, reiectisque quibusdam, aliis, velut ornamentis, adiectis, omnis incitatio et quasi flamma pulcre cogitandorum simul exstinguatur, § 111. Eiusmodi lima minorem maiori praefert elegantiam exceptione non eleganti, § 25, quia
that things first poured forth not without some force grow slack, and, with certain things rejected and others added like ornaments, all incitement and as it were the flame of things to be thought beautifully is extinguished at once, § 111. Such a file prefers lesser elegance to greater by an inelegant exception, § 25, because
festantem levia nervi Deficiunt animique.
"Attempts at ease emasculate my verse."
Hor.
Horace.
Neque tamen commendatur lima magis atterens,
Yet the file is not commended when it wears
quam poliens, excessus in corrigendo,
down more than it polishes: an excess in correcting,
vel in foetus ingenii, qui subiti et extemporales postulantur,
either spending so much study and diligence on offspring of
tantum studii diligentiaeque impendens,
talent that are required to be sudden and
ut lucernam olentes male
extemporaneous that, smelling of the lamp,
non habeant pulcram subitaneorum verisimilitudinem, § 96,
they badly fail to have the beautiful likelihood of spontaneous things, § 96;
vel impetus ad maiora dati
or being prodigal with impulse given for greater things,
prodigus, qui in minutulis eundem moratur aut distrahit, contra § 95,
delaying or distracting it in tiny details, against § 95;
vel ita sua retractans, quando
or reviewing one's own works in such a way, when
motus omnis animi, tanquam ventus, cogitantem deseruit, et omnis ardor consedit,
"But afterwards, when he took up the pen in his leisure hours, and his passion had sunk into a calm, his Elocution became dull and languid. ... But no man can revive at pleasure the ardour of his passions; and when that has once subsided, the fire and pathos of his language will be extinguished."
ut flaccescant non sine aliqua vi primum
that things first poured forth not without some force grow slack,
fusa, reiectisque quibusdam, aliis, velut ornamentis,
and, with certain things rejected and others added like ornaments,
adiectis, omnis incitatio et quasi flamma
all incitement and as it were the flame
pulcre cogitandorum simul exstinguatur, § 111.
of things to be thought beautifully is extinguished at once, § 111.
Eiusmodi lima minorem maiori praefert elegantiam exceptione non eleganti,
Such a file prefers lesser elegance to greater by an inelegant
§ 25, quia
exception, § 25, because
festantem levia nervi Deficiunt animique.
"Attempts at ease emasculate my verse."
Hor.
Horace.
Neque tamen commendatur lima magis atterens, quam poliens, excessus in corrigendo, vel in foetus ingenii, qui subiti et extemporales postulantur, tantum studii diligentiaeque impendens, ut lucernam olentes male non habeant pulcram subitaneorum verisimilitudinem, § 96, vel impetus ad maiora dati prodigus, qui in minutulis eundem moratur aut distrahit, contra § 95, vel ita sua retractans, quando / Yet the file is not commended when it wears down more than it polishes: an excess in correcting, either spending so much study and diligence on offspring of talent that are required to be sudden and extemporaneous that, smelling of the lamp, they badly fail to have the beautiful likelihood of spontaneous things, § 96; or being prodigal with impulse given for greater things, delaying or distracting it in tiny details, against § 95; or reviewing one's own works in such a way, when
motus omnis animi, tanquam ventus, cogitantem deseruit, et omnis ardor consedit,
"But afterwards, when he took up the pen in his leisure hours, and his passion had sunk into a calm, his Elocution became dull and languid. ... But no man can revive at pleasure the ardour of his passions; and when that has once subsided, the fire and pathos of his language will be extinguished."
ut flaccescant non sine aliqua vi primum fusa, reiectisque quibusdam, aliis, velut ornamentis, adiectis, omnis incitatio et quasi flamma pulcre cogitandorum simul exstinguatur, § 111. Eiusmodi lima minorem maiori praefert elegantiam exceptione non eleganti, § 25, quia / that things first poured forth not without some force grow slack, and, with certain things rejected and others added like ornaments, all incitement and as it were the flame of things to be thought beautifully is extinguished at once, § 111. Such a file prefers lesser elegance to greater by an inelegant exception, § 25, because
festantem levia nervi Deficiunt animique.
"Attempts at ease emasculate my verse."
Hor. / Horace.
§ 115
Si quis partim ab enumeratis S. II–VII iam instructus, partim non abhorrens, satis felix futurus aestheticus, § 27, consilium amplius rogaverit, de pulcre cogitando generatim, § 17, praesertim de pulcritudine rerum, § 18,
If someone, partly already instructed by the things enumerated in Sections II–VII and partly not out of harmony with them, as one who will become a sufficiently happy aesthetician, § 27, asks for further counsel about thinking beautifully in general, § 17, especially about the beauty of things, § 18,
utar vice cotis, acutum Reddere quae ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi. Munus et officium, nil scribens ipse, docebo: 1) Unde parentur opes.
"Well, never mind: mine be the whetstone's lot,
Which makes steel sharp, though cut itself will not.
Although no writer, I may yet impart
To writing folk the precepts of their art,
Whence come its stores, what trains and forms a bard."
Hor. Prima nempe cura sit in rebus cogitandis ubertas (copia, abundantia, multitudo, divitiae, opes) M. § 575, sed aesthetica, qua datum subiectum, certus cogitaturus, de dato obiecto, certa cogitandi materia, plura pulcre cogitare possit, § 22.
Horace. Therefore the first care in things to be thought should be abundance (copiousness, plenty, multitude, riches, resources), Metaphysics, § 575, but aesthetic abundance, by which a given subject, a definite thinker, about a given object and a definite matter of thinking, can think many things beautifully, § 22.
Si quis partim ab enumeratis S. II–VII iam instructus, partim non abhorrens, satis felix futurus aestheticus, § 27, consilium amplius rogaverit, de pulcre cogitando generatim, § 17, praesertim de pulcritudine rerum, § 18,
If someone, partly already instructed by the things enumerated in Sections II–VII and partly not out of harmony with them, as one who will become a sufficiently happy aesthetician, § 27, asks for further counsel about thinking beautifully in general, § 17, especially about the beauty of things, § 18,
utar vice cotis, acutum Reddere quae ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi. Munus et officium, nil scribens ipse, docebo: 1) Unde parentur opes.
"Well, never mind: mine be the whetstone's lot,
Which makes steel sharp, though cut itself will not.
Although no writer, I may yet impart
To writing folk the precepts of their art,
Whence come its stores, what trains and forms a bard."
Hor. Prima nempe cura sit in rebus cogitandis ubertas (copia, abundantia, multitudo, divitiae, opes) M. § 575, sed aesthetica, qua datum subiectum, certus cogitaturus, de dato obiecto, certa cogitandi materia, plura pulcre cogitare possit, § 22.
Horace. Therefore the first care in things to be thought should be abundance (copiousness, plenty, multitude, riches, resources), Metaphysics, § 575, but aesthetic abundance, by which a given subject, a definite thinker, about a given object and a definite matter of thinking, can think many things beautifully, § 22.
Si quis partim ab enumeratis S.
If someone, partly already instructed by the things enumerated in
II–VII iam instructus, partim non abhorrens,
Sections II–VII and partly not out of harmony with
satis felix futurus aestheticus,
them, as one who will become a sufficiently happy aesthetician,
§ 27, consilium amplius rogaverit, de pulcre cogitando generatim,
§ 27, asks for further counsel about thinking beautifully in general,
§ 17, praesertim de pulcritudine rerum, § 18,
§ 17, especially about the beauty of things, § 18,
utar vice cotis, acutum Reddere quae ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi. Munus et officium, nil scribens ipse, docebo: 1) Unde parentur opes.
"Well, never mind: mine be the whetstone's lot,
Which makes steel sharp, though cut itself will not.
Although no writer, I may yet impart
To writing folk the precepts of their art,
Whence come its stores, what trains and forms a bard."
Hor. Prima nempe cura sit in rebus cogitandis ubertas (copia,
Horace. Therefore the first care in things to be thought should be
abundantia, multitudo, divitiae, opes) M.
abundance (copiousness, plenty, multitude, riches, resources), Metaphysics,
§ 575, sed aesthetica, qua datum subiectum,
§ 575, but aesthetic abundance, by which a given subject,
certus cogitaturus, de dato obiecto,
a definite thinker, about a given object
certa cogitandi materia,
and a definite matter of thinking, can
plura pulcre cogitare possit, § 22.
think many things beautifully, § 22.
Si quis partim ab enumeratis S. II–VII iam instructus, partim non abhorrens, satis felix futurus aestheticus, § 27, consilium amplius rogaverit, de pulcre cogitando generatim, § 17, praesertim de pulcritudine rerum, § 18, / If someone, partly already instructed by the things enumerated in Sections II–VII and partly not out of harmony with them, as one who will become a sufficiently happy aesthetician, § 27, asks for further counsel about thinking beautifully in general, § 17, especially about the beauty of things, § 18,
utar vice cotis, acutum Reddere quae ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi. Munus et officium, nil scribens ipse, docebo: 1) Unde parentur opes.
"Well, never mind: mine be the whetstone's lot,
Which makes steel sharp, though cut itself will not.
Although no writer, I may yet impart
To writing folk the precepts of their art,
Whence come its stores, what trains and forms a bard."
Hor. Prima nempe cura sit in rebus cogitandis ubertas (copia, abundantia, multitudo, divitiae, opes) M. § 575, sed aesthetica, qua datum subiectum, certus cogitaturus, de dato obiecto, certa cogitandi materia, plura pulcre cogitare possit, § 22. / Horace. Therefore the first care in things to be thought should be abundance (copiousness, plenty, multitude, riches, resources), Metaphysics, § 575, but aesthetic abundance, by which a given subject, a definite thinker, about a given object and a definite matter of thinking, can think many things beautifully, § 22.
§ 116
Sic incipit laudes Isaei Plinius:
Thus Pliny begins the praises of Isaeus:
Summa est facultas, ubertas, copia,
"He possesses the utmost readiness, copiousness, and abundance of language."
L. II. ep. 3. Quam primo dividamus in absolutam, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, §§ 115, 22, et relativam, illum absolutae gradum, qui quibusdam pulcre cogitandis forte necessarius est, e.g. minus notis, aut admodum utilibus minus attento tamen inculcandis, quemque latitudinem platonicam dicamus, sequuti Plinium eundem, quando Euphratis quidem sermonem omnem copiosum, § 115, dicit; eundem tamen affirmat frequenter latitudinem illam platonicam effingere, L. I. ep. X.
Book II, Epistle 3. Let us first divide it into absolute abundance, necessary for every beautiful thinking, §§ 115, 22, and relative abundance, that degree of absolute abundance which perhaps is necessary for certain things to be thought beautifully, for example less known things, or very useful things that must be impressed upon a less attentive person; and let us call this Platonic breadth, following the same Pliny, when he says that all the speech of Euphrates is indeed "copious," § 115, yet also affirms that he frequently "shapes that Platonic breadth," Book I, Epistle 10.
Sic incipit laudes Isaei Plinius:
Thus Pliny begins the praises of Isaeus:
Summa est facultas, ubertas, copia,
"He possesses the utmost readiness, copiousness, and abundance of language."
L. II. ep. 3. Quam primo dividamus in absolutam, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, §§ 115, 22, et relativam, illum absolutae gradum, qui quibusdam pulcre cogitandis forte necessarius est, e.g. minus notis, aut admodum utilibus minus attento tamen inculcandis, quemque latitudinem platonicam dicamus, sequuti Plinium eundem, quando Euphratis quidem sermonem omnem copiosum, § 115, dicit; eundem tamen affirmat frequenter latitudinem illam platonicam effingere, L. I. ep. X.
Book II, Epistle 3. Let us first divide it into absolute abundance, necessary for every beautiful thinking, §§ 115, 22, and relative abundance, that degree of absolute abundance which perhaps is necessary for certain things to be thought beautifully, for example less known things, or very useful things that must be impressed upon a less attentive person; and let us call this Platonic breadth, following the same Pliny, when he says that all the speech of Euphrates is indeed "copious," § 115, yet also affirms that he frequently "shapes that Platonic breadth," Book I, Epistle 10.
Sic incipit laudes Isaei Plinius:
Thus Pliny begins the praises of Isaeus:
Summa est facultas, ubertas, copia,
"He possesses the utmost readiness, copiousness, and abundance of language."
L. II. ep. 3. Quam primo dividamus in absolutam,
Book II, Epistle 3. Let us first divide it into absolute
omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, §§ 115,
abundance, necessary for every beautiful thinking, §§ 115,
22, et relativam, illum absolutae gradum,
22, and relative abundance, that degree of absolute abundance which perhaps
qui quibusdam pulcre
is necessary for certain things to be thought beautifully,
cogitandis forte necessarius est, e.g. minus notis,
for example less known things, or
aut admodum utilibus minus attento tamen
very useful things that must be impressed upon a less attentive person;
inculcandis, quemque latitudinem platonicam dicamus,
and let us call this Platonic breadth,
sequuti Plinium eundem, quando
following the same Pliny, when he says that all
Euphratis quidem sermonem omnem copiosum, § 115, dicit;
the speech of Euphrates is indeed "copious," § 115,
eundem tamen affirmat frequenter latitudinem illam platonicam effingere, L.
yet also affirms that he frequently "shapes that Platonic breadth," Book
I. ep. X.
I, Epistle 10.
Sic incipit laudes Isaei Plinius: / Thus Pliny begins the praises of Isaeus:
Summa est facultas, ubertas, copia,
"He possesses the utmost readiness, copiousness, and abundance of language."
L. II. ep. 3. Quam primo dividamus in absolutam, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, §§ 115, 22, et relativam, illum absolutae gradum, qui quibusdam pulcre cogitandis forte necessarius est, e.g. minus notis, aut admodum utilibus minus attento tamen inculcandis, quemque latitudinem platonicam dicamus, sequuti Plinium eundem, quando Euphratis quidem sermonem omnem copiosum, § 115, dicit; eundem tamen affirmat frequenter latitudinem illam platonicam effingere, L. I. ep. X. / Book II, Epistle 3. Let us first divide it into absolute abundance, necessary for every beautiful thinking, §§ 115, 22, and relative abundance, that degree of absolute abundance which perhaps is necessary for certain things to be thought beautifully, for example less known things, or very useful things that must be impressed upon a less attentive person; and let us call this Platonic breadth, following the same Pliny, when he says that all the speech of Euphrates is indeed "copious," § 115, yet also affirms that he frequently "shapes that Platonic breadth," Book I, Epistle 10.
§ 117
Etiamsi non velit pulcre meditaturus aliquando latitudinem comparativam sequi, § 116, tamen copia rerum vere affluens satis eam eleganter, quasi per lancem saturam, ostentat, velut ex longinquo, ne spectator exhauriri putet materiam postea monstrandis propius, § 115. Ita Virgilius:
Even if one about to meditate beautifully should at some time not wish to follow comparative breadth, § 116, nevertheless a truly overflowing abundance of things displays it elegantly enough, as if by a full platter, as though from afar, lest the spectator think the matter exhausted by things later to be shown more closely, § 115. Thus Virgil:
Non mihi si linguae centum sint, oraque centum, Ferrea vox,
"Nay, though a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths
Were mine, a voice of iron."
e.c. Ita Cicero:
and so forth. Thus Cicero:
Nullius tantum est flumen ingenii, nulla dicendi aut scribendi tanta vis, tantaque copia, quae, non dicam exornare, sed enarrare,
"No one is blessed with such a stream of genius, no one is endowed with such vigour and richness of eloquence, either as a speaker or as a writer, as to be able, I will not say to extol, but even, O Caius Caesar, plainly to relate all your achievements."
e.c.
and so forth.
Etiamsi non velit pulcre meditaturus aliquando latitudinem comparativam sequi, § 116, tamen copia rerum vere affluens satis eam eleganter, quasi per lancem saturam, ostentat, velut ex longinquo, ne spectator exhauriri putet materiam postea monstrandis propius, § 115. Ita Virgilius:
Even if one about to meditate beautifully should at some time not wish to follow comparative breadth, § 116, nevertheless a truly overflowing abundance of things displays it elegantly enough, as if by a full platter, as though from afar, lest the spectator think the matter exhausted by things later to be shown more closely, § 115. Thus Virgil:
Non mihi si linguae centum sint, oraque centum, Ferrea vox,
"Nay, though a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths
Were mine, a voice of iron."
e.c. Ita Cicero:
and so forth. Thus Cicero:
Nullius tantum est flumen ingenii, nulla dicendi aut scribendi tanta vis, tantaque copia, quae, non dicam exornare, sed enarrare,
"No one is blessed with such a stream of genius, no one is endowed with such vigour and richness of eloquence, either as a speaker or as a writer, as to be able, I will not say to extol, but even, O Caius Caesar, plainly to relate all your achievements."
e.c.
and so forth.
Etiamsi non velit pulcre meditaturus aliquando
Even if one about to meditate beautifully should at
latitudinem comparativam sequi, § 116,
some time not wish to follow comparative breadth, § 116,
tamen copia rerum vere affluens satis eam eleganter,
nevertheless a truly overflowing abundance of things displays it elegantly
quasi per lancem saturam, ostentat,
enough, as if by a full platter,
velut ex longinquo, ne spectator
as though from afar, lest the spectator think the
exhauriri putet materiam postea monstrandis propius, § 115.
matter exhausted by things later to be shown more closely, § 115.
Ita Virgilius:
Thus Virgil:
Non mihi si linguae centum sint, oraque centum, Ferrea vox,
"Nay, though a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths
Were mine, a voice of iron."
e.c. Ita Cicero:
and so forth. Thus Cicero:
Nullius tantum est flumen ingenii, nulla dicendi aut scribendi tanta vis, tantaque copia, quae, non dicam exornare, sed enarrare,
"No one is blessed with such a stream of genius, no one is endowed with such vigour and richness of eloquence, either as a speaker or as a writer, as to be able, I will not say to extol, but even, O Caius Caesar, plainly to relate all your achievements."
e.c.
and so forth.
Etiamsi non velit pulcre meditaturus aliquando latitudinem comparativam sequi, § 116, tamen copia rerum vere affluens satis eam eleganter, quasi per lancem saturam, ostentat, velut ex longinquo, ne spectator exhauriri putet materiam postea monstrandis propius, § 115. Ita Virgilius: / Even if one about to meditate beautifully should at some time not wish to follow comparative breadth, § 116, nevertheless a truly overflowing abundance of things displays it elegantly enough, as if by a full platter, as though from afar, lest the spectator think the matter exhausted by things later to be shown more closely, § 115. Thus Virgil:
Non mihi si linguae centum sint, oraque centum, Ferrea vox,
"Nay, though a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths
Were mine, a voice of iron."
e.c. Ita Cicero: / and so forth. Thus Cicero:
Nullius tantum est flumen ingenii, nulla dicendi aut scribendi tanta vis, tantaque copia, quae, non dicam exornare, sed enarrare,
"No one is blessed with such a stream of genius, no one is endowed with such vigour and richness of eloquence, either as a speaker or as a writer, as to be able, I will not say to extol, but even, O Caius Caesar, plainly to relate all your achievements."
e.c. / and so forth.
§ 118
Ubertas aesthetica, porro est vel obiectiva, (rerum, materialis) quatenus in obiectis et cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio, cur per humani vires ingenii possint ubertim pingi; vel subiectiva, (ingenii et personae) possibilitas physica et potentia certi hominis, etiam secundum quid, et hypothetice talis certam rem ubertim repraesentandi. Sunt obiecta, velut ultro suas divitias offerentia. Vix in mentem incidunt,
Furthermore, aesthetic abundance is either objective (of things, material), insofar as in the objects and the things to be thought themselves there is the chief reason why they can be painted abundantly by the powers of human talent; or subjective (of talent and person), the physical possibility and power of a definite human being, even in a certain respect and hypothetically such, of representing a definite thing abundantly. There are objects as if offering their riches of their own accord. They scarcely fall into the mind, and
apparetque beata pleno Copia cornu.
"Come back to earth; and Plenty, see,
With teeming horn."
Hor. Tunc modo capacitatis habueris, quantum satis est, non aliis solum, sed et tibi copia
Horace. Then, provided only that you have had enough capacity, abundance will flow not only to others but also to you,
Manabit ad plenum benigno Ruris honorum opulenta cornu.
"Come hither, and the fields and groves
Their horn shall empty at your feet."
Hor.
Horace.
Ubertas aesthetica, porro est vel obiectiva, (rerum, materialis) quatenus in obiectis et cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio, cur per humani vires ingenii possint ubertim pingi; vel subiectiva, (ingenii et personae) possibilitas physica et potentia certi hominis, etiam secundum quid, et hypothetice talis certam rem ubertim repraesentandi.
Furthermore, aesthetic abundance is either objective (of things, material), insofar as in the objects and the things to be thought themselves there is the chief reason why they can be painted abundantly by the powers of human talent; or subjective (of talent and person), the physical possibility and power of a definite human being, even in a certain respect and hypothetically such, of representing a definite thing abundantly.
Sunt obiecta, velut ultro suas divitias offerentia.
There are objects as if offering their riches of their own accord.
Vix in mentem incidunt,
They scarcely fall into the mind, and
apparetque beata pleno Copia cornu.
"Come back to earth; and Plenty, see,
With teeming horn."
Hor. Tunc modo capacitatis habueris, quantum satis est, non aliis solum, sed et tibi copia
Horace. Then, provided only that you have had enough capacity, abundance will flow not only to others but also to you,
Manabit ad plenum benigno Ruris honorum opulenta cornu.
"Come hither, and the fields and groves
Their horn shall empty at your feet."
Hor.
Horace.
Ubertas aesthetica, porro est vel obiectiva, (rerum, materialis)
Furthermore, aesthetic abundance is either objective (of things, material),
quatenus in obiectis et
insofar as in the objects and the things to
cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio,
be thought themselves there is the chief
cur per
reason why they can be painted abundantly by the
humani vires ingenii possint ubertim pingi;
powers of human talent;
vel subiectiva, (ingenii et personae)
or subjective (of talent and person),
possibilitas physica et potentia certi hominis,
the physical possibility and power of a definite human
etiam secundum quid, et hypothetice talis
being, even in a certain respect and hypothetically such,
certam rem ubertim repraesentandi.
of representing a definite thing abundantly.
Sunt obiecta, velut ultro suas divitias offerentia.
There are objects as if offering their riches of their own accord.
Vix in mentem incidunt,
They scarcely fall into the mind, and
apparetque beata pleno Copia cornu.
"Come back to earth; and Plenty, see,
With teeming horn."
Hor. Tunc modo capacitatis
Horace. Then, provided only that you have had enough capacity,
habueris, quantum satis est, non aliis solum,
abundance will flow not only to others
sed et tibi copia
but also to you,
Manabit ad plenum benigno Ruris honorum opulenta cornu.
"Come hither, and the fields and groves
Their horn shall empty at your feet."
Hor.
Horace.
Ubertas aesthetica, porro est vel obiectiva, (rerum, materialis) quatenus in obiectis et cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio, cur per humani vires ingenii possint ubertim pingi; vel subiectiva, (ingenii et personae) possibilitas physica et potentia certi hominis, etiam secundum quid, et hypothetice talis certam rem ubertim repraesentandi. / Furthermore, aesthetic abundance is either objective (of things, material), insofar as in the objects and the things to be thought themselves there is the chief reason why they can be painted abundantly by the powers of human talent; or subjective (of talent and person), the physical possibility and power of a definite human being, even in a certain respect and hypothetically such, of representing a definite thing abundantly.
Sunt obiecta, velut ultro suas divitias offerentia. / There are objects as if offering their riches of their own accord.
Vix in mentem incidunt, / They scarcely fall into the mind, and
apparetque beata pleno Copia cornu.
"Come back to earth; and Plenty, see,
With teeming horn."
Hor. Tunc modo capacitatis habueris, quantum satis est, non aliis solum, sed et tibi copia / Horace. Then, provided only that you have had enough capacity, abundance will flow not only to others but also to you,
Manabit ad plenum benigno Ruris honorum opulenta cornu.
"Come hither, and the fields and groves
Their horn shall empty at your feet."
Hor. / Horace.
§ 119
Horizon (sphaera) cognitionis humanae est finitus materiarum ex universitate rerum infinita numerus, quae mediocri ingenio humano latius dicto possunt clarescere; harum quae possunt ab ingenio mediocriter philosophico perfectius concipi, horizontem logicum (territorium et sphaeram) rationis et intellectus constituunt; quae possunt ingenio mediocriter aesthetico pulcre splendescere, horizontem aestheticum (territorium et sphaeram pulcri rationis analogi) constituunt. Si qua
The horizon (sphere) of human cognition is the finite number of matters from the infinite universe of things which can become clear to a mediocre human talent, taken more broadly. Of these, those which can be conceived more perfectly by a moderately philosophical talent constitute the logical horizon (territory and sphere) of reason and intellect; those which can shine beautifully for a moderately aesthetic talent constitute the aesthetic horizon (territory and sphere of the beauty of the analogue of reason). If there are things which
Desperas tractata nitescere posse, relinque.
"And what he judges will not turn to gold
Beneath his touch, he passes by untold."
§ 115.
§ 115.
Horizon (sphaera) cognitionis humanae est finitus materiarum ex universitate rerum infinita numerus, quae mediocri ingenio humano latius dicto possunt clarescere; harum quae possunt ab ingenio mediocriter philosophico perfectius concipi, horizontem logicum (territorium et sphaeram) rationis et intellectus constituunt; quae possunt ingenio mediocriter aesthetico pulcre splendescere, horizontem aestheticum (territorium et sphaeram pulcri rationis analogi) constituunt.
The horizon (sphere) of human cognition is the finite number of matters from the infinite universe of things which can become clear to a mediocre human talent, taken more broadly. Of these, those which can be conceived more perfectly by a moderately philosophical talent constitute the logical horizon (territory and sphere) of reason and intellect; those which can shine beautifully for a moderately aesthetic talent constitute the aesthetic horizon (territory and sphere of the beauty of the analogue of reason).
Si qua
If there are things which
Desperas tractata nitescere posse, relinque.
"And what he judges will not turn to gold
Beneath his touch, he passes by untold."
§ 115.
§ 115.
Horizon (sphaera) cognitionis humanae est finitus
The horizon (sphere) of human cognition is the finite
materiarum ex universitate rerum infinita numerus,
number of matters from the infinite universe of things which
quae mediocri ingenio humano latius
can become clear to a mediocre human talent, taken more broadly.
dicto possunt clarescere; harum quae possunt ab ingenio mediocriter
Of these, those which can be conceived more perfectly
philosophico perfectius concipi,
by a moderately philosophical talent constitute
horizontem logicum (territorium et sphaeram) rationis et intellectus
the logical horizon (territory and sphere) of reason and intellect;
constituunt; quae possunt ingenio mediocriter aesthetico pulcre splendescere,
those which can shine beautifully for a moderately aesthetic talent constitute
horizontem aestheticum (territorium et sphaeram pulcri
the aesthetic horizon (territory and sphere of the beauty
rationis analogi) constituunt.
of the analogue of reason).
Si qua
If there are things which
Desperas tractata nitescere posse, relinque.
"And what he judges will not turn to gold
Beneath his touch, he passes by untold."
§ 115.
§ 115.
Horizon (sphaera) cognitionis humanae est finitus materiarum ex universitate rerum infinita numerus, quae mediocri ingenio humano latius dicto possunt clarescere; harum quae possunt ab ingenio mediocriter philosophico perfectius concipi, horizontem logicum (territorium et sphaeram) rationis et intellectus constituunt; quae possunt ingenio mediocriter aesthetico pulcre splendescere, horizontem aestheticum (territorium et sphaeram pulcri rationis analogi) constituunt. / The horizon (sphere) of human cognition is the finite number of matters from the infinite universe of things which can become clear to a mediocre human talent, taken more broadly. Of these, those which can be conceived more perfectly by a moderately philosophical talent constitute the logical horizon (territory and sphere) of reason and intellect; those which can shine beautifully for a moderately aesthetic talent constitute the aesthetic horizon (territory and sphere of the beauty of the analogue of reason).
Si qua / If there are things which
Desperas tractata nitescere posse, relinque.
"And what he judges will not turn to gold
Beneath his touch, he passes by untold."
§ 115. / § 115.
§ 120
Infra horizontem aestheticum posita sunt, quae ex obscuritate comparativa et relativa mediocriter aestheticum ingenium protrahere non potest in lucem pulcram. Qualia si themata sibi sumat pulcre cogitaturus, aut id serio fiet, et nascetur rerum inopia et meditationis exilitas, contra §§ 115, 119, aut delabetur in allotria, aut periculose iocabitur. Hinc esto eiusmodi
Things placed beneath the aesthetic horizon are those which a moderately aesthetic talent cannot draw forth from comparative and relative obscurity into beautiful light. If one about to think beautifully takes such themes for himself, either this will be done seriously, and there will arise poverty of things and thinness of meditation, contrary to §§ 115, 119, or he will slip into foreign matters, or he will play dangerously. Hence let such a
Thema irrepertum, et sic melius situm, Quum terra celat, spernere fortior.
"Of strength more potent to disdain
Hid gold, best buried in the mine."
Hor. Conferantur admiranda rerum admirabilium encomia.
Horace. Compare "the admirable encomia of admirable things."
Infra horizontem aestheticum posita sunt, quae ex obscuritate comparativa et relativa mediocriter aestheticum ingenium protrahere non potest in lucem pulcram.
Things placed beneath the aesthetic horizon are those which a moderately aesthetic talent cannot draw forth from comparative and relative obscurity into beautiful light.
Qualia si themata sibi sumat pulcre cogitaturus, aut id serio fiet, et nascetur rerum inopia et meditationis exilitas, contra §§ 115, 119, aut delabetur in allotria, aut periculose iocabitur.
If one about to think beautifully takes such themes for himself, either this will be done seriously, and there will arise poverty of things and thinness of meditation, contrary to §§ 115, 119, or he will slip into foreign matters, or he will play dangerously.
Hinc esto eiusmodi
Hence let such a
Thema irrepertum, et sic melius situm, Quum terra celat, spernere fortior.
"Of strength more potent to disdain
Hid gold, best buried in the mine."
Hor. Conferantur admiranda rerum admirabilium encomia.
Horace. Compare "the admirable encomia of admirable things."
Infra horizontem aestheticum posita sunt,
Things placed beneath the aesthetic horizon are
quae
those which a moderately aesthetic talent cannot draw forth
ex obscuritate comparativa et relativa mediocriter aestheticum ingenium protrahere
from comparative and relative
non potest in lucem pulcram.
obscurity into beautiful light.
Qualia si themata sibi sumat pulcre cogitaturus,
If one about to think beautifully takes such themes for himself,
aut id serio fiet,
either this will be done seriously,
et nascetur rerum inopia et meditationis
and there will arise poverty of things and thinness of meditation,
exilitas, contra §§ 115, 119, aut delabetur in allotria,
contrary to §§ 115, 119, or he will slip into foreign matters,
aut periculose iocabitur.
or he will play dangerously.
Hinc esto eiusmodi
Hence let such a
Thema irrepertum, et sic melius situm, Quum terra celat, spernere fortior.
"Of strength more potent to disdain
Hid gold, best buried in the mine."
Hor. Conferantur admiranda rerum admirabilium encomia.
Horace. Compare "the admirable encomia of admirable things."
Infra horizontem aestheticum posita sunt, quae ex obscuritate comparativa et relativa mediocriter aestheticum ingenium protrahere non potest in lucem pulcram. / Things placed beneath the aesthetic horizon are those which a moderately aesthetic talent cannot draw forth from comparative and relative obscurity into beautiful light.
Qualia si themata sibi sumat pulcre cogitaturus, aut id serio fiet, et nascetur rerum inopia et meditationis exilitas, contra §§ 115, 119, aut delabetur in allotria, aut periculose iocabitur. / If one about to think beautifully takes such themes for himself, either this will be done seriously, and there will arise poverty of things and thinness of meditation, contrary to §§ 115, 119, or he will slip into foreign matters, or he will play dangerously.
Hinc esto eiusmodi / Hence let such a
Thema irrepertum, et sic melius situm, Quum terra celat, spernere fortior.
"Of strength more potent to disdain
Hid gold, best buried in the mine."
Hor. Conferantur admiranda rerum admirabilium encomia. / Horace. Compare "the admirable encomia of admirable things."
§ 121
Carmina vel caelo possit deducere lunam,
"Songs can the very moon draw down from heaven."
nec ego tamen suaserim pulcre cogitaturo sibi materiem legere, supra horizontem aestheticum positam, nec ea tantum hic intelligo, vel maxime, quae horizontem cognitionis humanae transcendunt omnino, § 119, sed ea potissimum, quae ex superiori scientiarum distincta adaequataque cognitione non potest ad pulcram illam lucem deducere mediocriter aestheticum ingenium, quae rosca placeat, non praestringat oculos analogi rationis et inferiorum cognoscendi facultatum. Si tentaveris nihilominus, aut incides in incommoda, § 120 commemorata, aut iocis expones, quae gravissima putas, aut illigaberis angustis illis at concisis disputationibus, quas Antonius apud Ciceronem de Or. L. II, 61, philosophis generatim Graecis exprobrat, non sine solenni formula:
yet I would not therefore advise one about to think beautifully to choose for himself material placed above the aesthetic horizon; and here I do not understand only, or especially, those things which wholly transcend the horizon of human cognition, § 119, but chiefly those things which a moderately aesthetic talent, from the higher, distinct, and adequate cognition of the sciences, cannot bring down to that beautiful light which pleases in a dewy way and does not dazzle the eyes of the analogue of reason and the lower faculties of knowing. If nevertheless you try, you will either fall into the inconveniences mentioned in § 120, or expose to jokes the things you think most serious, or be bound up in those narrow yet concise disputations which Antonius in Cicero, On the Orator II.61, reproaches to Greek philosophers generally, not without the solemn formula:
Verbum prorsus nullum intelligo.
"I do not understand a single word of them."
Quod contra § 22.
This is contrary to § 22.
Carmina vel caelo possit deducere lunam,
"Songs can the very moon draw down from heaven."
nec ego tamen suaserim pulcre cogitaturo sibi materiem legere, supra horizontem aestheticum positam, nec ea tantum hic intelligo, vel maxime, quae horizontem cognitionis humanae transcendunt omnino, § 119, sed ea potissimum, quae ex superiori scientiarum distincta adaequataque cognitione non potest ad pulcram illam lucem deducere mediocriter aestheticum ingenium, quae rosca placeat, non praestringat oculos analogi rationis et inferiorum cognoscendi facultatum.
yet I would not therefore advise one about to think beautifully to choose for himself material placed above the aesthetic horizon; and here I do not understand only, or especially, those things which wholly transcend the horizon of human cognition, § 119, but chiefly those things which a moderately aesthetic talent, from the higher, distinct, and adequate cognition of the sciences, cannot bring down to that beautiful light which pleases in a dewy way and does not dazzle the eyes of the analogue of reason and the lower faculties of knowing.
Si tentaveris nihilominus, aut incides in incommoda, § 120 commemorata, aut iocis expones, quae gravissima putas, aut illigaberis angustis illis at concisis disputationibus, quas Antonius apud Ciceronem de Or. L. II, 61, philosophis generatim Graecis exprobrat, non sine solenni formula:
If nevertheless you try, you will either fall into the inconveniences mentioned in § 120, or expose to jokes the things you think most serious, or be bound up in those narrow yet concise disputations which Antonius in Cicero, On the Orator II.61, reproaches to Greek philosophers generally, not without the solemn formula:
Verbum prorsus nullum intelligo.
"I do not understand a single word of them."
Quod contra § 22.
This is contrary to § 22.
Carmina vel caelo possit deducere lunam,
"Songs can the very moon draw down from heaven."
nec ego tamen suaserim
yet I would not therefore advise one about to
pulcre cogitaturo sibi materiem legere, supra horizontem aestheticum positam,
think beautifully to choose for himself material placed above the aesthetic horizon;
nec ea tantum hic intelligo,
and here I do not understand only, or especially,
vel maxime, quae horizontem cognitionis humanae transcendunt omnino,
those things which wholly transcend the horizon of human cognition,
§ 119, sed ea potissimum, quae
§ 119, but chiefly those things which a moderately aesthetic talent,
ex superiori scientiarum distincta adaequataque cognitione non potest
from the higher, distinct, and adequate cognition of the sciences,
ad pulcram illam lucem deducere mediocriter aestheticum ingenium,
cannot bring down to that beautiful light which pleases in a
quae rosca placeat, non praestringat
dewy way and does not dazzle the eyes of
oculos analogi rationis et inferiorum cognoscendi facultatum.
the analogue of reason and the lower faculties of knowing.
Si tentaveris nihilominus, aut incides in incommoda,
If nevertheless you try, you will either fall into the
§ 120 commemorata, aut iocis expones,
inconveniences mentioned in § 120, or expose
quae gravissima putas, aut illigaberis angustis
to jokes the things you think most serious,
illis at concisis disputationibus,
or be bound up in those narrow yet concise disputations
quas Antonius apud Ciceronem de Or. L.
which Antonius in Cicero, On the Orator
II, 61, philosophis generatim Graecis exprobrat,
II.61, reproaches to Greek philosophers generally,
non sine solenni formula:
not without the solemn formula:
Verbum prorsus nullum intelligo.
"I do not understand a single word of them."
Quod contra § 22.
This is contrary to § 22.
Carmina vel caelo possit deducere lunam,
"Songs can the very moon draw down from heaven."
nec ego tamen suaserim pulcre cogitaturo sibi materiem legere, supra horizontem aestheticum positam, nec ea tantum hic intelligo, vel maxime, quae horizontem cognitionis humanae transcendunt omnino, § 119, sed ea potissimum, quae ex superiori scientiarum distincta adaequataque cognitione non potest ad pulcram illam lucem deducere mediocriter aestheticum ingenium, quae rosca placeat, non praestringat oculos analogi rationis et inferiorum cognoscendi facultatum. / yet I would not therefore advise one about to think beautifully to choose for himself material placed above the aesthetic horizon; and here I do not understand only, or especially, those things which wholly transcend the horizon of human cognition, § 119, but chiefly those things which a moderately aesthetic talent, from the higher, distinct, and adequate cognition of the sciences, cannot bring down to that beautiful light which pleases in a dewy way and does not dazzle the eyes of the analogue of reason and the lower faculties of knowing.
Si tentaveris nihilominus, aut incides in incommoda, § 120 commemorata, aut iocis expones, quae gravissima putas, aut illigaberis angustis illis at concisis disputationibus, quas Antonius apud Ciceronem de Or. L. II, 61, philosophis generatim Graecis exprobrat, non sine solenni formula: / If nevertheless you try, you will either fall into the inconveniences mentioned in § 120, or expose to jokes the things you think most serious, or be bound up in those narrow yet concise disputations which Antonius in Cicero, On the Orator II.61, reproaches to Greek philosophers generally, not without the solemn formula:
Verbum prorsus nullum intelligo.
"I do not understand a single word of them."
Quod contra § 22. / This is contrary to § 22.
§ 122
Egone vero reiciam ac reprehendam concisum cogitandi genus, cui tot ambitiosa scriptionum mearum ornamenta philosophicarum immolavi, quod nunc ipse sequor, licet paulisper laxius? Utinam Zenoni iam Stoico deprehensa veritas, quam repetit Ciceronis Orator, 113, 114, et Quintilianus II, 21, nostris saltem temporibus fieret apertior, esse duo cogitandi genera, alterum perpetuum, et latius, quod rhetorices sit, alterum concisum, et contractius, quod dialectices. Illud horizonti aesthetico, hoc logico proprium autumo, § 119. Comparationem
Shall I then reject and censure the concise mode of thinking, to which I have sacrificed so many ambitious ornaments of my philosophical writings, and which I myself now follow, though a little more loosely? Would that the truth already detected by Zeno the Stoic, which Cicero's Orator, 113, 114, and Quintilian II.21 repeat, might become clearer at least in our times: that there are two modes of thinking, one continuous and broader, which belongs to rhetoric, the other concise and more contracted, which belongs to dialectic. I think the former proper to the aesthetic horizon, the latter to the logical, § 119. I do not make my own the comparison of the
compressae in pugnum manus et explicitae
He compared the latter to the closed fist, the former to the open hand.
meam non facio. Sufficit concisum cogitandi genus in scientificis, praesertim acroamaticis, apprime necessarium, quod Aristoteles iam vidit, aestheticus sane, sicut practicus, ita theoreticus, alieno in loco et extra rationis circulos esse posse vitium, et si qua in iis, quae copiosam orationem requirunt,
It is enough that the concise mode of thinking, in scientific writings, especially acroamatic ones, is highly necessary, as Aristotle already saw; yet in aesthetics, whether practical or theoretical, it can be a vice in an alien place and outside the circles of reason, and if things that require copious speech
crebris parvisque conatibus se attollunt in horizontem logicum, inaequalia tantum et velut confragosa, nec admirationem consequi eminentium, et planorum gratiam perdere.
"And where eloquence seeks to secure elevation by frequent small efforts, it merely produces an uneven and broken surface which fails to win the admiration due to outstanding objects and lacks the charm that may be found in a smooth surface."
VIII, 5. Virtute ac facultate rationali non tam est minute atque concise in aestheticis utendum, quam in disputationibus scientiarum logicis, XII, 2.
VIII.5. Rational power and faculty are not to be used so minutely and concisely in aesthetic matters as in logical disputations of the sciences, XII.2.
Egone vero reiciam ac reprehendam concisum cogitandi genus, cui tot ambitiosa scriptionum mearum ornamenta philosophicarum immolavi, quod nunc ipse sequor, licet paulisper laxius?
Shall I then reject and censure the concise mode of thinking, to which I have sacrificed so many ambitious ornaments of my philosophical writings, and which I myself now follow, though a little more loosely?
Utinam Zenoni iam Stoico deprehensa veritas, quam repetit Ciceronis Orator, 113, 114, et Quintilianus II, 21, nostris saltem temporibus fieret apertior, esse duo cogitandi genera, alterum perpetuum, et latius, quod rhetorices sit, alterum concisum, et contractius, quod dialectices.
Would that the truth already detected by Zeno the Stoic, which Cicero's Orator, 113, 114, and Quintilian II.21 repeat, might become clearer at least in our times: that there are two modes of thinking, one continuous and broader, which belongs to rhetoric, the other concise and more contracted, which belongs to dialectic.
Illud horizonti aesthetico, hoc logico proprium autumo, § 119. Comparationem
I think the former proper to the aesthetic horizon, the latter to the logical, § 119. I do not make my own the comparison of the
compressae in pugnum manus et explicitae
He compared the latter to the closed fist, the former to the open hand.
meam non facio. Sufficit concisum cogitandi genus in scientificis, praesertim acroamaticis, apprime necessarium, quod Aristoteles iam vidit, aestheticus sane, sicut practicus, ita theoreticus, alieno in loco et extra rationis circulos esse posse vitium, et si qua in iis, quae copiosam orationem requirunt,
It is enough that the concise mode of thinking, in scientific writings, especially acroamatic ones, is highly necessary, as Aristotle already saw; yet in aesthetics, whether practical or theoretical, it can be a vice in an alien place and outside the circles of reason, and if things that require copious speech
crebris parvisque conatibus se attollunt in horizontem logicum, inaequalia tantum et velut confragosa, nec admirationem consequi eminentium, et planorum gratiam perdere.
"And where eloquence seeks to secure elevation by frequent small efforts, it merely produces an uneven and broken surface which fails to win the admiration due to outstanding objects and lacks the charm that may be found in a smooth surface."
VIII, 5. Virtute ac facultate rationali non tam est minute atque concise in aestheticis utendum, quam in disputationibus scientiarum logicis, XII, 2.
VIII.5. Rational power and faculty are not to be used so minutely and concisely in aesthetic matters as in logical disputations of the sciences, XII.2.
Egone vero reiciam ac reprehendam concisum cogitandi
Shall I then reject and censure the concise mode of thinking,
genus, cui tot ambitiosa scriptionum
to which I have sacrificed so many ambitious
mearum ornamenta philosophicarum immolavi,
ornaments of my philosophical writings,
quod nunc ipse sequor, licet paulisper laxius?
and which I myself now follow, though a little more loosely?
Utinam Zenoni iam Stoico
Would that the truth already detected by Zeno the Stoic,
deprehensa veritas, quam repetit Ciceronis Orator, 113, 114,
which Cicero's Orator, 113, 114,
et Quintilianus II, 21, nostris saltem temporibus fieret
and Quintilian II.21 repeat, might become clearer at least in our times:
apertior, esse duo cogitandi genera,
that there are two modes of thinking,
alterum perpetuum, et latius, quod rhetorices sit,
one continuous and broader, which belongs to rhetoric, the
alterum concisum, et contractius, quod dialectices.
other concise and more contracted, which belongs to dialectic.
Illud horizonti aesthetico,
I think the former proper to the aesthetic horizon,
hoc logico proprium autumo, § 119.
the latter to the logical, § 119.
Comparationem
I do not make my own the comparison of the
compressae in pugnum manus et explicitae
He compared the latter to the closed fist, the former to the open hand.
meam non facio. Sufficit concisum cogitandi
It is enough that the concise mode of thinking,
genus in scientificis, praesertim acroamaticis, apprime necessarium,
in scientific writings, especially acroamatic ones, is highly necessary,
quod Aristoteles iam vidit, aestheticus sane,
as Aristotle already saw; yet in aesthetics,
sicut practicus, ita theoreticus, alieno
whether practical or theoretical, it can be a vice
in loco et extra rationis circulos esse posse vitium,
in an alien place and outside the circles of reason,
et si qua in iis, quae copiosam orationem requirunt,
and if things that require copious speech
crebris parvisque conatibus se attollunt in horizontem logicum, inaequalia tantum et velut confragosa, nec admirationem consequi eminentium, et planorum gratiam perdere.
"And where eloquence seeks to secure elevation by frequent small efforts, it merely produces an uneven and broken surface which fails to win the admiration due to outstanding objects and lacks the charm that may be found in a smooth surface."
VIII, 5. Virtute ac facultate rationali non tam
VIII.5. Rational power and faculty are not to be
est minute atque concise in aestheticis utendum,
used so minutely and concisely in aesthetic matters
quam in disputationibus scientiarum logicis, XII, 2.
as in logical disputations of the sciences, XII.2.
Egone vero reiciam ac reprehendam concisum cogitandi genus, cui tot ambitiosa scriptionum mearum ornamenta philosophicarum immolavi, quod nunc ipse sequor, licet paulisper laxius? / Shall I then reject and censure the concise mode of thinking, to which I have sacrificed so many ambitious ornaments of my philosophical writings, and which I myself now follow, though a little more loosely?
Utinam Zenoni iam Stoico deprehensa veritas, quam repetit Ciceronis Orator, 113, 114, et Quintilianus II, 21, nostris saltem temporibus fieret apertior, esse duo cogitandi genera, alterum perpetuum, et latius, quod rhetorices sit, alterum concisum, et contractius, quod dialectices. / Would that the truth already detected by Zeno the Stoic, which Cicero's Orator, 113, 114, and Quintilian II.21 repeat, might become clearer at least in our times: that there are two modes of thinking, one continuous and broader, which belongs to rhetoric, the other concise and more contracted, which belongs to dialectic.
Illud horizonti aesthetico, hoc logico proprium autumo, § 119. Comparationem / I think the former proper to the aesthetic horizon, the latter to the logical, § 119. I do not make my own the comparison of the
compressae in pugnum manus et explicitae
He compared the latter to the closed fist, the former to the open hand.
meam non facio. Sufficit concisum cogitandi genus in scientificis, praesertim acroamaticis, apprime necessarium, quod Aristoteles iam vidit, aestheticus sane, sicut practicus, ita theoreticus, alieno in loco et extra rationis circulos esse posse vitium, et si qua in iis, quae copiosam orationem requirunt, / It is enough that the concise mode of thinking, in scientific writings, especially acroamatic ones, is highly necessary, as Aristotle already saw; yet in aesthetics, whether practical or theoretical, it can be a vice in an alien place and outside the circles of reason, and if things that require copious speech
crebris parvisque conatibus se attollunt in horizontem logicum, inaequalia tantum et velut confragosa, nec admirationem consequi eminentium, et planorum gratiam perdere.
"And where eloquence seeks to secure elevation by frequent small efforts, it merely produces an uneven and broken surface which fails to win the admiration due to outstanding objects and lacks the charm that may be found in a smooth surface."
VIII, 5. Virtute ac facultate rationali non tam est minute atque concise in aestheticis utendum, quam in disputationibus scientiarum logicis, XII, 2. / VIII.5. Rational power and faculty are not to be used so minutely and concisely in aesthetic matters as in logical disputations of the sciences, XII.2.
§ 123
Horizonti aesthetico logicoque possunt esse multae materiae communes, § 119; hinc ideo, quia aliquid in scientiis pertractatur, non excluditur idem ex sphaera pulcritudinis omnino; sed quatenus punctim et minutim cum accuratione philosophica mathematicaque conciperetur, § 121. Quatenus autem eadem materia vel intellectu pulcro ipsa M. § 637, notae autem eius sensitive ac vivide, vel ipsa etiam, nunc certe, vivida tantum ac venusta cogitari potest, intra horizontem aestheticum recipitur.
Many matters can be common to the aesthetic and logical horizons, § 119. Hence, because something is treated in the sciences, the same thing is not therefore excluded altogether from the sphere of beauty, but only insofar as it would be conceived point by point and minutely with philosophical and mathematical accuracy, § 121. But insofar as the same material itself can be thought either by beautiful understanding, Metaphysics, § 637, while its marks are thought sensitively and vividly, or even itself, now certainly, only vividly and charmingly, it is received within the aesthetic horizon.
Horizonti aesthetico logicoque possunt esse multae materiae communes, § 119; hinc ideo, quia aliquid in scientiis pertractatur, non excluditur idem ex sphaera pulcritudinis omnino; sed quatenus punctim et minutim cum accuratione philosophica mathematicaque conciperetur, § 121. Quatenus autem eadem materia vel intellectu pulcro ipsa M. § 637, notae autem eius sensitive ac vivide, vel ipsa etiam, nunc certe, vivida tantum ac venusta cogitari potest, intra horizontem aestheticum recipitur.
Many matters can be common to the aesthetic and logical horizons, § 119. Hence, because something is treated in the sciences, the same thing is not therefore excluded altogether from the sphere of beauty, but only insofar as it would be conceived point by point and minutely with philosophical and mathematical accuracy, § 121. But insofar as the same material itself can be thought either by beautiful understanding, Metaphysics, § 637, while its marks are thought sensitively and vividly, or even itself, now certainly, only vividly and charmingly, it is received within the aesthetic horizon.
Horizonti aesthetico logicoque possunt esse multae materiae communes,
Many matters can be common
§ 119;
to the aesthetic and logical horizons, § 119.
hinc ideo, quia aliquid in scientiis
Hence, because something is treated in the sciences,
pertractatur, non excluditur idem ex
the same thing is not therefore excluded altogether from
sphaera pulcritudinis omnino; sed quatenus punctim
the sphere of beauty, but only insofar as it
et minutim cum
would be conceived point by point and minutely with
accuratione philosophica mathematicaque conciperetur, § 121.
philosophical and mathematical accuracy, § 121.
Quatenus autem eadem materia vel intellectu pulcro ipsa M.
But insofar as the same material itself can be thought either
§ 637, notae autem eius
by beautiful understanding, Metaphysics, § 637, while its marks are
sensitive ac vivide, vel ipsa etiam, nunc certe,
thought sensitively and vividly, or even itself, now
vivida tantum ac venusta cogitari potest, intra horizontem aestheticum recipitur.
certainly, only vividly and charmingly, it is received within the aesthetic horizon.
Horizonti aesthetico logicoque possunt esse multae materiae communes, § 119; hinc ideo, quia aliquid in scientiis pertractatur, non excluditur idem ex sphaera pulcritudinis omnino; sed quatenus punctim et minutim cum accuratione philosophica mathematicaque conciperetur, § 121. Quatenus autem eadem materia vel intellectu pulcro ipsa M. § 637, notae autem eius sensitive ac vivide, vel ipsa etiam, nunc certe, vivida tantum ac venusta cogitari potest, intra horizontem aestheticum recipitur. / Many matters can be common to the aesthetic and logical horizons, § 119. Hence, because something is treated in the sciences, the same thing is not therefore excluded altogether from the sphere of beauty, but only insofar as it would be conceived point by point and minutely with philosophical and mathematical accuracy, § 121. But insofar as the same material itself can be thought either by beautiful understanding, Metaphysics, § 637, while its marks are thought sensitively and vividly, or even itself, now certainly, only vividly and charmingly, it is received within the aesthetic horizon.
§ 124
Quid sit bonum, praeter honestatem? Verine sensus? Quae sit solis magnitudo? Quaestiones eiusmodi procul ab oratoris persona esse facile omnes intelligere existimat Cicero. Nam quibus, inquit, in rebus summa ingenia philosophorum plurimo cum labore consumta intelligimus, eas, sicut aliquas parvas res, oratori attribuere magna amentia videtur.
"Whether there is anything good besides honesty? Whether the senses may be trusted? ... What is the size of the sun? But I imagine that all men can easily see that all such questions are far removed from the business of an orator; for it appears the excess of insanity to attribute those subjects, in which we know that the most sublime genius of philosophers has been exhausted with infinite labour, as if they were inconsiderable matters, to a rhetorician or an orator."
Recte vidit esse quaedam in scientiis supra horizontem aestheticum, § 121, quae sicut omnis pulcre meditaturus, ita orator, perperam sibi themata legeret, § 122. Quaestiones autem exempli loco commemoratas, si non orator, aestheticus certe practicus satis eleganter, arbitror, enarrare posset, modo aliam cogitandi de iisdem rationem sequeretur, ac demonstrator ethicus, logicus, physicus atque mathematicus, § 123.
Cicero thinks that everyone easily understands that questions of this sort are far from the person of the orator. He rightly saw that there are certain things in the sciences above the aesthetic horizon, § 121, which an orator, like anyone about to meditate beautifully, would wrongly choose as themes for himself, § 122. Yet the questions mentioned as examples, if not an orator, then certainly a practical aesthetician, I judge, could narrate elegantly enough, provided he followed a different way of thinking about them than an ethical, logical, physical, or mathematical demonstrator, § 123.
Quid sit bonum, praeter honestatem? Verine sensus? Quae sit solis magnitudo? Quaestiones eiusmodi procul ab oratoris persona esse facile omnes intelligere existimat Cicero. Nam quibus, inquit, in rebus summa ingenia philosophorum plurimo cum labore consumta intelligimus, eas, sicut aliquas parvas res, oratori attribuere magna amentia videtur.
"Whether there is anything good besides honesty? Whether the senses may be trusted? ... What is the size of the sun? But I imagine that all men can easily see that all such questions are far removed from the business of an orator; for it appears the excess of insanity to attribute those subjects, in which we know that the most sublime genius of philosophers has been exhausted with infinite labour, as if they were inconsiderable matters, to a rhetorician or an orator."
Recte vidit esse quaedam in scientiis supra horizontem aestheticum, § 121, quae sicut omnis pulcre meditaturus, ita orator, perperam sibi themata legeret, § 122. Quaestiones autem exempli loco commemoratas, si non orator, aestheticus certe practicus satis eleganter, arbitror, enarrare posset, modo aliam cogitandi de iisdem rationem sequeretur, ac demonstrator ethicus, logicus, physicus atque mathematicus, § 123.
Cicero thinks that everyone easily understands that questions of this sort are far from the person of the orator. He rightly saw that there are certain things in the sciences above the aesthetic horizon, § 121, which an orator, like anyone about to meditate beautifully, would wrongly choose as themes for himself, § 122. Yet the questions mentioned as examples, if not an orator, then certainly a practical aesthetician, I judge, could narrate elegantly enough, provided he followed a different way of thinking about them than an ethical, logical, physical, or mathematical demonstrator, § 123.
Quid sit bonum, praeter honestatem? Verine sensus? Quae sit solis magnitudo? Quaestiones eiusmodi procul ab oratoris persona esse facile omnes intelligere existimat Cicero. Nam quibus, inquit, in rebus summa ingenia philosophorum plurimo cum labore consumta intelligimus, eas, sicut aliquas parvas res, oratori attribuere magna amentia videtur.
"Whether there is anything good besides honesty? Whether the senses may be trusted? ... What is the size of the sun? But I imagine that all men can easily see that all such questions are far removed from the business of an orator; for it appears the excess of insanity to attribute those subjects, in which we know that the most sublime genius of philosophers has been exhausted with infinite labour, as if they were inconsiderable matters, to a rhetorician or an orator."
Recte vidit esse
Cicero thinks that everyone easily understands that questions of
quaedam in
this sort are far from the person of the orator. He rightly saw that there are certain things in
scientiis supra horizontem aestheticum, § 121,
the sciences above the aesthetic horizon, § 121,
quae sicut omnis pulcre meditaturus, ita orator,
which an orator,
perperam sibi themata legeret,
like anyone about to meditate beautifully,
§ 122.
would wrongly choose as themes for himself, § 122.
Quaestiones autem exempli loco commemoratas,
Yet the questions mentioned as examples,
si non orator, aestheticus certe practicus satis eleganter,
if not an orator, then certainly a practical aesthetician,
arbitror, enarrare posset, modo aliam
I judge, could narrate elegantly enough,
cogitandi de iisdem rationem sequeretur,
provided he followed a different way of thinking about them
ac demonstrator ethicus, logicus, physicus atque mathematicus, § 123.
than an ethical, logical, physical, or mathematical demonstrator, § 123.
Quid sit bonum, praeter honestatem? Verine sensus? Quae sit solis magnitudo? Quaestiones eiusmodi procul ab oratoris persona esse facile omnes intelligere existimat Cicero. Nam quibus, inquit, in rebus summa ingenia philosophorum plurimo cum labore consumta intelligimus, eas, sicut aliquas parvas res, oratori attribuere magna amentia videtur.
"Whether there is anything good besides honesty? Whether the senses may be trusted? ... What is the size of the sun? But I imagine that all men can easily see that all such questions are far removed from the business of an orator; for it appears the excess of insanity to attribute those subjects, in which we know that the most sublime genius of philosophers has been exhausted with infinite labour, as if they were inconsiderable matters, to a rhetorician or an orator."
Recte vidit esse quaedam in scientiis supra horizontem aestheticum, § 121, quae sicut omnis pulcre meditaturus, ita orator, perperam sibi themata legeret, § 122. Quaestiones autem exempli loco commemoratas, si non orator, aestheticus certe practicus satis eleganter, arbitror, enarrare posset, modo aliam cogitandi de iisdem rationem sequeretur, ac demonstrator ethicus, logicus, physicus atque mathematicus, § 123. / Cicero thinks that everyone easily understands that questions of this sort are far from the person of the orator. He rightly saw that there are certain things in the sciences above the aesthetic horizon, § 121, which an orator, like anyone about to meditate beautifully, would wrongly choose as themes for himself, § 122. Yet the questions mentioned as examples, if not an orator, then certainly a practical aesthetician, I judge, could narrate elegantly enough, provided he followed a different way of thinking about them than an ethical, logical, physical, or mathematical demonstrator, § 123.
§ 125
Non de omnibus quidem pulcre cogitandi datur copia, §§ 119–121, oratoremque plenum atque perfectum, qui de omnibus rebus possit varie copioseque dicere, Cic. de Or. I, 59, cum sapiente Stoico,
Indeed, abundance for thinking beautifully is not granted concerning all things, §§ 119–121, and the full and perfect orator, who can speak on all things variously and copiously, Cicero, On the Orator I.59, I bid, with the Stoic wise man,
Discipulorum inter iubeo plorare cathedras:
"Demetrius and Tigellius, off! go pule
To the bare benches of your ladies' school!"
neque tamen venuste cogitandi facultas tantum est in civilibus controversiis aut aliis levioris momenti quaestionibus: sed in ipsis disciplinarum etiam et scientiarum 1) dogmatibus, theologicis, physicis, practicis, historicis, e.c. materialiter spectatis, quando ita cogites illa, significesque,
Yet the faculty of thinking charmingly is not only in civil controversies or other questions of lighter moment, but also in the very doctrines of disciplines and sciences: 1) theological, physical, practical, historical, and so forth, materially considered, when you think and signify them in such a way
ut videaris voluisse esse illis, qui non sunt eruditissimi, familiaris,
"Who have adopted such a style that they seem to wish to be familiar to us who are not of the deepest erudition."
ib. II, 61. 2) illustrationibus scholiorum instar interspergendis, § 123. cf. Cic. de Or. I, 61.
ibid. II.61; 2) in illustrations to be sprinkled in after the manner of scholia, § 123; compare Cicero, On the Orator I.61.
Non de omnibus quidem pulcre cogitandi datur copia, §§ 119–121, oratoremque plenum atque perfectum, qui de omnibus rebus possit varie copioseque dicere, Cic. de Or. I, 59, cum sapiente Stoico,
Indeed, abundance for thinking beautifully is not granted concerning all things, §§ 119–121, and the full and perfect orator, who can speak on all things variously and copiously, Cicero, On the Orator I.59, I bid, with the Stoic wise man,
Discipulorum inter iubeo plorare cathedras:
"Demetrius and Tigellius, off! go pule
To the bare benches of your ladies' school!"
neque tamen venuste cogitandi facultas tantum est in civilibus controversiis aut aliis levioris momenti quaestionibus: sed in ipsis disciplinarum etiam et scientiarum 1) dogmatibus, theologicis, physicis, practicis, historicis, e.c. materialiter spectatis, quando ita cogites illa, significesque,
Yet the faculty of thinking charmingly is not only in civil controversies or other questions of lighter moment, but also in the very doctrines of disciplines and sciences: 1) theological, physical, practical, historical, and so forth, materially considered, when you think and signify them in such a way
ut videaris voluisse esse illis, qui non sunt eruditissimi, familiaris,
"Who have adopted such a style that they seem to wish to be familiar to us who are not of the deepest erudition."
ib.
ibid.
II, 61. 2) illustrationibus scholiorum instar interspergendis, § 123. cf. Cic. de Or. I, 61.
II.61; 2) in illustrations to be sprinkled in after the manner of scholia, § 123; compare Cicero, On the Orator I.61.
Non de omnibus quidem pulcre cogitandi datur copia,
Indeed, abundance for thinking beautifully is not granted concerning all things,
§§ 119–121, oratoremque plenum atque perfectum,
§§ 119–121, and the full and perfect orator,
qui de omnibus rebus possit varie copioseque dicere, Cic.
who can speak on all things variously and copiously, Cicero, On
de Or. I, 59, cum sapiente Stoico,
the Orator I.59, I bid, with the Stoic wise man,
Discipulorum inter iubeo plorare cathedras:
"Demetrius and Tigellius, off! go pule
To the bare benches of your ladies' school!"
neque tamen venuste cogitandi facultas tantum
Yet the faculty of thinking charmingly is not only
est in civilibus controversiis aut aliis levioris momenti quaestionibus:
in civil controversies or other questions of lighter moment,
sed in ipsis disciplinarum etiam et scientiarum
but also in the very doctrines of disciplines and sciences:
1) dogmatibus, theologicis, physicis, practicis, historicis, e.c.
1) theological, physical, practical, historical, and so forth,
materialiter spectatis, quando ita cogites illa, significesque,
materially considered, when you think and signify them in such a way
ut videaris voluisse esse illis, qui non sunt eruditissimi, familiaris,
"Who have adopted such a style that they seem to wish to be familiar to us who are not of the deepest erudition."
ib.
ibid.
II, 61. 2) illustrationibus scholiorum instar interspergendis,
II.61; 2) in illustrations to be sprinkled in after the
§ 123. cf. Cic. de Or. I, 61.
manner of scholia, § 123; compare Cicero, On the Orator I.61.
Non de omnibus quidem pulcre cogitandi datur copia, §§ 119–121, oratoremque plenum atque perfectum, qui de omnibus rebus possit varie copioseque dicere, Cic. de Or. I, 59, cum sapiente Stoico, / Indeed, abundance for thinking beautifully is not granted concerning all things, §§ 119–121, and the full and perfect orator, who can speak on all things variously and copiously, Cicero, On the Orator I.59, I bid, with the Stoic wise man,
Discipulorum inter iubeo plorare cathedras:
"Demetrius and Tigellius, off! go pule
To the bare benches of your ladies' school!"
neque tamen venuste cogitandi facultas tantum est in civilibus controversiis aut aliis levioris momenti quaestionibus: sed in ipsis disciplinarum etiam et scientiarum 1) dogmatibus, theologicis, physicis, practicis, historicis, e.c. materialiter spectatis, quando ita cogites illa, significesque, / Yet the faculty of thinking charmingly is not only in civil controversies or other questions of lighter moment, but also in the very doctrines of disciplines and sciences: 1) theological, physical, practical, historical, and so forth, materially considered, when you think and signify them in such a way
ut videaris voluisse esse illis, qui non sunt eruditissimi, familiaris,
"Who have adopted such a style that they seem to wish to be familiar to us who are not of the deepest erudition."
ib. / ibid.
II, 61. 2) illustrationibus scholiorum instar interspergendis, § 123. cf. Cic. de Or. I, 61. / II.61; 2) in illustrations to be sprinkled in after the manner of scholia, § 123; compare Cicero, On the Orator I.61.