§ 151
Nunc specialis etiam excolendus aestheticorum certi datique generis character est, § 27, ne personam induas, cui sustinendae, neque natus, neque factus es, § 150. I. an genius tibi caeteroquin satis bene nato etiam faveat ad datam certae speciei materiam belle pingendam? e.g. S. II. § 105.
Now the special character of a certain and given kind of aesthetic performances must also be cultivated, § 27, lest you put on a role for sustaining which you were neither born nor made, § 150. I. Does genius, even for you otherwise sufficiently well born, also favor the beautifully painting of a given matter of a certain species? for example, Section II, § 105.
Aude Caesaris invicti res dicere, multa laborum Praemia laturus. Cupidum, pater optime, vires Deficiunt. Neque enim quivis horrentia pilis Agmina, nec fracta pereuntes cuspide Gallos; Aut labentis equo describit vulnera Parthi.
"Sing of great Caesar's victories: a bard
Who works at that is sure to win reward.
Would that I could, my worthy sire! but skill
And vigour lack, how great soe'er the will.
Not every one can paint in epic strain
The lances bristling on the embattled plain,
Tell how the Gauls by broken javelins bleed,
Or sing the Parthian tumbling from his steed."
Hor. Serm. l. 1. 10.
Horace, Sermones 1.10.
Nunc specialis etiam excolendus aestheticorum certi datique generis character est, § 27, ne personam induas, cui sustinendae, neque natus, neque factus es, § 150. I. an genius tibi caeteroquin satis bene nato etiam faveat ad datam certae speciei materiam belle pingendam? e.g. S. II. § 105.
Now the special character of a certain and given kind of aesthetic performances must also be cultivated, § 27, lest you put on a role for sustaining which you were neither born nor made, § 150. I. Does genius, even for you otherwise sufficiently well born, also favor the beautifully painting of a given matter of a certain species? for example, Section II, § 105.
Aude Caesaris invicti res dicere, multa laborum Praemia laturus. Cupidum, pater optime, vires Deficiunt. Neque enim quivis horrentia pilis Agmina, nec fracta pereuntes cuspide Gallos; Aut labentis equo describit vulnera Parthi.
"Sing of great Caesar's victories: a bard
Who works at that is sure to win reward.
Would that I could, my worthy sire! but skill
And vigour lack, how great soe'er the will.
Not every one can paint in epic strain
The lances bristling on the embattled plain,
Tell how the Gauls by broken javelins bleed,
Or sing the Parthian tumbling from his steed."
Hor. Serm. l. 1. 10.
Horace, Sermones 1.10.
Nunc specialis etiam excolendus aestheticorum certi
Now the special character of a certain and given
datique generis character est, § 27,
kind of aesthetic performances must also be cultivated, § 27,
ne personam induas, cui sustinendae,
lest you put on a role for sustaining
neque natus, neque factus es, § 150. I.
which you were neither born nor made, § 150. I.
an genius tibi caeteroquin satis bene nato
Does genius, even for you otherwise sufficiently well born,
etiam faveat ad datam
also favor the beautifully painting of a given matter
certae speciei materiam belle pingendam? e.g. S. II. § 105.
of a certain species? for example, Section II, § 105.
Aude Caesaris invicti res dicere, multa laborum Praemia laturus. Cupidum, pater optime, vires Deficiunt. Neque enim quivis horrentia pilis Agmina, nec fracta pereuntes cuspide Gallos; Aut labentis equo describit vulnera Parthi.
"Sing of great Caesar's victories: a bard
Who works at that is sure to win reward.
Would that I could, my worthy sire! but skill
And vigour lack, how great soe'er the will.
Not every one can paint in epic strain
The lances bristling on the embattled plain,
Tell how the Gauls by broken javelins bleed,
Or sing the Parthian tumbling from his steed."
Hor. Serm. l. 1. 10.
Horace, Sermones 1.10.
Nunc specialis etiam excolendus aestheticorum certi datique generis character est, § 27, ne personam induas, cui sustinendae, neque natus, neque factus es, § 150. I. an genius tibi caeteroquin satis bene nato etiam faveat ad datam certae speciei materiam belle pingendam? e.g. S. II. § 105. / Now the special character of a certain and given kind of aesthetic performances must also be cultivated, § 27, lest you put on a role for sustaining which you were neither born nor made, § 150. I. Does genius, even for you otherwise sufficiently well born, also favor the beautifully painting of a given matter of a certain species? for example, Section II, § 105.
Aude Caesaris invicti res dicere, multa laborum Praemia laturus. Cupidum, pater optime, vires Deficiunt. Neque enim quivis horrentia pilis Agmina, nec fracta pereuntes cuspide Gallos; Aut labentis equo describit vulnera Parthi.
"Sing of great Caesar's victories: a bard
Who works at that is sure to win reward.
Would that I could, my worthy sire! but skill
And vigour lack, how great soe'er the will.
Not every one can paint in epic strain
The lances bristling on the embattled plain,
Tell how the Gauls by broken javelins bleed,
Or sing the Parthian tumbling from his steed."
Hor. Serm. l. 1. 10. / Horace, Sermones 1.10.
§ 152
II. An exercitiis ad speciale belle cogitandi genus, quo datum thema pertinet, et longa iam manu dudum praeparatus es, et adhuc praesto habes per ea semel obtentam dexteritatem, quanta sufficiet? S. III. Ad latinam poesin minus aptos expertus sum poetas, etiam natos, per academias prima demum artis in hac lingua carmen scribendi rudimenta posituros.
II. Have you long since, by exercises directed to the special kind of beautiful thinking to which the given theme belongs, been prepared with a long hand, and do you still have ready at hand, through them, the dexterity once obtained, as much as will suffice? Section III. I have found poets, even born poets, less suited to Latin poetry, who through academies would only then lay down the first rudiments of the art of writing verse in this language.
Dicendo homines, ut dicant, efficere solent.
"men by speaking succeed in becoming speakers."
Vere autem etiam illud dicitur, si intermittatur exercitatio,
But this too is truly said: if exercise is interrupted, then,
sumto spatio ad cogitandum paratius atque accuratius dicendi, perverse dicere homines, perverse dicendo, facillime consequi,
"men by speaking badly make sure of becoming bad speakers. ... after taking time to consider, to speak with greater preparation and accuracy."
licet olim in dicendo non male versatos. Cic. de Or. l. 150.
although they were once not badly practiced in speaking. Cicero, De oratore, l. 150.
Saepe ego longos Cantando puerum memini me condere soles. Nunc oblita mihi tot carmina. Vox quoque Moerin Iam fugit ipsa.
"Oft, as a boy, I sang the sun to rest,
but all those songs are from my memory fled,
and even his voice is failing Moeris now;"
Virg.
Virgil.
II. An exercitiis ad speciale belle cogitandi genus, quo datum thema pertinet, et longa iam manu dudum praeparatus es, et adhuc praesto habes per ea semel obtentam dexteritatem, quanta sufficiet?
II. Have you long since, by exercises directed to the special kind of beautiful thinking to which the given theme belongs, been prepared with a long hand, and do you still have ready at hand, through them, the dexterity once obtained, as much as will suffice?
S. III. Ad latinam poesin minus aptos expertus sum poetas, etiam natos, per academias prima demum artis in hac lingua carmen scribendi rudimenta posituros.
Section III. I have found poets, even born poets, less suited to Latin poetry, who through academies would only then lay down the first rudiments of the art of writing verse in this language.
Dicendo homines, ut dicant, efficere solent.
"men by speaking succeed in becoming speakers."
Vere autem etiam illud dicitur, si intermittatur exercitatio,
But this too is truly said: if exercise is interrupted, then,
sumto spatio ad cogitandum paratius atque accuratius dicendi, perverse dicere homines, perverse dicendo, facillime consequi,
"men by speaking badly make sure of becoming bad speakers. ... after taking time to consider, to speak with greater preparation and accuracy."
licet olim in dicendo non male versatos.
although they were once not badly practiced in speaking.
Cic. de Or. l. 150.
Cicero, De oratore, l. 150.
Saepe ego longos Cantando puerum memini me condere soles. Nunc oblita mihi tot carmina. Vox quoque Moerin Iam fugit ipsa.
"Oft, as a boy, I sang the sun to rest,
but all those songs are from my memory fled,
and even his voice is failing Moeris now;"
Virg.
Virgil.
II. An exercitiis ad
II. Have you long since, by exercises directed to
speciale belle cogitandi genus,
the special kind of beautiful thinking to
quo datum thema pertinet, et longa
which the given theme belongs,
iam manu dudum praeparatus es,
been prepared with a long hand,
et adhuc praesto habes
and do you still have ready at hand,
per ea semel obtentam dexteritatem, quanta sufficiet?
through them, the dexterity once obtained, as much as will suffice?
S. III. Ad latinam poesin
Section III. I have found poets, even born poets,
minus aptos expertus sum poetas, etiam natos,
less suited to Latin poetry, who
per academias prima demum artis
through academies would only then lay down the first
in hac lingua carmen scribendi rudimenta posituros.
rudiments of the art of writing verse in this language.
Dicendo homines, ut dicant, efficere solent.
"men by speaking succeed in becoming speakers."
Vere autem etiam illud dicitur, si intermittatur exercitatio,
But this too is truly said: if exercise is interrupted, then,
sumto spatio ad cogitandum paratius atque accuratius dicendi, perverse dicere homines, perverse dicendo, facillime consequi,
"men by speaking badly make sure of becoming bad speakers. ... after taking time to consider, to speak with greater preparation and accuracy."
licet olim in dicendo non male versatos.
although they were once not badly practiced in speaking.
Cic. de Or. l. 150.
Cicero, De oratore, l. 150.
Saepe ego longos Cantando puerum memini me condere soles. Nunc oblita mihi tot carmina. Vox quoque Moerin Iam fugit ipsa.
"Oft, as a boy, I sang the sun to rest,
but all those songs are from my memory fled,
and even his voice is failing Moeris now;"
Virg.
Virgil.
II. An exercitiis ad speciale belle cogitandi genus, quo datum thema pertinet, et longa iam manu dudum praeparatus es, et adhuc praesto habes per ea semel obtentam dexteritatem, quanta sufficiet? / II. Have you long since, by exercises directed to the special kind of beautiful thinking to which the given theme belongs, been prepared with a long hand, and do you still have ready at hand, through them, the dexterity once obtained, as much as will suffice?
S. III. Ad latinam poesin minus aptos expertus sum poetas, etiam natos, per academias prima demum artis in hac lingua carmen scribendi rudimenta posituros. / Section III. I have found poets, even born poets, less suited to Latin poetry, who through academies would only then lay down the first rudiments of the art of writing verse in this language.
Dicendo homines, ut dicant, efficere solent.
"men by speaking succeed in becoming speakers."
Vere autem etiam illud dicitur, si intermittatur exercitatio, / But this too is truly said: if exercise is interrupted, then,
sumto spatio ad cogitandum paratius atque accuratius dicendi, perverse dicere homines, perverse dicendo, facillime consequi,
"men by speaking badly make sure of becoming bad speakers. ... after taking time to consider, to speak with greater preparation and accuracy."
licet olim in dicendo non male versatos. / although they were once not badly practiced in speaking.
Cic. de Or. l. 150. / Cicero, De oratore, l. 150.
Saepe ego longos Cantando puerum memini me condere soles. Nunc oblita mihi tot carmina. Vox quoque Moerin Iam fugit ipsa.
"Oft, as a boy, I sang the sun to rest,
but all those songs are from my memory fled,
and even his voice is failing Moeris now;"
Virg. / Virgil.
§ 153
III. An iis pulcrae eruditionis partibus mediocriter instructus es, ad quam electum eligendumve tibi thema propius spectat, an artem calles specialem, ad cuius regulas peculiare tuum opus exigendum est atque componendum? § 67, 69. S. IV. Recte dicitur quilibet de iis, quae ignorat, turpissime dicere. Quod si verum non est, quod Socrates dicere solebat, omnes in eo, quod scirent, satis esse eloquentes, illud est, profecto, verius, neminem in eo disertum esse posse, quod nesciat. Cic. de Or. I. 63.
III. Are you moderately instructed in those parts of beautiful erudition to which the theme chosen, or to be chosen, by you more nearly belongs? Do you know the special art according to whose rules your particular work must be examined and composed? § 67, 69. Section IV. It is rightly said that everyone speaks most shamefully about the things he does not know. But if it is not true, as Socrates used to say, that all people are sufficiently eloquent in that which they know, this, certainly, is truer: no one can be eloquent in that which he does not know. Cicero, De oratore I.63.
Quid est enim tam furiosum, quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia, nec scientia?
"For what savours so much of madness, as the empty sound of words, even the choicest and most elegant, when there is no sense or knowledge contained in them?"
l.c. 51.
ibid. 51.
III. An iis pulcrae eruditionis partibus mediocriter instructus es, ad quam electum eligendumve tibi thema propius spectat, an artem calles specialem, ad cuius regulas peculiare tuum opus exigendum est atque componendum? § 67, 69. S. IV. Recte dicitur quilibet de iis, quae ignorat, turpissime dicere.
III. Are you moderately instructed in those parts of beautiful erudition to which the theme chosen, or to be chosen, by you more nearly belongs? Do you know the special art according to whose rules your particular work must be examined and composed? § 67, 69. Section IV. It is rightly said that everyone speaks most shamefully about the things he does not know.
Quod si verum non est, quod Socrates dicere solebat, omnes in eo, quod scirent, satis esse eloquentes, illud est, profecto, verius, neminem in eo disertum esse posse, quod nesciat.
But if it is not true, as Socrates used to say, that all people are sufficiently eloquent in that which they know, this, certainly, is truer: no one can be eloquent in that which he does not know.
Cic. de Or. I. 63.
Cicero, De oratore I.63.
Quid est enim tam furiosum, quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia, nec scientia?
"For what savours so much of madness, as the empty sound of words, even the choicest and most elegant, when there is no sense or knowledge contained in them?"
l.c. 51.
ibid. 51.
III. An iis pulcrae eruditionis partibus mediocriter instructus es,
III. Are you moderately instructed in those parts of beautiful erudition
ad quam electum eligendumve tibi thema
to which the theme chosen,
propius
or to be chosen, by you more nearly belongs?
spectat, an artem calles specialem,
Do you know the special art according
ad cuius regulas peculiare tuum opus exigendum est atque componendum?
to whose rules your particular work must be examined and composed?
§ 67, 69. S. IV.
§ 67, 69. Section IV. It is rightly
Recte dicitur quilibet de iis,
said that everyone speaks most shamefully about the
quae ignorat, turpissime dicere.
things he does not know.
Quod si verum non est, quod Socrates dicere
But if it is not true, as Socrates used to say,
solebat, omnes in eo,
that all people are sufficiently eloquent in that
quod scirent, satis esse eloquentes,
which they know, this, certainly, is truer:
illud est, profecto, verius, neminem in eo disertum esse posse, quod nesciat.
no one can be eloquent in that which he does not know.
Cic. de Or. I. 63.
Cicero, De oratore I.63.
Quid est enim tam furiosum, quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia, nec scientia?
"For what savours so much of madness, as the empty sound of words, even the choicest and most elegant, when there is no sense or knowledge contained in them?"
l.c. 51.
ibid. 51.
III. An iis pulcrae eruditionis partibus mediocriter instructus es, ad quam electum eligendumve tibi thema propius spectat, an artem calles specialem, ad cuius regulas peculiare tuum opus exigendum est atque componendum? § 67, 69. S. IV. Recte dicitur quilibet de iis, quae ignorat, turpissime dicere. / III. Are you moderately instructed in those parts of beautiful erudition to which the theme chosen, or to be chosen, by you more nearly belongs? Do you know the special art according to whose rules your particular work must be examined and composed? § 67, 69. Section IV. It is rightly said that everyone speaks most shamefully about the things he does not know.
Quod si verum non est, quod Socrates dicere solebat, omnes in eo, quod scirent, satis esse eloquentes, illud est, profecto, verius, neminem in eo disertum esse posse, quod nesciat. / But if it is not true, as Socrates used to say, that all people are sufficiently eloquent in that which they know, this, certainly, is truer: no one can be eloquent in that which he does not know.
Cic. de Or. I. 63. / Cicero, De oratore I.63.
Quid est enim tam furiosum, quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subiecta sententia, nec scientia?
"For what savours so much of madness, as the empty sound of words, even the choicest and most elegant, when there is no sense or knowledge contained in them?"
l.c. 51. / ibid. 51.
§ 154
Doctrina si vim promoveat insitam, Rectique cultus pectora roborant,
"But care draws forth the power within,
And cultured minds are strong for good:"
§ 153, non inscitum cogitandi genus dominae naturae § 151, diligentiaeque, § 152,
§ 153, then no tasteless kind of thinking rubs a stain on mistress nature, § 151, and on diligence, § 152,
qua una virtute omnes virtutes reliquae continentur,
"diligence; a single virtue, in which all other virtues are comprehended."
Cic. de Or. II. 150, maculam affricat § 107, inersve cogitandi genus easdem
Cicero, De oratore II.150, § 107; nor does a sluggish kind of thinking press those same things "with the shameful charge of an art not known," § 108.
Non ignoratae premit artis crimine turpi, § 108. Non quivis videt immodulata poemata iudex. Idcircone vager? scribamque licenter? an omnes Visuros peccata putem mea? Tutus et intra Spem veniae cautus, vitavi denique culpam; Non laudem merui.
"And brand our tragedy with want of skill
Or want of labour, call it which you will.
What then? false rhythm few judges can detect,
And Roman bards of course are all correct.
What shall a poet do? make rules his sport,
And dash through thick and thin, through long and short?
Or pick his steps, endeavour to walk clean,
And fancy every mud-stain will be seen?
What good were that, if though I mind my ways
And shun all blame, I do not merit praise?"
Doctrina si vim promoveat insitam, Rectique cultus pectora roborant,
"But care draws forth the power within,
And cultured minds are strong for good:"
§ 153, non inscitum cogitandi genus dominae naturae § 151, diligentiaeque, § 152,
§ 153, then no tasteless kind of thinking rubs a stain on mistress nature, § 151, and on diligence, § 152,
qua una virtute omnes virtutes reliquae continentur,
"diligence; a single virtue, in which all other virtues are comprehended."
Cic. de Or. II. 150, maculam affricat § 107, inersve cogitandi genus easdem
Cicero, De oratore II.150, § 107; nor does a sluggish kind of thinking press those same things "with the shameful charge of an art not known," § 108.
Non ignoratae premit artis crimine turpi, § 108. Non quivis videt immodulata poemata iudex. Idcircone vager? scribamque licenter? an omnes Visuros peccata putem mea? Tutus et intra Spem veniae cautus, vitavi denique culpam; Non laudem merui.
"And brand our tragedy with want of skill
Or want of labour, call it which you will.
What then? false rhythm few judges can detect,
And Roman bards of course are all correct.
What shall a poet do? make rules his sport,
And dash through thick and thin, through long and short?
Or pick his steps, endeavour to walk clean,
And fancy every mud-stain will be seen?
What good were that, if though I mind my ways
And shun all blame, I do not merit praise?"
Doctrina si vim promoveat insitam, Rectique cultus pectora roborant,
"But care draws forth the power within,
And cultured minds are strong for good:"
§ 153, non inscitum cogitandi genus
§ 153, then no tasteless kind of thinking rubs a
dominae naturae § 151, diligentiaeque, § 152,
stain on mistress nature, § 151, and on diligence, § 152,
qua una virtute omnes virtutes reliquae continentur,
"diligence; a single virtue, in which all other virtues are comprehended."
Cic. de Or. II. 150, maculam affricat § 107,
Cicero, De oratore II.150, § 107;
inersve cogitandi
nor does a sluggish kind of thinking press those
genus easdem
same things "with the shameful charge of an art not known," § 108.
Non ignoratae premit artis crimine turpi, § 108. Non quivis videt immodulata poemata iudex. Idcircone vager? scribamque licenter? an omnes Visuros peccata putem mea? Tutus et intra Spem veniae cautus, vitavi denique culpam; Non laudem merui.
"And brand our tragedy with want of skill
Or want of labour, call it which you will.
What then? false rhythm few judges can detect,
And Roman bards of course are all correct.
What shall a poet do? make rules his sport,
And dash through thick and thin, through long and short?
Or pick his steps, endeavour to walk clean,
And fancy every mud-stain will be seen?
What good were that, if though I mind my ways
And shun all blame, I do not merit praise?"
Doctrina si vim promoveat insitam, Rectique cultus pectora roborant,
"But care draws forth the power within,
And cultured minds are strong for good:"
§ 153, non inscitum cogitandi genus dominae naturae § 151, diligentiaeque, § 152, / § 153, then no tasteless kind of thinking rubs a stain on mistress nature, § 151, and on diligence, § 152,
qua una virtute omnes virtutes reliquae continentur,
"diligence; a single virtue, in which all other virtues are comprehended."
Cic. de Or. II. 150, maculam affricat § 107, inersve cogitandi genus easdem / Cicero, De oratore II.150, § 107; nor does a sluggish kind of thinking press those same things "with the shameful charge of an art not known," § 108.
Non ignoratae premit artis crimine turpi, § 108. Non quivis videt immodulata poemata iudex. Idcircone vager? scribamque licenter? an omnes Visuros peccata putem mea? Tutus et intra Spem veniae cautus, vitavi denique culpam; Non laudem merui.
"And brand our tragedy with want of skill
Or want of labour, call it which you will.
What then? false rhythm few judges can detect,
And Roman bards of course are all correct.
What shall a poet do? make rules his sport,
And dash through thick and thin, through long and short?
Or pick his steps, endeavour to walk clean,
And fancy every mud-stain will be seen?
What good were that, if though I mind my ways
And shun all blame, I do not merit praise?"
§ 155
IV. An nunc humana ea parte locatus es in re, ut omnino possis exspectare mentis impetum incitationemque, sine qua nihil egregii, an eam definite inflammationem animi sentis, aut sperare conceditur, qualem et quantam, et intensive, et extensive, et protensive, datum tuum sumendumve thema poposcerit? S. V.
IV. Are you now placed, in the human part of the matter, so that you can altogether expect the impulse and incitement of mind without which there is nothing excellent? Do you definitely feel, or is it allowed to hope for, that inflammation of soul, of such a kind and quantity, intensively, extensively, and protensively, as your given theme, or the theme to be taken up, will have demanded? Section V.
Iudicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum Quaerere. Quaesito tempore tutus eris. Carmina secessum scribentis et otia poscunt, § 84. Me mare, me venti, me fera iactat hiems.
"'Tis a judge's duty to investigate both the circumstances and the time of an act. If they ask the time you will be secure. ... Poetry requires the writer to be in privacy and ease; I am harassed by the sea, by gales, by wintry storms."
Ov. trist. l. 1.
§ 84. "The sea, the winds, and fierce winter toss me." Ovid, Tristia l. 1.
Arma gravi numero violentaque bella parabam, Edere, materia conveniente modis. Par erat inferior versus. Risse Cupido, § 87. Dicitur, atque unum surripuisse pedem.
"For mighty wars I thought to tune my lute,
And make my measures to my subject suit.
Six feet for ev'ry verse the muse design'd,
But Cupid laughing, when he saw my mind,
From ev'ry second verse a foot purloin'd."
Ov. Am. l. 1.
Ovid, Amores l. 1.
Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui, Victas et urbes, increpuit lyra, § 82. Ne parva Tyrrhenum per aequor Vela darem.
"Of battles fought I fain had told,
And conquer'd towns, when Phoebus smote
His harp-string: "Sooth, 'twere over-bold.
To tempt wide seas in that frail boat.""
Hor. od. IV. 15.
§ 82, "lest I set small sails over the Tyrrhenian sea." Horace, Odes IV.15.
IV. An nunc humana ea parte locatus es in re, ut omnino possis exspectare mentis impetum incitationemque, sine qua nihil egregii, an eam definite inflammationem animi sentis, aut sperare conceditur, qualem et quantam, et intensive, et extensive, et protensive, datum tuum sumendumve thema poposcerit?
IV. Are you now placed, in the human part of the matter, so that you can altogether expect the impulse and incitement of mind without which there is nothing excellent? Do you definitely feel, or is it allowed to hope for, that inflammation of soul, of such a kind and quantity, intensively, extensively, and protensively, as your given theme, or the theme to be taken up, will have demanded?
S. V.
Section V.
Iudicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum Quaerere. Quaesito tempore tutus eris. Carmina secessum scribentis et otia poscunt, § 84. Me mare, me venti, me fera iactat hiems.
"'Tis a judge's duty to investigate both the circumstances and the time of an act. If they ask the time you will be secure. ... Poetry requires the writer to be in privacy and ease; I am harassed by the sea, by gales, by wintry storms."
Ov. trist. l. 1.
§ 84. "The sea, the winds, and fierce winter toss me." Ovid, Tristia l. 1.
Arma gravi numero violentaque bella parabam, Edere, materia conveniente modis. Par erat inferior versus. Risse Cupido, § 87. Dicitur, atque unum surripuisse pedem.
"For mighty wars I thought to tune my lute,
And make my measures to my subject suit.
Six feet for ev'ry verse the muse design'd,
But Cupid laughing, when he saw my mind,
From ev'ry second verse a foot purloin'd."
Ov. Am. l. 1.
Ovid, Amores l. 1.
Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui, Victas et urbes, increpuit lyra, § 82. Ne parva Tyrrhenum per aequor Vela darem.
"Of battles fought I fain had told,
And conquer'd towns, when Phoebus smote
His harp-string: "Sooth, 'twere over-bold.
To tempt wide seas in that frail boat.""
Hor. od.
§ 82, "lest I set small sails over the Tyrrhenian sea."
IV. 15.
Horace, Odes IV.15.
IV. An nunc humana ea
IV. Are you now placed, in the human
parte locatus es in re, ut omnino possis
part of the matter, so that you can altogether
exspectare mentis impetum incitationemque, sine qua
expect the impulse and incitement of mind without which
nihil egregii, an
there is nothing excellent? Do you definitely feel,
eam definite
or is it allowed to hope for,
inflammationem animi sentis, aut sperare conceditur, qualem et quantam,
that inflammation of soul, of such a kind and quantity,
et intensive, et extensive, et protensive, datum
intensively, extensively, and protensively, as your given theme,
tuum sumendumve thema poposcerit?
or the theme to be taken up, will have demanded?
S. V.
Section V.
Iudicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum Quaerere. Quaesito tempore tutus eris. Carmina secessum scribentis et otia poscunt, § 84. Me mare, me venti, me fera iactat hiems.
"'Tis a judge's duty to investigate both the circumstances and the time of an act. If they ask the time you will be secure. ... Poetry requires the writer to be in privacy and ease; I am harassed by the sea, by gales, by wintry storms."
Ov.
§ 84. "The sea, the winds, and fierce winter toss me."
trist. l. 1.
Ovid, Tristia l. 1.
Arma gravi numero violentaque bella parabam, Edere, materia conveniente modis. Par erat inferior versus. Risse Cupido, § 87. Dicitur, atque unum surripuisse pedem.
"For mighty wars I thought to tune my lute,
And make my measures to my subject suit.
Six feet for ev'ry verse the muse design'd,
But Cupid laughing, when he saw my mind,
From ev'ry second verse a foot purloin'd."
Ov. Am. l. 1.
Ovid, Amores l. 1.
Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui, Victas et urbes, increpuit lyra, § 82. Ne parva Tyrrhenum per aequor Vela darem.
"Of battles fought I fain had told,
And conquer'd towns, when Phoebus smote
His harp-string: "Sooth, 'twere over-bold.
To tempt wide seas in that frail boat.""
Hor. od.
§ 82, "lest I set small sails over the Tyrrhenian sea."
IV. 15.
Horace, Odes IV.15.
IV. An nunc humana ea parte locatus es in re, ut omnino possis exspectare mentis impetum incitationemque, sine qua nihil egregii, an eam definite inflammationem animi sentis, aut sperare conceditur, qualem et quantam, et intensive, et extensive, et protensive, datum tuum sumendumve thema poposcerit? / IV. Are you now placed, in the human part of the matter, so that you can altogether expect the impulse and incitement of mind without which there is nothing excellent? Do you definitely feel, or is it allowed to hope for, that inflammation of soul, of such a kind and quantity, intensively, extensively, and protensively, as your given theme, or the theme to be taken up, will have demanded?
S. V. / Section V.
Iudicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum Quaerere. Quaesito tempore tutus eris. Carmina secessum scribentis et otia poscunt, § 84. Me mare, me venti, me fera iactat hiems.
"'Tis a judge's duty to investigate both the circumstances and the time of an act. If they ask the time you will be secure. ... Poetry requires the writer to be in privacy and ease; I am harassed by the sea, by gales, by wintry storms."
Ov. trist. l. 1. / § 84. "The sea, the winds, and fierce winter toss me." Ovid, Tristia l. 1.
Arma gravi numero violentaque bella parabam, Edere, materia conveniente modis. Par erat inferior versus. Risse Cupido, § 87. Dicitur, atque unum surripuisse pedem.
"For mighty wars I thought to tune my lute,
And make my measures to my subject suit.
Six feet for ev'ry verse the muse design'd,
But Cupid laughing, when he saw my mind,
From ev'ry second verse a foot purloin'd."
Ov. Am. l. 1. / Ovid, Amores l. 1.
Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui, Victas et urbes, increpuit lyra, § 82. Ne parva Tyrrhenum per aequor Vela darem.
"Of battles fought I fain had told,
And conquer'd towns, when Phoebus smote
His harp-string: "Sooth, 'twere over-bold.
To tempt wide seas in that frail boat.""
Hor. od. / § 82, "lest I set small sails over the Tyrrhenian sea."
IV. 15. / Horace, Odes IV.15.
§ 156
V. An satis tibi nunc erit otii spatiique non ad pertexendam solum telam, quam magno forsan cum impetu mentis exordiaris, ne cadat illud in te:
V. Will there now be enough leisure and space for you, not only for weaving through the web that perhaps you begin with a great impulse of mind, lest this saying fall upon you:
Amphora coepit Institui, currente rota, cur urceus exit?
"That crockery was a jar when you began;
It ends a pitcher: you an artist, man!"
Hor. sed etiam ad limam adeo commendabilem? S. VI. Quod tamen in solos foetus ingenii dictum velim, quos aliquis exponere publicae luci cogitat, neque tamen, ut extemporalia. § 96. quia
Horace; but also for the file, so highly commendable? Section VI. Yet I would wish this said only about offspring of talent that someone thinks of exposing to public light, and not about extemporaneous things, § 96, because
Tunc operae celeris nimium, curaque carentis.
with the imputation of being too precipitate and careless,
iure reus agi poteris, sicut ab Horatio Lucilius,
just as Lucilius is by Horace:
Garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, Scribendi recte; nam ut multum, nil moror.
"Fluent, yet indolent, he would rebel
Against the toil of writing, writing WELL,
Not writing MUCH; for that I grant you."
e.c. Hor. Serm. l. 4, 12.
etc. Horace, Sermones l. 4, 12.
V. An satis tibi nunc erit otii spatiique non ad pertexendam solum telam, quam magno forsan cum impetu mentis exordiaris, ne cadat illud in te:
V. Will there now be enough leisure and space for you, not only for weaving through the web that perhaps you begin with a great impulse of mind, lest this saying fall upon you:
Amphora coepit Institui, currente rota, cur urceus exit?
"That crockery was a jar when you began;
It ends a pitcher: you an artist, man!"
Hor. sed etiam ad limam adeo commendabilem?
Horace; but also for the file, so highly commendable?
S. VI. Quod tamen in solos foetus ingenii dictum velim, quos aliquis exponere publicae luci cogitat, neque tamen, ut extemporalia. § 96. quia
Section VI. Yet I would wish this said only about offspring of talent that someone thinks of exposing to public light, and not about extemporaneous things, § 96, because
Tunc operae celeris nimium, curaque carentis.
with the imputation of being too precipitate and careless,
iure reus agi poteris, sicut ab Horatio Lucilius,
just as Lucilius is by Horace:
Garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, Scribendi recte; nam ut multum, nil moror.
"Fluent, yet indolent, he would rebel
Against the toil of writing, writing WELL,
Not writing MUCH; for that I grant you."
e.c. Hor. Serm. l. 4, 12.
etc. Horace, Sermones l. 4, 12.
V. An satis tibi nunc erit
V. Will there now be
otii spatiique
enough leisure and space for you,
non ad pertexendam solum telam,
not only for weaving through the web
quam magno forsan cum impetu mentis exordiaris,
that perhaps you begin with a great impulse of
ne cadat illud in te:
mind, lest this saying fall upon you:
Amphora coepit Institui, currente rota, cur urceus exit?
"That crockery was a jar when you began;
It ends a pitcher: you an artist, man!"
Hor. sed etiam ad limam adeo commendabilem?
Horace; but also for the file, so highly commendable?
S. VI. Quod tamen in solos foetus ingenii dictum velim,
Section VI. Yet I would wish this said only about offspring of
quos aliquis exponere publicae luci
talent that someone thinks of exposing to public light,
cogitat, neque tamen, ut extemporalia. § 96. quia
and not about extemporaneous things, § 96, because
Tunc operae celeris nimium, curaque carentis.
with the imputation of being too precipitate and careless,
iure reus agi poteris, sicut ab Horatio Lucilius,
just as Lucilius is by Horace:
Garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, Scribendi recte; nam ut multum, nil moror.
"Fluent, yet indolent, he would rebel
Against the toil of writing, writing WELL,
Not writing MUCH; for that I grant you."
e.c. Hor. Serm. l. 4, 12.
etc. Horace, Sermones l. 4, 12.
V. An satis tibi nunc erit otii spatiique non ad pertexendam solum telam, quam magno forsan cum impetu mentis exordiaris, ne cadat illud in te: / V. Will there now be enough leisure and space for you, not only for weaving through the web that perhaps you begin with a great impulse of mind, lest this saying fall upon you:
Amphora coepit Institui, currente rota, cur urceus exit?
"That crockery was a jar when you began;
It ends a pitcher: you an artist, man!"
Hor. sed etiam ad limam adeo commendabilem? / Horace; but also for the file, so highly commendable?
S. VI. Quod tamen in solos foetus ingenii dictum velim, quos aliquis exponere publicae luci cogitat, neque tamen, ut extemporalia. § 96. quia / Section VI. Yet I would wish this said only about offspring of talent that someone thinks of exposing to public light, and not about extemporaneous things, § 96, because
Tunc operae celeris nimium, curaque carentis.
with the imputation of being too precipitate and careless,
iure reus agi poteris, sicut ab Horatio Lucilius, / just as Lucilius is by Horace:
Garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, Scribendi recte; nam ut multum, nil moror.
"Fluent, yet indolent, he would rebel
Against the toil of writing, writing WELL,
Not writing MUCH; for that I grant you."
e.c. Hor. Serm. l. 4, 12. / etc. Horace, Sermones l. 4, 12.
§ 157
Generatim § 152–156 ideo tantum expositae sunt; ut videas, quae tibi praecipue cogitanda sint. § 151, 118. non autem, ut inde caussis desidiae indulgeas, et iam hunc, iam alium, defectum prae te ferens semper habeas, propter quod tibi, nihil audenti omnino, ignoscas. Quint. X. 3. Infra horizontem aestheticum, vel omnem, § 120, vel tuum posita tibi themata legens, male fluctus moveres in simpulo, § 150. Supra horizontem aestheticum, vel omnem, § 121, vel tuum posita sectatus, male fieres imitator Icari, § 150, qui
Generally, §§ 152–156 have been set out only so that you may see what things must chiefly be thought about by you, § 151, 118, not so that from them you may indulge causes of idleness and, carrying now this, now that defect before yourself, always have something on account of which you may pardon yourself while daring nothing at all. Quintilian X.3. If you choose for yourself themes placed below the aesthetic horizon, either every horizon, § 120, or your own, you would badly stir waves in a ladle, § 150. If you follow themes placed above the aesthetic horizon, either every horizon, § 121, or your own, you would badly become an imitator of Icarus, § 150, who
ceratis ope Daedalea Nititur pennis vitreo daturus Nomina ponto.
"On waxen wings, Iulus, he
Soars heavenward, doom'd to give his name
To some new sea."
Utramque maculam ita cave, ut nec studia tua infinita cunctatione fraudes, quae, quum modum excedit, verendum est, ne inertiae et desidiae vel etiam timiditatis nomen accipiat. Plin. II. ep. 10.
Avoid both stains in such a way that you also do not cheat your studies by endless delay; when it exceeds measure, it must be feared that it will receive the name of inertia and idleness, or even timidity. Pliny II, ep. 10.
Generatim § 152–156 ideo tantum expositae sunt; ut videas, quae tibi praecipue cogitanda sint. § 151, 118. non autem, ut inde caussis desidiae indulgeas, et iam hunc, iam alium, defectum prae te ferens semper habeas, propter quod tibi, nihil audenti omnino, ignoscas.
Generally, §§ 152–156 have been set out only so that you may see what things must chiefly be thought about by you, § 151, 118, not so that from them you may indulge causes of idleness and, carrying now this, now that defect before yourself, always have something on account of which you may pardon yourself while daring nothing at all.
Quint. X. 3.
Quintilian X.3.
Infra horizontem aestheticum, vel omnem, § 120, vel tuum posita tibi themata legens, male fluctus moveres in simpulo, § 150. Supra horizontem aestheticum, vel omnem, § 121, vel tuum posita sectatus, male fieres imitator Icari, § 150, qui
If you choose for yourself themes placed below the aesthetic horizon, either every horizon, § 120, or your own, you would badly stir waves in a ladle, § 150. If you follow themes placed above the aesthetic horizon, either every horizon, § 121, or your own, you would badly become an imitator of Icarus, § 150, who
ceratis ope Daedalea Nititur pennis vitreo daturus Nomina ponto.
"On waxen wings, Iulus, he
Soars heavenward, doom'd to give his name
To some new sea."
Utramque maculam ita cave, ut nec studia tua infinita cunctatione fraudes, quae, quum modum excedit, verendum est, ne inertiae et desidiae vel etiam timiditatis nomen accipiat.
Avoid both stains in such a way that you also do not cheat your studies by endless delay; when it exceeds measure, it must be feared that it will receive the name of inertia and idleness, or even timidity.
Plin. II. ep. 10.
Pliny II, ep. 10.
Generatim § 152–156 ideo tantum expositae sunt;
Generally, §§ 152–156 have been set out only so
ut videas, quae tibi praecipue cogitanda sint.
that you may see what things must chiefly be thought about
§ 151, 118. non autem,
by you, § 151, 118, not so
ut inde caussis desidiae indulgeas,
that from them you may indulge causes of idleness
et iam hunc, iam alium, defectum prae
and, carrying now this, now that defect before yourself,
te ferens semper habeas, propter quod tibi,
always have something on account of which you may pardon
nihil audenti omnino, ignoscas.
yourself while daring nothing at all.
Quint. X. 3.
Quintilian X.3.
Infra horizontem aestheticum,
If you choose for yourself themes placed below the aesthetic
vel omnem, § 120, vel tuum posita tibi
horizon, either every horizon, § 120, or your own,
themata legens, male fluctus moveres in simpulo, § 150.
you would badly stir waves in a ladle, § 150.
Supra horizontem aestheticum, vel
If you follow themes placed above the aesthetic horizon,
omnem, § 121, vel tuum posita sectatus,
either every horizon, § 121, or your own, you
male fieres imitator Icari, § 150, qui
would badly become an imitator of Icarus, § 150, who
ceratis ope Daedalea Nititur pennis vitreo daturus Nomina ponto.
"On waxen wings, Iulus, he
Soars heavenward, doom'd to give his name
To some new sea."
Utramque maculam ita cave,
Avoid both stains in such a
ut nec studia
way that you also do not cheat your studies
tua infinita cunctatione fraudes, quae, quum modum excedit,
by endless delay; when it exceeds measure,
verendum est, ne
it must be feared that it will receive
inertiae et desidiae vel etiam timiditatis nomen accipiat.
the name of inertia and idleness, or even timidity.
Plin. II. ep. 10.
Pliny II, ep. 10.
Generatim § 152–156 ideo tantum expositae sunt; ut videas, quae tibi praecipue cogitanda sint. § 151, 118. non autem, ut inde caussis desidiae indulgeas, et iam hunc, iam alium, defectum prae te ferens semper habeas, propter quod tibi, nihil audenti omnino, ignoscas. / Generally, §§ 152–156 have been set out only so that you may see what things must chiefly be thought about by you, § 151, 118, not so that from them you may indulge causes of idleness and, carrying now this, now that defect before yourself, always have something on account of which you may pardon yourself while daring nothing at all.
Quint. X. 3. / Quintilian X.3.
Infra horizontem aestheticum, vel omnem, § 120, vel tuum posita tibi themata legens, male fluctus moveres in simpulo, § 150. Supra horizontem aestheticum, vel omnem, § 121, vel tuum posita sectatus, male fieres imitator Icari, § 150, qui / If you choose for yourself themes placed below the aesthetic horizon, either every horizon, § 120, or your own, you would badly stir waves in a ladle, § 150. If you follow themes placed above the aesthetic horizon, either every horizon, § 121, or your own, you would badly become an imitator of Icarus, § 150, who
ceratis ope Daedalea Nititur pennis vitreo daturus Nomina ponto.
"On waxen wings, Iulus, he
Soars heavenward, doom'd to give his name
To some new sea."
Utramque maculam ita cave, ut nec studia tua infinita cunctatione fraudes, quae, quum modum excedit, verendum est, ne inertiae et desidiae vel etiam timiditatis nomen accipiat. / Avoid both stains in such a way that you also do not cheat your studies by endless delay; when it exceeds measure, it must be feared that it will receive the name of inertia and idleness, or even timidity.
Plin. II. ep. 10. / Pliny II, ep. 10.
§ 158
Sectio XIII. Absoluta brevitas. Si divitiae et rerum S. VIIII et personae S. XII affluant, ne iam tibi plaudas, ut apud Terentium Pamphilus sibi:
Section XIII. Absolute Brevity. If riches both of things, Section VIII, and of the person, Section XII, flow abundantly, do not yet applaud yourself, as Pamphilus in Terence does himself:
Quis me est fortunatior venustatisque adeo plenior?
"Who is there happier than I, and, in fact, more full of joyousness?"
De magnis acervis eiusmodi, copiosaque sua cogitandorum 1) ea, tot ac tanta tollenda sunt in usus tuos, ex quibus completi quid pro fine, quem tibi proposuisti, componi possit ac effici. Completionem non postulo, quam in definitionibus logicus, ac problematibus philosophicomathematicis, requirat, sed eam, in qua nihil turpiter desit, nihil ad finem insufficientiae fiat phaenomenon, nihil eo pertinentium, nisi forte per solam intellectus vim, desideretur. § 16. Id consecutum cogitandi genus, plenum atque perfectum erit. Omne quidem bene plenum cogitandi genus cumulatum etiam erit atque copiosum, referta tamen atque cumulata potest esse cogitatio de re quapiam, neque plena neque perfecta, quod ultimum est ubertatis aestheticae, § 115.
From great heaps of this kind, and from your abundant supply of things to be thought, 1) those things, so many and so great, must be taken for your uses from which something complete can be composed and effected for the end you have proposed to yourself. I do not demand the completion that the logician requires in definitions and in philosophico-mathematical problems, but that in which nothing is disgracefully lacking, nothing becomes a phenomenon of insufficiency for the end, and nothing belonging to it is desired except perhaps by the force of intellect alone, § 16. The kind of thinking that has attained this will be full and perfect. Every well-full kind of thinking will indeed also be heaped up and copious; nevertheless a thought about some matter can be packed and heaped up, yet neither full nor perfect, which latter is the goal of aesthetic richness, § 115.
Sectio XIII. Absoluta brevitas.
Section XIII. Absolute Brevity.
Si divitiae et rerum S. VIIII et personae S. XII affluant, ne iam tibi plaudas, ut apud Terentium Pamphilus sibi:
If riches both of things, Section VIII, and of the person, Section XII, flow abundantly, do not yet applaud yourself, as Pamphilus in Terence does himself:
Quis me est fortunatior venustatisque adeo plenior?
"Who is there happier than I, and, in fact, more full of joyousness?"
De magnis acervis eiusmodi, copiosaque sua cogitandorum 1) ea, tot ac tanta tollenda sunt in usus tuos, ex quibus completi quid pro fine, quem tibi proposuisti, componi possit ac effici.
From great heaps of this kind, and from your abundant supply of things to be thought, 1) those things, so many and so great, must be taken for your uses from which something complete can be composed and effected for the end you have proposed to yourself.
Completionem non postulo, quam in definitionibus logicus, ac problematibus philosophicomathematicis, requirat, sed eam, in qua nihil turpiter desit, nihil ad finem insufficientiae fiat phaenomenon, nihil eo pertinentium, nisi forte per solam intellectus vim, desideretur. § 16. Id consecutum cogitandi genus, plenum atque perfectum erit.
I do not demand the completion that the logician requires in definitions and in philosophico-mathematical problems, but that in which nothing is disgracefully lacking, nothing becomes a phenomenon of insufficiency for the end, and nothing belonging to it is desired except perhaps by the force of intellect alone, § 16. The kind of thinking that has attained this will be full and perfect.
Omne quidem bene plenum cogitandi genus cumulatum etiam erit atque copiosum, referta tamen atque cumulata potest esse cogitatio de re quapiam, neque plena neque perfecta, quod ultimum est ubertatis aestheticae, § 115.
Every well-full kind of thinking will indeed also be heaped up and copious; nevertheless a thought about some matter can be packed and heaped up, yet neither full nor perfect, which latter is the goal of aesthetic richness, § 115.
Sectio XIII. Absoluta brevitas.
Section XIII. Absolute Brevity.
Si divitiae et rerum S. VIIII
If riches both of things, Section VIII,
et personae S. XII affluant, ne
and of the person, Section XII, flow abundantly,
iam tibi plaudas, ut apud Terentium Pamphilus sibi:
do not yet applaud yourself, as Pamphilus in Terence does himself:
Quis me est fortunatior venustatisque adeo plenior?
"Who is there happier than I, and, in fact, more full of joyousness?"
De magnis acervis eiusmodi,
From great heaps of this kind,
copiosaque sua cogitandorum
and from your abundant supply of things to be thought,
1) ea, tot ac tanta tollenda
1) those things, so many and so great,
sunt in usus tuos,
must be taken for your uses
ex quibus completi quid pro fine, quem tibi proposuisti,
from which something complete can be
componi possit ac effici.
composed and effected for the end you have proposed to yourself.
Completionem non postulo, quam
I do not demand the completion that the logician
in definitionibus logicus, ac problematibus philosophicomathematicis, requirat,
requires in definitions and in philosophico-mathematical problems,
sed eam, in qua nihil turpiter
but that in which nothing is disgracefully lacking,
desit, nihil ad finem insufficientiae
nothing becomes a phenomenon of insufficiency for the end,
fiat phaenomenon, nihil eo pertinentium,
and nothing belonging to it is
nisi forte per solam intellectus vim, desideretur.
desired except perhaps by the force of intellect alone,
§ 16. Id consecutum cogitandi genus, plenum atque perfectum erit.
§ 16. The kind of thinking that has attained this will be full and perfect.
Omne quidem bene plenum cogitandi genus cumulatum etiam
Every well-full kind of thinking will indeed also be
erit atque copiosum, referta tamen atque
heaped up and copious; nevertheless a thought about some
cumulata potest esse cogitatio de re quapiam,
matter can be packed and heaped up, yet
neque plena neque perfecta, quod ultimum est ubertatis aestheticae,
neither full nor perfect, which latter is the goal of aesthetic
§ 115.
richness, § 115.
Sectio XIII. Absoluta brevitas. / Section XIII. Absolute Brevity.
Si divitiae et rerum S. VIIII et personae S. XII affluant, ne iam tibi plaudas, ut apud Terentium Pamphilus sibi: / If riches both of things, Section VIII, and of the person, Section XII, flow abundantly, do not yet applaud yourself, as Pamphilus in Terence does himself:
Quis me est fortunatior venustatisque adeo plenior?
"Who is there happier than I, and, in fact, more full of joyousness?"
De magnis acervis eiusmodi, copiosaque sua cogitandorum 1) ea, tot ac tanta tollenda sunt in usus tuos, ex quibus completi quid pro fine, quem tibi proposuisti, componi possit ac effici. / From great heaps of this kind, and from your abundant supply of things to be thought, 1) those things, so many and so great, must be taken for your uses from which something complete can be composed and effected for the end you have proposed to yourself.
Completionem non postulo, quam in definitionibus logicus, ac problematibus philosophicomathematicis, requirat, sed eam, in qua nihil turpiter desit, nihil ad finem insufficientiae fiat phaenomenon, nihil eo pertinentium, nisi forte per solam intellectus vim, desideretur. § 16. Id consecutum cogitandi genus, plenum atque perfectum erit. / I do not demand the completion that the logician requires in definitions and in philosophico-mathematical problems, but that in which nothing is disgracefully lacking, nothing becomes a phenomenon of insufficiency for the end, and nothing belonging to it is desired except perhaps by the force of intellect alone, § 16. The kind of thinking that has attained this will be full and perfect.
Omne quidem bene plenum cogitandi genus cumulatum etiam erit atque copiosum, referta tamen atque cumulata potest esse cogitatio de re quapiam, neque plena neque perfecta, quod ultimum est ubertatis aestheticae, § 115. / Every well-full kind of thinking will indeed also be heaped up and copious; nevertheless a thought about some matter can be packed and heaped up, yet neither full nor perfect, which latter is the goal of aesthetic richness, § 115.
§ 159
Sit vasta, sit diffusa cogitatio, nisi simul omnibus numeris absoluta videatur ac integra, si quid aestheticorum aequum iudicem desiderare patiatur et rerum quarum, si quid omittat, salva pulcritudine quod deesse non potest, manca quodammodo, ac inchoata potius, quam perfecta censeatur. Huc hiulca ac abrupta cogitandi ratio, scatens saltibus aesthetice illegitimis. § 158. Quint. IV. 2.
Let the thought be vast, let it be diffuse; unless at the same time it seems finished and whole in every respect, if it allows a fair aesthetic judge to desire anything, and if it omits something among the things that, with beauty preserved, cannot be absent, it is judged in a certain way maimed, and rather begun than perfected. To this belongs a gaping and broken manner of thinking, teeming with aesthetically illegitimate leaps. § 158. Quintilian IV.2.
Sit vasta, sit diffusa cogitatio, nisi simul omnibus numeris absoluta videatur ac integra, si quid aestheticorum aequum iudicem desiderare patiatur et rerum quarum, si quid omittat, salva pulcritudine quod deesse non potest, manca quodammodo, ac inchoata potius, quam perfecta censeatur.
Let the thought be vast, let it be diffuse; unless at the same time it seems finished and whole in every respect, if it allows a fair aesthetic judge to desire anything, and if it omits something among the things that, with beauty preserved, cannot be absent, it is judged in a certain way maimed, and rather begun than perfected.
Huc hiulca ac abrupta cogitandi ratio, scatens saltibus aesthetice illegitimis. § 158. Quint. IV. 2.
To this belongs a gaping and broken manner of thinking, teeming with aesthetically illegitimate leaps. § 158. Quintilian IV.2.
Sit vasta, sit diffusa
Let the thought be vast, let it be diffuse;
cogitatio, nisi simul omnibus numeris absoluta videatur ac integra,
unless at the same time it seems finished and whole
si quid aestheticorum
in every respect, if it allows a fair aesthetic
aequum iudicem desiderare patiatur et rerum quarum, si quid omittat,
judge to desire anything, and if it omits
salva pulcritudine quod
something among the things that, with beauty preserved,
deesse non potest, manca quodammodo,
cannot be absent, it is judged in
ac inchoata potius, quam perfecta censeatur.
a certain way maimed, and rather begun than perfected.
Huc hiulca ac abrupta cogitandi
To this belongs a gaping and broken manner of thinking,
ratio, scatens saltibus aesthetice illegitimis. § 158. Quint. IV. 2.
teeming with aesthetically illegitimate leaps. § 158. Quintilian IV.2.
Sit vasta, sit diffusa cogitatio, nisi simul omnibus numeris absoluta videatur ac integra, si quid aestheticorum aequum iudicem desiderare patiatur et rerum quarum, si quid omittat, salva pulcritudine quod deesse non potest, manca quodammodo, ac inchoata potius, quam perfecta censeatur. / Let the thought be vast, let it be diffuse; unless at the same time it seems finished and whole in every respect, if it allows a fair aesthetic judge to desire anything, and if it omits something among the things that, with beauty preserved, cannot be absent, it is judged in a certain way maimed, and rather begun than perfected.
Huc hiulca ac abrupta cogitandi ratio, scatens saltibus aesthetice illegitimis. § 158. Quint. IV. 2. / To this belongs a gaping and broken manner of thinking, teeming with aesthetically illegitimate leaps. § 158. Quintilian IV.2.
§ 160
2) Ea omnia, quae salvo pulcritudinis gradu prorsus abesse possunt, relinquenda, vel etiam arrepta primum obvia reiicienda denuo sunt, quia heic superflua distrahentia nocent, M. § 638. Haec est brevitas laudabilis absoluta. Nec enim solum
2) All those things that can be entirely absent without loss of the degree of beauty must be left aside, or even, if at first seized as things occurring to hand, must be rejected again, because here superfluous distracting things harm, Metaphysics § 638. This is laudable absolute brevity. For it is not only that
Breve sit, quod turpiter audes,
"Let your evil days be short;"
Iuv. sed etiam, si quid suaviter. Neque tamen haec brevitas rationem habet ad tempus brevibus huiusmodi cogitationibus vere pulcris imbibendis insumendum,
Juvenal, but also whatever you do sweetly. Yet this brevity has no relation to the time to be spent in absorbing brief thoughts of this kind that are truly beautiful:
Saepe fuit brevior, quam mea verba, dies.
"oft the day was too short for my words."
Ov. Quis autem laudabilem Ovidio brevitatem omnino denegaverit? Habebit ea potius rationem ad multitudinem, paucitatemque cogitandorum de dato themate data ratione, plene tamen atque perfecte, § 158. Supervacuis forte nonnunquam perditur breve, at irreparabile tempus. Bene locatae vero in brevitatem hanc laudabilem exhibentibus Saepe citae vitae longis sermonibus horae.
Ovid. But who would altogether deny laudable brevity to Ovid? Rather, it will have relation to the multitude and paucity of things to be thought about a given theme in a given way, yet fully and perfectly, § 158. Sometimes perhaps "brief but irreparable time" is lost on superfluities; but for those who exhibit well-placed things in this laudable brevity, "often hours of swift life pass in long conversations."
2) Ea omnia, quae salvo pulcritudinis gradu prorsus abesse possunt, relinquenda, vel etiam arrepta primum obvia reiicienda denuo sunt, quia heic superflua distrahentia nocent, M. § 638. Haec est brevitas laudabilis absoluta.
2) All those things that can be entirely absent without loss of the degree of beauty must be left aside, or even, if at first seized as things occurring to hand, must be rejected again, because here superfluous distracting things harm, Metaphysics § 638. This is laudable absolute brevity.
Nec enim solum
For it is not only that
Breve sit, quod turpiter audes,
"Let your evil days be short;"
Iuv. sed etiam, si quid suaviter.
Juvenal, but also whatever you do sweetly.
Neque tamen haec brevitas rationem habet ad tempus brevibus huiusmodi cogitationibus vere pulcris imbibendis insumendum,
Yet this brevity has no relation to the time to be spent in absorbing brief thoughts of this kind that are truly beautiful:
Saepe fuit brevior, quam mea verba, dies.
"oft the day was too short for my words."
Ov. Quis autem laudabilem Ovidio brevitatem omnino denegaverit? Habebit ea potius rationem ad multitudinem, paucitatemque cogitandorum de dato themate data ratione, plene tamen atque perfecte, § 158. Supervacuis forte nonnunquam perditur breve, at irreparabile tempus. Bene locatae vero in brevitatem hanc laudabilem exhibentibus Saepe citae vitae longis sermonibus horae.
Ovid. But who would altogether deny laudable brevity to Ovid? Rather, it will have relation to the multitude and paucity of things to be thought about a given theme in a given way, yet fully and perfectly, § 158. Sometimes perhaps "brief but irreparable time" is lost on superfluities; but for those who exhibit well-placed things in this laudable brevity, "often hours of swift life pass in long conversations."
2) Ea omnia, quae salvo pulcritudinis gradu prorsus abesse
2) All those things that can be entirely absent
possunt, relinquenda,
without loss of the degree of beauty must
vel etiam arrepta primum obvia
be left aside, or even, if at first seized
reiicienda denuo
as things occurring to hand, must be rejected again,
sunt, quia heic superflua distrahentia nocent, M. § 638.
because here superfluous distracting things harm, Metaphysics § 638.
Haec est brevitas laudabilis absoluta.
This is laudable absolute brevity.
Nec enim solum
For it is not only that
Breve sit, quod turpiter audes,
"Let your evil days be short;"
Iuv. sed etiam, si quid suaviter.
Juvenal, but also whatever you do sweetly.
Neque tamen haec brevitas rationem
Yet this brevity has no relation to the
habet ad tempus brevibus huiusmodi cogitationibus
time to be spent in absorbing brief thoughts of
vere pulcris imbibendis insumendum,
this kind that are truly beautiful:
Saepe fuit brevior, quam mea verba, dies.
"oft the day was too short for my words."
Ov. Quis autem laudabilem Ovidio brevitatem omnino
Ovid. But who would altogether deny laudable brevity to Ovid?
denegaverit? Habebit ea potius rationem ad multitudinem,
Rather, it will have relation to the multitude
paucitatemque cogitandorum de dato
and paucity of things to be thought about a
themate data ratione, plene tamen atque perfecte, § 158.
given theme in a given way, yet fully and perfectly, § 158.
Supervacuis forte nonnunquam perditur breve, at irreparabile tempus.
Sometimes perhaps "brief but irreparable time" is lost on superfluities;
Bene locatae vero in brevitatem hanc laudabilem exhibentibus
but for those who exhibit well-placed things in this laudable brevity,
Saepe citae vitae longis sermonibus horae.
"often hours of swift life pass in long conversations."
2) Ea omnia, quae salvo pulcritudinis gradu prorsus abesse possunt, relinquenda, vel etiam arrepta primum obvia reiicienda denuo sunt, quia heic superflua distrahentia nocent, M. § 638. Haec est brevitas laudabilis absoluta. / 2) All those things that can be entirely absent without loss of the degree of beauty must be left aside, or even, if at first seized as things occurring to hand, must be rejected again, because here superfluous distracting things harm, Metaphysics § 638. This is laudable absolute brevity.
Nec enim solum / For it is not only that
Breve sit, quod turpiter audes,
"Let your evil days be short;"
Iuv. sed etiam, si quid suaviter. / Juvenal, but also whatever you do sweetly.
Neque tamen haec brevitas rationem habet ad tempus brevibus huiusmodi cogitationibus vere pulcris imbibendis insumendum, / Yet this brevity has no relation to the time to be spent in absorbing brief thoughts of this kind that are truly beautiful:
Saepe fuit brevior, quam mea verba, dies.
"oft the day was too short for my words."
Ov. Quis autem laudabilem Ovidio brevitatem omnino denegaverit? Habebit ea potius rationem ad multitudinem, paucitatemque cogitandorum de dato themate data ratione, plene tamen atque perfecte, § 158. Supervacuis forte nonnunquam perditur breve, at irreparabile tempus. Bene locatae vero in brevitatem hanc laudabilem exhibentibus Saepe citae vitae longis sermonibus horae. / Ovid. But who would altogether deny laudable brevity to Ovid? Rather, it will have relation to the multitude and paucity of things to be thought about a given theme in a given way, yet fully and perfectly, § 158. Sometimes perhaps "brief but irreparable time" is lost on superfluities; but for those who exhibit well-placed things in this laudable brevity, "often hours of swift life pass in long conversations."
§ 161
Brevis narrationis plena descriptio apud Ciceronem, de Inv. I. 28, definitionem § 160 illustrabit. Cogitatio absolute laudabiliterque brevis erit, si, unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur, et non ab ultimo repetetur; et si, cuius rei satis erit summam dixisse, eius partes non dicentur. Nam saepe satis est, quod factum sit, dicere, non, ut enarres, quomodo sit factum, et si non longius, quam quod scitu opus est, in narrando (meditando) procedatur; et, si nullam in rem aliam transibitur, et, si ita dicatur, ut non nunquam ex eo, quod dictum sit, id, quod dictum non sit, intelligatur, et, si non modo id, quod obest, verum etiam id, quod nec obest, nec adiuvat, praeteribitur, et, si semel unumquodque dicetur, et, si non ab eo, in quo proxime destitum erit, deinceps incipietur. cf. Quint. IV. 2.
The full description of a brief narration in Cicero, De inventione I.28, will illustrate the definition of § 160. A thought will be absolutely and laudably brief if a beginning is taken from where it is necessary, and is not repeated from the last thing; and if, for a matter of which it will be enough to have stated the summary, its parts are not stated. For it is often enough to say what has been done, not to narrate how it has been done; and if in narrating, or meditating, one proceeds no further than what needs to be known; and if one passes over into no other matter; and if it is said in such a way that sometimes from what has been said that which has not been said is understood; and if not only what obstructs, but also what neither obstructs nor helps, is passed over; and if each thing is said once; and if what follows does not begin from that at which the preceding item most nearly stopped. Compare Quintilian IV.2.
Brevis narrationis plena descriptio apud Ciceronem, de Inv. I. 28, definitionem § 160 illustrabit. Cogitatio absolute laudabiliterque brevis erit, si, unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur, et non ab ultimo repetetur; et si, cuius rei satis erit summam dixisse, eius partes non dicentur.
The full description of a brief narration in Cicero, De inventione I.28, will illustrate the definition of § 160. A thought will be absolutely and laudably brief if a beginning is taken from where it is necessary, and is not repeated from the last thing; and if, for a matter of which it will be enough to have stated the summary, its parts are not stated.
Nam saepe satis est, quod factum sit, dicere, non, ut enarres, quomodo sit factum, et si non longius, quam quod scitu opus est, in narrando (meditando) procedatur; et, si nullam in rem aliam transibitur, et, si ita dicatur, ut non nunquam ex eo, quod dictum sit, id, quod dictum non sit, intelligatur, et, si non modo id, quod obest, verum etiam id, quod nec obest, nec adiuvat, praeteribitur, et, si semel unumquodque dicetur, et, si non ab eo, in quo proxime destitum erit, deinceps incipietur. cf. Quint. IV. 2.
For it is often enough to say what has been done, not to narrate how it has been done; and if in narrating, or meditating, one proceeds no further than what needs to be known; and if one passes over into no other matter; and if it is said in such a way that sometimes from what has been said that which has not been said is understood; and if not only what obstructs, but also what neither obstructs nor helps, is passed over; and if each thing is said once; and if what follows does not begin from that at which the preceding item most nearly stopped. Compare Quintilian IV.2.
Brevis narrationis plena descriptio apud Ciceronem, de Inv.
The full description of a brief narration in Cicero, De inventione
I. 28, definitionem § 160 illustrabit.
I.28, will illustrate the definition of § 160. A
Cogitatio absolute laudabiliterque brevis erit, si,
thought will be absolutely and laudably brief if
unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur,
a beginning is taken from where it is necessary,
et non ab ultimo repetetur;
and is not repeated from the last thing;
et si, cuius rei satis erit
and if, for a matter of which it will
summam dixisse,
be enough to have stated the summary,
eius partes non dicentur.
its parts are not stated.
Nam saepe satis est, quod factum sit,
For it is often enough to say what has
dicere, non, ut enarres, quomodo sit factum,
been done, not to narrate how it has been done;
et si non longius, quam quod scitu opus est,
and if
in narrando (meditando) procedatur;
in narrating, or meditating, one proceeds
et, si nullam in rem aliam transibitur,
no further than what needs to be known; and if one passes over into no other matter;
et, si ita dicatur,
and if it is said in such a way
ut non nunquam ex eo, quod dictum sit, id,
that sometimes from what has been said that
quod dictum non sit, intelligatur,
which has not been said is understood;
et, si non modo id, quod obest,
and if not only what obstructs,
verum etiam id, quod nec obest, nec adiuvat, praeteribitur,
but also what neither obstructs nor helps, is passed over;
et, si semel
and if each thing is said once;
unumquodque dicetur, et, si non ab eo,
and if what follows does not begin from
in quo proxime destitum erit, deinceps incipietur. cf. Quint. IV. 2.
that at which the preceding item most nearly stopped. Compare Quintilian IV.2.
Brevis narrationis plena descriptio apud Ciceronem, de Inv. I. 28, definitionem § 160 illustrabit. Cogitatio absolute laudabiliterque brevis erit, si, unde necesse est, inde initium sumetur, et non ab ultimo repetetur; et si, cuius rei satis erit summam dixisse, eius partes non dicentur. / The full description of a brief narration in Cicero, De inventione I.28, will illustrate the definition of § 160. A thought will be absolutely and laudably brief if a beginning is taken from where it is necessary, and is not repeated from the last thing; and if, for a matter of which it will be enough to have stated the summary, its parts are not stated.
Nam saepe satis est, quod factum sit, dicere, non, ut enarres, quomodo sit factum, et si non longius, quam quod scitu opus est, in narrando (meditando) procedatur; et, si nullam in rem aliam transibitur, et, si ita dicatur, ut non nunquam ex eo, quod dictum sit, id, quod dictum non sit, intelligatur, et, si non modo id, quod obest, verum etiam id, quod nec obest, nec adiuvat, praeteribitur, et, si semel unumquodque dicetur, et, si non ab eo, in quo proxime destitum erit, deinceps incipietur. cf. Quint. IV. 2. / For it is often enough to say what has been done, not to narrate how it has been done; and if in narrating, or meditating, one proceeds no further than what needs to be known; and if one passes over into no other matter; and if it is said in such a way that sometimes from what has been said that which has not been said is understood; and if not only what obstructs, but also what neither obstructs nor helps, is passed over; and if each thing is said once; and if what follows does not begin from that at which the preceding item most nearly stopped. Compare Quintilian IV.2.
§ 162
Non enim in narratione solum, sed ubique belle cogitaturo utique praecipue media haec tenenda est via, quantum opus est, § 158, quantum sat est, § 160.
For not only in narration, but everywhere for one who is going to think beautifully, this middle way especially must be held: as much as is needed, § 158, as much as is enough, § 160.
Fallit voluptas, et quae delectant, minus longa videntur. Ut amoenum ac molle iter, etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus tamen fatigat, quam durum aridumque compendium.
"pleasure beguiles the attention, and that which delights us ever seems less long, just as a picturesque and easy journey tires us less for all its length than a difficult short cut through an arid waste."
Quint. VIII. 2. Iuvat l. II. Aen. Virg. 800 circiter versibus breviter
Quintilian VIII.2. It is pleasing, in book II of Virgil's Aeneid, in about 800 verses, briefly to hear
Troiae supremum audire laborem.
"to hear in brief of all our evil days
and Troy's last throes"
v. 11.
v. 11.
Non enim in narratione solum, sed ubique belle cogitaturo utique praecipue media haec tenenda est via, quantum opus est, § 158, quantum sat est, § 160.
For not only in narration, but everywhere for one who is going to think beautifully, this middle way especially must be held: as much as is needed, § 158, as much as is enough, § 160.
Fallit voluptas, et quae delectant, minus longa videntur. Ut amoenum ac molle iter, etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus tamen fatigat, quam durum aridumque compendium.
"pleasure beguiles the attention, and that which delights us ever seems less long, just as a picturesque and easy journey tires us less for all its length than a difficult short cut through an arid waste."
Quint. VIII. 2.
Quintilian VIII.2.
Iuvat l. II. Aen. Virg. 800 circiter versibus breviter
It is pleasing, in book II of Virgil's Aeneid, in about 800 verses, briefly to hear
Troiae supremum audire laborem.
"to hear in brief of all our evil days
and Troy's last throes"
v. 11.
v. 11.
Non enim in narratione solum,
For not only in narration,
sed ubique belle cogitaturo utique praecipue media
but everywhere for one who is going to think beautifully,
haec tenenda est via,
this middle way especially must be held:
quantum opus est, § 158, quantum sat est, § 160.
as much as is needed, § 158, as much as is enough, § 160.
Fallit voluptas, et quae delectant, minus longa videntur. Ut amoenum ac molle iter, etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus tamen fatigat, quam durum aridumque compendium.
"pleasure beguiles the attention, and that which delights us ever seems less long, just as a picturesque and easy journey tires us less for all its length than a difficult short cut through an arid waste."
Quint. VIII. 2.
Quintilian VIII.2.
Iuvat l. II. Aen. Virg.
It is pleasing, in book II of Virgil's
800 circiter versibus breviter
Aeneid, in about 800 verses, briefly to hear
Troiae supremum audire laborem.
"to hear in brief of all our evil days
and Troy's last throes"
v. 11.
v. 11.
Non enim in narratione solum, sed ubique belle cogitaturo utique praecipue media haec tenenda est via, quantum opus est, § 158, quantum sat est, § 160. / For not only in narration, but everywhere for one who is going to think beautifully, this middle way especially must be held: as much as is needed, § 158, as much as is enough, § 160.
Fallit voluptas, et quae delectant, minus longa videntur. Ut amoenum ac molle iter, etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus tamen fatigat, quam durum aridumque compendium.
"pleasure beguiles the attention, and that which delights us ever seems less long, just as a picturesque and easy journey tires us less for all its length than a difficult short cut through an arid waste."
Quint. VIII. 2. / Quintilian VIII.2.
Iuvat l. II. Aen. Virg. 800 circiter versibus breviter / It is pleasing, in book II of Virgil's Aeneid, in about 800 verses, briefly to hear
Troiae supremum audire laborem.
"to hear in brief of all our evil days
and Troy's last throes"
v. 11. / v. 11.
§ 163
Hinc et pulcre cogitaturis optandum cogitandi genus, quod diceremus philosophi adaequatum et finem exacte consequens, M. § 882, cui nihil insit incompleti § 159, nihil abundantis § 160, quantum id assequi, hoc vitare possit analogon rationis § 15, 16. Aliter eveniet, 1)
Hence, for those about to think beautifully, the desirable kind of thinking is the one that we philosophers would call adequate and exactly attaining its end, Metaphysics § 882, in which there is nothing incomplete, § 159, nothing excessive, § 160, so far as the analogue of reason, § 15, 16, can attain the former and avoid the latter. Otherwise it will happen, 1) that
Plenior ut si quos delectet copia iusto, Cum ripa simul avulsos ferat Aufidus acer,
"Hence it comes to pass, that the rapid Aufidus carries away, together with the bank, such men as an abundance more copious than what is just delights."
Hor. quorum cuius, quando
pleases some, Horace; and when
Apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto,
"Look, how the lonely swimmers breast the wave!"
acclames illud:
you may shout this to each of them:
Nihilo sapientior, ex quo Plenior es;
"and though you are nothing wiser, since you become richer";
alicuius autem sepulcro titulum inscribas:
or write on someone's tomb:
Brevior duxi securius aevum. Ipsa nocet moles.
"Better to have put up with the Sabines and Veii; in narrower bonds I passed securer days. My very magnitude undoes me;"
Claud. 2) Aut ut in vitia § 121, 122, 159 notata incurras, vel
Claudian. 2) Or you will fall into the faults noted in §§ 121, 122, 159, or
inornata ut brevitas fiat indocta,
"for our brevity must not be devoid of elegance, without which it would be merely uncouth"
§ 108. Quint. IV. 2.
§ 108. Quintilian IV.2.
Hinc et pulcre cogitaturis optandum cogitandi genus, quod diceremus philosophi adaequatum et finem exacte consequens, M. § 882, cui nihil insit incompleti § 159, nihil abundantis § 160, quantum id assequi, hoc vitare possit analogon rationis § 15, 16. Aliter eveniet, 1)
Hence, for those about to think beautifully, the desirable kind of thinking is the one that we philosophers would call adequate and exactly attaining its end, Metaphysics § 882, in which there is nothing incomplete, § 159, nothing excessive, § 160, so far as the analogue of reason, § 15, 16, can attain the former and avoid the latter. Otherwise it will happen, 1) that
Plenior ut si quos delectet copia iusto, Cum ripa simul avulsos ferat Aufidus acer,
"Hence it comes to pass, that the rapid Aufidus carries away, together with the bank, such men as an abundance more copious than what is just delights."
Hor. quorum cuius, quando
pleases some, Horace; and when
Apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto,
"Look, how the lonely swimmers breast the wave!"
acclames illud:
you may shout this to each of them:
Nihilo sapientior, ex quo Plenior es;
"and though you are nothing wiser, since you become richer";
alicuius autem sepulcro titulum inscribas:
or write on someone's tomb:
Brevior duxi securius aevum. Ipsa nocet moles.
"Better to have put up with the Sabines and Veii; in narrower bonds I passed securer days. My very magnitude undoes me;"
Claud. 2) Aut ut in vitia § 121, 122, 159 notata incurras, vel
Claudian. 2) Or you will fall into the faults noted in §§ 121, 122, 159, or
inornata ut brevitas fiat indocta,
"for our brevity must not be devoid of elegance, without which it would be merely uncouth"
§ 108. Quint. IV. 2.
§ 108. Quintilian IV.2.
Hinc et pulcre
Hence, for those about to think beautifully,
cogitaturis optandum cogitandi genus,
the desirable kind of thinking is
quod diceremus philosophi adaequatum et finem exacte consequens,
the one that we philosophers would call adequate and exactly attaining
M. § 882, cui nihil insit incompleti
its end, Metaphysics § 882, in which there is nothing incomplete,
§ 159, nihil abundantis § 160, quantum id assequi,
§ 159, nothing excessive, § 160, so far as
hoc vitare possit analogon rationis § 15, 16.
the analogue of reason, § 15, 16,
Aliter
can attain the former and avoid the latter.
eveniet, 1)
Otherwise it will happen, 1) that
Plenior ut si quos delectet copia iusto, Cum ripa simul avulsos ferat Aufidus acer,
"Hence it comes to pass, that the rapid Aufidus carries away, together with the bank, such men as an abundance more copious than what is just delights."
Hor. quorum cuius, quando
pleases some, Horace; and when
Apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto,
"Look, how the lonely swimmers breast the wave!"
acclames illud:
you may shout this to each of them:
Nihilo sapientior, ex quo Plenior es;
"and though you are nothing wiser, since you become richer";
alicuius autem sepulcro titulum inscribas:
or write on someone's tomb:
Brevior duxi securius aevum. Ipsa nocet moles.
"Better to have put up with the Sabines and Veii; in narrower bonds I passed securer days. My very magnitude undoes me;"
Claud. 2) Aut ut in vitia § 121,
Claudian. 2) Or you will fall into the faults noted in §§ 121,
122, 159 notata incurras, vel
122, 159, or
inornata ut brevitas fiat indocta,
"for our brevity must not be devoid of elegance, without which it would be merely uncouth"
§ 108. Quint. IV. 2.
§ 108. Quintilian IV.2.
Hinc et pulcre cogitaturis optandum cogitandi genus, quod diceremus philosophi adaequatum et finem exacte consequens, M. § 882, cui nihil insit incompleti § 159, nihil abundantis § 160, quantum id assequi, hoc vitare possit analogon rationis § 15, 16. Aliter eveniet, 1) / Hence, for those about to think beautifully, the desirable kind of thinking is the one that we philosophers would call adequate and exactly attaining its end, Metaphysics § 882, in which there is nothing incomplete, § 159, nothing excessive, § 160, so far as the analogue of reason, § 15, 16, can attain the former and avoid the latter. Otherwise it will happen, 1) that
Plenior ut si quos delectet copia iusto, Cum ripa simul avulsos ferat Aufidus acer,
"Hence it comes to pass, that the rapid Aufidus carries away, together with the bank, such men as an abundance more copious than what is just delights."
Hor. quorum cuius, quando / pleases some, Horace; and when
Apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto,
"Look, how the lonely swimmers breast the wave!"
acclames illud: / you may shout this to each of them:
Nihilo sapientior, ex quo Plenior es;
"and though you are nothing wiser, since you become richer";
alicuius autem sepulcro titulum inscribas: / or write on someone's tomb:
Brevior duxi securius aevum. Ipsa nocet moles.
"Better to have put up with the Sabines and Veii; in narrower bonds I passed securer days. My very magnitude undoes me;"
Claud. 2) Aut ut in vitia § 121, 122, 159 notata incurras, vel / Claudian. 2) Or you will fall into the faults noted in §§ 121, 122, 159, or
inornata ut brevitas fiat indocta,
"for our brevity must not be devoid of elegance, without which it would be merely uncouth"
§ 108. Quint. IV. 2. / § 108. Quintilian IV.2.
§ 164
Brevitas absoluta § 160 poscit, ut cuius pulcrae meditationis parti tantum modo venustatis detur, quantum pulcritudo totius admittit, § 19. Parsimioniam et sobrietatem aestheticam. E. § 289, 260.
Absolute brevity, § 160, requires that to each part of a beautiful meditation only so much charm be given as the beauty of the whole admits, § 19. Aesthetic parsimony and sobriety. Ethics §§ 289, 260.
Parsimonia est scientia vitandi sumtus supervacuos, aut ars re familiari (copia divitiisque, de quibus S. VIII–XII) moderate utendi. Parcissimum tamen hominem vocamus pusilli animi atque contracti, § 120, 149, quum infinitum intersit inter modum (quem parcus servat), et angustias,
"Economy is the science of avoiding unnecessary expenditure, or the art of using one's income with moderation: yet we call a man of mean and narrow mind, most economical, although there is an immeasurable distance between moderation and meanness."
§ 23. M. § 551. Sen. de Ben. II. 34. Sive malis esse parcissimus elegantium, uti Crassus, sive parcorum elegantissimus, uti Scaevola, Cic. de claris or. 148, satisfacies erudito palato, quoties in pleno cogitandi genere et perfecto, § 158, exhibebis ipsi
Here "income" denotes the abundance and riches discussed in Sections VIII–XII; see §§ 120, 149. "Moderation" is the measure preserved by the frugal person, as distinct from narrowness; see § 23. Metaphysics § 551. Seneca, De beneficiis II.34. Whether you prefer to be "the most sparing of the elegant," like Crassus, or "the most elegant of the sparing," like Scaevola, Cicero, De claris oratoribus 148, you will satisfy the learned palate whenever, in a full and perfect kind of thinking, § 158, you present to it
Parca, quod satis est, manu.
"No more than life requires."
§ 160, 162.
§ 160, 162.
Brevitas absoluta § 160 poscit, ut cuius pulcrae meditationis parti tantum modo venustatis detur, quantum pulcritudo totius admittit, § 19. Parsimioniam et sobrietatem aestheticam.
Absolute brevity, § 160, requires that to each part of a beautiful meditation only so much charm be given as the beauty of the whole admits, § 19. Aesthetic parsimony and sobriety.
E. § 289, 260.
Ethics §§ 289, 260.
Parsimonia est scientia vitandi sumtus supervacuos, aut ars re familiari (copia divitiisque, de quibus S. VIII–XII) moderate utendi. Parcissimum tamen hominem vocamus pusilli animi atque contracti, § 120, 149, quum infinitum intersit inter modum (quem parcus servat), et angustias,
"Economy is the science of avoiding unnecessary expenditure, or the art of using one's income with moderation: yet we call a man of mean and narrow mind, most economical, although there is an immeasurable distance between moderation and meanness."
§ 23. M. § 551. Sen. de Ben. II. 34. Sive malis esse parcissimus elegantium, uti Crassus, sive parcorum elegantissimus, uti Scaevola, Cic. de claris or. 148, satisfacies erudito palato, quoties in pleno cogitandi genere et perfecto, § 158, exhibebis ipsi
Here "income" denotes the abundance and riches discussed in Sections VIII–XII; see §§ 120, 149. "Moderation" is the measure preserved by the frugal person, as distinct from narrowness; see § 23. Metaphysics § 551. Seneca, De beneficiis II.34. Whether you prefer to be "the most sparing of the elegant," like Crassus, or "the most elegant of the sparing," like Scaevola, Cicero, De claris oratoribus 148, you will satisfy the learned palate whenever, in a full and perfect kind of thinking, § 158, you present to it
Parca, quod satis est, manu.
"No more than life requires."
§ 160, 162.
§ 160, 162.
Brevitas absoluta § 160 poscit,
Absolute brevity, § 160, requires that
ut cuius pulcrae meditationis parti tantum
to each part of a beautiful meditation only
modo venustatis detur, quantum pulcritudo totius admittit,
so much charm be given as the beauty of the whole admits,
§ 19. Parsimioniam et sobrietatem aestheticam.
§ 19. Aesthetic parsimony and sobriety.
E. § 289, 260.
Ethics §§ 289, 260.
Parsimonia est scientia vitandi sumtus supervacuos, aut ars re familiari (copia divitiisque, de quibus S. VIII–XII) moderate utendi. Parcissimum tamen hominem vocamus pusilli animi atque contracti, § 120, 149, quum infinitum intersit inter modum (quem parcus servat), et angustias,
"Economy is the science of avoiding unnecessary expenditure, or the art of using one's income with moderation: yet we call a man of mean and narrow mind, most economical, although there is an immeasurable distance between moderation and meanness."
§ 23. M. § 551. Sen.
Here "income" denotes the abundance and riches discussed in Sections VIII–XII; see §§ 120, 149. "Moderation" is the measure preserved by the frugal person, as distinct from narrowness; see § 23. Metaphysics § 551.
de Ben. II. 34. Sive malis esse
Seneca, De beneficiis II.34. Whether you prefer to be
parcissimus elegantium, uti Crassus,
"the most sparing of the elegant," like Crassus,
sive parcorum elegantissimus, uti Scaevola, Cic.
or "the most elegant of the sparing," like Scaevola, Cicero,
de claris or. 148, satisfacies erudito palato,
De claris oratoribus 148, you will satisfy the learned palate
quoties in pleno cogitandi genere et perfecto,
whenever, in a full and perfect kind of thinking,
§ 158, exhibebis ipsi
§ 158, you present to it
Parca, quod satis est, manu.
"No more than life requires."
§ 160, 162.
§ 160, 162.
Brevitas absoluta § 160 poscit, ut cuius pulcrae meditationis parti tantum modo venustatis detur, quantum pulcritudo totius admittit, § 19. Parsimioniam et sobrietatem aestheticam. / Absolute brevity, § 160, requires that to each part of a beautiful meditation only so much charm be given as the beauty of the whole admits, § 19. Aesthetic parsimony and sobriety.
E. § 289, 260. / Ethics §§ 289, 260.
Parsimonia est scientia vitandi sumtus supervacuos, aut ars re familiari (copia divitiisque, de quibus S. VIII–XII) moderate utendi. Parcissimum tamen hominem vocamus pusilli animi atque contracti, § 120, 149, quum infinitum intersit inter modum (quem parcus servat), et angustias,
"Economy is the science of avoiding unnecessary expenditure, or the art of using one's income with moderation: yet we call a man of mean and narrow mind, most economical, although there is an immeasurable distance between moderation and meanness."
§ 23. M. § 551. Sen. de Ben. II. 34. Sive malis esse parcissimus elegantium, uti Crassus, sive parcorum elegantissimus, uti Scaevola, Cic. de claris or. 148, satisfacies erudito palato, quoties in pleno cogitandi genere et perfecto, § 158, exhibebis ipsi / Here "income" denotes the abundance and riches discussed in Sections VIII–XII; see §§ 120, 149. "Moderation" is the measure preserved by the frugal person, as distinct from narrowness; see § 23. Metaphysics § 551. Seneca, De beneficiis II.34. Whether you prefer to be "the most sparing of the elegant," like Crassus, or "the most elegant of the sparing," like Scaevola, Cicero, De claris oratoribus 148, you will satisfy the learned palate whenever, in a full and perfect kind of thinking, § 158, you present to it
Parca, quod satis est, manu.
"No more than life requires."
§ 160, 162. / § 160, 162.
§ 165
Ut brevitas absoluta generatim id, quod philosophi nunc dicimus nimis prolixum cogitandi genus cavebit, § 160; sic elegantiarum parsimonia praecipue,
As absolute brevity in general will guard against what we philosophers now call an overly prolix kind of thinking, § 160, so parsimony of graces especially guards "lest the stalk sink under heavy ears," § 164. "It will graze down the luxuriance of crops in the tender blade," § 158.
ne gravidis procumbat culmus aristis, § 164. Luxuriem segetum tenera depascet in herba, § 158. Nam si luxuria foliorum exuberat umbra, Nequicquam pingues paleae teret area culmos.
"Or why of him, who lest the heavy ears
O'erweigh the stalk, while yet in tender blade
Feeds down the crop's luxuriance ...
But if the shade with wealth of leaves abound,
Vainly your threshing-floor will bruise the stalks
Rich but in chaff."
Virg. Georg. l. 191. Luxurians cogitandi genus s. kallopismos est, vel per omne meditationis filum plus venustatum et figurarum, § 26, ad singulas paene particulas constipans, ac fert pudica totius pulcritudo, vel nonnunquam saltim aliquam partem comptius effingens et alteram, ac pulcra totius admittit concinnitas. De prima venuste cogitaturi luxurie, cuius omnia dicta factaque quasi sesamo et papavere sparguntur, Petr. valeat illud sapientis:
Virgil, Georgics l. 191. A luxuriant kind of thinking, or kallopismos, exists either when it packs more charms and figures, § 26, into nearly every little part throughout the whole thread of meditation, and the modest beauty of the whole bears it; or when sometimes it at least shapes one part too elaborately and another as much as the beautiful harmony of the whole admits. About the first luxury of one who is going to think gracefully, whose every word and deed is sprinkled as if with sesame and poppy, Petronius, let that saying of the wise person hold:
pleon hemisu pantos,
Fools! They know not how much more the half is than the whole;
de utraque:
about both,
Persicos odi, puer, apparatus.
"No Persian cumber, boy, for me;"
Ut brevitas absoluta generatim id, quod philosophi nunc dicimus nimis prolixum cogitandi genus cavebit, § 160; sic elegantiarum parsimonia praecipue,
As absolute brevity in general will guard against what we philosophers now call an overly prolix kind of thinking, § 160, so parsimony of graces especially guards "lest the stalk sink under heavy ears," § 164. "It will graze down the luxuriance of crops in the tender blade," § 158.
ne gravidis procumbat culmus aristis, § 164. Luxuriem segetum tenera depascet in herba, § 158. Nam si luxuria foliorum exuberat umbra, Nequicquam pingues paleae teret area culmos.
"Or why of him, who lest the heavy ears
O'erweigh the stalk, while yet in tender blade
Feeds down the crop's luxuriance ...
But if the shade with wealth of leaves abound,
Vainly your threshing-floor will bruise the stalks
Rich but in chaff."
Virg. Georg. l. 191.
Virgil, Georgics l. 191.
Luxurians cogitandi genus s. kallopismos est, vel per omne meditationis filum plus venustatum et figurarum, § 26, ad singulas paene particulas constipans, ac fert pudica totius pulcritudo, vel nonnunquam saltim aliquam partem comptius effingens et alteram, ac pulcra totius admittit concinnitas.
A luxuriant kind of thinking, or kallopismos, exists either when it packs more charms and figures, § 26, into nearly every little part throughout the whole thread of meditation, and the modest beauty of the whole bears it; or when sometimes it at least shapes one part too elaborately and another as much as the beautiful harmony of the whole admits.
De prima venuste cogitaturi luxurie, cuius omnia dicta factaque quasi sesamo et papavere sparguntur, Petr. valeat illud sapientis:
About the first luxury of one who is going to think gracefully, whose every word and deed is sprinkled as if with sesame and poppy, Petronius, let that saying of the wise person hold:
pleon hemisu pantos,
Fools! They know not how much more the half is than the whole;
de utraque:
about both,
Persicos odi, puer, apparatus.
"No Persian cumber, boy, for me;"
Ut brevitas absoluta generatim id,
As absolute brevity in general will guard against what
quod philosophi nunc dicimus nimis prolixum cogitandi
we philosophers now call an overly prolix kind of thinking,
genus cavebit, § 160;
§ 160, so parsimony of graces especially guards
sic elegantiarum parsimonia praecipue,
"lest the stalk sink under heavy ears," § 164. "It will graze down the luxuriance of crops in the tender blade," § 158.
ne gravidis procumbat culmus aristis, § 164. Luxuriem segetum tenera depascet in herba, § 158. Nam si luxuria foliorum exuberat umbra, Nequicquam pingues paleae teret area culmos.
"Or why of him, who lest the heavy ears
O'erweigh the stalk, while yet in tender blade
Feeds down the crop's luxuriance ...
But if the shade with wealth of leaves abound,
Vainly your threshing-floor will bruise the stalks
Rich but in chaff."
Virg. Georg. l. 191.
Virgil, Georgics l. 191.
Luxurians cogitandi genus s.
A luxuriant kind of thinking, or
kallopismos est, vel per omne meditationis filum plus venustatum et figurarum,
kallopismos, exists either when it packs more charms and figures,
§ 26, ad singulas paene particulas constipans,
§ 26, into nearly every little part throughout the whole thread of meditation,
ac fert pudica totius
and the modest beauty of the whole bears it;
pulcritudo, vel nonnunquam saltim aliquam partem
or when sometimes it at least shapes one part
comptius effingens et alteram,
too elaborately and another as much
ac pulcra totius admittit concinnitas.
as the beautiful harmony of the whole admits.
De prima venuste cogitaturi luxurie,
About the first luxury of one who is
cuius omnia dicta factaque
going to think gracefully, whose every word and deed
quasi sesamo et papavere sparguntur, Petr.
is sprinkled as if with sesame and poppy, Petronius, let that
valeat illud sapientis:
saying of the wise person hold:
pleon hemisu pantos,
Fools! They know not how much more the half is than the whole;
de utraque:
about both,
Persicos odi, puer, apparatus.
"No Persian cumber, boy, for me;"
Ut brevitas absoluta generatim id, quod philosophi nunc dicimus nimis prolixum cogitandi genus cavebit, § 160; sic elegantiarum parsimonia praecipue, / As absolute brevity in general will guard against what we philosophers now call an overly prolix kind of thinking, § 160, so parsimony of graces especially guards "lest the stalk sink under heavy ears," § 164. "It will graze down the luxuriance of crops in the tender blade," § 158.
ne gravidis procumbat culmus aristis, § 164. Luxuriem segetum tenera depascet in herba, § 158. Nam si luxuria foliorum exuberat umbra, Nequicquam pingues paleae teret area culmos.
"Or why of him, who lest the heavy ears
O'erweigh the stalk, while yet in tender blade
Feeds down the crop's luxuriance ...
But if the shade with wealth of leaves abound,
Vainly your threshing-floor will bruise the stalks
Rich but in chaff."
Virg. Georg. l. 191. / Virgil, Georgics l. 191.
Luxurians cogitandi genus s. kallopismos est, vel per omne meditationis filum plus venustatum et figurarum, § 26, ad singulas paene particulas constipans, ac fert pudica totius pulcritudo, vel nonnunquam saltim aliquam partem comptius effingens et alteram, ac pulcra totius admittit concinnitas. / A luxuriant kind of thinking, or kallopismos, exists either when it packs more charms and figures, § 26, into nearly every little part throughout the whole thread of meditation, and the modest beauty of the whole bears it; or when sometimes it at least shapes one part too elaborately and another as much as the beautiful harmony of the whole admits.
De prima venuste cogitaturi luxurie, cuius omnia dicta factaque quasi sesamo et papavere sparguntur, Petr. valeat illud sapientis: / About the first luxury of one who is going to think gracefully, whose every word and deed is sprinkled as if with sesame and poppy, Petronius, let that saying of the wise person hold:
pleon hemisu pantos,
Fools! They know not how much more the half is than the whole;
de utraque: / about both,
Persicos odi, puer, apparatus.
"No Persian cumber, boy, for me;"
§ 166
Brevitatem omne pulcre cogitandi genus decentem, § 160, plenam illam et refertam, § 158, non mancam, non hiulcam, § 159, parcam tamen ac sobriam, § 164, non luxuriantem aut maculosam, § 165, uno nomine rotundam brevitatem dicere liceat. Ergo silvae tuae, quanta quanta sit, S. VIII–XII, lacunas exple ac hiatus, §§ 158, 159, simul tamen Luxuriantia compescens, § 165, et ad brevitatis laudabilis parsimoniaeque regulas omnia concinne rotundans, §§ 160–164, non aestheticam, § 115, sed Fastidiosam, desere copiam.
It is permitted to call by one name rounded brevity: the brevity fitting every kind of beautiful thinking, § 160, that full and well-stocked brevity, § 158, not maimed, not gaping, § 159, yet sparing and sober, § 164, not luxuriant or stained, § 165. Therefore, of your forest, however great it may be, Sections VIII–XII, fill up the gaps and openings, §§ 158, 159, while nevertheless "checking luxuriant things," § 165, and by rounding everything harmoniously according to the rules of laudable brevity and parsimony, §§ 160–164, abandon an abundance that is not aesthetic, § 115, but "fastidious."
Brevitatem omne pulcre cogitandi genus decentem, § 160, plenam illam et refertam, § 158, non mancam, non hiulcam, § 159, parcam tamen ac sobriam, § 164, non luxuriantem aut maculosam, § 165, uno nomine rotundam brevitatem dicere liceat. Ergo silvae tuae, quanta quanta sit, S. VIII–XII, lacunas exple ac hiatus, §§ 158, 159, simul tamen Luxuriantia compescens, § 165, et ad brevitatis laudabilis parsimoniaeque regulas omnia concinne rotundans, §§ 160–164, non aestheticam, § 115, sed Fastidiosam, desere copiam.
It is permitted to call by one name rounded brevity: the brevity fitting every kind of beautiful thinking, § 160, that full and well-stocked brevity, § 158, not maimed, not gaping, § 159, yet sparing and sober, § 164, not luxuriant or stained, § 165. Therefore, of your forest, however great it may be, Sections VIII–XII, fill up the gaps and openings, §§ 158, 159, while nevertheless "checking luxuriant things," § 165, and by rounding everything harmoniously according to the rules of laudable brevity and parsimony, §§ 160–164, abandon an abundance that is not aesthetic, § 115, but "fastidious."
Brevitatem
It is permitted to call by one name rounded brevity:
omne pulcre cogitandi
the brevity fitting every kind of beautiful thinking,
genus decentem, § 160, plenam illam et refertam, § 158,
§ 160, that full and well-stocked brevity, § 158,
non mancam, non hiulcam, § 159, parcam tamen ac sobriam,
not maimed, not gaping, § 159, yet sparing and sober,
§ 164, non luxuriantem aut maculosam, § 165,
§ 164, not luxuriant or stained, § 165.
uno nomine rotundam brevitatem dicere liceat.
Therefore, of your forest,
Ergo silvae tuae, quanta quanta sit, S. VIII–XII,
however great it may be, Sections VIII–XII,
lacunas exple ac hiatus, §§ 158, 159,
fill up the gaps and openings, §§ 158, 159,
simul tamen Luxuriantia compescens, § 165,
while nevertheless "checking luxuriant things," § 165,
et ad brevitatis laudabilis
and by rounding everything harmoniously according to the
parsimoniaeque regulas omnia concinne rotundans, §§ 160–164,
rules of laudable brevity and parsimony, §§ 160–164,
non aestheticam, § 115, sed Fastidiosam, desere copiam.
abandon an abundance that is not aesthetic, § 115, but "fastidious."
Brevitatem omne pulcre cogitandi genus decentem, § 160, plenam illam et refertam, § 158, non mancam, non hiulcam, § 159, parcam tamen ac sobriam, § 164, non luxuriantem aut maculosam, § 165, uno nomine rotundam brevitatem dicere liceat. Ergo silvae tuae, quanta quanta sit, S. VIII–XII, lacunas exple ac hiatus, §§ 158, 159, simul tamen Luxuriantia compescens, § 165, et ad brevitatis laudabilis parsimoniaeque regulas omnia concinne rotundans, §§ 160–164, non aestheticam, § 115, sed Fastidiosam, desere copiam. / It is permitted to call by one name rounded brevity: the brevity fitting every kind of beautiful thinking, § 160, that full and well-stocked brevity, § 158, not maimed, not gaping, § 159, yet sparing and sober, § 164, not luxuriant or stained, § 165. Therefore, of your forest, however great it may be, Sections VIII–XII, fill up the gaps and openings, §§ 158, 159, while nevertheless "checking luxuriant things," § 165, and by rounding everything harmoniously according to the rules of laudable brevity and parsimony, §§ 160–164, abandon an abundance that is not aesthetic, § 115, but "fastidious."
§ 167
Sicut ubertas aesthetica vel absoluta fuit, vel relativa, § 116, ita distinguenda etiam est ab absoluta brevitate laudabili ac rotunda, de qua S. XIII, relativa brevitas, maior ille gradus absolutae, § 160, qui quibusdam forte cogitandis eleganter necessarius et peculiaris est. Haec brevitas habet etiam aliquam rationem ad tempus cogitationibus hoc significatu brevibus imbibendis insumendum. § 160. Neque de meditatione brevitatem relativam poscente dici potest, quod Plinius de Ciceronis orationibus habet, optimam esse, quae maxima, quod minus accurate addit:
Just as aesthetic abundance was either absolute or relative, § 116, so also from absolute, laudable, and rounded brevity, about which Section XIII treated, there must be distinguished relative brevity: that greater degree of absolute brevity, § 160, which perhaps is elegantly necessary and peculiar for certain things to be thought. This brevity also has some relation to the time to be spent in taking in thoughts brief in this sense, § 160. Nor can it be said about a meditation requiring relative brevity what Pliny has about Cicero's speeches, that the best one is the greatest, to which he adds, less accurately:
bonus liber melior est quisque, quo maior.
"as with all other good things, the more there is of a good book, the better it is."
l. ep. 20, quae tota controversiam aestheticam continet huc pertinentem, et in aliis distinctione brevitatis absolutae relativaeque tollendam, vincente Plinio.
Letter 20 contains the whole aesthetic controversy belonging here, and in other cases to be removed by the distinction between absolute and relative brevity, Pliny winning.
Sicut ubertas aesthetica vel absoluta fuit, vel relativa, § 116, ita distinguenda etiam est ab absoluta brevitate laudabili ac rotunda, de qua S. XIII, relativa brevitas, maior ille gradus absolutae, § 160, qui quibusdam forte cogitandis eleganter necessarius et peculiaris est.
Just as aesthetic abundance was either absolute or relative, § 116, so also from absolute, laudable, and rounded brevity, about which Section XIII treated, there must be distinguished relative brevity: that greater degree of absolute brevity, § 160, which perhaps is elegantly necessary and peculiar for certain things to be thought.
Haec brevitas habet etiam aliquam rationem ad tempus cogitationibus hoc significatu brevibus imbibendis insumendum. § 160. Neque de meditatione brevitatem relativam poscente dici potest, quod Plinius de Ciceronis orationibus habet, optimam esse, quae maxima, quod minus accurate addit:
This brevity also has some relation to the time to be spent in taking in thoughts brief in this sense, § 160. Nor can it be said about a meditation requiring relative brevity what Pliny has about Cicero's speeches, that the best one is the greatest, to which he adds, less accurately:
bonus liber melior est quisque, quo maior.
"as with all other good things, the more there is of a good book, the better it is."
l. ep. 20, quae tota controversiam aestheticam continet huc pertinentem, et in aliis distinctione brevitatis absolutae relativaeque tollendam, vincente Plinio.
Letter 20 contains the whole aesthetic controversy belonging here, and in other cases to be removed by the distinction between absolute and relative brevity, Pliny winning.
Sicut ubertas aesthetica vel absoluta fuit,
Just as aesthetic abundance was either absolute or
vel relativa, § 116, ita distinguenda etiam est ab absoluta
relative, § 116, so also from absolute,
brevitate laudabili ac rotunda, de qua S. XIII,
laudable, and rounded brevity, about which Section XIII
relativa brevitas,
treated, there must be distinguished relative brevity:
maior ille gradus absolutae, § 160,
that greater degree of absolute brevity, § 160,
qui quibusdam forte cogitandis eleganter necessarius et peculiaris
which perhaps is elegantly necessary and peculiar for
est.
certain things to be thought.
Haec brevitas habet etiam aliquam rationem
This brevity also has some relation to the
ad tempus cogitationibus
time to be spent in taking in thoughts brief
hoc significatu brevibus imbibendis insumendum. § 160.
in this sense, § 160.
Neque de meditatione brevitatem
Nor can it be said about a meditation requiring
relativam poscente dici potest, quod Plinius de Ciceronis orationibus
relative brevity what Pliny has about Cicero's speeches,
habet, optimam esse, quae maxima,
that the best one is the greatest,
quod minus accurate addit:
to which he adds, less accurately:
bonus liber melior est quisque, quo maior.
"as with all other good things, the more there is of a good book, the better it is."
l. ep. 20, quae tota controversiam aestheticam continet huc pertinentem,
Letter 20 contains the whole aesthetic controversy belonging here,
et in aliis
and in other cases to be removed by the
distinctione brevitatis absolutae relativaeque tollendam, vincente Plinio.
distinction between absolute and relative brevity, Pliny winning.
Sicut ubertas aesthetica vel absoluta fuit, vel relativa, § 116, ita distinguenda etiam est ab absoluta brevitate laudabili ac rotunda, de qua S. XIII, relativa brevitas, maior ille gradus absolutae, § 160, qui quibusdam forte cogitandis eleganter necessarius et peculiaris est. / Just as aesthetic abundance was either absolute or relative, § 116, so also from absolute, laudable, and rounded brevity, about which Section XIII treated, there must be distinguished relative brevity: that greater degree of absolute brevity, § 160, which perhaps is elegantly necessary and peculiar for certain things to be thought.
Haec brevitas habet etiam aliquam rationem ad tempus cogitationibus hoc significatu brevibus imbibendis insumendum. § 160. Neque de meditatione brevitatem relativam poscente dici potest, quod Plinius de Ciceronis orationibus habet, optimam esse, quae maxima, quod minus accurate addit: / This brevity also has some relation to the time to be spent in taking in thoughts brief in this sense, § 160. Nor can it be said about a meditation requiring relative brevity what Pliny has about Cicero's speeches, that the best one is the greatest, to which he adds, less accurately:
bonus liber melior est quisque, quo maior.
"as with all other good things, the more there is of a good book, the better it is."
l. ep. 20, quae tota controversiam aestheticam continet huc pertinentem, et in aliis distinctione brevitatis absolutae relativaeque tollendam, vincente Plinio. / Letter 20 contains the whole aesthetic controversy belonging here, and in other cases to be removed by the distinction between absolute and relative brevity, Pliny winning.
§ 168
Multae enim lites inde ortae sunt, in definiendis pulcre cogitandorum generibus brevitatem relativam poscentibus, § 167, quando aliquibus in tali genere 1) absoluta brevitas, non satis a relativa distincta, recte iudicabatur apprime necessaria, §§ 160, 166, 2) occurrebant casus speciales bene multi sub tali genere contenti poscentes simul brevitatem utique relativam, 3) gratior apud plerosque brevitas etiam relativa deprehendebatur universim. Tunc enim aliis, 1) non distinctius, ac priores, brevitatem absolutam a relativa discernentibus tali thematum generi non tribuenda videbatur universim brevitas, quia 2) sub eiusmodi genere continebantur casus, ubi praevaricatio sit, cursim ac breviter (relative) attingere, quae sunt inculcanda, infigenda, repetenda, 3) brevitas (relativa) in tali thematum genere semper et promiscue non placeat, nisi inertibus, quorum delicias desidiamque, quasi iudicium, respicere, ridiculum sit. Nam si hos in consilio habeas, non solum satius esse (relative) breviter dicere, sed omnino non dicere.
For many disputes have arisen from this, in defining the kinds of things to be thought beautifully that require relative brevity, § 167: when to some people in such a kind 1) absolute brevity, not sufficiently distinguished from relative brevity, was rightly judged especially necessary, §§ 160, 166; 2) very many special cases contained under such a kind occurred that at the same time certainly required relative brevity; 3) even relative brevity was found generally more pleasing among most people. Then, to others 1) not distinguishing absolute brevity from relative brevity more clearly than the former, brevity seemed not to be attributed universally to such a kind of themes, because 2) under such a kind were contained cases in which it is a dereliction to touch cursorily and briefly, that is relatively, on what must be driven home, fixed in, and repeated; 3) relative brevity in such a kind of themes does not always and indiscriminately please except the sluggish, whose delights and idleness, as though they were judgment, it would be ridiculous to respect. For if you have these people in counsel, it would be better not only to speak briefly, relatively, but not to speak at all.
Multae enim lites inde ortae sunt, in definiendis pulcre cogitandorum generibus brevitatem relativam poscentibus, § 167, quando aliquibus in tali genere 1) absoluta brevitas, non satis a relativa distincta, recte iudicabatur apprime necessaria, §§ 160, 166, 2) occurrebant casus speciales bene multi sub tali genere contenti poscentes simul brevitatem utique relativam, 3) gratior apud plerosque brevitas etiam relativa deprehendebatur universim.
For many disputes have arisen from this, in defining the kinds of things to be thought beautifully that require relative brevity, § 167: when to some people in such a kind 1) absolute brevity, not sufficiently distinguished from relative brevity, was rightly judged especially necessary, §§ 160, 166; 2) very many special cases contained under such a kind occurred that at the same time certainly required relative brevity; 3) even relative brevity was found generally more pleasing among most people.
Tunc enim aliis, 1) non distinctius, ac priores, brevitatem absolutam a relativa discernentibus tali thematum generi non tribuenda videbatur universim brevitas, quia 2) sub eiusmodi genere continebantur casus, ubi praevaricatio sit, cursim ac breviter (relative) attingere, quae sunt inculcanda, infigenda, repetenda, 3) brevitas (relativa) in tali thematum genere semper et promiscue non placeat, nisi inertibus, quorum delicias desidiamque, quasi iudicium, respicere, ridiculum sit.
Then, to others 1) not distinguishing absolute brevity from relative brevity more clearly than the former, brevity seemed not to be attributed universally to such a kind of themes, because 2) under such a kind were contained cases in which it is a dereliction to touch cursorily and briefly, that is relatively, on what must be driven home, fixed in, and repeated; 3) relative brevity in such a kind of themes does not always and indiscriminately please except the sluggish, whose delights and idleness, as though they were judgment, it would be ridiculous to respect.
Nam si hos in consilio habeas, non solum satius esse (relative) breviter dicere, sed omnino non dicere.
For if you have these people in counsel, it would be better not only to speak briefly, relatively, but not to speak at all.
Multae enim lites inde ortae sunt,
For many disputes have arisen from this,
in definiendis
in defining the kinds of things to be thought
pulcre cogitandorum generibus brevitatem relativam poscentibus, § 167,
beautifully that require relative brevity, § 167:
quando aliquibus in tali genere 1) absoluta brevitas,
when to some people in such a kind 1) absolute brevity,
non satis a relativa distincta, recte iudicabatur apprime necessaria,
not sufficiently distinguished from relative brevity, was rightly judged especially necessary,
§§ 160, 166, 2) occurrebant casus speciales bene
§§ 160, 166; 2) very many special cases contained under
multi sub tali genere contenti poscentes simul brevitatem utique relativam,
such a kind occurred that at the same time certainly required relative
3) gratior apud plerosque brevitas etiam relativa
brevity; 3) even relative brevity
deprehendebatur universim.
was found generally more pleasing among most people.
Tunc enim aliis, 1) non distinctius, ac priores,
Then, to others 1) not distinguishing absolute
brevitatem absolutam a relativa discernentibus tali
brevity from relative brevity more clearly than the former,
thematum generi non tribuenda videbatur universim
brevity seemed not to be attributed universally to
brevitas, quia 2)
such a kind of themes, because 2) under such
sub eiusmodi genere continebantur casus,
a kind were contained cases in which it is
ubi praevaricatio sit, cursim ac breviter (relative)
a dereliction to touch cursorily and briefly, that is relatively,
attingere, quae sunt inculcanda, infigenda, repetenda,
on what must be driven home, fixed in, and repeated;
3) brevitas (relativa) in tali
3) relative brevity in such a kind of
thematum genere semper et promiscue non placeat,
themes does not always and indiscriminately please except the sluggish,
nisi inertibus, quorum delicias desidiamque, quasi
whose delights and idleness, as though they were judgment,
iudicium, respicere, ridiculum sit.
it would be ridiculous to respect.
Nam si hos in consilio habeas,
For if you have these people in counsel, it
non solum satius esse (relative)
would be better not only to speak briefly, relatively,
breviter dicere, sed omnino non dicere.
but not to speak at all.
Multae enim lites inde ortae sunt, in definiendis pulcre cogitandorum generibus brevitatem relativam poscentibus, § 167, quando aliquibus in tali genere 1) absoluta brevitas, non satis a relativa distincta, recte iudicabatur apprime necessaria, §§ 160, 166, 2) occurrebant casus speciales bene multi sub tali genere contenti poscentes simul brevitatem utique relativam, 3) gratior apud plerosque brevitas etiam relativa deprehendebatur universim. / For many disputes have arisen from this, in defining the kinds of things to be thought beautifully that require relative brevity, § 167: when to some people in such a kind 1) absolute brevity, not sufficiently distinguished from relative brevity, was rightly judged especially necessary, §§ 160, 166; 2) very many special cases contained under such a kind occurred that at the same time certainly required relative brevity; 3) even relative brevity was found generally more pleasing among most people.
Tunc enim aliis, 1) non distinctius, ac priores, brevitatem absolutam a relativa discernentibus tali thematum generi non tribuenda videbatur universim brevitas, quia 2) sub eiusmodi genere continebantur casus, ubi praevaricatio sit, cursim ac breviter (relative) attingere, quae sunt inculcanda, infigenda, repetenda, 3) brevitas (relativa) in tali thematum genere semper et promiscue non placeat, nisi inertibus, quorum delicias desidiamque, quasi iudicium, respicere, ridiculum sit. / Then, to others 1) not distinguishing absolute brevity from relative brevity more clearly than the former, brevity seemed not to be attributed universally to such a kind of themes, because 2) under such a kind were contained cases in which it is a dereliction to touch cursorily and briefly, that is relatively, on what must be driven home, fixed in, and repeated; 3) relative brevity in such a kind of themes does not always and indiscriminately please except the sluggish, whose delights and idleness, as though they were judgment, it would be ridiculous to respect.
Nam si hos in consilio habeas, non solum satius esse (relative) breviter dicere, sed omnino non dicere. / For if you have these people in counsel, it would be better not only to speak briefly, relatively, but not to speak at all.
§ 169
Quoniam heic nondum methodus naturalis, quam mathematicam dicunt, principia sufficientia decidendarum eiusmodi controversiarum, § 168, anteponere tractationi praesenti permisit, aliquas tantum exempli loco videamus. I.
Since here the natural method, which they call mathematical, has not yet allowed sufficient principles for deciding controversies of this kind, § 168, to be placed before the present treatment, let us look at only some by way of example. I.
An in caussis agendis nihil aeque, ac brevitas placet?
"who admires in pleading nothing so much as brevity."
Haec est Pliniana l.c. quaestio, cui nostris temporibus adiungamus similem quaestionem de sacris ex suggestu habendis orationibus. R. Absoluta brevitas, § 160, sed rotunda, § 166, est una ex primis utrarumque dotibus, neque tamen primaria, poscens in aliquibus relativam etiam per omnia, in aliis, qua quasdam partes, § 167. In omnibus autem non potest, multo minus in singulis omnium partibus potest haec relativa ferri, tantum abest, ut laudari, tantum abest, ut tanquam iucundissima, possit aestimari a severo, licet non moroso, iudice. § 168.
This is Pliny's question in the cited place; to it in our times let us add the similar question about sacred orations to be delivered from the pulpit. Answer: absolute brevity, § 160, but rounded, § 166, is one of the first excellences of both, though not the primary one; in some cases it requires relative brevity throughout, in others relative brevity as to certain parts, § 167. But in all cases, and much less in each single part of all cases, this relative brevity cannot be borne, so far is it from being praised, so far from being able to be judged most pleasant by a severe, although not morose, judge, § 168.
Quoniam heic nondum methodus naturalis, quam mathematicam dicunt, principia sufficientia decidendarum eiusmodi controversiarum, § 168, anteponere tractationi praesenti permisit, aliquas tantum exempli loco videamus.
Since here the natural method, which they call mathematical, has not yet allowed sufficient principles for deciding controversies of this kind, § 168, to be placed before the present treatment, let us look at only some by way of example.
I.
I.
An in caussis agendis nihil aeque, ac brevitas placet?
"who admires in pleading nothing so much as brevity."
Haec est Pliniana l.c. quaestio, cui nostris temporibus adiungamus similem quaestionem de sacris ex suggestu habendis orationibus.
This is Pliny's question in the cited place; to it in our times let us add the similar question about sacred orations to be delivered from the pulpit.
R. Absoluta brevitas, § 160, sed rotunda, § 166, est una ex primis utrarumque dotibus, neque tamen primaria, poscens in aliquibus relativam etiam per omnia, in aliis, qua quasdam partes, § 167. In omnibus autem non potest, multo minus in singulis omnium partibus potest haec relativa ferri, tantum abest, ut laudari, tantum abest, ut tanquam iucundissima, possit aestimari a severo, licet non moroso, iudice. § 168.
Answer: absolute brevity, § 160, but rounded, § 166, is one of the first excellences of both, though not the primary one; in some cases it requires relative brevity throughout, in others relative brevity as to certain parts, § 167. But in all cases, and much less in each single part of all cases, this relative brevity cannot be borne, so far is it from being praised, so far from being able to be judged most pleasant by a severe, although not morose, judge, § 168.
Quoniam heic nondum methodus naturalis, quam mathematicam
Since here the natural method, which they call mathematical,
dicunt, principia sufficientia decidendarum eiusmodi controversiarum,
has not yet allowed sufficient principles for deciding controversies
§ 168, anteponere tractationi praesenti
of this kind, § 168, to be placed before the present treatment,
permisit, aliquas tantum exempli loco videamus.
let us look at only some by way of example.
I.
I.
An in caussis agendis nihil aeque, ac brevitas placet?
"who admires in pleading nothing so much as brevity."
Haec est Pliniana l.c. quaestio,
This is Pliny's question in the cited place;
cui nostris temporibus adiungamus
to it in our times let us add the
similem quaestionem de sacris ex suggestu habendis orationibus.
similar question about sacred orations to be delivered from the pulpit.
R. Absoluta brevitas, § 160, sed rotunda, § 166,
Answer: absolute brevity, § 160, but rounded, § 166,
est una ex primis utrarumque dotibus,
is one of the first excellences of both, though
neque tamen primaria, poscens in aliquibus relativam etiam per
not the primary one; in some cases it requires relative brevity throughout,
omnia, in aliis, qua quasdam partes, § 167.
in others relative brevity as to certain parts, § 167.
In omnibus autem non potest,
But in all cases, and much
multo minus in singulis omnium partibus potest
less in each single part of all cases,
haec relativa ferri, tantum abest,
this relative brevity cannot be borne, so far is it
ut laudari, tantum abest,
from being praised, so far from being able
ut tanquam iucundissima, possit aestimari a severo, licet non moroso, iudice.
to be judged most pleasant by a severe, although not morose, judge,
§ 168.
§ 168.
Quoniam heic nondum methodus naturalis, quam mathematicam dicunt, principia sufficientia decidendarum eiusmodi controversiarum, § 168, anteponere tractationi praesenti permisit, aliquas tantum exempli loco videamus. / Since here the natural method, which they call mathematical, has not yet allowed sufficient principles for deciding controversies of this kind, § 168, to be placed before the present treatment, let us look at only some by way of example.
I. / I.
An in caussis agendis nihil aeque, ac brevitas placet?
"who admires in pleading nothing so much as brevity."
Haec est Pliniana l.c. quaestio, cui nostris temporibus adiungamus similem quaestionem de sacris ex suggestu habendis orationibus. / This is Pliny's question in the cited place; to it in our times let us add the similar question about sacred orations to be delivered from the pulpit.
R. Absoluta brevitas, § 160, sed rotunda, § 166, est una ex primis utrarumque dotibus, neque tamen primaria, poscens in aliquibus relativam etiam per omnia, in aliis, qua quasdam partes, § 167. In omnibus autem non potest, multo minus in singulis omnium partibus potest haec relativa ferri, tantum abest, ut laudari, tantum abest, ut tanquam iucundissima, possit aestimari a severo, licet non moroso, iudice. § 168. / Answer: absolute brevity, § 160, but rounded, § 166, is one of the first excellences of both, though not the primary one; in some cases it requires relative brevity throughout, in others relative brevity as to certain parts, § 167. But in all cases, and much less in each single part of all cases, this relative brevity cannot be borne, so far is it from being praised, so far from being able to be judged most pleasant by a severe, although not morose, judge, § 168.
§ 170
II.) An narrationem oportet esse brevem? Iam Aristoteles ab Isocrate dissentit praeceptum brevitatis irridens, tanquam necesse sit, longam aut brevem esse expositionem, ne liceat ire per medium. Theodori quoque scholae negant, quia nec breviter utique, nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere. Quint. IIII. 2. Cicero facit cum Isocrate,
II. "Must narration be brief?" Already Aristotle disagrees with Isocrates, mocking the precept of brevity as though an exposition must be long or brief and it were not permitted to go by the middle way. The schools of Theodorus also deny it, because it is not always useful to expound either briefly, surely, or lucidly. Quintilian IIII.2. Cicero sides with Isocrates,
et adhuc sub iudice lis est.
"and the controversy still waits the determination of a judge."
Id certum est absolutam brevitatem in narrationibus bene multis maiorem brevitatem relativam postulare, ac in aliis aliquibus orationis partibus, §§ 160, 167. Relativae enim brevitatis denuo dantur gradus, § 167. Recte Quintilianus l.c. brevitatem narrationis oratori suadens, tamen:
This is certain: absolute brevity in very many narrations requires a greater relative brevity than in some other parts of an oration, §§ 160, 167. For there are again degrees of relative brevity, § 167. Quintilian, in the cited place, rightly advises the orator to brevity of narration; nevertheless, he says,
Vitanda est, inquit, illa Sallustiana brevitas, quamquam in ipso virtutis obtinet locum, et abruptum sermonis genus, § 159, quod otiosum fortasse lectorem minus fallat, audientem transvolat, nec dum repetatur, exspectat.
"We must therefore avoid even the famous terseness of Sallust (though in his case of course it is a merit), and shun all abruptness of speech, since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again;"
e.c.
§ 159, "which perhaps misleads a leisurely reader less, but flies past a hearer, and does not wait until it is repeated," etc.
II.) An narrationem oportet esse brevem?
II. "Must narration be brief?"
Iam Aristoteles ab Isocrate dissentit praeceptum brevitatis irridens, tanquam necesse sit, longam aut brevem esse expositionem, ne liceat ire per medium.
Already Aristotle disagrees with Isocrates, mocking the precept of brevity as though an exposition must be long or brief and it were not permitted to go by the middle way.
Theodori quoque scholae negant, quia nec breviter utique, nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere.
The schools of Theodorus also deny it, because it is not always useful to expound either briefly, surely, or lucidly.
Quint. IIII. 2.
Quintilian IIII.2.
Cicero facit cum Isocrate,
Cicero sides with Isocrates,
et adhuc sub iudice lis est.
"and the controversy still waits the determination of a judge."
Id certum est absolutam brevitatem in narrationibus bene multis maiorem brevitatem relativam postulare, ac in aliis aliquibus orationis partibus, §§ 160, 167. Relativae enim brevitatis denuo dantur gradus, § 167. Recte Quintilianus l.c. brevitatem narrationis oratori suadens, tamen:
This is certain: absolute brevity in very many narrations requires a greater relative brevity than in some other parts of an oration, §§ 160, 167. For there are again degrees of relative brevity, § 167. Quintilian, in the cited place, rightly advises the orator to brevity of narration; nevertheless, he says,
Vitanda est, inquit, illa Sallustiana brevitas, quamquam in ipso virtutis obtinet locum, et abruptum sermonis genus, § 159, quod otiosum fortasse lectorem minus fallat, audientem transvolat, nec dum repetatur, exspectat.
"We must therefore avoid even the famous terseness of Sallust (though in his case of course it is a merit), and shun all abruptness of speech, since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again;"
e.c.
§ 159, "which perhaps misleads a leisurely reader less, but flies past a hearer, and does not wait until it is repeated," etc.
II.) An narrationem oportet esse brevem?
II. "Must narration be brief?"
Iam Aristoteles ab Isocrate dissentit praeceptum brevitatis irridens,
Already Aristotle disagrees with Isocrates, mocking the precept of brevity as
tanquam necesse sit, longam aut brevem esse expositionem,
though an exposition must be long or brief and it were not
ne liceat ire per medium.
permitted to go by the middle way.
Theodori quoque scholae negant,
The schools of Theodorus also deny it,
quia nec breviter utique, nec dilucide semper sit
because it is not always useful to expound either briefly,
utile exponere.
surely, or lucidly.
Quint. IIII. 2.
Quintilian IIII.2.
Cicero facit cum Isocrate,
Cicero sides with Isocrates,
et adhuc sub iudice lis est.
"and the controversy still waits the determination of a judge."
Id certum est absolutam brevitatem in
This is certain: absolute brevity in very many
narrationibus bene multis maiorem brevitatem relativam postulare,
narrations requires a greater relative brevity
ac in aliis aliquibus orationis partibus, §§ 160, 167.
than in some other parts of an oration, §§ 160, 167.
Relativae enim brevitatis denuo dantur gradus, § 167.
For there are again degrees of relative brevity, § 167.
Recte Quintilianus l.c.
Quintilian, in the cited place, rightly advises the orator
brevitatem narrationis oratori suadens, tamen:
to brevity of narration; nevertheless, he says,
Vitanda est, inquit, illa Sallustiana brevitas, quamquam in ipso virtutis obtinet locum, et abruptum sermonis genus, § 159, quod otiosum fortasse lectorem minus fallat, audientem transvolat, nec dum repetatur, exspectat.
"We must therefore avoid even the famous terseness of Sallust (though in his case of course it is a merit), and shun all abruptness of speech, since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again;"
e.c.
§ 159, "which perhaps misleads a leisurely reader less, but flies past a hearer, and does not wait until it is repeated," etc.
II.) An narrationem oportet esse brevem? / II. "Must narration be brief?"
Iam Aristoteles ab Isocrate dissentit praeceptum brevitatis irridens, tanquam necesse sit, longam aut brevem esse expositionem, ne liceat ire per medium. / Already Aristotle disagrees with Isocrates, mocking the precept of brevity as though an exposition must be long or brief and it were not permitted to go by the middle way.
Theodori quoque scholae negant, quia nec breviter utique, nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere. / The schools of Theodorus also deny it, because it is not always useful to expound either briefly, surely, or lucidly.
Quint. IIII. 2. / Quintilian IIII.2.
Cicero facit cum Isocrate, / Cicero sides with Isocrates,
et adhuc sub iudice lis est.
"and the controversy still waits the determination of a judge."
Id certum est absolutam brevitatem in narrationibus bene multis maiorem brevitatem relativam postulare, ac in aliis aliquibus orationis partibus, §§ 160, 167. Relativae enim brevitatis denuo dantur gradus, § 167. Recte Quintilianus l.c. brevitatem narrationis oratori suadens, tamen: / This is certain: absolute brevity in very many narrations requires a greater relative brevity than in some other parts of an oration, §§ 160, 167. For there are again degrees of relative brevity, § 167. Quintilian, in the cited place, rightly advises the orator to brevity of narration; nevertheless, he says,
Vitanda est, inquit, illa Sallustiana brevitas, quamquam in ipso virtutis obtinet locum, et abruptum sermonis genus, § 159, quod otiosum fortasse lectorem minus fallat, audientem transvolat, nec dum repetatur, exspectat.
"We must therefore avoid even the famous terseness of Sallust (though in his case of course it is a merit), and shun all abruptness of speech, since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again;"
e.c. / § 159, "which perhaps misleads a leisurely reader less, but flies past a hearer, and does not wait until it is repeated," etc.
§ 171
Occasione brevis narrationis Cicero lepidum et satis usitatum perstringit errorem, quando:
On the occasion of brief narration Cicero touches on a witty and quite common error of relative brevity when he says:
Multos, ait, imitatio decipit brevitatis, (relativae) ut, dum se breves putent esse, longissimi sint, quia dent operam, ut res multas breviter dicant, non, ut omnino paucas res dicant, et non plures, quam necesse sit.
"the imitation of brevity takes in many people, so that, when they think that they are being brief, they are exceedingly prolix, while they are taking pains to say many things with brevity, not absolutely to say but few things and no more than are necessary."
de Inv. I. 28. Exemplum ibi profert, quale est et in Quint. l.c. Meo concipiendi modo dicerem studium relativae brevitatis cum neglectu absolutae, longissimam quasi brevitatem, non solas orationes deturpantem. (longissimum quasi laconismum.)
De inventione I.28. He brings forward an example there, of the sort that is also in Quintilian, cited place. In my way of conceiving it, I would call the pursuit of relative brevity with neglect of absolute brevity a very long quasi-brevity, disfiguring not speeches alone: a very long quasi-laconism.
Occasione brevis narrationis Cicero lepidum et satis usitatum perstringit errorem, quando:
On the occasion of brief narration Cicero touches on a witty and quite common error of relative brevity when he says:
Multos, ait, imitatio decipit brevitatis, (relativae) ut, dum se breves putent esse, longissimi sint, quia dent operam, ut res multas breviter dicant, non, ut omnino paucas res dicant, et non plures, quam necesse sit.
"the imitation of brevity takes in many people, so that, when they think that they are being brief, they are exceedingly prolix, while they are taking pains to say many things with brevity, not absolutely to say but few things and no more than are necessary."
de Inv.
De inventione I.28.
I. 28. Exemplum ibi profert, quale est et in Quint. l.c. Meo concipiendi modo dicerem studium relativae brevitatis cum neglectu absolutae, longissimam quasi brevitatem, non solas orationes deturpantem. (longissimum quasi laconismum.)
He brings forward an example there, of the sort that is also in Quintilian, cited place. In my way of conceiving it, I would call the pursuit of relative brevity with neglect of absolute brevity a very long quasi-brevity, disfiguring not speeches alone: a very long quasi-laconism.
Occasione brevis narrationis Cicero lepidum
On the occasion of brief narration Cicero touches on
et satis usitatum perstringit errorem,
a witty and quite common error
quando:
of relative brevity when he says:
Multos, ait, imitatio decipit brevitatis, (relativae) ut, dum se breves putent esse, longissimi sint, quia dent operam, ut res multas breviter dicant, non, ut omnino paucas res dicant, et non plures, quam necesse sit.
"the imitation of brevity takes in many people, so that, when they think that they are being brief, they are exceedingly prolix, while they are taking pains to say many things with brevity, not absolutely to say but few things and no more than are necessary."
de Inv.
De inventione I.28.
I. 28. Exemplum ibi profert,
He brings forward an example there, of
quale est et in Quint. l.c.
the sort that is also in Quintilian, cited place.
Meo concipiendi modo
In my way of conceiving it,
dicerem studium relativae brevitatis cum neglectu absolutae,
I would call the pursuit of relative brevity with neglect of absolute
longissimam quasi brevitatem, non solas orationes
brevity a very long quasi-brevity, disfiguring not speeches alone:
deturpantem. (longissimum quasi laconismum.)
a very long quasi-laconism.
Occasione brevis narrationis Cicero lepidum et satis usitatum perstringit errorem, quando: / On the occasion of brief narration Cicero touches on a witty and quite common error of relative brevity when he says:
Multos, ait, imitatio decipit brevitatis, (relativae) ut, dum se breves putent esse, longissimi sint, quia dent operam, ut res multas breviter dicant, non, ut omnino paucas res dicant, et non plures, quam necesse sit.
"the imitation of brevity takes in many people, so that, when they think that they are being brief, they are exceedingly prolix, while they are taking pains to say many things with brevity, not absolutely to say but few things and no more than are necessary."
de Inv. / De inventione I.28.
I. 28. Exemplum ibi profert, quale est et in Quint. l.c. Meo concipiendi modo dicerem studium relativae brevitatis cum neglectu absolutae, longissimam quasi brevitatem, non solas orationes deturpantem. (longissimum quasi laconismum.) / He brings forward an example there, of the sort that is also in Quintilian, cited place. In my way of conceiving it, I would call the pursuit of relative brevity with neglect of absolute brevity a very long quasi-brevity, disfiguring not speeches alone: a very long quasi-laconism.
§ 172
Vidisse tamen et Ciceronem verum in sententia brevitatem relativam in narrando non omnino probantium, docet l. de Or. III. 202, ubi suadet aliquando adhibere
Yet that Cicero also saw what was true in the opinion of those not wholly approving relative brevity in narration is taught by De oratore III.202, where he advises that sometimes there be used
commorationem una in re permultum moventem et illustrem explanationem, rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub adspectum paene subiectionem,
"For dwelling on a single circumstance often has a considerable effect; and a clear illustration and exhibition of matters to the eye of the audience, almost as if they were transacted before them."
quae et in exponenda re, § 170, plurimum valeat, et ad illustrandum id, quod exponitur, et ad amplificandum, ut iis, qui audiunt illud, quod augebimus, quantum efficere oratio poterit, tantum esse videatur, § 116; aliquando autem praecisionem (brevitatem relativam) et
This has very great force both in setting forth a matter, § 170, and for illustrating what is set forth, and for amplifying it, so that to those who hear, the thing that we are enlarging may seem as great as speech can make it, § 116. But sometimes he recommends "cutting-off" – relative brevity – and
plus ad intelligendum, quam dixeris, significationem, et disiuncte concisam brevitatem et extenuationem,
"There is also intimation that more is to be understood than you have expressed; distinct and concise brevity; and extenuation"
e.c. utramque referens ad figuras sententiae, § 26.
etc., referring both to figures of thought, § 26.
Vidisse tamen et Ciceronem verum in sententia brevitatem relativam in narrando non omnino probantium, docet l. de Or. III. 202, ubi suadet aliquando adhibere
Yet that Cicero also saw what was true in the opinion of those not wholly approving relative brevity in narration is taught by De oratore III.202, where he advises that sometimes there be used
commorationem una in re permultum moventem et illustrem explanationem, rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub adspectum paene subiectionem,
"For dwelling on a single circumstance often has a considerable effect; and a clear illustration and exhibition of matters to the eye of the audience, almost as if they were transacted before them."
quae et in exponenda re, § 170, plurimum valeat, et ad illustrandum id, quod exponitur, et ad amplificandum, ut iis, qui audiunt illud, quod augebimus, quantum efficere oratio poterit, tantum esse videatur, § 116; aliquando autem praecisionem (brevitatem relativam) et
This has very great force both in setting forth a matter, § 170, and for illustrating what is set forth, and for amplifying it, so that to those who hear, the thing that we are enlarging may seem as great as speech can make it, § 116. But sometimes he recommends "cutting-off" – relative brevity – and
plus ad intelligendum, quam dixeris, significationem, et disiuncte concisam brevitatem et extenuationem,
"There is also intimation that more is to be understood than you have expressed; distinct and concise brevity; and extenuation"
e.c. utramque referens ad figuras sententiae, § 26.
etc., referring both to figures of thought, § 26.
Vidisse tamen et Ciceronem verum
Yet that Cicero also saw what was true
in sententia brevitatem relativam
in the opinion of those not wholly approving relative
in narrando non omnino probantium, docet l. de Or.
brevity in narration is taught by De oratore
III. 202, ubi suadet aliquando adhibere
III.202, where he advises that sometimes there be used
commorationem una in re permultum moventem et illustrem explanationem, rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub adspectum paene subiectionem,
"For dwelling on a single circumstance often has a considerable effect; and a clear illustration and exhibition of matters to the eye of the audience, almost as if they were transacted before them."
quae et in exponenda re,
This has very great force both in setting forth
§ 170, plurimum valeat, et ad illustrandum id,
a matter, § 170, and for illustrating what is
quod exponitur, et ad amplificandum, ut iis,
set forth, and for amplifying it, so that to those
qui audiunt illud, quod augebimus,
who hear, the thing that we are enlarging
quantum efficere oratio poterit, tantum esse videatur, § 116;
may seem as great as speech can make it, § 116.
aliquando autem praecisionem (brevitatem relativam) et
But sometimes he recommends "cutting-off" – relative brevity – and
plus ad intelligendum, quam dixeris, significationem, et disiuncte concisam brevitatem et extenuationem,
"There is also intimation that more is to be understood than you have expressed; distinct and concise brevity; and extenuation"
e.c. utramque referens ad figuras sententiae, § 26.
etc., referring both to figures of thought, § 26.
Vidisse tamen et Ciceronem verum in sententia brevitatem relativam in narrando non omnino probantium, docet l. de Or. III. 202, ubi suadet aliquando adhibere / Yet that Cicero also saw what was true in the opinion of those not wholly approving relative brevity in narration is taught by De oratore III.202, where he advises that sometimes there be used
commorationem una in re permultum moventem et illustrem explanationem, rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub adspectum paene subiectionem,
"For dwelling on a single circumstance often has a considerable effect; and a clear illustration and exhibition of matters to the eye of the audience, almost as if they were transacted before them."
quae et in exponenda re, § 170, plurimum valeat, et ad illustrandum id, quod exponitur, et ad amplificandum, ut iis, qui audiunt illud, quod augebimus, quantum efficere oratio poterit, tantum esse videatur, § 116; aliquando autem praecisionem (brevitatem relativam) et / This has very great force both in setting forth a matter, § 170, and for illustrating what is set forth, and for amplifying it, so that to those who hear, the thing that we are enlarging may seem as great as speech can make it, § 116. But sometimes he recommends "cutting-off" – relative brevity – and
plus ad intelligendum, quam dixeris, significationem, et disiuncte concisam brevitatem et extenuationem,
"There is also intimation that more is to be understood than you have expressed; distinct and concise brevity; and extenuation"
e.c. utramque referens ad figuras sententiae, § 26. / etc., referring both to figures of thought, § 26.
§ 173
Neque moror graeculorum quorundam distinctionem inter circumcisam expositionem, i.e. syntomon, et brevem, quando illa supervacuis carens, i.e. vere et absolute brevis, § 160, haec definitur, ut quae possit aliquid ex necessariis desiderare, quoniam haec, nisi de verbis litigare iuverit, vitium est, §§ 158, 159, nomine brevitatis, quae virtus est, §§ 160, 167, prorsus indigna. Quint. l.c. Alias distinctionem inter concisum distincte ratiocinandi genus et syntomon ex una, ac brevitatem aestheticorum rotundam, § 166, relativam etiam, § 167, ex altera parte lubens concedo. §§ 121, 122.
Nor do I linger over the distinction of certain Greeklings between a "circumcised exposition," that is, syntomon, and a brief one, when the former, lacking superfluities, that is, truly and absolutely brief, § 160, is defined in such a way that the latter may lack something from the necessary things. For this latter, unless one delights in quarreling about words, is a fault, §§ 158, 159, utterly unworthy of the name of brevity, which is a virtue, §§ 160, 167. Quintilian, cited place. Otherwise, I freely concede a distinction between a concise, distinctly reasoning kind and syntomon on the one side, and the rounded brevity of aesthetic matters, § 166, even relative brevity, § 167, on the other. §§ 121, 122.
Neque moror graeculorum quorundam distinctionem inter circumcisam expositionem, i.e. syntomon, et brevem, quando illa supervacuis carens, i.e. vere et absolute brevis, § 160, haec definitur, ut quae possit aliquid ex necessariis desiderare, quoniam haec, nisi de verbis litigare iuverit, vitium est, §§ 158, 159, nomine brevitatis, quae virtus est, §§ 160, 167, prorsus indigna.
Nor do I linger over the distinction of certain Greeklings between a "circumcised exposition," that is, syntomon, and a brief one, when the former, lacking superfluities, that is, truly and absolutely brief, § 160, is defined in such a way that the latter may lack something from the necessary things. For this latter, unless one delights in quarreling about words, is a fault, §§ 158, 159, utterly unworthy of the name of brevity, which is a virtue, §§ 160, 167. Quintilian, cited place.
Quint. l.c. Alias distinctionem inter concisum distincte ratiocinandi genus et syntomon ex una, ac brevitatem aestheticorum rotundam, § 166, relativam etiam, § 167, ex altera parte lubens concedo. §§ 121, 122.
Otherwise, I freely concede a distinction between a concise, distinctly reasoning kind and syntomon on the one side, and the rounded brevity of aesthetic matters, § 166, even relative brevity, § 167, on the other. §§ 121, 122.
Neque moror graeculorum quorundam distinctionem inter
Nor do I linger over the distinction of certain
circumcisam expositionem, i.e.
Greeklings between a "circumcised exposition," that
syntomon, et brevem, quando illa
is, syntomon, and a brief one, when the former,
supervacuis carens, i.e. vere et absolute brevis, § 160,
lacking superfluities, that is, truly and absolutely brief, § 160,
haec definitur, ut quae possit
is defined in such a way that the latter
aliquid ex necessariis desiderare,
may lack something from the necessary things.
quoniam haec, nisi de verbis litigare iuverit,
For this latter, unless one delights in quarreling about words,
vitium est, §§ 158, 159,
is a fault, §§ 158, 159,
nomine brevitatis, quae virtus est,
utterly unworthy of the name of brevity, which is
§§ 160, 167, prorsus indigna.
a virtue, §§ 160, 167. Quintilian, cited place.
Quint. l.c. Alias distinctionem inter concisum
Otherwise, I freely concede a distinction between a concise,
distincte ratiocinandi genus et syntomon ex una,
distinctly reasoning kind and syntomon on the one side,
ac brevitatem aestheticorum rotundam, § 166,
and the rounded brevity of aesthetic matters, § 166,
relativam etiam, § 167, ex altera parte lubens concedo. §§ 121, 122.
even relative brevity, § 167, on the other. §§ 121, 122.
Neque moror graeculorum quorundam distinctionem inter circumcisam expositionem, i.e. syntomon, et brevem, quando illa supervacuis carens, i.e. vere et absolute brevis, § 160, haec definitur, ut quae possit aliquid ex necessariis desiderare, quoniam haec, nisi de verbis litigare iuverit, vitium est, §§ 158, 159, nomine brevitatis, quae virtus est, §§ 160, 167, prorsus indigna. / Nor do I linger over the distinction of certain Greeklings between a "circumcised exposition," that is, syntomon, and a brief one, when the former, lacking superfluities, that is, truly and absolutely brief, § 160, is defined in such a way that the latter may lack something from the necessary things. For this latter, unless one delights in quarreling about words, is a fault, §§ 158, 159, utterly unworthy of the name of brevity, which is a virtue, §§ 160, 167. Quintilian, cited place.
Quint. l.c. Alias distinctionem inter concisum distincte ratiocinandi genus et syntomon ex una, ac brevitatem aestheticorum rotundam, § 166, relativam etiam, § 167, ex altera parte lubens concedo. §§ 121, 122. / Otherwise, I freely concede a distinction between a concise, distinctly reasoning kind and syntomon on the one side, and the rounded brevity of aesthetic matters, § 166, even relative brevity, § 167, on the other. §§ 121, 122.
§ 174
III. Maior iam consensus criticorum est brevitatem relativam requiri in sententiis.
III. There is now greater agreement among critics that relative brevity is required in maxims.
Quicquid praecipies, esto brevis; ut cito dicta Percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles; Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat.
"Whatever precepts you give, be concise; that docile minds may soon
comprehend what is said, and faithfully retain it. All superfluous
instructions flow from the too full memory."
Hor. A.P. 335.
Horace, Ars poetica 335.
Est brevitate opus, et currat sententia, neu se Impediat verbis lassas onerantibus aures.
"There is need of conciseness that the sentence may run, and not embarrass itself with verbiage, that overloads the sated ear;"
Serm. I. 10.
Sermones I.10.
Brevitas non modo senatoris, sed etiam oratoris magna laus est in sententia.
"brevity in parliamentary oratory, and all kinds of oratory, is the best recommendation of a speech."
Cic. de leg. III. 40. Amatores quidem multis iam ante Ciceronem saeculis et Philisto Syracusio defuerunt; et ipsi Thucididi, quia eorum concisis sententiis, §§ 121, 122, interdum etiam non satis apertis cum brevitate, tum nimio acumine officit Theopompus. Cic. de claris or. 66. Neque tamen paucos amatores Thucididi, ipsique Tacito, conciliavit grata posteritas et fatum eorum scripta servans, dum alia
Cicero, De legibus III.40. Certainly lovers were lacking, already many centuries before Cicero, even to Philistus of Syracuse, and to Thucydides himself, because Theopompus harms by their concise maxims, §§ 121, 122, sometimes not sufficiently open, both with brevity and with excessive sharpness. Cicero, De claris oratoribus 66. Yet grateful posterity and the fate that preserved their writings have won no few lovers for Thucydides, and for Tacitus himself, while other writings it
Defert in vicum vendentem thus et odores, Et piper, et quicquid chartis amicitur ineptis.
"be conveyed into the street that sells frankincense, and spices, and pepper, and whatever is wrapped up in impertinent writings."
Interim Ciceronis observatio docebit ultimum modum esse brevitati relativae etiam in sententiis, § 170.
Meanwhile Cicero's observation will teach that there is an ultimate limit to relative brevity even in maxims, § 170.
III. Maior iam consensus criticorum est brevitatem relativam requiri in sententiis.
III. There is now greater agreement among critics that relative brevity is required in maxims.
Quicquid praecipies, esto brevis; ut cito dicta Percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles; Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat.
"Whatever precepts you give, be concise; that docile minds may soon
comprehend what is said, and faithfully retain it. All superfluous
instructions flow from the too full memory."
Hor. A.P. 335.
Horace, Ars poetica 335.
Est brevitate opus, et currat sententia, neu se Impediat verbis lassas onerantibus aures.
"There is need of conciseness that the sentence may run, and not embarrass itself with verbiage, that overloads the sated ear;"
Serm. I. 10.
Sermones I.10.
Brevitas non modo senatoris, sed etiam oratoris magna laus est in sententia.
"brevity in parliamentary oratory, and all kinds of oratory, is the best recommendation of a speech."
Cic. de leg.
Cicero, De legibus III.40.
III. 40. Amatores quidem multis iam ante Ciceronem saeculis et Philisto Syracusio defuerunt; et ipsi Thucididi, quia eorum concisis sententiis, §§ 121, 122, interdum etiam non satis apertis cum brevitate, tum nimio acumine officit Theopompus.
Certainly lovers were lacking, already many centuries before Cicero, even to Philistus of Syracuse, and to Thucydides himself, because Theopompus harms by their concise maxims, §§ 121, 122, sometimes not sufficiently open, both with brevity and with excessive sharpness.
Cic. de claris or. 66. Neque tamen paucos amatores Thucididi, ipsique Tacito, conciliavit grata posteritas et fatum eorum scripta servans, dum alia
Cicero, De claris oratoribus 66. Yet grateful posterity and the fate that preserved their writings have won no few lovers for Thucydides, and for Tacitus himself, while other writings it
Defert in vicum vendentem thus et odores, Et piper, et quicquid chartis amicitur ineptis.
"be conveyed into the street that sells frankincense, and spices, and pepper, and whatever is wrapped up in impertinent writings."
Interim Ciceronis observatio docebit ultimum modum esse brevitati relativae etiam in sententiis, § 170.
Meanwhile Cicero's observation will teach that there is an ultimate limit to relative brevity even in maxims, § 170.
III. Maior iam consensus criticorum est
III. There is now greater agreement among critics that
brevitatem relativam requiri in sententiis.
relative brevity is required in maxims.
Quicquid praecipies, esto brevis; ut cito dicta Percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles; Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat.
"Whatever precepts you give, be concise; that docile minds may soon
comprehend what is said, and faithfully retain it. All superfluous
instructions flow from the too full memory."
Hor. A.P. 335.
Horace, Ars poetica 335.
Est brevitate opus, et currat sententia, neu se Impediat verbis lassas onerantibus aures.
"There is need of conciseness that the sentence may run, and not embarrass itself with verbiage, that overloads the sated ear;"
Serm. I. 10.
Sermones I.10.
Brevitas non modo senatoris, sed etiam oratoris magna laus est in sententia.
"brevity in parliamentary oratory, and all kinds of oratory, is the best recommendation of a speech."
Cic. de leg.
Cicero, De legibus III.40.
III. 40. Amatores quidem multis iam ante Ciceronem
Certainly lovers were lacking, already many centuries before Cicero,
saeculis et Philisto Syracusio defuerunt;
even to Philistus of Syracuse,
et ipsi Thucididi, quia eorum concisis sententiis,
and to Thucydides himself, because Theopompus harms by their concise maxims,
§§ 121, 122, interdum etiam non satis apertis cum brevitate,
§§ 121, 122, sometimes not sufficiently open, both with brevity
tum nimio acumine officit Theopompus.
and with excessive sharpness.
Cic. de claris or. 66.
Cicero, De claris oratoribus 66. Yet
Neque tamen paucos amatores Thucididi, ipsique Tacito,
grateful posterity and the fate that preserved their writings have
conciliavit grata posteritas et fatum eorum scripta
won no few lovers for Thucydides, and for Tacitus himself,
servans, dum alia
while other writings it
Defert in vicum vendentem thus et odores, Et piper, et quicquid chartis amicitur ineptis.
"be conveyed into the street that sells frankincense, and spices, and pepper, and whatever is wrapped up in impertinent writings."
Interim Ciceronis observatio docebit ultimum modum esse
Meanwhile Cicero's observation will teach that there is an
brevitati relativae etiam in sententiis, § 170.
ultimate limit to relative brevity even in maxims, § 170.
III. Maior iam consensus criticorum est brevitatem relativam requiri in sententiis. / III. There is now greater agreement among critics that relative brevity is required in maxims.
Quicquid praecipies, esto brevis; ut cito dicta Percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles; Omne supervacuum pleno de pectore manat.
"Whatever precepts you give, be concise; that docile minds may soon
comprehend what is said, and faithfully retain it. All superfluous
instructions flow from the too full memory."
Hor. A.P. 335. / Horace, Ars poetica 335.
Est brevitate opus, et currat sententia, neu se Impediat verbis lassas onerantibus aures.
"There is need of conciseness that the sentence may run, and not embarrass itself with verbiage, that overloads the sated ear;"
Serm. I. 10. / Sermones I.10.
Brevitas non modo senatoris, sed etiam oratoris magna laus est in sententia.
"brevity in parliamentary oratory, and all kinds of oratory, is the best recommendation of a speech."
Cic. de leg. / Cicero, De legibus III.40.
III. 40. Amatores quidem multis iam ante Ciceronem saeculis et Philisto Syracusio defuerunt; et ipsi Thucididi, quia eorum concisis sententiis, §§ 121, 122, interdum etiam non satis apertis cum brevitate, tum nimio acumine officit Theopompus. / Certainly lovers were lacking, already many centuries before Cicero, even to Philistus of Syracuse, and to Thucydides himself, because Theopompus harms by their concise maxims, §§ 121, 122, sometimes not sufficiently open, both with brevity and with excessive sharpness.
Cic. de claris or. 66. Neque tamen paucos amatores Thucididi, ipsique Tacito, conciliavit grata posteritas et fatum eorum scripta servans, dum alia / Cicero, De claris oratoribus 66. Yet grateful posterity and the fate that preserved their writings have won no few lovers for Thucydides, and for Tacitus himself, while other writings it
Defert in vicum vendentem thus et odores, Et piper, et quicquid chartis amicitur ineptis.
"be conveyed into the street that sells frankincense, and spices, and pepper, and whatever is wrapped up in impertinent writings."
Interim Ciceronis observatio docebit ultimum modum esse brevitati relativae etiam in sententiis, § 170. / Meanwhile Cicero's observation will teach that there is an ultimate limit to relative brevity even in maxims, § 170.
§ 175
IV.
IV.
Acutior est atque velocior in urbanitate brevitas.
"On the other hand brevity in wit gives greater point and speed."
Quint. VI. 4. ubi quidem in sequentibus Marsi definitionem urbanitatis adducens:
Quintilian VI.4. There, indeed, in what follows, bringing forward Marsus' definition of urbanity – "Urbanity is a certain virtue compressed into a brief saying, most suitable for resisting or for attacking, according as each matter and person requires" – he adds:
Urbanitas est virtus quaedam in breve dictum coacta maxime idonea ad resistendum; vel lacessendum, pro ut quaeque res ac persona desiderat, addit: Cui brevitatis exceptionem detraxeris, omnes orationis virtutes complexa sit. Cur autem brevem esse voluerit Marsus, nescio. — Nec tamen iudicium Marsi hominis eruditissimi subtraham.
"Urbanity is a certain quality of language compressed into the limits of a brief saying and adapted to delight and move men to every kind of emotion, but specially suitable to resistance or attack according as the person or circumstances concerned may demand. But this definition, if we except the quality of brevity, includes all the virtues of oratory. ... Why he insisted on brevity being essential I do not know... However, out of respect to the judgment of Marsus, who was a man of the greatest learning, I will add"
Confirmat Marsi iudicium Horatius, simulque rationem videtur subinnuere, quando poscit sermonem
Horace confirms Marsus' judgment, and at the same time seems to hint at the reason, when he calls for speech
Interdum urbani parcentis viribus, atque Extenuantis eas consulto.
"now and then that of a graceful rallier that curbs the force of his
pleasantry and weakens it on purpose."
§§ 164, 172. Hor. Serm. I. 10.
§§ 164, 172. Horace, Sermones I.10.
IV.
IV.
Acutior est atque velocior in urbanitate brevitas.
"On the other hand brevity in wit gives greater point and speed."
Quint. VI. 4. ubi quidem in sequentibus Marsi definitionem urbanitatis adducens:
Quintilian VI.4. There, indeed, in what follows, bringing forward Marsus' definition of urbanity – "Urbanity is a certain virtue compressed into a brief saying, most suitable for resisting or for attacking, according as each matter and person requires" – he adds:
Urbanitas est virtus quaedam in breve dictum coacta maxime idonea ad resistendum; vel lacessendum, pro ut quaeque res ac persona desiderat, addit: Cui brevitatis exceptionem detraxeris, omnes orationis virtutes complexa sit. Cur autem brevem esse voluerit Marsus, nescio. — Nec tamen iudicium Marsi hominis eruditissimi subtraham.
"Urbanity is a certain quality of language compressed into the limits of a brief saying and adapted to delight and move men to every kind of emotion, but specially suitable to resistance or attack according as the person or circumstances concerned may demand. But this definition, if we except the quality of brevity, includes all the virtues of oratory. ... Why he insisted on brevity being essential I do not know... However, out of respect to the judgment of Marsus, who was a man of the greatest learning, I will add"
Confirmat Marsi iudicium Horatius, simulque rationem videtur subinnuere, quando poscit sermonem
Horace confirms Marsus' judgment, and at the same time seems to hint at the reason, when he calls for speech
Interdum urbani parcentis viribus, atque Extenuantis eas consulto.
"now and then that of a graceful rallier that curbs the force of his
pleasantry and weakens it on purpose."
§§ 164, 172. Hor. Serm. I. 10.
§§ 164, 172. Horace, Sermones I.10.
IV.
IV.
Acutior est atque velocior in urbanitate brevitas.
"On the other hand brevity in wit gives greater point and speed."
Quint. VI. 4.
Quintilian VI.4. There, indeed, in what follows,
ubi quidem
bringing forward Marsus' definition of urbanity – "Urbanity is
in sequentibus
a certain virtue compressed into a brief saying,
Marsi definitionem
most suitable for resisting or for attacking,
urbanitatis adducens:
according as each matter and person requires" – he adds:
Urbanitas est virtus quaedam in breve dictum coacta maxime idonea ad resistendum; vel lacessendum, pro ut quaeque res ac persona desiderat, addit: Cui brevitatis exceptionem detraxeris, omnes orationis virtutes complexa sit. Cur autem brevem esse voluerit Marsus, nescio. — Nec tamen iudicium Marsi hominis eruditissimi subtraham.
"Urbanity is a certain quality of language compressed into the limits of a brief saying and adapted to delight and move men to every kind of emotion, but specially suitable to resistance or attack according as the person or circumstances concerned may demand. But this definition, if we except the quality of brevity, includes all the virtues of oratory. ... Why he insisted on brevity being essential I do not know... However, out of respect to the judgment of Marsus, who was a man of the greatest learning, I will add"
Confirmat Marsi iudicium Horatius,
Horace confirms Marsus' judgment, and at the
simulque rationem videtur subinnuere,
same time seems to hint at the reason,
quando poscit sermonem
when he calls for speech
Interdum urbani parcentis viribus, atque Extenuantis eas consulto.
"now and then that of a graceful rallier that curbs the force of his
pleasantry and weakens it on purpose."
§§ 164, 172. Hor. Serm. I. 10.
§§ 164, 172. Horace, Sermones I.10.
IV. / IV.
Acutior est atque velocior in urbanitate brevitas.
"On the other hand brevity in wit gives greater point and speed."
Quint. VI. 4. ubi quidem in sequentibus Marsi definitionem urbanitatis adducens: / Quintilian VI.4. There, indeed, in what follows, bringing forward Marsus' definition of urbanity – "Urbanity is a certain virtue compressed into a brief saying, most suitable for resisting or for attacking, according as each matter and person requires" – he adds:
Urbanitas est virtus quaedam in breve dictum coacta maxime idonea ad resistendum; vel lacessendum, pro ut quaeque res ac persona desiderat, addit: Cui brevitatis exceptionem detraxeris, omnes orationis virtutes complexa sit. Cur autem brevem esse voluerit Marsus, nescio. — Nec tamen iudicium Marsi hominis eruditissimi subtraham.
"Urbanity is a certain quality of language compressed into the limits of a brief saying and adapted to delight and move men to every kind of emotion, but specially suitable to resistance or attack according as the person or circumstances concerned may demand. But this definition, if we except the quality of brevity, includes all the virtues of oratory. ... Why he insisted on brevity being essential I do not know... However, out of respect to the judgment of Marsus, who was a man of the greatest learning, I will add"
Confirmat Marsi iudicium Horatius, simulque rationem videtur subinnuere, quando poscit sermonem / Horace confirms Marsus' judgment, and at the same time seems to hint at the reason, when he calls for speech
Interdum urbani parcentis viribus, atque Extenuantis eas consulto.
"now and then that of a graceful rallier that curbs the force of his
pleasantry and weakens it on purpose."
§§ 164, 172. Hor. Serm. I. 10. / §§ 164, 172. Horace, Sermones I.10.