§ 176
Breviter: Para opes, S. VIII, unde possunt expectari, S. VIIII, unde sumpseris, parum curaverim, S. X; para tu modo, S. XI, fodes, S. XII, paratas exhibe rotunda brevitate, S. XIII, meditationique tua posthinc commemorandarum venustatum, § 22, non immemor,
Briefly: prepare resources, Section VIII, from where they can be expected, Section VIIII; from where you have taken them I shall have cared little, Section X. Only prepare them, Section XI; dig them up, Section XII; display them, once prepared, with rounded brevity, Section XIII; and for your meditation, not forgetful of the charms to be commemorated hereafter, § 22,
Conveniet voto longa, § 116, brevisque, S. XIIII, meo.
"With every size my passion does agree,
And tall and short are both alike to me."
Ov.
Ovid.
Breviter: Para opes, S. VIII, unde possunt expectari, S. VIIII, unde sumpseris, parum curaverim, S. X; para tu modo, S. XI, fodes, S. XII, paratas exhibe rotunda brevitate, S. XIII, meditationique tua posthinc commemorandarum venustatum, § 22, non immemor,
Briefly: prepare resources, Section VIII, from where they can be expected, Section VIIII; from where you have taken them I shall have cared little, Section X. Only prepare them, Section XI; dig them up, Section XII; display them, once prepared, with rounded brevity, Section XIII; and for your meditation, not forgetful of the charms to be commemorated hereafter, § 22,
Conveniet voto longa, § 116, brevisque, S. XIIII, meo.
"With every size my passion does agree,
And tall and short are both alike to me."
Ov.
Ovid.
Breviter: Para opes, S. VIII, unde possunt expectari,
Briefly: prepare resources, Section VIII, from where they can be expected,
S. VIIII, unde sumpseris,
Section VIIII; from where you have taken
parum curaverim, S. X; para
them I shall have cared little, Section X.
tu modo, S. XI, fodes, S. XII, paratas
Only prepare them, Section XI; dig them up, Section XII;
exhibe rotunda brevitate, S. XIII,
display them, once prepared, with rounded brevity, Section XIII;
meditationique tua posthinc
and for your meditation, not forgetful of the charms
commemorandarum venustatum, § 22, non immemor,
to be commemorated hereafter, § 22,
Conveniet voto longa, § 116, brevisque, S. XIIII, meo.
"With every size my passion does agree,
And tall and short are both alike to me."
Ov.
Ovid.
Breviter: Para opes, S. VIII, unde possunt expectari, S. VIIII, unde sumpseris, parum curaverim, S. X; para tu modo, S. XI, fodes, S. XII, paratas exhibe rotunda brevitate, S. XIII, meditationique tua posthinc commemorandarum venustatum, § 22, non immemor, / Briefly: prepare resources, Section VIII, from where they can be expected, Section VIIII; from where you have taken them I shall have cared little, Section X. Only prepare them, Section XI; dig them up, Section XII; display them, once prepared, with rounded brevity, Section XIII; and for your meditation, not forgetful of the charms to be commemorated hereafter, § 22,
Conveniet voto longa, § 116, brevisque, S. XIIII, meo.
"With every size my passion does agree,
And tall and short are both alike to me."
Ov. / Ovid.
§ 177
Secunda cura sit in rebus venuste cogitandis § 115 magnitudo, M. § 515, sed aesthetica, quo nomine 1) pondus obiectorum, § 18, et gravitatem, M. § 166, 2) proportionatarum obiectis cogitationum, 3) cum foecunditate utrorumque, M. § 166, complectamur. § 22.
The second care in matters to be thought gracefully, § 115, should be magnitude, Metaphysics § 515, but aesthetic magnitude. By this name we include 1) the weight of objects, § 18, and gravity, Metaphysics § 166; 2) thoughts proportioned to the objects; 3) together with the fruitfulness of both, Metaphysics § 166. § 22.
Illud vere magnum, quod subinde cogitandum considerandumque nobis occurrit (polle he anatheoresis), quod vix, ac ne vix quidem, animo excidere potest, sed constanti, firma, et indelebili memoria retinetur.
"For what is truly great gives abundant food for thought: it is irksome, nay, impossible, to resist its effect; the memory of it is stubborn and indelible."
Longinus. S. VI.
– polle he anatheoresis – Longinus, Section VI.
Secunda cura sit in rebus venuste cogitandis § 115 magnitudo, M. § 515, sed aesthetica, quo nomine 1) pondus obiectorum, § 18, et gravitatem, M. § 166, 2) proportionatarum obiectis cogitationum, 3) cum foecunditate utrorumque, M. § 166, complectamur. § 22.
The second care in matters to be thought gracefully, § 115, should be magnitude, Metaphysics § 515, but aesthetic magnitude. By this name we include 1) the weight of objects, § 18, and gravity, Metaphysics § 166; 2) thoughts proportioned to the objects; 3) together with the fruitfulness of both, Metaphysics § 166. § 22.
Illud vere magnum, quod subinde cogitandum considerandumque nobis occurrit (polle he anatheoresis), quod vix, ac ne vix quidem, animo excidere potest, sed constanti, firma, et indelebili memoria retinetur.
"For what is truly great gives abundant food for thought: it is irksome, nay, impossible, to resist its effect; the memory of it is stubborn and indelible."
Longinus. S. VI.
– polle he anatheoresis – Longinus, Section VI.
Secunda cura sit in rebus venuste cogitandis
The second care in matters to be thought gracefully,
§ 115 magnitudo, M. § 515, sed aesthetica,
§ 115, should be magnitude, Metaphysics § 515, but aesthetic magnitude.
quo nomine 1) pondus obiectorum,
By this name we include 1) the weight
§ 18, et gravitatem, M. § 166,
of objects, § 18, and gravity, Metaphysics § 166;
2) proportionatarum obiectis
2) thoughts proportioned to the objects;
cogitationum, 3) cum foecunditate utrorumque, M. § 166, complectamur. § 22.
3) together with the fruitfulness of both, Metaphysics § 166. § 22.
Illud vere magnum, quod subinde cogitandum considerandumque nobis occurrit (polle he anatheoresis), quod vix, ac ne vix quidem, animo excidere potest, sed constanti, firma, et indelebili memoria retinetur.
"For what is truly great gives abundant food for thought: it is irksome, nay, impossible, to resist its effect; the memory of it is stubborn and indelible."
Longinus. S. VI.
– polle he anatheoresis – Longinus, Section VI.
Secunda cura sit in rebus venuste cogitandis § 115 magnitudo, M. § 515, sed aesthetica, quo nomine 1) pondus obiectorum, § 18, et gravitatem, M. § 166, 2) proportionatarum obiectis cogitationum, 3) cum foecunditate utrorumque, M. § 166, complectamur. § 22. / The second care in matters to be thought gracefully, § 115, should be magnitude, Metaphysics § 515, but aesthetic magnitude. By this name we include 1) the weight of objects, § 18, and gravity, Metaphysics § 166; 2) thoughts proportioned to the objects; 3) together with the fruitfulness of both, Metaphysics § 166. § 22.
Illud vere magnum, quod subinde cogitandum considerandumque nobis occurrit (polle he anatheoresis), quod vix, ac ne vix quidem, animo excidere potest, sed constanti, firma, et indelebili memoria retinetur.
"For what is truly great gives abundant food for thought: it is irksome, nay, impossible, to resist its effect; the memory of it is stubborn and indelible."
Longinus. S. VI. / – polle he anatheoresis – Longinus, Section VI.
§ 178
Ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior, atque os Magna § 177 sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem,
"To him who has genius, who has a soul of a diviner cast, and a greatness of expression, give the honor of this appellation."
ut poeta dicatur, et musicus, si magna canat, et pictor, si magna pingat e.c.
so that he may be called poet, and musician if he sings great things, and painter if he paints great things, etc.
Voluminibus ipsis auctoritatem aliquam et pulcritudinem adiicit magnitudo.
"even the mere volumes themselves acquire a certain additional dignity and beauty from mere bulk."
Plin. ep. l. 20. Magnitudinem autem aestheticam primo dividamus denuo, sicut ubertatem, § 116, in absolutam, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, § 177, et relativam ac comparativam, illum absolutae gradum, qui quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiariter et speciatim requiritur. Utramque noverit, et probe distinguat,
Pliny, letter I.20. But let us first divide aesthetic magnitude again, like abundance, § 116, into absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking, § 177, and relative and comparative, that degree of the absolute which is required peculiarly and especially for certain things to be thought beautifully. Let one know both and distinguish them well,
Artis severae si quis ardet effectus, Mentemque magnis applicat, simul ac morem Frugalitatis § 164 lege callet exacta.
"If any man seeks for success in stern art and applies his mind to great tasks, let him first perfect his character by the rigid law of frugality."
Petr.
§ 164. Petronius.
Ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior, atque os Magna § 177 sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem,
"To him who has genius, who has a soul of a diviner cast, and a greatness of expression, give the honor of this appellation."
ut poeta dicatur, et musicus, si magna canat, et pictor, si magna pingat e.c.
so that he may be called poet, and musician if he sings great things, and painter if he paints great things, etc.
Voluminibus ipsis auctoritatem aliquam et pulcritudinem adiicit magnitudo.
"even the mere volumes themselves acquire a certain additional dignity and beauty from mere bulk."
Plin. ep. l. 20.
Pliny, letter I.20.
Magnitudinem autem aestheticam primo dividamus denuo, sicut ubertatem, § 116, in absolutam, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, § 177, et relativam ac comparativam, illum absolutae gradum, qui quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiariter et speciatim requiritur.
But let us first divide aesthetic magnitude again, like abundance, § 116, into absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking, § 177, and relative and comparative, that degree of the absolute which is required peculiarly and especially for certain things to be thought beautifully.
Utramque noverit, et probe distinguat,
Let one know both and distinguish them well,
Artis severae si quis ardet effectus, Mentemque magnis applicat, simul ac morem Frugalitatis § 164 lege callet exacta.
"If any man seeks for success in stern art and applies his mind to great tasks, let him first perfect his character by the rigid law of frugality."
Petr.
§ 164. Petronius.
Ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior, atque os Magna § 177 sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem,
"To him who has genius, who has a soul of a diviner cast, and a greatness of expression, give the honor of this appellation."
ut poeta dicatur,
so that he may be called poet,
et musicus, si magna canat, et pictor,
and musician if he sings great things, and painter
si magna pingat e.c.
if he paints great things, etc.
Voluminibus ipsis auctoritatem aliquam et pulcritudinem adiicit magnitudo.
"even the mere volumes themselves acquire a certain additional dignity and beauty from mere bulk."
Plin. ep. l. 20.
Pliny, letter I.20.
Magnitudinem autem aestheticam primo dividamus denuo,
But let us first divide aesthetic magnitude again,
sicut ubertatem, § 116, in absolutam, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam,
like abundance, § 116, into absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking,
§ 177, et relativam ac comparativam, illum absolutae gradum,
§ 177, and relative and comparative, that degree of the absolute which
qui quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiariter et
is required peculiarly and especially for certain
speciatim requiritur.
things to be thought beautifully.
Utramque noverit, et probe distinguat,
Let one know both and distinguish them well,
Artis severae si quis ardet effectus, Mentemque magnis applicat, simul ac morem Frugalitatis § 164 lege callet exacta.
"If any man seeks for success in stern art and applies his mind to great tasks, let him first perfect his character by the rigid law of frugality."
Petr.
§ 164. Petronius.
Ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior, atque os Magna § 177 sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem,
"To him who has genius, who has a soul of a diviner cast, and a greatness of expression, give the honor of this appellation."
ut poeta dicatur, et musicus, si magna canat, et pictor, si magna pingat e.c. / so that he may be called poet, and musician if he sings great things, and painter if he paints great things, etc.
Voluminibus ipsis auctoritatem aliquam et pulcritudinem adiicit magnitudo.
"even the mere volumes themselves acquire a certain additional dignity and beauty from mere bulk."
Plin. ep. l. 20. / Pliny, letter I.20.
Magnitudinem autem aestheticam primo dividamus denuo, sicut ubertatem, § 116, in absolutam, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, § 177, et relativam ac comparativam, illum absolutae gradum, qui quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiariter et speciatim requiritur. / But let us first divide aesthetic magnitude again, like abundance, § 116, into absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking, § 177, and relative and comparative, that degree of the absolute which is required peculiarly and especially for certain things to be thought beautifully.
Utramque noverit, et probe distinguat, / Let one know both and distinguish them well,
Artis severae si quis ardet effectus, Mentemque magnis applicat, simul ac morem Frugalitatis § 164 lege callet exacta.
"If any man seeks for success in stern art and applies his mind to great tasks, let him first perfect his character by the rigid law of frugality."
Petr. / § 164. Petronius.
§ 179
Quemadmodum vere pulcre cogitantes, quando non latitudinem sectantur comparativam, § 116, et multo minus in circumductum et diffusum et abundans luxuriando cogitandi genus incidere laborant, § 165, inopiae, § 120, se ipsos reos agunt extenuatione, § 175, nonnunquam forsan ironica: ita iidem, iisdem forsan ex caussis, sublimia non cogitantes, et multo minus amantes tumescere, se dicunt animi pusilli, neque tamen auditores sibi volunt credulos. Ita Horatius:
Just as those who truly think beautifully, when they do not pursue comparative breadth, § 116, and much less strive to fall, by luxuriating, into a roundabout, diffuse, and abundant kind of thinking, § 165, accuse themselves of poverty, § 120, by attenuation, § 175, sometimes perhaps ironically: so these same persons, perhaps from the same causes, not thinking sublime things and much less loving to swell, call themselves of a little mind, and yet they do not wish their hearers to be credulous toward them. Thus Horace:
Dii bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusilli Finxerunt animi, raro ac perpauca loquentis. At tu conclusas hircinis follibus auras.
"The gods have done a good part by me, since they have framed me of an humble and meek disposition, speaking but seldom, briefly: but do you, as much as you will, imitate air which is shut up in leathern bellows,"
e.c. Ita Martialis IX. 50:
etc. So Martial IX.50:
Ingenium mihi, Gaure, probas sic esse pusillum, § 177, Carmina quod faciam, quae brevitate placent,
"You prove to me, Gaurus, that my genius is in this way a puny one, because I make poems that please by their brevity."
S. XIII.
§ 177, "because I make poems that please by brevity," Section XIII.
Confiteor. Sed tu, bis denis grandia libris Qui scribis Priami proelia, magnus homo es.
"I confess it. But you, who in twice six books write of Priam's wars in grand style, are you a great man?"
Quemadmodum vere pulcre cogitantes, quando non latitudinem sectantur comparativam, § 116, et multo minus in circumductum et diffusum et abundans luxuriando cogitandi genus incidere laborant, § 165, inopiae, § 120, se ipsos reos agunt extenuatione, § 175, nonnunquam forsan ironica: ita iidem, iisdem forsan ex caussis, sublimia non cogitantes, et multo minus amantes tumescere, se dicunt animi pusilli, neque tamen auditores sibi volunt credulos.
Just as those who truly think beautifully, when they do not pursue comparative breadth, § 116, and much less strive to fall, by luxuriating, into a roundabout, diffuse, and abundant kind of thinking, § 165, accuse themselves of poverty, § 120, by attenuation, § 175, sometimes perhaps ironically: so these same persons, perhaps from the same causes, not thinking sublime things and much less loving to swell, call themselves of a little mind, and yet they do not wish their hearers to be credulous toward them.
Ita Horatius:
Thus Horace:
Dii bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusilli Finxerunt animi, raro ac perpauca loquentis. At tu conclusas hircinis follibus auras.
"The gods have done a good part by me, since they have framed me of an humble and meek disposition, speaking but seldom, briefly: but do you, as much as you will, imitate air which is shut up in leathern bellows,"
e.c. Ita Martialis IX. 50:
etc. So Martial IX.50:
Ingenium mihi, Gaure, probas sic esse pusillum, § 177, Carmina quod faciam, quae brevitate placent,
"You prove to me, Gaurus, that my genius is in this way a puny one, because I make poems that please by their brevity."
S. XIII.
§ 177, "because I make poems that please by brevity," Section XIII.
Confiteor. Sed tu, bis denis grandia libris Qui scribis Priami proelia, magnus homo es.
"I confess it. But you, who in twice six books write of Priam's wars in grand style, are you a great man?"
Quemadmodum vere pulcre cogitantes,
Just as those who truly think beautifully, when
quando non latitudinem sectantur comparativam, § 116,
they do not pursue comparative breadth, § 116,
et multo minus
and much less strive to fall, by luxuriating,
in circumductum et diffusum et abundans luxuriando cogitandi
into a roundabout, diffuse, and abundant kind of thinking,
genus incidere laborant, § 165, inopiae, § 120, se ipsos
§ 165, accuse themselves of poverty,
reos agunt extenuatione, § 175, nonnunquam forsan ironica:
§ 120, by attenuation, § 175, sometimes perhaps ironically:
ita iidem, iisdem forsan ex caussis,
so these same persons, perhaps from the same causes,
sublimia non cogitantes, et multo minus amantes
not thinking sublime things and much less loving to swell,
tumescere, se dicunt animi pusilli,
call themselves of a little mind, and yet they do
neque tamen auditores sibi volunt credulos.
not wish their hearers to be credulous toward them.
Ita Horatius:
Thus Horace:
Dii bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusilli Finxerunt animi, raro ac perpauca loquentis. At tu conclusas hircinis follibus auras.
"The gods have done a good part by me, since they have framed me of an humble and meek disposition, speaking but seldom, briefly: but do you, as much as you will, imitate air which is shut up in leathern bellows,"
e.c. Ita Martialis IX. 50:
etc. So Martial IX.50:
Ingenium mihi, Gaure, probas sic esse pusillum, § 177, Carmina quod faciam, quae brevitate placent,
"You prove to me, Gaurus, that my genius is in this way a puny one, because I make poems that please by their brevity."
S. XIII.
§ 177, "because I make poems that please by brevity," Section XIII.
Confiteor. Sed tu, bis denis grandia libris Qui scribis Priami proelia, magnus homo es.
"I confess it. But you, who in twice six books write of Priam's wars in grand style, are you a great man?"
Quemadmodum vere pulcre cogitantes, quando non latitudinem sectantur comparativam, § 116, et multo minus in circumductum et diffusum et abundans luxuriando cogitandi genus incidere laborant, § 165, inopiae, § 120, se ipsos reos agunt extenuatione, § 175, nonnunquam forsan ironica: ita iidem, iisdem forsan ex caussis, sublimia non cogitantes, et multo minus amantes tumescere, se dicunt animi pusilli, neque tamen auditores sibi volunt credulos. / Just as those who truly think beautifully, when they do not pursue comparative breadth, § 116, and much less strive to fall, by luxuriating, into a roundabout, diffuse, and abundant kind of thinking, § 165, accuse themselves of poverty, § 120, by attenuation, § 175, sometimes perhaps ironically: so these same persons, perhaps from the same causes, not thinking sublime things and much less loving to swell, call themselves of a little mind, and yet they do not wish their hearers to be credulous toward them.
Ita Horatius: / Thus Horace:
Dii bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusilli Finxerunt animi, raro ac perpauca loquentis. At tu conclusas hircinis follibus auras.
"The gods have done a good part by me, since they have framed me of an humble and meek disposition, speaking but seldom, briefly: but do you, as much as you will, imitate air which is shut up in leathern bellows,"
e.c. Ita Martialis IX. 50: / etc. So Martial IX.50:
Ingenium mihi, Gaure, probas sic esse pusillum, § 177, Carmina quod faciam, quae brevitate placent,
"You prove to me, Gaurus, that my genius is in this way a puny one, because I make poems that please by their brevity."
S. XIII. / § 177, "because I make poems that please by brevity," Section XIII.
Confiteor. Sed tu, bis denis grandia libris Qui scribis Priami proelia, magnus homo es.
"I confess it. But you, who in twice six books write of Priam's wars in grand style, are you a great man?"
§ 180
Magnitudo aesthetica relativa et comparativa multos quidem gradus habet, § 178, nunc tamen eam, uti decet aestheticum, §§ 15, 16, in tres tantum usitatos grammaticis gradus dividamus, ut quaedam magna sint, absolute scilicet, §§ 178, 177, in positivo, quaedam in comparativo, quaedam in superlativo. Prima sint humiles myricae, secunda arbusta, tertia
Relative and comparative aesthetic magnitude indeed has many degrees, § 178; yet now, as suits an aesthetician, §§ 15, 16, let us divide it into only the three degrees familiar to grammarians: that some things are great, namely absolutely, §§ 178, 177, in the positive; some in the comparative; some in the superlative. Let the first be "lowly tamarisks," the second "shrubs," the third "woods."
silvae. Non omnes arbusta iuvant, humilesque myricae, Si canimus silvas, silvae sint consule dignae,
"Not all men love coppice or lowly tamarisk: sing we woods, woods worthy of a Consul let them be."
Virg.
Virgil.
Magnitudo aesthetica relativa et comparativa multos quidem gradus habet, § 178, nunc tamen eam, uti decet aestheticum, §§ 15, 16, in tres tantum usitatos grammaticis gradus dividamus, ut quaedam magna sint, absolute scilicet, §§ 178, 177, in positivo, quaedam in comparativo, quaedam in superlativo.
Relative and comparative aesthetic magnitude indeed has many degrees, § 178; yet now, as suits an aesthetician, §§ 15, 16, let us divide it into only the three degrees familiar to grammarians: that some things are great, namely absolutely, §§ 178, 177, in the positive; some in the comparative; some in the superlative.
Prima sint humiles myricae, secunda arbusta, tertia
Let the first be "lowly tamarisks," the second "shrubs," the third "woods."
silvae. Non omnes arbusta iuvant, humilesque myricae, Si canimus silvas, silvae sint consule dignae,
"Not all men love coppice or lowly tamarisk: sing we woods, woods worthy of a Consul let them be."
Virg.
Virgil.
Magnitudo aesthetica relativa et comparativa multos quidem gradus habet, § 178,
Relative and comparative aesthetic magnitude indeed has many degrees, § 178;
nunc tamen eam, uti decet aestheticum, §§ 15, 16,
yet now, as suits an aesthetician, §§ 15, 16,
in tres tantum
let us divide it into only the three
usitatos grammaticis gradus dividamus, ut quaedam magna sint,
degrees familiar to grammarians: that some things are great,
absolute scilicet, §§ 178, 177, in positivo,
namely absolutely, §§ 178, 177, in the positive;
quaedam in comparativo, quaedam in superlativo.
some in the comparative; some in the superlative.
Prima sint humiles myricae, secunda arbusta, tertia
Let the first be "lowly tamarisks," the second "shrubs," the third "woods."
silvae. Non omnes arbusta iuvant, humilesque myricae, Si canimus silvas, silvae sint consule dignae,
"Not all men love coppice or lowly tamarisk: sing we woods, woods worthy of a Consul let them be."
Virg.
Virgil.
Magnitudo aesthetica relativa et comparativa multos quidem gradus habet, § 178, nunc tamen eam, uti decet aestheticum, §§ 15, 16, in tres tantum usitatos grammaticis gradus dividamus, ut quaedam magna sint, absolute scilicet, §§ 178, 177, in positivo, quaedam in comparativo, quaedam in superlativo. / Relative and comparative aesthetic magnitude indeed has many degrees, § 178; yet now, as suits an aesthetician, §§ 15, 16, let us divide it into only the three degrees familiar to grammarians: that some things are great, namely absolutely, §§ 178, 177, in the positive; some in the comparative; some in the superlative.
Prima sint humiles myricae, secunda arbusta, tertia / Let the first be "lowly tamarisks," the second "shrubs," the third "woods."
silvae. Non omnes arbusta iuvant, humilesque myricae, Si canimus silvas, silvae sint consule dignae,
"Not all men love coppice or lowly tamarisk: sing we woods, woods worthy of a Consul let them be."
Virg. / Virgil.
§ 181
Magnitudo aesthetica, § 177, et absoluta, § 178, et relativa, § 180, porro est vel naturalis, cum libertate propius non connexis conveniens, vel moralis, obiectis cogitationibusque tribuenda, quatenus propius cum libertate connectuntur. Naturalis est e.g. Virg. Aen. V. 421, quando
Aesthetic magnitude, § 177, both absolute, § 178, and relative, § 180, is further either natural, fitting things not more closely connected with freedom, or moral, to be attributed to objects and thoughts insofar as they are more closely connected with freedom. It is natural, for example, in Virgil, Aeneid V.421, when
Entellus duplicem ex humeris reiecit amictum Et magnos membrorum artus, magna ossa lacertosque Exuit, atque ingens media constitit arena.
"So saying, he dropped down the double-folded mantle from his shoulders, stripped bare the huge joints, the huge arms and thews, and towered gigantic in the midmost ring."
e.c. Ubertim S. VIII cogitentur intra horizontem aestheticum constituta themata, S. VIIII, locis S. X et argumentis locupletantibus, S. XI, si noveris uti, S. XII, habebunt eadem simul magnitudinem, absolutam certe, naturalem, § 177. Hinc ad hanc parum opus est novis regulis.
etc. If themes placed within the aesthetic horizon, Section VIIII, are thought abundantly according to Section VIII, with places, Section X, and enriching arguments, Section XI, if you know how to use them, Section XII, the same themes will also have magnitude, certainly absolute and natural magnitude, § 177. Hence for this there is little need of new rules.
Magnitudo aesthetica, § 177, et absoluta, § 178, et relativa, § 180, porro est vel naturalis, cum libertate propius non connexis conveniens, vel moralis, obiectis cogitationibusque tribuenda, quatenus propius cum libertate connectuntur.
Aesthetic magnitude, § 177, both absolute, § 178, and relative, § 180, is further either natural, fitting things not more closely connected with freedom, or moral, to be attributed to objects and thoughts insofar as they are more closely connected with freedom.
Naturalis est e.g. Virg. Aen. V. 421, quando
It is natural, for example, in Virgil, Aeneid V.421, when
Entellus duplicem ex humeris reiecit amictum Et magnos membrorum artus, magna ossa lacertosque Exuit, atque ingens media constitit arena.
"So saying, he dropped down the double-folded mantle from his shoulders, stripped bare the huge joints, the huge arms and thews, and towered gigantic in the midmost ring."
e.c. Ubertim S. VIII cogitentur intra horizontem aestheticum constituta themata, S. VIIII, locis S. X et argumentis locupletantibus, S. XI, si noveris uti, S. XII, habebunt eadem simul magnitudinem, absolutam certe, naturalem, § 177. Hinc ad hanc parum opus est novis regulis.
etc. If themes placed within the aesthetic horizon, Section VIIII, are thought abundantly according to Section VIII, with places, Section X, and enriching arguments, Section XI, if you know how to use them, Section XII, the same themes will also have magnitude, certainly absolute and natural magnitude, § 177. Hence for this there is little need of new rules.
Magnitudo aesthetica, § 177, et absoluta, § 178, et relativa,
Aesthetic magnitude, § 177, both absolute, § 178, and relative,
§ 180, porro est vel naturalis,
§ 180, is further either natural,
cum libertate
fitting things not more closely connected with freedom,
propius non connexis conveniens, vel moralis, obiectis cogitationibusque tribuenda,
or moral, to be attributed to objects and thoughts
quatenus propius cum libertate connectuntur.
insofar as they are more closely connected with freedom.
Naturalis est e.g. Virg. Aen. V. 421, quando
It is natural, for example, in Virgil, Aeneid V.421, when
Entellus duplicem ex humeris reiecit amictum Et magnos membrorum artus, magna ossa lacertosque Exuit, atque ingens media constitit arena.
"So saying, he dropped down the double-folded mantle from his shoulders, stripped bare the huge joints, the huge arms and thews, and towered gigantic in the midmost ring."
e.c. Ubertim S. VIII cogitentur intra horizontem
etc. If themes placed within the aesthetic horizon,
aestheticum constituta themata, S. VIIII,
Section VIIII, are thought abundantly according to Section VIII,
locis S. X et argumentis locupletantibus, S. XI,
with places, Section X, and enriching arguments, Section XI,
si noveris uti, S. XII, habebunt eadem
if you know how to use them, Section XII,
simul magnitudinem, absolutam certe,
the same themes will also have magnitude, certainly absolute and
naturalem, § 177. Hinc ad hanc parum opus est
natural magnitude, § 177. Hence for this there is
novis regulis.
little need of new rules.
Magnitudo aesthetica, § 177, et absoluta, § 178, et relativa, § 180, porro est vel naturalis, cum libertate propius non connexis conveniens, vel moralis, obiectis cogitationibusque tribuenda, quatenus propius cum libertate connectuntur. / Aesthetic magnitude, § 177, both absolute, § 178, and relative, § 180, is further either natural, fitting things not more closely connected with freedom, or moral, to be attributed to objects and thoughts insofar as they are more closely connected with freedom.
Naturalis est e.g. Virg. Aen. V. 421, quando / It is natural, for example, in Virgil, Aeneid V.421, when
Entellus duplicem ex humeris reiecit amictum Et magnos membrorum artus, magna ossa lacertosque Exuit, atque ingens media constitit arena.
"So saying, he dropped down the double-folded mantle from his shoulders, stripped bare the huge joints, the huge arms and thews, and towered gigantic in the midmost ring."
e.c. Ubertim S. VIII cogitentur intra horizontem aestheticum constituta themata, S. VIIII, locis S. X et argumentis locupletantibus, S. XI, si noveris uti, S. XII, habebunt eadem simul magnitudinem, absolutam certe, naturalem, § 177. Hinc ad hanc parum opus est novis regulis. / etc. If themes placed within the aesthetic horizon, Section VIIII, are thought abundantly according to Section VIII, with places, Section X, and enriching arguments, Section XI, if you know how to use them, Section XII, the same themes will also have magnitude, certainly absolute and natural magnitude, § 177. Hence for this there is little need of new rules.
§ 182
Magnitudinem aestheticam moralem, i.e. per libertatem legibus moralibus conformiter determinatam, quae possibilis est, § 181, deprehendo 1) in obiectis eorumque variis et consectariis, si citra detrimentum virtutis cogitari possunt pluribus, et caeteroquin eleganter, 2) in iisdem, si dictis modis cogitari possunt serius aut citius ad virtutem tandem consentientia, 3) in cogitationibus, si proportionari exaequarique suis obiectis et materiis ita possunt, ne quid detrimenti, 4) ut tandem certe nonnihil emolumenti capiat res virtutis bonorumque morum saluberrima, pulcerrima. § 177. Liceat hanc moralem magnitudinem aestheticam brevius dignitatem aestheticam dicere, et iam post § 115 videre,
Moral aesthetic magnitude, that is, magnitude determined through freedom in conformity with moral laws, insofar as it is possible, § 181, I find 1) in objects and their various consequences, if they can be thought by many persons, and otherwise elegantly, without detriment to virtue; 2) in the same objects, if in the stated ways they can sooner or later be thought as finally agreeing with virtue; 3) in thoughts, if they can be proportioned and made equal to their objects and materials in such a way that there is no detriment; 4) so that finally the most wholesome and most beautiful cause of virtue and good morals surely receives some benefit. § 177. Let it be permitted to call this moral aesthetic magnitude more briefly aesthetic dignity, and now after § 115 to see
2) Quid deceat, quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error.
"what gives grace, what not; what is the tendency of excellence, what that of error."
§ 22.
§ 22.
Magnitudinem aestheticam moralem, i.e. per libertatem legibus moralibus conformiter determinatam, quae possibilis est, § 181, deprehendo 1) in obiectis eorumque variis et consectariis, si citra detrimentum virtutis cogitari possunt pluribus, et caeteroquin eleganter, 2) in iisdem, si dictis modis cogitari possunt serius aut citius ad virtutem tandem consentientia, 3) in cogitationibus, si proportionari exaequarique suis obiectis et materiis ita possunt, ne quid detrimenti, 4) ut tandem certe nonnihil emolumenti capiat res virtutis bonorumque morum saluberrima, pulcerrima. § 177. Liceat hanc moralem magnitudinem aestheticam brevius dignitatem aestheticam dicere, et iam post § 115 videre,
Moral aesthetic magnitude, that is, magnitude determined through freedom in conformity with moral laws, insofar as it is possible, § 181, I find 1) in objects and their various consequences, if they can be thought by many persons, and otherwise elegantly, without detriment to virtue; 2) in the same objects, if in the stated ways they can sooner or later be thought as finally agreeing with virtue; 3) in thoughts, if they can be proportioned and made equal to their objects and materials in such a way that there is no detriment; 4) so that finally the most wholesome and most beautiful cause of virtue and good morals surely receives some benefit. § 177. Let it be permitted to call this moral aesthetic magnitude more briefly aesthetic dignity, and now after § 115 to see
2) Quid deceat, quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error.
"what gives grace, what not; what is the tendency of excellence, what that of error."
§ 22.
§ 22.
Magnitudinem aestheticam moralem, i.e.
Moral aesthetic magnitude, that is, magnitude
per libertatem legibus moralibus conformiter determinatam,
determined through freedom in conformity with moral laws, insofar
quae possibilis est, § 181, deprehendo 1) in
as it is possible, § 181, I find 1) in
obiectis eorumque variis et consectariis,
objects and their various consequences,
si citra detrimentum virtutis cogitari possunt pluribus,
if they can be thought by many persons,
et caeteroquin eleganter,
and otherwise elegantly, without detriment to virtue;
2) in iisdem, si
2) in the same objects, if in the stated
dictis modis cogitari possunt serius aut
ways they can sooner or later be thought as
citius ad virtutem tandem consentientia, 3) in cogitationibus,
finally agreeing with virtue; 3) in thoughts,
si proportionari exaequarique
if they can be proportioned and made equal to
suis obiectis et materiis ita possunt,
their objects and materials in such a way
ne quid detrimenti, 4) ut tandem
that there is no detriment; 4) so that finally
certe nonnihil emolumenti capiat res virtutis
the most wholesome and most beautiful cause of virtue
bonorumque morum saluberrima, pulcerrima. § 177.
and good morals surely receives some benefit. § 177.
Liceat hanc moralem
Let it be permitted to call this moral aesthetic
magnitudinem aestheticam brevius dignitatem aestheticam dicere,
magnitude more briefly aesthetic dignity,
et iam post § 115 videre,
and now after § 115 to see
2) Quid deceat, quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error.
"what gives grace, what not; what is the tendency of excellence, what that of error."
§ 22.
§ 22.
Magnitudinem aestheticam moralem, i.e. per libertatem legibus moralibus conformiter determinatam, quae possibilis est, § 181, deprehendo 1) in obiectis eorumque variis et consectariis, si citra detrimentum virtutis cogitari possunt pluribus, et caeteroquin eleganter, 2) in iisdem, si dictis modis cogitari possunt serius aut citius ad virtutem tandem consentientia, 3) in cogitationibus, si proportionari exaequarique suis obiectis et materiis ita possunt, ne quid detrimenti, 4) ut tandem certe nonnihil emolumenti capiat res virtutis bonorumque morum saluberrima, pulcerrima. § 177. Liceat hanc moralem magnitudinem aestheticam brevius dignitatem aestheticam dicere, et iam post § 115 videre, / Moral aesthetic magnitude, that is, magnitude determined through freedom in conformity with moral laws, insofar as it is possible, § 181, I find 1) in objects and their various consequences, if they can be thought by many persons, and otherwise elegantly, without detriment to virtue; 2) in the same objects, if in the stated ways they can sooner or later be thought as finally agreeing with virtue; 3) in thoughts, if they can be proportioned and made equal to their objects and materials in such a way that there is no detriment; 4) so that finally the most wholesome and most beautiful cause of virtue and good morals surely receives some benefit. § 177. Let it be permitted to call this moral aesthetic magnitude more briefly aesthetic dignity, and now after § 115 to see
2) Quid deceat, quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error.
"what gives grace, what not; what is the tendency of excellence, what that of error."
§ 22. / § 22.
§ 183
Nolim hanc cogitationum venustatem, veluti per metabasin eis allo genos, et quasi falx in alienam messem immitteretur, nunc derivari tantum ex severioribus vitae beatae superioribusque legibus, aut omnino ex genuini Christianismi sanctissimis oraculis. Malim eam heic considerari, velut conditionem, sine qua non, operis ingeniorum vere pulcri, qua deficiente prorsus, non spiritui solum, non rationi solum, § 15, sed ipsi rationis analogo per magnitudinem pectoris connatam, § 45, usu, § 50, disciplinaque, § 63, confirmatam suffulto pelluceat quaedam deformitas elegantia quaedam alia tamen deturpans, quoniam iis immorari non licet sine morum iactura, per exceptionem, sane, non elegantem, § 25, vel ex eius arbitrio, qui mores ex solo sapore, neque tamen publico meretricioque, metiretur, § 35.
I should not want this charm of thoughts, as if by a metabasis eis allo genos, and as if a sickle were being put into another's harvest, now to be derived only from the stricter and higher laws of the blessed life, or altogether from the most holy oracles of genuine Christianity. I would prefer it here to be considered as the condition without which there is no truly beautiful work of talents. If it is wholly lacking, a certain deformity shines through, disfiguring some otherwise present elegance, not only to spirit, not only to reason, § 15, but even to the analogue of reason supported by a greatness of heart that is inborn, § 45, and confirmed by use, § 50, and discipline, § 63. For one may not linger on such matters without loss of morals, except by an exception that is surely not elegant, § 25, or by the judgment of one who measures morals from taste alone, yet not from public and meretricious taste, § 35.
Nolim hanc cogitationum venustatem, veluti per metabasin eis allo genos, et quasi falx in alienam messem immitteretur, nunc derivari tantum ex severioribus vitae beatae superioribusque legibus, aut omnino ex genuini Christianismi sanctissimis oraculis.
I should not want this charm of thoughts, as if by a metabasis eis allo genos, and as if a sickle were being put into another's harvest, now to be derived only from the stricter and higher laws of the blessed life, or altogether from the most holy oracles of genuine Christianity.
Malim eam heic considerari, velut conditionem, sine qua non, operis ingeniorum vere pulcri, qua deficiente prorsus, non spiritui solum, non rationi solum, § 15, sed ipsi rationis analogo per magnitudinem pectoris connatam, § 45, usu, § 50, disciplinaque, § 63, confirmatam suffulto pelluceat quaedam deformitas elegantia quaedam alia tamen deturpans, quoniam iis immorari non licet sine morum iactura, per exceptionem, sane, non elegantem, § 25, vel ex eius arbitrio, qui mores ex solo sapore, neque tamen publico meretricioque, metiretur, § 35.
I would prefer it here to be considered as the condition without which there is no truly beautiful work of talents. If it is wholly lacking, a certain deformity shines through, disfiguring some otherwise present elegance, not only to spirit, not only to reason, § 15, but even to the analogue of reason supported by a greatness of heart that is inborn, § 45, and confirmed by use, § 50, and discipline, § 63. For one may not linger on such matters without loss of morals, except by an exception that is surely not elegant, § 25, or by the judgment of one who measures morals from taste alone, yet not from public and meretricious taste, § 35.
Nolim hanc cogitationum venustatem, veluti
I should not want this charm of thoughts,
per metabasin eis allo genos,
as if by a metabasis eis allo genos,
et quasi falx in alienam messem
and as if a sickle were being put into another's harvest,
immitteretur, nunc derivari tantum ex severioribus vitae
now to be derived only from the stricter and
beatae superioribusque legibus, aut
higher laws of the blessed life,
omnino ex genuini Christianismi sanctissimis oraculis.
or altogether from the most holy oracles of genuine Christianity.
Malim eam heic considerari,
I would prefer it here to be considered
velut conditionem, sine qua non,
as the condition without which
operis ingeniorum vere pulcri, qua
there is no truly beautiful work of talents.
deficiente prorsus,
If it is wholly lacking, a certain deformity shines through,
non spiritui
disfiguring some otherwise present elegance, not only to spirit,
solum, non rationi solum, § 15,
not only to reason, § 15,
sed ipsi rationis analogo per magnitudinem pectoris connatam,
but even to the analogue of reason supported by a greatness of
§ 45, usu,
heart that is inborn, § 45, and confirmed by use,
§ 50, disciplinaque, § 63, confirmatam suffulto pelluceat quaedam deformitas
§ 50, and discipline, § 63.
elegantia quaedam alia tamen deturpans, quoniam iis immorari non
For one may not
licet sine morum iactura,
linger on such matters without loss of morals,
per exceptionem, sane, non elegantem,
except by an exception that is surely not elegant,
§ 25, vel ex eius arbitrio, qui
§ 25, or by the judgment of one who measures
mores ex solo sapore, neque tamen publico meretricioque, metiretur, § 35.
morals from taste alone, yet not from public and meretricious taste, § 35.
Nolim hanc cogitationum venustatem, veluti per metabasin eis allo genos, et quasi falx in alienam messem immitteretur, nunc derivari tantum ex severioribus vitae beatae superioribusque legibus, aut omnino ex genuini Christianismi sanctissimis oraculis. / I should not want this charm of thoughts, as if by a metabasis eis allo genos, and as if a sickle were being put into another's harvest, now to be derived only from the stricter and higher laws of the blessed life, or altogether from the most holy oracles of genuine Christianity.
Malim eam heic considerari, velut conditionem, sine qua non, operis ingeniorum vere pulcri, qua deficiente prorsus, non spiritui solum, non rationi solum, § 15, sed ipsi rationis analogo per magnitudinem pectoris connatam, § 45, usu, § 50, disciplinaque, § 63, confirmatam suffulto pelluceat quaedam deformitas elegantia quaedam alia tamen deturpans, quoniam iis immorari non licet sine morum iactura, per exceptionem, sane, non elegantem, § 25, vel ex eius arbitrio, qui mores ex solo sapore, neque tamen publico meretricioque, metiretur, § 35. / I would prefer it here to be considered as the condition without which there is no truly beautiful work of talents. If it is wholly lacking, a certain deformity shines through, disfiguring some otherwise present elegance, not only to spirit, not only to reason, § 15, but even to the analogue of reason supported by a greatness of heart that is inborn, § 45, and confirmed by use, § 50, and discipline, § 63. For one may not linger on such matters without loss of morals, except by an exception that is surely not elegant, § 25, or by the judgment of one who measures morals from taste alone, yet not from public and meretricious taste, § 35.
§ 184
Iam hinc enim constabit, turpissimas licet poenas aliter sentientibus minantem, falli tamen Catullum, et turpiter falli, quando c. 16:
For from this it will now be clear that Catullus, although threatening the most shameful punishments to those who think otherwise, is nevertheless deceived, and shamefully deceived, when in poem 16 he says:
Castum, ait, esse decet pium poetam Ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est Qui tum denique habent salem et leporem, Si sunt molliculi et parum pudici, Et, quod pruriat, excitare possunt.
"For pious poet it behoves be chaste Himself; no chastity his verses need; Nay, gain they finally more salt of wit When over softy and of scanty shame, Apt for exciting somewhat prurient,"
Quanquam non verius Martialis l. I. 35.
Although Martial I.35 is no truer:
Lex haec carminibus data est iocosis: Non possunt, nisi pruriant, placere,
"This is the rule assigned to jocular poems, to be unable to please unless they are prurient."
dignum ille tamen patella reperit operculum ita turpem suam legem, uti decet, probans:
Yet he found a lid worthy of the dish when, as is fitting, he proves his shameful law:
quis stolatum Permisit meretricibus pudorem?
"Who brings garments into Flora's festival, and permits prostitutes the
modesty of the stole?"
§ 165. Rectius utique Persius sat. 1, nisi peccat in forma:
§ 165. Persius, Satire 1, is certainly more correct, unless he sins in form: "Here with neither decent custom nor calm voice you would see huge Titi trembling," § 183,
Hic neque more probo videas, neque voce serena, § 183, Ingentes trepidare Titos, quum carmina lumbum Intrant, ac tremulo scalpuntur ubi intima versu.
"Thereupon, as the thrilling strains make their way into the loins, and tickle the inward parts, you may see the burly sons of Rome, quivering in no seemly fashion, and uttering no seemly words."
Iam hinc enim constabit, turpissimas licet poenas aliter sentientibus minantem, falli tamen Catullum, et turpiter falli, quando c. 16:
For from this it will now be clear that Catullus, although threatening the most shameful punishments to those who think otherwise, is nevertheless deceived, and shamefully deceived, when in poem 16 he says:
Castum, ait, esse decet pium poetam Ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est Qui tum denique habent salem et leporem, Si sunt molliculi et parum pudici, Et, quod pruriat, excitare possunt.
"For pious poet it behoves be chaste Himself; no chastity his verses need; Nay, gain they finally more salt of wit When over softy and of scanty shame, Apt for exciting somewhat prurient,"
Quanquam non verius Martialis l. I. 35.
Although Martial I.35 is no truer:
Lex haec carminibus data est iocosis: Non possunt, nisi pruriant, placere,
"This is the rule assigned to jocular poems, to be unable to please unless they are prurient."
dignum ille tamen patella reperit operculum ita turpem suam legem, uti decet, probans:
Yet he found a lid worthy of the dish when, as is fitting, he proves his shameful law:
quis stolatum Permisit meretricibus pudorem?
"Who brings garments into Flora's festival, and permits prostitutes the
modesty of the stole?"
§ 165. Rectius utique Persius sat. 1, nisi peccat in forma:
§ 165. Persius, Satire 1, is certainly more correct, unless he sins in form: "Here with neither decent custom nor calm voice you would see huge Titi trembling," § 183,
Hic neque more probo videas, neque voce serena, § 183, Ingentes trepidare Titos, quum carmina lumbum Intrant, ac tremulo scalpuntur ubi intima versu.
"Thereupon, as the thrilling strains make their way into the loins, and tickle the inward parts, you may see the burly sons of Rome, quivering in no seemly fashion, and uttering no seemly words."
Iam hinc enim constabit,
For from this it will now be clear that
turpissimas licet poenas aliter sentientibus minantem,
Catullus, although threatening the most shameful punishments to those
falli tamen Catullum, et turpiter
who think otherwise, is nevertheless deceived, and shamefully deceived,
falli, quando c. 16:
when in poem 16 he says:
Castum, ait, esse decet pium poetam Ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est Qui tum denique habent salem et leporem, Si sunt molliculi et parum pudici, Et, quod pruriat, excitare possunt.
"For pious poet it behoves be chaste Himself; no chastity his verses need; Nay, gain they finally more salt of wit When over softy and of scanty shame, Apt for exciting somewhat prurient,"
Quanquam non verius Martialis l. I. 35.
Although Martial I.35 is no truer:
Lex haec carminibus data est iocosis: Non possunt, nisi pruriant, placere,
"This is the rule assigned to jocular poems, to be unable to please unless they are prurient."
dignum ille tamen patella reperit operculum ita
Yet he found a lid worthy of the dish when,
turpem suam legem, uti decet, probans:
as is fitting, he proves his shameful law:
quis stolatum Permisit meretricibus pudorem?
"Who brings garments into Flora's festival, and permits prostitutes the
modesty of the stole?"
§ 165. Rectius utique Persius sat. 1,
§ 165. Persius, Satire 1, is certainly more correct,
nisi peccat in
unless he sins in form: "Here with neither decent
forma:
custom nor calm voice you would see huge Titi trembling," § 183,
Hic neque more probo videas, neque voce serena, § 183, Ingentes trepidare Titos, quum carmina lumbum Intrant, ac tremulo scalpuntur ubi intima versu.
"Thereupon, as the thrilling strains make their way into the loins, and tickle the inward parts, you may see the burly sons of Rome, quivering in no seemly fashion, and uttering no seemly words."
Iam hinc enim constabit, turpissimas licet poenas aliter sentientibus minantem, falli tamen Catullum, et turpiter falli, quando c. 16: / For from this it will now be clear that Catullus, although threatening the most shameful punishments to those who think otherwise, is nevertheless deceived, and shamefully deceived, when in poem 16 he says:
Castum, ait, esse decet pium poetam Ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est Qui tum denique habent salem et leporem, Si sunt molliculi et parum pudici, Et, quod pruriat, excitare possunt.
"For pious poet it behoves be chaste Himself; no chastity his verses need; Nay, gain they finally more salt of wit When over softy and of scanty shame, Apt for exciting somewhat prurient,"
Quanquam non verius Martialis l. I. 35. / Although Martial I.35 is no truer:
Lex haec carminibus data est iocosis: Non possunt, nisi pruriant, placere,
"This is the rule assigned to jocular poems, to be unable to please unless they are prurient."
dignum ille tamen patella reperit operculum ita turpem suam legem, uti decet, probans: / Yet he found a lid worthy of the dish when, as is fitting, he proves his shameful law:
quis stolatum Permisit meretricibus pudorem?
"Who brings garments into Flora's festival, and permits prostitutes the
modesty of the stole?"
§ 165. Rectius utique Persius sat. 1, nisi peccat in forma: / § 165. Persius, Satire 1, is certainly more correct, unless he sins in form: "Here with neither decent custom nor calm voice you would see huge Titi trembling," § 183,
Hic neque more probo videas, neque voce serena, § 183, Ingentes trepidare Titos, quum carmina lumbum Intrant, ac tremulo scalpuntur ubi intima versu.
"Thereupon, as the thrilling strains make their way into the loins, and tickle the inward parts, you may see the burly sons of Rome, quivering in no seemly fashion, and uttering no seemly words."
§ 185
Dignitas aesthetica, § 182, pars et species magnitudinis aestheticae, sicut haec, §§ 177, 178, vel absoluta erit, omni pulcre cogitando necessaria, de qua iureconsultos romanos imitati, quicquid cogitare fusius contra bonos mores esset, illi nos ne cogitando quidem immorari posse censeamus, §§ 183, 184, vel relativa, quae quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiaris requiritur, non eodem in gradu in omnibus, § 178. De hac loquitur Cornelius, quando
Aesthetic dignity, § 182, a part and species of aesthetic magnitude, like magnitude itself, §§ 177, 178, will be either absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking. About it, imitating the Roman jurists, whatever it would be against good morals to think at greater length, we should judge that we cannot dwell on even in thinking, §§ 183, 184. Or it will be relative, which is required as peculiar to certain things to be thought beautifully, not in the same degree in all, § 178. Cornelius speaks of this when
non dubitat fore plerosque, qui suum genus scribendi leve, et non satis dignum summorum virorum personis iudicent,
"I do not doubt that there will be many, Atticus, who will think this kind of writing trifling in its nature, and not sufficiently adapted to the characters of eminent men."
et Cicero de Fin. l. 1, suspicatus aliquos futuros, qui hoc genus scribendi
And Cicero, De finibus book 1, suspected that there would be some who, although this kind of writing –
(quae philosophi graeco sermone tractarunt, latinis litteris mandans,)
"I was not ignorant, Brutus, when I was endeavouring to add to Latin literature the same things which philosophers of the most sublime genius and the most profound and accurate learning had previously handled in the Greek language."
etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent.
– is elegant, would nevertheless deny that it belongs to a person and to dignity.
Dignitas aesthetica, § 182, pars et species magnitudinis aestheticae, sicut haec, §§ 177, 178, vel absoluta erit, omni pulcre cogitando necessaria, de qua iureconsultos romanos imitati, quicquid cogitare fusius contra bonos mores esset, illi nos ne cogitando quidem immorari posse censeamus, §§ 183, 184, vel relativa, quae quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiaris requiritur, non eodem in gradu in omnibus, § 178. De hac loquitur Cornelius, quando
Aesthetic dignity, § 182, a part and species of aesthetic magnitude, like magnitude itself, §§ 177, 178, will be either absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking. About it, imitating the Roman jurists, whatever it would be against good morals to think at greater length, we should judge that we cannot dwell on even in thinking, §§ 183, 184. Or it will be relative, which is required as peculiar to certain things to be thought beautifully, not in the same degree in all, § 178. Cornelius speaks of this when
non dubitat fore plerosque, qui suum genus scribendi leve, et non satis dignum summorum virorum personis iudicent,
"I do not doubt that there will be many, Atticus, who will think this kind of writing trifling in its nature, and not sufficiently adapted to the characters of eminent men."
et Cicero de Fin. l. 1, suspicatus aliquos futuros, qui hoc genus scribendi
And Cicero, De finibus book 1, suspected that there would be some who, although this kind of writing –
(quae philosophi graeco sermone tractarunt, latinis litteris mandans,)
"I was not ignorant, Brutus, when I was endeavouring to add to Latin literature the same things which philosophers of the most sublime genius and the most profound and accurate learning had previously handled in the Greek language."
etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent.
– is elegant, would nevertheless deny that it belongs to a person and to dignity.
Dignitas aesthetica, § 182, pars et species magnitudinis aestheticae,
Aesthetic dignity, § 182, a part and species of aesthetic
sicut haec, §§ 177, 178, vel absoluta erit,
magnitude, like magnitude itself, §§ 177, 178, will
omni pulcre cogitando necessaria,
be either absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking.
de qua iureconsultos romanos imitati,
About it, imitating the Roman jurists, whatever
quicquid cogitare fusius contra bonos mores
it would be against good morals to think at greater length,
esset, illi nos ne cogitando quidem immorari posse censeamus,
we should judge that we cannot dwell on even in thinking,
§§ 183, 184, vel relativa,
§§ 183, 184. Or it will be relative,
quae quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiaris requiritur,
which is required as peculiar to certain things
non eodem in gradu in omnibus,
to be thought beautifully, not in the same degree in all,
§ 178. De hac loquitur Cornelius, quando
§ 178. Cornelius speaks of this when
non dubitat fore plerosque, qui suum genus scribendi leve, et non satis dignum summorum virorum personis iudicent,
"I do not doubt that there will be many, Atticus, who will think this kind of writing trifling in its nature, and not sufficiently adapted to the characters of eminent men."
et Cicero de Fin.
And Cicero, De finibus book 1,
l. 1, suspicatus aliquos futuros,
suspected that there would be some who,
qui hoc genus scribendi
although this kind of writing –
(quae philosophi graeco sermone tractarunt, latinis litteris mandans,)
"I was not ignorant, Brutus, when I was endeavouring to add to Latin literature the same things which philosophers of the most sublime genius and the most profound and accurate learning had previously handled in the Greek language."
etsi sit elegans, personae tamen
– is elegant, would nevertheless deny that it belongs
et dignitatis esse negent.
to a person and to dignity.
Dignitas aesthetica, § 182, pars et species magnitudinis aestheticae, sicut haec, §§ 177, 178, vel absoluta erit, omni pulcre cogitando necessaria, de qua iureconsultos romanos imitati, quicquid cogitare fusius contra bonos mores esset, illi nos ne cogitando quidem immorari posse censeamus, §§ 183, 184, vel relativa, quae quibusdam pulcre cogitandis peculiaris requiritur, non eodem in gradu in omnibus, § 178. De hac loquitur Cornelius, quando / Aesthetic dignity, § 182, a part and species of aesthetic magnitude, like magnitude itself, §§ 177, 178, will be either absolute, necessary for all beautiful thinking. About it, imitating the Roman jurists, whatever it would be against good morals to think at greater length, we should judge that we cannot dwell on even in thinking, §§ 183, 184. Or it will be relative, which is required as peculiar to certain things to be thought beautifully, not in the same degree in all, § 178. Cornelius speaks of this when
non dubitat fore plerosque, qui suum genus scribendi leve, et non satis dignum summorum virorum personis iudicent,
"I do not doubt that there will be many, Atticus, who will think this kind of writing trifling in its nature, and not sufficiently adapted to the characters of eminent men."
et Cicero de Fin. l. 1, suspicatus aliquos futuros, qui hoc genus scribendi / And Cicero, De finibus book 1, suspected that there would be some who, although this kind of writing –
(quae philosophi graeco sermone tractarunt, latinis litteris mandans,)
"I was not ignorant, Brutus, when I was endeavouring to add to Latin literature the same things which philosophers of the most sublime genius and the most profound and accurate learning had previously handled in the Greek language."
etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. / – is elegant, would nevertheless deny that it belongs to a person and to dignity.
§ 186
De eadem relativa, § 185, tantum intelligendus est Cicero, quando Off. l. I. 130 pulcritudinis duo genera constituit, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducens, dignitatem virilem. Nam et ipse poscit in oratoris perfecti vultu, ne dignitatem solum sed etiam venustatem afferat, Or. 60, et dignitati, Fam. X. ep. 6, sane non venustatem, sed deformitatem opponit. Est et matronis sua dignitas et praecisius, uti ICtum decet, § 15, Ulp. de senator.:
Cicero must be understood only of the same relative dignity, § 185, when in De officiis I.130 he establishes two kinds of beauty, in one of which there is charm, in the other dignity, taking charm as feminine and dignity as masculine. For he himself requires that in the face of the perfect orator it bring not only dignity but also charm, Orator 60; and to dignity, Ad familiares X, ep. 6, he opposes surely not charm but deformity. Matrons too have their dignity, and more precisely, as befits a jurist, § 15, Ulpian, On Senators:
Maior dignitas est in sexu virili.
"I should hold that he does, because the male sex deserves the greater
honour."
Interim pace Ciceronis et auctoritate, licebit omnia, quibus omnino deest dignitas, etiam absoluta, deformia dicere, §§ 185, 177, et in vera, mascula praesertim pulcritudine, e.g. actionis, ad venustatem in primis dignitatem poscere, de Or. l. I. 142, et statuere
Meanwhile, with pardon for Cicero and his authority, it will be permitted to call all things deformed in which dignity, even absolute dignity, is wholly lacking, §§ 185, 177; and in true beauty, especially masculine beauty such as that of action, to require dignity above all for charm, De oratore I.142; and to establish that
deformari rem personamque detrahendo spoliandoque dignitatem.
"I should reply first to those things which the accusers have advanced with the general view of disparaging him and for the sake of detracting from his honour and despoiling him of his dignity."
Or. pro Caelio 3.
Pro Caelio 3.
De eadem relativa, § 185, tantum intelligendus est Cicero, quando Off. l. I. 130 pulcritudinis duo genera constituit, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducens, dignitatem virilem.
Cicero must be understood only of the same relative dignity, § 185, when in De officiis I.130 he establishes two kinds of beauty, in one of which there is charm, in the other dignity, taking charm as feminine and dignity as masculine.
Nam et ipse poscit in oratoris perfecti vultu, ne dignitatem solum sed etiam venustatem afferat, Or. 60, et dignitati, Fam. X. ep. 6, sane non venustatem, sed deformitatem opponit.
For he himself requires that in the face of the perfect orator it bring not only dignity but also charm, Orator 60; and to dignity, Ad familiares X, ep. 6, he opposes surely not charm but deformity.
Est et matronis sua dignitas et praecisius, uti ICtum decet, § 15, Ulp. de senator.:
Matrons too have their dignity, and more precisely, as befits a jurist, § 15, Ulpian, On Senators:
Maior dignitas est in sexu virili.
"I should hold that he does, because the male sex deserves the greater
honour."
Interim pace Ciceronis et auctoritate, licebit omnia, quibus omnino deest dignitas, etiam absoluta, deformia dicere, §§ 185, 177, et in vera, mascula praesertim pulcritudine, e.g. actionis, ad venustatem in primis dignitatem poscere, de Or. l. I. 142, et statuere
Meanwhile, with pardon for Cicero and his authority, it will be permitted to call all things deformed in which dignity, even absolute dignity, is wholly lacking, §§ 185, 177; and in true beauty, especially masculine beauty such as that of action, to require dignity above all for charm, De oratore I.142; and to establish that
deformari rem personamque detrahendo spoliandoque dignitatem.
"I should reply first to those things which the accusers have advanced with the general view of disparaging him and for the sake of detracting from his honour and despoiling him of his dignity."
Or. pro Caelio 3.
Pro Caelio 3.
De eadem relativa,
Cicero must be understood only of the same relative
§ 185, tantum intelligendus est Cicero, quando Off.
dignity, § 185, when in De officiis
l. I. 130 pulcritudinis duo genera constituit, quorum
I.130 he establishes two kinds of beauty,
in altero venustas sit,
in one of which there is charm,
in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducens, dignitatem virilem.
in the other dignity, taking charm as feminine and dignity as masculine.
Nam et ipse poscit in oratoris perfecti vultu,
For he himself requires that in the face of the perfect orator
ne dignitatem solum sed etiam venustatem afferat, Or. 60,
it bring not only dignity but also charm, Orator 60;
et dignitati, Fam. X. ep. 6,
and to dignity, Ad familiares X, ep.
sane non venustatem, sed deformitatem opponit.
6, he opposes surely not charm but deformity.
Est et matronis sua dignitas et praecisius,
Matrons too have their dignity, and more precisely,
uti ICtum decet, § 15, Ulp. de senator.:
as befits a jurist, § 15, Ulpian, On Senators:
Maior dignitas est in sexu virili.
"I should hold that he does, because the male sex deserves the greater
honour."
Interim pace Ciceronis et auctoritate,
Meanwhile, with pardon for Cicero and his authority,
licebit omnia,
it will be permitted to call all things deformed
quibus omnino deest dignitas, etiam absoluta, deformia dicere,
in which dignity, even absolute dignity, is
§§ 185, 177, et in vera,
wholly lacking, §§ 185, 177; and in true beauty,
mascula praesertim pulcritudine, e.g. actionis,
especially masculine beauty such as that of action,
ad venustatem in primis dignitatem poscere, de Or.
to require dignity above all for charm, De oratore
l. I. 142, et statuere
I.142; and to establish that
deformari rem personamque detrahendo spoliandoque dignitatem.
"I should reply first to those things which the accusers have advanced with the general view of disparaging him and for the sake of detracting from his honour and despoiling him of his dignity."
Or. pro Caelio 3.
Pro Caelio 3.
De eadem relativa, § 185, tantum intelligendus est Cicero, quando Off. l. I. 130 pulcritudinis duo genera constituit, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducens, dignitatem virilem. / Cicero must be understood only of the same relative dignity, § 185, when in De officiis I.130 he establishes two kinds of beauty, in one of which there is charm, in the other dignity, taking charm as feminine and dignity as masculine.
Nam et ipse poscit in oratoris perfecti vultu, ne dignitatem solum sed etiam venustatem afferat, Or. 60, et dignitati, Fam. X. ep. 6, sane non venustatem, sed deformitatem opponit. / For he himself requires that in the face of the perfect orator it bring not only dignity but also charm, Orator 60; and to dignity, Ad familiares X, ep. 6, he opposes surely not charm but deformity.
Est et matronis sua dignitas et praecisius, uti ICtum decet, § 15, Ulp. de senator.: / Matrons too have their dignity, and more precisely, as befits a jurist, § 15, Ulpian, On Senators:
Maior dignitas est in sexu virili.
"I should hold that he does, because the male sex deserves the greater
honour."
Interim pace Ciceronis et auctoritate, licebit omnia, quibus omnino deest dignitas, etiam absoluta, deformia dicere, §§ 185, 177, et in vera, mascula praesertim pulcritudine, e.g. actionis, ad venustatem in primis dignitatem poscere, de Or. l. I. 142, et statuere / Meanwhile, with pardon for Cicero and his authority, it will be permitted to call all things deformed in which dignity, even absolute dignity, is wholly lacking, §§ 185, 177; and in true beauty, especially masculine beauty such as that of action, to require dignity above all for charm, De oratore I.142; and to establish that
deformari rem personamque detrahendo spoliandoque dignitatem.
"I should reply first to those things which the accusers have advanced with the general view of disparaging him and for the sake of detracting from his honour and despoiling him of his dignity."
Or. pro Caelio 3. / Pro Caelio 3.
§ 187
Neque diffiteor hoc confidentius me germanam dignitatem in primis pulcre cogitandorum venustatibus legere, § 186, germanis potissimum scribentem; quoniam expertus novi, in aliis, in quibus gens germanorum romanis est apprime similis, hanc etiam laudem utrique populo communem esse, de qua Cic. pro Mur. 23.
Nor do I deny that I, writing especially for Germans, choose this German dignity more confidently among the first charms of things to be thought beautifully, § 186. For I know by experience that in other matters, in which the German nation is especially similar to the Romans, this praise too is common to both peoples, about which Cicero, Pro Murena 23:
Omnes artes, quae nobis populi romani (nationis germanicae) studia conciliant, et admirabilem dignitatem et pergratam utilitatem debent habere.
"For all arts which can conciliate for us the good-will of the Roman people ought to possess both an admirable dignity, and a very delightful utility."
Vel absolutam dignitatem universim et strenue commendari arti nostrae aestheticae, relativam etiam clarius ob oculos ponenti, forte non sua solum constabit absoluta dignitas, sed et relativa quaedam tribuetur a gravibus, neque tamen tetricis, inter cives iudicibus. § 185.
(and of the German nation). If absolute dignity is universally and vigorously commended to our aesthetic art, which also places relative dignity more clearly before the eyes, perhaps not only its own absolute dignity will be established, but a certain relative dignity too will be attributed to it by serious, yet not gloomy, judges among the citizens. § 185.
Neque diffiteor hoc confidentius me germanam dignitatem in primis pulcre cogitandorum venustatibus legere, § 186, germanis potissimum scribentem; quoniam expertus novi, in aliis, in quibus gens germanorum romanis est apprime similis, hanc etiam laudem utrique populo communem esse, de qua Cic. pro Mur. 23.
Nor do I deny that I, writing especially for Germans, choose this German dignity more confidently among the first charms of things to be thought beautifully, § 186. For I know by experience that in other matters, in which the German nation is especially similar to the Romans, this praise too is common to both peoples, about which Cicero, Pro Murena 23:
Omnes artes, quae nobis populi romani (nationis germanicae) studia conciliant, et admirabilem dignitatem et pergratam utilitatem debent habere.
"For all arts which can conciliate for us the good-will of the Roman people ought to possess both an admirable dignity, and a very delightful utility."
Vel absolutam dignitatem universim et strenue commendari arti nostrae aestheticae, relativam etiam clarius ob oculos ponenti, forte non sua solum constabit absoluta dignitas, sed et relativa quaedam tribuetur a gravibus, neque tamen tetricis, inter cives iudicibus. § 185.
(and of the German nation). If absolute dignity is universally and vigorously commended to our aesthetic art, which also places relative dignity more clearly before the eyes, perhaps not only its own absolute dignity will be established, but a certain relative dignity too will be attributed to it by serious, yet not gloomy, judges among the citizens. § 185.
Neque diffiteor
Nor do I deny that I, writing especially for Germans,
hoc confidentius me germanam dignitatem in
choose this German dignity more confidently among
primis pulcre
the first charms of things to be thought beautifully,
cogitandorum venustatibus legere, § 186, germanis potissimum scribentem;
§ 186. For I know
quoniam expertus novi, in aliis,
by experience that in other matters,
in quibus gens germanorum romanis est apprime similis,
in which the German nation is especially similar
hanc etiam laudem utrique populo communem esse,
to the Romans, this praise too is
de qua Cic. pro Mur. 23.
common to both peoples, about which Cicero, Pro Murena 23:
Omnes artes, quae nobis populi romani (nationis germanicae) studia conciliant, et admirabilem dignitatem et pergratam utilitatem debent habere.
"For all arts which can conciliate for us the good-will of the Roman people ought to possess both an admirable dignity, and a very delightful utility."
Vel absolutam dignitatem
(and of the German nation). If absolute dignity is
universim et strenue commendari arti nostrae aestheticae, relativam
universally and vigorously commended to our aesthetic art,
etiam clarius ob oculos ponenti, forte
which also places relative dignity more clearly before the eyes,
non sua solum constabit absoluta dignitas,
perhaps not only its own absolute dignity will be established,
sed et relativa quaedam tribuetur
but a certain relative dignity too will be
a gravibus, neque tamen tetricis, inter cives iudicibus.
attributed to it by serious, yet not gloomy, judges among the citizens.
§ 185.
§ 185.
Neque diffiteor hoc confidentius me germanam dignitatem in primis pulcre cogitandorum venustatibus legere, § 186, germanis potissimum scribentem; quoniam expertus novi, in aliis, in quibus gens germanorum romanis est apprime similis, hanc etiam laudem utrique populo communem esse, de qua Cic. pro Mur. 23. / Nor do I deny that I, writing especially for Germans, choose this German dignity more confidently among the first charms of things to be thought beautifully, § 186. For I know by experience that in other matters, in which the German nation is especially similar to the Romans, this praise too is common to both peoples, about which Cicero, Pro Murena 23:
Omnes artes, quae nobis populi romani (nationis germanicae) studia conciliant, et admirabilem dignitatem et pergratam utilitatem debent habere.
"For all arts which can conciliate for us the good-will of the Roman people ought to possess both an admirable dignity, and a very delightful utility."
Vel absolutam dignitatem universim et strenue commendari arti nostrae aestheticae, relativam etiam clarius ob oculos ponenti, forte non sua solum constabit absoluta dignitas, sed et relativa quaedam tribuetur a gravibus, neque tamen tetricis, inter cives iudicibus. § 185. / (and of the German nation). If absolute dignity is universally and vigorously commended to our aesthetic art, which also places relative dignity more clearly before the eyes, perhaps not only its own absolute dignity will be established, but a certain relative dignity too will be attributed to it by serious, yet not gloomy, judges among the citizens. § 185.
§ 188
Erunt interim, nisi fallor, et in germanis civibus, qui § 182 n. 1 et 3 satis liberaliter concedant, tamen n. 2 et 4 postulari iudicent aliquid; quod ubique requirere, quando pulcre cogitatur, videatur iusto venustoque rigidius. Verum his excusabor facilius, quando 1) expresse et explicite paraenetica didicerint curatius distinguere ab iis, quae tacite et implicite et longa veluti manu, admodum mediate vel ad minorum morum praecepta non omnino nihil conferant, 2) vitam pulcrae cognitionis dotem primariam, § 22, penitius inspexerint, quam variis illa se modis ac gradibus belle soleat exserere. Nunc § 160 ita me defendam: ut negem mihi vitio verti posse, si vel eadem, vel omnino minora poposcerim, respectu disciplinae morum aut probitatis, ac ille, qui se ipse dicit, Epicuri de grege porcum, Horatius de poetis generatim iterum asserit iterumque, e.g.
Meanwhile there will be, unless I am mistaken, even among German citizens, those who grant § 182 numbers 1 and 3 rather liberally, yet judge that something is demanded by numbers 2 and 4; and to require this everywhere, whenever one thinks beautifully, will seem more rigid than is just and charming. But I shall be more easily excused by them when 1) they have learned more carefully to distinguish things explicitly and expressly paraenetic from those which tacitly, implicitly, and as if by a long hand, very mediately, or toward precepts of lesser morals, contribute not wholly nothing; 2) they have looked more deeply into life, the primary endowment of beautiful cognition, § 22, and how beautifully it is accustomed to put itself forth in various modes and degrees. Now, § 160, I shall defend myself thus: I deny that it can be turned into a fault for me if, with respect to moral discipline or probity, I have demanded either the same or altogether less than he who calls himself "a pig from Epicurus' herd," Horace, repeatedly asserts of poets generally, for example:
Et prodesse volunt et delectare poetae Et simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae. Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
"Poets wish either to profit or to delight; or to deliver at once both the pleasures and the necessaries of life. [...] He who joins the instructive with the agreeable, carries off every vote, by delighting and at the same time admonishing the reader."
Erunt interim, nisi fallor, et in germanis civibus, qui § 182 n. 1 et 3 satis liberaliter concedant, tamen n. 2 et 4 postulari iudicent aliquid; quod ubique requirere, quando pulcre cogitatur, videatur iusto venustoque rigidius.
Meanwhile there will be, unless I am mistaken, even among German citizens, those who grant § 182 numbers 1 and 3 rather liberally, yet judge that something is demanded by numbers 2 and 4; and to require this everywhere, whenever one thinks beautifully, will seem more rigid than is just and charming.
Verum his excusabor facilius, quando 1) expresse et explicite paraenetica didicerint curatius distinguere ab iis, quae tacite et implicite et longa veluti manu, admodum mediate vel ad minorum morum praecepta non omnino nihil conferant, 2) vitam pulcrae cognitionis dotem primariam, § 22, penitius inspexerint, quam variis illa se modis ac gradibus belle soleat exserere.
But I shall be more easily excused by them when 1) they have learned more carefully to distinguish things explicitly and expressly paraenetic from those which tacitly, implicitly, and as if by a long hand, very mediately, or toward precepts of lesser morals, contribute not wholly nothing; 2) they have looked more deeply into life, the primary endowment of beautiful cognition, § 22, and how beautifully it is accustomed to put itself forth in various modes and degrees.
Nunc § 160 ita me defendam: ut negem mihi vitio verti posse, si vel eadem, vel omnino minora poposcerim, respectu disciplinae morum aut probitatis, ac ille, qui se ipse dicit, Epicuri de grege porcum, Horatius de poetis generatim iterum asserit iterumque, e.g.
Now, § 160, I shall defend myself thus: I deny that it can be turned into a fault for me if, with respect to moral discipline or probity, I have demanded either the same or altogether less than he who calls himself "a pig from Epicurus' herd," Horace, repeatedly asserts of poets generally, for example:
Et prodesse volunt et delectare poetae Et simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae. Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
"Poets wish either to profit or to delight; or to deliver at once both the pleasures and the necessaries of life. [...] He who joins the instructive with the agreeable, carries off every vote, by delighting and at the same time admonishing the reader."
Erunt interim, nisi fallor, et
Meanwhile there will be, unless I am mistaken,
in germanis civibus, qui § 182 n. 1
even among German citizens, those who grant § 182 numbers
et 3 satis liberaliter concedant,
1 and 3 rather liberally, yet judge
tamen n. 2 et 4
that something is demanded by numbers 2 and 4;
postulari iudicent aliquid; quod ubique requirere,
and to require this everywhere,
quando pulcre cogitatur,
whenever one thinks beautifully, will seem more
videatur iusto venustoque rigidius.
rigid than is just and charming.
Verum his excusabor facilius,
But I shall be more easily
quando 1) expresse
excused by them when 1) they have learned more
et explicite paraenetica didicerint
carefully to distinguish things explicitly and expressly paraenetic
curatius distinguere ab iis, quae tacite et implicite
from those which tacitly, implicitly,
et longa veluti manu,
and as if by a long hand,
admodum mediate vel ad minorum morum praecepta
very mediately, or toward precepts of lesser morals,
non omnino nihil conferant, 2)
contribute not wholly nothing; 2) they have looked
vitam pulcrae cognitionis dotem primariam,
more deeply into life, the primary endowment of beautiful cognition,
§ 22, penitius inspexerint, quam
§ 22, and how beautifully it is accustomed to put
variis illa se modis ac gradibus belle soleat exserere.
itself forth in various modes and degrees.
Nunc § 160 ita me defendam:
Now, § 160, I shall defend myself thus:
ut negem mihi vitio verti posse,
I deny that it can be turned into a fault
si vel eadem, vel omnino minora poposcerim,
for me if, with respect to moral
respectu disciplinae morum aut probitatis, ac ille,
discipline or probity, I have demanded either the same
qui se ipse dicit,
or altogether less than he who calls himself "a pig
Epicuri de grege porcum, Horatius de poetis generatim
from Epicurus' herd," Horace, repeatedly asserts of poets generally,
iterum asserit iterumque, e.g.
for example:
Et prodesse volunt et delectare poetae Et simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae. Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
"Poets wish either to profit or to delight; or to deliver at once both the pleasures and the necessaries of life. [...] He who joins the instructive with the agreeable, carries off every vote, by delighting and at the same time admonishing the reader."
Erunt interim, nisi fallor, et in germanis civibus, qui § 182 n. 1 et 3 satis liberaliter concedant, tamen n. 2 et 4 postulari iudicent aliquid; quod ubique requirere, quando pulcre cogitatur, videatur iusto venustoque rigidius. / Meanwhile there will be, unless I am mistaken, even among German citizens, those who grant § 182 numbers 1 and 3 rather liberally, yet judge that something is demanded by numbers 2 and 4; and to require this everywhere, whenever one thinks beautifully, will seem more rigid than is just and charming.
Verum his excusabor facilius, quando 1) expresse et explicite paraenetica didicerint curatius distinguere ab iis, quae tacite et implicite et longa veluti manu, admodum mediate vel ad minorum morum praecepta non omnino nihil conferant, 2) vitam pulcrae cognitionis dotem primariam, § 22, penitius inspexerint, quam variis illa se modis ac gradibus belle soleat exserere. / But I shall be more easily excused by them when 1) they have learned more carefully to distinguish things explicitly and expressly paraenetic from those which tacitly, implicitly, and as if by a long hand, very mediately, or toward precepts of lesser morals, contribute not wholly nothing; 2) they have looked more deeply into life, the primary endowment of beautiful cognition, § 22, and how beautifully it is accustomed to put itself forth in various modes and degrees.
Nunc § 160 ita me defendam: ut negem mihi vitio verti posse, si vel eadem, vel omnino minora poposcerim, respectu disciplinae morum aut probitatis, ac ille, qui se ipse dicit, Epicuri de grege porcum, Horatius de poetis generatim iterum asserit iterumque, e.g. / Now, § 160, I shall defend myself thus: I deny that it can be turned into a fault for me if, with respect to moral discipline or probity, I have demanded either the same or altogether less than he who calls himself "a pig from Epicurus' herd," Horace, repeatedly asserts of poets generally, for example:
Et prodesse volunt et delectare poetae Et simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae. Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
"Poets wish either to profit or to delight; or to deliver at once both the pleasures and the necessaries of life. [...] He who joins the instructive with the agreeable, carries off every vote, by delighting and at the same time admonishing the reader."
§ 189
Magnitudo tandem aesthetica, § 177, hinc et dignitas, § 182, tam absolutae, quam relativae, §§ 178, 185, erunt vel obiectivae (rerum, materiae), quatenus in obiectis et cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio, cur per pulcrum ingenium et pectus, S. II, proportionata in magnitudine ac dignitate possint pingi, vel subiectivae (personae) possibilitates physicae potentiaeque certi hominis, etiam secundum quid et hypothetice tales, cum appetitionibus et decreto datam materiem, qua pote, qua fas est, in magnitudine et dignitate venuste sistendi ob oculos. Has posteriores dicamus magnanimitatem et gravitatem aestheticam. E. § 489.
Finally, aesthetic magnitude, § 177, and hence also dignity, § 182, both absolute and relative, §§ 178, 185, will be either objective – of things, of material – insofar as in the objects and things to be thought themselves there is the chief reason why, through a beautiful talent and heart, Section II, they can be depicted with proportionate magnitude and dignity; or subjective – of the person – the physical possibilities and powers of a certain human being, even those such only in a qualified and hypothetical respect, together with the appetitions and resolve for setting the given material beautifully before the eyes in magnitude and dignity, so far as one can and so far as it is right. Let us call these latter aesthetic magnanimity and gravity. Ethics § 489.
Magnitudo tandem aesthetica, § 177, hinc et dignitas, § 182, tam absolutae, quam relativae, §§ 178, 185, erunt vel obiectivae (rerum, materiae), quatenus in obiectis et cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio, cur per pulcrum ingenium et pectus, S. II, proportionata in magnitudine ac dignitate possint pingi, vel subiectivae (personae) possibilitates physicae potentiaeque certi hominis, etiam secundum quid et hypothetice tales, cum appetitionibus et decreto datam materiem, qua pote, qua fas est, in magnitudine et dignitate venuste sistendi ob oculos.
Finally, aesthetic magnitude, § 177, and hence also dignity, § 182, both absolute and relative, §§ 178, 185, will be either objective – of things, of material – insofar as in the objects and things to be thought themselves there is the chief reason why, through a beautiful talent and heart, Section II, they can be depicted with proportionate magnitude and dignity; or subjective – of the person – the physical possibilities and powers of a certain human being, even those such only in a qualified and hypothetical respect, together with the appetitions and resolve for setting the given material beautifully before the eyes in magnitude and dignity, so far as one can and so far as it is right.
Has posteriores dicamus magnanimitatem et gravitatem aestheticam.
Let us call these latter aesthetic magnanimity and gravity.
E. § 489.
Ethics § 489.
Magnitudo tandem aesthetica, § 177, hinc et dignitas,
Finally, aesthetic magnitude, § 177, and hence also dignity,
§ 182, tam absolutae, quam relativae, §§ 178, 185,
§ 182, both absolute and relative, §§ 178, 185,
erunt vel obiectivae (rerum, materiae),
will be either objective – of things, of material
quatenus in obiectis et
– insofar as in the objects and things to
cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio, cur
be thought themselves there is the chief reason why,
per pulcrum ingenium et
through a beautiful talent and heart, Section II,
pectus, S. II, proportionata in magnitudine ac dignitate
they can be depicted with proportionate magnitude and dignity;
possint pingi, vel subiectivae (personae)
or subjective – of the person –
possibilitates physicae potentiaeque certi hominis,
the physical possibilities and powers of a certain human being,
etiam secundum quid et hypothetice
even those such only in a qualified and hypothetical respect,
tales, cum appetitionibus et decreto datam materiem,
together with the appetitions and resolve for setting the given material
qua pote, qua fas est, in magnitudine et dignitate
beautifully before the eyes in magnitude and dignity,
venuste sistendi ob oculos.
so far as one can and so far as it is right.
Has posteriores dicamus magnanimitatem et gravitatem aestheticam.
Let us call these latter aesthetic magnanimity and gravity.
E. § 489.
Ethics § 489.
Magnitudo tandem aesthetica, § 177, hinc et dignitas, § 182, tam absolutae, quam relativae, §§ 178, 185, erunt vel obiectivae (rerum, materiae), quatenus in obiectis et cogitandis ipsis est praecipua ratio, cur per pulcrum ingenium et pectus, S. II, proportionata in magnitudine ac dignitate possint pingi, vel subiectivae (personae) possibilitates physicae potentiaeque certi hominis, etiam secundum quid et hypothetice tales, cum appetitionibus et decreto datam materiem, qua pote, qua fas est, in magnitudine et dignitate venuste sistendi ob oculos. / Finally, aesthetic magnitude, § 177, and hence also dignity, § 182, both absolute and relative, §§ 178, 185, will be either objective – of things, of material – insofar as in the objects and things to be thought themselves there is the chief reason why, through a beautiful talent and heart, Section II, they can be depicted with proportionate magnitude and dignity; or subjective – of the person – the physical possibilities and powers of a certain human being, even those such only in a qualified and hypothetical respect, together with the appetitions and resolve for setting the given material beautifully before the eyes in magnitude and dignity, so far as one can and so far as it is right.
Has posteriores dicamus magnanimitatem et gravitatem aestheticam. / Let us call these latter aesthetic magnanimity and gravity.
E. § 489. / Ethics § 489.
§ 190
Sunt res, et materiae, quarum adspectu primo describendarum cum aliqua pulcritudine statim exprimatur nobis, quod olim Virgilio:
There are things and materials at whose first sight, when they are to be described with some beauty, there is immediately expressed to us what once was expressed to Virgil:
Maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo, Maius opus moveo.
"Events of grander march impel my song, and loftier task I try."
VII. 44. Aen. Tunc felix ille, qui iustus aestimator sui vere tamen de themate tali a se pulcre exsequendo, possit praedicere, quod idem de saeculis aureis se vivo redituris:
Aeneid VII.44. Then happy is the one who, a just estimator of himself, yet truly about such a theme to be beautifully carried out by himself, can predict what the same poet predicted about the golden ages returning while he was alive:
Non me carminibus vincet nec Thracius Orpheus, Nec Linus, huic mater quamvis, atque huic pater adsit, Orphei Calliopea, Lino formosus Apollo. Pan deus Arcadia mecum si iudice certet, Pan etiam Arcadia dicet se iudice victum.
"Nor Thracian Orpheus should out-sing me then, nor Linus, though his mother this, and that his sire should aid - Orpheus Calliope, and Linus fair Apollo. Nay, though Pan, with Arcady for judge, my claim contest, with Arcady for judge great Pan himself should own him foiled, and from the field retire."
§ 189.
§ 189.
Sunt res, et materiae, quarum adspectu primo describendarum cum aliqua pulcritudine statim exprimatur nobis, quod olim Virgilio:
There are things and materials at whose first sight, when they are to be described with some beauty, there is immediately expressed to us what once was expressed to Virgil:
Maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo, Maius opus moveo.
"Events of grander march impel my song, and loftier task I try."
VII. 44.
Aeneid VII.44.
Aen. Tunc felix ille, qui iustus aestimator sui vere tamen de themate tali a se pulcre exsequendo, possit praedicere, quod idem de saeculis aureis se vivo redituris:
Then happy is the one who, a just estimator of himself, yet truly about such a theme to be beautifully carried out by himself, can predict what the same poet predicted about the golden ages returning while he was alive:
Non me carminibus vincet nec Thracius Orpheus, Nec Linus, huic mater quamvis, atque huic pater adsit, Orphei Calliopea, Lino formosus Apollo. Pan deus Arcadia mecum si iudice certet, Pan etiam Arcadia dicet se iudice victum.
"Nor Thracian Orpheus should out-sing me then, nor Linus, though his mother this, and that his sire should aid - Orpheus Calliope, and Linus fair Apollo. Nay, though Pan, with Arcady for judge, my claim contest, with Arcady for judge great Pan himself should own him foiled, and from the field retire."
§ 189.
§ 189.
Sunt res, et materiae, quarum
There are things and materials at whose first sight,
adspectu primo describendarum cum aliqua
when they are to be described with some beauty,
pulcritudine statim exprimatur nobis, quod olim Virgilio:
there is immediately expressed to us what once was expressed to Virgil:
Maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo, Maius opus moveo.
"Events of grander march impel my song, and loftier task I try."
VII. 44.
Aeneid VII.44.
Aen. Tunc felix ille, qui iustus aestimator sui
Then happy is the one who, a just estimator of himself,
vere tamen de themate tali
yet truly about such a theme to be beautifully
a se pulcre exsequendo, possit praedicere,
carried out by himself, can predict
quod idem de saeculis aureis se vivo redituris:
what the same poet predicted about the golden ages returning while he was alive:
Non me carminibus vincet nec Thracius Orpheus, Nec Linus, huic mater quamvis, atque huic pater adsit, Orphei Calliopea, Lino formosus Apollo. Pan deus Arcadia mecum si iudice certet, Pan etiam Arcadia dicet se iudice victum.
"Nor Thracian Orpheus should out-sing me then, nor Linus, though his mother this, and that his sire should aid - Orpheus Calliope, and Linus fair Apollo. Nay, though Pan, with Arcady for judge, my claim contest, with Arcady for judge great Pan himself should own him foiled, and from the field retire."
§ 189.
§ 189.
Sunt res, et materiae, quarum adspectu primo describendarum cum aliqua pulcritudine statim exprimatur nobis, quod olim Virgilio: / There are things and materials at whose first sight, when they are to be described with some beauty, there is immediately expressed to us what once was expressed to Virgil:
Maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo, Maius opus moveo.
"Events of grander march impel my song, and loftier task I try."
VII. 44. / Aeneid VII.44.
Aen. Tunc felix ille, qui iustus aestimator sui vere tamen de themate tali a se pulcre exsequendo, possit praedicere, quod idem de saeculis aureis se vivo redituris: / Then happy is the one who, a just estimator of himself, yet truly about such a theme to be beautifully carried out by himself, can predict what the same poet predicted about the golden ages returning while he was alive:
Non me carminibus vincet nec Thracius Orpheus, Nec Linus, huic mater quamvis, atque huic pater adsit, Orphei Calliopea, Lino formosus Apollo. Pan deus Arcadia mecum si iudice certet, Pan etiam Arcadia dicet se iudice victum.
"Nor Thracian Orpheus should out-sing me then, nor Linus, though his mother this, and that his sire should aid - Orpheus Calliope, and Linus fair Apollo. Nay, though Pan, with Arcady for judge, my claim contest, with Arcady for judge great Pan himself should own him foiled, and from the field retire."
§ 189. / § 189.
§ 191
Magnitudo materiae aesthetica absoluta, § 189, poscit, ne cogitanda ac themata sumantur pulcre meditaturo obiecta ac materiae, quibus intra horizontem hominum aestheticum constitutis, §§ 119, 127, omnino deest magnitudo, § 177, nugae vere tales (res infimae et nugatoriae, quisquiliae, ineptiae).
Absolute aesthetic magnitude of the material, § 189, requires that one who is going to meditate beautifully not take as objects and materials for thinking themes which, though placed within the human aesthetic horizon, §§ 119, 127, wholly lack magnitude, § 177: trifles truly such – lowest and trifling things, rubbish, inanities.
Poetam non audio in nugis,
"I overlook the trifling faults of a poet; but shall I approve my fellow-citizen's life while he is counting his misdeeds with his fingers?"
Cic. Par. 3. Unde sat. V. 19 Persius optime:
Cicero, Paradoxa 3. Hence Persius, Satire V.19, very well:
Non equidem hoc studeo bullatis ut mihi nugis Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo. Excutienda damus praecordia,
"Nay, indeed, it is no aim of mine that my page should swell with pretentious trifles, fit only to give solidity to smoke. [...] I now shake out my heart to you at the bidding of the Muse."
§ 182.
§ 182.
Magnitudo materiae aesthetica absoluta, § 189, poscit, ne cogitanda ac themata sumantur pulcre meditaturo obiecta ac materiae, quibus intra horizontem hominum aestheticum constitutis, §§ 119, 127, omnino deest magnitudo, § 177, nugae vere tales (res infimae et nugatoriae, quisquiliae, ineptiae).
Absolute aesthetic magnitude of the material, § 189, requires that one who is going to meditate beautifully not take as objects and materials for thinking themes which, though placed within the human aesthetic horizon, §§ 119, 127, wholly lack magnitude, § 177: trifles truly such – lowest and trifling things, rubbish, inanities.
Poetam non audio in nugis,
"I overlook the trifling faults of a poet; but shall I approve my fellow-citizen's life while he is counting his misdeeds with his fingers?"
Cic. Par. 3. Unde sat. V. 19 Persius optime:
Cicero, Paradoxa 3. Hence Persius, Satire V.19, very well:
Non equidem hoc studeo bullatis ut mihi nugis Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo. Excutienda damus praecordia,
"Nay, indeed, it is no aim of mine that my page should swell with pretentious trifles, fit only to give solidity to smoke. [...] I now shake out my heart to you at the bidding of the Muse."
§ 182.
§ 182.
Magnitudo materiae aesthetica absoluta, § 189,
Absolute aesthetic magnitude of the material, § 189,
poscit, ne cogitanda ac themata sumantur pulcre
requires that one who is going to meditate beautifully
meditaturo obiecta ac materiae, quibus
not take as objects and materials for thinking themes which,
intra horizontem hominum aestheticum constitutis, §§ 119, 127,
though placed within the human aesthetic horizon, §§ 119, 127,
omnino deest magnitudo, § 177, nugae vere tales (res
wholly lack magnitude, § 177: trifles truly such
infimae et nugatoriae, quisquiliae, ineptiae).
– lowest and trifling things, rubbish, inanities.
Poetam non audio in nugis,
"I overlook the trifling faults of a poet; but shall I approve my fellow-citizen's life while he is counting his misdeeds with his fingers?"
Cic. Par. 3. Unde sat. V. 19 Persius optime:
Cicero, Paradoxa 3. Hence Persius, Satire V.19, very well:
Non equidem hoc studeo bullatis ut mihi nugis Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo. Excutienda damus praecordia,
"Nay, indeed, it is no aim of mine that my page should swell with pretentious trifles, fit only to give solidity to smoke. [...] I now shake out my heart to you at the bidding of the Muse."
§ 182.
§ 182.
Magnitudo materiae aesthetica absoluta, § 189, poscit, ne cogitanda ac themata sumantur pulcre meditaturo obiecta ac materiae, quibus intra horizontem hominum aestheticum constitutis, §§ 119, 127, omnino deest magnitudo, § 177, nugae vere tales (res infimae et nugatoriae, quisquiliae, ineptiae). / Absolute aesthetic magnitude of the material, § 189, requires that one who is going to meditate beautifully not take as objects and materials for thinking themes which, though placed within the human aesthetic horizon, §§ 119, 127, wholly lack magnitude, § 177: trifles truly such – lowest and trifling things, rubbish, inanities.
Poetam non audio in nugis,
"I overlook the trifling faults of a poet; but shall I approve my fellow-citizen's life while he is counting his misdeeds with his fingers?"
Cic. Par. 3. Unde sat. V. 19 Persius optime: / Cicero, Paradoxa 3. Hence Persius, Satire V.19, very well:
Non equidem hoc studeo bullatis ut mihi nugis Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo. Excutienda damus praecordia,
"Nay, indeed, it is no aim of mine that my page should swell with pretentious trifles, fit only to give solidity to smoke. [...] I now shake out my heart to you at the bidding of the Muse."
§ 182. / § 182.
§ 192
Si quis rixatur de lana saepe caprina, et Propugnat nugis armatus,
"another often wrangles about a goat's hair, and armed engages for any
trifle"
huc § 191 materia litis vere pertinet, nisi velit omnino suas tricas ultra horizontem aestheticum tollere, § 121. Catullus atque Martialis in ea sua cogitata, quae scripserunt ex turpi lege, de qua § 184, iusto leniores sunt, quando ea nugas vocant, alia tamen pulcrius a se concepta involventes eodem titulo sunt interpretandi ex § 179. Habentur etiam saepius in nugis, quae non sunt, qualia § 100, et forsan huc opinio Democriti, probe intellecta, quam Cicero male refutatam de Div. II. 20, non aequius in magnis nugis habet, ac
the material of the dispute truly belongs here, § 191, unless he wants altogether to raise his knots above the aesthetic horizon, § 121. Catullus and Martial, in those thoughts of theirs which they wrote from the shameful law discussed in § 184, are more lenient than is just when they call them trifles; yet when they wrap other things more beautifully conceived by themselves under the same title, they are to be interpreted according to § 179. Also, things are rather often counted among trifles which are not such, of the sort mentioned in § 100; and perhaps here belongs Democritus' opinion, rightly understood, which Cicero, badly refuted in De divinatione II.20, treats no more fairly among great trifles, and says that
physicorum genere nihil ait arrogantius esse.
"Nevertheless Democritus jests rather prettily for a natural philosopher - and there is no more arrogant class - when he says:"
Si quis rixatur de lana saepe caprina, et Propugnat nugis armatus,
"another often wrangles about a goat's hair, and armed engages for any
trifle"
huc § 191 materia litis vere pertinet, nisi velit omnino suas tricas ultra horizontem aestheticum tollere, § 121. Catullus atque Martialis in ea sua cogitata, quae scripserunt ex turpi lege, de qua § 184, iusto leniores sunt, quando ea nugas vocant, alia tamen pulcrius a se concepta involventes eodem titulo sunt interpretandi ex § 179. Habentur etiam saepius in nugis, quae non sunt, qualia § 100, et forsan huc opinio Democriti, probe intellecta, quam Cicero male refutatam de Div. II. 20, non aequius in magnis nugis habet, ac
the material of the dispute truly belongs here, § 191, unless he wants altogether to raise his knots above the aesthetic horizon, § 121. Catullus and Martial, in those thoughts of theirs which they wrote from the shameful law discussed in § 184, are more lenient than is just when they call them trifles; yet when they wrap other things more beautifully conceived by themselves under the same title, they are to be interpreted according to § 179. Also, things are rather often counted among trifles which are not such, of the sort mentioned in § 100; and perhaps here belongs Democritus' opinion, rightly understood, which Cicero, badly refuted in De divinatione II.20, treats no more fairly among great trifles, and says that
physicorum genere nihil ait arrogantius esse.
"Nevertheless Democritus jests rather prettily for a natural philosopher - and there is no more arrogant class - when he says:"
Si quis rixatur de lana saepe caprina, et Propugnat nugis armatus,
"another often wrangles about a goat's hair, and armed engages for any
trifle"
huc § 191 materia litis vere
the material of the dispute truly belongs here,
pertinet, nisi velit omnino suas tricas ultra
§ 191, unless he wants altogether to raise his knots
horizontem aestheticum tollere, § 121. Catullus atque Martialis
above the aesthetic horizon, § 121. Catullus and Martial,
in ea sua cogitata,
in those thoughts of theirs which
quae scripserunt ex turpi lege, de qua § 184,
they wrote from the shameful law discussed in § 184,
iusto leniores sunt, quando
are more lenient than is just when they call them trifles;
ea nugas vocant, alia tamen pulcrius
yet when they wrap other things more beautifully conceived
a se concepta involventes eodem titulo
by themselves under the same title,
sunt interpretandi ex § 179.
they are to be interpreted according to § 179.
Habentur etiam saepius in nugis,
Also, things are rather often counted among trifles
quae non sunt, qualia § 100,
which are not such, of the sort mentioned in § 100;
et forsan huc opinio Democriti, probe intellecta, quam
and perhaps here belongs Democritus' opinion, rightly understood,
Cicero male refutatam de Div.
which Cicero, badly refuted in De divinatione
II. 20, non aequius in magnis nugis habet, ac
II.20, treats no more fairly among great trifles, and says that
physicorum genere nihil ait arrogantius esse.
"Nevertheless Democritus jests rather prettily for a natural philosopher - and there is no more arrogant class - when he says:"
Si quis rixatur de lana saepe caprina, et Propugnat nugis armatus,
"another often wrangles about a goat's hair, and armed engages for any
trifle"
huc § 191 materia litis vere pertinet, nisi velit omnino suas tricas ultra horizontem aestheticum tollere, § 121. Catullus atque Martialis in ea sua cogitata, quae scripserunt ex turpi lege, de qua § 184, iusto leniores sunt, quando ea nugas vocant, alia tamen pulcrius a se concepta involventes eodem titulo sunt interpretandi ex § 179. Habentur etiam saepius in nugis, quae non sunt, qualia § 100, et forsan huc opinio Democriti, probe intellecta, quam Cicero male refutatam de Div. II. 20, non aequius in magnis nugis habet, ac / the material of the dispute truly belongs here, § 191, unless he wants altogether to raise his knots above the aesthetic horizon, § 121. Catullus and Martial, in those thoughts of theirs which they wrote from the shameful law discussed in § 184, are more lenient than is just when they call them trifles; yet when they wrap other things more beautifully conceived by themselves under the same title, they are to be interpreted according to § 179. Also, things are rather often counted among trifles which are not such, of the sort mentioned in § 100; and perhaps here belongs Democritus' opinion, rightly understood, which Cicero, badly refuted in De divinatione II.20, treats no more fairly among great trifles, and says that
physicorum genere nihil ait arrogantius esse.
"Nevertheless Democritus jests rather prettily for a natural philosopher - and there is no more arrogant class - when he says:"
§ 193
Dignitatem aestheticam, § 182, et absolutam et relativam, § 185, et obiectivam et subiectivam, quatenus in ea deprehenduntur n. 1 et 3, § 182, liceat in sequentibus negativam, quatenus autem simul n. 2 et 4 § c. considerantur, positivam appellare. Et quoniam nobilem iam ἤθους aesthetici partem aggredimur, definiam illud, psychologis saltim perspicue, generatim ante omnia per studium possibilitatis moralis, M. § 723, aestheticum, vel in aestheticis observatum. Ἦθος nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo romanus.
Let it be permitted in what follows to call negative aesthetic dignity, § 182, both absolute and relative, § 185, and objective and subjective, insofar as numbers 1 and 3 are found in it, § 182; but positive insofar as numbers 2 and 4 are at the same time considered. And since we now approach a noble part of aesthetic ethos, I shall define it, at least clearly for psychologists, generally and before all else through a study of moral possibility, Metaphysics § 723, either aesthetic or observed in aesthetics. Roman speech, as I at least think, lacks a word for ἦθος.
Mores appellantur – Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur, quam morum quaedam proprietas.
"it is however rendered by mores (morals) [...] But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects"
Quint. VI. 3.
Quintilian VI.3.
Dignitatem aestheticam, § 182, et absolutam et relativam, § 185, et obiectivam et subiectivam, quatenus in ea deprehenduntur n. 1 et 3, § 182, liceat in sequentibus negativam, quatenus autem simul n. 2 et 4 § c. considerantur, positivam appellare.
Let it be permitted in what follows to call negative aesthetic dignity, § 182, both absolute and relative, § 185, and objective and subjective, insofar as numbers 1 and 3 are found in it, § 182; but positive insofar as numbers 2 and 4 are at the same time considered.
Et quoniam nobilem iam ἤθους aesthetici partem aggredimur, definiam illud, psychologis saltim perspicue, generatim ante omnia per studium possibilitatis moralis, M. § 723, aestheticum, vel in aestheticis observatum.
And since we now approach a noble part of aesthetic ethos, I shall define it, at least clearly for psychologists, generally and before all else through a study of moral possibility, Metaphysics § 723, either aesthetic or observed in aesthetics.
Ἦθος nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo romanus.
Roman speech, as I at least think, lacks a word for ἦθος.
Mores appellantur – Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur, quam morum quaedam proprietas.
"it is however rendered by mores (morals) [...] But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects"
Quint. VI. 3.
Quintilian VI.3.
Dignitatem aestheticam,
Let it be permitted in what follows to call negative aesthetic
§ 182, et absolutam et relativam, § 185,
dignity, § 182, both absolute and relative, § 185,
et obiectivam et subiectivam, quatenus in ea deprehenduntur n. 1 et 3,
and objective and subjective, insofar as numbers 1 and 3
§ 182, liceat in sequentibus negativam, quatenus autem
are found in it, § 182; but positive insofar as
simul n. 2 et 4 § c. considerantur, positivam appellare.
numbers 2 and 4 are at the same time considered.
Et quoniam nobilem iam ἤθους aesthetici partem
And since we now approach a noble part of aesthetic ethos,
aggredimur, definiam illud, psychologis
I shall define it, at least clearly for psychologists,
saltim perspicue, generatim ante omnia per studium possibilitatis moralis,
generally and before all else through a study of moral
M. § 723, aestheticum, vel in aestheticis observatum.
possibility, Metaphysics § 723, either aesthetic or observed in aesthetics.
Ἦθος nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo romanus.
Roman speech, as I at least think, lacks a word for ἦθος.
Mores appellantur – Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur, quam morum quaedam proprietas.
"it is however rendered by mores (morals) [...] But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects"
Quint. VI. 3.
Quintilian VI.3.
Dignitatem aestheticam, § 182, et absolutam et relativam, § 185, et obiectivam et subiectivam, quatenus in ea deprehenduntur n. 1 et 3, § 182, liceat in sequentibus negativam, quatenus autem simul n. 2 et 4 § c. considerantur, positivam appellare. / Let it be permitted in what follows to call negative aesthetic dignity, § 182, both absolute and relative, § 185, and objective and subjective, insofar as numbers 1 and 3 are found in it, § 182; but positive insofar as numbers 2 and 4 are at the same time considered.
Et quoniam nobilem iam ἤθους aesthetici partem aggredimur, definiam illud, psychologis saltim perspicue, generatim ante omnia per studium possibilitatis moralis, M. § 723, aestheticum, vel in aestheticis observatum. / And since we now approach a noble part of aesthetic ethos, I shall define it, at least clearly for psychologists, generally and before all else through a study of moral possibility, Metaphysics § 723, either aesthetic or observed in aesthetics.
Ἦθος nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo romanus. / Roman speech, as I at least think, lacks a word for ἦθος.
Mores appellantur – Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur, quam morum quaedam proprietas.
"it is however rendered by mores (morals) [...] But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects"
Quint. VI. 3. / Quintilian VI.3.
§ 194
Ἦθος aestheticum habet etiam speciem suam partemque, ex qua negativum dicatur, §§ 193, 182, cuius haec est formula: Res, ordo, significatio, e.g. dictio, § 13, si pulcrae intenduntur, ita instituantur, ne quid moraliter absurdi in iisdem, vel ipsi rationis analogo pelluceat, §§ 16, 22; et alteram speciem ac partem, ex qua positivum appelletur, et secundum quam eadem, quae modo dixi, vere etiam consentire moribus et cum iisdem congruere, pulcre convenire cum illis, quae moraliter, ethice, oeconomice, civiliter ex usibus consuetudinibusque fieri possunt, fiat phaenomenon, vel ipsi rationis analogo observabile, § 23.
Aesthetic ethos also has its own species and part from which it is called negative, §§ 193, 182. Its formula is this: things, order, signification, for example diction, § 13, if they are intended to be beautiful, should be so arranged that nothing morally absurd shines through in them, even to the analogue of reason, §§ 16, 22. It has another species and part from which it is called positive; according to it, the same things I have just named truly also agree with morals, are congruent with them, and beautifully fit with those things that morally, ethically, economically, and civically can occur from usages and customs, so that this becomes a phenomenon observable even to the analogue of reason, § 23.
Ἦθος aestheticum habet etiam speciem suam partemque, ex qua negativum dicatur, §§ 193, 182, cuius haec est formula: Res, ordo, significatio, e.g. dictio, § 13, si pulcrae intenduntur, ita instituantur, ne quid moraliter absurdi in iisdem, vel ipsi rationis analogo pelluceat, §§ 16, 22; et alteram speciem ac partem, ex qua positivum appelletur, et secundum quam eadem, quae modo dixi, vere etiam consentire moribus et cum iisdem congruere, pulcre convenire cum illis, quae moraliter, ethice, oeconomice, civiliter ex usibus consuetudinibusque fieri possunt, fiat phaenomenon, vel ipsi rationis analogo observabile, § 23.
Aesthetic ethos also has its own species and part from which it is called negative, §§ 193, 182. Its formula is this: things, order, signification, for example diction, § 13, if they are intended to be beautiful, should be so arranged that nothing morally absurd shines through in them, even to the analogue of reason, §§ 16, 22. It has another species and part from which it is called positive; according to it, the same things I have just named truly also agree with morals, are congruent with them, and beautifully fit with those things that morally, ethically, economically, and civically can occur from usages and customs, so that this becomes a phenomenon observable even to the analogue of reason, § 23.
Ἦθος aestheticum habet etiam speciem suam partemque,
Aesthetic ethos also has its own species and part
ex qua negativum dicatur, §§ 193, 182,
from which it is called negative, §§ 193, 182.
cuius haec est formula: Res, ordo, significatio, e.g.
Its formula is this: things, order, signification, for example
dictio, § 13, si pulcrae intenduntur,
diction, § 13, if they are intended to be beautiful,
ita instituantur, ne quid moraliter absurdi in iisdem,
should be so arranged that nothing morally absurd shines through in them,
vel ipsi rationis analogo pelluceat, §§ 16, 22;
even to the analogue of reason, §§ 16, 22.
et alteram speciem ac partem, ex qua positivum
It has another species and part from which it is called positive;
appelletur, et secundum quam eadem,
according to it, the same things
quae modo dixi, vere etiam consentire moribus et cum
I have just named truly also agree with morals,
iisdem congruere, pulcre convenire cum illis,
are congruent with them, and beautifully fit with those things
quae moraliter, ethice, oeconomice, civiliter ex usibus consuetudinibusque
that morally, ethically, economically, and civically can occur from usages and customs,
fieri possunt, fiat phaenomenon,
so that this becomes a phenomenon
vel ipsi rationis analogo observabile, § 23.
observable even to the analogue of reason, § 23.
Ἦθος aestheticum habet etiam speciem suam partemque, ex qua negativum dicatur, §§ 193, 182, cuius haec est formula: Res, ordo, significatio, e.g. dictio, § 13, si pulcrae intenduntur, ita instituantur, ne quid moraliter absurdi in iisdem, vel ipsi rationis analogo pelluceat, §§ 16, 22; et alteram speciem ac partem, ex qua positivum appelletur, et secundum quam eadem, quae modo dixi, vere etiam consentire moribus et cum iisdem congruere, pulcre convenire cum illis, quae moraliter, ethice, oeconomice, civiliter ex usibus consuetudinibusque fieri possunt, fiat phaenomenon, vel ipsi rationis analogo observabile, § 23. / Aesthetic ethos also has its own species and part from which it is called negative, §§ 193, 182. Its formula is this: things, order, signification, for example diction, § 13, if they are intended to be beautiful, should be so arranged that nothing morally absurd shines through in them, even to the analogue of reason, §§ 16, 22. It has another species and part from which it is called positive; according to it, the same things I have just named truly also agree with morals, are congruent with them, and beautifully fit with those things that morally, ethically, economically, and civically can occur from usages and customs, so that this becomes a phenomenon observable even to the analogue of reason, § 23.
§ 195
Veniamus ad unam ἦθος partem ex primis, § 194, quam naturalis nunc meditandi ratio subministrabit. Dignitas aesthetica, si vel absolutam tantum intelligas, §§ 182, 185, postulat, ne qua cogitanda, multo minus themata sumantur, quibus intra horizontem aestheticum constitutis, ubertimque ac vivide e.c. § 22 percipiendis omnis omnino deest dignitas, obiecta vilia et plebeia, quae luto potius, quam myricis, § 178, conferas, et has humiles nuncupans illa humillima dicas et abiecta.
Let us come to one of the first parts of ἦθος, § 194, which the natural manner of meditating will now supply. Aesthetic dignity, even if you understand only absolute dignity, §§ 182, 185, requires that no things to be thought, much less themes, be taken up which, though placed within the aesthetic horizon and to be perceived abundantly and vividly, etc., § 22, wholly lack every dignity: base and plebeian objects. These you would compare with mud rather than with tamarisks, § 178; and, calling the latter humble, you would call the former lowest and abject.
Veniamus ad unam ἦθος partem ex primis, § 194, quam naturalis nunc meditandi ratio subministrabit.
Let us come to one of the first parts of ἦθος, § 194, which the natural manner of meditating will now supply.
Dignitas aesthetica, si vel absolutam tantum intelligas, §§ 182, 185, postulat, ne qua cogitanda, multo minus themata sumantur, quibus intra horizontem aestheticum constitutis, ubertimque ac vivide e.c. § 22 percipiendis omnis omnino deest dignitas, obiecta vilia et plebeia, quae luto potius, quam myricis, § 178, conferas, et has humiles nuncupans illa humillima dicas et abiecta.
Aesthetic dignity, even if you understand only absolute dignity, §§ 182, 185, requires that no things to be thought, much less themes, be taken up which, though placed within the aesthetic horizon and to be perceived abundantly and vividly, etc., § 22, wholly lack every dignity: base and plebeian objects. These you would compare with mud rather than with tamarisks, § 178; and, calling the latter humble, you would call the former lowest and abject.
Veniamus ad unam ἦθος partem ex primis,
Let us come to one of the first parts of ἦθος,
§ 194, quam naturalis nunc meditandi ratio subministrabit.
§ 194, which the natural manner of meditating will now supply.
Dignitas aesthetica, si vel absolutam tantum intelligas,
Aesthetic dignity, even if you understand only absolute dignity,
§§ 182, 185, postulat, ne qua cogitanda,
§§ 182, 185, requires that no things to be thought,
multo minus themata sumantur, quibus
much less themes, be taken up which,
intra horizontem aestheticum constitutis,
though placed within the aesthetic horizon
ubertimque ac vivide e.c.
and to be perceived abundantly and vividly, etc.,
§ 22 percipiendis omnis omnino deest dignitas, obiecta vilia et plebeia,
§ 22, wholly lack every dignity: base and plebeian objects.
quae luto potius, quam myricis, § 178,
These you would compare with mud rather than with tamarisks, § 178;
conferas, et has humiles
and, calling the latter humble,
nuncupans illa humillima dicas et abiecta.
you would call the former lowest and abject.
Veniamus ad unam ἦθος partem ex primis, § 194, quam naturalis nunc meditandi ratio subministrabit. / Let us come to one of the first parts of ἦθος, § 194, which the natural manner of meditating will now supply.
Dignitas aesthetica, si vel absolutam tantum intelligas, §§ 182, 185, postulat, ne qua cogitanda, multo minus themata sumantur, quibus intra horizontem aestheticum constitutis, ubertimque ac vivide e.c. § 22 percipiendis omnis omnino deest dignitas, obiecta vilia et plebeia, quae luto potius, quam myricis, § 178, conferas, et has humiles nuncupans illa humillima dicas et abiecta. / Aesthetic dignity, even if you understand only absolute dignity, §§ 182, 185, requires that no things to be thought, much less themes, be taken up which, though placed within the aesthetic horizon and to be perceived abundantly and vividly, etc., § 22, wholly lack every dignity: base and plebeian objects. These you would compare with mud rather than with tamarisks, § 178; and, calling the latter humble, you would call the former lowest and abject.
§ 196
Ut quisque optime natus institutusque est (haec autem est aesthetici practici persona, §§ 45, 54, 63), nihil abiectum, nihil humile, § 195, cogitant.
"Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to batten on the most exquisite pleasures. [...] insatiable in their appetite for study, they forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or mean thought."
Cic. de Fin. V. 57. Eorum nemo
– and this is the person of the practical aesthetician, §§ 45, 54, 63 – § 195. Cicero, De finibus V.57. None of them
Migret in obscuras humili sermone tabernas, Offenduntur enim, quibus est equus, et pater et res.
"may deviate into the low style of obscure, mechanical shops [...] For [at such stuff] all are offended, who have a horse, a father, or an estate"
Hor. Neque huc tantum traho turpissimam obscenitatem, de qua §§ 184, 192, sed et humi repentem adulationem,
Horace. Nor do I draw hither only the most shameful obscenity, about which §§ 184, 192, but also flattery creeping along the ground,
laudare paratam Si bene — , aut si quid fecit amicus, Quod proferre palam non possit lingua modeste,
"to throw up his hands and applaud if his friend spit or hiccup nicely, or if his golden basin make a gurgle when turned upside down"
Iuv. et luxuriantem contumeliis conviciisque lixas inter et calones maledicentiam, quam olim quidam critici, bona mens! qui Critici! documentum ubertatis suae copiaeque voluerunt. § 195.
Juvenal; and abusive speech luxuriating in insults and revilings among sutlers and camp-followers, which some critics once – good sense! what critics! – wanted to be a proof of their abundance and copiousness. § 195.
Ut quisque optime natus institutusque est (haec autem est aesthetici practici persona, §§ 45, 54, 63), nihil abiectum, nihil humile, § 195, cogitant.
"Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to batten on the most exquisite pleasures. [...] insatiable in their appetite for study, they forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or mean thought."
Cic. de Fin. V. 57. Eorum nemo
– and this is the person of the practical aesthetician, §§ 45, 54, 63 – § 195. Cicero, De finibus V.57. None of them
Migret in obscuras humili sermone tabernas, Offenduntur enim, quibus est equus, et pater et res.
"may deviate into the low style of obscure, mechanical shops [...] For [at such stuff] all are offended, who have a horse, a father, or an estate"
Hor. Neque huc tantum traho turpissimam obscenitatem, de qua §§ 184, 192, sed et humi repentem adulationem,
Horace. Nor do I draw hither only the most shameful obscenity, about which §§ 184, 192, but also flattery creeping along the ground,
laudare paratam Si bene — , aut si quid fecit amicus, Quod proferre palam non possit lingua modeste,
"to throw up his hands and applaud if his friend spit or hiccup nicely, or if his golden basin make a gurgle when turned upside down"
Iuv. et luxuriantem contumeliis conviciisque lixas inter et calones maledicentiam, quam olim quidam critici, bona mens! qui Critici! documentum ubertatis suae copiaeque voluerunt. § 195.
Juvenal; and abusive speech luxuriating in insults and revilings among sutlers and camp-followers, which some critics once – good sense! what critics! – wanted to be a proof of their abundance and copiousness. § 195.
Ut quisque optime natus institutusque est (haec autem est aesthetici practici persona, §§ 45, 54, 63), nihil abiectum, nihil humile, § 195, cogitant.
"Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to batten on the most exquisite pleasures. [...] insatiable in their appetite for study, they forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or mean thought."
Cic.
– and this is the person of the practical aesthetician,
de Fin. V. 57. Eorum nemo
§§ 45, 54, 63 – § 195. Cicero, De finibus V.57. None of them
Migret in obscuras humili sermone tabernas, Offenduntur enim, quibus est equus, et pater et res.
"may deviate into the low style of obscure, mechanical shops [...] For [at such stuff] all are offended, who have a horse, a father, or an estate"
Hor. Neque huc tantum traho turpissimam obscenitatem,
Horace. Nor do I draw hither only the most shameful obscenity,
de qua §§ 184, 192, sed et humi repentem adulationem,
about which §§ 184, 192, but also flattery creeping along the ground,
laudare paratam Si bene — , aut si quid fecit amicus, Quod proferre palam non possit lingua modeste,
"to throw up his hands and applaud if his friend spit or hiccup nicely, or if his golden basin make a gurgle when turned upside down"
Iuv. et luxuriantem contumeliis conviciisque lixas
Juvenal; and abusive speech luxuriating in insults and revilings
inter et calones maledicentiam, quam olim quidam critici,
among sutlers and camp-followers, which some critics
bona mens! qui Critici!
once – good sense! what critics!
documentum ubertatis suae copiaeque voluerunt. § 195.
– wanted to be a proof of their abundance and copiousness. § 195.
Ut quisque optime natus institutusque est (haec autem est aesthetici practici persona, §§ 45, 54, 63), nihil abiectum, nihil humile, § 195, cogitant.
"Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to batten on the most exquisite pleasures. [...] insatiable in their appetite for study, they forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or mean thought."
Cic. de Fin. V. 57. Eorum nemo / – and this is the person of the practical aesthetician, §§ 45, 54, 63 – § 195. Cicero, De finibus V.57. None of them
Migret in obscuras humili sermone tabernas, Offenduntur enim, quibus est equus, et pater et res.
"may deviate into the low style of obscure, mechanical shops [...] For [at such stuff] all are offended, who have a horse, a father, or an estate"
Hor. Neque huc tantum traho turpissimam obscenitatem, de qua §§ 184, 192, sed et humi repentem adulationem, / Horace. Nor do I draw hither only the most shameful obscenity, about which §§ 184, 192, but also flattery creeping along the ground,
laudare paratam Si bene — , aut si quid fecit amicus, Quod proferre palam non possit lingua modeste,
"to throw up his hands and applaud if his friend spit or hiccup nicely, or if his golden basin make a gurgle when turned upside down"
Iuv. et luxuriantem contumeliis conviciisque lixas inter et calones maledicentiam, quam olim quidam critici, bona mens! qui Critici! documentum ubertatis suae copiaeque voluerunt. § 195. / Juvenal; and abusive speech luxuriating in insults and revilings among sutlers and camp-followers, which some critics once – good sense! what critics! – wanted to be a proof of their abundance and copiousness. § 195.
§ 197
In diiudicanda magnitudine ac dignitate materiarum absoluta, ne magna pusillis, sine pondere habentia pondus, § 177, digna indignis, § 182, fanda nefandis, § 196, temere misceantur, non excluduntur ex materiis pulcre cogitandis, 1) vere nonnullam habentia magnitudinem, aliquando summam, § 178, in quibus tamen non nemo, gigantum fraterculus, qui se solum putat aliquid magni, ac omnia refert ad grandem, quam in se solus miratur, mensuram, nihil omnino, nisi nihili facienda, vili pendenda, nugas meras, potest deprehendere. Non opus est musicam Epaminondae citare, quamdiu ipsa religio multis, nisi cum re, vilior alga est.
In judging the absolute magnitude and dignity of materials, lest great things be rashly mixed with small, things "without weight having weight," § 177, worthy things with unworthy, § 182, speakable with unspeakable, § 196, the following are not excluded from materials to be thought beautifully: 1) things that truly have some magnitude, sometimes the highest, § 178, in which nevertheless some little brother of the giants, who thinks that he alone is something great and refers all things to the grand measure that he alone admires in himself, can detect nothing at all except things to be treated as nothing, held cheap, mere trifles. There is no need to cite the music of Epaminondas, as long as religion itself for many people, "unless with property, is cheaper than seaweed."
In diiudicanda magnitudine ac dignitate materiarum absoluta, ne magna pusillis, sine pondere habentia pondus, § 177, digna indignis, § 182, fanda nefandis, § 196, temere misceantur, non excluduntur ex materiis pulcre cogitandis, 1) vere nonnullam habentia magnitudinem, aliquando summam, § 178, in quibus tamen non nemo, gigantum fraterculus, qui se solum putat aliquid magni, ac omnia refert ad grandem, quam in se solus miratur, mensuram, nihil omnino, nisi nihili facienda, vili pendenda, nugas meras, potest deprehendere.
In judging the absolute magnitude and dignity of materials, lest great things be rashly mixed with small, things "without weight having weight," § 177, worthy things with unworthy, § 182, speakable with unspeakable, § 196, the following are not excluded from materials to be thought beautifully: 1) things that truly have some magnitude, sometimes the highest, § 178, in which nevertheless some little brother of the giants, who thinks that he alone is something great and refers all things to the grand measure that he alone admires in himself, can detect nothing at all except things to be treated as nothing, held cheap, mere trifles.
Non opus est musicam Epaminondae citare, quamdiu ipsa religio multis, nisi cum re, vilior alga est.
There is no need to cite the music of Epaminondas, as long as religion itself for many people, "unless with property, is cheaper than seaweed."
In diiudicanda magnitudine ac dignitate materiarum
In judging the absolute magnitude and dignity of materials,
absoluta, ne magna pusillis,
lest great things be rashly mixed with small,
sine pondere habentia pondus, § 177, digna indignis,
things "without weight having weight," § 177, worthy things
§ 182, fanda nefandis, § 196, temere misceantur,
with unworthy, § 182, speakable with unspeakable, § 196, the following
non excluduntur ex materiis pulcre
are not excluded from materials to be thought beautifully:
cogitandis, 1) vere nonnullam habentia magnitudinem,
1) things that truly have some magnitude,
aliquando summam, § 178, in quibus tamen non nemo,
sometimes the highest, § 178, in which nevertheless some little
gigantum fraterculus, qui se solum putat
brother of the giants, who thinks that
aliquid magni, ac omnia refert
he alone is something great and refers all
ad grandem, quam in se
things to the grand measure that he alone admires in himself,
solus miratur, mensuram, nihil omnino, nisi nihili facienda,
can detect nothing at all except things to
vili pendenda, nugas meras, potest deprehendere.
be treated as nothing, held cheap, mere trifles.
Non opus est musicam Epaminondae
There is no need to cite the music of Epaminondas,
citare, quamdiu ipsa religio multis,
as long as religion itself for many people,
nisi cum re, vilior alga est.
"unless with property, is cheaper than seaweed."
In diiudicanda magnitudine ac dignitate materiarum absoluta, ne magna pusillis, sine pondere habentia pondus, § 177, digna indignis, § 182, fanda nefandis, § 196, temere misceantur, non excluduntur ex materiis pulcre cogitandis, 1) vere nonnullam habentia magnitudinem, aliquando summam, § 178, in quibus tamen non nemo, gigantum fraterculus, qui se solum putat aliquid magni, ac omnia refert ad grandem, quam in se solus miratur, mensuram, nihil omnino, nisi nihili facienda, vili pendenda, nugas meras, potest deprehendere. / In judging the absolute magnitude and dignity of materials, lest great things be rashly mixed with small, things "without weight having weight," § 177, worthy things with unworthy, § 182, speakable with unspeakable, § 196, the following are not excluded from materials to be thought beautifully: 1) things that truly have some magnitude, sometimes the highest, § 178, in which nevertheless some little brother of the giants, who thinks that he alone is something great and refers all things to the grand measure that he alone admires in himself, can detect nothing at all except things to be treated as nothing, held cheap, mere trifles.
Non opus est musicam Epaminondae citare, quamdiu ipsa religio multis, nisi cum re, vilior alga est. / There is no need to cite the music of Epaminondas, as long as religion itself for many people, "unless with property, is cheaper than seaweed."
§ 198
2) Quibus deest utique quaedam magnitudo relativa ac comparativa, neque tamen absoluta, § 178, e.g. in colloquiis epistolisque familiaribus, in quibus vel duo nonnunquam
2) Things to which a certain relative and comparative magnitude is certainly lacking, but not absolute magnitude, § 178, for example in familiar conversations and letters, in which even two persons sometimes are
satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus.
"each of us is enough of an audience for the other"
Sen. Talem se sistit Corydon:
Seneca. Corydon presents himself as such:
Despectus tibi sum, nec quis sim quaeris, Alexi, Quam dives pecoris nivei, quam lactis abundans. Mille meae Siculis errant in montibus agnae.
"You scorn me, Alexis, who or what I am care not to ask - how rich in flocks, or how in snow-white milk abounding: yet for me roam on Sicilian hills a thousand lambs"
e.c. Virg. Ecl. II. 19.
etc. Virgil, Eclogue II.19.
2) Quibus deest utique quaedam magnitudo relativa ac comparativa, neque tamen absoluta, § 178, e.g. in colloquiis epistolisque familiaribus, in quibus vel duo nonnunquam
2) Things to which a certain relative and comparative magnitude is certainly lacking, but not absolute magnitude, § 178, for example in familiar conversations and letters, in which even two persons sometimes are
satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus.
"each of us is enough of an audience for the other"
Sen.
Seneca.
Talem se sistit Corydon:
Corydon presents himself as such:
Despectus tibi sum, nec quis sim quaeris, Alexi, Quam dives pecoris nivei, quam lactis abundans. Mille meae Siculis errant in montibus agnae.
"You scorn me, Alexis, who or what I am care not to ask - how rich in flocks, or how in snow-white milk abounding: yet for me roam on Sicilian hills a thousand lambs"
e.c. Virg. Ecl. II. 19.
etc. Virgil, Eclogue II.19.
2) Quibus deest utique quaedam magnitudo relativa ac comparativa,
2) Things to which a certain relative and comparative
neque tamen absoluta, § 178, e.g.
magnitude is certainly lacking, but not absolute magnitude, § 178, for
in colloquiis epistolisque familiaribus,
example in familiar conversations and letters,
in quibus vel duo nonnunquam
in which even two persons sometimes are
satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus.
"each of us is enough of an audience for the other"
Sen.
Seneca.
Talem se sistit Corydon:
Corydon presents himself as such:
Despectus tibi sum, nec quis sim quaeris, Alexi, Quam dives pecoris nivei, quam lactis abundans. Mille meae Siculis errant in montibus agnae.
"You scorn me, Alexis, who or what I am care not to ask - how rich in flocks, or how in snow-white milk abounding: yet for me roam on Sicilian hills a thousand lambs"
e.c. Virg. Ecl. II. 19.
etc. Virgil, Eclogue II.19.
2) Quibus deest utique quaedam magnitudo relativa ac comparativa, neque tamen absoluta, § 178, e.g. in colloquiis epistolisque familiaribus, in quibus vel duo nonnunquam / 2) Things to which a certain relative and comparative magnitude is certainly lacking, but not absolute magnitude, § 178, for example in familiar conversations and letters, in which even two persons sometimes are
satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus.
"each of us is enough of an audience for the other"
Sen. / Seneca.
Talem se sistit Corydon: / Corydon presents himself as such:
Despectus tibi sum, nec quis sim quaeris, Alexi, Quam dives pecoris nivei, quam lactis abundans. Mille meae Siculis errant in montibus agnae.
"You scorn me, Alexis, who or what I am care not to ask - how rich in flocks, or how in snow-white milk abounding: yet for me roam on Sicilian hills a thousand lambs"
e.c. Virg. Ecl. II. 19. / etc. Virgil, Eclogue II.19.
§ 199
3) Quae non ipsa solum, sed et cum suis variis consectariisque satis multis pura mente cogitari possunt, etiam copiose, vivide e.c. § 22, licet impura mens possit in ipsis eorumque variis et consectariis simul non pauca virtuti inimica excogitare, e.g. si,
3) Things which can be thought with a pure mind not only in themselves but also with their various aspects and many enough consequences, even copiously and vividly, etc., § 22, although an impure mind can at the same time devise in those things and their various aspects and consequences not a few things hostile to virtue; for example, if
Tityre, lentus in umbra Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas.
"while, Tityrus, you sit careless in the shade, and, at your call, "Fair Amaryllis" bid the woods resound"
4) quae morosae virtuti, vel etiam fucatae taedium afferunt, quando ab aliis cogitantur, innocentia, non sine suspicione invidiae: e.g. Mart. IX. 98:
4) Things which bring weariness to morose virtue, or even to painted virtue, when they are thought by others, though they are innocent – not without suspicion of envy; for example Martial IX.98:
quod amamur, quodque probamur.
"He is bursting with envy, because I am loved and praised."
3) Quae non ipsa solum, sed et cum suis variis consectariisque satis multis pura mente cogitari possunt, etiam copiose, vivide e.c. § 22, licet impura mens possit in ipsis eorumque variis et consectariis simul non pauca virtuti inimica excogitare, e.g. si,
3) Things which can be thought with a pure mind not only in themselves but also with their various aspects and many enough consequences, even copiously and vividly, etc., § 22, although an impure mind can at the same time devise in those things and their various aspects and consequences not a few things hostile to virtue; for example, if
Tityre, lentus in umbra Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas.
"while, Tityrus, you sit careless in the shade, and, at your call, "Fair Amaryllis" bid the woods resound"
4) quae morosae virtuti, vel etiam fucatae taedium afferunt, quando ab aliis cogitantur, innocentia, non sine suspicione invidiae: e.g. Mart. IX. 98:
4) Things which bring weariness to morose virtue, or even to painted virtue, when they are thought by others, though they are innocent – not without suspicion of envy; for example Martial IX.98:
quod amamur, quodque probamur.
"He is bursting with envy, because I am loved and praised."
3) Quae
3) Things which can be thought with a pure
non ipsa solum, sed et cum suis
mind not only in themselves but also with their
variis consectariisque satis multis pura mente cogitari possunt,
various aspects and many enough consequences,
etiam copiose, vivide e.c. § 22,
even copiously and vividly, etc., § 22,
licet impura mens possit
although an impure mind can at the same time
in ipsis eorumque variis et
devise in those things and their various aspects and
consectariis simul non pauca virtuti
consequences not a few things hostile to virtue;
inimica excogitare, e.g. si,
for example, if
Tityre, lentus in umbra Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas.
"while, Tityrus, you sit careless in the shade, and, at your call, "Fair Amaryllis" bid the woods resound"
4) quae morosae virtuti,
4) Things which bring weariness to morose virtue,
vel etiam fucatae taedium afferunt, quando ab aliis
or even to painted virtue, when they are thought by others,
cogitantur, innocentia, non sine suspicione invidiae:
though they are innocent – not without suspicion of
e.g. Mart. IX. 98:
envy; for example Martial IX.98:
quod amamur, quodque probamur.
"He is bursting with envy, because I am loved and praised."
3) Quae non ipsa solum, sed et cum suis variis consectariisque satis multis pura mente cogitari possunt, etiam copiose, vivide e.c. § 22, licet impura mens possit in ipsis eorumque variis et consectariis simul non pauca virtuti inimica excogitare, e.g. si, / 3) Things which can be thought with a pure mind not only in themselves but also with their various aspects and many enough consequences, even copiously and vividly, etc., § 22, although an impure mind can at the same time devise in those things and their various aspects and consequences not a few things hostile to virtue; for example, if
Tityre, lentus in umbra Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas.
"while, Tityrus, you sit careless in the shade, and, at your call, "Fair Amaryllis" bid the woods resound"
4) quae morosae virtuti, vel etiam fucatae taedium afferunt, quando ab aliis cogitantur, innocentia, non sine suspicione invidiae: e.g. Mart. IX. 98: / 4) Things which bring weariness to morose virtue, or even to painted virtue, when they are thought by others, though they are innocent – not without suspicion of envy; for example Martial IX.98:
quod amamur, quodque probamur.
"He is bursting with envy, because I am loved and praised."
§ 200
5) Quae non omnibus personis ac aetatibus, temporibus ac locis conveniant, aliquibus autem utique; salva tam magnitudine, quam dignitate absolutis, § 197, e.g. quae solebant cum Lucilio,
5) Things that do not fit all persons and ages, times and places, yet certainly fit some, while both absolute magnitude and dignity are preserved, § 197; for example, those things that used to be done with Lucilius,
ubi se a vulgo et scena in secreta remorant Virtus Scipiadiae ac mitis sapientia Laeli Nugari, § 192, faciles, discincti et ludere, donec Decoqueretur olus.
"Yet, when the valorous Scipio, and the mild philosophical Laelius, had
withdrawn themselves from the crowd and the public scene, they used to
divert themselves with him, and joke in a free manner, while a few
vegetables were boiled [for supper]."
Hor. Serm. II. 1.75. 6) non explicite, immediate, aut propius virtutes inculcantia. e.g. Lucretii l. 49:
§ 192, "relaxed, ungirt, and to play, until the vegetables were cooked." Horace, Sermones II.1.75. 6) Things not explicitly, immediately, or more closely inculcating virtues; for example Lucretius I.49:
De summa caeli ratione deumque Disserere incipiam, et rerum primordia pandam, Unde omnes natura creet res, aucet, alatque, Quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat.
"I prove the supreme law of Gods and sky, And the primordial germs of things unfold, Whence Nature all creates, and multiplies And fosters all, and whither she resolves Each in the end when each is overthrown."
e.c.
etc.
5) Quae non omnibus personis ac aetatibus, temporibus ac locis conveniant, aliquibus autem utique; salva tam magnitudine, quam dignitate absolutis, § 197, e.g. quae solebant cum Lucilio,
5) Things that do not fit all persons and ages, times and places, yet certainly fit some, while both absolute magnitude and dignity are preserved, § 197; for example, those things that used to be done with Lucilius,
ubi se a vulgo et scena in secreta remorant Virtus Scipiadiae ac mitis sapientia Laeli Nugari, § 192, faciles, discincti et ludere, donec Decoqueretur olus.
"Yet, when the valorous Scipio, and the mild philosophical Laelius, had
withdrawn themselves from the crowd and the public scene, they used to
divert themselves with him, and joke in a free manner, while a few
vegetables were boiled [for supper]."
Hor. Serm. II. 1.75. 6) non explicite, immediate, aut propius virtutes inculcantia. e.g. Lucretii l. 49:
§ 192, "relaxed, ungirt, and to play, until the vegetables were cooked." Horace, Sermones II.1.75. 6) Things not explicitly, immediately, or more closely inculcating virtues; for example Lucretius I.49:
De summa caeli ratione deumque Disserere incipiam, et rerum primordia pandam, Unde omnes natura creet res, aucet, alatque, Quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat.
"I prove the supreme law of Gods and sky, And the primordial germs of things unfold, Whence Nature all creates, and multiplies And fosters all, and whither she resolves Each in the end when each is overthrown."
e.c.
etc.
5) Quae non omnibus personis ac aetatibus,
5) Things that do not fit all persons and ages,
temporibus ac locis conveniant, aliquibus autem utique;
times and places, yet certainly fit some, while
salva tam magnitudine, quam dignitate absolutis, § 197,
both absolute magnitude and dignity are preserved, § 197;
e.g. quae solebant cum Lucilio,
for example, those things that used to be done with Lucilius,
ubi se a vulgo et scena in secreta remorant Virtus Scipiadiae ac mitis sapientia Laeli Nugari, § 192, faciles, discincti et ludere, donec Decoqueretur olus.
"Yet, when the valorous Scipio, and the mild philosophical Laelius, had
withdrawn themselves from the crowd and the public scene, they used to
divert themselves with him, and joke in a free manner, while a few
vegetables were boiled [for supper]."
Hor.
§ 192, "relaxed, ungirt, and to play, until the vegetables were cooked."
Serm. II. 1.75. 6) non explicite, immediate, aut propius virtutes inculcantia.
Horace, Sermones II.1.75. 6) Things not explicitly, immediately, or more closely inculcating
e.g. Lucretii l. 49:
virtues; for example Lucretius I.49:
De summa caeli ratione deumque Disserere incipiam, et rerum primordia pandam, Unde omnes natura creet res, aucet, alatque, Quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat.
"I prove the supreme law of Gods and sky, And the primordial germs of things unfold, Whence Nature all creates, and multiplies And fosters all, and whither she resolves Each in the end when each is overthrown."
e.c.
etc.
5) Quae non omnibus personis ac aetatibus, temporibus ac locis conveniant, aliquibus autem utique; salva tam magnitudine, quam dignitate absolutis, § 197, e.g. quae solebant cum Lucilio, / 5) Things that do not fit all persons and ages, times and places, yet certainly fit some, while both absolute magnitude and dignity are preserved, § 197; for example, those things that used to be done with Lucilius,
ubi se a vulgo et scena in secreta remorant Virtus Scipiadiae ac mitis sapientia Laeli Nugari, § 192, faciles, discincti et ludere, donec Decoqueretur olus.
"Yet, when the valorous Scipio, and the mild philosophical Laelius, had
withdrawn themselves from the crowd and the public scene, they used to
divert themselves with him, and joke in a free manner, while a few
vegetables were boiled [for supper]."
Hor. Serm. II. 1.75. 6) non explicite, immediate, aut propius virtutes inculcantia. e.g. Lucretii l. 49: / § 192, "relaxed, ungirt, and to play, until the vegetables were cooked." Horace, Sermones II.1.75. 6) Things not explicitly, immediately, or more closely inculcating virtues; for example Lucretius I.49:
De summa caeli ratione deumque Disserere incipiam, et rerum primordia pandam, Unde omnes natura creet res, aucet, alatque, Quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat.
"I prove the supreme law of Gods and sky, And the primordial germs of things unfold, Whence Nature all creates, and multiplies And fosters all, and whither she resolves Each in the end when each is overthrown."
e.c. / etc.