§ 526
Iudicium generale, s. dogma, vel est theoreticum, vel practicum. Dogma practicum aesthetice cogitatum est sententia. Conceptus inferior suum superiorem, sub quo continetur, declarans, s. clariorem reddens, est exemplum. Exemplum sententiae stricte fictum, § 506, est fabula. Quanquam enim quaevis, etiam strictissime vera, narratiuncula, quoniam eundo plerumque crescit et spurias ex adiectionibus fictis vires acquirit, nonnunquam fabula dicitur latius, ut ante suum diem ob luxuriam mortuus aliquis
A general judgment, or dogma, is either theoretical or practical. A practical dogma thought aesthetically is a sentence. An inferior concept declaring, or making clearer, its superior under which it is contained is an example. An example of a sentence, strictly invented, § 506, is a fable. For although any little narrative, even one most strictly true, because in going around it very often grows and acquires spurious powers from invented additions, is sometimes called a fable more broadly, as someone dead before his day because of luxury
It nova, nec tristis, per cunctas fabula coenas,
"The news travels to all the dinner-tables, but calls forth no grief;"
Iuv. Sat. I. tamen strictius nobis utendum erit vocabulo simpliciter, ut strictissime veris opponatur narrationibus.
Juvenal, Satire I, nevertheless we shall have to use the word simply in the stricter sense, so that it may be opposed to narratives that are most strictly true.
Iudicium generale, s. dogma, vel est theoreticum, vel practicum.
A general judgment, or dogma, is either theoretical or practical.
Dogma practicum aesthetice cogitatum est sententia.
A practical dogma thought aesthetically is a sentence.
Conceptus inferior suum superiorem, sub quo continetur, declarans, s. clariorem reddens, est exemplum.
An inferior concept declaring, or making clearer, its superior under which it is contained is an example.
Exemplum sententiae stricte fictum, § 506, est fabula.
An example of a sentence, strictly invented, § 506, is a fable.
Quanquam enim quaevis, etiam strictissime vera, narratiuncula, quoniam eundo plerumque crescit et spurias ex adiectionibus fictis vires acquirit, nonnunquam fabula dicitur latius, ut ante suum diem ob luxuriam mortuus aliquis
For although any little narrative, even one most strictly true, because in going around it very often grows and acquires spurious powers from invented additions, is sometimes called a fable more broadly, as someone dead before his day because of luxury
It nova, nec tristis, per cunctas fabula coenas,
"The news travels to all the dinner-tables, but calls forth no grief;"
Iuv. Sat. I. tamen strictius nobis utendum erit vocabulo simpliciter, ut strictissime veris opponatur narrationibus.
Juvenal, Satire I, nevertheless we shall have to use the word simply in the stricter sense, so that it may be opposed to narratives that are most strictly true.
Iudicium generale, s. dogma, vel est theoreticum, vel practicum.
A general judgment, or dogma, is either theoretical or practical.
Dogma practicum aesthetice cogitatum est sententia.
A practical dogma thought aesthetically is a sentence.
Conceptus inferior suum superiorem, sub quo continetur, declarans, s.
An inferior concept declaring, or making clearer, its superior under which it
clariorem reddens, est exemplum.
is contained is an example.
Exemplum sententiae stricte fictum, § 506, est fabula.
An example of a sentence, strictly invented, § 506, is a fable.
Quanquam enim quaevis, etiam strictissime vera, narratiuncula,
For although any little narrative, even one most strictly
quoniam eundo plerumque crescit
true, because in going around it very often grows
et spurias ex adiectionibus fictis vires acquirit,
and acquires spurious powers from invented additions, is sometimes called
nonnunquam fabula dicitur latius, ut ante suum diem ob
a fable more broadly, as someone dead before his
luxuriam mortuus aliquis
day because of luxury
It nova, nec tristis, per cunctas fabula coenas,
"The news travels to all the dinner-tables, but calls forth no grief;"
Iuv. Sat. I. tamen strictius
Juvenal, Satire I, nevertheless we shall have to use
nobis utendum erit vocabulo simpliciter,
the word simply in the stricter sense, so
ut strictissime veris opponatur narrationibus.
that it may be opposed to narratives that are most strictly true.
Iudicium generale, s. dogma, vel est theoreticum, vel practicum. / A general judgment, or dogma, is either theoretical or practical.
Dogma practicum aesthetice cogitatum est sententia. / A practical dogma thought aesthetically is a sentence.
Conceptus inferior suum superiorem, sub quo continetur, declarans, s. clariorem reddens, est exemplum. / An inferior concept declaring, or making clearer, its superior under which it is contained is an example.
Exemplum sententiae stricte fictum, § 506, est fabula. / An example of a sentence, strictly invented, § 506, is a fable.
Quanquam enim quaevis, etiam strictissime vera, narratiuncula, quoniam eundo plerumque crescit et spurias ex adiectionibus fictis vires acquirit, nonnunquam fabula dicitur latius, ut ante suum diem ob luxuriam mortuus aliquis / For although any little narrative, even one most strictly true, because in going around it very often grows and acquires spurious powers from invented additions, is sometimes called a fable more broadly, as someone dead before his day because of luxury
It nova, nec tristis, per cunctas fabula coenas,
"The news travels to all the dinner-tables, but calls forth no grief;"
Iuv. Sat. I. tamen strictius nobis utendum erit vocabulo simpliciter, ut strictissime veris opponatur narrationibus. / Juvenal, Satire I, nevertheless we shall have to use the word simply in the stricter sense, so that it may be opposed to narratives that are most strictly true.
§ 527
Fabula erit vel fictio historica strictius, §§ 526, 509, quae nullis interstincta fictionibus poeticis, § 511, simplex dicitur, vel fictio poetica, § 511, vel ex historicis poeticisque fictionibus mixta. Fictiones generis secundi et tertii fabulosae dicuntur. Nobis ad analogiam fictionum fabulas primi generis historicas, § 526, secundi autem et tertii generis fabulas dicere liceat poeticas.
A fable will be either historical fiction more strictly, §§ 526, 509, which, interspersed with no poetic fictions, § 511, is called simple; or poetic fiction, § 511; or mixed from historical and poetic fictions. Fictions of the second and third kind are called fabulous. Let it be permitted to us, by analogy with fictions, to call fables of the first kind historical, § 526, but fables of the second and third kind poetic.
Fabula erit vel fictio historica strictius, §§ 526, 509, quae nullis interstincta fictionibus poeticis, § 511, simplex dicitur, vel fictio poetica, § 511, vel ex historicis poeticisque fictionibus mixta.
A fable will be either historical fiction more strictly, §§ 526, 509, which, interspersed with no poetic fictions, § 511, is called simple; or poetic fiction, § 511; or mixed from historical and poetic fictions.
Fictiones generis secundi et tertii fabulosae dicuntur.
Fictions of the second and third kind are called fabulous.
Nobis ad analogiam fictionum fabulas primi generis historicas, § 526, secundi autem et tertii generis fabulas dicere liceat poeticas.
Let it be permitted to us, by analogy with fictions, to call fables of the first kind historical, § 526, but fables of the second and third kind poetic.
Fabula erit vel fictio historica strictius,
A fable will be either historical fiction more strictly,
§§ 526, 509, quae nullis interstincta fictionibus poeticis, § 511, simplex
§§ 526, 509, which, interspersed with no poetic fictions, § 511, is called simple;
dicitur, vel fictio poetica, § 511, vel ex historicis poeticisque fictionibus mixta.
or poetic fiction, § 511; or mixed from historical and poetic fictions.
Fictiones generis secundi et tertii fabulosae dicuntur.
Fictions of the second and third kind are called fabulous.
Nobis ad analogiam fictionum
Let it be permitted to us, by analogy with fictions,
fabulas primi generis historicas, § 526,
to call fables of the first kind historical, § 526,
secundi autem et tertii generis fabulas
but fables of the second
dicere liceat poeticas.
and third kind poetic.
Fabula erit vel fictio historica strictius, §§ 526, 509, quae nullis interstincta fictionibus poeticis, § 511, simplex dicitur, vel fictio poetica, § 511, vel ex historicis poeticisque fictionibus mixta. / A fable will be either historical fiction more strictly, §§ 526, 509, which, interspersed with no poetic fictions, § 511, is called simple; or poetic fiction, § 511; or mixed from historical and poetic fictions.
Fictiones generis secundi et tertii fabulosae dicuntur. / Fictions of the second and third kind are called fabulous.
Nobis ad analogiam fictionum fabulas primi generis historicas, § 526, secundi autem et tertii generis fabulas dicere liceat poeticas. / Let it be permitted to us, by analogy with fictions, to call fables of the first kind historical, § 526, but fables of the second and third kind poetic.
§ 528
Fabulae historicae § 527 illae sunt, quae mediis aliquando fabellis interpositae tamen narrationum, immo historiarum, nomen accipiunt: poeticae autem sunt, de quibus Cicero de Inv. I. 27, tanquam de genere narrationum remoto a civilibus caussis, quod delectationis caussa non inutili cum exercitatione dicatur et scribatur (cogitetur venustius) loquutus easdem describit, eas (narrationes) quae nec (strictissime) veras, nec (strictissime) verisimiles res contineant, cuiusmodi sit:
Historical fables, § 527, are those which, although sometimes little fables have been interposed in their midst, nevertheless receive the name of narratives, indeed of histories: but poetic fables are those concerning which Cicero, On Invention I.27, speaking of them as a kind of narratives remote from civil cases, which is spoken and written for the sake of delight, not without exercise, (more charmingly, is thought), describes the same things, as those (narrations) which contain things neither (most strictly) true nor (most strictly) verisimilar, of which sort is:
Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo.
"Huge winged snakes, join'd by one common yoke."
Fabulae historicae § 527 illae sunt, quae mediis aliquando fabellis interpositae tamen narrationum, immo historiarum, nomen accipiunt: poeticae autem sunt, de quibus Cicero de Inv. I. 27, tanquam de genere narrationum remoto a civilibus caussis, quod delectationis caussa non inutili cum exercitatione dicatur et scribatur (cogitetur venustius) loquutus easdem describit, eas (narrationes) quae nec (strictissime) veras, nec (strictissime) verisimiles res contineant, cuiusmodi sit:
Historical fables, § 527, are those which, although sometimes little fables have been interposed in their midst, nevertheless receive the name of narratives, indeed of histories: but poetic fables are those concerning which Cicero, On Invention I.27, speaking of them as a kind of narratives remote from civil cases, which is spoken and written for the sake of delight, not without exercise, (more charmingly, is thought), describes the same things, as those (narrations) which contain things neither (most strictly) true nor (most strictly) verisimilar, of which sort is:
Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo.
"Huge winged snakes, join'd by one common yoke."
Fabulae historicae § 527 illae sunt, quae
Historical fables, § 527, are those which,
mediis aliquando fabellis interpositae
although sometimes little fables have been interposed in their midst,
tamen narrationum, immo historiarum,
nevertheless receive the name of narratives, indeed of histories:
nomen accipiunt: poeticae autem sunt, de quibus Cicero de Inv.
but poetic fables are those concerning which Cicero, On Invention
I. 27, tanquam de genere narrationum
I.27, speaking of them as a kind of narratives
remoto a civilibus caussis, quod delectationis caussa
remote from civil cases, which is spoken and written
non inutili cum exercitatione
for the sake of delight, not without exercise,
dicatur et scribatur (cogitetur venustius) loquutus easdem describit,
(more charmingly, is thought), describes
eas (narrationes) quae nec (strictissime) veras,
the same things, as those (narrations) which contain things neither (most
nec (strictissime) verisimiles res contineant, cuiusmodi sit:
strictly) true nor (most strictly) verisimilar, of which sort is:
Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo.
"Huge winged snakes, join'd by one common yoke."
Fabulae historicae § 527 illae sunt, quae mediis aliquando fabellis interpositae tamen narrationum, immo historiarum, nomen accipiunt: poeticae autem sunt, de quibus Cicero de Inv. I. 27, tanquam de genere narrationum remoto a civilibus caussis, quod delectationis caussa non inutili cum exercitatione dicatur et scribatur (cogitetur venustius) loquutus easdem describit, eas (narrationes) quae nec (strictissime) veras, nec (strictissime) verisimiles res contineant, cuiusmodi sit: / Historical fables, § 527, are those which, although sometimes little fables have been interposed in their midst, nevertheless receive the name of narratives, indeed of histories: but poetic fables are those concerning which Cicero, On Invention I.27, speaking of them as a kind of narratives remote from civil cases, which is spoken and written for the sake of delight, not without exercise, (more charmingly, is thought), describes the same things, as those (narrations) which contain things neither (most strictly) true nor (most strictly) verisimilar, of which sort is:
Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo.
"Huge winged snakes, join'd by one common yoke."
§ 529
Quintilianus, l. 4, narrationum tres enumerat species 1) historiam (veram strictissime, saltem a potiori) 2) fabulam, quae versatur in tragoediis atque carminibus, non a veritate modo (strictissime dicta), sed etiam a forma veritatis (strictissimae) remota, 3) argumentum, quod (latissime) falsum, sed veri (strictissime talis) simile comoediae fingunt. Hinc etiam fabella est fabula nobis poetica, § 526. Quamque fabulam argumentum dicit, eam vere esse fabulam omnes concedunt comici, plerumque tamen argumentum Comoediae, et recte quidem, est species fabularum, quas historicas vocavimus, § 527. En! primum Terentii prologum:
Quintilian, book 4, enumerates three species of narratives: 1) history (most strictly true, at least for the most part); 2) fable, which is found in tragedies and poems, removed not only from truth (strictly so called), but also from the form of truth (of the strictest kind); 3) plot, which comedies fashion as (most broadly) false, but similar to the true (of the strictly such kind). Hence also a little fable is for us a poetic fable, § 526. And the fable which he calls a plot, all comic poets concede to be truly a fable; yet for the most part the plot of comedy, and rightly indeed, is a species of fables that we have called historical, § 527. See the first prologue of Terence:
Poeta quum primum animum ad scribendum appulit, / Id sibi negotii credidit solum dari, / Populo ut placerent, quas fecisset, fabulas.
"THE POET, when first he applied his mind to writing, thought that the only duty which devolved on him was, that the Plays he should compose might please the public."
Quintilianus, l. 4, narrationum tres enumerat species 1) historiam (veram strictissime, saltem a potiori) 2) fabulam, quae versatur in tragoediis atque carminibus, non a veritate modo (strictissime dicta), sed etiam a forma veritatis (strictissimae) remota, 3) argumentum, quod (latissime) falsum, sed veri (strictissime talis) simile comoediae fingunt.
Quintilian, book 4, enumerates three species of narratives: 1) history (most strictly true, at least for the most part); 2) fable, which is found in tragedies and poems, removed not only from truth (strictly so called), but also from the form of truth (of the strictest kind); 3) plot, which comedies fashion as (most broadly) false, but similar to the true (of the strictly such kind).
Hinc etiam fabella est fabula nobis poetica, § 526. Quamque fabulam argumentum dicit, eam vere esse fabulam omnes concedunt comici, plerumque tamen argumentum Comoediae, et recte quidem, est species fabularum, quas historicas vocavimus, § 527. En! primum Terentii prologum:
Hence also a little fable is for us a poetic fable, § 526. And the fable which he calls a plot, all comic poets concede to be truly a fable; yet for the most part the plot of comedy, and rightly indeed, is a species of fables that we have called historical, § 527. See the first prologue of Terence:
Poeta quum primum animum ad scribendum appulit, / Id sibi negotii credidit solum dari, / Populo ut placerent, quas fecisset, fabulas.
"THE POET, when first he applied his mind to writing, thought that the only duty which devolved on him was, that the Plays he should compose might please the public."
Quintilianus, l. 4, narrationum tres enumerat species
Quintilian, book 4, enumerates three species of narratives:
1) historiam (veram strictissime, saltem a potiori)
1) history (most strictly true, at least for the most part);
2) fabulam, quae versatur in tragoediis atque
2) fable, which is found in tragedies and poems,
carminibus, non a veritate modo (strictissime dicta),
removed not only from truth (strictly so called),
sed etiam a forma veritatis (strictissimae) remota,
but also from the form of truth (of the strictest kind);
3) argumentum, quod (latissime) falsum,
3) plot, which comedies fashion as (most broadly) false,
sed veri (strictissime talis) simile
but similar to the true (of
comoediae fingunt.
the strictly such kind).
Hinc etiam fabella est fabula nobis poetica, § 526.
Hence also a little fable is for us a poetic fable, § 526.
Quamque fabulam argumentum dicit, eam
And the fable which he calls a plot,
vere esse fabulam
all comic poets concede to be truly a fable;
omnes concedunt comici, plerumque tamen argumentum Comoediae,
yet for the most part the plot of comedy,
et recte quidem, est species fabularum,
and rightly indeed, is a species of
quas historicas vocavimus, § 527. En!
fables that we have called historical, § 527. See
primum Terentii prologum:
the first prologue of Terence:
Poeta quum primum animum ad scribendum appulit, / Id sibi negotii credidit solum dari, / Populo ut placerent, quas fecisset, fabulas.
"THE POET, when first he applied his mind to writing, thought that the only duty which devolved on him was, that the Plays he should compose might please the public."
Quintilianus, l. 4, narrationum tres enumerat species 1) historiam (veram strictissime, saltem a potiori) 2) fabulam, quae versatur in tragoediis atque carminibus, non a veritate modo (strictissime dicta), sed etiam a forma veritatis (strictissimae) remota, 3) argumentum, quod (latissime) falsum, sed veri (strictissime talis) simile comoediae fingunt. / Quintilian, book 4, enumerates three species of narratives: 1) history (most strictly true, at least for the most part); 2) fable, which is found in tragedies and poems, removed not only from truth (strictly so called), but also from the form of truth (of the strictest kind); 3) plot, which comedies fashion as (most broadly) false, but similar to the true (of the strictly such kind).
Hinc etiam fabella est fabula nobis poetica, § 526. Quamque fabulam argumentum dicit, eam vere esse fabulam omnes concedunt comici, plerumque tamen argumentum Comoediae, et recte quidem, est species fabularum, quas historicas vocavimus, § 527. En! primum Terentii prologum: / Hence also a little fable is for us a poetic fable, § 526. And the fable which he calls a plot, all comic poets concede to be truly a fable; yet for the most part the plot of comedy, and rightly indeed, is a species of fables that we have called historical, § 527. See the first prologue of Terence:
Poeta quum primum animum ad scribendum appulit, / Id sibi negotii credidit solum dari, / Populo ut placerent, quas fecisset, fabulas.
"THE POET, when first he applied his mind to writing, thought that the only duty which devolved on him was, that the Plays he should compose might please the public."
§ 530
Sicut itaque veritas vel strictissime dicta est singularis, (historica) vel heterocosmica, poetica, § 441, ita est etiam verisimilitudo aesthetica, § 483, dos pulcre cogitandorum universalis, § 22, vel ea, in qua ne latissime quidem dicta falsitas appercipitur, verisimilitudo strictissime dicta (historica) vel ea, in qua latissime quidem sic dicta deprehenditur falsitas, spectatoribus tamen amabili vigilantium somnio semel in alienum orbem delatis per elegantem cognitionem mediam, sic satis possibilibus alterius illius mundi semel suppositis, omnia bene et apte cohaerent, sine vividius notabili repugnantia, hiatu, saltu, e.c. Haec est verisimilitudo heterocosmica (poetica). Prior est fictionum et fabularum historicarum, poeticarum posterior, §§ 509, 527.
Just as, therefore, truth strictly so called is either singular, (historical), or heterocosmic, poetic, § 441, so also aesthetic verisimilitude, § 483, the universal endowment of things beautifully to be thought, § 22, is either that in which not even falsity most broadly so called is perceived, verisimilitude strictly so called (historical), or that in which falsity so called in the broadest sense is indeed detected, yet when the spectators, by the lovable dream of those awake, have once been carried into a foreign sphere through elegant mediate cognition, and when in this way the things sufficiently possible in that other world have once been supposed, all things cohere well and fitly, without a more vividly notable contradiction, gap, leap, etc. This is heterocosmic (poetic) verisimilitude. The former belongs to historical fictions and fables, the latter to poetic ones, §§ 509, 527.
Sicut itaque veritas vel strictissime dicta est singularis, (historica) vel heterocosmica, poetica, § 441, ita est etiam verisimilitudo aesthetica, § 483, dos pulcre cogitandorum universalis, § 22, vel ea, in qua ne latissime quidem dicta falsitas appercipitur, verisimilitudo strictissime dicta (historica) vel ea, in qua latissime quidem sic dicta deprehenditur falsitas, spectatoribus tamen amabili vigilantium somnio semel in alienum orbem delatis per elegantem cognitionem mediam, sic satis possibilibus alterius illius mundi semel suppositis, omnia bene et apte cohaerent, sine vividius notabili repugnantia, hiatu, saltu, e.c. Haec est verisimilitudo heterocosmica (poetica).
Just as, therefore, truth strictly so called is either singular, (historical), or heterocosmic, poetic, § 441, so also aesthetic verisimilitude, § 483, the universal endowment of things beautifully to be thought, § 22, is either that in which not even falsity most broadly so called is perceived, verisimilitude strictly so called (historical), or that in which falsity so called in the broadest sense is indeed detected, yet when the spectators, by the lovable dream of those awake, have once been carried into a foreign sphere through elegant mediate cognition, and when in this way the things sufficiently possible in that other world have once been supposed, all things cohere well and fitly, without a more vividly notable contradiction, gap, leap, etc. This is heterocosmic (poetic) verisimilitude.
Prior est fictionum et fabularum historicarum, poeticarum posterior, §§ 509, 527.
The former belongs to historical fictions and fables, the latter to poetic ones, §§ 509, 527.
Sicut itaque veritas vel strictissime dicta est singularis,
Just as, therefore, truth strictly so called is either singular,
(historica) vel heterocosmica, poetica, § 441, ita est etiam verisimilitudo
(historical), or heterocosmic, poetic, § 441, so also aesthetic verisimilitude,
aesthetica, § 483, dos pulcre cogitandorum universalis,
§ 483, the universal endowment of things beautifully to be thought,
§ 22, vel ea, in qua ne latissime quidem
§ 22, is either that in which not even
dicta falsitas appercipitur,
falsity most broadly so called is perceived,
verisimilitudo strictissime dicta (historica) vel ea,
verisimilitude strictly so called (historical), or that
in qua latissime quidem sic
in which falsity so called in the broadest sense is indeed detected,
dicta deprehenditur falsitas, spectatoribus tamen amabili vigilantium
yet when the spectators, by the lovable dream of those awake,
somnio semel in alienum orbem delatis per elegantem cognitionem
have once been carried into a foreign sphere through elegant mediate cognition,
mediam, sic satis possibilibus
and when in this way the things sufficiently possible
alterius illius mundi semel suppositis,
in that other world have once been supposed,
omnia bene et apte cohaerent,
all things cohere well and fitly,
sine vividius notabili repugnantia, hiatu, saltu, e.c.
without a more vividly notable contradiction, gap, leap, etc.
Haec est verisimilitudo heterocosmica (poetica).
This is heterocosmic (poetic) verisimilitude.
Prior est fictionum et fabularum historicarum,
The former belongs to historical fictions and fables, the
poeticarum posterior, §§ 509, 527.
latter to poetic ones, §§ 509, 527.
Sicut itaque veritas vel strictissime dicta est singularis, (historica) vel heterocosmica, poetica, § 441, ita est etiam verisimilitudo aesthetica, § 483, dos pulcre cogitandorum universalis, § 22, vel ea, in qua ne latissime quidem dicta falsitas appercipitur, verisimilitudo strictissime dicta (historica) vel ea, in qua latissime quidem sic dicta deprehenditur falsitas, spectatoribus tamen amabili vigilantium somnio semel in alienum orbem delatis per elegantem cognitionem mediam, sic satis possibilibus alterius illius mundi semel suppositis, omnia bene et apte cohaerent, sine vividius notabili repugnantia, hiatu, saltu, e.c. Haec est verisimilitudo heterocosmica (poetica). / Just as, therefore, truth strictly so called is either singular, (historical), or heterocosmic, poetic, § 441, so also aesthetic verisimilitude, § 483, the universal endowment of things beautifully to be thought, § 22, is either that in which not even falsity most broadly so called is perceived, verisimilitude strictly so called (historical), or that in which falsity so called in the broadest sense is indeed detected, yet when the spectators, by the lovable dream of those awake, have once been carried into a foreign sphere through elegant mediate cognition, and when in this way the things sufficiently possible in that other world have once been supposed, all things cohere well and fitly, without a more vividly notable contradiction, gap, leap, etc. This is heterocosmic (poetic) verisimilitude.
Prior est fictionum et fabularum historicarum, poeticarum posterior, §§ 509, 527. / The former belongs to historical fictions and fables, the latter to poetic ones, §§ 509, 527.
§ 531
In iureiurando, quod habet Ovidius Met. III. 657:
In the oath which Ovid has, Metamorphoses III.657:
Per tibi (Pentheu) nunc ipsum, (Bacchum) nec enim praesentior illo / Est deus, adiuro, tam me tibi vera referre, / Quam veri maiora fide,
"By Bacchus do I swear to you (and naught
celestial is more potent) all the things
I tell you are as true as they surpass
the limit of belief."
in quo ratio complete certo videt nihil iurari, rationis analogon videbit verisimilitudinem historicam, potuisse aliquem bonum et pauperem piscatorem a primis unguiculis aquae potorem, qualis Acoetes iurans pingitur, orgiis et omni Bacchico apparatu in eum enthusiasmum rapi, ut talia bona fide iuret. Poeticam autem verisimilitudinem tantum in sequentibus, si fictionibus heterocosmicis amabilia vigilantium somnia sequaris, secundum analogiam mythologiae graecoromanae, mutatos reliquos, Bacchi raptores in delphinas, solum Acoeten a Pentheo nunc in vincula coniectum, sed
in which reason, completely certainly, sees that nothing is sworn, the analogue of reason will see historical verisimilitude: that some good and poor fisherman, a drinker of water from earliest nails, such as Acoetes is painted as swearing, could have been able, to be carried by rites and by the whole Bacchic apparatus into such enthusiasm that he would swear such things in good faith. But poetic verisimilitude only in the following things, if, with heterocosmic fictions, you follow the lovable dreams of those awake, according to the analogy of Greco-Roman mythology: the rest, the kidnappers of Bacchus, changed into dolphins, Acoetes alone now thrown into chains by Pentheus, but
Sponte sua patuisse fores, lapsasque lacertis / Sponte sua, (fama est,) nullo solvente, catenas.
"the legend says, though no one aided him,
the chains were loosened and slipped off his arms;
the doors flew open of their own accord."
In iureiurando, quod habet Ovidius Met. III. 657:
In the oath which Ovid has, Metamorphoses III.657:
Per tibi (Pentheu) nunc ipsum, (Bacchum) nec enim praesentior illo / Est deus, adiuro, tam me tibi vera referre, / Quam veri maiora fide,
"By Bacchus do I swear to you (and naught
celestial is more potent) all the things
I tell you are as true as they surpass
the limit of belief."
in quo ratio complete certo videt nihil iurari, rationis analogon videbit verisimilitudinem historicam, potuisse aliquem bonum et pauperem piscatorem a primis unguiculis aquae potorem, qualis Acoetes iurans pingitur, orgiis et omni Bacchico apparatu in eum enthusiasmum rapi, ut talia bona fide iuret.
in which reason, completely certainly, sees that nothing is sworn, the analogue of reason will see historical verisimilitude: that some good and poor fisherman, a drinker of water from earliest nails, such as Acoetes is painted as swearing, could have been able, to be carried by rites and by the whole Bacchic apparatus into such enthusiasm that he would swear such things in good faith.
Poeticam autem verisimilitudinem tantum in sequentibus, si fictionibus heterocosmicis amabilia vigilantium somnia sequaris, secundum analogiam mythologiae graecoromanae, mutatos reliquos, Bacchi raptores in delphinas, solum Acoeten a Pentheo nunc in vincula coniectum, sed
But poetic verisimilitude only in the following things, if, with heterocosmic fictions, you follow the lovable dreams of those awake, according to the analogy of Greco-Roman mythology: the rest, the kidnappers of Bacchus, changed into dolphins, Acoetes alone now thrown into chains by Pentheus, but
Sponte sua patuisse fores, lapsasque lacertis / Sponte sua, (fama est,) nullo solvente, catenas.
"the legend says, though no one aided him,
the chains were loosened and slipped off his arms;
the doors flew open of their own accord."
In iureiurando, quod habet Ovidius Met. III. 657:
In the oath which Ovid has, Metamorphoses III.657:
Per tibi (Pentheu) nunc ipsum, (Bacchum) nec enim praesentior illo / Est deus, adiuro, tam me tibi vera referre, / Quam veri maiora fide,
"By Bacchus do I swear to you (and naught
celestial is more potent) all the things
I tell you are as true as they surpass
the limit of belief."
in quo ratio complete certo videt
in which reason, completely certainly, sees that nothing is sworn,
nihil iurari, rationis analogon videbit verisimilitudinem
the analogue of reason will see historical verisimilitude:
historicam, potuisse aliquem bonum et pauperem piscatorem
that some good and poor fisherman,
a primis unguiculis aquae potorem,
a drinker of water from earliest nails, such
qualis Acoetes iurans
as Acoetes is painted as swearing, could have been able,
pingitur, orgiis et omni
to be carried by rites and by the whole
Bacchico apparatu in eum enthusiasmum rapi,
Bacchic apparatus into such enthusiasm
ut talia bona fide iuret.
that he would swear such things in good faith.
Poeticam autem verisimilitudinem tantum in sequentibus,
But poetic verisimilitude only in the following things,
si fictionibus heterocosmicis amabilia vigilantium somnia sequaris,
if, with heterocosmic fictions, you follow the lovable dreams of
secundum analogiam mythologiae graecoromanae, mutatos
those awake, according to the analogy of Greco-Roman mythology:
reliquos, Bacchi raptores in delphinas,
the rest, the kidnappers of Bacchus, changed into dolphins,
solum Acoeten a Pentheo nunc in vincula coniectum, sed
Acoetes alone now thrown into chains by Pentheus, but
Sponte sua patuisse fores, lapsasque lacertis / Sponte sua, (fama est,) nullo solvente, catenas.
"the legend says, though no one aided him,
the chains were loosened and slipped off his arms;
the doors flew open of their own accord."
In iureiurando, quod habet Ovidius Met. III. 657: / In the oath which Ovid has, Metamorphoses III.657:
Per tibi (Pentheu) nunc ipsum, (Bacchum) nec enim praesentior illo / Est deus, adiuro, tam me tibi vera referre, / Quam veri maiora fide,
"By Bacchus do I swear to you (and naught
celestial is more potent) all the things
I tell you are as true as they surpass
the limit of belief."
in quo ratio complete certo videt nihil iurari, rationis analogon videbit verisimilitudinem historicam, potuisse aliquem bonum et pauperem piscatorem a primis unguiculis aquae potorem, qualis Acoetes iurans pingitur, orgiis et omni Bacchico apparatu in eum enthusiasmum rapi, ut talia bona fide iuret. / in which reason, completely certainly, sees that nothing is sworn, the analogue of reason will see historical verisimilitude: that some good and poor fisherman, a drinker of water from earliest nails, such as Acoetes is painted as swearing, could have been able, to be carried by rites and by the whole Bacchic apparatus into such enthusiasm that he would swear such things in good faith.
Poeticam autem verisimilitudinem tantum in sequentibus, si fictionibus heterocosmicis amabilia vigilantium somnia sequaris, secundum analogiam mythologiae graecoromanae, mutatos reliquos, Bacchi raptores in delphinas, solum Acoeten a Pentheo nunc in vincula coniectum, sed / But poetic verisimilitude only in the following things, if, with heterocosmic fictions, you follow the lovable dreams of those awake, according to the analogy of Greco-Roman mythology: the rest, the kidnappers of Bacchus, changed into dolphins, Acoetes alone now thrown into chains by Pentheus, but
Sponte sua patuisse fores, lapsasque lacertis / Sponte sua, (fama est,) nullo solvente, catenas.
"the legend says, though no one aided him,
the chains were loosened and slipped off his arms;
the doors flew open of their own accord."
§ 532
Hinc et concipi potest satis usitata fabularum divisio in probabiles et improbabiles. Pone enim analogon rationis qualicunque fabulae verisimilitudine animadversa, § 530, velut excitari ad curatiores rationum in assensum vel dissensum ponderationes, in rationibus assensus solas eas numerare, quae probent veritatem strictissime dictam, reliquas veritatis cuiuscunque rationes negligendo, tunc paene solae fabulae historicae restabunt in bilance probabilium, reliquas omnes aut tantum non omnes sursum tollet improbabilium levitas. Hinc fabula strictius probabilis erit, ad quam statuendam possibile huius mundi plus videtur rationis esse, quam ad id, ut ea mittatur in exsilium ex hoc mundo in heterocosmica, vel omnino in mundum fabulosum. Fabula autem strictius improbabilis erit, ad quam non habendam in possibilibus huius mundi plus rationis esse videtur, quam ad oppositum, §§ 485, 486.
Hence also the sufficiently usual division of fables into probable and improbable can be conceived. For suppose the analogue of reason, once some verisimilitude of a fable has been noticed, § 530, to be as it were stirred up to more careful weighings of reasons toward assent or dissent, to number among the reasons for assent only those that prove truth strictly so called, while neglecting the remaining reasons of truth of whatever kind, then almost only historical fables will remain in the balance of probable things; the lightness of improbable things will lift all the others, or almost all the others, upward. Hence a fable more strictly probable will be one for establishing which as possible in this world there seems to be more reason than for its being sent into exile from this world into heterocosmic things, or altogether into a fabulous world. But a fable more strictly improbable will be one for not having which among the possible things of this world there seems to be more reason than for the opposite, §§ 485, 486.
Hinc et concipi potest satis usitata fabularum divisio in probabiles et improbabiles.
Hence also the sufficiently usual division of fables into probable and improbable can be conceived.
Pone enim analogon rationis qualicunque fabulae verisimilitudine animadversa, § 530, velut excitari ad curatiores rationum in assensum vel dissensum ponderationes, in rationibus assensus solas eas numerare, quae probent veritatem strictissime dictam, reliquas veritatis cuiuscunque rationes negligendo, tunc paene solae fabulae historicae restabunt in bilance probabilium, reliquas omnes aut tantum non omnes sursum tollet improbabilium levitas.
For suppose the analogue of reason, once some verisimilitude of a fable has been noticed, § 530, to be as it were stirred up to more careful weighings of reasons toward assent or dissent, to number among the reasons for assent only those that prove truth strictly so called, while neglecting the remaining reasons of truth of whatever kind, then almost only historical fables will remain in the balance of probable things; the lightness of improbable things will lift all the others, or almost all the others, upward.
Hinc fabula strictius probabilis erit, ad quam statuendam possibile huius mundi plus videtur rationis esse, quam ad id, ut ea mittatur in exsilium ex hoc mundo in heterocosmica, vel omnino in mundum fabulosum.
Hence a fable more strictly probable will be one for establishing which as possible in this world there seems to be more reason than for its being sent into exile from this world into heterocosmic things, or altogether into a fabulous world.
Fabula autem strictius improbabilis erit, ad quam non habendam in possibilibus huius mundi plus rationis esse videtur, quam ad oppositum, §§ 485, 486.
But a fable more strictly improbable will be one for not having which among the possible things of this world there seems to be more reason than for the opposite, §§ 485, 486.
Hinc et concipi potest satis usitata fabularum divisio
Hence also the sufficiently usual division of
in probabiles et improbabiles.
fables into probable and improbable can be conceived.
Pone enim analogon rationis
For suppose the analogue of reason,
qualicunque fabulae verisimilitudine animadversa,
once some verisimilitude of a fable has been noticed,
§ 530, velut excitari ad
§ 530, to be as it were stirred up to
curatiores rationum in assensum vel dissensum
more careful weighings of reasons toward assent or dissent,
ponderationes, in rationibus assensus solas eas numerare,
to number among the reasons for assent only those
quae probent veritatem strictissime dictam,
that prove truth strictly so called,
reliquas veritatis cuiuscunque rationes negligendo,
while neglecting the remaining reasons of truth of whatever kind,
tunc paene solae fabulae historicae restabunt in bilance probabilium,
then almost only historical fables will remain in the balance of probable
reliquas omnes aut tantum non omnes
things; the lightness of improbable things will lift all the others,
sursum tollet improbabilium levitas.
or almost all the others, upward.
Hinc fabula strictius probabilis erit,
Hence a fable more strictly probable will
ad quam statuendam possibile huius
be one for establishing which as possible in this
mundi plus videtur rationis esse, quam ad id,
world there seems to be more reason than for
ut ea mittatur in exsilium ex hoc mundo in heterocosmica,
its being sent into exile from this world into heterocosmic
vel omnino in mundum fabulosum.
things, or altogether into a fabulous world.
Fabula autem strictius improbabilis erit,
But a fable more strictly improbable will
ad quam non habendam in possibilibus
be one for not having which among the possible
huius mundi plus rationis esse videtur,
things of this world there seems to be more
quam ad oppositum, §§ 485, 486.
reason than for the opposite, §§ 485, 486.
Hinc et concipi potest satis usitata fabularum divisio in probabiles et improbabiles. / Hence also the sufficiently usual division of fables into probable and improbable can be conceived.
Pone enim analogon rationis qualicunque fabulae verisimilitudine animadversa, § 530, velut excitari ad curatiores rationum in assensum vel dissensum ponderationes, in rationibus assensus solas eas numerare, quae probent veritatem strictissime dictam, reliquas veritatis cuiuscunque rationes negligendo, tunc paene solae fabulae historicae restabunt in bilance probabilium, reliquas omnes aut tantum non omnes sursum tollet improbabilium levitas. / For suppose the analogue of reason, once some verisimilitude of a fable has been noticed, § 530, to be as it were stirred up to more careful weighings of reasons toward assent or dissent, to number among the reasons for assent only those that prove truth strictly so called, while neglecting the remaining reasons of truth of whatever kind, then almost only historical fables will remain in the balance of probable things; the lightness of improbable things will lift all the others, or almost all the others, upward.
Hinc fabula strictius probabilis erit, ad quam statuendam possibile huius mundi plus videtur rationis esse, quam ad id, ut ea mittatur in exsilium ex hoc mundo in heterocosmica, vel omnino in mundum fabulosum. / Hence a fable more strictly probable will be one for establishing which as possible in this world there seems to be more reason than for its being sent into exile from this world into heterocosmic things, or altogether into a fabulous world.
Fabula autem strictius improbabilis erit, ad quam non habendam in possibilibus huius mundi plus rationis esse videtur, quam ad oppositum, §§ 485, 486. / But a fable more strictly improbable will be one for not having which among the possible things of this world there seems to be more reason than for the opposite, §§ 485, 486.
§ 533
Eodem itaque, quo veritates, fictiones, fabulas, verisimilitudines, probabilitates etiam aestheticas distinguemus in historicas, aut strictissimae veritatis superponderantes indices, et poeticas, superpondia veritatis heterocosmicae. §§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530. Fabula improbabilis (historice et in hoc universo) non destituitur omnis probabilitate omni aesthetica (etiam, heterocosmica) § 531, latissime falsi similis, § 489, potest nihilominus multum veritatis aestheticae continere, §§ 441, 423.
Therefore in the same way in which we distinguish truths, fictions, fables, and verisimilitudes, we shall also distinguish aesthetic probabilities into historical ones, or indications outweighing toward the strictest truth, and poetic ones, outweighings of heterocosmic truth. §§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530. An improbable fable (historically and in this universe) is not every one deprived of every aesthetic probability (even heterocosmic), § 531, though in the broadest sense like the false, § 489, can nevertheless contain much aesthetic truth, §§ 441, 423.
Eodem itaque, quo veritates, fictiones, fabulas, verisimilitudines, probabilitates etiam aestheticas distinguemus in historicas, aut strictissimae veritatis superponderantes indices, et poeticas, superpondia veritatis heterocosmicae. §§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530. Fabula improbabilis (historice et in hoc universo) non destituitur omnis probabilitate omni aesthetica (etiam, heterocosmica) § 531, latissime falsi similis, § 489, potest nihilominus multum veritatis aestheticae continere, §§ 441, 423.
Therefore in the same way in which we distinguish truths, fictions, fables, and verisimilitudes, we shall also distinguish aesthetic probabilities into historical ones, or indications outweighing toward the strictest truth, and poetic ones, outweighings of heterocosmic truth. §§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530. An improbable fable (historically and in this universe) is not every one deprived of every aesthetic probability (even heterocosmic), § 531, though in the broadest sense like the false, § 489, can nevertheless contain much aesthetic truth, §§ 441, 423.
Eodem itaque, quo veritates,
Therefore in the same way in which we distinguish truths,
fictiones, fabulas, verisimilitudines, probabilitates etiam aestheticas distinguemus in historicas,
fictions, fables, and verisimilitudes, we shall also distinguish aesthetic probabilities into historical
aut strictissimae veritatis
ones, or indications outweighing toward the strictest truth,
superponderantes indices, et poeticas, superpondia veritatis
and poetic ones, outweighings of heterocosmic truth.
heterocosmicae. §§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530.
§§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530.
Fabula improbabilis (historice et in hoc universo)
An improbable fable (historically and in this universe) is
non destituitur omnis probabilitate omni aesthetica (etiam,
not every one deprived of every aesthetic probability (even
heterocosmica) § 531, latissime falsi
heterocosmic), § 531, though in the broadest sense like the false,
similis, § 489, potest nihilominus multum veritatis aestheticae continere, §§ 441, 423.
§ 489, can nevertheless contain much aesthetic truth, §§ 441, 423.
Eodem itaque, quo veritates, fictiones, fabulas, verisimilitudines, probabilitates etiam aestheticas distinguemus in historicas, aut strictissimae veritatis superponderantes indices, et poeticas, superpondia veritatis heterocosmicae. §§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530. Fabula improbabilis (historice et in hoc universo) non destituitur omnis probabilitate omni aesthetica (etiam, heterocosmica) § 531, latissime falsi similis, § 489, potest nihilominus multum veritatis aestheticae continere, §§ 441, 423. / Therefore in the same way in which we distinguish truths, fictions, fables, and verisimilitudes, we shall also distinguish aesthetic probabilities into historical ones, or indications outweighing toward the strictest truth, and poetic ones, outweighings of heterocosmic truth. §§ 441, 509, 511, 527, 530. An improbable fable (historically and in this universe) is not every one deprived of every aesthetic probability (even heterocosmic), § 531, though in the broadest sense like the false, § 489, can nevertheless contain much aesthetic truth, §§ 441, 423.
§ 534
Prima Phaedri fabula est improbabilis strictius, § 532. quanquam eadem nihil esse saepe verius probent ita mores saeculi, ut demonstrationibus Spinozae supersedere possimus, L. autem III. fabula X. qua praefata,
The first fable of Phaedrus is more strictly improbable, § 532, although the morals of the age so prove that often nothing is truer than the same thing, that we can dispense with Spinoza's demonstrations, But book III, fable X, prefaced by this:
Exploranda est veritas multum prius, / Quem stulta prave iudicet sententia,
"Therefore, we ought to examine strictly into the truth of a matter, rather than suffer an erroneous impression to pervert our judgment."
post materiem narrationis probe pensitatam non destituetur sua probabilitate historica, § 533, quanquam inusitatius est, talia contingere, quae narrat, quam quae prima finguntur fabula.
after the matter of the narration has been duly weighed, will not be deprived of its historical probability, § 533, although it is more unusual for such things to happen as it narrates than those things that are feigned in the first fable.
Prima Phaedri fabula est improbabilis strictius, § 532. quanquam eadem nihil esse saepe verius probent ita mores saeculi, ut demonstrationibus Spinozae supersedere possimus, L. autem III. fabula X. qua praefata,
The first fable of Phaedrus is more strictly improbable, § 532, although the morals of the age so prove that often nothing is truer than the same thing, that we can dispense with Spinoza's demonstrations, But book III, fable X, prefaced by this:
Exploranda est veritas multum prius, / Quem stulta prave iudicet sententia,
"Therefore, we ought to examine strictly into the truth of a matter, rather than suffer an erroneous impression to pervert our judgment."
post materiem narrationis probe pensitatam non destituetur sua probabilitate historica, § 533, quanquam inusitatius est, talia contingere, quae narrat, quam quae prima finguntur fabula.
after the matter of the narration has been duly weighed, will not be deprived of its historical probability, § 533, although it is more unusual for such things to happen as it narrates than those things that are feigned in the first fable.
Prima Phaedri fabula est improbabilis strictius, § 532.
The first fable of Phaedrus is more strictly improbable, § 532,
quanquam eadem nihil esse saepe verius probent
although the morals of the age so prove that
ita mores saeculi,
often nothing is truer than the same thing,
ut demonstrationibus Spinozae supersedere possimus, L.
that we can dispense with Spinoza's demonstrations, But
autem III. fabula X. qua praefata,
book III, fable X, prefaced by this:
Exploranda est veritas multum prius, / Quem stulta prave iudicet sententia,
"Therefore, we ought to examine strictly into the truth of a matter, rather than suffer an erroneous impression to pervert our judgment."
post materiem narrationis probe pensitatam
after the matter of the narration has been duly weighed,
non destituetur sua probabilitate historica, § 533,
will not be deprived of its historical probability, § 533,
quanquam inusitatius est, talia contingere,
although it is more unusual for such things to happen
quae narrat, quam quae prima
as it narrates than those things that are feigned
finguntur fabula.
in the first fable.
Prima Phaedri fabula est improbabilis strictius, § 532. quanquam eadem nihil esse saepe verius probent ita mores saeculi, ut demonstrationibus Spinozae supersedere possimus, L. autem III. fabula X. qua praefata, / The first fable of Phaedrus is more strictly improbable, § 532, although the morals of the age so prove that often nothing is truer than the same thing, that we can dispense with Spinoza's demonstrations, But book III, fable X, prefaced by this:
Exploranda est veritas multum prius, / Quem stulta prave iudicet sententia,
"Therefore, we ought to examine strictly into the truth of a matter, rather than suffer an erroneous impression to pervert our judgment."
post materiem narrationis probe pensitatam non destituetur sua probabilitate historica, § 533, quanquam inusitatius est, talia contingere, quae narrat, quam quae prima finguntur fabula. / after the matter of the narration has been duly weighed, will not be deprived of its historical probability, § 533, although it is more unusual for such things to happen as it narrates than those things that are feigned in the first fable.
§ 535
Subiungamus fabularum aliquas species, etiamsi propius non spectent verisimilitudinem, ut compleantur ea, in quibus sedulo curanda pulcre cogitaturis est verisimilitudo. In fabulis insignis commutatio infelicitatis in felicitatem nodus est (peripeteia), quem quae continent, sunt eae fabulae implicitae et connexae, quarum partes desis et colligatio, metabasis et transitus, ac tandem lysis, solutio.
Let us append some species of fables, even if they do not more nearly regard verisimilitude, so that those things may be completed in which verisimilitude must be carefully cared for by those who are going to think beautifully. In fables a notable change of unhappiness into happiness is a knot (peripeteia); those which contain it are the involved and connected fables, whose parts are desis and binding, metabasis and transition, and finally lysis, solution.
Subiungamus fabularum aliquas species, etiamsi propius non spectent verisimilitudinem, ut compleantur ea, in quibus sedulo curanda pulcre cogitaturis est verisimilitudo. In fabulis insignis commutatio infelicitatis in felicitatem nodus est (peripeteia), quem quae continent, sunt eae fabulae implicitae et connexae, quarum partes desis et colligatio, metabasis et transitus, ac tandem lysis, solutio.
Let us append some species of fables, even if they do not more nearly regard verisimilitude, so that those things may be completed in which verisimilitude must be carefully cared for by those who are going to think beautifully. In fables a notable change of unhappiness into happiness is a knot (peripeteia); those which contain it are the involved and connected fables, whose parts are desis and binding, metabasis and transition, and finally lysis, solution.
Subiungamus fabularum aliquas species, etiamsi
Let us append some species of fables,
propius non spectent verisimilitudinem,
even if they do not more nearly regard verisimilitude,
ut compleantur ea,
so that those things may be completed
in quibus sedulo curanda
in which verisimilitude must be carefully cared for by
pulcre cogitaturis est verisimilitudo.
those who are going to think beautifully.
In fabulis insignis commutatio infelicitatis in felicitatem
In fables a notable change of unhappiness into
nodus est (peripeteia), quem quae continent,
happiness is a knot (peripeteia); those which contain
sunt eae fabulae implicitae et connexae, quarum
it are the involved and connected fables,
partes desis et colligatio, metabasis et transitus,
whose parts are desis and binding, metabasis and transition,
ac tandem lysis, solutio.
and finally lysis, solution.
Subiungamus fabularum aliquas species, etiamsi propius non spectent verisimilitudinem, ut compleantur ea, in quibus sedulo curanda pulcre cogitaturis est verisimilitudo. In fabulis insignis commutatio infelicitatis in felicitatem nodus est (peripeteia), quem quae continent, sunt eae fabulae implicitae et connexae, quarum partes desis et colligatio, metabasis et transitus, ac tandem lysis, solutio. / Let us append some species of fables, even if they do not more nearly regard verisimilitude, so that those things may be completed in which verisimilitude must be carefully cared for by those who are going to think beautifully. In fables a notable change of unhappiness into happiness is a knot (peripeteia); those which contain it are the involved and connected fables, whose parts are desis and binding, metabasis and transition, and finally lysis, solution.
§ 536
Quis nescit dramatum fabulas implicitarum eiusmodi fabularum exempla, nunc comica, nunc tragica? Quemadmodum interim non ita felicem successum experti sunt tragoedias felicis eventus adorti fingere: sic nec illi rem suam agerent bene, quibus veniret in mentem comoediis vere tristem exitum affingere. Rationes ex cuiusvis poematis propria forma pulcrius erui possunt. Nunc sufficiat adnotare, non esse solas dramaticas fabulas ut eas cogitandas, quae nodum habeant. In ipsis epicis multae pluresque, quae sunt in iisdem, velut episodia, huc pertinent. Immo aesopicarum si placeret aliquas diducere, huc transfirent non paucae, quarum nunc nodus in scirpo quaereretur.
Who does not know that the fables of dramas are examples of involved fables of this sort, now comic, now tragic? Meanwhile, just as those who have attempted to invent tragedies of a happy outcome have experienced a not very happy success, so neither would those conduct their affair well to whom it should come into mind to attach a truly sad ending to comedies. The reasons can be drawn more beautifully from the proper form of any poem. For now let it suffice to note that dramatic fables alone are not to be thought as those which have a knot. In epics themselves many, and more things that are in the same, as episodes, belong here. Indeed, if it pleased one to draw apart some Aesopic fables, not a few would be transferred here, in which now a knot would be sought in a rush.
Quis nescit dramatum fabulas implicitarum eiusmodi fabularum exempla, nunc comica, nunc tragica?
Who does not know that the fables of dramas are examples of involved fables of this sort, now comic, now tragic?
Quemadmodum interim non ita felicem successum experti sunt tragoedias felicis eventus adorti fingere: sic nec illi rem suam agerent bene, quibus veniret in mentem comoediis vere tristem exitum affingere.
Meanwhile, just as those who have attempted to invent tragedies of a happy outcome have experienced a not very happy success, so neither would those conduct their affair well to whom it should come into mind to attach a truly sad ending to comedies.
Rationes ex cuiusvis poematis propria forma pulcrius erui possunt.
The reasons can be drawn more beautifully from the proper form of any poem.
Nunc sufficiat adnotare, non esse solas dramaticas fabulas ut eas cogitandas, quae nodum habeant.
For now let it suffice to note that dramatic fables alone are not to be thought as those which have a knot.
In ipsis epicis multae pluresque, quae sunt in iisdem, velut episodia, huc pertinent.
In epics themselves many, and more things that are in the same, as episodes, belong here.
Immo aesopicarum si placeret aliquas diducere, huc transfirent non paucae, quarum nunc nodus in scirpo quaereretur.
Indeed, if it pleased one to draw apart some Aesopic fables, not a few would be transferred here, in which now a knot would be sought in a rush.
Quis nescit dramatum fabulas implicitarum eiusmodi fabularum exempla,
Who does not know that the fables of dramas are examples
nunc comica, nunc tragica?
of involved fables of this sort, now comic, now tragic?
Quemadmodum interim non ita felicem successum experti sunt
Meanwhile, just as those who have attempted to invent
tragoedias felicis eventus adorti fingere:
tragedies of a happy outcome have experienced a not very
sic nec
happy success, so neither would those conduct their affair
illi rem suam agerent bene,
well to whom it
quibus veniret in mentem comoediis vere tristem exitum affingere.
should come into mind to attach a truly sad ending to comedies.
Rationes ex cuiusvis
The reasons can be drawn more beautifully from
poematis propria forma pulcrius erui possunt.
the proper form of any poem.
Nunc sufficiat adnotare,
For now let it suffice to note
non esse solas dramaticas fabulas ut eas cogitandas,
that dramatic fables alone are not to be thought as
quae nodum habeant.
those which have a knot.
In ipsis epicis multae pluresque,
In epics themselves many, and more
quae sunt in iisdem, velut episodia, huc pertinent.
things that are in the same, as episodes, belong here.
Immo aesopicarum si placeret aliquas diducere,
Indeed, if it pleased one to draw apart some
huc transfirent non paucae,
Aesopic fables, not a few would be transferred here,
quarum nunc nodus in scirpo quaereretur.
in which now a knot would be sought in a rush.
Quis nescit dramatum fabulas implicitarum eiusmodi fabularum exempla, nunc comica, nunc tragica? / Who does not know that the fables of dramas are examples of involved fables of this sort, now comic, now tragic?
Quemadmodum interim non ita felicem successum experti sunt tragoedias felicis eventus adorti fingere: sic nec illi rem suam agerent bene, quibus veniret in mentem comoediis vere tristem exitum affingere. / Meanwhile, just as those who have attempted to invent tragedies of a happy outcome have experienced a not very happy success, so neither would those conduct their affair well to whom it should come into mind to attach a truly sad ending to comedies.
Rationes ex cuiusvis poematis propria forma pulcrius erui possunt. / The reasons can be drawn more beautifully from the proper form of any poem.
Nunc sufficiat adnotare, non esse solas dramaticas fabulas ut eas cogitandas, quae nodum habeant. / For now let it suffice to note that dramatic fables alone are not to be thought as those which have a knot.
In ipsis epicis multae pluresque, quae sunt in iisdem, velut episodia, huc pertinent. / In epics themselves many, and more things that are in the same, as episodes, belong here.
Immo aesopicarum si placeret aliquas diducere, huc transfirent non paucae, quarum nunc nodus in scirpo quaereretur. / Indeed, if it pleased one to draw apart some Aesopic fables, not a few would be transferred here, in which now a knot would be sought in a rush.
§ 537
Exempla fabularum vel sunt ratione praedita, quorum fabulae rationales appellantur, vel quae censentur ratione destituta, et horum fabulae moratae quibusdam, aliis fictae, apologi, aeni, aisopopoiemata vocantur, vel partim ex prima, partim ex secunda classe coniuncta, quorum fabulae mixtae sunt.
Examples of fables are either endowed with reason, whose fables are called rational, or those which are judged destitute of reason, and of these latter the fables are called by some moralized, by others fictitious, apologues, ainoi, Aesopic productions, or they are joined partly from the first, partly from the second class, whose fables are mixed.
Exempla fabularum vel sunt ratione praedita, quorum fabulae rationales appellantur, vel quae censentur ratione destituta, et horum fabulae moratae quibusdam, aliis fictae, apologi, aeni, aisopopoiemata vocantur, vel partim ex prima, partim ex secunda classe coniuncta, quorum fabulae mixtae sunt.
Examples of fables are either endowed with reason, whose fables are called rational, or those which are judged destitute of reason, and of these latter the fables are called by some moralized, by others fictitious, apologues, ainoi, Aesopic productions, or they are joined partly from the first, partly from the second class, whose fables are mixed.
Exempla fabularum vel sunt ratione praedita,
Examples of fables are either endowed with reason,
quorum fabulae rationales appellantur, vel quae censentur ratione destituta,
whose fables are called rational, or those which are judged destitute
et horum fabulae moratae quibusdam,
of reason, and of these latter the fables are called
aliis fictae, apologi, aeni,
by some moralized, by others fictitious, apologues, ainoi,
aisopopoiemata vocantur, vel partim ex prima,
Aesopic productions, or they are joined partly from the
partim ex secunda classe coniuncta, quorum fabulae mixtae sunt.
first, partly from the second class, whose fables are mixed.
Exempla fabularum vel sunt ratione praedita, quorum fabulae rationales appellantur, vel quae censentur ratione destituta, et horum fabulae moratae quibusdam, aliis fictae, apologi, aeni, aisopopoiemata vocantur, vel partim ex prima, partim ex secunda classe coniuncta, quorum fabulae mixtae sunt. / Examples of fables are either endowed with reason, whose fables are called rational, or those which are judged destitute of reason, and of these latter the fables are called by some moralized, by others fictitious, apologues, ainoi, Aesopic productions, or they are joined partly from the first, partly from the second class, whose fables are mixed.
§ 538
Rationalium addamus tres species, vel ordines potius inferiores, exempli gratia. 1) Exempla divina vel divinorum, rationalia tamen, si quibus sunt, sunt eae fabulae theologicae, et strictius mythologicae. 2) Exempla amoris, quorum fabulae sunt Milesiae, et romanenses strictius, quae latius cum fictionibus poeticis coincidunt. 3) Exempla virtutis sublimis et gloriam promeritae, quorum fabulae sunt heroicae. Quemadmodum his addi species ordinesve possent alii, sic maior quaedam fabula e.g. epica nonnunquam eos omnes amplectitur simul, quando
Let us add three species of rational fables, or rather lower orders, for the sake of example. 1) Divine examples, or examples of divine things, yet rational if there are any, are those theological fables, and more strictly mythological ones. 2) Examples of love, whose fables are Milesian, and romances more strictly, which more broadly coincide with poetic fictions. 3) Examples of sublime virtue and of earned glory, whose fables are heroic. Just as other species or orders could be added to these, so some greater fable, for example an epic, sometimes embraces all of them at once, when
per ambages deorumque ministeria et fabulosum sententiarum tormentum praecipitat liberum spiritum, ut potius furentis animi vaticinatio, de castis heroum amoribus, appareat, quam religiosae orationis sub testibus fides.
"Events, past and passing, ought not to be merely recorded in verse, the historian will deal with them far better; by means of circumlocutions and the intervention of the immortals, the free spirit, wracked by the search for epigrams having a mythological illusion, should plunge headlong and appear as the prophecy of a mind inspired rather than the attested faith of scrupulous exactitude in speech."
Petr.
Petronius.
Rationalium addamus tres species, vel ordines potius inferiores, exempli gratia. 1) Exempla divina vel divinorum, rationalia tamen, si quibus sunt, sunt eae fabulae theologicae, et strictius mythologicae. 2) Exempla amoris, quorum fabulae sunt Milesiae, et romanenses strictius, quae latius cum fictionibus poeticis coincidunt. 3) Exempla virtutis sublimis et gloriam promeritae, quorum fabulae sunt heroicae.
Let us add three species of rational fables, or rather lower orders, for the sake of example. 1) Divine examples, or examples of divine things, yet rational if there are any, are those theological fables, and more strictly mythological ones. 2) Examples of love, whose fables are Milesian, and romances more strictly, which more broadly coincide with poetic fictions. 3) Examples of sublime virtue and of earned glory, whose fables are heroic.
Quemadmodum his addi species ordinesve possent alii, sic maior quaedam fabula e.g. epica nonnunquam eos omnes amplectitur simul, quando
Just as other species or orders could be added to these, so some greater fable, for example an epic, sometimes embraces all of them at once, when
per ambages deorumque ministeria et fabulosum sententiarum tormentum praecipitat liberum spiritum, ut potius furentis animi vaticinatio, de castis heroum amoribus, appareat, quam religiosae orationis sub testibus fides.
"Events, past and passing, ought not to be merely recorded in verse, the historian will deal with them far better; by means of circumlocutions and the intervention of the immortals, the free spirit, wracked by the search for epigrams having a mythological illusion, should plunge headlong and appear as the prophecy of a mind inspired rather than the attested faith of scrupulous exactitude in speech."
Petr.
Petronius.
Rationalium addamus tres species, vel
Let us add three species of rational fables,
ordines potius inferiores, exempli
or rather lower orders, for the sake of example.
gratia. 1) Exempla divina vel divinorum,
1) Divine examples, or examples of divine things,
rationalia tamen, si quibus sunt,
yet rational if there are any,
sunt eae fabulae theologicae, et strictius mythologicae.
are those theological fables, and more strictly mythological
2) Exempla amoris, quorum fabulae sunt Milesiae,
ones. 2) Examples of love, whose fables are Milesian,
et romanenses strictius, quae latius cum fictionibus poeticis coincidunt.
and romances more strictly, which more broadly coincide with poetic fictions.
3) Exempla virtutis sublimis et gloriam
3) Examples of sublime virtue and of earned glory,
promeritae, quorum fabulae sunt heroicae.
whose fables are heroic.
Quemadmodum his addi species ordinesve possent alii,
Just as other species or orders could be added to
sic maior quaedam fabula e.g.
these, so some greater fable, for example
epica nonnunquam eos omnes amplectitur simul, quando
an epic, sometimes embraces all of them at once, when
per ambages deorumque ministeria et fabulosum sententiarum tormentum praecipitat liberum spiritum, ut potius furentis animi vaticinatio, de castis heroum amoribus, appareat, quam religiosae orationis sub testibus fides.
"Events, past and passing, ought not to be merely recorded in verse, the historian will deal with them far better; by means of circumlocutions and the intervention of the immortals, the free spirit, wracked by the search for epigrams having a mythological illusion, should plunge headlong and appear as the prophecy of a mind inspired rather than the attested faith of scrupulous exactitude in speech."
Petr.
Petronius.
Rationalium addamus tres species, vel ordines potius inferiores, exempli gratia. 1) Exempla divina vel divinorum, rationalia tamen, si quibus sunt, sunt eae fabulae theologicae, et strictius mythologicae. 2) Exempla amoris, quorum fabulae sunt Milesiae, et romanenses strictius, quae latius cum fictionibus poeticis coincidunt. 3) Exempla virtutis sublimis et gloriam promeritae, quorum fabulae sunt heroicae. / Let us add three species of rational fables, or rather lower orders, for the sake of example. 1) Divine examples, or examples of divine things, yet rational if there are any, are those theological fables, and more strictly mythological ones. 2) Examples of love, whose fables are Milesian, and romances more strictly, which more broadly coincide with poetic fictions. 3) Examples of sublime virtue and of earned glory, whose fables are heroic.
Quemadmodum his addi species ordinesve possent alii, sic maior quaedam fabula e.g. epica nonnunquam eos omnes amplectitur simul, quando / Just as other species or orders could be added to these, so some greater fable, for example an epic, sometimes embraces all of them at once, when
per ambages deorumque ministeria et fabulosum sententiarum tormentum praecipitat liberum spiritum, ut potius furentis animi vaticinatio, de castis heroum amoribus, appareat, quam religiosae orationis sub testibus fides.
"Events, past and passing, ought not to be merely recorded in verse, the historian will deal with them far better; by means of circumlocutions and the intervention of the immortals, the free spirit, wracked by the search for epigrams having a mythological illusion, should plunge headlong and appear as the prophecy of a mind inspired rather than the attested faith of scrupulous exactitude in speech."
Petr. / Petronius.
§ 539
Argumenta probantia nunc aestheticis nobis sunt, quorum vel unica, vel potior, vel certe iam potissimum consideranda vis est, § 143, exhibere cogitandis et quasi circumdare pulcram verisimilitudinem, et eam veritatem, quae quantacunque sit, quotcunque falsis videatur involuta, se probet tamen et iucundam ac facilem praebeat bonis omnibus haec veritatis viridaria penetrare gnaris.
Proving arguments now for us as aestheticians are those whose either sole, or stronger, or certainly now chiefly to be considered force is, § 143, to exhibit to things to be thought, and as it were to surround them with, beautiful verisimilitude, and that truth which, however great it may be, with however many false things it may seem enveloped, nevertheless proves itself and offers it as pleasant and easy to all good people skilled in penetrating these pleasure-gardens of truth.
Argumenta probantia nunc aestheticis nobis sunt, quorum vel unica, vel potior, vel certe iam potissimum consideranda vis est, § 143, exhibere cogitandis et quasi circumdare pulcram verisimilitudinem, et eam veritatem, quae quantacunque sit, quotcunque falsis videatur involuta, se probet tamen et iucundam ac facilem praebeat bonis omnibus haec veritatis viridaria penetrare gnaris.
Proving arguments now for us as aestheticians are those whose either sole, or stronger, or certainly now chiefly to be considered force is, § 143, to exhibit to things to be thought, and as it were to surround them with, beautiful verisimilitude, and that truth which, however great it may be, with however many false things it may seem enveloped, nevertheless proves itself and offers it as pleasant and easy to all good people skilled in penetrating these pleasure-gardens of truth.
Argumenta probantia nunc aestheticis nobis sunt,
Proving arguments now for us as aestheticians are
quorum vel unica, vel potior,
those whose either sole, or stronger,
vel certe iam potissimum consideranda vis est,
or certainly now chiefly to be considered force is,
§ 143, exhibere cogitandis
§ 143, to exhibit to things to be thought,
et quasi circumdare pulcram
and as it were to surround them with,
verisimilitudinem, et eam veritatem,
beautiful verisimilitude, and that truth which, however great it may
quae quantacunque sit, quotcunque falsis videatur involuta, se
be, with however many false things it may seem enveloped,
probet tamen et iucundam ac
nevertheless proves itself and offers it as pleasant and
facilem praebeat bonis omnibus haec veritatis viridaria penetrare
easy to all good people skilled in penetrating
gnaris.
these pleasure-gardens of truth.
Argumenta probantia nunc aestheticis nobis sunt, quorum vel unica, vel potior, vel certe iam potissimum consideranda vis est, § 143, exhibere cogitandis et quasi circumdare pulcram verisimilitudinem, et eam veritatem, quae quantacunque sit, quotcunque falsis videatur involuta, se probet tamen et iucundam ac facilem praebeat bonis omnibus haec veritatis viridaria penetrare gnaris. / Proving arguments now for us as aestheticians are those whose either sole, or stronger, or certainly now chiefly to be considered force is, § 143, to exhibit to things to be thought, and as it were to surround them with, beautiful verisimilitude, and that truth which, however great it may be, with however many false things it may seem enveloped, nevertheless proves itself and offers it as pleasant and easy to all good people skilled in penetrating these pleasure-gardens of truth.
§ 540
Velut omnibus aptum argumentis eiusmodi legimus exordium apud Lucretium L. II.
As suited to all arguments of this sort, we read an exordium in Lucretius, book II.
Nunc animum nobis adhibe veram ad rationem. / Desine quapropter novitate exterritus ipsa / Exspuere ex animo rationem, sed magis acri / Iudicio perpende, et, si tibi vera videtur, / Dede manus, aut, si falsa est, accingere contra. / Quaerit enim rationem animus.
"Now to true reason give thy mind for us. [...]
Then, spew not reason from thy mind away,
Beside thyself because the matter's new,
But rather with keen judgment nicely weigh;
And if to thee it then appeareth true,
Render thy hands, or, if 'tis false at last,
Gird thee to combat. For my mind-of-man
Now seeks the nature of the vast Beyond [...]"
Nec tamen omnia, quanquam nec nihil, dicit post tantum prologum non ita parvus promissor, de mundorum multitudine. Quintilianus huc facientium argumentorum magnam congeriem conscribens, V. 10. vocem argumenti quidem probantibus persuadentibusque solis significandis nunc adhibet, ipse tamen monet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiem dici posse argumentum. Ergo et omnis ad cogitandum materies, ratio alterius perceptionis, perceptio, § 26.
And yet, after so great a prologue, the not so small promiser says not everything, although not nothing, concerning the multitude of worlds. Quintilian, writing out a great heap of arguments making for this, V.10, indeed now uses the word argument for signifying only proving and persuading things, yet he himself warns that "all matter destined for writing" can be called an argument. Therefore also every matter for thinking, the reason of another perception, is a perception, § 26.
Velut omnibus aptum argumentis eiusmodi legimus exordium apud Lucretium L. II.
As suited to all arguments of this sort, we read an exordium in Lucretius, book II.
Nunc animum nobis adhibe veram ad rationem. / Desine quapropter novitate exterritus ipsa / Exspuere ex animo rationem, sed magis acri / Iudicio perpende, et, si tibi vera videtur, / Dede manus, aut, si falsa est, accingere contra. / Quaerit enim rationem animus.
"Now to true reason give thy mind for us. [...]
Then, spew not reason from thy mind away,
Beside thyself because the matter's new,
But rather with keen judgment nicely weigh;
And if to thee it then appeareth true,
Render thy hands, or, if 'tis false at last,
Gird thee to combat. For my mind-of-man
Now seeks the nature of the vast Beyond [...]"
Nec tamen omnia, quanquam nec nihil, dicit post tantum prologum non ita parvus promissor, de mundorum multitudine.
And yet, after so great a prologue, the not so small promiser says not everything, although not nothing, concerning the multitude of worlds.
Quintilianus huc facientium argumentorum magnam congeriem conscribens, V. 10. vocem argumenti quidem probantibus persuadentibusque solis significandis nunc adhibet, ipse tamen monet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiem dici posse argumentum.
Quintilian, writing out a great heap of arguments making for this, V.10, indeed now uses the word argument for signifying only proving and persuading things, yet he himself warns that "all matter destined for writing" can be called an argument.
Ergo et omnis ad cogitandum materies, ratio alterius perceptionis, perceptio, § 26.
Therefore also every matter for thinking, the reason of another perception, is a perception, § 26.
Velut omnibus aptum argumentis eiusmodi
As suited to all arguments of this sort,
legimus exordium apud Lucretium L. II.
we read an exordium in Lucretius, book II.
Nunc animum nobis adhibe veram ad rationem. / Desine quapropter novitate exterritus ipsa / Exspuere ex animo rationem, sed magis acri / Iudicio perpende, et, si tibi vera videtur, / Dede manus, aut, si falsa est, accingere contra. / Quaerit enim rationem animus.
"Now to true reason give thy mind for us. [...]
Then, spew not reason from thy mind away,
Beside thyself because the matter's new,
But rather with keen judgment nicely weigh;
And if to thee it then appeareth true,
Render thy hands, or, if 'tis false at last,
Gird thee to combat. For my mind-of-man
Now seeks the nature of the vast Beyond [...]"
Nec tamen omnia, quanquam nec nihil,
And yet, after so great a prologue, the
dicit post tantum prologum non ita parvus promissor,
not so small promiser says not everything, although not nothing,
de mundorum multitudine.
concerning the multitude of worlds.
Quintilianus huc facientium argumentorum magnam congeriem conscribens, V.
Quintilian, writing out a great heap of arguments making for this, V.10,
10. vocem argumenti quidem
indeed now uses the word argument for signifying only
probantibus persuadentibusque solis significandis nunc adhibet,
proving and persuading things, yet he
ipse tamen monet omnem ad scribendum destinatam
himself warns that "all matter destined for writing" can
materiem dici posse argumentum.
be called an argument.
Ergo et omnis ad cogitandum materies,
Therefore also every matter for thinking, the reason
ratio alterius perceptionis, perceptio, § 26.
of another perception, is a perception, § 26.
Velut omnibus aptum argumentis eiusmodi legimus exordium apud Lucretium L. II. / As suited to all arguments of this sort, we read an exordium in Lucretius, book II.
Nunc animum nobis adhibe veram ad rationem. / Desine quapropter novitate exterritus ipsa / Exspuere ex animo rationem, sed magis acri / Iudicio perpende, et, si tibi vera videtur, / Dede manus, aut, si falsa est, accingere contra. / Quaerit enim rationem animus.
"Now to true reason give thy mind for us. [...]
Then, spew not reason from thy mind away,
Beside thyself because the matter's new,
But rather with keen judgment nicely weigh;
And if to thee it then appeareth true,
Render thy hands, or, if 'tis false at last,
Gird thee to combat. For my mind-of-man
Now seeks the nature of the vast Beyond [...]"
Nec tamen omnia, quanquam nec nihil, dicit post tantum prologum non ita parvus promissor, de mundorum multitudine. / And yet, after so great a prologue, the not so small promiser says not everything, although not nothing, concerning the multitude of worlds.
Quintilianus huc facientium argumentorum magnam congeriem conscribens, V. 10. vocem argumenti quidem probantibus persuadentibusque solis significandis nunc adhibet, ipse tamen monet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiem dici posse argumentum. / Quintilian, writing out a great heap of arguments making for this, V.10, indeed now uses the word argument for signifying only proving and persuading things, yet he himself warns that "all matter destined for writing" can be called an argument.
Ergo et omnis ad cogitandum materies, ratio alterius perceptionis, perceptio, § 26. / Therefore also every matter for thinking, the reason of another perception, is a perception, § 26.
§ 541
Iam observavi Quintilianum non distinguere probantia argumenta a persuadentibus. Hinc ad probationes euthymemata, epicheremata et apodixes omnes refert, evidenter probationes, uti apud Geometras. Sed infra patebit uberius, cur nunc ab iisdem abstineam. Aliud est argumentum veritatis aestheticae, aliud argumentum illustrans. Haec compone, et tunc demum habebis argumentum persuadens. Omne persuadens probat, sed non omne probans persuadet, §§ 22, 539. Verum persuadeat etiam, nunc tamen unice attenditur, ut probans.
I have already observed that Quintilian does not distinguish proving arguments from persuading ones. Hence he refers to proofs all euthymemata, epicheiremata, and apodeixeis, evident proofs such as among geometers. But below it will appear more fully why I now abstain from these same things. An argument of aesthetic truth is one thing; an illustrating argument is another. Combine these, and then at last you will have a persuading argument. Every persuading thing proves, but not every proving thing persuades, §§ 22, 539. Yet although it may also persuade, now nevertheless it is attended to only as proving.
Iam observavi Quintilianum non distinguere probantia argumenta a persuadentibus.
I have already observed that Quintilian does not distinguish proving arguments from persuading ones.
Hinc ad probationes euthymemata, epicheremata et apodixes omnes refert, evidenter probationes, uti apud Geometras.
Hence he refers to proofs all euthymemata, epicheiremata, and apodeixeis, evident proofs such as among geometers.
Sed infra patebit uberius, cur nunc ab iisdem abstineam.
But below it will appear more fully why I now abstain from these same things.
Aliud est argumentum veritatis aestheticae, aliud argumentum illustrans.
An argument of aesthetic truth is one thing; an illustrating argument is another.
Haec compone, et tunc demum habebis argumentum persuadens.
Combine these, and then at last you will have a persuading argument.
Omne persuadens probat, sed non omne probans persuadet, §§ 22, 539. Verum persuadeat etiam, nunc tamen unice attenditur, ut probans.
Every persuading thing proves, but not every proving thing persuades, §§ 22, 539. Yet although it may also persuade, now nevertheless it is attended to only as proving.
Iam observavi Quintilianum non distinguere
I have already observed that Quintilian does not distinguish
probantia argumenta a persuadentibus.
proving arguments from persuading ones.
Hinc ad probationes euthymemata, epicheremata
Hence he refers to proofs all euthymemata, epicheiremata,
et apodixes omnes refert, evidenter probationes, uti apud Geometras.
and apodeixeis, evident proofs such as among geometers.
Sed infra patebit uberius, cur nunc ab iisdem abstineam.
But below it will appear more fully why I now abstain from these same things.
Aliud est argumentum veritatis aestheticae,
An argument of aesthetic truth is one thing;
aliud argumentum illustrans.
an illustrating argument is another.
Haec compone, et tunc demum habebis argumentum persuadens.
Combine these, and then at last you will have a persuading argument.
Omne persuadens probat, sed non omne probans persuadet, §§ 22, 539.
Every persuading thing proves, but not every proving thing persuades, §§ 22, 539.
Verum persuadeat etiam, nunc tamen unice attenditur,
Yet although it may also persuade, now nevertheless it is attended
ut probans.
to only as proving.
Iam observavi Quintilianum non distinguere probantia argumenta a persuadentibus. / I have already observed that Quintilian does not distinguish proving arguments from persuading ones.
Hinc ad probationes euthymemata, epicheremata et apodixes omnes refert, evidenter probationes, uti apud Geometras. / Hence he refers to proofs all euthymemata, epicheiremata, and apodeixeis, evident proofs such as among geometers.
Sed infra patebit uberius, cur nunc ab iisdem abstineam. / But below it will appear more fully why I now abstain from these same things.
Aliud est argumentum veritatis aestheticae, aliud argumentum illustrans. / An argument of aesthetic truth is one thing; an illustrating argument is another.
Haec compone, et tunc demum habebis argumentum persuadens. / Combine these, and then at last you will have a persuading argument.
Omne persuadens probat, sed non omne probans persuadet, §§ 22, 539. Verum persuadeat etiam, nunc tamen unice attenditur, ut probans. / Every persuading thing proves, but not every proving thing persuades, §§ 22, 539. Yet although it may also persuade, now nevertheless it is attended to only as proving.
§ 542
Acquiescamus in descriptione apud Quintilianum l. c. quando,
Let us rest content with the description in Quintilian, cited place, when he says:
argumentum, ait, (probans) est ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliquid per aliud, et quae, quod est dubium, per id, quod dubium non est, confirmat.
"an argument is a process of reasoning which provides proof and enables one thing to be inferred from another and confirms facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain,"
Verum ohe! quae quanta postulat? Pergens:
This is a proving argument. But ah! what things, and how great, does it require? Continuing:
Debet nota esse, recte argumenta tractaturo, vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat. Hinc enim sunt, quae exorta dicuntur.
"Further, the man who is to handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects. For it is thus that we arrive at probable arguments or εἰκότα as the Greeks call them."
Verum interpretemur nota aesthetice et res omnes, de quibus pulcre cogitare instituas. Generatim enim suo postulato satisfacere concedit ipse longum, impossibile, aut potius infinitum esse.
But let us interpret "known" aesthetically, and "all things" as those about which you undertake to think beautifully. For he himself grants that to satisfy his postulate generally is long, impossible, or rather infinite.
Acquiescamus in descriptione apud Quintilianum l. c. quando,
Let us rest content with the description in Quintilian, cited place, when he says:
argumentum, ait, (probans) est ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliquid per aliud, et quae, quod est dubium, per id, quod dubium non est, confirmat.
"an argument is a process of reasoning which provides proof and enables one thing to be inferred from another and confirms facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain,"
Verum ohe! quae quanta postulat?
This is a proving argument. But ah! what things, and how great, does it require?
Pergens:
Continuing:
Debet nota esse, recte argumenta tractaturo, vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat. Hinc enim sunt, quae exorta dicuntur.
"Further, the man who is to handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects. For it is thus that we arrive at probable arguments or εἰκότα as the Greeks call them."
Verum interpretemur nota aesthetice et res omnes, de quibus pulcre cogitare instituas.
But let us interpret "known" aesthetically, and "all things" as those about which you undertake to think beautifully.
Generatim enim suo postulato satisfacere concedit ipse longum, impossibile, aut potius infinitum esse.
For he himself grants that to satisfy his postulate generally is long, impossible, or rather infinite.
Acquiescamus in descriptione apud Quintilianum l.
Let us rest content with the description in Quintilian, cited
c. quando,
place, when he says:
argumentum, ait, (probans) est ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliquid per aliud, et quae, quod est dubium, per id, quod dubium non est, confirmat.
"an argument is a process of reasoning which provides proof and enables one thing to be inferred from another and confirms facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain,"
Verum ohe!
This is a proving argument. But ah!
quae quanta postulat?
what things, and how great, does it require?
Pergens:
Continuing:
Debet nota esse, recte argumenta tractaturo, vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat. Hinc enim sunt, quae exorta dicuntur.
"Further, the man who is to handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects. For it is thus that we arrive at probable arguments or εἰκότα as the Greeks call them."
Verum interpretemur nota aesthetice et res omnes,
But let us interpret "known" aesthetically, and "all things" as
de quibus pulcre cogitare instituas.
those about which you undertake to think beautifully.
Generatim enim suo postulato satisfacere concedit ipse longum,
For he himself grants that to satisfy his postulate generally is long,
impossibile, aut potius infinitum esse.
impossible, or rather infinite.
Acquiescamus in descriptione apud Quintilianum l. c. quando, / Let us rest content with the description in Quintilian, cited place, when he says:
argumentum, ait, (probans) est ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliquid per aliud, et quae, quod est dubium, per id, quod dubium non est, confirmat.
"an argument is a process of reasoning which provides proof and enables one thing to be inferred from another and confirms facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain,"
Verum ohe! quae quanta postulat? / This is a proving argument. But ah! what things, and how great, does it require?
Pergens: / Continuing:
Debet nota esse, recte argumenta tractaturo, vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat. Hinc enim sunt, quae exorta dicuntur.
"Further, the man who is to handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects. For it is thus that we arrive at probable arguments or εἰκότα as the Greeks call them."
Verum interpretemur nota aesthetice et res omnes, de quibus pulcre cogitare instituas. / But let us interpret "known" aesthetically, and "all things" as those about which you undertake to think beautifully.
Generatim enim suo postulato satisfacere concedit ipse longum, impossibile, aut potius infinitum esse. / For he himself grants that to satisfy his postulate generally is long, impossible, or rather infinite.
§ 543
Sed veniamus ad quaedam eiusmodi species argumentorum, non excussis denuo topicis, de quibus iam supra sic satis, S. X. Habent in figuris dictionis Paregmenon, qua radicibus et origine cognata coniunguntur vocabula. e.g. Ov. de Ponto, II. 5.
But let us come to certain species of arguments of this sort, without shaking out again the topics, about which above already thus enough, Section X. Among figures of diction they have paregmenon, by which words related in roots and origin are joined; for example Ovid, Ex Ponto II.5.
Tu quoque Pieridum studio, studiose, teneris, / Ingenioque faves, ingeniose, meo.
"You too are possessed with devotion to the Pierians, studious one; you, talented yourself, look with favour on my talent."
Haec quoties fit argumentum probans, vel ex finitione per etymologiam, quam Quintilianus dicit, aut ex onomatologia desumtum, vel illud de coniugatis, quod ridiculum putasset, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, fit figura sententiae, multa nonnunquam cum verisimilitudine adhibenda, §§ 26, 539.
Whenever this becomes a proving argument, either taken from definition through etymology, as Quintilian says, or from onomatology, or that one from conjugates, which he would have thought ridiculous unless Cicero used it, it becomes a figure of thought, sometimes to be applied with much verisimilitude, §§ 26, 539.
Sed veniamus ad quaedam eiusmodi species argumentorum, non excussis denuo topicis, de quibus iam supra sic satis, S. X. Habent in figuris dictionis Paregmenon, qua radicibus et origine cognata coniunguntur vocabula. e.g. Ov. de Ponto, II. 5.
But let us come to certain species of arguments of this sort, without shaking out again the topics, about which above already thus enough, Section X. Among figures of diction they have paregmenon, by which words related in roots and origin are joined; for example Ovid, Ex Ponto II.5.
Tu quoque Pieridum studio, studiose, teneris, / Ingenioque faves, ingeniose, meo.
"You too are possessed with devotion to the Pierians, studious one; you, talented yourself, look with favour on my talent."
Haec quoties fit argumentum probans, vel ex finitione per etymologiam, quam Quintilianus dicit, aut ex onomatologia desumtum, vel illud de coniugatis, quod ridiculum putasset, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, fit figura sententiae, multa nonnunquam cum verisimilitudine adhibenda, §§ 26, 539.
Whenever this becomes a proving argument, either taken from definition through etymology, as Quintilian says, or from onomatology, or that one from conjugates, which he would have thought ridiculous unless Cicero used it, it becomes a figure of thought, sometimes to be applied with much verisimilitude, §§ 26, 539.
Sed veniamus ad quaedam eiusmodi species argumentorum,
But let us come to certain species of arguments
non excussis denuo topicis,
of this sort, without shaking out again the topics,
de quibus iam supra sic satis, S. X.
about which above already thus enough, Section X.
Habent in figuris dictionis Paregmenon,
Among figures of diction they have paregmenon,
qua radicibus et origine cognata coniunguntur
by which words related in roots and origin are joined;
vocabula. e.g. Ov. de Ponto, II. 5.
for example Ovid, Ex Ponto II.5.
Tu quoque Pieridum studio, studiose, teneris, / Ingenioque faves, ingeniose, meo.
"You too are possessed with devotion to the Pierians, studious one; you, talented yourself, look with favour on my talent."
Haec quoties fit argumentum probans,
Whenever this becomes a proving argument, either
vel ex finitione per etymologiam, quam Quintilianus dicit,
taken from definition through etymology, as Quintilian says,
aut ex onomatologia desumtum, vel illud de coniugatis,
or from onomatology, or that one from conjugates,
quod ridiculum putasset,
which he would have thought ridiculous
nisi eo Cicero uteretur,
unless Cicero used it, it becomes
fit figura sententiae, multa nonnunquam cum verisimilitudine
a figure of thought, sometimes to be applied with much verisimilitude,
adhibenda, §§ 26, 539.
§§ 26, 539.
Sed veniamus ad quaedam eiusmodi species argumentorum, non excussis denuo topicis, de quibus iam supra sic satis, S. X. Habent in figuris dictionis Paregmenon, qua radicibus et origine cognata coniunguntur vocabula. e.g. Ov. de Ponto, II. 5. / But let us come to certain species of arguments of this sort, without shaking out again the topics, about which above already thus enough, Section X. Among figures of diction they have paregmenon, by which words related in roots and origin are joined; for example Ovid, Ex Ponto II.5.
Tu quoque Pieridum studio, studiose, teneris, / Ingenioque faves, ingeniose, meo.
"You too are possessed with devotion to the Pierians, studious one; you, talented yourself, look with favour on my talent."
Haec quoties fit argumentum probans, vel ex finitione per etymologiam, quam Quintilianus dicit, aut ex onomatologia desumtum, vel illud de coniugatis, quod ridiculum putasset, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, fit figura sententiae, multa nonnunquam cum verisimilitudine adhibenda, §§ 26, 539. / Whenever this becomes a proving argument, either taken from definition through etymology, as Quintilian says, or from onomatology, or that one from conjugates, which he would have thought ridiculous unless Cicero used it, it becomes a figure of thought, sometimes to be applied with much verisimilitude, §§ 26, 539.
§ 544
Nec enim desunt in plerisque spectatorum, quos suos vult venuste cogitaturus, anticipationes huiusmodi: 1) Cordati nostri maiores vocabulis similibus et cognatis et cognatas similesque, profecto, res significare voluerunt. 2) Propositiones tautologicae, vel totaliter, vel maximam partem, sunt etiam identicae. Fundamenta argumenti et etymologici, et a coniugatis eleganter petendi, § 543. Sic Cicero ex vocabulo convivii praelato graecorum συμποσίοις nunc vel ipsis germanis nostris verisimile redderet, si vellet, vivendum potius una esse in conviviis, quam una bibendum. Neque apud germanos suae linguae fautores nullum erit argumentum, ex eorum essentiali vocabulo, quo felicitatem designant, ipsis aesthetice probaturi, virtutem eo beatitudinemque non minus, ac fortunam, pertinere, si quis id artificis manu tornare didicerit, ne scholam sapiat.
For in most of the spectators whom one about to think gracefully wishes to be his own, anticipations of this sort are not lacking: 1) Our sensible ancestors, by similar and cognate words, surely wished to signify cognate and similar things. 2) Tautological propositions, either wholly or for the greatest part, are also identical. These are the foundations of an argument both etymological and elegantly to be sought from conjugates, § 543. Thus Cicero, from the word convivium set before the Greeks' συμποσίοις, would now make it verisimilar even to our Germans themselves, if he wished, that in banquets one must live together rather than drink together. Nor among Germans, supporters of their language, will there be no argument from their essential word by which they designate happiness, for proving aesthetically to them that virtue and blessedness belong to it no less than fortune, if someone has learned to turn this with an artist's hand, lest it taste of the school.
Nec enim desunt in plerisque spectatorum, quos suos vult venuste cogitaturus, anticipationes huiusmodi: 1) Cordati nostri maiores vocabulis similibus et cognatis et cognatas similesque, profecto, res significare voluerunt. 2) Propositiones tautologicae, vel totaliter, vel maximam partem, sunt etiam identicae.
For in most of the spectators whom one about to think gracefully wishes to be his own, anticipations of this sort are not lacking: 1) Our sensible ancestors, by similar and cognate words, surely wished to signify cognate and similar things. 2) Tautological propositions, either wholly or for the greatest part, are also identical.
Fundamenta argumenti et etymologici, et a coniugatis eleganter petendi, § 543. Sic Cicero ex vocabulo convivii praelato graecorum συμποσίοις nunc vel ipsis germanis nostris verisimile redderet, si vellet, vivendum potius una esse in conviviis, quam una bibendum.
These are the foundations of an argument both etymological and elegantly to be sought from conjugates, § 543. Thus Cicero, from the word convivium set before the Greeks' συμποσίοις, would now make it verisimilar even to our Germans themselves, if he wished, that in banquets one must live together rather than drink together.
Neque apud germanos suae linguae fautores nullum erit argumentum, ex eorum essentiali vocabulo, quo felicitatem designant, ipsis aesthetice probaturi, virtutem eo beatitudinemque non minus, ac fortunam, pertinere, si quis id artificis manu tornare didicerit, ne scholam sapiat.
Nor among Germans, supporters of their language, will there be no argument from their essential word by which they designate happiness, for proving aesthetically to them that virtue and blessedness belong to it no less than fortune, if someone has learned to turn this with an artist's hand, lest it taste of the school.
Nec enim desunt in plerisque spectatorum,
For in most of the spectators
quos suos vult venuste cogitaturus,
whom one about to think gracefully wishes to be
anticipationes huiusmodi:
his own, anticipations of this sort are not lacking:
1) Cordati nostri maiores vocabulis similibus et cognatis et cognatas similesque,
1) Our sensible ancestors, by similar and cognate words,
profecto, res significare voluerunt.
surely wished to signify cognate and similar things.
2) Propositiones tautologicae, vel totaliter, vel maximam partem,
2) Tautological propositions, either wholly or for the greatest part,
sunt etiam identicae.
are also identical.
Fundamenta argumenti et etymologici,
These are the foundations of an argument both etymological
et a coniugatis eleganter petendi, § 543.
and elegantly to be sought from conjugates, § 543.
Sic Cicero ex vocabulo convivii praelato graecorum συμποσίοις
Thus Cicero, from the word convivium set before the Greeks' συμποσίοις,
nunc vel ipsis germanis nostris verisimile redderet,
would now make it verisimilar even to our
si vellet, vivendum potius una esse in conviviis,
Germans themselves, if he wished, that in banquets
quam una bibendum.
one must live together rather than drink together.
Neque apud germanos suae linguae
Nor among Germans, supporters of their language,
fautores nullum erit argumentum,
will there be no argument
ex eorum essentiali vocabulo, quo felicitatem designant,
from their essential word by which they designate happiness,
ipsis aesthetice probaturi,
for proving aesthetically to them that
virtutem eo beatitudinemque non minus,
virtue and blessedness belong to it no less
ac fortunam, pertinere, si quis
than fortune, if someone has learned to turn
id artificis manu tornare didicerit, ne scholam sapiat.
this with an artist's hand, lest it taste of the school.
Nec enim desunt in plerisque spectatorum, quos suos vult venuste cogitaturus, anticipationes huiusmodi: 1) Cordati nostri maiores vocabulis similibus et cognatis et cognatas similesque, profecto, res significare voluerunt. 2) Propositiones tautologicae, vel totaliter, vel maximam partem, sunt etiam identicae. / For in most of the spectators whom one about to think gracefully wishes to be his own, anticipations of this sort are not lacking: 1) Our sensible ancestors, by similar and cognate words, surely wished to signify cognate and similar things. 2) Tautological propositions, either wholly or for the greatest part, are also identical.
Fundamenta argumenti et etymologici, et a coniugatis eleganter petendi, § 543. Sic Cicero ex vocabulo convivii praelato graecorum συμποσίοις nunc vel ipsis germanis nostris verisimile redderet, si vellet, vivendum potius una esse in conviviis, quam una bibendum. / These are the foundations of an argument both etymological and elegantly to be sought from conjugates, § 543. Thus Cicero, from the word convivium set before the Greeks' συμποσίοις, would now make it verisimilar even to our Germans themselves, if he wished, that in banquets one must live together rather than drink together.
Neque apud germanos suae linguae fautores nullum erit argumentum, ex eorum essentiali vocabulo, quo felicitatem designant, ipsis aesthetice probaturi, virtutem eo beatitudinemque non minus, ac fortunam, pertinere, si quis id artificis manu tornare didicerit, ne scholam sapiat. / Nor among Germans, supporters of their language, will there be no argument from their essential word by which they designate happiness, for proving aesthetically to them that virtue and blessedness belong to it no less than fortune, if someone has learned to turn this with an artist's hand, lest it taste of the school.
§ 545
In figuris sententiae quae numerantur, earum aetiologian huc eo suo iure primam cito, ut eandem omne venustius probans argumentum audeam definire, et colorem, aetiologian stricte fictam, qui tamen non confundendus est cum coloribus, de quibus infra, sicut cura quaedam laudatur, curae vituperantur omnes satis commode. Est eiusmodi multiplicata aetiologia apud Ciceronem pro Plancio:
Among the figures of thought which are enumerated, I cite their aetiology here first by its own right, so that I would dare to define the same as every argument proving more gracefully, and color, a strictly invented aetiology, which nevertheless is not to be confused with the colors about which below, just as a certain care is praised, while cares are all blamed quite suitably. There is a multiplied aetiology of this sort in Cicero's For Plancius:
Quis est, qui neget, ordinis eius, (publicanorum) studium fuisse in honore Plancii singulare? Neque iniuria, vel quod erat pater is, qui est princeps iam diu publicanorum, vel quod is ab sociis unice diligebatur, vel quod diligentissime rogabat, vel quia pro filio supplicabat, vel quia huius in illum ordinem summa officia quaesturae tribunatusque constabant, vel quod illi in hoc ornando ordinem se ornare, et consulere liberis suis arbitrabantur.
"Who is there, then, who can deny that that body showed extraordinary zeal in aiding Plancius in his contest for honour? And it was very natural that they should, because his father is a man who has for a long time been the head of the company of farmers; and because he was exceedingly beloved by his fellows of that company; and because he canvassed them with the greatest diligence; and because he was entreating them in favour of his son; and because it was notorious that Plancius himself had both in his quaestorship and tribuneship done many kindnesses to that body; and because in promoting him they thought that they were promoting themselves, and consulting the welfare and dignity of their children."
In figuris sententiae quae numerantur, earum aetiologian huc eo suo iure primam cito, ut eandem omne venustius probans argumentum audeam definire, et colorem, aetiologian stricte fictam, qui tamen non confundendus est cum coloribus, de quibus infra, sicut cura quaedam laudatur, curae vituperantur omnes satis commode.
Among the figures of thought which are enumerated, I cite their aetiology here first by its own right, so that I would dare to define the same as every argument proving more gracefully, and color, a strictly invented aetiology, which nevertheless is not to be confused with the colors about which below, just as a certain care is praised, while cares are all blamed quite suitably.
Est eiusmodi multiplicata aetiologia apud Ciceronem pro Plancio:
There is a multiplied aetiology of this sort in Cicero's For Plancius:
Quis est, qui neget, ordinis eius, (publicanorum) studium fuisse in honore Plancii singulare? Neque iniuria, vel quod erat pater is, qui est princeps iam diu publicanorum, vel quod is ab sociis unice diligebatur, vel quod diligentissime rogabat, vel quia pro filio supplicabat, vel quia huius in illum ordinem summa officia quaesturae tribunatusque constabant, vel quod illi in hoc ornando ordinem se ornare, et consulere liberis suis arbitrabantur.
"Who is there, then, who can deny that that body showed extraordinary zeal in aiding Plancius in his contest for honour? And it was very natural that they should, because his father is a man who has for a long time been the head of the company of farmers; and because he was exceedingly beloved by his fellows of that company; and because he canvassed them with the greatest diligence; and because he was entreating them in favour of his son; and because it was notorious that Plancius himself had both in his quaestorship and tribuneship done many kindnesses to that body; and because in promoting him they thought that they were promoting themselves, and consulting the welfare and dignity of their children."
In figuris sententiae quae numerantur,
Among the figures of thought which are enumerated,
earum aetiologian huc eo suo iure primam
I cite their aetiology here first by its own right,
cito, ut eandem
so that I would dare to define the same
omne venustius probans argumentum audeam definire, et colorem,
as every argument proving more gracefully, and color,
aetiologian stricte fictam, qui tamen non confundendus
a strictly invented aetiology, which nevertheless is not to
est cum coloribus, de quibus infra,
be confused with the colors about which below, just
sicut cura quaedam laudatur, curae
as a certain care is praised,
vituperantur omnes satis commode.
while cares are all blamed quite suitably.
Est eiusmodi multiplicata aetiologia apud Ciceronem pro Plancio:
There is a multiplied aetiology of this sort in Cicero's For Plancius:
Quis est, qui neget, ordinis eius, (publicanorum) studium fuisse in honore Plancii singulare? Neque iniuria, vel quod erat pater is, qui est princeps iam diu publicanorum, vel quod is ab sociis unice diligebatur, vel quod diligentissime rogabat, vel quia pro filio supplicabat, vel quia huius in illum ordinem summa officia quaesturae tribunatusque constabant, vel quod illi in hoc ornando ordinem se ornare, et consulere liberis suis arbitrabantur.
"Who is there, then, who can deny that that body showed extraordinary zeal in aiding Plancius in his contest for honour? And it was very natural that they should, because his father is a man who has for a long time been the head of the company of farmers; and because he was exceedingly beloved by his fellows of that company; and because he canvassed them with the greatest diligence; and because he was entreating them in favour of his son; and because it was notorious that Plancius himself had both in his quaestorship and tribuneship done many kindnesses to that body; and because in promoting him they thought that they were promoting themselves, and consulting the welfare and dignity of their children."
In figuris sententiae quae numerantur, earum aetiologian huc eo suo iure primam cito, ut eandem omne venustius probans argumentum audeam definire, et colorem, aetiologian stricte fictam, qui tamen non confundendus est cum coloribus, de quibus infra, sicut cura quaedam laudatur, curae vituperantur omnes satis commode. / Among the figures of thought which are enumerated, I cite their aetiology here first by its own right, so that I would dare to define the same as every argument proving more gracefully, and color, a strictly invented aetiology, which nevertheless is not to be confused with the colors about which below, just as a certain care is praised, while cares are all blamed quite suitably.
Est eiusmodi multiplicata aetiologia apud Ciceronem pro Plancio: / There is a multiplied aetiology of this sort in Cicero's For Plancius:
Quis est, qui neget, ordinis eius, (publicanorum) studium fuisse in honore Plancii singulare? Neque iniuria, vel quod erat pater is, qui est princeps iam diu publicanorum, vel quod is ab sociis unice diligebatur, vel quod diligentissime rogabat, vel quia pro filio supplicabat, vel quia huius in illum ordinem summa officia quaesturae tribunatusque constabant, vel quod illi in hoc ornando ordinem se ornare, et consulere liberis suis arbitrabantur.
"Who is there, then, who can deny that that body showed extraordinary zeal in aiding Plancius in his contest for honour? And it was very natural that they should, because his father is a man who has for a long time been the head of the company of farmers; and because he was exceedingly beloved by his fellows of that company; and because he canvassed them with the greatest diligence; and because he was entreating them in favour of his son; and because it was notorious that Plancius himself had both in his quaestorship and tribuneship done many kindnesses to that body; and because in promoting him they thought that they were promoting themselves, and consulting the welfare and dignity of their children."
§ 546
Coloris exemplum habet Iuvenalis Sat. VI. 229. quod fallor? an est alicubi gentium strictissime verum?
Juvenal, Satire VI.229, has an example of color. Am I mistaken? Or is there anywhere among nations something most strictly true?
Sed (uxor) iacet in servi complexibus, aut equitis. Dic, Dic aliquem, sodes, heic, Quintiliane, colorem, § 545. Haeremus. Dic ipsa: Olim convenerat, inquit, Ut faceres tu, quod velles, nec non ego possem Indulgere mihi. Clames licet, et mare caelo Confundas, homo sum. Nihil est audacius illis Deprensis. Iram atque animos a crimine sumunt.
"But suppose her actually caught in the arms of a slave or knight. “Pray suggest in this case some colorable excuse, Quintilian!” “We are at fault! Let the lady herself speak!” “It was formerly agreed,” she says, “that you should do what you pleased, and that I also might have full power to gratify myself. In spite of your outcry and confounding heaven and sea, I am mortal.” Nothing is more audacious than these women when detected. They affect resentment, and borrow courage from their very guilt itself."
Ipsa illa decantata Virgilii sententia, § 499, non nisi color est, quo Aen. L. XI. Drances
§ 545. That very well-worn sentence of Virgil, § 499, is nothing but a color by which, in Aeneid book XI, Drances,
infensus, quem gloria Turni Obliqua invidia stimulisque agitabat amaris, seditione potentem animum tegit,
"Then Drances rose,
that foe inveterate, whom Turnus' fame
to stinging hate and envy double-tongued
ever pricked on. [...] in quarrels stronger still;"
v. 362. graviter reprehensus a Turno: v. 399.
verse 362. He is severely rebuked by Turnus, verse 399:
Nulla salus bello? Capiti cane talia demens Dardanio, rebusque tuis.
"War will not save us? Fling that prophecy
on the doomed Dardan's head, or on thy own,
thou madman!"
Coloris exemplum habet Iuvenalis Sat.
Juvenal, Satire VI.229, has an example of color.
VI. 229. quod fallor? an est alicubi gentium strictissime verum?
Am I mistaken? Or is there anywhere among nations something most strictly true?
Sed (uxor) iacet in servi complexibus, aut equitis. Dic, Dic aliquem, sodes, heic, Quintiliane, colorem, § 545. Haeremus. Dic ipsa: Olim convenerat, inquit, Ut faceres tu, quod velles, nec non ego possem Indulgere mihi. Clames licet, et mare caelo Confundas, homo sum. Nihil est audacius illis Deprensis. Iram atque animos a crimine sumunt.
"But suppose her actually caught in the arms of a slave or knight. “Pray suggest in this case some colorable excuse, Quintilian!” “We are at fault! Let the lady herself speak!” “It was formerly agreed,” she says, “that you should do what you pleased, and that I also might have full power to gratify myself. In spite of your outcry and confounding heaven and sea, I am mortal.” Nothing is more audacious than these women when detected. They affect resentment, and borrow courage from their very guilt itself."
Ipsa illa decantata Virgilii sententia, § 499, non nisi color est, quo Aen. L. XI. Drances
§ 545. That very well-worn sentence of Virgil, § 499, is nothing but a color by which, in Aeneid book XI, Drances,
infensus, quem gloria Turni Obliqua invidia stimulisque agitabat amaris, seditione potentem animum tegit,
"Then Drances rose,
that foe inveterate, whom Turnus' fame
to stinging hate and envy double-tongued
ever pricked on. [...] in quarrels stronger still;"
v. 362. graviter reprehensus a Turno: v. 399.
verse 362. He is severely rebuked by Turnus, verse 399:
Nulla salus bello? Capiti cane talia demens Dardanio, rebusque tuis.
"War will not save us? Fling that prophecy
on the doomed Dardan's head, or on thy own,
thou madman!"
Coloris exemplum habet Iuvenalis Sat.
Juvenal, Satire VI.229, has an example of color.
VI. 229. quod fallor? an est
Am I mistaken? Or is there anywhere among
alicubi gentium strictissime verum?
nations something most strictly true?
Sed (uxor) iacet in servi complexibus, aut equitis. Dic, Dic aliquem, sodes, heic, Quintiliane, colorem, § 545. Haeremus. Dic ipsa: Olim convenerat, inquit, Ut faceres tu, quod velles, nec non ego possem Indulgere mihi. Clames licet, et mare caelo Confundas, homo sum. Nihil est audacius illis Deprensis. Iram atque animos a crimine sumunt.
"But suppose her actually caught in the arms of a slave or knight. “Pray suggest in this case some colorable excuse, Quintilian!” “We are at fault! Let the lady herself speak!” “It was formerly agreed,” she says, “that you should do what you pleased, and that I also might have full power to gratify myself. In spite of your outcry and confounding heaven and sea, I am mortal.” Nothing is more audacious than these women when detected. They affect resentment, and borrow courage from their very guilt itself."
Ipsa illa decantata Virgilii sententia, § 499,
§ 545. That very well-worn sentence of Virgil, § 499,
non nisi color est, quo Aen. L. XI. Drances
is nothing but a color by which, in Aeneid book XI, Drances,
infensus, quem gloria Turni Obliqua invidia stimulisque agitabat amaris, seditione potentem animum tegit,
"Then Drances rose,
that foe inveterate, whom Turnus' fame
to stinging hate and envy double-tongued
ever pricked on. [...] in quarrels stronger still;"
v. 362. graviter reprehensus a Turno: v. 399.
verse 362. He is severely rebuked by Turnus, verse 399:
Nulla salus bello? Capiti cane talia demens Dardanio, rebusque tuis.
"War will not save us? Fling that prophecy
on the doomed Dardan's head, or on thy own,
thou madman!"
Coloris exemplum habet Iuvenalis Sat. / Juvenal, Satire VI.229, has an example of color.
VI. 229. quod fallor? an est alicubi gentium strictissime verum? / Am I mistaken? Or is there anywhere among nations something most strictly true?
Sed (uxor) iacet in servi complexibus, aut equitis. Dic, Dic aliquem, sodes, heic, Quintiliane, colorem, § 545. Haeremus. Dic ipsa: Olim convenerat, inquit, Ut faceres tu, quod velles, nec non ego possem Indulgere mihi. Clames licet, et mare caelo Confundas, homo sum. Nihil est audacius illis Deprensis. Iram atque animos a crimine sumunt.
"But suppose her actually caught in the arms of a slave or knight. “Pray suggest in this case some colorable excuse, Quintilian!” “We are at fault! Let the lady herself speak!” “It was formerly agreed,” she says, “that you should do what you pleased, and that I also might have full power to gratify myself. In spite of your outcry and confounding heaven and sea, I am mortal.” Nothing is more audacious than these women when detected. They affect resentment, and borrow courage from their very guilt itself."
Ipsa illa decantata Virgilii sententia, § 499, non nisi color est, quo Aen. L. XI. Drances / § 545. That very well-worn sentence of Virgil, § 499, is nothing but a color by which, in Aeneid book XI, Drances,
infensus, quem gloria Turni Obliqua invidia stimulisque agitabat amaris, seditione potentem animum tegit,
"Then Drances rose,
that foe inveterate, whom Turnus' fame
to stinging hate and envy double-tongued
ever pricked on. [...] in quarrels stronger still;"
v. 362. graviter reprehensus a Turno: v. 399. / verse 362. He is severely rebuked by Turnus, verse 399:
Nulla salus bello? Capiti cane talia demens Dardanio, rebusque tuis.
"War will not save us? Fling that prophecy
on the doomed Dardan's head, or on thy own,
thou madman!"
§ 547
Iam dictum de omni et nullo docet, quanto huc iure pertineat sententia, § 525, quoniam ex generalibus colligi singularium et inferiorum sub illis contentorum veritas solet. Erit autem sententia probans etiam vel aetiologia, nunc complete certa, nunc aesthetice probabilis, vel color, § 545. Primae exemplum esto Salustii introitus:
What has already been said about every and none teaches by how much right a maxim belongs here, § 525, since from generals the truth of singulars and of inferiors contained under them is usually gathered. But a proving maxim will also be either an aetiology, now completely certain, now aesthetically probable, or a color, § 545. Let the beginning of Sallust be an example of the first:
Omnes homines, qui sese student praestare caeteris animalibus summa ope niti decet, ne vitam silentio transeant, veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri obedientia finxit.
"It becomes all men, who desire to excel other animals, to strive, to the utmost of their power, not to pass through life in obscurity, like the beasts of the field, which nature has formed groveling and subservient to appetite."
Secundae:
Of the second:
Mihi rectius videtur ingenii, quam virium opibus, gloriam quaerere, et, quoniam vita ipsa, qua fruimur, brevis est, memoriam nostri quam maxime longam efficere.
"It appears to me, therefore, more reasonable to pursue glory by means of the intellect than of bodily strength, and, since the life which we enjoy is short, to make the remembrance of us as lasting as possible."
Iam dictum de omni et nullo docet, quanto huc iure pertineat sententia, § 525, quoniam ex generalibus colligi singularium et inferiorum sub illis contentorum veritas solet.
What has already been said about every and none teaches by how much right a maxim belongs here, § 525, since from generals the truth of singulars and of inferiors contained under them is usually gathered.
Erit autem sententia probans etiam vel aetiologia, nunc complete certa, nunc aesthetice probabilis, vel color, § 545. Primae exemplum esto Salustii introitus:
But a proving maxim will also be either an aetiology, now completely certain, now aesthetically probable, or a color, § 545. Let the beginning of Sallust be an example of the first:
Omnes homines, qui sese student praestare caeteris animalibus summa ope niti decet, ne vitam silentio transeant, veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri obedientia finxit.
"It becomes all men, who desire to excel other animals, to strive, to the utmost of their power, not to pass through life in obscurity, like the beasts of the field, which nature has formed groveling and subservient to appetite."
Secundae:
Of the second:
Mihi rectius videtur ingenii, quam virium opibus, gloriam quaerere, et, quoniam vita ipsa, qua fruimur, brevis est, memoriam nostri quam maxime longam efficere.
"It appears to me, therefore, more reasonable to pursue glory by means of the intellect than of bodily strength, and, since the life which we enjoy is short, to make the remembrance of us as lasting as possible."
Iam dictum de omni et nullo docet,
What has already been said about every and none teaches
quanto huc iure pertineat sententia, § 525,
by how much right a maxim belongs here, § 525,
quoniam ex generalibus colligi singularium et
since from generals the truth of singulars and of
inferiorum sub illis contentorum veritas solet.
inferiors contained under them is usually gathered.
Erit autem sententia probans etiam
But a proving maxim will also
vel aetiologia, nunc complete certa, nunc aesthetice probabilis,
be either an aetiology, now completely certain, now aesthetically probable,
vel color, § 545. Primae
or a color, § 545. Let the beginning of Sallust
exemplum esto Salustii introitus:
be an example of the first:
Omnes homines, qui sese student praestare caeteris animalibus summa ope niti decet, ne vitam silentio transeant, veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri obedientia finxit.
"It becomes all men, who desire to excel other animals, to strive, to the utmost of their power, not to pass through life in obscurity, like the beasts of the field, which nature has formed groveling and subservient to appetite."
Secundae:
Of the second:
Mihi rectius videtur ingenii, quam virium opibus, gloriam quaerere, et, quoniam vita ipsa, qua fruimur, brevis est, memoriam nostri quam maxime longam efficere.
"It appears to me, therefore, more reasonable to pursue glory by means of the intellect than of bodily strength, and, since the life which we enjoy is short, to make the remembrance of us as lasting as possible."
Iam dictum de omni et nullo docet, quanto huc iure pertineat sententia, § 525, quoniam ex generalibus colligi singularium et inferiorum sub illis contentorum veritas solet. / What has already been said about every and none teaches by how much right a maxim belongs here, § 525, since from generals the truth of singulars and of inferiors contained under them is usually gathered.
Erit autem sententia probans etiam vel aetiologia, nunc complete certa, nunc aesthetice probabilis, vel color, § 545. Primae exemplum esto Salustii introitus: / But a proving maxim will also be either an aetiology, now completely certain, now aesthetically probable, or a color, § 545. Let the beginning of Sallust be an example of the first:
Omnes homines, qui sese student praestare caeteris animalibus summa ope niti decet, ne vitam silentio transeant, veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri obedientia finxit.
"It becomes all men, who desire to excel other animals, to strive, to the utmost of their power, not to pass through life in obscurity, like the beasts of the field, which nature has formed groveling and subservient to appetite."
Secundae: / Of the second:
Mihi rectius videtur ingenii, quam virium opibus, gloriam quaerere, et, quoniam vita ipsa, qua fruimur, brevis est, memoriam nostri quam maxime longam efficere.
"It appears to me, therefore, more reasonable to pursue glory by means of the intellect than of bodily strength, and, since the life which we enjoy is short, to make the remembrance of us as lasting as possible."
§ 548
Sententiam, quae color est, § 546, optime morati tunc non raro suis interserunt, quando improbe factorum verisimilitudinem praestituri coguntur aliquid eorum promere principiorum practicorum, ex quorum perversa opinione mali animi pessime egerint. Huc sententia Euripidis, sed ex alterius sensu prolata, quam Cicero vertit, Caesar suam toties fecit:
A maxim which is a color, § 546, those best morally formed then not rarely insert among their own, when, about to furnish verisimilitude for wicked deeds, they are compelled to bring forth something of those practical principles from whose perverse opinion evil minds have acted very badly. Here belongs the sentence of Euripides, but uttered from the sense of another person, which Cicero translated and which Caesar so often made his own:
Si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia Violandum est, aliis rebus pietatem colas.
"If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake
Were wrong most right:–be God in all else feared!"
Multa tamen opus in his erit cautione, partim ut satis constet ex mente scelerati talia proferri, partim ne tantum habeant ambiguitatis, aut adeo lepidae et venustae concipiantur, ut, plus aequo ne placeant, merito timendum sit, §§ 465, 467.
Yet in these matters there will be need of much caution, partly so that it be sufficiently clear that such things are being brought forth from the mind of a criminal, partly lest they have so much ambiguity, or be conceived so wittily and gracefully, that it is rightly to be feared they may please more than is fair, §§ 465, 467.
Sententiam, quae color est, § 546, optime morati tunc non raro suis interserunt, quando improbe factorum verisimilitudinem praestituri coguntur aliquid eorum promere principiorum practicorum, ex quorum perversa opinione mali animi pessime egerint.
A maxim which is a color, § 546, those best morally formed then not rarely insert among their own, when, about to furnish verisimilitude for wicked deeds, they are compelled to bring forth something of those practical principles from whose perverse opinion evil minds have acted very badly.
Huc sententia Euripidis, sed ex alterius sensu prolata, quam Cicero vertit, Caesar suam toties fecit:
Here belongs the sentence of Euripides, but uttered from the sense of another person, which Cicero translated and which Caesar so often made his own:
Si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia Violandum est, aliis rebus pietatem colas.
"If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake
Were wrong most right:–be God in all else feared!"
Multa tamen opus in his erit cautione, partim ut satis constet ex mente scelerati talia proferri, partim ne tantum habeant ambiguitatis, aut adeo lepidae et venustae concipiantur, ut, plus aequo ne placeant, merito timendum sit, §§ 465, 467.
Yet in these matters there will be need of much caution, partly so that it be sufficiently clear that such things are being brought forth from the mind of a criminal, partly lest they have so much ambiguity, or be conceived so wittily and gracefully, that it is rightly to be feared they may please more than is fair, §§ 465, 467.
Sententiam, quae color est, § 546,
A maxim which is a color, § 546,
optime morati tunc non raro suis interserunt,
those best morally formed then not rarely insert
quando improbe factorum verisimilitudinem praestituri
among their own, when, about to furnish verisimilitude for wicked deeds,
coguntur aliquid eorum promere principiorum practicorum,
they are compelled to bring forth something of those practical
ex quorum perversa opinione mali animi pessime egerint.
principles from whose perverse opinion evil minds have acted very badly.
Huc sententia Euripidis,
Here belongs the sentence of Euripides,
sed ex alterius sensu prolata,
but uttered from the sense of another person,
quam Cicero vertit, Caesar suam toties fecit:
which Cicero translated and which Caesar so often made his own:
Si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia Violandum est, aliis rebus pietatem colas.
"If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake
Were wrong most right:–be God in all else feared!"
Multa tamen opus in his erit
Yet in these matters there will be
cautione, partim ut satis
need of much caution, partly so that it be
constet
sufficiently clear that such things are being brought forth
ex mente scelerati talia proferri,
from the mind of a criminal,
partim ne tantum habeant ambiguitatis,
partly lest they have so much ambiguity,
aut adeo lepidae et venustae concipiantur,
or be conceived so wittily and gracefully, that
ut, plus aequo ne placeant,
it is rightly to be feared they may
merito timendum sit, §§ 465, 467.
please more than is fair, §§ 465, 467.
Sententiam, quae color est, § 546, optime morati tunc non raro suis interserunt, quando improbe factorum verisimilitudinem praestituri coguntur aliquid eorum promere principiorum practicorum, ex quorum perversa opinione mali animi pessime egerint. / A maxim which is a color, § 546, those best morally formed then not rarely insert among their own, when, about to furnish verisimilitude for wicked deeds, they are compelled to bring forth something of those practical principles from whose perverse opinion evil minds have acted very badly.
Huc sententia Euripidis, sed ex alterius sensu prolata, quam Cicero vertit, Caesar suam toties fecit: / Here belongs the sentence of Euripides, but uttered from the sense of another person, which Cicero translated and which Caesar so often made his own:
Si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia Violandum est, aliis rebus pietatem colas.
"If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake
Were wrong most right:–be God in all else feared!"
Multa tamen opus in his erit cautione, partim ut satis constet ex mente scelerati talia proferri, partim ne tantum habeant ambiguitatis, aut adeo lepidae et venustae concipiantur, ut, plus aequo ne placeant, merito timendum sit, §§ 465, 467. / Yet in these matters there will be need of much caution, partly so that it be sufficiently clear that such things are being brought forth from the mind of a criminal, partly lest they have so much ambiguity, or be conceived so wittily and gracefully, that it is rightly to be feared they may please more than is fair, §§ 465, 467.
§ 549
Nec inutiliter sententiae distinguuntur in prolatas de facto et eas, quae de iure, iusto et aequo, concipiuntur. Priores rem quandam moralem generatim sistunt, ob oculos, uti plerumque se solet habere, uti solet contingere, non eo detorquendae, quasi probaretur et commendaretur imitandum, quod meditationis argumentum est.
Nor are maxims uselessly distinguished into those put forward de facto and those which are conceived de iure, concerning the just and equitable. The former generally set a certain moral matter before the eyes, as it usually tends to be, as it tends to happen, not to be twisted to this point, as if what is the subject of meditation were being proved and commended as something to be imitated.
Auri sacra fames, quo non mortalia cogis Pectora!
"O, whither at thy will,
curst greed of gold, may mortal hearts be driven?"
Posteriores ita generalia quaedam ad mores pertinentia exhibent, ut simul ostendant, quid in iisdem verum et laudabile ponat affirmans:
The latter so exhibit certain general things pertaining to morals that at the same time they show what the one affirming posits in them as true and praiseworthy:
Discite iustitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos.
"O, ere too late, learn justice and fear God!"
Hic adhibebitur bene cautio, de qua § 547, quo crebrius ea confundi, quae fiunt, quaeque debent fieri, quotidiana docet experientia.
Here the caution about which § 547 speaks will be well applied, since daily experience teaches how often those things that happen and those things that ought to happen are confused.
Quoto cuique eadem honestatis cura secreto, quae palam? Multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur,
"How few there are who are as careful of acting honourably in secret as in public! While many people are afraid of what others will say, few are afraid of their own conscience."
Plin. III, ep. 20. Tandem meminerimus in sententiis § 174, nec eas temere cumulemus, ubicunque vivendi praeceptores videri nolumus, ne quando nobis forte videmur gravissimi, tenues gnomotypikon venas imitari videamur, de quibus, § 370.
Pliny, III, letter 20. Finally let us remember, concerning maxims, § 174, and not pile them up rashly wherever we do not wish to seem teachers of living, lest, when perhaps we seem to ourselves most weighty, we seem to imitate the thin veins of the gnomotypikon, about which, § 370.
Nec inutiliter sententiae distinguuntur in prolatas de facto et eas, quae de iure, iusto et aequo, concipiuntur.
Nor are maxims uselessly distinguished into those put forward de facto and those which are conceived de iure, concerning the just and equitable.
Priores rem quandam moralem generatim sistunt, ob oculos, uti plerumque se solet habere, uti solet contingere, non eo detorquendae, quasi probaretur et commendaretur imitandum, quod meditationis argumentum est.
The former generally set a certain moral matter before the eyes, as it usually tends to be, as it tends to happen, not to be twisted to this point, as if what is the subject of meditation were being proved and commended as something to be imitated.
Auri sacra fames, quo non mortalia cogis Pectora!
"O, whither at thy will,
curst greed of gold, may mortal hearts be driven?"
Posteriores ita generalia quaedam ad mores pertinentia exhibent, ut simul ostendant, quid in iisdem verum et laudabile ponat affirmans:
The latter so exhibit certain general things pertaining to morals that at the same time they show what the one affirming posits in them as true and praiseworthy:
Discite iustitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos.
"O, ere too late, learn justice and fear God!"
Hic adhibebitur bene cautio, de qua § 547, quo crebrius ea confundi, quae fiunt, quaeque debent fieri, quotidiana docet experientia.
Here the caution about which § 547 speaks will be well applied, since daily experience teaches how often those things that happen and those things that ought to happen are confused.
Quoto cuique eadem honestatis cura secreto, quae palam? Multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur,
"How few there are who are as careful of acting honourably in secret as in public! While many people are afraid of what others will say, few are afraid of their own conscience."
Plin. III, ep. 20. Tandem meminerimus in sententiis § 174, nec eas temere cumulemus, ubicunque vivendi praeceptores videri nolumus, ne quando nobis forte videmur gravissimi, tenues gnomotypikon venas imitari videamur, de quibus, § 370.
Pliny, III, letter 20. Finally let us remember, concerning maxims, § 174, and not pile them up rashly wherever we do not wish to seem teachers of living, lest, when perhaps we seem to ourselves most weighty, we seem to imitate the thin veins of the gnomotypikon, about which, § 370.
Nec inutiliter sententiae distinguuntur in prolatas
Nor are maxims uselessly distinguished into those put forward
de facto et eas, quae de iure,
de facto and those which are conceived de iure,
iusto et aequo, concipiuntur.
concerning the just and equitable.
Priores rem quandam moralem generatim sistunt,
The former generally set a certain moral matter before
ob oculos, uti plerumque se solet
the eyes, as it usually tends to be,
habere, uti solet contingere, non
as it tends to happen, not to be twisted to this point,
eo detorquendae, quasi probaretur
as if what is the subject of meditation were
et commendaretur imitandum, quod meditationis argumentum est.
being proved and commended as something to be imitated.
Auri sacra fames, quo non mortalia cogis Pectora!
"O, whither at thy will,
curst greed of gold, may mortal hearts be driven?"
Posteriores ita generalia quaedam ad mores pertinentia exhibent,
The latter so exhibit certain general things pertaining to morals
ut simul ostendant,
that at the same time they
quid in iisdem verum
show what the one affirming posits in them as
et laudabile ponat affirmans:
true and praiseworthy:
Discite iustitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos.
"O, ere too late, learn justice and fear God!"
Hic adhibebitur bene cautio, de qua § 547,
Here the caution about which § 547
quo crebrius ea confundi,
speaks will be well applied, since daily experience teaches how often
quae fiunt, quaeque debent fieri,
those things that happen and those things that
quotidiana docet experientia.
ought to happen are confused.
Quoto cuique eadem honestatis cura secreto, quae palam? Multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur,
"How few there are who are as careful of acting honourably in secret as in public! While many people are afraid of what others will say, few are afraid of their own conscience."
Plin. III, ep. 20. Tandem meminerimus
Pliny, III, letter 20. Finally let us remember,
in sententiis § 174, nec eas temere cumulemus,
concerning maxims, § 174, and not pile them up rashly wherever we do
ubicunque vivendi praeceptores videri nolumus, ne
not wish to seem teachers of living, lest,
quando nobis forte videmur gravissimi,
when perhaps we seem to ourselves most weighty,
tenues gnomotypikon venas imitari videamur,
we seem to imitate the thin veins of the
de quibus, § 370.
gnomotypikon, about which, § 370.
Nec inutiliter sententiae distinguuntur in prolatas de facto et eas, quae de iure, iusto et aequo, concipiuntur. / Nor are maxims uselessly distinguished into those put forward de facto and those which are conceived de iure, concerning the just and equitable.
Priores rem quandam moralem generatim sistunt, ob oculos, uti plerumque se solet habere, uti solet contingere, non eo detorquendae, quasi probaretur et commendaretur imitandum, quod meditationis argumentum est. / The former generally set a certain moral matter before the eyes, as it usually tends to be, as it tends to happen, not to be twisted to this point, as if what is the subject of meditation were being proved and commended as something to be imitated.
Auri sacra fames, quo non mortalia cogis Pectora!
"O, whither at thy will,
curst greed of gold, may mortal hearts be driven?"
Posteriores ita generalia quaedam ad mores pertinentia exhibent, ut simul ostendant, quid in iisdem verum et laudabile ponat affirmans: / The latter so exhibit certain general things pertaining to morals that at the same time they show what the one affirming posits in them as true and praiseworthy:
Discite iustitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos.
"O, ere too late, learn justice and fear God!"
Hic adhibebitur bene cautio, de qua § 547, quo crebrius ea confundi, quae fiunt, quaeque debent fieri, quotidiana docet experientia. / Here the caution about which § 547 speaks will be well applied, since daily experience teaches how often those things that happen and those things that ought to happen are confused.
Quoto cuique eadem honestatis cura secreto, quae palam? Multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur,
"How few there are who are as careful of acting honourably in secret as in public! While many people are afraid of what others will say, few are afraid of their own conscience."
Plin. III, ep. 20. Tandem meminerimus in sententiis § 174, nec eas temere cumulemus, ubicunque vivendi praeceptores videri nolumus, ne quando nobis forte videmur gravissimi, tenues gnomotypikon venas imitari videamur, de quibus, § 370. / Pliny, III, letter 20. Finally let us remember, concerning maxims, § 174, and not pile them up rashly wherever we do not wish to seem teachers of living, lest, when perhaps we seem to ourselves most weighty, we seem to imitate the thin veins of the gnomotypikon, about which, § 370.
§ 550
Philosophi post geometras accurati noverint, quantum ad eruendam veritatem valeat vera definitio, praesertim genetica. Haec de multis pulcre cogitandis in logico etiam rigore concepta si cognita fuerit eleganter meditaturo, etiamsi non ipsa totidem syllabis et notis exprimatur, quot eam intellectus distincte cognovit, sed vel omittatur omnino, vel pluribus interstincta notis et characteribus in pleniorem analogoque rationis rotundiorem diluatur descriptionem, vel nominalem, vel realem, tamen notionis directricis instar, uti plures ad elegantias viam sternet, ita foedam impossibilitatem internam figmenti utopici cavebit, praebebit internam, nonnunquam etiam externam, possibilitatem descripti, primam eius unitatem, nexum cum caussis et prima consectaria, facili negotio ex regulis artis aesthetices exornanda in veritatem aestheticam, S. XXVII. Hinc definitionem nunc non possum non legere in argumentis probantibus, vel omissam, seu non explicite cogitatam, vel transformatam in satis bellam descriptionem, § 539.
Accurate philosophers, after geometers, have known how much a true definition, especially a genetic one, avails for digging out truth. If this, conceived even in logical rigor concerning many things to be thought beautifully, shall be known to one who is about to meditate elegantly, even if it is not itself expressed in the same number of syllables and marks by which the intellect distinctly knew it, but either be omitted altogether, or, interspersed with several marks and characters, be diluted into a fuller description, more rounded by the analogue of reason, either nominal or real, nevertheless, in the manner of a directing notion, as it will pave the way to many elegances, so it will guard against the ugly internal impossibility of a utopian fiction, it will furnish the internal, sometimes also the external, possibility of the thing described, its first unity, its connection with causes and first consequences, to be adorned with easy business from the rules of the art of aesthetics into aesthetic truth, Section XXVII. Hence I now cannot fail to read definition among proving arguments, either omitted, or not explicitly thought, or transformed into a sufficiently beautiful description, § 539.
Philosophi post geometras accurati noverint, quantum ad eruendam veritatem valeat vera definitio, praesertim genetica.
Accurate philosophers, after geometers, have known how much a true definition, especially a genetic one, avails for digging out truth.
Haec de multis pulcre cogitandis in logico etiam rigore concepta si cognita fuerit eleganter meditaturo, etiamsi non ipsa totidem syllabis et notis exprimatur, quot eam intellectus distincte cognovit, sed vel omittatur omnino, vel pluribus interstincta notis et characteribus in pleniorem analogoque rationis rotundiorem diluatur descriptionem, vel nominalem, vel realem, tamen notionis directricis instar, uti plures ad elegantias viam sternet, ita foedam impossibilitatem internam figmenti utopici cavebit, praebebit internam, nonnunquam etiam externam, possibilitatem descripti, primam eius unitatem, nexum cum caussis et prima consectaria, facili negotio ex regulis artis aesthetices exornanda in veritatem aestheticam, S. XXVII. Hinc definitionem nunc non possum non legere in argumentis probantibus, vel omissam, seu non explicite cogitatam, vel transformatam in satis bellam descriptionem, § 539.
If this, conceived even in logical rigor concerning many things to be thought beautifully, shall be known to one who is about to meditate elegantly, even if it is not itself expressed in the same number of syllables and marks by which the intellect distinctly knew it, but either be omitted altogether, or, interspersed with several marks and characters, be diluted into a fuller description, more rounded by the analogue of reason, either nominal or real, nevertheless, in the manner of a directing notion, as it will pave the way to many elegances, so it will guard against the ugly internal impossibility of a utopian fiction, it will furnish the internal, sometimes also the external, possibility of the thing described, its first unity, its connection with causes and first consequences, to be adorned with easy business from the rules of the art of aesthetics into aesthetic truth, Section XXVII. Hence I now cannot fail to read definition among proving arguments, either omitted, or not explicitly thought, or transformed into a sufficiently beautiful description, § 539.
Philosophi post geometras accurati noverint,
Accurate philosophers, after geometers, have known
quantum ad eruendam veritatem valeat vera definitio, praesertim genetica.
how much a true definition, especially a genetic one, avails for digging out truth.
Haec de multis pulcre cogitandis in logico etiam
If this, conceived even in logical
rigore
rigor concerning many things to be thought beautifully,
concepta si cognita fuerit eleganter meditaturo,
shall be known to one who is about to meditate
etiamsi non ipsa totidem
elegantly, even if it is not itself expressed in
syllabis et notis exprimatur,
the same number of syllables and marks by
quot eam intellectus distincte cognovit, sed vel omittatur omnino,
which the intellect distinctly knew it, but either be omitted
vel pluribus interstincta notis et characteribus
altogether, or, interspersed with several marks and characters,
in pleniorem
be diluted into a fuller description,
analogoque rationis rotundiorem diluatur descriptionem,
more rounded by the analogue of reason,
vel nominalem, vel realem, tamen notionis directricis instar,
either nominal or real, nevertheless, in the manner of a directing notion,
uti plures ad elegantias
as it will pave the way to many elegances,
viam sternet, ita foedam impossibilitatem internam figmenti
so it will guard against the ugly internal impossibility
utopici cavebit, praebebit internam,
of a utopian fiction, it will furnish the internal,
nonnunquam etiam externam, possibilitatem descripti,
sometimes also the external, possibility of the thing described,
primam eius unitatem, nexum cum caussis et prima consectaria,
its first unity, its connection with causes and first consequences,
facili negotio ex regulis
to be adorned with easy business from the rules
artis aesthetices exornanda in veritatem aestheticam, S.
of the art of aesthetics into aesthetic truth,
XXVII. Hinc definitionem nunc non possum non legere
Section XXVII. Hence I now cannot fail to read
in argumentis probantibus, vel omissam, seu
definition among proving arguments, either omitted,
non explicite cogitatam, vel transformatam in satis bellam descriptionem, § 539.
or not explicitly thought, or transformed into a sufficiently beautiful description, § 539.
Philosophi post geometras accurati noverint, quantum ad eruendam veritatem valeat vera definitio, praesertim genetica. / Accurate philosophers, after geometers, have known how much a true definition, especially a genetic one, avails for digging out truth.
Haec de multis pulcre cogitandis in logico etiam rigore concepta si cognita fuerit eleganter meditaturo, etiamsi non ipsa totidem syllabis et notis exprimatur, quot eam intellectus distincte cognovit, sed vel omittatur omnino, vel pluribus interstincta notis et characteribus in pleniorem analogoque rationis rotundiorem diluatur descriptionem, vel nominalem, vel realem, tamen notionis directricis instar, uti plures ad elegantias viam sternet, ita foedam impossibilitatem internam figmenti utopici cavebit, praebebit internam, nonnunquam etiam externam, possibilitatem descripti, primam eius unitatem, nexum cum caussis et prima consectaria, facili negotio ex regulis artis aesthetices exornanda in veritatem aestheticam, S. XXVII. Hinc definitionem nunc non possum non legere in argumentis probantibus, vel omissam, seu non explicite cogitatam, vel transformatam in satis bellam descriptionem, § 539. / If this, conceived even in logical rigor concerning many things to be thought beautifully, shall be known to one who is about to meditate elegantly, even if it is not itself expressed in the same number of syllables and marks by which the intellect distinctly knew it, but either be omitted altogether, or, interspersed with several marks and characters, be diluted into a fuller description, more rounded by the analogue of reason, either nominal or real, nevertheless, in the manner of a directing notion, as it will pave the way to many elegances, so it will guard against the ugly internal impossibility of a utopian fiction, it will furnish the internal, sometimes also the external, possibility of the thing described, its first unity, its connection with causes and first consequences, to be adorned with easy business from the rules of the art of aesthetics into aesthetic truth, Section XXVII. Hence I now cannot fail to read definition among proving arguments, either omitted, or not explicitly thought, or transformed into a sufficiently beautiful description, § 539.