§ 551
De definitionibus et descriptionibus aestheticis est specialis in nostra disciplina tractandi locus. Hic earum tantum attendenda est in pulcre probando vis et efficacia, § 550. Quemadmodum olim graeci oceano se suaque tradentes ad cursum ursae maioris, velut ad ducem viae suspiciebant, phoenices autem ad Cynosuram directius gubernabant: ita quo verior, quo exactior erit de pulcre cogitandis mente concepta definitio, hoc omnis venustae meditationis decursus erit verisimilior, verior, certior, quo vero crassior, quo pluribus iam conceptibus adhaerentibus erroneis scatens primus eleganter cogitandi sit conceptus, hoc facilior erit in ipsam aestheticam falsitatem declinatio. Finge de casu, fortuna, fama, honore, divitiis, amicitia, negotiis publicis, e. c. pulcre cogitaturum, qui, quid ea sint, natura sua, non melius noverit, ac omnes solent, qui sibi nihil esse magis perspectum putant, dum sciunt cum ignarissimis. Hinc illae tot falsae sententiae, tot imaginum deturpationes, ne verisimiles quidem, tot verborum ambages, quibus omnino nihil dicitur.
Concerning aesthetic definitions and descriptions there is in our discipline a special place for treating them. Here only their force and efficacy in proving beautifully must be attended to, § 550. Just as once the Greeks, entrusting themselves and their goods to the ocean, looked up to the course of the greater Bear as to a guide of the way, while the Phoenicians steered more directly by Cynosura: so the truer, the more exact the definition conceived in the mind about things to be thought beautifully will be, by so much the whole course of graceful meditation will be more verisimilar, truer, more certain, but the coarser the first concept of thinking elegantly is, the more it teems with many erroneous adhering concepts, by so much the easier will be the turning aside into aesthetic falsity itself. Imagine someone about to think beautifully about chance, fortune, fame, honor, wealth, friendship, public affairs, and so on, who does not know what these things are by their own nature any better than all those usually do who think nothing is more thoroughly seen by themselves, while they know along with the most ignorant. Hence those so many false maxims, so many disfigurements of images, not even verisimilar, so many circumlocutions of words by which absolutely nothing is said.
De definitionibus et descriptionibus aestheticis est specialis in nostra disciplina tractandi locus.
Concerning aesthetic definitions and descriptions there is in our discipline a special place for treating them.
Hic earum tantum attendenda est in pulcre probando vis et efficacia, § 550. Quemadmodum olim graeci oceano se suaque tradentes ad cursum ursae maioris, velut ad ducem viae suspiciebant, phoenices autem ad Cynosuram directius gubernabant: ita quo verior, quo exactior erit de pulcre cogitandis mente concepta definitio, hoc omnis venustae meditationis decursus erit verisimilior, verior, certior, quo vero crassior, quo pluribus iam conceptibus adhaerentibus erroneis scatens primus eleganter cogitandi sit conceptus, hoc facilior erit in ipsam aestheticam falsitatem declinatio.
Here only their force and efficacy in proving beautifully must be attended to, § 550. Just as once the Greeks, entrusting themselves and their goods to the ocean, looked up to the course of the greater Bear as to a guide of the way, while the Phoenicians steered more directly by Cynosura: so the truer, the more exact the definition conceived in the mind about things to be thought beautifully will be, by so much the whole course of graceful meditation will be more verisimilar, truer, more certain, but the coarser the first concept of thinking elegantly is, the more it teems with many erroneous adhering concepts, by so much the easier will be the turning aside into aesthetic falsity itself.
Finge de casu, fortuna, fama, honore, divitiis, amicitia, negotiis publicis, e. c. pulcre cogitaturum, qui, quid ea sint, natura sua, non melius noverit, ac omnes solent, qui sibi nihil esse magis perspectum putant, dum sciunt cum ignarissimis.
Imagine someone about to think beautifully about chance, fortune, fame, honor, wealth, friendship, public affairs, and so on, who does not know what these things are by their own nature any better than all those usually do who think nothing is more thoroughly seen by themselves, while they know along with the most ignorant.
Hinc illae tot falsae sententiae, tot imaginum deturpationes, ne verisimiles quidem, tot verborum ambages, quibus omnino nihil dicitur.
Hence those so many false maxims, so many disfigurements of images, not even verisimilar, so many circumlocutions of words by which absolutely nothing is said.
De definitionibus et descriptionibus aestheticis est specialis in
Concerning aesthetic definitions and descriptions there is in
nostra disciplina tractandi locus.
our discipline a special place for treating them.
Hic earum tantum attendenda est in
Here only their force and efficacy in proving
pulcre probando vis et efficacia, § 550.
beautifully must be attended to, § 550.
Quemadmodum olim graeci oceano se
Just as once the Greeks, entrusting themselves and their
suaque tradentes ad cursum ursae maioris,
goods to the ocean, looked up to the course of the greater
velut ad ducem viae suspiciebant,
Bear as to a guide of the way,
phoenices autem ad Cynosuram
while the Phoenicians steered more directly by Cynosura:
directius gubernabant: ita quo verior, quo exactior
so the truer, the more exact the definition
erit de pulcre cogitandis mente
conceived in the mind about things to be thought beautifully will be,
concepta definitio, hoc omnis venustae meditationis
by so much the whole course of graceful meditation
decursus erit verisimilior, verior, certior,
will be more verisimilar, truer, more certain,
quo vero crassior, quo pluribus iam conceptibus adhaerentibus erroneis
but the coarser the first concept of thinking
scatens primus eleganter
elegantly is, the more it teems with
cogitandi sit conceptus, hoc facilior
many erroneous adhering concepts, by so much the easier
erit in ipsam aestheticam falsitatem declinatio.
will be the turning aside into aesthetic falsity itself.
Finge de casu, fortuna,
Imagine someone about to think beautifully about chance, fortune,
fama, honore, divitiis, amicitia, negotiis publicis, e. c.
fame, honor, wealth, friendship, public affairs, and so
pulcre cogitaturum, qui, quid ea sint,
on, who does not know what these things are
natura sua, non melius noverit,
by their own nature any better than all
ac omnes solent, qui sibi nihil esse magis perspectum
those usually do who think nothing is more thoroughly seen by themselves,
putant, dum sciunt cum ignarissimis.
while they know along with the most ignorant.
Hinc illae tot falsae sententiae,
Hence those so many false maxims, so
tot imaginum deturpationes, ne verisimiles quidem,
many disfigurements of images, not even verisimilar, so
tot verborum ambages, quibus omnino nihil dicitur.
many circumlocutions of words by which absolutely nothing is said.
De definitionibus et descriptionibus aestheticis est specialis in nostra disciplina tractandi locus. / Concerning aesthetic definitions and descriptions there is in our discipline a special place for treating them.
Hic earum tantum attendenda est in pulcre probando vis et efficacia, § 550. Quemadmodum olim graeci oceano se suaque tradentes ad cursum ursae maioris, velut ad ducem viae suspiciebant, phoenices autem ad Cynosuram directius gubernabant: ita quo verior, quo exactior erit de pulcre cogitandis mente concepta definitio, hoc omnis venustae meditationis decursus erit verisimilior, verior, certior, quo vero crassior, quo pluribus iam conceptibus adhaerentibus erroneis scatens primus eleganter cogitandi sit conceptus, hoc facilior erit in ipsam aestheticam falsitatem declinatio. / Here only their force and efficacy in proving beautifully must be attended to, § 550. Just as once the Greeks, entrusting themselves and their goods to the ocean, looked up to the course of the greater Bear as to a guide of the way, while the Phoenicians steered more directly by Cynosura: so the truer, the more exact the definition conceived in the mind about things to be thought beautifully will be, by so much the whole course of graceful meditation will be more verisimilar, truer, more certain, but the coarser the first concept of thinking elegantly is, the more it teems with many erroneous adhering concepts, by so much the easier will be the turning aside into aesthetic falsity itself.
Finge de casu, fortuna, fama, honore, divitiis, amicitia, negotiis publicis, e. c. pulcre cogitaturum, qui, quid ea sint, natura sua, non melius noverit, ac omnes solent, qui sibi nihil esse magis perspectum putant, dum sciunt cum ignarissimis. / Imagine someone about to think beautifully about chance, fortune, fame, honor, wealth, friendship, public affairs, and so on, who does not know what these things are by their own nature any better than all those usually do who think nothing is more thoroughly seen by themselves, while they know along with the most ignorant.
Hinc illae tot falsae sententiae, tot imaginum deturpationes, ne verisimiles quidem, tot verborum ambages, quibus omnino nihil dicitur. / Hence those so many false maxims, so many disfigurements of images, not even verisimilar, so many circumlocutions of words by which absolutely nothing is said.
§ 552
Unam adhuc commendemus in elegantioribus probationum argumentis epanorthosin, sive correctionem. Primo, repetamus animis, quid verum et exactum, in quo limatur ipsa veritas, utique differant. M. § 515. Hinc inferamus: Sicut veritas qualiscunque non est exacta, sic cogitari etiam potest Aesthetica Veritas et verisimilitudo Crassa quaedam et nimis popularis, immo paene plebeia; potest eadem ad lapidem lydium, nisi purioris rationis et intellectus, ut ita dicam, scientifici, tamen delicatioris saporis et maturi iudicii, etiamsi sensitivi, qua partem potiorem, exigi. Possunt ex eadem poliendo tolli conceptus adhaerentes, nisi falsi omnes, ii tamen, quos nonnihil falsitatis etiam aestheticae tuis materiis illaturos verearis. Haec est Veritas et verisimilitudo Aesthetica Exacta.
Let us still recommend one thing among the more elegant arguments of proofs: epanorthosis, or correction. First, let us recall in our minds how truth and exactness, in which truth itself is polished, certainly differ. Metaphysics § 515. From this let us infer: just as truth of whatever sort is not exact, so an Aesthetic Truth and verisimilitude can also be thought that is Coarse and too popular, indeed almost plebeian; The same can be tested at a Lydian stone, if not of purer reason and of intellect, so to speak, scientific, nevertheless of more delicate taste and mature judgment, even if sensitive, for the better part. From the same, by polishing, adhering concepts can be removed; if not all false ones, at least those which you fear would bring some aesthetic falsity into your materials. This is Truth and verisimilitude Aesthetically Exact.
Unam adhuc commendemus in elegantioribus probationum argumentis epanorthosin, sive correctionem.
Let us still recommend one thing among the more elegant arguments of proofs: epanorthosis, or correction.
Primo, repetamus animis, quid verum et exactum, in quo limatur ipsa veritas, utique differant.
First, let us recall in our minds how truth and exactness, in which truth itself is polished, certainly differ.
M. § 515. Hinc inferamus: Sicut veritas qualiscunque non est exacta, sic cogitari etiam potest Aesthetica Veritas et verisimilitudo Crassa quaedam et nimis popularis, immo paene plebeia; potest eadem ad lapidem lydium, nisi purioris rationis et intellectus, ut ita dicam, scientifici, tamen delicatioris saporis et maturi iudicii, etiamsi sensitivi, qua partem potiorem, exigi.
Metaphysics § 515. From this let us infer: just as truth of whatever sort is not exact, so an Aesthetic Truth and verisimilitude can also be thought that is Coarse and too popular, indeed almost plebeian; The same can be tested at a Lydian stone, if not of purer reason and of intellect, so to speak, scientific, nevertheless of more delicate taste and mature judgment, even if sensitive, for the better part.
Possunt ex eadem poliendo tolli conceptus adhaerentes, nisi falsi omnes, ii tamen, quos nonnihil falsitatis etiam aestheticae tuis materiis illaturos verearis.
From the same, by polishing, adhering concepts can be removed; if not all false ones, at least those which you fear would bring some aesthetic falsity into your materials.
Haec est Veritas et verisimilitudo Aesthetica Exacta.
This is Truth and verisimilitude Aesthetically Exact.
Unam adhuc commendemus in
Let us still recommend one thing among the more
elegantioribus probationum argumentis epanorthosin, sive correctionem.
elegant arguments of proofs: epanorthosis, or correction.
Primo, repetamus animis, quid verum et exactum,
First, let us recall in our minds how truth and exactness,
in quo limatur ipsa veritas, utique differant.
in which truth itself is polished, certainly differ.
M. § 515. Hinc inferamus:
Metaphysics § 515. From this let us infer:
Sicut veritas qualiscunque non est exacta,
just as truth of whatever sort is not exact,
sic cogitari etiam potest Aesthetica Veritas et verisimilitudo
so an Aesthetic Truth and verisimilitude can
Crassa quaedam et nimis popularis, immo paene plebeia;
also be thought that is Coarse and too popular, indeed almost plebeian;
potest eadem ad lapidem lydium, nisi
The same can be tested at a Lydian stone,
purioris rationis et intellectus,
if not of purer reason and of intellect,
ut ita dicam, scientifici, tamen delicatioris
so to speak, scientific, nevertheless of more delicate
saporis et maturi iudicii, etiamsi sensitivi, qua partem potiorem, exigi.
taste and mature judgment, even if sensitive, for the better part.
Possunt ex eadem poliendo tolli conceptus adhaerentes,
From the same, by polishing, adhering concepts can be removed;
nisi falsi omnes, ii tamen,
if not all false ones, at least
quos nonnihil falsitatis etiam aestheticae tuis materiis illaturos verearis.
those which you fear would bring some aesthetic falsity into your materials.
Haec est Veritas et verisimilitudo Aesthetica Exacta.
This is Truth and verisimilitude Aesthetically Exact.
Unam adhuc commendemus in elegantioribus probationum argumentis epanorthosin, sive correctionem. / Let us still recommend one thing among the more elegant arguments of proofs: epanorthosis, or correction.
Primo, repetamus animis, quid verum et exactum, in quo limatur ipsa veritas, utique differant. / First, let us recall in our minds how truth and exactness, in which truth itself is polished, certainly differ.
M. § 515. Hinc inferamus: Sicut veritas qualiscunque non est exacta, sic cogitari etiam potest Aesthetica Veritas et verisimilitudo Crassa quaedam et nimis popularis, immo paene plebeia; potest eadem ad lapidem lydium, nisi purioris rationis et intellectus, ut ita dicam, scientifici, tamen delicatioris saporis et maturi iudicii, etiamsi sensitivi, qua partem potiorem, exigi. / Metaphysics § 515. From this let us infer: just as truth of whatever sort is not exact, so an Aesthetic Truth and verisimilitude can also be thought that is Coarse and too popular, indeed almost plebeian; The same can be tested at a Lydian stone, if not of purer reason and of intellect, so to speak, scientific, nevertheless of more delicate taste and mature judgment, even if sensitive, for the better part.
Possunt ex eadem poliendo tolli conceptus adhaerentes, nisi falsi omnes, ii tamen, quos nonnihil falsitatis etiam aestheticae tuis materiis illaturos verearis. / From the same, by polishing, adhering concepts can be removed; if not all false ones, at least those which you fear would bring some aesthetic falsity into your materials.
Haec est Veritas et verisimilitudo Aesthetica Exacta. / This is Truth and verisimilitude Aesthetically Exact.
§ 553
Studium illud apprime commendandum, S. VI. §§ 22, 423. vel primo statim cogitationum impetu quasi fusas ideas rerum et sententiarum generaliumque aliorum notiones exactas crassis omnino suppressis substituit, vel harum, praesumens in suis praecipuis spectatoribus anticipationes easdem primo kat' eidos expresse cogitat, quales esse solent, dein autem corrigendo exasciat, et purgata falsitatum etiam aestheticarum, etiamsi minorum, sordibus. Haec est epanorthosis. e.g. Finge cum Horatio Serm. II. 6. Inter convivas venuste laetiores.
That study, especially to be commended, Section VI, §§ 22, 423, either at once in the first impulse of thoughts substitutes exact ideas of things and exact notions of maxims and other generals, as if poured forth, with the coarse ones wholly suppressed, or, presuming the same anticipations of these in one's chief spectators, first thinks them expressly kat' eidos, such as they usually are, but then, by correcting, planes them smooth, and purges them of the filth of falsities, even aesthetic ones, even if minor. This is epanorthosis. For example, imagine with Horace, Sermones II.6, among guests more gracefully cheerful.
Sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis, Nec male, necne Lepos saltet. Sed, quod magis ad nos Pertinet, et nescire malum est, agitamus utrumne Divitiis homines, an sint virtute, beati, Quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos, Et quae sit natura boni, summumque quid eius.
"Then conversation arises, not concerning other people's villas and houses, nor whether Lepos dances well or not; but we debate on what is more to our purpose, and what it is pernicious not to know–whether men are made happier by riches or by virtue; or what leads us into intimacies, interest or moral rectitude; and what is the nature of good, and what its perfection."
En! epanorthosin crypticam colloquiorum, in familiaribus etiam, verius venustorum, et exemplum in aesthetice verum exactius inquirentium, quoniam:
Behold a cryptic epanorthosis of conversations, even in familiar ones, more truly graceful, and an example of those inquiring more exactly into what is aesthetically true, since:
Cervius haec inter vicinus garrit aniles Ex re fabellas,
"Meanwhile, my neighbor Cervius prates away old stories relative to the
subject."
Studium illud apprime commendandum, S. VI. §§ 22, 423. vel primo statim cogitationum impetu quasi fusas ideas rerum et sententiarum generaliumque aliorum notiones exactas crassis omnino suppressis substituit, vel harum, praesumens in suis praecipuis spectatoribus anticipationes easdem primo kat' eidos expresse cogitat, quales esse solent, dein autem corrigendo exasciat, et purgata falsitatum etiam aestheticarum, etiamsi minorum, sordibus.
That study, especially to be commended, Section VI, §§ 22, 423, either at once in the first impulse of thoughts substitutes exact ideas of things and exact notions of maxims and other generals, as if poured forth, with the coarse ones wholly suppressed, or, presuming the same anticipations of these in one's chief spectators, first thinks them expressly kat' eidos, such as they usually are, but then, by correcting, planes them smooth, and purges them of the filth of falsities, even aesthetic ones, even if minor.
Haec est epanorthosis. e.g. Finge cum Horatio Serm.
This is epanorthosis.
II. 6. Inter convivas venuste laetiores.
For example, imagine with Horace, Sermones II.6, among guests more gracefully cheerful.
Sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis, Nec male, necne Lepos saltet. Sed, quod magis ad nos Pertinet, et nescire malum est, agitamus utrumne Divitiis homines, an sint virtute, beati, Quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos, Et quae sit natura boni, summumque quid eius.
"Then conversation arises, not concerning other people's villas and houses, nor whether Lepos dances well or not; but we debate on what is more to our purpose, and what it is pernicious not to know–whether men are made happier by riches or by virtue; or what leads us into intimacies, interest or moral rectitude; and what is the nature of good, and what its perfection."
En! epanorthosin crypticam colloquiorum, in familiaribus etiam, verius venustorum, et exemplum in aesthetice verum exactius inquirentium, quoniam:
Behold a cryptic epanorthosis of conversations, even in familiar ones, more truly graceful, and an example of those inquiring more exactly into what is aesthetically true, since:
Cervius haec inter vicinus garrit aniles Ex re fabellas,
"Meanwhile, my neighbor Cervius prates away old stories relative to the
subject."
Studium illud apprime commendandum, S. VI.
That study, especially to be commended, Section VI,
§§ 22, 423. vel primo statim
§§ 22, 423, either at once in the first impulse
cogitationum impetu quasi fusas ideas rerum et
of thoughts substitutes exact ideas of things and exact
sententiarum generaliumque aliorum
notions of maxims and other generals, as if poured forth,
notiones exactas crassis omnino suppressis substituit,
with the coarse ones wholly suppressed,
vel harum, praesumens in suis praecipuis spectatoribus
or, presuming the same anticipations of these in one's chief spectators,
anticipationes easdem primo kat' eidos expresse cogitat,
first thinks them expressly kat' eidos, such as they
quales esse solent, dein autem corrigendo
usually are, but then, by correcting, planes them smooth,
exasciat, et purgata falsitatum
and purges them of the filth of falsities,
etiam aestheticarum, etiamsi minorum, sordibus.
even aesthetic ones, even if minor.
Haec est epanorthosis. e.g. Finge cum Horatio Serm.
This is epanorthosis.
II. 6. Inter convivas venuste laetiores.
For example, imagine with Horace, Sermones II.6, among guests more gracefully cheerful.
Sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis, Nec male, necne Lepos saltet. Sed, quod magis ad nos Pertinet, et nescire malum est, agitamus utrumne Divitiis homines, an sint virtute, beati, Quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos, Et quae sit natura boni, summumque quid eius.
"Then conversation arises, not concerning other people's villas and houses, nor whether Lepos dances well or not; but we debate on what is more to our purpose, and what it is pernicious not to know–whether men are made happier by riches or by virtue; or what leads us into intimacies, interest or moral rectitude; and what is the nature of good, and what its perfection."
En! epanorthosin crypticam colloquiorum, in familiaribus
Behold a cryptic epanorthosis of conversations, even in familiar ones,
etiam, verius venustorum, et exemplum
more truly graceful, and an example of those inquiring
in aesthetice verum exactius inquirentium, quoniam:
more exactly into what is aesthetically true, since:
Cervius haec inter vicinus garrit aniles Ex re fabellas,
"Meanwhile, my neighbor Cervius prates away old stories relative to the
subject."
Studium illud apprime commendandum, S. VI. §§ 22, 423. vel primo statim cogitationum impetu quasi fusas ideas rerum et sententiarum generaliumque aliorum notiones exactas crassis omnino suppressis substituit, vel harum, praesumens in suis praecipuis spectatoribus anticipationes easdem primo kat' eidos expresse cogitat, quales esse solent, dein autem corrigendo exasciat, et purgata falsitatum etiam aestheticarum, etiamsi minorum, sordibus. / That study, especially to be commended, Section VI, §§ 22, 423, either at once in the first impulse of thoughts substitutes exact ideas of things and exact notions of maxims and other generals, as if poured forth, with the coarse ones wholly suppressed, or, presuming the same anticipations of these in one's chief spectators, first thinks them expressly kat' eidos, such as they usually are, but then, by correcting, planes them smooth, and purges them of the filth of falsities, even aesthetic ones, even if minor.
Haec est epanorthosis. e.g. Finge cum Horatio Serm. / This is epanorthosis.
II. 6. Inter convivas venuste laetiores. / For example, imagine with Horace, Sermones II.6, among guests more gracefully cheerful.
Sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis, Nec male, necne Lepos saltet. Sed, quod magis ad nos Pertinet, et nescire malum est, agitamus utrumne Divitiis homines, an sint virtute, beati, Quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos, Et quae sit natura boni, summumque quid eius.
"Then conversation arises, not concerning other people's villas and houses, nor whether Lepos dances well or not; but we debate on what is more to our purpose, and what it is pernicious not to know–whether men are made happier by riches or by virtue; or what leads us into intimacies, interest or moral rectitude; and what is the nature of good, and what its perfection."
En! epanorthosin crypticam colloquiorum, in familiaribus etiam, verius venustorum, et exemplum in aesthetice verum exactius inquirentium, quoniam: / Behold a cryptic epanorthosis of conversations, even in familiar ones, more truly graceful, and an example of those inquiring more exactly into what is aesthetically true, since:
Cervius haec inter vicinus garrit aniles Ex re fabellas,
"Meanwhile, my neighbor Cervius prates away old stories relative to the
subject."
§ 554
Fructum eiusmodi confabulationum exactioris in aestheticis veri studiosarum, profecto, bellum leges, novam satis usitatae correctionem opinionis, IV. od. 9.
You will read, indeed, a fine fruit of conversations of this sort, eager for the more exact true in aesthetics: a new correction of a sufficiently usual opinion, Odes IV.9.
Non possidentem multa vocaveris Recte beatum. Rectius occupat Nomen beati, qui deorum Muneribus sapienter uti, Duramque callet pauperiem pati, Peiusque leto flagitium timet. Non ille pro caris amicis, Aut patria timidus perire.
"The lord of boundless revenues,
Salute not him as happy: no,
Call him the happy, who can use
The bounty that the gods bestow,
Can bear the load of poverty,
And tremble not at death, but sin:
No recreant he when called to die
In cause of country or of kin."
Huc artificium in notione quadam e.g. opum crassiuscula conceptus adhaerentes falsos, quos plerique habent infinite parvos, per hyperbolen ironicam attollendi vel deiiciendi potius in manifestam falsitatem, etiam aestheticam, S. XXVIII. e. g. Hor. Serm. II. 3. v. 94.
To this belongs the artifice, in a certain rather coarse notion, for example of riches, of false adhering concepts, which most people hold as infinitely small, of raising them by ironic hyperbole, or rather of casting them down into manifest falsity, even aesthetic falsity, Section XXVIII. For example, Horace, Sermones II.3, verse 94:
Omnis res, Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulcris Divitiis parent, quas qui construxerit, ille Clarus erit, fortis, iustus. Sapiensne? Etiam, et rex; Et quicquid volet.
"For every thing, virtue, fame, glory, divine and human affairs, are subservient to the attraction of riches; which whoever shall have accumulated, shall be illustrious, brave, just–What, wise too? Ay, and a king, and whatever else he pleases."
Fructum eiusmodi confabulationum exactioris in aestheticis veri studiosarum, profecto, bellum leges, novam satis usitatae correctionem opinionis, IV. od. 9.
You will read, indeed, a fine fruit of conversations of this sort, eager for the more exact true in aesthetics: a new correction of a sufficiently usual opinion, Odes IV.9.
Non possidentem multa vocaveris Recte beatum. Rectius occupat Nomen beati, qui deorum Muneribus sapienter uti, Duramque callet pauperiem pati, Peiusque leto flagitium timet. Non ille pro caris amicis, Aut patria timidus perire.
"The lord of boundless revenues,
Salute not him as happy: no,
Call him the happy, who can use
The bounty that the gods bestow,
Can bear the load of poverty,
And tremble not at death, but sin:
No recreant he when called to die
In cause of country or of kin."
Huc artificium in notione quadam e.g. opum crassiuscula conceptus adhaerentes falsos, quos plerique habent infinite parvos, per hyperbolen ironicam attollendi vel deiiciendi potius in manifestam falsitatem, etiam aestheticam, S. XXVIII. e. g. Hor. Serm. II. 3. v. 94.
To this belongs the artifice, in a certain rather coarse notion, for example of riches, of false adhering concepts, which most people hold as infinitely small, of raising them by ironic hyperbole, or rather of casting them down into manifest falsity, even aesthetic falsity, Section XXVIII. For example, Horace, Sermones II.3, verse 94:
Omnis res, Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulcris Divitiis parent, quas qui construxerit, ille Clarus erit, fortis, iustus. Sapiensne? Etiam, et rex; Et quicquid volet.
"For every thing, virtue, fame, glory, divine and human affairs, are subservient to the attraction of riches; which whoever shall have accumulated, shall be illustrious, brave, just–What, wise too? Ay, and a king, and whatever else he pleases."
Fructum eiusmodi confabulationum exactioris in aestheticis
You will read, indeed, a fine fruit of conversations of this sort,
veri studiosarum, profecto, bellum leges, novam satis
eager for the more exact true in aesthetics:
usitatae correctionem opinionis, IV. od. 9.
a new correction of a sufficiently usual opinion, Odes IV.9.
Non possidentem multa vocaveris Recte beatum. Rectius occupat Nomen beati, qui deorum Muneribus sapienter uti, Duramque callet pauperiem pati, Peiusque leto flagitium timet. Non ille pro caris amicis, Aut patria timidus perire.
"The lord of boundless revenues,
Salute not him as happy: no,
Call him the happy, who can use
The bounty that the gods bestow,
Can bear the load of poverty,
And tremble not at death, but sin:
No recreant he when called to die
In cause of country or of kin."
Huc artificium in notione
To this belongs the artifice, in a certain rather coarse notion,
quadam e.g. opum crassiuscula conceptus adhaerentes falsos, quos plerique
for example of riches, of false adhering concepts,
habent infinite parvos,
which most people hold as infinitely small,
per hyperbolen
of raising them by ironic hyperbole,
ironicam attollendi vel deiiciendi potius in manifestam falsitatem, etiam aestheticam, S.
or rather of casting them down into manifest falsity, even aesthetic falsity,
XXVIII. e. g. Hor. Serm. II. 3. v. 94.
Section XXVIII. For example, Horace, Sermones II.3, verse 94:
Omnis res, Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulcris Divitiis parent, quas qui construxerit, ille Clarus erit, fortis, iustus. Sapiensne? Etiam, et rex; Et quicquid volet.
"For every thing, virtue, fame, glory, divine and human affairs, are subservient to the attraction of riches; which whoever shall have accumulated, shall be illustrious, brave, just–What, wise too? Ay, and a king, and whatever else he pleases."
Fructum eiusmodi confabulationum exactioris in aestheticis veri studiosarum, profecto, bellum leges, novam satis usitatae correctionem opinionis, IV. od. 9. / You will read, indeed, a fine fruit of conversations of this sort, eager for the more exact true in aesthetics: a new correction of a sufficiently usual opinion, Odes IV.9.
Non possidentem multa vocaveris Recte beatum. Rectius occupat Nomen beati, qui deorum Muneribus sapienter uti, Duramque callet pauperiem pati, Peiusque leto flagitium timet. Non ille pro caris amicis, Aut patria timidus perire.
"The lord of boundless revenues,
Salute not him as happy: no,
Call him the happy, who can use
The bounty that the gods bestow,
Can bear the load of poverty,
And tremble not at death, but sin:
No recreant he when called to die
In cause of country or of kin."
Huc artificium in notione quadam e.g. opum crassiuscula conceptus adhaerentes falsos, quos plerique habent infinite parvos, per hyperbolen ironicam attollendi vel deiiciendi potius in manifestam falsitatem, etiam aestheticam, S. XXVIII. e. g. Hor. Serm. II. 3. v. 94. / To this belongs the artifice, in a certain rather coarse notion, for example of riches, of false adhering concepts, which most people hold as infinitely small, of raising them by ironic hyperbole, or rather of casting them down into manifest falsity, even aesthetic falsity, Section XXVIII. For example, Horace, Sermones II.3, verse 94:
Omnis res, Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulcris Divitiis parent, quas qui construxerit, ille Clarus erit, fortis, iustus. Sapiensne? Etiam, et rex; Et quicquid volet.
"For every thing, virtue, fame, glory, divine and human affairs, are subservient to the attraction of riches; which whoever shall have accumulated, shall be illustrious, brave, just–What, wise too? Ay, and a king, and whatever else he pleases."
§ 555
Quo maior est aesthetice verorum, verisimilium, fictionum, fabularumque silva, per quam errare potest pulcre cogitaturus, ne vagetur in eadem licenter, omnes potius sua peccata falsitate deturpantia visuros putet, in eleganti talis ingenii pectorisque persona iam separatim attendi debet singulare Veritatis Studium, quo nomine complecti liceat, non ingenium solum aptum, sed et multo labore exercitatum et adsuetum perspiciendis veritatibus aestheticologicis, neque qualemcunque propensionem, sed firmum animi propositum inferendi suis meditationibus veritatem, quam admittant salva totius pulcritudine, maximam. Hunc animi characterem, quoniam omnibus universim belle cogitandis necessarium iudico, § 22, dicamus Studium Veritatis Absolutum et, universale, §§ 29, 45.
The greater is the forest of aesthetically true things, verisimilar things, fictions, and tales through which one about to think beautifully can wander, lest he roam in the same licentiously, let him rather think that all will see his sins disfiguring things by falsity, in the elegant person of such a talent and heart there must now be separately attended to a singular Study of Truth, under which name it is permitted to include not only a talent fit for this, but also one exercised by much labor and accustomed to seeing aestheticological truths, and not just any inclination, but a firm purpose of mind of bringing into one's meditations the greatest truth that they admit while the beauty of the whole is preserved. This character of mind, since I judge it necessary for all things universally to be thought beautifully, § 22, let us call the Absolute Study of Truth, and universal, §§ 29, 45.
Quo maior est aesthetice verorum, verisimilium, fictionum, fabularumque silva, per quam errare potest pulcre cogitaturus, ne vagetur in eadem licenter, omnes potius sua peccata falsitate deturpantia visuros putet, in eleganti talis ingenii pectorisque persona iam separatim attendi debet singulare Veritatis Studium, quo nomine complecti liceat, non ingenium solum aptum, sed et multo labore exercitatum et adsuetum perspiciendis veritatibus aestheticologicis, neque qualemcunque propensionem, sed firmum animi propositum inferendi suis meditationibus veritatem, quam admittant salva totius pulcritudine, maximam.
The greater is the forest of aesthetically true things, verisimilar things, fictions, and tales through which one about to think beautifully can wander, lest he roam in the same licentiously, let him rather think that all will see his sins disfiguring things by falsity, in the elegant person of such a talent and heart there must now be separately attended to a singular Study of Truth, under which name it is permitted to include not only a talent fit for this, but also one exercised by much labor and accustomed to seeing aestheticological truths, and not just any inclination, but a firm purpose of mind of bringing into one's meditations the greatest truth that they admit while the beauty of the whole is preserved.
Hunc animi characterem, quoniam omnibus universim belle cogitandis necessarium iudico, § 22, dicamus Studium Veritatis Absolutum et, universale, §§ 29, 45.
This character of mind, since I judge it necessary for all things universally to be thought beautifully, § 22, let us call the Absolute Study of Truth, and universal, §§ 29, 45.
Quo maior est aesthetice verorum,
The greater is the forest of aesthetically true things,
verisimilium, fictionum, fabularumque silva, per quam
verisimilar things, fictions, and tales through which one about
errare potest pulcre cogitaturus, ne vagetur in
to think beautifully can wander, lest he roam in the same licentiously,
eadem licenter, omnes potius sua peccata
let him rather think that all will see his
falsitate deturpantia visuros putet,
sins disfiguring things by falsity,
in eleganti talis ingenii pectorisque persona
in the elegant person of such
iam separatim
a talent and heart there must now be separately
attendi debet singulare Veritatis Studium,
attended to a singular Study of Truth, under
quo nomine complecti liceat,
which name it is permitted to
non ingenium solum aptum,
include not only a talent fit for this,
sed et multo labore exercitatum et
but also one exercised by much labor and
adsuetum perspiciendis veritatibus aestheticologicis, neque qualemcunque propensionem,
accustomed to seeing aestheticological truths, and not just any inclination,
sed firmum animi propositum inferendi
but a firm purpose of mind of bringing into
suis meditationibus veritatem,
one's meditations the greatest truth that
quam admittant salva totius pulcritudine, maximam.
they admit while the beauty of the whole is preserved.
Hunc animi characterem, quoniam
This character of mind, since I judge it
omnibus universim belle cogitandis necessarium iudico,
necessary for all things universally to be thought beautifully,
§ 22, dicamus Studium Veritatis
§ 22, let us call the Absolute Study of Truth,
Absolutum et, universale, §§ 29, 45.
and universal, §§ 29, 45.
Quo maior est aesthetice verorum, verisimilium, fictionum, fabularumque silva, per quam errare potest pulcre cogitaturus, ne vagetur in eadem licenter, omnes potius sua peccata falsitate deturpantia visuros putet, in eleganti talis ingenii pectorisque persona iam separatim attendi debet singulare Veritatis Studium, quo nomine complecti liceat, non ingenium solum aptum, sed et multo labore exercitatum et adsuetum perspiciendis veritatibus aestheticologicis, neque qualemcunque propensionem, sed firmum animi propositum inferendi suis meditationibus veritatem, quam admittant salva totius pulcritudine, maximam. / The greater is the forest of aesthetically true things, verisimilar things, fictions, and tales through which one about to think beautifully can wander, lest he roam in the same licentiously, let him rather think that all will see his sins disfiguring things by falsity, in the elegant person of such a talent and heart there must now be separately attended to a singular Study of Truth, under which name it is permitted to include not only a talent fit for this, but also one exercised by much labor and accustomed to seeing aestheticological truths, and not just any inclination, but a firm purpose of mind of bringing into one's meditations the greatest truth that they admit while the beauty of the whole is preserved.
Hunc animi characterem, quoniam omnibus universim belle cogitandis necessarium iudico, § 22, dicamus Studium Veritatis Absolutum et, universale, §§ 29, 45. / This character of mind, since I judge it necessary for all things universally to be thought beautifully, § 22, let us call the Absolute Study of Truth, and universal, §§ 29, 45.
§ 556
Posset idem ex gravitate absoluta demonstrari, S. XXIII. iis, qui norunt omnem virtutem a multis non ineptis philosophis in amore veritatis constitui. Unus ex summis elegantiarum arbitris inter Anglos, omnem pulcritudinem veritatem esse decernit, in ipsa Poesi, ubi omnia fabulae sint veritatem tamen dominari, et efficere perfectionem totius. Praestabit autem severioribus veritatis fautoribus aestheticologicae gradus altius nonnihil repetere. Minima est minima perceptio veritatis metaphysicae minimae. Hinc 1) quo uberior, 2) quo maior et dignior, 3) quo exactior, 4) quo clarior et distinctior, 5) quo certior et solidior, 6) quo ardentior est perceptio obiecti, 7) quo hoc plura, 8) quo maiora ac graviora, 9) quo fortioribus regulis, 10) quo convenientiora complectitur, hoc maior est veritas aestheticologica, § 437. M. § 184.
The same could be demonstrated from absolute gravity, Section XXIII, for those who know that all virtue is placed by many not inept philosophers in the love of truth. One of the highest arbiters of elegance among the English determines that all beauty is truth; in poetry itself, where all things are fables, nevertheless truth rules and produces the perfection of the whole. But it will be preferable, for the stricter supporters of aestheticological truth, to repeat the degrees somewhat from higher up. The least truth is the least perception of the least metaphysical truth. Hence, 1) the richer, 2) the greater and more worthy, 3) the more exact, 4) the clearer and more distinct, 5) the more certain and more solid, 6) the more ardent the perception of the object is, 7) the more things this embraces, 8) the greater and weightier things, 9) by the stronger rules, 10) the more fitting things, by so much the greater is aestheticological truth, § 437. Metaphysics § 184.
Posset idem ex gravitate absoluta demonstrari, S. XXIII. iis, qui norunt omnem virtutem a multis non ineptis philosophis in amore veritatis constitui.
The same could be demonstrated from absolute gravity, Section XXIII, for those who know that all virtue is placed by many not inept philosophers in the love of truth.
Unus ex summis elegantiarum arbitris inter Anglos, omnem pulcritudinem veritatem esse decernit, in ipsa Poesi, ubi omnia fabulae sint veritatem tamen dominari, et efficere perfectionem totius.
One of the highest arbiters of elegance among the English determines that all beauty is truth; in poetry itself, where all things are fables, nevertheless truth rules and produces the perfection of the whole.
Praestabit autem severioribus veritatis fautoribus aestheticologicae gradus altius nonnihil repetere.
But it will be preferable, for the stricter supporters of aestheticological truth, to repeat the degrees somewhat from higher up.
Minima est minima perceptio veritatis metaphysicae minimae.
The least truth is the least perception of the least metaphysical truth.
Hinc 1) quo uberior, 2) quo maior et dignior, 3) quo exactior, 4) quo clarior et distinctior, 5) quo certior et solidior, 6) quo ardentior est perceptio obiecti, 7) quo hoc plura, 8) quo maiora ac graviora, 9) quo fortioribus regulis, 10) quo convenientiora complectitur, hoc maior est veritas aestheticologica, § 437. M. § 184.
Hence, 1) the richer, 2) the greater and more worthy, 3) the more exact, 4) the clearer and more distinct, 5) the more certain and more solid, 6) the more ardent the perception of the object is, 7) the more things this embraces, 8) the greater and weightier things, 9) by the stronger rules, 10) the more fitting things, by so much the greater is aestheticological truth, § 437. Metaphysics § 184.
Posset idem ex gravitate absoluta demonstrari, S.
The same could be demonstrated from absolute gravity, Section
XXIII. iis, qui norunt omnem virtutem
XXIII, for those who know that all virtue is
a multis non ineptis philosophis in amore veritatis constitui.
placed by many not inept philosophers in the love of truth.
Unus ex summis elegantiarum arbitris inter Anglos,
One of the highest arbiters of elegance among the
omnem pulcritudinem veritatem esse decernit,
English determines that all beauty is truth;
in ipsa Poesi, ubi omnia fabulae
in poetry itself, where all things are fables,
sint veritatem tamen dominari, et efficere perfectionem totius.
nevertheless truth rules and produces the perfection of the whole.
Praestabit autem severioribus veritatis fautoribus aestheticologicae gradus
But it will be preferable, for the stricter supporters of aestheticological truth,
altius nonnihil repetere.
to repeat the degrees somewhat from higher up.
Minima est minima perceptio veritatis metaphysicae minimae.
The least truth is the least perception of the least metaphysical truth.
Hinc 1) quo uberior, 2) quo maior et dignior,
Hence, 1) the richer, 2) the greater and more worthy,
3) quo exactior, 4) quo clarior et distinctior,
3) the more exact, 4) the clearer and more distinct,
5) quo certior et solidior,
5) the more certain and more solid,
6) quo ardentior est perceptio obiecti,
6) the more ardent the perception of the object
7) quo hoc plura,
is, 7) the more things this embraces,
8) quo maiora ac graviora, 9) quo fortioribus regulis,
8) the greater and weightier things, 9) by the stronger rules,
10) quo convenientiora complectitur, hoc
10) the more fitting things, by so much the
maior est veritas aestheticologica, § 437. M. § 184.
greater is aestheticological truth, § 437. Metaphysics § 184.
Posset idem ex gravitate absoluta demonstrari, S. XXIII. iis, qui norunt omnem virtutem a multis non ineptis philosophis in amore veritatis constitui. / The same could be demonstrated from absolute gravity, Section XXIII, for those who know that all virtue is placed by many not inept philosophers in the love of truth.
Unus ex summis elegantiarum arbitris inter Anglos, omnem pulcritudinem veritatem esse decernit, in ipsa Poesi, ubi omnia fabulae sint veritatem tamen dominari, et efficere perfectionem totius. / One of the highest arbiters of elegance among the English determines that all beauty is truth; in poetry itself, where all things are fables, nevertheless truth rules and produces the perfection of the whole.
Praestabit autem severioribus veritatis fautoribus aestheticologicae gradus altius nonnihil repetere. / But it will be preferable, for the stricter supporters of aestheticological truth, to repeat the degrees somewhat from higher up.
Minima est minima perceptio veritatis metaphysicae minimae. / The least truth is the least perception of the least metaphysical truth.
Hinc 1) quo uberior, 2) quo maior et dignior, 3) quo exactior, 4) quo clarior et distinctior, 5) quo certior et solidior, 6) quo ardentior est perceptio obiecti, 7) quo hoc plura, 8) quo maiora ac graviora, 9) quo fortioribus regulis, 10) quo convenientiora complectitur, hoc maior est veritas aestheticologica, § 437. M. § 184. / Hence, 1) the richer, 2) the greater and more worthy, 3) the more exact, 4) the clearer and more distinct, 5) the more certain and more solid, 6) the more ardent the perception of the object is, 7) the more things this embraces, 8) the greater and weightier things, 9) by the stronger rules, 10) the more fitting things, by so much the greater is aestheticological truth, § 437. Metaphysics § 184.
§ 557
Non putaverim nunc opus esse demonstratione 1) nullam veritatem maximam esse aestheticologicam, sed strictius logicam, § 424, 2) talem veritatem nullam in hominem cadere, nullam rem in veritate logica maxima ab ullo hominum intellectu cognosci, quoniam qui unam ita cognoscit, omnes novit. Hinc omnis veritatis apud hominem aestheticologicae, malum metaphysicum, defectus veritatis summae logicae in omniscientia tantum obviae infinite magnus. Adeoque mentis bene sanae studium veri amantissimum quoniam ferri tamen non potest in ea, quae nosse potest non posse fieri, nec omnino nihil velle, quam primum se non posse nancisci omnia cognoverit: contentum esse debet, parte veritatis logicae latius sumtae summae infinite parva, ea scilicet, quam adipisci potest, § 556.
I would not now think there is need of a demonstration 1) that no greatest truth is aestheticological, but rather strictly logical, § 424, 2) that no such truth falls within a human being, that no thing is known in maximum logical truth by any human intellect, because whoever knows one thing in that way knows all things. Hence, of every aestheticological truth among human beings, the metaphysical evil, the defect of the highest logical truth, which is found only in omniscience, is infinitely great. And therefore the most truth-loving pursuit of a well-sound mind, since nevertheless it cannot be carried into those things which it can know cannot happen, nor wish absolutely nothing as soon as it has recognized that it cannot obtain all things: it must be content with an infinitely small part of supreme logical truth taken more broadly, namely that part which it can attain, § 556.
Non putaverim nunc opus esse demonstratione 1) nullam veritatem maximam esse aestheticologicam, sed strictius logicam, § 424, 2) talem veritatem nullam in hominem cadere, nullam rem in veritate logica maxima ab ullo hominum intellectu cognosci, quoniam qui unam ita cognoscit, omnes novit.
I would not now think there is need of a demonstration 1) that no greatest truth is aestheticological, but rather strictly logical, § 424, 2) that no such truth falls within a human being, that no thing is known in maximum logical truth by any human intellect, because whoever knows one thing in that way knows all things.
Hinc omnis veritatis apud hominem aestheticologicae, malum metaphysicum, defectus veritatis summae logicae in omniscientia tantum obviae infinite magnus.
Hence, of every aestheticological truth among human beings, the metaphysical evil, the defect of the highest logical truth, which is found only in omniscience, is infinitely great.
Adeoque mentis bene sanae studium veri amantissimum quoniam ferri tamen non potest in ea, quae nosse potest non posse fieri, nec omnino nihil velle, quam primum se non posse nancisci omnia cognoverit: contentum esse debet, parte veritatis logicae latius sumtae summae infinite parva, ea scilicet, quam adipisci potest, § 556.
And therefore the most truth-loving pursuit of a well-sound mind, since nevertheless it cannot be carried into those things which it can know cannot happen, nor wish absolutely nothing as soon as it has recognized that it cannot obtain all things: it must be content with an infinitely small part of supreme logical truth taken more broadly, namely that part which it can attain, § 556.
Non putaverim nunc opus esse
I would not now think there is need of
demonstratione 1) nullam veritatem maximam esse aestheticologicam,
a demonstration 1) that no greatest truth is aestheticological,
sed strictius logicam, § 424, 2) talem veritatem
but rather strictly logical, § 424, 2) that no such
nullam in hominem cadere, nullam
truth falls within a human being,
rem in veritate logica maxima
that no thing is known in maximum logical truth
ab ullo hominum intellectu cognosci, quoniam qui unam ita cognoscit,
by any human intellect, because whoever knows one thing in that way
omnes novit.
knows all things.
Hinc omnis veritatis apud hominem aestheticologicae,
Hence, of every aestheticological truth among human beings,
malum metaphysicum, defectus veritatis
the metaphysical evil, the defect of the highest logical truth,
summae logicae in omniscientia tantum obviae infinite magnus.
which is found only in omniscience, is infinitely great.
Adeoque mentis bene sanae studium veri amantissimum quoniam
And therefore the most truth-loving pursuit of a well-sound mind,
ferri tamen non potest in ea,
since nevertheless it cannot be carried into those
quae nosse potest non posse fieri,
things which it can know cannot happen, nor
nec omnino nihil velle,
wish absolutely nothing as soon as
quam primum se non posse nancisci omnia
it has recognized that it cannot obtain all things:
cognoverit: contentum esse debet, parte
it must be content with an infinitely small part
veritatis logicae latius
of supreme logical truth taken more broadly,
sumtae summae infinite parva, ea scilicet, quam adipisci potest, § 556.
namely that part which it can attain, § 556.
Non putaverim nunc opus esse demonstratione 1) nullam veritatem maximam esse aestheticologicam, sed strictius logicam, § 424, 2) talem veritatem nullam in hominem cadere, nullam rem in veritate logica maxima ab ullo hominum intellectu cognosci, quoniam qui unam ita cognoscit, omnes novit. / I would not now think there is need of a demonstration 1) that no greatest truth is aestheticological, but rather strictly logical, § 424, 2) that no such truth falls within a human being, that no thing is known in maximum logical truth by any human intellect, because whoever knows one thing in that way knows all things.
Hinc omnis veritatis apud hominem aestheticologicae, malum metaphysicum, defectus veritatis summae logicae in omniscientia tantum obviae infinite magnus. / Hence, of every aestheticological truth among human beings, the metaphysical evil, the defect of the highest logical truth, which is found only in omniscience, is infinitely great.
Adeoque mentis bene sanae studium veri amantissimum quoniam ferri tamen non potest in ea, quae nosse potest non posse fieri, nec omnino nihil velle, quam primum se non posse nancisci omnia cognoverit: contentum esse debet, parte veritatis logicae latius sumtae summae infinite parva, ea scilicet, quam adipisci potest, § 556. / And therefore the most truth-loving pursuit of a well-sound mind, since nevertheless it cannot be carried into those things which it can know cannot happen, nor wish absolutely nothing as soon as it has recognized that it cannot obtain all things: it must be content with an infinitely small part of supreme logical truth taken more broadly, namely that part which it can attain, § 556.
§ 558
Perfectionem veritati logicae latius sumtae, § 556. n. 1–6. formalem, n. 7–10. materialem conciliant. Hinc humanum veritatis studium nunc formalem potissimum intendit, quod fieri non potest sine dispendio materialis, nunc materialem potissimum amplectitur, neque potest idem, nisi cum detrimento formalis, § 557. Tribuitur alicui, non copiosa solum, sed et completa, non satis magna solum, sed et obiectum suum exaequans, eique adaequata, non vera solum, sed et exacta, cui nihil insit omnino falsi, non clara solum, sed et complete clara, sufficiens ad distinguendum obiectum ab omnibus, sed et distincta, cuius omnes notae clarae sunt, non raro per plures gradus, non certa solum, sed et complete certa, rigorose demonstrabilis, et omnem formidinem oppositi excludens, non movens solum, sed et cogens ad assensum, extorquens approbationem, et aliquam voluptatem appetitionemque necessariam cognitio,
For logical truth taken more broadly, § 556, numbers 1–6 secure formal perfection, numbers 7–10 material perfection. Hence the human pursuit of truth now chiefly aims at the formal, which cannot happen without loss of the material; now it chiefly embraces the material, and it cannot do the same except with detriment to the formal, § 557. There is attributed to someone a cognition not only copious, but also complete; not only sufficiently great, but also equalling its object and adequate to it; not only true, but also exact, in which there is nothing at all false; not only clear, but also completely clear, sufficient for distinguishing the object from all things, but also distinct, whose all marks are clear, not rarely through several degrees; not only certain, but also completely certain, rigorously demonstrable, and excluding every fear of the opposite; a cognition not only moving, but also compelling to assent, wresting approval, and some necessary pleasure and appetite,
Perfectionem veritati logicae latius sumtae, § 556. n. 1–6. formalem, n. 7–10. materialem conciliant.
For logical truth taken more broadly, § 556, numbers 1–6 secure formal perfection, numbers 7–10 material perfection.
Hinc humanum veritatis studium nunc formalem potissimum intendit, quod fieri non potest sine dispendio materialis, nunc materialem potissimum amplectitur, neque potest idem, nisi cum detrimento formalis, § 557. Tribuitur alicui, non copiosa solum, sed et completa, non satis magna solum, sed et obiectum suum exaequans, eique adaequata, non vera solum, sed et exacta, cui nihil insit omnino falsi, non clara solum, sed et complete clara, sufficiens ad distinguendum obiectum ab omnibus, sed et distincta, cuius omnes notae clarae sunt, non raro per plures gradus, non certa solum, sed et complete certa, rigorose demonstrabilis, et omnem formidinem oppositi excludens, non movens solum, sed et cogens ad assensum, extorquens approbationem, et aliquam voluptatem appetitionemque necessariam cognitio,
Hence the human pursuit of truth now chiefly aims at the formal, which cannot happen without loss of the material; now it chiefly embraces the material, and it cannot do the same except with detriment to the formal, § 557. There is attributed to someone a cognition not only copious, but also complete; not only sufficiently great, but also equalling its object and adequate to it; not only true, but also exact, in which there is nothing at all false; not only clear, but also completely clear, sufficient for distinguishing the object from all things, but also distinct, whose all marks are clear, not rarely through several degrees; not only certain, but also completely certain, rigorously demonstrable, and excluding every fear of the opposite; a cognition not only moving, but also compelling to assent, wresting approval, and some necessary pleasure and appetite,
Perfectionem veritati logicae latius sumtae, § 556.
For logical truth taken more broadly, § 556,
n. 1–6. formalem, n. 7–10. materialem conciliant.
numbers 1–6 secure formal perfection, numbers 7–10 material perfection.
Hinc humanum veritatis studium nunc formalem potissimum intendit,
Hence the human pursuit of truth now chiefly aims at
quod fieri non potest sine dispendio materialis, nunc materialem
the formal, which cannot happen without loss of the material;
potissimum amplectitur, neque potest
now it chiefly embraces the material,
idem,
and it cannot do the same
nisi cum detrimento formalis, § 557.
except with detriment to the formal, § 557.
Tribuitur alicui, non copiosa
There is attributed to someone a cognition not only copious,
solum, sed et completa, non satis magna solum,
but also complete; not only sufficiently great,
sed et obiectum suum exaequans,
but also equalling its object and
eique adaequata, non vera solum, sed et exacta,
adequate to it; not only true, but also exact,
cui nihil insit omnino falsi,
in which there is nothing at all false;
non clara solum, sed et complete clara,
not only clear, but also completely clear,
sufficiens ad distinguendum obiectum ab omnibus,
sufficient for distinguishing the object from all things,
sed et distincta, cuius omnes notae clarae sunt,
but also distinct, whose all marks are clear,
non raro per plures gradus, non certa solum,
not rarely through several degrees; not only certain,
sed et complete certa, rigorose demonstrabilis,
but also completely certain, rigorously demonstrable,
et omnem formidinem oppositi
and excluding every fear of the opposite;
excludens, non movens solum, sed et cogens ad assensum,
a cognition not only moving, but also compelling to assent,
extorquens approbationem, et aliquam voluptatem appetitionemque necessariam cognitio,
wresting approval, and some necessary pleasure and appetite,
Perfectionem veritati logicae latius sumtae, § 556. n. 1–6. formalem, n. 7–10. materialem conciliant. / For logical truth taken more broadly, § 556, numbers 1–6 secure formal perfection, numbers 7–10 material perfection.
Hinc humanum veritatis studium nunc formalem potissimum intendit, quod fieri non potest sine dispendio materialis, nunc materialem potissimum amplectitur, neque potest idem, nisi cum detrimento formalis, § 557. Tribuitur alicui, non copiosa solum, sed et completa, non satis magna solum, sed et obiectum suum exaequans, eique adaequata, non vera solum, sed et exacta, cui nihil insit omnino falsi, non clara solum, sed et complete clara, sufficiens ad distinguendum obiectum ab omnibus, sed et distincta, cuius omnes notae clarae sunt, non raro per plures gradus, non certa solum, sed et complete certa, rigorose demonstrabilis, et omnem formidinem oppositi excludens, non movens solum, sed et cogens ad assensum, extorquens approbationem, et aliquam voluptatem appetitionemque necessariam cognitio, / Hence the human pursuit of truth now chiefly aims at the formal, which cannot happen without loss of the material; now it chiefly embraces the material, and it cannot do the same except with detriment to the formal, § 557. There is attributed to someone a cognition not only copious, but also complete; not only sufficiently great, but also equalling its object and adequate to it; not only true, but also exact, in which there is nothing at all false; not only clear, but also completely clear, sufficient for distinguishing the object from all things, but also distinct, whose all marks are clear, not rarely through several degrees; not only certain, but also completely certain, rigorously demonstrable, and excluding every fear of the opposite; a cognition not only moving, but also compelling to assent, wresting approval, and some necessary pleasure and appetite,
§ 559
Haec omnia bene se habent. Sed quale est illud obiectum, quod homo tam perfecta ratione contemplatur? Universale quoddam ex individuis plurima maxima, fortissimis regulis convenientissima, pro suo quaevis modulo, complectentibus, ceu notas differentiarum ad numericam usque plurimarum innumeras, ita ortum, ut in his, in quibus veritas metaphysica determinatissima solis sit, quaeque perceptioni hinc perfectionem materialem generice maximam conciliarent, si perciperentur, ut individua, 1) abundantia ultra perceptionem, quae completa sit, abstrahantur, 2) maiora ac graviora, quam gradus est, qui in cognitione ponebatur, obiectum exaequante, abstrahantur 3) ea, de quibus data exacta cognitio non satis perspicit, an vera sint, nec ne, ne quid supersit cognitioni falsitatis, abstrahantur; 4) ea, quibus non opus est ad distinguendum, cum iis, quae clara fieri dato subiecto refugiunt, abstrahantur, 5) ea, quae dato subiecto nondum sunt complete certa, non demonstrabilia rigorose, in quibus superest formido oppositi, abstrahantur, 6) ea, quae movere in contrarium, assensum revocare, taedium etiam forsan creare possent, abstrahantur.
All these things are well. But what kind is that object which a human being contemplates by so perfect a reason? A certain universal, from individuals embracing very many and very great things, things most fitted by the strongest rules, each according to its own measure, as innumerable marks of very many differences all the way to numerical difference, so arisen, so that in these things, in which the most determinate metaphysical truth is alone, and which would hence secure for perception the generically greatest material perfection if they were perceived as individuals, 1) abundances beyond the perception that would be complete are abstracted away, 2) greater and weightier things than is the degree which was being placed in cognition equalling the object are abstracted away, 3) those things about which a given exact cognition does not sufficiently see whether they are true or not, lest anything of falsity remain for cognition, are abstracted away; 4) those things which are not needed for distinguishing, together with those which refuse to become clear for the given subject, are abstracted away, 5) those things which for the given subject are not yet completely certain, not rigorously demonstrable, in which fear of the opposite remains, are abstracted away, 6) those things which could move in the contrary direction, recall assent, perhaps even create weariness, are abstracted away.
Haec omnia bene se habent.
All these things are well.
Sed quale est illud obiectum, quod homo tam perfecta ratione contemplatur?
But what kind is that object which a human being contemplates by so perfect a reason?
Universale quoddam ex individuis plurima maxima, fortissimis regulis convenientissima, pro suo quaevis modulo, complectentibus, ceu notas differentiarum ad numericam usque plurimarum innumeras, ita ortum, ut in his, in quibus veritas metaphysica determinatissima solis sit, quaeque perceptioni hinc perfectionem materialem generice maximam conciliarent, si perciperentur, ut individua, 1) abundantia ultra perceptionem, quae completa sit, abstrahantur, 2) maiora ac graviora, quam gradus est, qui in cognitione ponebatur, obiectum exaequante, abstrahantur 3) ea, de quibus data exacta cognitio non satis perspicit, an vera sint, nec ne, ne quid supersit cognitioni falsitatis, abstrahantur; 4) ea, quibus non opus est ad distinguendum, cum iis, quae clara fieri dato subiecto refugiunt, abstrahantur, 5) ea, quae dato subiecto nondum sunt complete certa, non demonstrabilia rigorose, in quibus superest formido oppositi, abstrahantur, 6) ea, quae movere in contrarium, assensum revocare, taedium etiam forsan creare possent, abstrahantur.
A certain universal, from individuals embracing very many and very great things, things most fitted by the strongest rules, each according to its own measure, as innumerable marks of very many differences all the way to numerical difference, so arisen, so that in these things, in which the most determinate metaphysical truth is alone, and which would hence secure for perception the generically greatest material perfection if they were perceived as individuals, 1) abundances beyond the perception that would be complete are abstracted away, 2) greater and weightier things than is the degree which was being placed in cognition equalling the object are abstracted away, 3) those things about which a given exact cognition does not sufficiently see whether they are true or not, lest anything of falsity remain for cognition, are abstracted away; 4) those things which are not needed for distinguishing, together with those which refuse to become clear for the given subject, are abstracted away, 5) those things which for the given subject are not yet completely certain, not rigorously demonstrable, in which fear of the opposite remains, are abstracted away, 6) those things which could move in the contrary direction, recall assent, perhaps even create weariness, are abstracted away.
Haec omnia bene se habent.
All these things are well.
Sed quale est illud obiectum,
But what kind is that object
quod homo tam perfecta ratione contemplatur?
which a human being contemplates by so perfect a reason?
Universale quoddam ex individuis plurima maxima,
A certain universal, from individuals embracing very many and
fortissimis regulis
very great things, things most fitted by the strongest rules,
convenientissima, pro suo quaevis modulo, complectentibus,
each according to its own measure,
ceu notas differentiarum
as innumerable marks of very many differences all the
ad numericam usque plurimarum innumeras, ita ortum,
way to numerical difference, so arisen, so
ut in his, in quibus veritas
that in these things, in which the most determinate
metaphysica determinatissima solis sit, quaeque perceptioni hinc
metaphysical truth is alone, and which would hence secure
perfectionem materialem generice maximam conciliarent, si perciperentur,
for perception the generically greatest material perfection if they
ut individua, 1) abundantia ultra perceptionem,
were perceived as individuals, 1) abundances beyond the perception
quae completa sit, abstrahantur,
that would be complete are abstracted away,
2) maiora ac graviora, quam gradus est,
2) greater and weightier things than is
qui in cognitione ponebatur,
the degree which was being placed in cognition equalling
obiectum exaequante, abstrahantur 3) ea,
the object are abstracted away, 3) those
de quibus data exacta cognitio non satis perspicit,
things about which a given exact cognition does not sufficiently see
an vera sint, nec ne,
whether they are true or not,
ne quid supersit cognitioni falsitatis, abstrahantur;
lest anything of falsity remain for cognition, are abstracted
4) ea, quibus non opus est ad distinguendum,
away; 4) those things which are not needed for distinguishing,
cum iis, quae clara fieri dato subiecto
together with those which refuse to become clear for the given subject,
refugiunt, abstrahantur, 5) ea, quae dato
are abstracted away, 5) those things which for the
subiecto nondum sunt complete certa,
given subject are not yet completely certain,
non demonstrabilia rigorose, in quibus superest formido oppositi,
not rigorously demonstrable, in which fear of the opposite
abstrahantur, 6) ea,
remains, are abstracted away, 6) those
quae movere in contrarium,
things which could move in the contrary direction,
assensum revocare, taedium etiam forsan creare possent, abstrahantur.
recall assent, perhaps even create weariness, are abstracted away.
Haec omnia bene se habent. / All these things are well.
Sed quale est illud obiectum, quod homo tam perfecta ratione contemplatur? / But what kind is that object which a human being contemplates by so perfect a reason?
Universale quoddam ex individuis plurima maxima, fortissimis regulis convenientissima, pro suo quaevis modulo, complectentibus, ceu notas differentiarum ad numericam usque plurimarum innumeras, ita ortum, ut in his, in quibus veritas metaphysica determinatissima solis sit, quaeque perceptioni hinc perfectionem materialem generice maximam conciliarent, si perciperentur, ut individua, 1) abundantia ultra perceptionem, quae completa sit, abstrahantur, 2) maiora ac graviora, quam gradus est, qui in cognitione ponebatur, obiectum exaequante, abstrahantur 3) ea, de quibus data exacta cognitio non satis perspicit, an vera sint, nec ne, ne quid supersit cognitioni falsitatis, abstrahantur; 4) ea, quibus non opus est ad distinguendum, cum iis, quae clara fieri dato subiecto refugiunt, abstrahantur, 5) ea, quae dato subiecto nondum sunt complete certa, non demonstrabilia rigorose, in quibus superest formido oppositi, abstrahantur, 6) ea, quae movere in contrarium, assensum revocare, taedium etiam forsan creare possent, abstrahantur. / A certain universal, from individuals embracing very many and very great things, things most fitted by the strongest rules, each according to its own measure, as innumerable marks of very many differences all the way to numerical difference, so arisen, so that in these things, in which the most determinate metaphysical truth is alone, and which would hence secure for perception the generically greatest material perfection if they were perceived as individuals, 1) abundances beyond the perception that would be complete are abstracted away, 2) greater and weightier things than is the degree which was being placed in cognition equalling the object are abstracted away, 3) those things about which a given exact cognition does not sufficiently see whether they are true or not, lest anything of falsity remain for cognition, are abstracted away; 4) those things which are not needed for distinguishing, together with those which refuse to become clear for the given subject, are abstracted away, 5) those things which for the given subject are not yet completely certain, not rigorously demonstrable, in which fear of the opposite remains, are abstracted away, 6) those things which could move in the contrary direction, recall assent, perhaps even create weariness, are abstracted away.
§ 560
Sic enatis disciplinarum scientiarumque humanarum obiectis, universalibus, § 559. utique perfecta, saepe pulcra, connascitur in animis solide doctorum veritas, etiam strictius logica. Iam autem quaeritur, an tali universali sit aequalis veritas metaphysica, ac est huius individuo, quod sub eodem continetur? Equidem arbitror philosophis apertissimum esse iam posse, cum iactura multae magnaeque perfectionis in cognitione et veritate logica materialis emendum fuisse, quicquid ipsi perfectionis formalis inest praecipuae. Quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est? Pari ratione ex marmore irregularis figurae non efficias globum marmoreum, nisi cum tanto saltim materiae detrimento, quantum postulabit maius rotunditatis pretium.
With the objects of human disciplines and sciences, universals, thus having come forth, § 559, truth, certainly perfect and often beautiful, even more strictly logical, is born together in the minds of the solidly learned. But now it is asked whether metaphysical truth is equal in such a universal as it is in the individual of this universal which is contained under the same. Indeed I think it can now be most evident to philosophers that, with the loss of much and great material perfection in cognition and logical truth, it had to be bought, whatever of chief formal perfection is in it. For what is abstraction, if it is not loss? By the same reasoning, from marble of irregular shape you would not make a marble sphere except with at least as much loss of matter as the greater price of roundness will demand.
Sic enatis disciplinarum scientiarumque humanarum obiectis, universalibus, § 559. utique perfecta, saepe pulcra, connascitur in animis solide doctorum veritas, etiam strictius logica.
With the objects of human disciplines and sciences, universals, thus having come forth, § 559, truth, certainly perfect and often beautiful, even more strictly logical, is born together in the minds of the solidly learned.
Iam autem quaeritur, an tali universali sit aequalis veritas metaphysica, ac est huius individuo, quod sub eodem continetur?
But now it is asked whether metaphysical truth is equal in such a universal as it is in the individual of this universal which is contained under the same.
Equidem arbitror philosophis apertissimum esse iam posse, cum iactura multae magnaeque perfectionis in cognitione et veritate logica materialis emendum fuisse, quicquid ipsi perfectionis formalis inest praecipuae.
Indeed I think it can now be most evident to philosophers that, with the loss of much and great material perfection in cognition and logical truth, it had to be bought, whatever of chief formal perfection is in it.
Quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est?
For what is abstraction, if it is not loss?
Pari ratione ex marmore irregularis figurae non efficias globum marmoreum, nisi cum tanto saltim materiae detrimento, quantum postulabit maius rotunditatis pretium.
By the same reasoning, from marble of irregular shape you would not make a marble sphere except with at least as much loss of matter as the greater price of roundness will demand.
Sic enatis disciplinarum scientiarumque humanarum obiectis, universalibus,
With the objects of human disciplines and sciences, universals,
§ 559. utique perfecta,
thus having come forth, § 559, truth, certainly perfect
saepe pulcra, connascitur
and often beautiful, even more strictly logical,
in animis solide doctorum veritas, etiam strictius logica.
is born together in the minds of the solidly learned.
Iam autem quaeritur, an tali universali sit
But now it is asked whether metaphysical truth is
aequalis veritas metaphysica, ac est huius individuo,
equal in such a universal as it is in the individual
quod sub eodem continetur?
of this universal which is contained under the same.
Equidem arbitror philosophis apertissimum esse iam posse,
Indeed I think it can now be most evident to
cum iactura multae magnaeque
philosophers that, with the loss of much and great
perfectionis in cognitione et veritate logica
material perfection in cognition and logical truth,
materialis emendum fuisse, quicquid ipsi perfectionis formalis
it had to be bought, whatever of chief formal
inest praecipuae.
perfection is in it.
Quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est?
For what is abstraction, if it is not loss?
Pari ratione ex marmore irregularis figurae
By the same reasoning, from marble of irregular shape
non efficias globum marmoreum,
you would not make a marble
nisi cum tanto saltim materiae detrimento,
sphere except with at least as much loss of matter as
quantum postulabit maius rotunditatis pretium.
the greater price of roundness will demand.
Sic enatis disciplinarum scientiarumque humanarum obiectis, universalibus, § 559. utique perfecta, saepe pulcra, connascitur in animis solide doctorum veritas, etiam strictius logica. / With the objects of human disciplines and sciences, universals, thus having come forth, § 559, truth, certainly perfect and often beautiful, even more strictly logical, is born together in the minds of the solidly learned.
Iam autem quaeritur, an tali universali sit aequalis veritas metaphysica, ac est huius individuo, quod sub eodem continetur? / But now it is asked whether metaphysical truth is equal in such a universal as it is in the individual of this universal which is contained under the same.
Equidem arbitror philosophis apertissimum esse iam posse, cum iactura multae magnaeque perfectionis in cognitione et veritate logica materialis emendum fuisse, quicquid ipsi perfectionis formalis inest praecipuae. / Indeed I think it can now be most evident to philosophers that, with the loss of much and great material perfection in cognition and logical truth, it had to be bought, whatever of chief formal perfection is in it.
Quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est? / For what is abstraction, if it is not loss?
Pari ratione ex marmore irregularis figurae non efficias globum marmoreum, nisi cum tanto saltim materiae detrimento, quantum postulabit maius rotunditatis pretium. / By the same reasoning, from marble of irregular shape you would not make a marble sphere except with at least as much loss of matter as the greater price of roundness will demand.
§ 561
Iam supponatur veritatis aestheticologicae studium aliquando ferri praesertim in perfectionem eiusdem materialem, § 558, et hinc amplecti obiecta veritatis metaphysicae, quae potest, determinatissimae. Hic intentio non est dato consilio amputare per abstractionem cuiuscunque rotunditatis impedimenta, neque tamen est opis humanae determinationis omnimodae latissimum ambitum sibi complete signare; data opera non praescinduntur magnitudinem intellectionis nostrae superantia, neque tamen omnia determinatarum rerum et paene vel omnino actualium pondera assequi et iustis momentis exaequare mens humana potest. Non constituimus praescindere, quicquid ulla ratione falsi speciem posset induere, neque tamen in indefinitis eiusmodi obiecti tantum non singularis momentis verum ubique liquet. Non est consilium omittere et prorsus in voluntarias tenebras relegare, quae requisitam aliquam claritatem non habent, et tamen ad eandem singula momenta obiecti tollere vires, locus, tempus non permittunt. Non animus est aliquantulum incerta prorsus omittere, neque tamen omnia cogitans rigorose demonstrare potest, quae obiecto determinatissimae veritatis conveniunt. Multa, quae placeant, aut odio sint, praescindere non constituimus, neque tamen vires sufficiunt ad omnia sic exhibenda, ut efficaciter appetere, vel aversari certis deliberatisque decretis ea meditatus possit.
Now let it be supposed that the study of aestheticological truth is sometimes carried especially into the material perfection of the same, § 558, and hence embraces objects of metaphysical truth, as determinate as it can. Here the intention is not, by a given plan, to cut away through abstraction the impediments of any roundness whatever; and yet it is not within human power to mark out completely for itself the widest range of omnimodal determination; By deliberate effort, things surpassing the magnitude of our understanding are not cut off; and yet the human mind cannot attain all the weights of determinate things, and of things almost or wholly actual, and balance them by just measures. We do not resolve to cut off whatever could in any way put on the appearance of the false; and yet in the indefinite moments of such an object, almost singular, the true is not everywhere clear. It is not the plan to omit and wholly relegate into voluntary darkness those things which do not have some required clarity, and yet strength, place, and time do not permit one to raise the individual moments of the object to that same clarity. The mind is not to omit entirely things somewhat uncertain; and yet a thinker cannot rigorously demonstrate all things that belong to an object of the most determinate truth. We do not resolve to cut off many things which may please or be hateful, and yet powers do not suffice for exhibiting all things in such a way that the one meditating them could effectively desire or avoid them by certain and deliberate decrees.
Iam supponatur veritatis aestheticologicae studium aliquando ferri praesertim in perfectionem eiusdem materialem, § 558, et hinc amplecti obiecta veritatis metaphysicae, quae potest, determinatissimae.
Now let it be supposed that the study of aestheticological truth is sometimes carried especially into the material perfection of the same, § 558, and hence embraces objects of metaphysical truth, as determinate as it can.
Hic intentio non est dato consilio amputare per abstractionem cuiuscunque rotunditatis impedimenta, neque tamen est opis humanae determinationis omnimodae latissimum ambitum sibi complete signare; data opera non praescinduntur magnitudinem intellectionis nostrae superantia, neque tamen omnia determinatarum rerum et paene vel omnino actualium pondera assequi et iustis momentis exaequare mens humana potest.
Here the intention is not, by a given plan, to cut away through abstraction the impediments of any roundness whatever; and yet it is not within human power to mark out completely for itself the widest range of omnimodal determination; By deliberate effort, things surpassing the magnitude of our understanding are not cut off; and yet the human mind cannot attain all the weights of determinate things, and of things almost or wholly actual, and balance them by just measures.
Non constituimus praescindere, quicquid ulla ratione falsi speciem posset induere, neque tamen in indefinitis eiusmodi obiecti tantum non singularis momentis verum ubique liquet.
We do not resolve to cut off whatever could in any way put on the appearance of the false; and yet in the indefinite moments of such an object, almost singular, the true is not everywhere clear.
Non est consilium omittere et prorsus in voluntarias tenebras relegare, quae requisitam aliquam claritatem non habent, et tamen ad eandem singula momenta obiecti tollere vires, locus, tempus non permittunt.
It is not the plan to omit and wholly relegate into voluntary darkness those things which do not have some required clarity, and yet strength, place, and time do not permit one to raise the individual moments of the object to that same clarity.
Non animus est aliquantulum incerta prorsus omittere, neque tamen omnia cogitans rigorose demonstrare potest, quae obiecto determinatissimae veritatis conveniunt.
The mind is not to omit entirely things somewhat uncertain; and yet a thinker cannot rigorously demonstrate all things that belong to an object of the most determinate truth.
Multa, quae placeant, aut odio sint, praescindere non constituimus, neque tamen vires sufficiunt ad omnia sic exhibenda, ut efficaciter appetere, vel aversari certis deliberatisque decretis ea meditatus possit.
We do not resolve to cut off many things which may please or be hateful, and yet powers do not suffice for exhibiting all things in such a way that the one meditating them could effectively desire or avoid them by certain and deliberate decrees.
Iam supponatur veritatis aestheticologicae studium
Now let it be supposed that the study of
aliquando ferri praesertim in perfectionem eiusdem materialem,
aestheticological truth is sometimes carried especially into the material perfection of the
§ 558, et hinc amplecti obiecta veritatis
same, § 558, and hence embraces objects of metaphysical truth,
metaphysicae, quae potest, determinatissimae.
as determinate as it can.
Hic intentio non est dato consilio
Here the intention is not, by a given plan,
amputare per abstractionem cuiuscunque rotunditatis impedimenta, neque
to cut away through abstraction the impediments of any roundness whatever;
tamen est opis humanae determinationis omnimodae
and yet it is not within human power to
latissimum ambitum sibi complete signare;
mark out completely for itself the widest range
data opera non
of omnimodal determination; By deliberate effort,
praescinduntur magnitudinem intellectionis nostrae superantia, neque tamen
things surpassing the magnitude of our understanding are not cut off;
omnia
and yet the human mind cannot attain all the
determinatarum rerum et paene vel omnino actualium
weights of determinate things, and of things almost or wholly actual,
pondera assequi et iustis momentis exaequare mens humana potest.
and balance them by just measures.
Non constituimus praescindere, quicquid ulla ratione falsi
We do not resolve to cut off whatever
speciem posset induere, neque tamen
could in any way put on the appearance of the false;
in indefinitis eiusmodi obiecti
and yet in the indefinite moments of such an object,
tantum non singularis momentis verum ubique liquet.
almost singular, the true is not everywhere clear.
Non est consilium omittere et prorsus
It is not the plan to omit and wholly
in voluntarias tenebras relegare, quae requisitam aliquam claritatem
relegate into voluntary darkness those things which do
non habent,
not have some required clarity, and yet strength, place,
et tamen ad eandem singula
and time do not permit one to raise the
momenta obiecti tollere vires, locus, tempus non permittunt.
individual moments of the object to that same clarity.
Non animus est aliquantulum incerta
The mind is not to omit entirely things somewhat uncertain;
prorsus omittere, neque tamen omnia cogitans rigorose demonstrare potest,
and yet a thinker cannot rigorously demonstrate all things that belong
quae obiecto determinatissimae veritatis conveniunt.
to an object of the most determinate truth.
Multa, quae placeant, aut odio sint,
We do not resolve to cut off many things
praescindere non constituimus,
which may please or be hateful,
neque tamen vires sufficiunt ad
and yet powers do not suffice for
omnia sic exhibenda, ut efficaciter appetere,
exhibiting all things in such a way that the one
vel aversari
meditating them could effectively desire or avoid them by
certis deliberatisque decretis ea meditatus possit.
certain and deliberate decrees.
Iam supponatur veritatis aestheticologicae studium aliquando ferri praesertim in perfectionem eiusdem materialem, § 558, et hinc amplecti obiecta veritatis metaphysicae, quae potest, determinatissimae. / Now let it be supposed that the study of aestheticological truth is sometimes carried especially into the material perfection of the same, § 558, and hence embraces objects of metaphysical truth, as determinate as it can.
Hic intentio non est dato consilio amputare per abstractionem cuiuscunque rotunditatis impedimenta, neque tamen est opis humanae determinationis omnimodae latissimum ambitum sibi complete signare; data opera non praescinduntur magnitudinem intellectionis nostrae superantia, neque tamen omnia determinatarum rerum et paene vel omnino actualium pondera assequi et iustis momentis exaequare mens humana potest. / Here the intention is not, by a given plan, to cut away through abstraction the impediments of any roundness whatever; and yet it is not within human power to mark out completely for itself the widest range of omnimodal determination; By deliberate effort, things surpassing the magnitude of our understanding are not cut off; and yet the human mind cannot attain all the weights of determinate things, and of things almost or wholly actual, and balance them by just measures.
Non constituimus praescindere, quicquid ulla ratione falsi speciem posset induere, neque tamen in indefinitis eiusmodi obiecti tantum non singularis momentis verum ubique liquet. / We do not resolve to cut off whatever could in any way put on the appearance of the false; and yet in the indefinite moments of such an object, almost singular, the true is not everywhere clear.
Non est consilium omittere et prorsus in voluntarias tenebras relegare, quae requisitam aliquam claritatem non habent, et tamen ad eandem singula momenta obiecti tollere vires, locus, tempus non permittunt. / It is not the plan to omit and wholly relegate into voluntary darkness those things which do not have some required clarity, and yet strength, place, and time do not permit one to raise the individual moments of the object to that same clarity.
Non animus est aliquantulum incerta prorsus omittere, neque tamen omnia cogitans rigorose demonstrare potest, quae obiecto determinatissimae veritatis conveniunt. / The mind is not to omit entirely things somewhat uncertain; and yet a thinker cannot rigorously demonstrate all things that belong to an object of the most determinate truth.
Multa, quae placeant, aut odio sint, praescindere non constituimus, neque tamen vires sufficiunt ad omnia sic exhibenda, ut efficaciter appetere, vel aversari certis deliberatisque decretis ea meditatus possit. / We do not resolve to cut off many things which may please or be hateful, and yet powers do not suffice for exhibiting all things in such a way that the one meditating them could effectively desire or avoid them by certain and deliberate decrees.
§ 562
Habes perfectionem veritatis aestheticologicae compositam, § 556, vides exceptiones inevitabiles, utramque si velis assequi vel mediocriter, § 560. 561. Intellectus et ratio purior severiorum veritatis amicorum, per accuratas scientias ita formalem sequitur, § 560. descriptam, ut complementa ac supplementa veritatis materialiter perfectae, suis universalibus et abstractioribus ad formalem scientificorum perfectionem deductis, adjicere pro viribus relinquat analogo rationis et cognitionibus quocunque gradu sensitivis.
You have the composed perfection of aestheticological truth, § 556; you see the inevitable exceptions, if you wish to attain each even moderately, § 560. 561. The purer understanding and reason of the stricter friends of truth, through accurate sciences, so follows the formal perfection described, § 560, that the complements and supplements of materially perfect truth, once its universals and more abstract things have been led down to the formal perfection of scientific things, it leaves to the analog of reason and to cognitions sensitive in whatever degree to add them, according to their powers.
Habes perfectionem veritatis aestheticologicae compositam, § 556, vides exceptiones inevitabiles, utramque si velis assequi vel mediocriter, § 560. 561. Intellectus et ratio purior severiorum veritatis amicorum, per accuratas scientias ita formalem sequitur, § 560. descriptam, ut complementa ac supplementa veritatis materialiter perfectae, suis universalibus et abstractioribus ad formalem scientificorum perfectionem deductis, adjicere pro viribus relinquat analogo rationis et cognitionibus quocunque gradu sensitivis.
You have the composed perfection of aestheticological truth, § 556; you see the inevitable exceptions, if you wish to attain each even moderately, § 560. 561. The purer understanding and reason of the stricter friends of truth, through accurate sciences, so follows the formal perfection described, § 560, that the complements and supplements of materially perfect truth, once its universals and more abstract things have been led down to the formal perfection of scientific things, it leaves to the analog of reason and to cognitions sensitive in whatever degree to add them, according to their powers.
Habes perfectionem veritatis aestheticologicae compositam, § 556,
You have the composed perfection of aestheticological truth, § 556;
vides exceptiones inevitabiles, utramque si
you see the inevitable exceptions, if you wish to
velis assequi vel mediocriter, § 560. 561.
attain each even moderately, § 560. 561.
Intellectus et ratio purior severiorum veritatis
The purer understanding and reason of the stricter friends of truth,
amicorum, per accuratas scientias ita formalem sequitur, § 560.
through accurate sciences, so follows the formal perfection described, § 560,
descriptam, ut complementa ac supplementa veritatis materialiter perfectae,
that the complements and supplements of materially perfect
suis universalibus et abstractioribus
truth, once its universals and more abstract things have
ad formalem scientificorum perfectionem
been led down to the formal perfection of scientific things,
deductis, adjicere pro viribus relinquat analogo rationis et
it leaves to the analog of reason and
cognitionibus quocunque gradu sensitivis.
to cognitions sensitive in whatever degree to add them, according to their powers.
Habes perfectionem veritatis aestheticologicae compositam, § 556, vides exceptiones inevitabiles, utramque si velis assequi vel mediocriter, § 560. 561. Intellectus et ratio purior severiorum veritatis amicorum, per accuratas scientias ita formalem sequitur, § 560. descriptam, ut complementa ac supplementa veritatis materialiter perfectae, suis universalibus et abstractioribus ad formalem scientificorum perfectionem deductis, adjicere pro viribus relinquat analogo rationis et cognitionibus quocunque gradu sensitivis. / You have the composed perfection of aestheticological truth, § 556; you see the inevitable exceptions, if you wish to attain each even moderately, § 560. 561. The purer understanding and reason of the stricter friends of truth, through accurate sciences, so follows the formal perfection described, § 560, that the complements and supplements of materially perfect truth, once its universals and more abstract things have been led down to the formal perfection of scientific things, it leaves to the analog of reason and to cognitions sensitive in whatever degree to add them, according to their powers.
§ 563
Verum amicus veritatis non minus strenuus, qui sequitur eandem analogo rationis, non habet denuo facultatem sensitivam inferiorem, cui relicta a se et omissa commendet, ob veritatis materialem perfectionem tamen ea, quae multum habent in se veritatis metaphysicae determinatissimae negligere omnino non audet. Hinc huic magis necessarium est nonnunquam excipere a regulis summae perfectionis formalis in indaganda veritate aesthetica, ne nimium detrimenti capiat veritatis eiusdem perfectio materialis, § 558.
But the no less strenuous friend of truth, who follows the same truth by the analog of reason, does not again have a lower sensitive faculty to which he may entrust what has been left behind and omitted by himself, yet, on account of the material perfection of truth, he does not dare wholly to neglect those things which have much of the most determinate metaphysical truth in themselves. Hence it is more necessary for this one sometimes to make exception from the rules of the highest formal perfection in investigating aesthetic truth, lest the material perfection of the same truth suffer too much loss, § 558.
Verum amicus veritatis non minus strenuus, qui sequitur eandem analogo rationis, non habet denuo facultatem sensitivam inferiorem, cui relicta a se et omissa commendet, ob veritatis materialem perfectionem tamen ea, quae multum habent in se veritatis metaphysicae determinatissimae negligere omnino non audet.
But the no less strenuous friend of truth, who follows the same truth by the analog of reason, does not again have a lower sensitive faculty to which he may entrust what has been left behind and omitted by himself, yet, on account of the material perfection of truth, he does not dare wholly to neglect those things which have much of the most determinate metaphysical truth in themselves.
Hinc huic magis necessarium est nonnunquam excipere a regulis summae perfectionis formalis in indaganda veritate aesthetica, ne nimium detrimenti capiat veritatis eiusdem perfectio materialis, § 558.
Hence it is more necessary for this one sometimes to make exception from the rules of the highest formal perfection in investigating aesthetic truth, lest the material perfection of the same truth suffer too much loss, § 558.
Verum amicus veritatis non minus strenuus,
But the no less strenuous friend of truth,
qui sequitur eandem analogo rationis,
who follows the same truth by the analog of reason,
non habet denuo facultatem sensitivam inferiorem,
does not again have a lower sensitive faculty to which
cui relicta a se
he may entrust what has been left behind and omitted by himself,
et omissa commendet, ob veritatis materialem perfectionem tamen ea,
yet, on account of the material perfection of truth,
quae multum habent in se
he does not dare wholly to neglect those things
veritatis metaphysicae determinatissimae negligere omnino non audet.
which have much of the most determinate metaphysical truth in themselves.
Hinc huic magis necessarium
Hence it is more necessary for this one sometimes
est nonnunquam excipere a regulis summae perfectionis
to make exception from the rules of the highest
formalis in indaganda veritate aesthetica,
formal perfection in investigating aesthetic truth,
ne nimium detrimenti capiat veritatis eiusdem perfectio materialis,
lest the material perfection of the same truth suffer too much
§ 558.
loss, § 558.
Verum amicus veritatis non minus strenuus, qui sequitur eandem analogo rationis, non habet denuo facultatem sensitivam inferiorem, cui relicta a se et omissa commendet, ob veritatis materialem perfectionem tamen ea, quae multum habent in se veritatis metaphysicae determinatissimae negligere omnino non audet. / But the no less strenuous friend of truth, who follows the same truth by the analog of reason, does not again have a lower sensitive faculty to which he may entrust what has been left behind and omitted by himself, yet, on account of the material perfection of truth, he does not dare wholly to neglect those things which have much of the most determinate metaphysical truth in themselves.
Hinc huic magis necessarium est nonnunquam excipere a regulis summae perfectionis formalis in indaganda veritate aesthetica, ne nimium detrimenti capiat veritatis eiusdem perfectio materialis, § 558. / Hence it is more necessary for this one sometimes to make exception from the rules of the highest formal perfection in investigating aesthetic truth, lest the material perfection of the same truth suffer too much loss, § 558.
§ 564
Universalissimis, abstractissimis, et per artem, § 559. descriptam ad perfectionem veritatis formalem ab hominibus obtinendarum summam evehendis partim omnino relictis horizonti logico, partim ex eodem detractis et involutis denuo nonnihil in non ita paucas, a quibus abstraxerat ratio, differentias determinatiores, praesertim autem perfectionem materialem veritatis aestheticologicae maximam exhibentibus singularibus, individuis, et determinatissimis fruitur horizon aestheticus, sua silva, Chao, et materia, § 129. ex quibus veritatem aestheticam ad formam, nisi perfectam omnino, pulcram tamen, § 558, 14. ita exsculpat, ut inter elaborandum, quam fieri potest minimum veritatis materialiter perfectae pereat et elegantiae caussa poliendo deteratur, § 563.
The most universal, the most abstract, and those to be raised by the art described in § 559 to the highest formal perfection of truth obtainable by human beings, having partly been left entirely to the logical horizon, and partly having been drawn back from the same and again wrapped somewhat into not so few more determinate differences from which reason had abstracted, but especially the aesthetic horizon enjoys singular, individual, and most determinate things that display the greatest material perfection of aestheticological truth, its own forest, Chaos, and matter, § 129, from which it carves aesthetic truth into a form, if not wholly perfect, nevertheless beautiful, § 558, 14, in such a way that while it is being worked out, as little as possible of materially perfect truth perishes and is worn away by polishing for the sake of elegance, § 563.
Universalissimis, abstractissimis, et per artem, § 559. descriptam ad perfectionem veritatis formalem ab hominibus obtinendarum summam evehendis partim omnino relictis horizonti logico, partim ex eodem detractis et involutis denuo nonnihil in non ita paucas, a quibus abstraxerat ratio, differentias determinatiores, praesertim autem perfectionem materialem veritatis aestheticologicae maximam exhibentibus singularibus, individuis, et determinatissimis fruitur horizon aestheticus, sua silva, Chao, et materia, § 129. ex quibus veritatem aestheticam ad formam, nisi perfectam omnino, pulcram tamen, § 558, 14. ita exsculpat, ut inter elaborandum, quam fieri potest minimum veritatis materialiter perfectae pereat et elegantiae caussa poliendo deteratur, § 563.
The most universal, the most abstract, and those to be raised by the art described in § 559 to the highest formal perfection of truth obtainable by human beings, having partly been left entirely to the logical horizon, and partly having been drawn back from the same and again wrapped somewhat into not so few more determinate differences from which reason had abstracted, but especially the aesthetic horizon enjoys singular, individual, and most determinate things that display the greatest material perfection of aestheticological truth, its own forest, Chaos, and matter, § 129, from which it carves aesthetic truth into a form, if not wholly perfect, nevertheless beautiful, § 558, 14, in such a way that while it is being worked out, as little as possible of materially perfect truth perishes and is worn away by polishing for the sake of elegance, § 563.
Universalissimis, abstractissimis,
The most universal, the most abstract,
et per artem, § 559.
and those to be raised by the art described in § 559
descriptam ad perfectionem veritatis formalem
to the highest formal perfection of truth
ab hominibus obtinendarum summam evehendis partim omnino relictis horizonti logico,
obtainable by human beings, having partly been left entirely to the logical
partim ex eodem
horizon, and partly having been drawn back from the
detractis et involutis denuo nonnihil in non ita paucas,
same and again wrapped somewhat into not so few
a quibus abstraxerat ratio,
more determinate differences from which reason had abstracted,
differentias determinatiores, praesertim autem perfectionem materialem veritatis aestheticologicae maximam exhibentibus singularibus,
but especially the aesthetic horizon enjoys singular,
individuis, et determinatissimis fruitur
individual, and most determinate things that display the greatest
horizon aestheticus, sua silva, Chao, et materia, § 129.
material perfection of aestheticological truth, its own forest, Chaos, and matter, § 129,
ex quibus veritatem aestheticam ad formam,
from which it carves aesthetic truth into a form,
nisi perfectam omnino, pulcram tamen, § 558, 14.
if not wholly perfect, nevertheless beautiful, § 558, 14,
ita exsculpat, ut inter elaborandum,
in such a way that while it is being worked out,
quam fieri potest minimum veritatis materialiter perfectae pereat
as little as possible of materially perfect truth perishes
et elegantiae
and is worn away by polishing for the sake of elegance,
caussa poliendo deteratur, § 563.
§ 563.
Universalissimis, abstractissimis, et per artem, § 559. descriptam ad perfectionem veritatis formalem ab hominibus obtinendarum summam evehendis partim omnino relictis horizonti logico, partim ex eodem detractis et involutis denuo nonnihil in non ita paucas, a quibus abstraxerat ratio, differentias determinatiores, praesertim autem perfectionem materialem veritatis aestheticologicae maximam exhibentibus singularibus, individuis, et determinatissimis fruitur horizon aestheticus, sua silva, Chao, et materia, § 129. ex quibus veritatem aestheticam ad formam, nisi perfectam omnino, pulcram tamen, § 558, 14. ita exsculpat, ut inter elaborandum, quam fieri potest minimum veritatis materialiter perfectae pereat et elegantiae caussa poliendo deteratur, § 563. / The most universal, the most abstract, and those to be raised by the art described in § 559 to the highest formal perfection of truth obtainable by human beings, having partly been left entirely to the logical horizon, and partly having been drawn back from the same and again wrapped somewhat into not so few more determinate differences from which reason had abstracted, but especially the aesthetic horizon enjoys singular, individual, and most determinate things that display the greatest material perfection of aestheticological truth, its own forest, Chaos, and matter, § 129, from which it carves aesthetic truth into a form, if not wholly perfect, nevertheless beautiful, § 558, 14, in such a way that while it is being worked out, as little as possible of materially perfect truth perishes and is worn away by polishing for the sake of elegance, § 563.
§ 565
Sumat itaque pulcre cogitaturus sibi materiam vel determinatiorem, unam ex generibus inferioribus aut omnino speciebus rerum, vel si altius videatur in genera superiora adscendere, teneatur tamen eadem vestire multis, quas omittit purior scientia, notis et characteribus, vel tandem singularia sibi legat themata, in quibus regnet perfectio veritatis materialis. Circumfundatur notarum ingenti multitudine. Reiecerit, quas non admittit pulcra forma. Restent, quarum vix unam desiderari brevis, sed eleganter plena, rotunditas, venusta dignitas, tum absoluta, tum relativa, veritatis ipsius materialis perfectio, elegans vividitas et necessarius meditationi nitor, intima persuasio, vita praesertim et ad delectandum ac movendum efficacia patiatur. In his autem notis bene multis non sit meditanti veritas metaphysica completam ad lucem usque perspecta, licet nihil falsi turpioris iisdem insit. Iam putaverim ad generalem aliquam formulam redegisse necessitates aestheticas, quarum aliquos speciales casus enumeravi, §§ 491–502, in collisione regularum perfectionis in cognoscendo vero, excipiendi a veritatis forma perfectiori, ob veritatem materialiter perfectiorem involvendam amabiliori formae verisimilitudinis, § 483.
Therefore let the one about to think beautifully take for himself matter that is either more determinate, one from lower genera or wholly from the species of things, or if it seems better to ascend higher into superior genera, let him nevertheless be bound to clothe the same things with many marks and characters which purer science omits, or finally let him choose singular themes for himself, in which the perfection of material truth reigns. Let him be surrounded by a huge multitude of marks. He will reject those which beautiful form does not admit. Let those remain of which a brief, but elegantly full, roundness, graceful dignity, both absolute and relative, would scarcely allow even one to be missed, and the perfection of material truth itself, elegant vividness and the brilliance necessary for meditation, intimate persuasion, especially life and efficacy for delighting and moving, would scarcely allow it. But in these very many marks, metaphysical truth may not be seen by the one meditating all the way to complete light, although nothing of uglier falsity is in them. Now I would think that I have reduced to some general formula the aesthetic necessities, of which I enumerated some special cases, §§ 491–502, in the collision of rules of perfection in knowing the true, of making exception from the more perfect form of truth, on account of a materially more perfect truth that must be wrapped in a more lovable form of verisimilitude, § 483.
Sumat itaque pulcre cogitaturus sibi materiam vel determinatiorem, unam ex generibus inferioribus aut omnino speciebus rerum, vel si altius videatur in genera superiora adscendere, teneatur tamen eadem vestire multis, quas omittit purior scientia, notis et characteribus, vel tandem singularia sibi legat themata, in quibus regnet perfectio veritatis materialis.
Therefore let the one about to think beautifully take for himself matter that is either more determinate, one from lower genera or wholly from the species of things, or if it seems better to ascend higher into superior genera, let him nevertheless be bound to clothe the same things with many marks and characters which purer science omits, or finally let him choose singular themes for himself, in which the perfection of material truth reigns.
Circumfundatur notarum ingenti multitudine.
Let him be surrounded by a huge multitude of marks.
Reiecerit, quas non admittit pulcra forma.
He will reject those which beautiful form does not admit.
Restent, quarum vix unam desiderari brevis, sed eleganter plena, rotunditas, venusta dignitas, tum absoluta, tum relativa, veritatis ipsius materialis perfectio, elegans vividitas et necessarius meditationi nitor, intima persuasio, vita praesertim et ad delectandum ac movendum efficacia patiatur.
Let those remain of which a brief, but elegantly full, roundness, graceful dignity, both absolute and relative, would scarcely allow even one to be missed, and the perfection of material truth itself, elegant vividness and the brilliance necessary for meditation, intimate persuasion, especially life and efficacy for delighting and moving, would scarcely allow it.
In his autem notis bene multis non sit meditanti veritas metaphysica completam ad lucem usque perspecta, licet nihil falsi turpioris iisdem insit.
But in these very many marks, metaphysical truth may not be seen by the one meditating all the way to complete light, although nothing of uglier falsity is in them.
Iam putaverim ad generalem aliquam formulam redegisse necessitates aestheticas, quarum aliquos speciales casus enumeravi, §§ 491–502, in collisione regularum perfectionis in cognoscendo vero, excipiendi a veritatis forma perfectiori, ob veritatem materialiter perfectiorem involvendam amabiliori formae verisimilitudinis, § 483.
Now I would think that I have reduced to some general formula the aesthetic necessities, of which I enumerated some special cases, §§ 491–502, in the collision of rules of perfection in knowing the true, of making exception from the more perfect form of truth, on account of a materially more perfect truth that must be wrapped in a more lovable form of verisimilitude, § 483.
Sumat itaque pulcre cogitaturus
Therefore let the one about to think beautifully take
sibi materiam vel determinatiorem,
for himself matter that is either more determinate,
unam ex generibus inferioribus aut omnino speciebus rerum,
one from lower genera or wholly from the species of
vel si altius videatur in genera
things, or if it seems better to ascend higher into superior genera,
superiora adscendere, teneatur tamen eadem vestire multis,
let him nevertheless be bound to clothe
quas omittit purior scientia, notis et characteribus,
the same things with many marks and characters
vel tandem
which purer science omits, or finally let him choose
singularia sibi legat themata, in quibus regnet perfectio veritatis materialis.
singular themes for himself, in which the perfection of material truth reigns.
Circumfundatur notarum ingenti multitudine.
Let him be surrounded by a huge multitude of marks.
Reiecerit, quas non admittit pulcra forma.
He will reject those which beautiful form does not admit.
Restent, quarum vix unam desiderari brevis, sed eleganter plena,
Let those remain of which a brief, but elegantly full,
rotunditas, venusta dignitas, tum absoluta, tum relativa,
roundness, graceful dignity, both absolute and relative,
veritatis
would scarcely allow even one to be missed,
ipsius materialis perfectio,
and the perfection of material truth itself,
elegans vividitas et necessarius meditationi nitor,
elegant vividness and the brilliance necessary for meditation,
intima persuasio, vita praesertim et ad delectandum ac
intimate persuasion, especially life and efficacy for delighting and moving,
movendum efficacia patiatur.
would scarcely allow it.
In his autem notis
But in these very many marks,
bene multis non sit
metaphysical truth may not be seen by the one
meditanti veritas metaphysica completam ad lucem usque perspecta,
meditating all the way to complete light, although
licet nihil falsi turpioris iisdem insit.
nothing of uglier falsity is in them.
Iam putaverim ad
Now I would think that I have reduced to
generalem aliquam formulam redegisse necessitates aestheticas,
some general formula the aesthetic necessities, of
quarum aliquos speciales casus enumeravi, §§ 491–502,
which I enumerated some special cases, §§ 491–502,
in collisione regularum perfectionis in
in the collision of rules of perfection in knowing the true,
cognoscendo vero, excipiendi a veritatis
of making exception from the more perfect form of truth,
forma perfectiori, ob veritatem materialiter perfectiorem
on account of a materially more perfect truth that
involvendam amabiliori formae verisimilitudinis, § 483.
must be wrapped in a more lovable form of verisimilitude, § 483.
Sumat itaque pulcre cogitaturus sibi materiam vel determinatiorem, unam ex generibus inferioribus aut omnino speciebus rerum, vel si altius videatur in genera superiora adscendere, teneatur tamen eadem vestire multis, quas omittit purior scientia, notis et characteribus, vel tandem singularia sibi legat themata, in quibus regnet perfectio veritatis materialis. / Therefore let the one about to think beautifully take for himself matter that is either more determinate, one from lower genera or wholly from the species of things, or if it seems better to ascend higher into superior genera, let him nevertheless be bound to clothe the same things with many marks and characters which purer science omits, or finally let him choose singular themes for himself, in which the perfection of material truth reigns.
Circumfundatur notarum ingenti multitudine. / Let him be surrounded by a huge multitude of marks.
Reiecerit, quas non admittit pulcra forma. / He will reject those which beautiful form does not admit.
Restent, quarum vix unam desiderari brevis, sed eleganter plena, rotunditas, venusta dignitas, tum absoluta, tum relativa, veritatis ipsius materialis perfectio, elegans vividitas et necessarius meditationi nitor, intima persuasio, vita praesertim et ad delectandum ac movendum efficacia patiatur. / Let those remain of which a brief, but elegantly full, roundness, graceful dignity, both absolute and relative, would scarcely allow even one to be missed, and the perfection of material truth itself, elegant vividness and the brilliance necessary for meditation, intimate persuasion, especially life and efficacy for delighting and moving, would scarcely allow it.
In his autem notis bene multis non sit meditanti veritas metaphysica completam ad lucem usque perspecta, licet nihil falsi turpioris iisdem insit. / But in these very many marks, metaphysical truth may not be seen by the one meditating all the way to complete light, although nothing of uglier falsity is in them.
Iam putaverim ad generalem aliquam formulam redegisse necessitates aestheticas, quarum aliquos speciales casus enumeravi, §§ 491–502, in collisione regularum perfectionis in cognoscendo vero, excipiendi a veritatis forma perfectiori, ob veritatem materialiter perfectiorem involvendam amabiliori formae verisimilitudinis, § 483. / Now I would think that I have reduced to some general formula the aesthetic necessities, of which I enumerated some special cases, §§ 491–502, in the collision of rules of perfection in knowing the true, of making exception from the more perfect form of truth, on account of a materially more perfect truth that must be wrapped in a more lovable form of verisimilitude, § 483.
§ 566
Studium veritatis absolutum, sed aestheticum, § 565. comparate sese exseret pro triplici veritatum specie, et materialiter perfectarum gradu, in quibus versatur, potissimum. Sunt eiusdem materiae 1) generalia, 2) actualia huius mundi, 3) heterocosmica. Genus Cogitandi generalia sed eleganter exprimens est Aestheticodogmaticum, actualia huius mundi venuste pingens, ob exiguum futurorum strictissima in veritate sistendorum numerum, dicamus Aestheticohistoricum. Genus tandem eleganter heterocosmica meditandi nominemus per novam aliquam synecdochen tunc etiam, quando non exprimitur carminibus, Genus Cogitandi Poeticum.
The absolute, but aesthetic, study of truth, § 565, will show itself comparatively, chiefly according to the threefold species of truths and according to the degree of materially perfected truths in which it is engaged. Its matters are 1) general things, 2) actual things of this world, 3) heterocosmic things. The Kind of Thinking expressing general things, but elegantly, is Aestheticodogmatic, The kind that gracefully paints actual things of this world, because the number of future things to be established in the strictest truth is small, let us call Aestheticohistorical. Finally, let us name the kind of elegantly meditating heterocosmic things, by some new synecdoche even when it is not expressed in verses, the Poetic Kind of Thinking.
Studium veritatis absolutum, sed aestheticum, § 565. comparate sese exseret pro triplici veritatum specie, et materialiter perfectarum gradu, in quibus versatur, potissimum.
The absolute, but aesthetic, study of truth, § 565, will show itself comparatively, chiefly according to the threefold species of truths and according to the degree of materially perfected truths in which it is engaged.
Sunt eiusdem materiae 1) generalia, 2) actualia huius mundi, 3) heterocosmica.
Its matters are 1) general things, 2) actual things of this world, 3) heterocosmic things.
Genus Cogitandi generalia sed eleganter exprimens est Aestheticodogmaticum, actualia huius mundi venuste pingens, ob exiguum futurorum strictissima in veritate sistendorum numerum, dicamus Aestheticohistoricum.
The Kind of Thinking expressing general things, but elegantly, is Aestheticodogmatic, The kind that gracefully paints actual things of this world, because the number of future things to be established in the strictest truth is small, let us call Aestheticohistorical.
Genus tandem eleganter heterocosmica meditandi nominemus per novam aliquam synecdochen tunc etiam, quando non exprimitur carminibus, Genus Cogitandi Poeticum.
Finally, let us name the kind of elegantly meditating heterocosmic things, by some new synecdoche even when it is not expressed in verses, the Poetic Kind of Thinking.
Studium veritatis absolutum, sed aestheticum, § 565.
The absolute, but aesthetic, study of truth, § 565,
comparate sese exseret pro triplici veritatum specie,
will show itself comparatively, chiefly according to the threefold species
et materialiter perfectarum gradu,
of truths and according to the degree of materially perfected truths
in quibus versatur, potissimum.
in which it is engaged.
Sunt eiusdem materiae 1) generalia,
Its matters are 1) general things,
2) actualia huius mundi, 3) heterocosmica.
2) actual things of this world, 3) heterocosmic things.
Genus Cogitandi generalia sed eleganter
The Kind of Thinking expressing general things, but elegantly,
exprimens est Aestheticodogmaticum, actualia
is Aestheticodogmatic, The kind that gracefully paints actual
huius mundi venuste pingens,
things of this world, because the
ob exiguum futurorum strictissima in
number of future things to be established in the
veritate sistendorum numerum, dicamus Aestheticohistoricum.
strictest truth is small, let us call Aestheticohistorical.
Genus tandem eleganter heterocosmica meditandi nominemus
Finally, let us name the kind of elegantly meditating heterocosmic things,
per novam aliquam synecdochen tunc etiam,
by some new synecdoche even
quando non exprimitur carminibus, Genus Cogitandi Poeticum.
when it is not expressed in verses, the Poetic Kind of Thinking.
Studium veritatis absolutum, sed aestheticum, § 565. comparate sese exseret pro triplici veritatum specie, et materialiter perfectarum gradu, in quibus versatur, potissimum. / The absolute, but aesthetic, study of truth, § 565, will show itself comparatively, chiefly according to the threefold species of truths and according to the degree of materially perfected truths in which it is engaged.
Sunt eiusdem materiae 1) generalia, 2) actualia huius mundi, 3) heterocosmica. / Its matters are 1) general things, 2) actual things of this world, 3) heterocosmic things.
Genus Cogitandi generalia sed eleganter exprimens est Aestheticodogmaticum, actualia huius mundi venuste pingens, ob exiguum futurorum strictissima in veritate sistendorum numerum, dicamus Aestheticohistoricum. / The Kind of Thinking expressing general things, but elegantly, is Aestheticodogmatic, The kind that gracefully paints actual things of this world, because the number of future things to be established in the strictest truth is small, let us call Aestheticohistorical.
Genus tandem eleganter heterocosmica meditandi nominemus per novam aliquam synecdochen tunc etiam, quando non exprimitur carminibus, Genus Cogitandi Poeticum. / Finally, let us name the kind of elegantly meditating heterocosmic things, by some new synecdoche even when it is not expressed in verses, the Poetic Kind of Thinking.
§ 567
Genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum quoniam 1) a materiarum per disciplinas ordinibus denominatum theologicum, philosophicum, e. c. commune nomen habet cum genere cogitandi theologico, philosophico, e. c. scientifico et acroamatico, 2) altius adscendendo saepius horizonti logico et aesthetico communia contemplatur, 3) recte primaria sua capita et meditationis momenta praecipua exhibet intellectui pulcro per distinctionem extensivam: plerumque confunditur cum genere cogitandi scientifico, et, formaliter philosophico, saepe cum eodem non inepte combinatur, semper tamen, uti vere diversum est, singularibus cum scientiarum non minus, quam elegantiarum, emolumentis ab eodem distinguitur. § 566.
Since the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking 1) when denominated from the orders of materials through disciplines as theological, philosophical, and so on, has a common name with the theological, philosophical, and so on scientific and acroamatic kind of thinking, 2) by ascending higher, it rather often contemplates things common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, 3) it rightly exhibits its primary heads and the chief moments of meditation to beautiful intellect through extensive distinction: it is for the most part confused with the scientific and, formally, philosophical kind of thinking, and is often not ineptly combined with the same, nevertheless always, as it is truly different, it is distinguished from the same by singular advantages for the sciences no less than for the elegances. § 566.
Genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum quoniam 1) a materiarum per disciplinas ordinibus denominatum theologicum, philosophicum, e. c. commune nomen habet cum genere cogitandi theologico, philosophico, e. c. scientifico et acroamatico, 2) altius adscendendo saepius horizonti logico et aesthetico communia contemplatur, 3) recte primaria sua capita et meditationis momenta praecipua exhibet intellectui pulcro per distinctionem extensivam: plerumque confunditur cum genere cogitandi scientifico, et, formaliter philosophico, saepe cum eodem non inepte combinatur, semper tamen, uti vere diversum est, singularibus cum scientiarum non minus, quam elegantiarum, emolumentis ab eodem distinguitur. § 566.
Since the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking 1) when denominated from the orders of materials through disciplines as theological, philosophical, and so on, has a common name with the theological, philosophical, and so on scientific and acroamatic kind of thinking, 2) by ascending higher, it rather often contemplates things common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, 3) it rightly exhibits its primary heads and the chief moments of meditation to beautiful intellect through extensive distinction: it is for the most part confused with the scientific and, formally, philosophical kind of thinking, and is often not ineptly combined with the same, nevertheless always, as it is truly different, it is distinguished from the same by singular advantages for the sciences no less than for the elegances. § 566.
Genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum quoniam 1)
Since the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking 1) when denominated
a materiarum per disciplinas ordinibus denominatum theologicum, philosophicum, e.
from the orders of materials through disciplines as theological, philosophical, and
c. commune nomen habet cum genere cogitandi theologico,
so on, has a common name with the theological,
philosophico, e. c. scientifico et acroamatico,
philosophical, and so on scientific and acroamatic kind of thinking,
2) altius adscendendo saepius horizonti
2) by ascending higher, it rather often contemplates things
logico et aesthetico communia contemplatur,
common to the logical and aesthetic horizon,
3) recte primaria sua capita et
3) it rightly exhibits its primary heads and
meditationis momenta praecipua exhibet intellectui pulcro per distinctionem
the chief moments of meditation to beautiful intellect through extensive distinction:
extensivam: plerumque confunditur cum genere cogitandi scientifico,
it is for the most part confused with the scientific
et, formaliter philosophico,
and, formally, philosophical kind of thinking,
saepe cum eodem non inepte combinatur, semper tamen,
and is often not ineptly combined with the same,
uti vere diversum est,
nevertheless always, as it is truly different, it is
singularibus cum scientiarum non minus,
distinguished from the same by singular advantages for the sciences no less
quam elegantiarum, emolumentis ab eodem distinguitur. § 566.
than for the elegances. § 566.
Genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum quoniam 1) a materiarum per disciplinas ordinibus denominatum theologicum, philosophicum, e. c. commune nomen habet cum genere cogitandi theologico, philosophico, e. c. scientifico et acroamatico, 2) altius adscendendo saepius horizonti logico et aesthetico communia contemplatur, 3) recte primaria sua capita et meditationis momenta praecipua exhibet intellectui pulcro per distinctionem extensivam: plerumque confunditur cum genere cogitandi scientifico, et, formaliter philosophico, saepe cum eodem non inepte combinatur, semper tamen, uti vere diversum est, singularibus cum scientiarum non minus, quam elegantiarum, emolumentis ab eodem distinguitur. § 566. / Since the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking 1) when denominated from the orders of materials through disciplines as theological, philosophical, and so on, has a common name with the theological, philosophical, and so on scientific and acroamatic kind of thinking, 2) by ascending higher, it rather often contemplates things common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, 3) it rightly exhibits its primary heads and the chief moments of meditation to beautiful intellect through extensive distinction: it is for the most part confused with the scientific and, formally, philosophical kind of thinking, and is often not ineptly combined with the same, nevertheless always, as it is truly different, it is distinguished from the same by singular advantages for the sciences no less than for the elegances. § 566.
§ 568
Ex confusione duplicium dogmatica cogitandi generum, logici et aesthetici, duplex dominatur praeiudicata opinio 1) eorum, qui tunc etiam, quando de rigidiori primorum cognitionis alicuius universalis principiorum intellectuali ac rationali theoria agitur, quam fieri potest exactissime, distinctissime, solidissimeque pertractanda, subsistunt in diluta, nec omnino levi, verisimili, satis perspicua, quantulumcunque certa, veritatis expositione, modo placeat illa satis auribus, oculisve, rationisque videatur ferre, vere ferat analogi potius rationis calculum. 2) Eorum, qui dogma quoddam ad captum minus exercitatorum in scientiis, vel omnino popularem intelligentiam, et viva quidem voce, proponendum cogitant, idque tamen brevissimis definitionibus, exactissimis axiomatibus, distinctissimis notionum resolutionibus, demonstrationibusque complete certis exornare nequicquam laborant. § 567.
From the confusion of the two dogmatic kinds of thinking, the logical and the aesthetic, a twofold prejudiced opinion prevails: 1) of those who, even when the question concerns a stricter intellectual and rational theory of the first principles of some universal cognition, which must be treated as exactly, distinctly, and solidly as can be done, stop in a diluted, and not wholly light, verisimilar, sufficiently perspicuous, somewhat certain exposition of truth, provided that it pleases the ears or eyes enough, and seems to bear, and truly bears, the calculation of the analog of reason rather than of reason itself. 2) Of those who think that some doctrine must be proposed to the grasp of those less exercised in the sciences, or to an altogether popular understanding, and indeed by the living voice, and yet they labor in vain to adorn it with the briefest definitions, the most exact axioms, the most distinct resolutions of notions, and completely certain demonstrations. § 567.
Ex confusione duplicium dogmatica cogitandi generum, logici et aesthetici, duplex dominatur praeiudicata opinio 1) eorum, qui tunc etiam, quando de rigidiori primorum cognitionis alicuius universalis principiorum intellectuali ac rationali theoria agitur, quam fieri potest exactissime, distinctissime, solidissimeque pertractanda, subsistunt in diluta, nec omnino levi, verisimili, satis perspicua, quantulumcunque certa, veritatis expositione, modo placeat illa satis auribus, oculisve, rationisque videatur ferre, vere ferat analogi potius rationis calculum. 2) Eorum, qui dogma quoddam ad captum minus exercitatorum in scientiis, vel omnino popularem intelligentiam, et viva quidem voce, proponendum cogitant, idque tamen brevissimis definitionibus, exactissimis axiomatibus, distinctissimis notionum resolutionibus, demonstrationibusque complete certis exornare nequicquam laborant. § 567.
From the confusion of the two dogmatic kinds of thinking, the logical and the aesthetic, a twofold prejudiced opinion prevails: 1) of those who, even when the question concerns a stricter intellectual and rational theory of the first principles of some universal cognition, which must be treated as exactly, distinctly, and solidly as can be done, stop in a diluted, and not wholly light, verisimilar, sufficiently perspicuous, somewhat certain exposition of truth, provided that it pleases the ears or eyes enough, and seems to bear, and truly bears, the calculation of the analog of reason rather than of reason itself. 2) Of those who think that some doctrine must be proposed to the grasp of those less exercised in the sciences, or to an altogether popular understanding, and indeed by the living voice, and yet they labor in vain to adorn it with the briefest definitions, the most exact axioms, the most distinct resolutions of notions, and completely certain demonstrations. § 567.
Ex confusione duplicium dogmatica cogitandi
From the confusion of the two dogmatic kinds of thinking,
generum, logici et aesthetici, duplex dominatur praeiudicata opinio
the logical and the aesthetic, a twofold prejudiced opinion prevails:
1) eorum, qui tunc etiam, quando de rigidiori primorum
1) of those who, even when the question concerns
cognitionis alicuius universalis principiorum intellectuali ac rationali theoria
a stricter intellectual and rational theory of
agitur, quam
the first principles of some universal cognition, which must be treated as exactly, distinctly,
fieri potest exactissime, distinctissime, solidissimeque pertractanda,
and solidly as can be done, stop
subsistunt in diluta, nec omnino levi, verisimili,
in a diluted, and not wholly light, verisimilar,
satis perspicua, quantulumcunque certa, veritatis
sufficiently perspicuous, somewhat certain exposition of truth,
expositione, modo
provided that it pleases the ears or eyes enough,
placeat illa satis auribus, oculisve, rationisque videatur ferre,
and seems to bear, and truly bears, the calculation
vere ferat analogi potius rationis calculum.
of the analog of reason rather than of reason itself.
2) Eorum,
2) Of those who think that
qui dogma quoddam ad captum
some doctrine must be proposed to the grasp of
minus exercitatorum in scientiis,
those less exercised in the sciences,
vel omnino popularem intelligentiam,
or to an altogether popular understanding,
et viva quidem voce, proponendum cogitant,
and indeed by the living voice, and yet they
idque tamen brevissimis definitionibus,
labor in vain to adorn it with the briefest definitions,
exactissimis axiomatibus, distinctissimis notionum resolutionibus,
the most exact axioms, the most distinct resolutions
demonstrationibusque complete certis exornare nequicquam laborant. § 567.
of notions, and completely certain demonstrations. § 567.
Ex confusione duplicium dogmatica cogitandi generum, logici et aesthetici, duplex dominatur praeiudicata opinio 1) eorum, qui tunc etiam, quando de rigidiori primorum cognitionis alicuius universalis principiorum intellectuali ac rationali theoria agitur, quam fieri potest exactissime, distinctissime, solidissimeque pertractanda, subsistunt in diluta, nec omnino levi, verisimili, satis perspicua, quantulumcunque certa, veritatis expositione, modo placeat illa satis auribus, oculisve, rationisque videatur ferre, vere ferat analogi potius rationis calculum. 2) Eorum, qui dogma quoddam ad captum minus exercitatorum in scientiis, vel omnino popularem intelligentiam, et viva quidem voce, proponendum cogitant, idque tamen brevissimis definitionibus, exactissimis axiomatibus, distinctissimis notionum resolutionibus, demonstrationibusque complete certis exornare nequicquam laborant. § 567. / From the confusion of the two dogmatic kinds of thinking, the logical and the aesthetic, a twofold prejudiced opinion prevails: 1) of those who, even when the question concerns a stricter intellectual and rational theory of the first principles of some universal cognition, which must be treated as exactly, distinctly, and solidly as can be done, stop in a diluted, and not wholly light, verisimilar, sufficiently perspicuous, somewhat certain exposition of truth, provided that it pleases the ears or eyes enough, and seems to bear, and truly bears, the calculation of the analog of reason rather than of reason itself. 2) Of those who think that some doctrine must be proposed to the grasp of those less exercised in the sciences, or to an altogether popular understanding, and indeed by the living voice, and yet they labor in vain to adorn it with the briefest definitions, the most exact axioms, the most distinct resolutions of notions, and completely certain demonstrations. § 567.
§ 569
Genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum et aestheticodogmaticum, a potiori desumtis denominationibus, non forma solum inter se differunt, sed etiam materiis, quibus convenire vel maxime prima fronte videbantur. Prius uti thematis sui principia potissimum sequitur, ita posterius principiata et consectaria. Prius uti potissimum eruit universalia, sub quibus thema suum continetur, ita posterius eiusdem thematis inferiores conceptus attendit potissimum, quos sub se continet. Etiamsi materiae a tota disciplina nomen acceperint, sunt tamen in quavis disciplina prima quaedam ordine, quaedam in methodo synthetica velut ultima. Illa potissimum logicum, haec aestheticum ita sectatur per disciplinas cogitandi genus, ut dici circiter in qualibet possit, ubi desinit logicum, aestheticum cogitandi genus incipere. § 566.
The logical-dogmatic and aesthetic-dogmatic kind of thinking, their denominations having been taken from what is stronger in each, differ between themselves not only in form, but also in the matters in which at first sight they seemed most of all to agree. As the former chiefly follows the principles of its theme, so the latter follows the things principled and the consequences. As the former chiefly digs out universals under which its theme is contained, so the latter chiefly attends to the lower concepts of the same theme, which it contains under itself. Even if the matters have received their name from the whole discipline, there are nevertheless in any discipline certain things first in order, and certain things as if last in synthetic method. The former things the logical kind of thinking especially follows through the disciplines; the latter things the aesthetic kind follows, so that it can be said approximately in any discipline: where the logical kind of thinking ends, the aesthetic begins. § 566.
Genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum et aestheticodogmaticum, a potiori desumtis denominationibus, non forma solum inter se differunt, sed etiam materiis, quibus convenire vel maxime prima fronte videbantur.
The logical-dogmatic and aesthetic-dogmatic kind of thinking, their denominations having been taken from what is stronger in each, differ between themselves not only in form, but also in the matters in which at first sight they seemed most of all to agree.
Prius uti thematis sui principia potissimum sequitur, ita posterius principiata et consectaria.
As the former chiefly follows the principles of its theme, so the latter follows the things principled and the consequences.
Prius uti potissimum eruit universalia, sub quibus thema suum continetur, ita posterius eiusdem thematis inferiores conceptus attendit potissimum, quos sub se continet.
As the former chiefly digs out universals under which its theme is contained, so the latter chiefly attends to the lower concepts of the same theme, which it contains under itself.
Etiamsi materiae a tota disciplina nomen acceperint, sunt tamen in quavis disciplina prima quaedam ordine, quaedam in methodo synthetica velut ultima.
Even if the matters have received their name from the whole discipline, there are nevertheless in any discipline certain things first in order, and certain things as if last in synthetic method.
Illa potissimum logicum, haec aestheticum ita sectatur per disciplinas cogitandi genus, ut dici circiter in qualibet possit, ubi desinit logicum, aestheticum cogitandi genus incipere. § 566.
The former things the logical kind of thinking especially follows through the disciplines; the latter things the aesthetic kind follows, so that it can be said approximately in any discipline: where the logical kind of thinking ends, the aesthetic begins. § 566.
Genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum et aestheticodogmaticum,
The logical-dogmatic and aesthetic-dogmatic kind of thinking,
a potiori desumtis denominationibus,
their denominations having been taken from what is stronger
non forma solum inter se differunt,
in each, differ between themselves not only in form,
sed etiam materiis, quibus convenire
but also in the matters in which at first
vel maxime prima fronte videbantur.
sight they seemed most of all to agree.
Prius uti thematis sui principia potissimum
As the former chiefly follows the principles of its theme,
sequitur, ita posterius principiata et consectaria.
so the latter follows the things principled and the consequences.
Prius uti potissimum eruit universalia,
As the former chiefly digs out universals
sub quibus thema suum continetur,
under which its theme is contained,
ita posterius eiusdem thematis inferiores conceptus attendit potissimum,
so the latter chiefly attends to the lower concepts of the same
quos sub se continet.
theme, which it contains under itself.
Etiamsi materiae a tota disciplina
Even if the matters have received their name from the whole discipline,
nomen acceperint, sunt tamen in quavis disciplina prima quaedam
there are nevertheless in any discipline certain
ordine, quaedam
things first in order, and certain things as if
in methodo synthetica velut ultima.
last in synthetic method.
Illa potissimum logicum, haec aestheticum ita
The former things the logical kind of thinking especially
sectatur per disciplinas cogitandi genus,
follows through the disciplines; the latter things the aesthetic
ut dici circiter in qualibet possit,
kind follows, so that it can be said approximately in any discipline:
ubi desinit logicum, aestheticum cogitandi genus incipere. § 566.
where the logical kind of thinking ends, the aesthetic begins. § 566.
Genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum et aestheticodogmaticum, a potiori desumtis denominationibus, non forma solum inter se differunt, sed etiam materiis, quibus convenire vel maxime prima fronte videbantur. / The logical-dogmatic and aesthetic-dogmatic kind of thinking, their denominations having been taken from what is stronger in each, differ between themselves not only in form, but also in the matters in which at first sight they seemed most of all to agree.
Prius uti thematis sui principia potissimum sequitur, ita posterius principiata et consectaria. / As the former chiefly follows the principles of its theme, so the latter follows the things principled and the consequences.
Prius uti potissimum eruit universalia, sub quibus thema suum continetur, ita posterius eiusdem thematis inferiores conceptus attendit potissimum, quos sub se continet. / As the former chiefly digs out universals under which its theme is contained, so the latter chiefly attends to the lower concepts of the same theme, which it contains under itself.
Etiamsi materiae a tota disciplina nomen acceperint, sunt tamen in quavis disciplina prima quaedam ordine, quaedam in methodo synthetica velut ultima. / Even if the matters have received their name from the whole discipline, there are nevertheless in any discipline certain things first in order, and certain things as if last in synthetic method.
Illa potissimum logicum, haec aestheticum ita sectatur per disciplinas cogitandi genus, ut dici circiter in qualibet possit, ubi desinit logicum, aestheticum cogitandi genus incipere. § 566. / The former things the logical kind of thinking especially follows through the disciplines; the latter things the aesthetic kind follows, so that it can be said approximately in any discipline: where the logical kind of thinking ends, the aesthetic begins. § 566.
§ 570
Qui res interius perspexerunt, probe vident inter ea rerum genera, de quibus scientiae huc usque stricte dictae cultae sunt, et individua, interiacere adhuc magnam inferiorum generum, et specierum intercapedinem, in cuius raro territorium demonstratores descendant, in quod experimentatores et observatores accurati raro feliciter adscendant. Hoc est illud maxime stadium in quo cogitandi genus aestheticodogmaticum decurrat. Hinc vel ipsum sibi thema legit optime, vel thema etiam altius petitum eo tamen usque detrahit, ad maiorem veritatem materialem, § 440. etiamsi fiat eo ipso formaliter paullo minus exacta, secundum logicorum trutinam scientificam, i. e. elegantem ad verisimilitudinem. § 567.
Those who have looked more inwardly into things see well that between those genera of things about which sciences, strictly so called, have been cultivated up to now, and individuals, there still lies between them a great interval of lower genera and species, into whose territory demonstrators rarely descend, and into which experimenters and accurate observers rarely ascend successfully. This is especially that course in which the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking runs. Hence it either chooses the theme itself for itself very well, or even draws down a theme sought from higher up, nevertheless to this point: toward greater material truth, § 440. even if by that very fact it becomes formally a little less exact according to the scientific balance of the logicians, that is, elegant toward verisimilitude. § 567.
Qui res interius perspexerunt, probe vident inter ea rerum genera, de quibus scientiae huc usque stricte dictae cultae sunt, et individua, interiacere adhuc magnam inferiorum generum, et specierum intercapedinem, in cuius raro territorium demonstratores descendant, in quod experimentatores et observatores accurati raro feliciter adscendant.
Those who have looked more inwardly into things see well that between those genera of things about which sciences, strictly so called, have been cultivated up to now, and individuals, there still lies between them a great interval of lower genera and species, into whose territory demonstrators rarely descend, and into which experimenters and accurate observers rarely ascend successfully.
Hoc est illud maxime stadium in quo cogitandi genus aestheticodogmaticum decurrat.
This is especially that course in which the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking runs.
Hinc vel ipsum sibi thema legit optime, vel thema etiam altius petitum eo tamen usque detrahit, ad maiorem veritatem materialem, § 440. etiamsi fiat eo ipso formaliter paullo minus exacta, secundum logicorum trutinam scientificam, i. e. elegantem ad verisimilitudinem. § 567.
Hence it either chooses the theme itself for itself very well, or even draws down a theme sought from higher up, nevertheless to this point: toward greater material truth, § 440. even if by that very fact it becomes formally a little less exact according to the scientific balance of the logicians, that is, elegant toward verisimilitude. § 567.
Qui res interius perspexerunt, probe vident inter
Those who have looked more inwardly into things see
ea rerum genera, de quibus scientiae
well that between those genera of things about which sciences,
huc usque stricte dictae cultae sunt,
strictly so called, have been cultivated up
et individua, interiacere adhuc magnam
to now, and individuals, there still lies between them
inferiorum generum, et specierum intercapedinem,
a great interval of lower genera and species,
in cuius raro territorium demonstratores descendant,
into whose territory demonstrators rarely descend,
in quod experimentatores et observatores accurati raro feliciter adscendant.
and into which experimenters and accurate observers rarely ascend successfully.
Hoc est illud maxime stadium in quo
This is especially that course in which the aestheticodogmatic
cogitandi genus aestheticodogmaticum decurrat.
kind of thinking runs.
Hinc vel ipsum sibi thema legit optime,
Hence it either chooses the theme itself for itself very
vel thema etiam altius petitum eo tamen usque
well, or even draws down a theme sought from higher up,
detrahit, ad maiorem veritatem materialem, § 440.
nevertheless to this point: toward greater material truth, § 440.
etiamsi fiat eo ipso formaliter
even if by that very fact it becomes formally
paullo minus exacta, secundum logicorum trutinam scientificam, i.
a little less exact according to the scientific balance of
e. elegantem ad verisimilitudinem. § 567.
the logicians, that is, elegant toward verisimilitude. § 567.
Qui res interius perspexerunt, probe vident inter ea rerum genera, de quibus scientiae huc usque stricte dictae cultae sunt, et individua, interiacere adhuc magnam inferiorum generum, et specierum intercapedinem, in cuius raro territorium demonstratores descendant, in quod experimentatores et observatores accurati raro feliciter adscendant. / Those who have looked more inwardly into things see well that between those genera of things about which sciences, strictly so called, have been cultivated up to now, and individuals, there still lies between them a great interval of lower genera and species, into whose territory demonstrators rarely descend, and into which experimenters and accurate observers rarely ascend successfully.
Hoc est illud maxime stadium in quo cogitandi genus aestheticodogmaticum decurrat. / This is especially that course in which the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking runs.
Hinc vel ipsum sibi thema legit optime, vel thema etiam altius petitum eo tamen usque detrahit, ad maiorem veritatem materialem, § 440. etiamsi fiat eo ipso formaliter paullo minus exacta, secundum logicorum trutinam scientificam, i. e. elegantem ad verisimilitudinem. § 567. / Hence it either chooses the theme itself for itself very well, or even draws down a theme sought from higher up, nevertheless to this point: toward greater material truth, § 440. even if by that very fact it becomes formally a little less exact according to the scientific balance of the logicians, that is, elegant toward verisimilitude. § 567.
§ 571
Studium veritatis in genere cogitandi aestheticodogmatico comparativum, § 566. 1) veritatem etiam strictius logicam de ipsa materia, si fuerit horizontis aesthetico-logici, vel de eius generibus notionibusque superioribus sollicite quaeret, etiamsi non exprimendam acroamatice, tamen ut directricem explicite cogitandae verisimilitudinis in generalibus et adoptandis notionibus. §§ 429, 424. 2) Notiones, in quibus aliquid contradictionis ad absurditatem usque, vel paene eo usque, iam detexit intellectus et ratio, cavebit hoc curatius, quo probabilius est, tales etiam spectatores e. c. fore meditationi eiusmodi aestheticodogmaticae, qui latentem inconvenientiam et ipsi ratione certissime perspicere possint, et aliis in spectando, legendo e. c. sociis aesthetice satis ostendere, §§ 431–435.
The comparative study of truth in the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking, § 566, 1) will carefully seek even more strictly logical truth about the matter itself, if it belongs to the aesthetic-logical horizon, or about its genera and higher notions, even if it is not to be expressed acroamatically, nevertheless as the guide of verisimilitude to be explicitly thought in general things and in notions to be adopted. §§ 429, 424. 2) Notions in which understanding and reason have already detected something of contradiction up to absurdity, or almost up to that point, he will avoid all the more carefully, the more probable it is that such spectators, and so on, will also be present for an aestheticodogmatic meditation of this kind, who can both see the latent incongruity themselves most certainly by reason, and show it aesthetically enough to others, companions in viewing, reading, and so on, §§ 431–435.
Studium veritatis in genere cogitandi aestheticodogmatico comparativum, § 566. 1) veritatem etiam strictius logicam de ipsa materia, si fuerit horizontis aesthetico-logici, vel de eius generibus notionibusque superioribus sollicite quaeret, etiamsi non exprimendam acroamatice, tamen ut directricem explicite cogitandae verisimilitudinis in generalibus et adoptandis notionibus. §§ 429, 424. 2) Notiones, in quibus aliquid contradictionis ad absurditatem usque, vel paene eo usque, iam detexit intellectus et ratio, cavebit hoc curatius, quo probabilius est, tales etiam spectatores e. c. fore meditationi eiusmodi aestheticodogmaticae, qui latentem inconvenientiam et ipsi ratione certissime perspicere possint, et aliis in spectando, legendo e. c. sociis aesthetice satis ostendere, §§ 431–435.
The comparative study of truth in the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking, § 566, 1) will carefully seek even more strictly logical truth about the matter itself, if it belongs to the aesthetic-logical horizon, or about its genera and higher notions, even if it is not to be expressed acroamatically, nevertheless as the guide of verisimilitude to be explicitly thought in general things and in notions to be adopted. §§ 429, 424. 2) Notions in which understanding and reason have already detected something of contradiction up to absurdity, or almost up to that point, he will avoid all the more carefully, the more probable it is that such spectators, and so on, will also be present for an aestheticodogmatic meditation of this kind, who can both see the latent incongruity themselves most certainly by reason, and show it aesthetically enough to others, companions in viewing, reading, and so on, §§ 431–435.
Studium veritatis in genere cogitandi
The comparative study of truth in the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking,
aestheticodogmatico comparativum, § 566. 1) veritatem etiam
§ 566, 1) will carefully seek even more
strictius logicam de ipsa materia,
strictly logical truth about the matter itself,
si fuerit horizontis aesthetico-logici, vel
if it belongs to the aesthetic-logical horizon,
de eius generibus notionibusque superioribus sollicite quaeret,
or about its genera and higher notions, even if it
etiamsi non exprimendam acroamatice,
is not to be expressed acroamatically,
tamen ut directricem explicite
nevertheless as the guide of verisimilitude to be explicitly
cogitandae verisimilitudinis in generalibus et adoptandis notionibus.
thought in general things and in notions
§§ 429, 424. 2) Notiones,
to be adopted. §§ 429, 424. 2) Notions
in quibus aliquid
in which understanding and reason have already detected something
contradictionis ad absurditatem usque, vel paene eo usque,
of contradiction up to absurdity, or almost up to
iam detexit intellectus et ratio, cavebit hoc curatius,
that point, he will avoid all the more carefully,
quo probabilius est, tales
the more probable it is that such spectators,
etiam spectatores e. c.
and so on, will also be present for
fore meditationi eiusmodi aestheticodogmaticae, qui
an aestheticodogmatic meditation of this kind,
latentem inconvenientiam et ipsi
who can both see the latent incongruity themselves
ratione certissime perspicere possint, et aliis
most certainly by reason, and show it aesthetically enough to others,
in spectando, legendo e. c. sociis aesthetice satis ostendere, §§ 431–435.
companions in viewing, reading, and so on, §§ 431–435.
Studium veritatis in genere cogitandi aestheticodogmatico comparativum, § 566. 1) veritatem etiam strictius logicam de ipsa materia, si fuerit horizontis aesthetico-logici, vel de eius generibus notionibusque superioribus sollicite quaeret, etiamsi non exprimendam acroamatice, tamen ut directricem explicite cogitandae verisimilitudinis in generalibus et adoptandis notionibus. §§ 429, 424. 2) Notiones, in quibus aliquid contradictionis ad absurditatem usque, vel paene eo usque, iam detexit intellectus et ratio, cavebit hoc curatius, quo probabilius est, tales etiam spectatores e. c. fore meditationi eiusmodi aestheticodogmaticae, qui latentem inconvenientiam et ipsi ratione certissime perspicere possint, et aliis in spectando, legendo e. c. sociis aesthetice satis ostendere, §§ 431–435. / The comparative study of truth in the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking, § 566, 1) will carefully seek even more strictly logical truth about the matter itself, if it belongs to the aesthetic-logical horizon, or about its genera and higher notions, even if it is not to be expressed acroamatically, nevertheless as the guide of verisimilitude to be explicitly thought in general things and in notions to be adopted. §§ 429, 424. 2) Notions in which understanding and reason have already detected something of contradiction up to absurdity, or almost up to that point, he will avoid all the more carefully, the more probable it is that such spectators, and so on, will also be present for an aestheticodogmatic meditation of this kind, who can both see the latent incongruity themselves most certainly by reason, and show it aesthetically enough to others, companions in viewing, reading, and so on, §§ 431–435.
§ 572
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 3) in id praesertim incumbet, ut nexum materiae suae, brevius cum principiis, uberius cum gravissimis consectariis, verosimillimum vividissime pingat, non sine desiderabili, vel taediorum ex aversando hauriendorum feraci persuasione, § 437. 4) Si quid etiam progredi tentet in inferiora, ac ratio immediate praeluceat, supplementa tamen sua ad certitudine completa cognoscendum cum hoc inseparabiliter coniuncta sistere movebit omnem lapidem, § 439.
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 3) will especially lean toward this, that the connection of its matter, more briefly with the principles, more abundantly with the weightiest consequences, it may most vividly paint as most verisimilar, not without desirable persuasion, or persuasion fertile in the wearinesses to be drawn from aversion, § 437. 4) If it also attempts to advance into lower things, and reason immediately shines before it, nevertheless it will move every stone to present its supplements, inseparably joined with this, for being known with complete certainty, § 439.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 3) in id praesertim incumbet, ut nexum materiae suae, brevius cum principiis, uberius cum gravissimis consectariis, verosimillimum vividissime pingat, non sine desiderabili, vel taediorum ex aversando hauriendorum feraci persuasione, § 437. 4) Si quid etiam progredi tentet in inferiora, ac ratio immediate praeluceat, supplementa tamen sua ad certitudine completa cognoscendum cum hoc inseparabiliter coniuncta sistere movebit omnem lapidem, § 439.
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 3) will especially lean toward this, that the connection of its matter, more briefly with the principles, more abundantly with the weightiest consequences, it may most vividly paint as most verisimilar, not without desirable persuasion, or persuasion fertile in the wearinesses to be drawn from aversion, § 437. 4) If it also attempts to advance into lower things, and reason immediately shines before it, nevertheless it will move every stone to present its supplements, inseparably joined with this, for being known with complete certainty, § 439.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 3) in
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 3) will
id praesertim incumbet, ut nexum materiae
especially lean toward this, that the connection of its matter,
suae, brevius cum principiis, uberius cum gravissimis consectariis,
more briefly with the principles, more abundantly with the weightiest
verosimillimum vividissime pingat,
consequences, it may most vividly paint as most verisimilar,
non sine desiderabili, vel taediorum
not without desirable persuasion, or persuasion fertile in the
ex aversando hauriendorum feraci persuasione, § 437.
wearinesses to be drawn from aversion, § 437.
4) Si quid etiam progredi tentet in inferiora,
4) If it also attempts to advance into lower
ac ratio immediate praeluceat, supplementa tamen
things, and reason immediately shines before it,
sua ad certitudine completa cognoscendum
nevertheless it will move every stone to present its supplements,
cum hoc inseparabiliter coniuncta sistere movebit omnem lapidem, § 439.
inseparably joined with this, for being known with complete certainty, § 439.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 3) in id praesertim incumbet, ut nexum materiae suae, brevius cum principiis, uberius cum gravissimis consectariis, verosimillimum vividissime pingat, non sine desiderabili, vel taediorum ex aversando hauriendorum feraci persuasione, § 437. 4) Si quid etiam progredi tentet in inferiora, ac ratio immediate praeluceat, supplementa tamen sua ad certitudine completa cognoscendum cum hoc inseparabiliter coniuncta sistere movebit omnem lapidem, § 439. / The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 3) will especially lean toward this, that the connection of its matter, more briefly with the principles, more abundantly with the weightiest consequences, it may most vividly paint as most verisimilar, not without desirable persuasion, or persuasion fertile in the wearinesses to be drawn from aversion, § 437. 4) If it also attempts to advance into lower things, and reason immediately shines before it, nevertheless it will move every stone to present its supplements, inseparably joined with this, for being known with complete certainty, § 439.
§ 573
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis, 5) ea lubentissime suis exponet, quae cogitaturus etiam certo novit logice vera, § 571. per harmoniam facultatum cognoscitivarum inferiorum et superiorum, nunc exhibenda aesthetice vera; si hoc non conceditur praeferet logice sibi probabilia, sibi logice improbabilibus, § 485. ob eandem harmoniam. Haec aut iudicabit suis praecipuis spectatoribus iam etiam fore verisimilia, et in iisdem securus acquiescit; aut suspicabitur, ea parum habitura apud hos verisimilitudinis. In ultimo casu aut habet occasionem ad dandam suis verisimilitudinem argumentis venuste probantibus, nec tunc latum unguem avellitur a vero, quod ipsi videtur, et suos potius ad suam sententiam attrahere laborat, quam ut cum iis contraria sentiat, aut conciliare sibi probabilibus, suis quae sint sine dubio satis improbabilia, verisimilitudinem locus et tempus non permittunt.
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters, 5) will most gladly set forth to its own those things which the one about to think also certainly knows to be logically true, § 571. through the harmony of the lower and higher cognitive faculties, now to be exhibited as aesthetically true; if this is not granted, he will prefer things logically probable to himself over things logically improbable to himself, § 485, on account of the same harmony. These things he will either judge will now also be verisimilar for his chief spectators, and he securely rests in them; or he will suspect that they will have little verisimilitude among them. In the last case he either has occasion for giving verisimilitude to his own people by arguments proving gracefully, and then he is not torn by a nail's breadth from the true which seems so to him, and labors rather to draw his own people to his opinion than to think contrary things with them, or place and time do not permit him to reconcile verisimilitude to things probable to himself which are without doubt quite improbable to his own people.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis, 5) ea lubentissime suis exponet, quae cogitaturus etiam certo novit logice vera, § 571. per harmoniam facultatum cognoscitivarum inferiorum et superiorum, nunc exhibenda aesthetice vera; si hoc non conceditur praeferet logice sibi probabilia, sibi logice improbabilibus, § 485. ob eandem harmoniam.
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters, 5) will most gladly set forth to its own those things which the one about to think also certainly knows to be logically true, § 571. through the harmony of the lower and higher cognitive faculties, now to be exhibited as aesthetically true; if this is not granted, he will prefer things logically probable to himself over things logically improbable to himself, § 485, on account of the same harmony.
Haec aut iudicabit suis praecipuis spectatoribus iam etiam fore verisimilia, et in iisdem securus acquiescit; aut suspicabitur, ea parum habitura apud hos verisimilitudinis.
These things he will either judge will now also be verisimilar for his chief spectators, and he securely rests in them; or he will suspect that they will have little verisimilitude among them.
In ultimo casu aut habet occasionem ad dandam suis verisimilitudinem argumentis venuste probantibus, nec tunc latum unguem avellitur a vero, quod ipsi videtur, et suos potius ad suam sententiam attrahere laborat, quam ut cum iis contraria sentiat, aut conciliare sibi probabilibus, suis quae sint sine dubio satis improbabilia, verisimilitudinem locus et tempus non permittunt.
In the last case he either has occasion for giving verisimilitude to his own people by arguments proving gracefully, and then he is not torn by a nail's breadth from the true which seems so to him, and labors rather to draw his own people to his opinion than to think contrary things with them, or place and time do not permit him to reconcile verisimilitude to things probable to himself which are without doubt quite improbable to his own people.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis,
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters,
5) ea lubentissime suis exponet,
5) will most gladly set forth to its
quae cogitaturus
own those things which the one about to think
etiam certo novit logice vera, § 571.
also certainly knows to be logically true, § 571.
per harmoniam facultatum cognoscitivarum inferiorum et superiorum,
through the harmony of the lower and higher cognitive
nunc exhibenda aesthetice vera;
faculties, now to be exhibited as aesthetically true;
si hoc non conceditur praeferet logice sibi probabilia,
if this is not granted, he will prefer things logically probable
sibi logice improbabilibus, § 485.
to himself over things logically improbable to himself, § 485,
ob eandem harmoniam.
on account of the same harmony.
Haec aut iudicabit suis praecipuis spectatoribus iam etiam fore verisimilia,
These things he will either judge will now also be verisimilar
et in iisdem
for his chief spectators, and he securely rests in them;
securus acquiescit; aut suspicabitur, ea parum habitura apud hos verisimilitudinis.
or he will suspect that they will have little verisimilitude among them.
In ultimo casu aut habet occasionem ad
In the last case he either has occasion for
dandam suis verisimilitudinem argumentis venuste probantibus,
giving verisimilitude to his own people by arguments proving
nec tunc latum unguem avellitur a vero,
gracefully, and then he is not torn by a nail's breadth from
quod ipsi videtur,
the true which seems so to him,
et suos potius ad suam sententiam attrahere laborat,
and labors rather to draw his own people to
quam ut cum iis
his opinion than to think contrary things with them,
contraria sentiat, aut
or place and time do not permit him to
conciliare sibi probabilibus, suis quae sint
reconcile verisimilitude to things probable to himself which are
sine dubio satis improbabilia, verisimilitudinem locus et tempus non permittunt.
without doubt quite improbable to his own people.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis, 5) ea lubentissime suis exponet, quae cogitaturus etiam certo novit logice vera, § 571. per harmoniam facultatum cognoscitivarum inferiorum et superiorum, nunc exhibenda aesthetice vera; si hoc non conceditur praeferet logice sibi probabilia, sibi logice improbabilibus, § 485. ob eandem harmoniam. / The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters, 5) will most gladly set forth to its own those things which the one about to think also certainly knows to be logically true, § 571. through the harmony of the lower and higher cognitive faculties, now to be exhibited as aesthetically true; if this is not granted, he will prefer things logically probable to himself over things logically improbable to himself, § 485, on account of the same harmony.
Haec aut iudicabit suis praecipuis spectatoribus iam etiam fore verisimilia, et in iisdem securus acquiescit; aut suspicabitur, ea parum habitura apud hos verisimilitudinis. / These things he will either judge will now also be verisimilar for his chief spectators, and he securely rests in them; or he will suspect that they will have little verisimilitude among them.
In ultimo casu aut habet occasionem ad dandam suis verisimilitudinem argumentis venuste probantibus, nec tunc latum unguem avellitur a vero, quod ipsi videtur, et suos potius ad suam sententiam attrahere laborat, quam ut cum iis contraria sentiat, aut conciliare sibi probabilibus, suis quae sint sine dubio satis improbabilia, verisimilitudinem locus et tempus non permittunt. / In the last case he either has occasion for giving verisimilitude to his own people by arguments proving gracefully, and then he is not torn by a nail's breadth from the true which seems so to him, and labors rather to draw his own people to his opinion than to think contrary things with them, or place and time do not permit him to reconcile verisimilitude to things probable to himself which are without doubt quite improbable to his own people.
§ 574
Si pulcre cogitaturus incidat in dogma sibi probabile, quod nec esse suis verisimile, nec a se iam tale reddi iisdem posse perspicit § 573. amicus veritatis aut nec hoc, nec oppositum, spectatoribus verisimile, ponet, si licet ab utroque abstrahere, aut, si ponendum est aesthetica necessitate alterutrum, multa cum gravitate perpendit, an spectatoribus suis praecipue attendendis verisimile, sit forsan error, communis quidem, oppido tamen innocens, an periculosior, et cuius fautores rei falsitatis moralis vel per indirectum agi possint ex merito. §§ 470, 467. In priori casu utetur opinione suorum, sicuti philosophi mathematicique fictionibus suis heuristicis, in posteriori latissime potius falsum errans cogitasse videri volet, § 471. quam ut conscientiam vel famam suam exponat futuro falsitatis moralis opprobrio, § 464.
If the one about to think beautifully falls upon a doctrine probable to himself, which he sees is neither verisimilar to his own people, nor can now be rendered such to them by himself, § 573, the friend of truth will either posit neither this nor the opposite as verisimilar to the spectators, if it is permitted to abstract from both, or, if by aesthetic necessity one or the other must be posited, he weighs with much gravity whether what is verisimilar to his spectators especially to be attended to is perhaps an error, indeed common, yet very innocent, or a more dangerous one, and one whose supporters can deservedly be treated, even indirectly, as guilty of moral falsity. §§ 470, 467. In the former case he will use the opinion of his own people, just as philosophers and mathematicians use their heuristic fictions, in the latter case he will rather wish to seem to have thought something false while erring in the broadest sense, § 471, than expose his conscience or reputation to the future reproach of moral falsity, § 464.
Si pulcre cogitaturus incidat in dogma sibi probabile, quod nec esse suis verisimile, nec a se iam tale reddi iisdem posse perspicit § 573. amicus veritatis aut nec hoc, nec oppositum, spectatoribus verisimile, ponet, si licet ab utroque abstrahere, aut, si ponendum est aesthetica necessitate alterutrum, multa cum gravitate perpendit, an spectatoribus suis praecipue attendendis verisimile, sit forsan error, communis quidem, oppido tamen innocens, an periculosior, et cuius fautores rei falsitatis moralis vel per indirectum agi possint ex merito. §§ 470, 467. In priori casu utetur opinione suorum, sicuti philosophi mathematicique fictionibus suis heuristicis, in posteriori latissime potius falsum errans cogitasse videri volet, § 471. quam ut conscientiam vel famam suam exponat futuro falsitatis moralis opprobrio, § 464.
If the one about to think beautifully falls upon a doctrine probable to himself, which he sees is neither verisimilar to his own people, nor can now be rendered such to them by himself, § 573, the friend of truth will either posit neither this nor the opposite as verisimilar to the spectators, if it is permitted to abstract from both, or, if by aesthetic necessity one or the other must be posited, he weighs with much gravity whether what is verisimilar to his spectators especially to be attended to is perhaps an error, indeed common, yet very innocent, or a more dangerous one, and one whose supporters can deservedly be treated, even indirectly, as guilty of moral falsity. §§ 470, 467. In the former case he will use the opinion of his own people, just as philosophers and mathematicians use their heuristic fictions, in the latter case he will rather wish to seem to have thought something false while erring in the broadest sense, § 471, than expose his conscience or reputation to the future reproach of moral falsity, § 464.
Si pulcre cogitaturus incidat
If the one about to think beautifully falls
in dogma sibi probabile, quod
upon a doctrine probable to himself,
nec esse suis verisimile, nec a
which he sees is neither verisimilar to his own people,
se iam tale reddi iisdem posse perspicit § 573.
nor can now be rendered such to them by himself, § 573,
amicus veritatis aut nec hoc,
the friend of truth will either posit neither this
nec oppositum, spectatoribus verisimile, ponet,
nor the opposite as verisimilar to the spectators,
si licet ab utroque abstrahere, aut,
if it is permitted to abstract from both, or,
si ponendum est aesthetica necessitate alterutrum,
if by aesthetic necessity one or the other
multa cum gravitate perpendit,
must be posited, he weighs with much gravity whether
an spectatoribus suis praecipue attendendis verisimile,
what is verisimilar to his spectators especially to be attended to
sit forsan error, communis quidem, oppido tamen innocens,
is perhaps an error, indeed common, yet very innocent,
an periculosior, et cuius fautores rei
or a more dangerous one, and one whose supporters
falsitatis moralis vel per indirectum agi possint ex merito.
can deservedly be treated, even indirectly, as guilty of moral falsity.
§§ 470, 467. In priori casu
§§ 470, 467. In the former case he will use
utetur opinione suorum,
the opinion of his own people, just
sicuti philosophi mathematicique fictionibus suis heuristicis,
as philosophers and mathematicians use their heuristic fictions,
in posteriori latissime potius
in the latter case he will rather wish to
falsum errans cogitasse videri volet,
seem to have thought something false while erring in the broadest
§ 471. quam ut conscientiam vel famam suam
sense, § 471, than expose his conscience or reputation to
exponat futuro falsitatis moralis opprobrio, § 464.
the future reproach of moral falsity, § 464.
Si pulcre cogitaturus incidat in dogma sibi probabile, quod nec esse suis verisimile, nec a se iam tale reddi iisdem posse perspicit § 573. amicus veritatis aut nec hoc, nec oppositum, spectatoribus verisimile, ponet, si licet ab utroque abstrahere, aut, si ponendum est aesthetica necessitate alterutrum, multa cum gravitate perpendit, an spectatoribus suis praecipue attendendis verisimile, sit forsan error, communis quidem, oppido tamen innocens, an periculosior, et cuius fautores rei falsitatis moralis vel per indirectum agi possint ex merito. §§ 470, 467. In priori casu utetur opinione suorum, sicuti philosophi mathematicique fictionibus suis heuristicis, in posteriori latissime potius falsum errans cogitasse videri volet, § 471. quam ut conscientiam vel famam suam exponat futuro falsitatis moralis opprobrio, § 464. / If the one about to think beautifully falls upon a doctrine probable to himself, which he sees is neither verisimilar to his own people, nor can now be rendered such to them by himself, § 573, the friend of truth will either posit neither this nor the opposite as verisimilar to the spectators, if it is permitted to abstract from both, or, if by aesthetic necessity one or the other must be posited, he weighs with much gravity whether what is verisimilar to his spectators especially to be attended to is perhaps an error, indeed common, yet very innocent, or a more dangerous one, and one whose supporters can deservedly be treated, even indirectly, as guilty of moral falsity. §§ 470, 467. In the former case he will use the opinion of his own people, just as philosophers and mathematicians use their heuristic fictions, in the latter case he will rather wish to seem to have thought something false while erring in the broadest sense, § 471, than expose his conscience or reputation to the future reproach of moral falsity, § 464.
§ 575
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 6) non solius illustrationis gratia, sed etiam ob §§ 572, 569. multum in exemplis suae materiae versabitur, § 526. in iisque singularia praeferet universalibus, ideas notionibus, strictissime vera heterocosmicis et fabulosis, § 472. aut ad haec quando venusta vocaverit necessitas, ea non dissimulabit esse fabulas, § 565. aut fictiones aesthetice heuristicas, § 574.
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 6) not for the sake of illustration alone, but also because of §§ 572, 569, will be much engaged in examples of its matter, § 526. and in them it will prefer singulars to universals, ideas to notions, things true in the strictest sense to heterocosmic and fabulous things, § 472. or, when graceful necessity has called it to these things, it will not conceal that they are fables, § 565. or aesthetically heuristic fictions, § 574.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 6) non solius illustrationis gratia, sed etiam ob §§ 572, 569. multum in exemplis suae materiae versabitur, § 526. in iisque singularia praeferet universalibus, ideas notionibus, strictissime vera heterocosmicis et fabulosis, § 472. aut ad haec quando venusta vocaverit necessitas, ea non dissimulabit esse fabulas, § 565. aut fictiones aesthetice heuristicas, § 574.
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 6) not for the sake of illustration alone, but also because of §§ 572, 569, will be much engaged in examples of its matter, § 526. and in them it will prefer singulars to universals, ideas to notions, things true in the strictest sense to heterocosmic and fabulous things, § 472. or, when graceful necessity has called it to these things, it will not conceal that they are fables, § 565. or aesthetically heuristic fictions, § 574.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 6) non
The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 6) not
solius illustrationis gratia, sed etiam ob §§ 572, 569.
for the sake of illustration alone, but also because of §§ 572, 569,
multum in exemplis suae materiae versabitur, § 526.
will be much engaged in examples of its matter, § 526.
in iisque singularia praeferet universalibus,
and in them it will prefer singulars to universals,
ideas notionibus, strictissime vera
ideas to notions, things true in the strictest sense
heterocosmicis et fabulosis, § 472.
to heterocosmic and fabulous things, § 472.
aut ad haec quando venusta vocaverit
or, when graceful necessity has called it to these things,
necessitas, ea non dissimulabit esse fabulas, § 565.
it will not conceal that they are fables, § 565.
aut fictiones aesthetice heuristicas, § 574.
or aesthetically heuristic fictions, § 574.
Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis 6) non solius illustrationis gratia, sed etiam ob §§ 572, 569. multum in exemplis suae materiae versabitur, § 526. in iisque singularia praeferet universalibus, ideas notionibus, strictissime vera heterocosmicis et fabulosis, § 472. aut ad haec quando venusta vocaverit necessitas, ea non dissimulabit esse fabulas, § 565. aut fictiones aesthetice heuristicas, § 574. / The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters 6) not for the sake of illustration alone, but also because of §§ 572, 569, will be much engaged in examples of its matter, § 526. and in them it will prefer singulars to universals, ideas to notions, things true in the strictest sense to heterocosmic and fabulous things, § 472. or, when graceful necessity has called it to these things, it will not conceal that they are fables, § 565. or aesthetically heuristic fictions, § 574.