Aesthetica

Naturalis splendoris simiam, fucum in exemplis ridet Horatius. A. P. 25.

Horace, Ars Poetica 25, laughs in examples at the ape of natural splendor, false coloring.

Habes ciconiam in maleseriatos eiusmodi pictores, qui materiam sibi legunt satis bellam et de qua speres singulariter non pulcra solum, sed etiam novitate praeclara, de qua promittat auctor ipse spe tua paene maiora, quando autem devenitur ad rem, caecum imitatorum pecus nescit aliquid novi, quod rerum natura, de quibus agitur, pronissime suppeditaret, in plena luce sistere, nescit collustrare; quae praecipuum splendorem requirerent, sed, unitate neglecta, detorquet attentionem in diversam omnino, vel minus connexum rem aliam, ideo tantum illatam in male cohaerens opus, ut ea, iam vero in nitore picta ab ingeniis vere pulcris, nunc denuo pingatur, si diis placet, nitidius, vere per obscurum et asiaticum, nescio quem, apparatum. § 325, 623.

You have a mocking sign against such badly ordered painters, who choose for themselves material sufficiently beautiful and from which you would hope for things not only beautiful in a singular way, but also distinguished by novelty, and about which the author himself promises things almost greater than your hope. But when one comes to the matter itself, the blind herd of imitators does not know how to set in full light some new thing which the nature of the matters at issue would most readily supply; it does not know how to illuminate it. The things that would require chief splendor are neglected; instead, unity having been neglected, he twists attention toward some other thing wholly different or less connected, brought into the badly cohering work only so that this thing, already painted in brightness by truly beautiful talents, may now be painted again, if it please the gods, more brightly, truly through some obscure and Asiatic apparatus, I know not what. § 325, 623.

Iuv. I. 8.

Juvenal I. 8.

Naturalis splendoris simiam, fucum in exemplis ridet Horatius. A. P. 25.

Horace, Ars Poetica 25, laughs in examples at the ape of natural splendor, false coloring.

Habes ciconiam in maleseriatos eiusmodi pictores, qui materiam sibi legunt satis bellam et de qua speres singulariter non pulcra solum, sed etiam novitate praeclara, de qua promittat auctor ipse spe tua paene maiora, quando autem devenitur ad rem, caecum imitatorum pecus nescit aliquid novi, quod rerum natura, de quibus agitur, pronissime suppeditaret, in plena luce sistere, nescit collustrare; quae praecipuum splendorem requirerent, sed, unitate neglecta, detorquet attentionem in diversam omnino, vel minus connexum rem aliam, ideo tantum illatam in male cohaerens opus, ut ea, iam vero in nitore picta ab ingeniis vere pulcris, nunc denuo pingatur, si diis placet, nitidius, vere per obscurum et asiaticum, nescio quem, apparatum. § 325, 623.

You have a mocking sign against such badly ordered painters, who choose for themselves material sufficiently beautiful and from which you would hope for things not only beautiful in a singular way, but also distinguished by novelty, and about which the author himself promises things almost greater than your hope. But when one comes to the matter itself, the blind herd of imitators does not know how to set in full light some new thing which the nature of the matters at issue would most readily supply; it does not know how to illuminate it. The things that would require chief splendor are neglected; instead, unity having been neglected, he twists attention toward some other thing wholly different or less connected, brought into the badly cohering work only so that this thing, already painted in brightness by truly beautiful talents, may now be painted again, if it please the gods, more brightly, truly through some obscure and Asiatic apparatus, I know not what. § 325, 623.

Iuv. I. 8.

Juvenal I. 8.

Alii pictores ex minimis, de quibus Iuvenalis, decipiuntur audacibus quorundam magnorum ingeniorum dictis, quale ad § 125. notavimus, quale Ciceronis est in prooemio paradoxorum; Nihil est tam horridum, § 621.

Other painters, from the lesser ones about whom Juvenal speaks, are deceived by bold sayings of certain great talents, such as the one we noted at § 125, such as Cicero's in the preface to the Paradoxes: Nothing is so rough, § 621,

Nec enim sentiunt primarios eiusmodi viros, fretos suis viribus, si penitius asserta perspiciamus,

For they do not perceive that men of this first rank, relying on their own powers, if we look more deeply into the assertions,

Hinc pulcelli, de quibus loquimur, micrologi, § 356. se plerumque putantes aliquid egregii, colligunt suum esse nunc illorum implere vaticinia et audere, nisi Minerva, Fortuna tamen iuvante, quae fieri posse Cicero quidam interdum dormitans effatus est. Quaerunt itaque materias, quas excogitare possunt natura sua minimum splendoris admissuras, easque, vel invitis diis omnibus, tot peregrinis flosculis, tot ornamentis amiciunt, ut potissimis suorum spectatorum sistant quidem thema non dissimile plumis alienis apud Aesopum superbientis corniculae, semper tamen eo melius se cogitasse gaudeant in sinu, quo minus hi ipsi spectatores ex proposita sibi tabula naturalis voluptatis, si vel artis ignari forent, haurire se potuisse fateantur. § 623; 119–121.

Hence the rather pretty little micrologists of whom we speak, § 356, usually thinking themselves something excellent, conclude that it is now theirs to fulfill those prophecies and to dare, if not with Minerva, yet with Fortune helping, the things which some Cicero, sometimes sleeping, declared could be done. And so they seek materials which they can devise as admitting by their nature the least splendor, and these, even with all the gods unwilling, they dress with so many foreign little flowers, so many ornaments, so that indeed they present to their principal spectators a theme not unlike Aesop's little crow proud in borrowed feathers; yet they always rejoice inwardly that they have thought so much better, the less these very spectators would confess that, from the picture set before them, they could have drawn natural pleasure, even if they were ignorant of art. § 623; 119–121.

Alii pictores ex minimis, de quibus Iuvenalis, decipiuntur audacibus quorundam magnorum ingeniorum dictis, quale ad § 125. notavimus, quale Ciceronis est in prooemio paradoxorum; Nihil est tam horridum, § 621.

Other painters, from the lesser ones about whom Juvenal speaks, are deceived by bold sayings of certain great talents, such as the one we noted at § 125, such as Cicero's in the preface to the Paradoxes: Nothing is so rough, § 621,

Nec enim sentiunt primarios eiusmodi viros, fretos suis viribus, si penitius asserta perspiciamus,

For they do not perceive that men of this first rank, relying on their own powers, if we look more deeply into the assertions,

Hinc pulcelli, de quibus loquimur, micrologi, § 356. se plerumque putantes aliquid egregii, colligunt suum esse nunc illorum implere vaticinia et audere, nisi Minerva, Fortuna tamen iuvante, quae fieri posse Cicero quidam interdum dormitans effatus est.

Hence the rather pretty little micrologists of whom we speak, § 356, usually thinking themselves something excellent, conclude that it is now theirs to fulfill those prophecies and to dare, if not with Minerva, yet with Fortune helping, the things which some Cicero, sometimes sleeping, declared could be done.

Quaerunt itaque materias, quas excogitare possunt natura sua minimum splendoris admissuras, easque, vel invitis diis omnibus, tot peregrinis flosculis, tot ornamentis amiciunt, ut potissimis suorum spectatorum sistant quidem thema non dissimile plumis alienis apud Aesopum superbientis corniculae, semper tamen eo melius se cogitasse gaudeant in sinu, quo minus hi ipsi spectatores ex proposita sibi tabula naturalis voluptatis, si vel artis ignari forent, haurire se potuisse fateantur. § 623; 119–121.

And so they seek materials which they can devise as admitting by their nature the least splendor, and these, even with all the gods unwilling, they dress with so many foreign little flowers, so many ornaments, so that indeed they present to their principal spectators a theme not unlike Aesop's little crow proud in borrowed feathers; yet they always rejoice inwardly that they have thought so much better, the less these very spectators would confess that, from the picture set before them, they could have drawn natural pleasure, even if they were ignorant of art. § 623; 119–121.

Neque solus Heliconis pygmaeus naturae talis adscititium belle cogitandis fucum a splendore vere naturali vix ac ne vix quidem discernet: § 359. mediocribus etiam ingeniis idem erit difficillimum, quando prava per adolescentiam contracta consuetudo naturam vere elegantem simulabit, § 622. et temporum iniuriae, locorumque, quibus vixerint, barbaries intimam pulcerrimarum rerum naturam obtegens haerere semper in cortice coget, iisdemque satis depravatum apud aequales iudicium solas fucatas veneres, ut ipsius naturae filias, venerari consueverit, § 622, 623. Interim felicius in aestheticis ingenium, S. II–VII. veluti Caesar apud Ciceronem de claris or. 261. rationem adhibens, § 58. consuetudinem vitiosam et corruptam pura et incorrupta consuetudine emendat, quum ad dilucidam ubique cogitationum elegantiam § 625. adiungit ornamenta quaedam singularia, tum videtur

Nor will only such a pygmy of Helicon scarcely, indeed hardly at all, distinguish adventitious false coloring in beautiful thinking from truly natural splendor, § 359. The same thing will be very difficult even for middling talents, when a depraved habit contracted through youth simulates a truly elegant nature, § 622. And when the injuries of the times and the barbarism of the places in which they have lived, covering over the innermost nature of the most beautiful things, compel them always to stick in the bark, and when a judgment sufficiently depraved among their contemporaries has accustomed them to venerate only false-colored charms as daughters of nature itself, § 622, 623. Meanwhile a happier talent in aesthetic matters, S. II–VII, like Caesar in Cicero, On Famous Orators 261, applying reason, § 58, corrects a faulty and corrupt habit by a pure and uncorrupted habit. When it joins certain singular ornaments to an everywhere clear elegance of thoughts, § 625, then it seems

ac splendidam quandam, minimeque veteratoriam, rationem cogitandi tenet.

and it holds a certain splendid and by no means crafty way of thinking.

Neque solus Heliconis pygmaeus naturae talis adscititium belle cogitandis fucum a splendore vere naturali vix ac ne vix quidem discernet: § 359. mediocribus etiam ingeniis idem erit difficillimum, quando prava per adolescentiam contracta consuetudo naturam vere elegantem simulabit, § 622. et temporum iniuriae, locorumque, quibus vixerint, barbaries intimam pulcerrimarum rerum naturam obtegens haerere semper in cortice coget, iisdemque satis depravatum apud aequales iudicium solas fucatas veneres, ut ipsius naturae filias, venerari consueverit, § 622, 623. Interim felicius in aestheticis ingenium, S. II–VII. veluti Caesar apud Ciceronem de claris or. 261. rationem adhibens, § 58. consuetudinem vitiosam et corruptam pura et incorrupta consuetudine emendat, quum ad dilucidam ubique cogitationum elegantiam § 625. adiungit ornamenta quaedam singularia, tum videtur

Nor will only such a pygmy of Helicon scarcely, indeed hardly at all, distinguish adventitious false coloring in beautiful thinking from truly natural splendor, § 359. The same thing will be very difficult even for middling talents, when a depraved habit contracted through youth simulates a truly elegant nature, § 622. And when the injuries of the times and the barbarism of the places in which they have lived, covering over the innermost nature of the most beautiful things, compel them always to stick in the bark, and when a judgment sufficiently depraved among their contemporaries has accustomed them to venerate only false-colored charms as daughters of nature itself, § 622, 623. Meanwhile a happier talent in aesthetic matters, S. II–VII, like Caesar in Cicero, On Famous Orators 261, applying reason, § 58, corrects a faulty and corrupt habit by a pure and uncorrupted habit. When it joins certain singular ornaments to an everywhere clear elegance of thoughts, § 625, then it seems

ac splendidam quandam, minimeque veteratoriam, rationem cogitandi tenet.

and it holds a certain splendid and by no means crafty way of thinking.

Cogitationum nitor ac splendor quoniam est species, immo gradus quidam, perspicuitatis sensitivae, genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum aeque bene caret eodem, ac aestheticodogmaticum intensioribus perspicuitatis intellectualis gradibus, § 617, 567. Quo magis erit illud genus cogitandi formaliter philosophicum, scientificum, et rationi solidiori, puriori intellectui, pervium ac perspicuum, hoc minus nitoris habebit et perspicuitatis etiam analogo rationis pellucidae. § 578. Quo plus genus cogitandi dogmaticum vividi splendoris habet, hoc minus ad logica, hoc magis ad aesthetica referendum est. § 568. Hinc contra quosdam recentiorum miscelliones librorum suorum philosophicorum genus cogitandi Cicero iudicat ipse aestheticodogmaticum, dum de fin. I. 6.

Since the brightness and splendor of thoughts is a species, indeed a certain degree, of sensory perspicuity, the logical-dogmatic kind of thinking lacks it just as properly as the aesthetic-dogmatic kind lacks the more intense degrees of intellectual perspicuity, §§ 617, 567. The more that kind of thinking is formally philosophical, scientific, and accessible and perspicuous to sounder reason and purer intellect, the less brightness it will have, and the less perspicuity even for the analogue of clear reason, § 578. The more vivid splendor a dogmatic kind of thinking has, the less it is to be referred to logic, and the more to aesthetics, § 568. Hence, against certain more recent miscellaneous writers, Cicero himself judges the kind of thinking in his philosophical books to be aesthetic-dogmatic, when in De finibus I.6 he says:

Aperitius adhuc mentem exponit in prooemio parad. ubi:

(my writings on philosophy) He sets out his mind still more openly in the preface to the Paradoxa, where he says:

§ 569.

δεικτικὰ to this oratorical kind of speaking of ours, § 569.

Cogitationum nitor ac splendor quoniam est species, immo gradus quidam, perspicuitatis sensitivae, genus cogitandi logicodogmaticum aeque bene caret eodem, ac aestheticodogmaticum intensioribus perspicuitatis intellectualis gradibus, § 617, 567. Quo magis erit illud genus cogitandi formaliter philosophicum, scientificum, et rationi solidiori, puriori intellectui, pervium ac perspicuum, hoc minus nitoris habebit et perspicuitatis etiam analogo rationis pellucidae. § 578. Quo plus genus cogitandi dogmaticum vividi splendoris habet, hoc minus ad logica, hoc magis ad aesthetica referendum est. § 568. Hinc contra quosdam recentiorum miscelliones librorum suorum philosophicorum genus cogitandi Cicero iudicat ipse aestheticodogmaticum, dum de fin. I. 6.

Since the brightness and splendor of thoughts is a species, indeed a certain degree, of sensory perspicuity, the logical-dogmatic kind of thinking lacks it just as properly as the aesthetic-dogmatic kind lacks the more intense degrees of intellectual perspicuity, §§ 617, 567. The more that kind of thinking is formally philosophical, scientific, and accessible and perspicuous to sounder reason and purer intellect, the less brightness it will have, and the less perspicuity even for the analogue of clear reason, § 578. The more vivid splendor a dogmatic kind of thinking has, the less it is to be referred to logic, and the more to aesthetics, § 568. Hence, against certain more recent miscellaneous writers, Cicero himself judges the kind of thinking in his philosophical books to be aesthetic-dogmatic, when in De finibus I.6 he says:

Aperitius adhuc mentem exponit in prooemio parad. ubi:

(my writings on philosophy) He sets out his mind still more openly in the preface to the Paradoxa, where he says:

§ 569.

δεικτικὰ to this oratorical kind of speaking of ours, § 569.

Equidem cum Cicerone off. I. 6. existimo,

I indeed, with Cicero, De officiis I.6, think that

§ 567. Si vero fecisset ornate, si fecisset splendide, si se in philosophico disputandi genere praestitisset Demosthenem: tunc ex mea sententia non tam rationem et intellectum, qua potest fieri, cum evidentia instructurus, quam analogon rationis ingenti persuasionis lumine collustraturus fuisset. § 629, 568.

§ 567. But if he had done so ornately, if he had done so splendidly, if he had shown himself Demosthenes in the philosophical kind of disputing, then in my opinion he would not so much have been about to instruct reason and intellect with evidentness, insofar as that can be done, as to illuminate the analogue of reason with a huge light of persuasion, §§ 629, 568.

Equidem cum Cicerone off. I. 6. existimo,

I indeed, with Cicero, De officiis I.6, think that

§ 567. Si vero fecisset ornate, si fecisset splendide, si se in philosophico disputandi genere praestitisset Demosthenem: tunc ex mea sententia non tam rationem et intellectum, qua potest fieri, cum evidentia instructurus, quam analogon rationis ingenti persuasionis lumine collustraturus fuisset. § 629, 568.

§ 567. But if he had done so ornately, if he had done so splendidly, if he had shown himself Demosthenes in the philosophical kind of disputing, then in my opinion he would not so much have been about to instruct reason and intellect with evidentness, insofar as that can be done, as to illuminate the analogue of reason with a huge light of persuasion, §§ 629, 568.

SECTIO XXXVIII
OBSCURITAS AESTHETICA
Defectus et oppositum lucis ac claritatis quum sit obscuritas, lux autem et claritas vel sensitiva, vel intellectualis, S. XXXVII. rectissime iam veteres obscuritatem κατ' αἴσθησιν ab obscuritate κατὰ νόησιν distinxerunt. Res et cogitatio, quae sensitive percipienda non satis claritatis, extensivae scilicet, aestheticaeque lucis habet, est obscura κατ' αἴσθησιν. Hinc distinctiora, puriora, profundiora quaevis per scientias, quoniam ea non assequitur analogon rationis, per hoc solum si quis velit considerare, non queretur ea solum obscura, sed etiam sentiet, uti sunt κατ' αἴσθησιν.

SECTION XXXVIII
AESTHETIC OBSCURITY
A thing and thought which, in order to be perceived sensitively, does not have enough clarity, namely extensive clarity and aesthetic light, is obscure κατ' αἴσθησιν. Hence any things that are more distinct, purer, and deeper through the sciences, since the analogue of reason does not attain them, if someone wishes to consider them through this alone, he will not only complain that they are obscure, but will also feel them as they are κατ' αἴσθησιν.

SECTIO XXXVIII
OBSCURITAS AESTHETICA
Defectus et oppositum lucis ac claritatis quum sit obscuritas, lux autem et claritas vel sensitiva, vel intellectualis, S. XXXVII. rectissime iam veteres obscuritatem κατ' αἴσθησιν ab obscuritate κατὰ νόησιν distinxerunt.

SECTION XXXVIII
AESTHETIC OBSCURITY
A thing and thought which, in order to be perceived sensitively, does not have enough clarity, namely extensive clarity and aesthetic light, is obscure κατ' αἴσθησιν.

Res et cogitatio, quae sensitive percipienda non satis claritatis, extensivae scilicet, aestheticaeque lucis habet, est obscura κατ' αἴσθησιν. Hinc distinctiora, puriora, profundiora quaevis per scientias, quoniam ea non assequitur analogon rationis, per hoc solum si quis velit considerare, non queretur ea solum obscura, sed etiam sentiet, uti sunt κατ' αἴσθησιν.

Hence any things that are more distinct, purer, and deeper through the sciences, since the analogue of reason does not attain them, if someone wishes to consider them through this alone, he will not only complain that they are obscure, but will also feel them as they are κατ' αἴσθησιν.

Res et cogitatio, quae per intellectum et rationem concipienda non tantum claritatis, intensivae scilicet, distinctionis, puritatis, ac profunditatis habet, quantum ad distinguendum ex notis claris et rationibus probe perspectis, vel enucleatius pronunciandum, vel complete demonstrandum requiritur, est obscura κατὰ νόησιν. Hinc si quis bene multa non solum aesthetice dilucida, sed etiam pulcro nitore splendida, sicut eadem propinantur soli rationis analogo, distinctius tamen concipere, ratione rimari profundius laboraverit, ea saepe numero non queretur solum obscura, sed etiam sentiet, uti sunt κατὰ νόησιν.

A thing and thought which, in order to be conceived through intellect and reason, does not have as much clarity, namely intensive clarity, distinction, purity, and depth, as is required for distinguishing from clear marks and well-perceived reasons, or for pronouncing more fully, or for demonstrating completely, is obscure κατὰ νόησιν. Hence if someone has labored to conceive more distinctly, and to search more deeply by reason, very many things not only aesthetically clear but also splendid with beautiful brightness, just as those same things are offered to the mere analogue of reason, he will often not only complain that they are obscure, but will also feel them as they are κατὰ νόησιν.

Res et cogitatio, quae per intellectum et rationem concipienda non tantum claritatis, intensivae scilicet, distinctionis, puritatis, ac profunditatis habet, quantum ad distinguendum ex notis claris et rationibus probe perspectis, vel enucleatius pronunciandum, vel complete demonstrandum requiritur, est obscura κατὰ νόησιν.

A thing and thought which, in order to be conceived through intellect and reason, does not have as much clarity, namely intensive clarity, distinction, purity, and depth, as is required for distinguishing from clear marks and well-perceived reasons, or for pronouncing more fully, or for demonstrating completely, is obscure κατὰ νόησιν.

Hinc si quis bene multa non solum aesthetice dilucida, sed etiam pulcro nitore splendida, sicut eadem propinantur soli rationis analogo, distinctius tamen concipere, ratione rimari profundius laboraverit, ea saepe numero non queretur solum obscura, sed etiam sentiet, uti sunt κατὰ νόησιν.

Hence if someone has labored to conceive more distinctly, and to search more deeply by reason, very many things not only aesthetically clear but also splendid with beautiful brightness, just as those same things are offered to the mere analogue of reason, he will often not only complain that they are obscure, but will also feel them as they are κατὰ νόησιν.