§ 601
Septima sit quaestio: Si figmentum prorsus ignotum ausus aliquis est afferre, et octava: si quis omnino figmentum anomalon formaverit, an utrumque satis habeat internae verisimilitudinis, qua compensari possit, quicquid primo falsi simile talibus in fictionibus videbatur, ut ultima tandem fictio correctio potius haberi possit mundi poetici, quam turpis in eodem anomalia. § 518, 520. Nona: An fabularum sententia, § 526, de facto verisimilitudinem dogmaticam moralem latius dictam, § 577. de iure, simul strictius dictam habeat? § 433, 435. An satis ex fabulae eventu pateat, velitne sententiam auctor de facto tantum, an etiam de iure veram intelligi? § 548.
Let the seventh question be: if someone has dared to introduce a figment altogether unknown, and the eighth: if someone has formed a wholly anomalous figment, whether each has enough internal verisimilitude, by which whatever at first seemed false-like in such fictions can be compensated, so that at last the final fiction can be regarded rather as a correction of the poetic world than as an ugly anomaly in it. §§ 518, 520. Ninth: whether the sententia of fables, § 526, has, concerning fact, dogmatic moral verisimilitude more broadly so called, § 577, and, concerning right, at the same time verisimilitude more strictly so called? §§ 433, 435. Whether it is sufficiently evident from the outcome of the fable whether the author wishes the sententia to be understood as true only concerning fact, or also concerning right? § 548.
Septima sit quaestio: Si figmentum prorsus ignotum ausus aliquis est afferre, et octava: si quis omnino figmentum anomalon formaverit, an utrumque satis habeat internae verisimilitudinis, qua compensari possit, quicquid primo falsi simile talibus in fictionibus videbatur, ut ultima tandem fictio correctio potius haberi possit mundi poetici, quam turpis in eodem anomalia. § 518, 520. Nona: An fabularum sententia, § 526, de facto verisimilitudinem dogmaticam moralem latius dictam, § 577. de iure, simul strictius dictam habeat? § 433, 435. An satis ex fabulae eventu pateat, velitne sententiam auctor de facto tantum, an etiam de iure veram intelligi? § 548.
Let the seventh question be: if someone has dared to introduce a figment altogether unknown, and the eighth: if someone has formed a wholly anomalous figment, whether each has enough internal verisimilitude, by which whatever at first seemed false-like in such fictions can be compensated, so that at last the final fiction can be regarded rather as a correction of the poetic world than as an ugly anomaly in it. §§ 518, 520. Ninth: whether the sententia of fables, § 526, has, concerning fact, dogmatic moral verisimilitude more broadly so called, § 577, and, concerning right, at the same time verisimilitude more strictly so called? §§ 433, 435. Whether it is sufficiently evident from the outcome of the fable whether the author wishes the sententia to be understood as true only concerning fact, or also concerning right? § 548.
Septima sit quaestio: Si figmentum prorsus
Let the seventh question be: if someone has dared
ignotum ausus aliquis est afferre, et octava:
to introduce a figment altogether unknown, and the eighth:
si quis omnino figmentum anomalon formaverit,
if someone has formed a wholly anomalous figment,
an utrumque satis habeat internae verisimilitudinis, qua compensari possit,
whether each has enough internal verisimilitude, by which whatever at
quicquid primo falsi simile talibus in fictionibus
first seemed false-like in such fictions can be compensated,
videbatur, ut ultima tandem fictio
so that at last the final fiction can be
correctio potius haberi possit mundi poetici,
regarded rather as a correction of the poetic world than as an
quam turpis in eodem anomalia. § 518, 520. Nona:
ugly anomaly in it. §§ 518, 520. Ninth:
An fabularum sententia, § 526, de facto
whether the sententia of fables, § 526, has, concerning fact,
verisimilitudinem dogmaticam moralem latius dictam, § 577.
dogmatic moral verisimilitude more broadly so called, § 577,
de iure, simul strictius dictam habeat?
and, concerning right, at the same time verisimilitude more strictly so called?
§ 433, 435. An satis ex
§§ 433, 435. Whether it is sufficiently evident from the
fabulae eventu pateat,
outcome of the fable whether the
velitne sententiam auctor de facto tantum,
author wishes the sententia to be understood as true only
an etiam de iure veram intelligi? § 548.
concerning fact, or also concerning right? § 548.
Septima sit quaestio: Si figmentum prorsus ignotum ausus aliquis est afferre, et octava: si quis omnino figmentum anomalon formaverit, an utrumque satis habeat internae verisimilitudinis, qua compensari possit, quicquid primo falsi simile talibus in fictionibus videbatur, ut ultima tandem fictio correctio potius haberi possit mundi poetici, quam turpis in eodem anomalia. § 518, 520. Nona: An fabularum sententia, § 526, de facto verisimilitudinem dogmaticam moralem latius dictam, § 577. de iure, simul strictius dictam habeat? § 433, 435. An satis ex fabulae eventu pateat, velitne sententiam auctor de facto tantum, an etiam de iure veram intelligi? § 548. / Let the seventh question be: if someone has dared to introduce a figment altogether unknown, and the eighth: if someone has formed a wholly anomalous figment, whether each has enough internal verisimilitude, by which whatever at first seemed false-like in such fictions can be compensated, so that at last the final fiction can be regarded rather as a correction of the poetic world than as an ugly anomaly in it. §§ 518, 520. Ninth: whether the sententia of fables, § 526, has, concerning fact, dogmatic moral verisimilitude more broadly so called, § 577, and, concerning right, at the same time verisimilitude more strictly so called? §§ 433, 435. Whether it is sufficiently evident from the outcome of the fable whether the author wishes the sententia to be understood as true only concerning fact, or also concerning right? § 548.
§ 602
Phaedri l. II. f. 1. veram habet sententiam de iure, cuius exemplum est leo partem praedae praedoni denegatam innoxio viatori relinquens.
Phaedrus book II, fable 1, has a true sententia concerning right, of which the example is the lion leaving to the harmless traveller the part of the prey denied to the robber.
Exemplum egregium prorsus et laudabile / Verum est aviditas dives, et pauper pudor.
A very excellent example, and worthy of all praise; but covetousness is rich and modesty in want.
F. 2. sententiam de facto tantum intelligendam docet turpis viri calvities uxorii:
Fable 2 teaches that the baldness of an ugly uxorious man is to be understood as a sententia concerning fact only:
A foeminis utcunque spoliari viros, / Ament, amentur, nempe exemplis discimus.
That the men, under all circumstances, are preyed upon by the women, whether they love or are beloved, {this} truly we learn from examples.
L. III. f. 5. vero quoniam maxime pronam hanc daret sententiam: prudens aliquando fert iniurias agendo gratias et incitando in potentiorem vindicem, quae, sane, vix fuisset strictius vera moraliter sententia: fabula quidem narratur, verior autem adscribitur sententia; licet nimis generalis:
But book III, fable 5, since it would most readily give this sententia: the prudent person sometimes bears injuries by giving thanks and by provoking a more powerful avenger, which, indeed, would scarcely have been a morally true sententia in the stricter sense: the fable indeed is narrated, but a truer sententia is ascribed, although too general:
Successus ad perniciem multos devocat,
Success leads many astray to their ruin.
Phaedri l. II. f. 1. veram habet sententiam de iure, cuius exemplum est leo partem praedae praedoni denegatam innoxio viatori relinquens.
Phaedrus book II, fable 1, has a true sententia concerning right, of which the example is the lion leaving to the harmless traveller the part of the prey denied to the robber.
Exemplum egregium prorsus et laudabile / Verum est aviditas dives, et pauper pudor.
A very excellent example, and worthy of all praise; but covetousness is rich and modesty in want.
F. 2. sententiam de facto tantum intelligendam docet turpis viri calvities uxorii:
Fable 2 teaches that the baldness of an ugly uxorious man is to be understood as a sententia concerning fact only:
A foeminis utcunque spoliari viros, / Ament, amentur, nempe exemplis discimus.
That the men, under all circumstances, are preyed upon by the women, whether they love or are beloved, {this} truly we learn from examples.
L. III. f. 5. vero quoniam maxime pronam hanc daret sententiam: prudens aliquando fert iniurias agendo gratias et incitando in potentiorem vindicem, quae, sane, vix fuisset strictius vera moraliter sententia: fabula quidem narratur, verior autem adscribitur sententia; licet nimis generalis:
But book III, fable 5, since it would most readily give this sententia: the prudent person sometimes bears injuries by giving thanks and by provoking a more powerful avenger, which, indeed, would scarcely have been a morally true sententia in the stricter sense: the fable indeed is narrated, but a truer sententia is ascribed, although too general:
Successus ad perniciem multos devocat,
Success leads many astray to their ruin.
Phaedri l. II. f. 1. veram habet sententiam
Phaedrus book II, fable 1, has a true sententia concerning right,
de iure, cuius exemplum est
of which the example is the lion leaving to
leo partem praedae praedoni denegatam innoxio viatori relinquens.
the harmless traveller the part of the prey denied to the robber.
Exemplum egregium prorsus et laudabile / Verum est aviditas dives, et pauper pudor.
A very excellent example, and worthy of all praise; but covetousness is rich and modesty in want.
F. 2. sententiam de facto
Fable 2 teaches that the baldness of an ugly
tantum intelligendam docet turpis viri calvities uxorii:
uxorious man is to be understood as a sententia concerning fact only:
A foeminis utcunque spoliari viros, / Ament, amentur, nempe exemplis discimus.
That the men, under all circumstances, are preyed upon by the women, whether they love or are beloved, {this} truly we learn from examples.
L. III. f. 5. vero quoniam maxime
But book III, fable 5, since it would most
pronam hanc daret sententiam: prudens aliquando fert
readily give this sententia: the prudent person sometimes bears
iniurias agendo gratias et incitando in
injuries by giving thanks and by provoking a more powerful avenger,
potentiorem vindicem, quae, sane, vix fuisset strictius vera moraliter sententia:
which, indeed, would scarcely have been a morally true sententia
fabula quidem narratur,
in the stricter sense: the fable indeed is narrated,
verior autem adscribitur sententia; licet nimis generalis:
but a truer sententia is ascribed, although too general:
Successus ad perniciem multos devocat,
Success leads many astray to their ruin.
Phaedri l. II. f. 1. veram habet sententiam de iure, cuius exemplum est leo partem praedae praedoni denegatam innoxio viatori relinquens. / Phaedrus book II, fable 1, has a true sententia concerning right, of which the example is the lion leaving to the harmless traveller the part of the prey denied to the robber.
Exemplum egregium prorsus et laudabile / Verum est aviditas dives, et pauper pudor.
A very excellent example, and worthy of all praise; but covetousness is rich and modesty in want.
F. 2. sententiam de facto tantum intelligendam docet turpis viri calvities uxorii: / Fable 2 teaches that the baldness of an ugly uxorious man is to be understood as a sententia concerning fact only:
A foeminis utcunque spoliari viros, / Ament, amentur, nempe exemplis discimus.
That the men, under all circumstances, are preyed upon by the women, whether they love or are beloved, {this} truly we learn from examples.
L. III. f. 5. vero quoniam maxime pronam hanc daret sententiam: prudens aliquando fert iniurias agendo gratias et incitando in potentiorem vindicem, quae, sane, vix fuisset strictius vera moraliter sententia: fabula quidem narratur, verior autem adscribitur sententia; licet nimis generalis: / But book III, fable 5, since it would most readily give this sententia: the prudent person sometimes bears injuries by giving thanks and by provoking a more powerful avenger, which, indeed, would scarcely have been a morally true sententia in the stricter sense: the fable indeed is narrated, but a truer sententia is ascribed, although too general:
Successus ad perniciem multos devocat,
Success leads many astray to their ruin.
§ 603
Haec sententiae veritas moralis primarium est, quod in fabularum verisimilitudine sit attendendum, § 600. cui iungi tamen secundariae possunt decima quaestio: An fabula, quae narrationis titulo strictius ornata non ultra fictiones historicas progredi debeat, incidat nihilominus in licentiam poeticam? An eadem leges fictionum historicarum affabre servans possit in re graviori eo usque fallere, ut pro strictissime vero habeatur a multis cum notabili ipsorum decremento? § 527, 587. Exemplum fabulae, cui et veritas dogmatica, § 601. desit, et utrumque vitium inhaereat, quod iam indicavimus, esse potest Philostratus in sua de Apollonio Tyaneo fabula.
This moral truth of the sententia is the primary thing that must be attended to in the verisimilitude of fables, § 600. To this, however, secondary questions can be joined, the tenth question: whether a fable which, adorned more strictly with the title of narration, ought not to advance beyond historical fictions, nevertheless fall into poetic license? Whether the same, skillfully preserving the laws of historical fictions, can in a weightier matter deceive so far that it is held by many as true in the strictest sense, with notable loss to them? §§ 527, 587. An example of a fable to which both dogmatic truth, § 601, is lacking, and in which each fault inheres, which we have already indicated, Philostratus in his fable about Apollonius of Tyana can serve.
Haec sententiae veritas moralis primarium est, quod in fabularum verisimilitudine sit attendendum, § 600. cui iungi tamen secundariae possunt decima quaestio: An fabula, quae narrationis titulo strictius ornata non ultra fictiones historicas progredi debeat, incidat nihilominus in licentiam poeticam?
This moral truth of the sententia is the primary thing that must be attended to in the verisimilitude of fables, § 600. To this, however, secondary questions can be joined, the tenth question: whether a fable which, adorned more strictly with the title of narration, ought not to advance beyond historical fictions, nevertheless fall into poetic license?
An eadem leges fictionum historicarum affabre servans possit in re graviori eo usque fallere, ut pro strictissime vero habeatur a multis cum notabili ipsorum decremento? § 527, 587. Exemplum fabulae, cui et veritas dogmatica, § 601. desit, et utrumque vitium inhaereat, quod iam indicavimus, esse potest Philostratus in sua de Apollonio Tyaneo fabula.
Whether the same, skillfully preserving the laws of historical fictions, can in a weightier matter deceive so far that it is held by many as true in the strictest sense, with notable loss to them? §§ 527, 587. An example of a fable to which both dogmatic truth, § 601, is lacking, and in which each fault inheres, which we have already indicated, Philostratus in his fable about Apollonius of Tyana can serve.
Haec sententiae veritas moralis primarium est,
This moral truth of the sententia is
quod in
the primary thing that must be attended to in
fabularum verisimilitudine sit attendendum, § 600. cui iungi tamen
the verisimilitude of fables, § 600. To this, however,
secundariae possunt decima quaestio:
secondary questions can be joined, the tenth question:
An fabula, quae narrationis titulo strictius ornata
whether a fable which, adorned more strictly with the title of narration,
non ultra fictiones historicas progredi debeat,
ought not to advance beyond historical fictions,
incidat nihilominus in licentiam poeticam?
nevertheless fall into poetic license?
An eadem leges fictionum historicarum affabre servans
Whether the same, skillfully preserving the laws of historical fictions,
possit in re graviori eo usque fallere,
can in a weightier matter deceive so far
ut pro strictissime vero habeatur a
that it is held by many as true
multis cum notabili ipsorum decremento?
in the strictest sense, with notable loss to them?
§ 527, 587. Exemplum fabulae,
§§ 527, 587. An example of a fable
cui et veritas dogmatica, § 601.
to which both dogmatic truth, § 601,
desit, et utrumque vitium inhaereat,
is lacking, and in which each fault inheres,
quod iam indicavimus, esse potest Philostratus in sua
which we have already indicated, Philostratus in his fable
de Apollonio Tyaneo fabula.
about Apollonius of Tyana can serve.
Haec sententiae veritas moralis primarium est, quod in fabularum verisimilitudine sit attendendum, § 600. cui iungi tamen secundariae possunt decima quaestio: An fabula, quae narrationis titulo strictius ornata non ultra fictiones historicas progredi debeat, incidat nihilominus in licentiam poeticam? / This moral truth of the sententia is the primary thing that must be attended to in the verisimilitude of fables, § 600. To this, however, secondary questions can be joined, the tenth question: whether a fable which, adorned more strictly with the title of narration, ought not to advance beyond historical fictions, nevertheless fall into poetic license?
An eadem leges fictionum historicarum affabre servans possit in re graviori eo usque fallere, ut pro strictissime vero habeatur a multis cum notabili ipsorum decremento? § 527, 587. Exemplum fabulae, cui et veritas dogmatica, § 601. desit, et utrumque vitium inhaereat, quod iam indicavimus, esse potest Philostratus in sua de Apollonio Tyaneo fabula. / Whether the same, skillfully preserving the laws of historical fictions, can in a weightier matter deceive so far that it is held by many as true in the strictest sense, with notable loss to them? §§ 527, 587. An example of a fable to which both dogmatic truth, § 601, is lacking, and in which each fault inheres, which we have already indicated, Philostratus in his fable about Apollonius of Tyana can serve.
§ 604
Vndecima quaestio: An fabula, poetica etiam, § 527, si opus fuisse videatur, non potuerit aeque bene veritatem sententiae dogmaticam exprimere strictius probabilis, ac strictius improbabilis? § 532. Aequalis hic bonitas est aequalis totius pulcritudo, quam non semper obtinebunt, probabilitate historica gaudentes prae iis, in quibus verisimilior probabilitas, licet poetica tantum, fulget. § 533. An fabula, etiam improbabilis belle et recte, nihil tamen improbabilium contineat, nisi quot et qualia requiruntur ad illustrandam sufficienter sententiam? § 589. Haec videtur illa fuisse caussa, ob quam Longinus, non Iliadi, fabulae non minus poeticae, et ex meo sensu strictius etiam improbabili, sed Odysseae tamen, fabularum amorem vitio vertit, § 311.
The eleventh question: whether a fable, even a poetic one, § 527, if there seems to have been need, could not equally well express the dogmatic truth of the sententia as strictly probable and as strictly improbable? § 532. Here equal goodness is equal beauty of the whole, which those enjoying historical probability will not always obtain before those things in which a more verisimilar probability, although only poetic, shines. § 533. Whether a fable, even one improbable beautifully and rightly, nevertheless contains nothing improbable except as many and such things as are required for sufficiently illustrating the sententia? § 589. This seems to have been that cause on account of which Longinus, not to the Iliad, a fable no less poetic and, in my judgment, even strictly more improbable, but nevertheless to the Odyssey, imputed as a fault the love of fables, § 311.
Vndecima quaestio: An fabula, poetica etiam, § 527, si opus fuisse videatur, non potuerit aeque bene veritatem sententiae dogmaticam exprimere strictius probabilis, ac strictius improbabilis? § 532. Aequalis hic bonitas est aequalis totius pulcritudo, quam non semper obtinebunt, probabilitate historica gaudentes prae iis, in quibus verisimilior probabilitas, licet poetica tantum, fulget. § 533. An fabula, etiam improbabilis belle et recte, nihil tamen improbabilium contineat, nisi quot et qualia requiruntur ad illustrandam sufficienter sententiam? § 589. Haec videtur illa fuisse caussa, ob quam Longinus, non Iliadi, fabulae non minus poeticae, et ex meo sensu strictius etiam improbabili, sed Odysseae tamen, fabularum amorem vitio vertit, § 311.
The eleventh question: whether a fable, even a poetic one, § 527, if there seems to have been need, could not equally well express the dogmatic truth of the sententia as strictly probable and as strictly improbable? § 532. Here equal goodness is equal beauty of the whole, which those enjoying historical probability will not always obtain before those things in which a more verisimilar probability, although only poetic, shines. § 533. Whether a fable, even one improbable beautifully and rightly, nevertheless contains nothing improbable except as many and such things as are required for sufficiently illustrating the sententia? § 589. This seems to have been that cause on account of which Longinus, not to the Iliad, a fable no less poetic and, in my judgment, even strictly more improbable, but nevertheless to the Odyssey, imputed as a fault the love of fables, § 311.
Vndecima quaestio: An fabula, poetica etiam,
The eleventh question: whether a fable, even
§ 527, si opus fuisse videatur,
a poetic one, § 527, if there seems to
non potuerit aeque bene veritatem
have been need, could not equally well express
sententiae dogmaticam exprimere strictius probabilis,
the dogmatic truth of the sententia as strictly probable
ac strictius improbabilis? § 532. Aequalis hic bonitas
and as strictly improbable? § 532. Here equal goodness
est aequalis totius pulcritudo, quam non semper obtinebunt,
is equal beauty of the whole, which those enjoying historical
probabilitate historica gaudentes prae iis,
probability will not always obtain before those
in quibus verisimilior probabilitas, licet poetica tantum, fulget.
things in which a more verisimilar probability, although only poetic, shines.
§ 533. An fabula, etiam improbabilis belle et
§ 533. Whether a fable, even one improbable beautifully and rightly,
recte, nihil tamen improbabilium contineat, nisi quot et
nevertheless contains nothing improbable except as many and such
qualia requiruntur ad illustrandam sufficienter sententiam?
things as are required for sufficiently illustrating the sententia?
§ 589. Haec videtur illa fuisse caussa,
§ 589. This seems to have been that cause
ob quam Longinus, non Iliadi,
on account of which Longinus, not to the Iliad,
fabulae non minus poeticae, et ex meo sensu
a fable no less poetic and, in my judgment,
strictius etiam improbabili, sed Odysseae
even strictly more improbable, but nevertheless to the Odyssey,
tamen, fabularum amorem vitio vertit, § 311.
imputed as a fault the love of fables, § 311.
Vndecima quaestio: An fabula, poetica etiam, § 527, si opus fuisse videatur, non potuerit aeque bene veritatem sententiae dogmaticam exprimere strictius probabilis, ac strictius improbabilis? § 532. Aequalis hic bonitas est aequalis totius pulcritudo, quam non semper obtinebunt, probabilitate historica gaudentes prae iis, in quibus verisimilior probabilitas, licet poetica tantum, fulget. § 533. An fabula, etiam improbabilis belle et recte, nihil tamen improbabilium contineat, nisi quot et qualia requiruntur ad illustrandam sufficienter sententiam? § 589. Haec videtur illa fuisse caussa, ob quam Longinus, non Iliadi, fabulae non minus poeticae, et ex meo sensu strictius etiam improbabili, sed Odysseae tamen, fabularum amorem vitio vertit, § 311. / The eleventh question: whether a fable, even a poetic one, § 527, if there seems to have been need, could not equally well express the dogmatic truth of the sententia as strictly probable and as strictly improbable? § 532. Here equal goodness is equal beauty of the whole, which those enjoying historical probability will not always obtain before those things in which a more verisimilar probability, although only poetic, shines. § 533. Whether a fable, even one improbable beautifully and rightly, nevertheless contains nothing improbable except as many and such things as are required for sufficiently illustrating the sententia? § 589. This seems to have been that cause on account of which Longinus, not to the Iliad, a fable no less poetic and, in my judgment, even strictly more improbable, but nevertheless to the Odyssey, imputed as a fault the love of fables, § 311.
§ 605
Duodecima quaestio non in eo consistet, potissimum, an fabula quaedam poetica, et fictio fabulosa, rectius rationalis sit, ac fictus aliquis apologus, atque pulcrius, praesertim hac aetate nostra, qua animalibus etiam praeter hominem aliis denuo nonnihil intellectus ac rationis veritate sic satis aesthetica tribuitur, an tandem rectius mere rationalis, quam mixta, § 537. Haec potius sic: An fictis personis, iis etiam, quas alias bruta censemus, immo vegetabilia, suum tamen ἦθος verisimile tribuatur, quod aut ex analogia mundi poetici, aut ex insufficientibus historiae naturalis traditionibus, aut ex opinionibus eorum, quorum potissimum gratia scribimus, ipsis conveniat? § 495.
The twelfth question will not chiefly consist in this, whether some poetic fable and fabulous fiction is more rightly rational, and whether some invented apologue is more beautiful, especially in our own age, in which even to animals other than man something of intellect and reason is again attributed with a truth sufficiently aesthetic, or whether at last it is more rightly merely rational than mixed, § 537. Rather, let this be as follows: whether to fictive persons, even those which we otherwise consider brutes, indeed even plants, nevertheless have attributed to them their own verisimilar ἦθος, which either from the analogy of the poetic world, or from insufficient traditions of natural history, or from the opinions of those for whose sake especially we write, may be suitable to them? § 495.
Duodecima quaestio non in eo consistet, potissimum, an fabula quaedam poetica, et fictio fabulosa, rectius rationalis sit, ac fictus aliquis apologus, atque pulcrius, praesertim hac aetate nostra, qua animalibus etiam praeter hominem aliis denuo nonnihil intellectus ac rationis veritate sic satis aesthetica tribuitur, an tandem rectius mere rationalis, quam mixta, § 537. Haec potius sic: An fictis personis, iis etiam, quas alias bruta censemus, immo vegetabilia, suum tamen ἦθος verisimile tribuatur, quod aut ex analogia mundi poetici, aut ex insufficientibus historiae naturalis traditionibus, aut ex opinionibus eorum, quorum potissimum gratia scribimus, ipsis conveniat? § 495.
The twelfth question will not chiefly consist in this, whether some poetic fable and fabulous fiction is more rightly rational, and whether some invented apologue is more beautiful, especially in our own age, in which even to animals other than man something of intellect and reason is again attributed with a truth sufficiently aesthetic, or whether at last it is more rightly merely rational than mixed, § 537. Rather, let this be as follows: whether to fictive persons, even those which we otherwise consider brutes, indeed even plants, nevertheless have attributed to them their own verisimilar ἦθος, which either from the analogy of the poetic world, or from insufficient traditions of natural history, or from the opinions of those for whose sake especially we write, may be suitable to them? § 495.
Duodecima quaestio non in eo
The twelfth question will not chiefly consist in this,
consistet, potissimum, an fabula quaedam poetica, et fictio fabulosa,
whether some poetic fable and fabulous fiction is more
rectius rationalis sit, ac fictus aliquis apologus,
rightly rational, and whether some invented apologue
atque pulcrius, praesertim hac aetate nostra,
is more beautiful, especially in our own age, in
qua animalibus etiam praeter hominem aliis denuo
which even to animals other than man something
nonnihil intellectus ac rationis veritate sic satis aesthetica
of intellect and reason is again attributed with a truth sufficiently aesthetic,
tribuitur, an tandem rectius mere rationalis,
or whether at last it is more rightly merely rational
quam mixta, § 537. Haec potius
than mixed, § 537. Rather, let this be as follows:
sic: An fictis personis, iis etiam,
whether to fictive persons, even
quas alias bruta
those which we otherwise consider brutes, indeed even plants,
censemus, immo vegetabilia, suum tamen ἦθος
nevertheless have attributed to them their own verisimilar ἦθος,
verisimile tribuatur, quod aut ex analogia mundi poetici,
which either from the analogy of the poetic
aut ex insufficientibus historiae naturalis traditionibus,
world, or from insufficient traditions of natural history,
aut ex opinionibus eorum,
or from the opinions of those for whose
quorum potissimum gratia scribimus, ipsis conveniat? § 495.
sake especially we write, may be suitable to them? § 495.
Duodecima quaestio non in eo consistet, potissimum, an fabula quaedam poetica, et fictio fabulosa, rectius rationalis sit, ac fictus aliquis apologus, atque pulcrius, praesertim hac aetate nostra, qua animalibus etiam praeter hominem aliis denuo nonnihil intellectus ac rationis veritate sic satis aesthetica tribuitur, an tandem rectius mere rationalis, quam mixta, § 537. Haec potius sic: An fictis personis, iis etiam, quas alias bruta censemus, immo vegetabilia, suum tamen ἦθος verisimile tribuatur, quod aut ex analogia mundi poetici, aut ex insufficientibus historiae naturalis traditionibus, aut ex opinionibus eorum, quorum potissimum gratia scribimus, ipsis conveniat? § 495. / The twelfth question will not chiefly consist in this, whether some poetic fable and fabulous fiction is more rightly rational, and whether some invented apologue is more beautiful, especially in our own age, in which even to animals other than man something of intellect and reason is again attributed with a truth sufficiently aesthetic, or whether at last it is more rightly merely rational than mixed, § 537. Rather, let this be as follows: whether to fictive persons, even those which we otherwise consider brutes, indeed even plants, nevertheless have attributed to them their own verisimilar ἦθος, which either from the analogy of the poetic world, or from insufficient traditions of natural history, or from the opinions of those for whose sake especially we write, may be suitable to them? § 495.
§ 606
In fabula Aeneidos rationali pius Aeneas ἦθος personae, quam ipsi semel imposuit poeta, sustinens ita primum prodit in scenam, L. I, 96.
In the rational fable of the Aeneid, pious Aeneas, sustaining the ἦθος of the person which the poet once imposed on him, thus first comes forth onto the stage, book I, 96.
Extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra, / Ingemit et duplices tendens ad sidera palmas Talia voce refert: O! terque quaterque beati, / Quos ante ora patrum, Troiae sub moenibus altis, / Contigit oppetere!
Straightway Aeneas, shuddering with amaze,
groaned loud, upraised both holy hands to Heaven,
and thus did plead: “O thrice and four times blest,
ye whom your sires and whom the walls of Troy
looked on in your last hour!”
ita postremam scenam concludit, ut vel in hostem Turnum lenis esse inciperet, huius
he concludes the last scene in such a way that he even began to be gentle toward his enemy Turnus, of whom
infelix humero quum apparuit alto / Balteus, et notis fulserunt cingula bullis / Pallantis pueri, victum quem vulnere Turnus / Straverat, atque, humeris inimicum insigne gerebat. Ille oculis postquam saevi monumenta doloris / Exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira / Terribilis: Tune hinc spoliis indute meorum / Eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas / Immolat, ac poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit. Hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit / Fervidus: ast illi solvuntur frigore membra, / Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.
when suddenly,
over the mighty shoulder slung, he saw
that fatal baldric studded with bright gold
which youthful Pallas wore, what time he fell
vanquished by Turnus' stroke, whose shoulders now
carried such trophy of a foeman slain.
Aeneas' eyes took sure and slow survey
of spoils that were the proof and memory
of cruel sorrow; then with kindling rage
and terrifying look, he cried, “Wouldst thou,
clad in a prize stripped off my chosen friend,
escape this hand? In this thy mortal wound
't is Pallas has a victim; Pallas takes
the lawful forfeit of thy guilty blood!”
He said, and buried deep his furious blade
in the opposer's heart. The failing limbs
sank cold and helpless; and the vital breath
with moan of wrath to darkness fled away.
Gemitus et frigore soluta membra incipientis Aeneae, finientis in hoste sunt, pius autem in deos, patriam, suos Aeneas sibi constans semper, manet unus et idem, § 605.
The groan and the limbs loosened by chill belong to Aeneas as he begins, and to his enemy as he ends, but Aeneas, pious toward the gods, fatherland, and his own people, always self-consistent, remains one and the same, § 605.
In fabula Aeneidos rationali pius Aeneas ἦθος personae, quam ipsi semel imposuit poeta, sustinens ita primum prodit in scenam, L. I, 96.
In the rational fable of the Aeneid, pious Aeneas, sustaining the ἦθος of the person which the poet once imposed on him, thus first comes forth onto the stage, book I, 96.
Extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra, / Ingemit et duplices tendens ad sidera palmas Talia voce refert: O! terque quaterque beati, / Quos ante ora patrum, Troiae sub moenibus altis, / Contigit oppetere!
Straightway Aeneas, shuddering with amaze,
groaned loud, upraised both holy hands to Heaven,
and thus did plead: “O thrice and four times blest,
ye whom your sires and whom the walls of Troy
looked on in your last hour!”
ita postremam scenam concludit, ut vel in hostem Turnum lenis esse inciperet, huius
he concludes the last scene in such a way that he even began to be gentle toward his enemy Turnus, of whom
infelix humero quum apparuit alto / Balteus, et notis fulserunt cingula bullis / Pallantis pueri, victum quem vulnere Turnus / Straverat, atque, humeris inimicum insigne gerebat. Ille oculis postquam saevi monumenta doloris / Exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira / Terribilis: Tune hinc spoliis indute meorum / Eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas / Immolat, ac poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit. Hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit / Fervidus: ast illi solvuntur frigore membra, / Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.
when suddenly,
over the mighty shoulder slung, he saw
that fatal baldric studded with bright gold
which youthful Pallas wore, what time he fell
vanquished by Turnus' stroke, whose shoulders now
carried such trophy of a foeman slain.
Aeneas' eyes took sure and slow survey
of spoils that were the proof and memory
of cruel sorrow; then with kindling rage
and terrifying look, he cried, “Wouldst thou,
clad in a prize stripped off my chosen friend,
escape this hand? In this thy mortal wound
't is Pallas has a victim; Pallas takes
the lawful forfeit of thy guilty blood!”
He said, and buried deep his furious blade
in the opposer's heart. The failing limbs
sank cold and helpless; and the vital breath
with moan of wrath to darkness fled away.
Gemitus et frigore soluta membra incipientis Aeneae, finientis in hoste sunt, pius autem in deos, patriam, suos Aeneas sibi constans semper, manet unus et idem, § 605.
The groan and the limbs loosened by chill belong to Aeneas as he begins, and to his enemy as he ends, but Aeneas, pious toward the gods, fatherland, and his own people, always self-consistent, remains one and the same, § 605.
In fabula Aeneidos rationali pius Aeneas
In the rational fable of the Aeneid, pious Aeneas,
ἦθος personae,
sustaining the ἦθος of the person
quam ipsi semel imposuit poeta, sustinens
which the poet once imposed on him,
ita primum prodit in scenam, L. I, 96.
thus first comes forth onto the stage, book I, 96.
Extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra, / Ingemit et duplices tendens ad sidera palmas Talia voce refert: O! terque quaterque beati, / Quos ante ora patrum, Troiae sub moenibus altis, / Contigit oppetere!
Straightway Aeneas, shuddering with amaze,
groaned loud, upraised both holy hands to Heaven,
and thus did plead: “O thrice and four times blest,
ye whom your sires and whom the walls of Troy
looked on in your last hour!”
ita postremam scenam concludit,
he concludes the last scene in
ut vel in hostem Turnum lenis
such a way that he even began to
esse inciperet, huius
be gentle toward his enemy Turnus, of whom
infelix humero quum apparuit alto / Balteus, et notis fulserunt cingula bullis / Pallantis pueri, victum quem vulnere Turnus / Straverat, atque, humeris inimicum insigne gerebat. Ille oculis postquam saevi monumenta doloris / Exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira / Terribilis: Tune hinc spoliis indute meorum / Eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas / Immolat, ac poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit. Hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit / Fervidus: ast illi solvuntur frigore membra, / Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.
when suddenly,
over the mighty shoulder slung, he saw
that fatal baldric studded with bright gold
which youthful Pallas wore, what time he fell
vanquished by Turnus' stroke, whose shoulders now
carried such trophy of a foeman slain.
Aeneas' eyes took sure and slow survey
of spoils that were the proof and memory
of cruel sorrow; then with kindling rage
and terrifying look, he cried, “Wouldst thou,
clad in a prize stripped off my chosen friend,
escape this hand? In this thy mortal wound
't is Pallas has a victim; Pallas takes
the lawful forfeit of thy guilty blood!”
He said, and buried deep his furious blade
in the opposer's heart. The failing limbs
sank cold and helpless; and the vital breath
with moan of wrath to darkness fled away.
Gemitus et frigore soluta membra incipientis Aeneae,
The groan and the limbs loosened by chill belong to Aeneas
finientis in hoste sunt, pius autem in deos,
as he begins, and to his enemy as he
patriam, suos Aeneas
ends, but Aeneas, pious toward the gods, fatherland,
sibi constans semper, manet unus et idem, § 605.
and his own people, always self-consistent, remains one and the same, § 605.
In fabula Aeneidos rationali pius Aeneas ἦθος personae, quam ipsi semel imposuit poeta, sustinens ita primum prodit in scenam, L. I, 96. / In the rational fable of the Aeneid, pious Aeneas, sustaining the ἦθος of the person which the poet once imposed on him, thus first comes forth onto the stage, book I, 96.
Extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra, / Ingemit et duplices tendens ad sidera palmas Talia voce refert: O! terque quaterque beati, / Quos ante ora patrum, Troiae sub moenibus altis, / Contigit oppetere!
Straightway Aeneas, shuddering with amaze,
groaned loud, upraised both holy hands to Heaven,
and thus did plead: “O thrice and four times blest,
ye whom your sires and whom the walls of Troy
looked on in your last hour!”
ita postremam scenam concludit, ut vel in hostem Turnum lenis esse inciperet, huius / he concludes the last scene in such a way that he even began to be gentle toward his enemy Turnus, of whom
infelix humero quum apparuit alto / Balteus, et notis fulserunt cingula bullis / Pallantis pueri, victum quem vulnere Turnus / Straverat, atque, humeris inimicum insigne gerebat. Ille oculis postquam saevi monumenta doloris / Exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira / Terribilis: Tune hinc spoliis indute meorum / Eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas / Immolat, ac poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit. Hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit / Fervidus: ast illi solvuntur frigore membra, / Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.
when suddenly,
over the mighty shoulder slung, he saw
that fatal baldric studded with bright gold
which youthful Pallas wore, what time he fell
vanquished by Turnus' stroke, whose shoulders now
carried such trophy of a foeman slain.
Aeneas' eyes took sure and slow survey
of spoils that were the proof and memory
of cruel sorrow; then with kindling rage
and terrifying look, he cried, “Wouldst thou,
clad in a prize stripped off my chosen friend,
escape this hand? In this thy mortal wound
't is Pallas has a victim; Pallas takes
the lawful forfeit of thy guilty blood!”
He said, and buried deep his furious blade
in the opposer's heart. The failing limbs
sank cold and helpless; and the vital breath
with moan of wrath to darkness fled away.
Gemitus et frigore soluta membra incipientis Aeneae, finientis in hoste sunt, pius autem in deos, patriam, suos Aeneas sibi constans semper, manet unus et idem, § 605. / The groan and the limbs loosened by chill belong to Aeneas as he begins, and to his enemy as he ends, but Aeneas, pious toward the gods, fatherland, and his own people, always self-consistent, remains one and the same, § 605.
§ 607
Quaestio decima tertia: An in fabulis, quae vel huic simpliciter et per eminentiam connexae dici videantur, implicitis, § 535. venustus ille nexus observatur, quo praeparantur in ipsa iam colligatione remotius, in transitu propius omnia catastrophae et solutioni ita, ut imprudentibus quidem, neque tamen non verisimilis, haec eveniat praesenti sic inferendo praeteritum, ut vel inopinatum maxime, natum tamen inde futurum appareat, eaque omnia servent iucundam istam unitatem, qua nihil cogitatorum deesse, postque factam solutionem nihil amplius desiderari posse videatur? § 437, 439. Nec hic minor cura verisimilitudinis moralis, § 604. et cuiusdam analogiae, in ipsis imponendis nominibus, § 594.
The thirteenth question: whether in fables, even in those that seem to be connected with this simply and by eminence, implicit fables, § 535, that graceful connection is observed, by which, already in the very binding-together, all things are prepared more remotely, and in the transition more closely, for catastrophe and resolution in such a way, that for the unwary indeed, yet not without verisimilitude, this happens by so inferring the past from the present, that even what is most unexpected nevertheless appears as the future born from it, and all those things preserve that pleasant unity, by which none of the things thought seems to be lacking, and after the resolution has been made nothing further seems able to be desired? §§ 437, 439. Nor here is there less care for moral verisimilitude, § 604, and for a certain analogy, in the very assigning of names, § 594.
Quod si personis iisdem uti aliis non licet, / Qui magis licet currentes servos scribere, / Bonas matronas facere, meretrices malas, Parasitum edacem, gloriosum militem, / Puerum supponi, falli per servum senem, / Amare, odisse, suspicari?
But if it is not permitted us to use the same characters as others, how can it any more be allowed to represent hurrying servants, to describe virtuous matrons, artful courtesans, the gluttonous parasite, the braggart captain, the infant palmed off, the old man cajoled by the servant, about love, hatred, suspicion?
Ter. Eun. prol. Immo vero, non licet solum, sed et oportet saepe numero, § 433.
Terence, Eunuchus, prologue. Indeed, truly, it is not only permitted, but also often necessary, § 433.
Quaestio decima tertia: An in fabulis, quae vel huic simpliciter et per eminentiam connexae dici videantur, implicitis, § 535. venustus ille nexus observatur, quo praeparantur in ipsa iam colligatione remotius, in transitu propius omnia catastrophae et solutioni ita, ut imprudentibus quidem, neque tamen non verisimilis, haec eveniat praesenti sic inferendo praeteritum, ut vel inopinatum maxime, natum tamen inde futurum appareat, eaque omnia servent iucundam istam unitatem, qua nihil cogitatorum deesse, postque factam solutionem nihil amplius desiderari posse videatur? § 437, 439. Nec hic minor cura verisimilitudinis moralis, § 604. et cuiusdam analogiae, in ipsis imponendis nominibus, § 594.
The thirteenth question: whether in fables, even in those that seem to be connected with this simply and by eminence, implicit fables, § 535, that graceful connection is observed, by which, already in the very binding-together, all things are prepared more remotely, and in the transition more closely, for catastrophe and resolution in such a way, that for the unwary indeed, yet not without verisimilitude, this happens by so inferring the past from the present, that even what is most unexpected nevertheless appears as the future born from it, and all those things preserve that pleasant unity, by which none of the things thought seems to be lacking, and after the resolution has been made nothing further seems able to be desired? §§ 437, 439. Nor here is there less care for moral verisimilitude, § 604, and for a certain analogy, in the very assigning of names, § 594.
Quod si personis iisdem uti aliis non licet, / Qui magis licet currentes servos scribere, / Bonas matronas facere, meretrices malas, Parasitum edacem, gloriosum militem, / Puerum supponi, falli per servum senem, / Amare, odisse, suspicari?
But if it is not permitted us to use the same characters as others, how can it any more be allowed to represent hurrying servants, to describe virtuous matrons, artful courtesans, the gluttonous parasite, the braggart captain, the infant palmed off, the old man cajoled by the servant, about love, hatred, suspicion?
Ter. Eun. prol.
Terence, Eunuchus, prologue.
Immo vero, non licet solum, sed et oportet saepe numero, § 433.
Indeed, truly, it is not only permitted, but also often necessary, § 433.
Quaestio decima tertia: An in fabulis,
The thirteenth question: whether in fables,
quae vel
even in those that seem to be connected with
huic simpliciter et per eminentiam connexae dici videantur, implicitis, § 535.
this simply and by eminence, implicit fables, § 535,
venustus ille nexus observatur, quo
that graceful connection is observed, by which,
praeparantur in ipsa iam colligatione
already in the very binding-together, all things are prepared more remotely,
remotius, in transitu propius
and in the transition more closely,
omnia catastrophae et solutioni ita,
for catastrophe and resolution in such a way,
ut imprudentibus quidem, neque tamen non verisimilis,
that for the unwary indeed, yet not without verisimilitude,
haec eveniat praesenti sic inferendo praeteritum,
this happens by so inferring the past from the present,
ut vel inopinatum maxime,
that even what is most unexpected nevertheless appears as
natum tamen inde futurum appareat,
the future born from it, and all
eaque omnia servent iucundam istam unitatem,
those things preserve that pleasant unity, by
qua nihil cogitatorum deesse,
which none of the things thought seems to be
postque factam solutionem nihil amplius desiderari
lacking, and after the resolution has been made nothing
posse videatur? § 437, 439.
further seems able to be desired? §§ 437, 439.
Nec hic minor cura verisimilitudinis moralis, § 604.
Nor here is there less care for moral verisimilitude, § 604,
et cuiusdam analogiae, in ipsis imponendis nominibus, § 594.
and for a certain analogy, in the very assigning of names, § 594.
Quod si personis iisdem uti aliis non licet, / Qui magis licet currentes servos scribere, / Bonas matronas facere, meretrices malas, Parasitum edacem, gloriosum militem, / Puerum supponi, falli per servum senem, / Amare, odisse, suspicari?
But if it is not permitted us to use the same characters as others, how can it any more be allowed to represent hurrying servants, to describe virtuous matrons, artful courtesans, the gluttonous parasite, the braggart captain, the infant palmed off, the old man cajoled by the servant, about love, hatred, suspicion?
Ter. Eun. prol.
Terence, Eunuchus, prologue.
Immo vero, non licet solum,
Indeed, truly, it is not only permitted,
sed et oportet saepe numero, § 433.
but also often necessary, § 433.
Quaestio decima tertia: An in fabulis, quae vel huic simpliciter et per eminentiam connexae dici videantur, implicitis, § 535. venustus ille nexus observatur, quo praeparantur in ipsa iam colligatione remotius, in transitu propius omnia catastrophae et solutioni ita, ut imprudentibus quidem, neque tamen non verisimilis, haec eveniat praesenti sic inferendo praeteritum, ut vel inopinatum maxime, natum tamen inde futurum appareat, eaque omnia servent iucundam istam unitatem, qua nihil cogitatorum deesse, postque factam solutionem nihil amplius desiderari posse videatur? § 437, 439. Nec hic minor cura verisimilitudinis moralis, § 604. et cuiusdam analogiae, in ipsis imponendis nominibus, § 594. / The thirteenth question: whether in fables, even in those that seem to be connected with this simply and by eminence, implicit fables, § 535, that graceful connection is observed, by which, already in the very binding-together, all things are prepared more remotely, and in the transition more closely, for catastrophe and resolution in such a way, that for the unwary indeed, yet not without verisimilitude, this happens by so inferring the past from the present, that even what is most unexpected nevertheless appears as the future born from it, and all those things preserve that pleasant unity, by which none of the things thought seems to be lacking, and after the resolution has been made nothing further seems able to be desired? §§ 437, 439. Nor here is there less care for moral verisimilitude, § 604, and for a certain analogy, in the very assigning of names, § 594.
Quod si personis iisdem uti aliis non licet, / Qui magis licet currentes servos scribere, / Bonas matronas facere, meretrices malas, Parasitum edacem, gloriosum militem, / Puerum supponi, falli per servum senem, / Amare, odisse, suspicari?
But if it is not permitted us to use the same characters as others, how can it any more be allowed to represent hurrying servants, to describe virtuous matrons, artful courtesans, the gluttonous parasite, the braggart captain, the infant palmed off, the old man cajoled by the servant, about love, hatred, suspicion?
Ter. Eun. prol. / Terence, Eunuchus, prologue.
Immo vero, non licet solum, sed et oportet saepe numero, § 433. / Indeed, truly, it is not only permitted, but also often necessary, § 433.
§ 608
Quaestio decima quarta: An sententia satis grandis est, ut eidem sine anthropomorphismo, qui vel analogo rationis talis esse videatur, crasso possint exempla divina subsumi? an exempla divinorum ita se gerant, ut ex iis per argumentum a minori ad maius, divina pulcre per analogon rationis colligi possint? An in utrisque casibus omnia vere se habeant, secundum exactum analogi rationis iudicium, theoprepos. § 435, 399. In Phaedri l. III. f. 17. primum licet quaerere, an aesopicis divina fabulis miscere conveniat? Sed hoc mittamus: Deinde Minervae admiranti, quare Divi sibi steriles arbores legerent,
The fourteenth question: whether the sententia is grand enough, that divine examples can be subsumed under it without a crude anthropomorphism that even to the analogue of reason seems to be such? or whether examples of divine things so conduct themselves, that from them, through an argument from the lesser to the greater, divine things can be beautifully gathered by the analogue of reason? Whether in both cases all things truly stand, according to the exact judgment of the analogue of reason, theoprepos. §§ 435, 399. In Phaedrus book III, fable 17, first it is permitted to ask, whether it is fitting to mix divine things with Aesopic fables? But let us pass over this: Then, to Minerva wondering why the gods chose for themselves sterile trees,
Olim quas vellent esse in tutela sua,
The Gods in days of yore made choice of such Trees as they wished to be under their protection.,
caussam dixit Iuppiter:
Jupiter gave the reason:
Honore fructum ne videamur vendere.
That we may not seem to sell the honor for the fruit.
Minerva olivam propter fructum praefert, et corrigit sententiam suam, iamque sic sentit
Minerva prefers the olive because of its fruit, and corrects her own sententia, and now judges thus:
Deorum genitor atque hominum sator: / Nisi utile est, quod facimus, stulta est gloria.
Then said the Father of the Gods and the Creator of men: “[...] unless what we do is useful, vain is our glory.”
Quaestio decima quarta: An sententia satis grandis est, ut eidem sine anthropomorphismo, qui vel analogo rationis talis esse videatur, crasso possint exempla divina subsumi? an exempla divinorum ita se gerant, ut ex iis per argumentum a minori ad maius, divina pulcre per analogon rationis colligi possint?
The fourteenth question: whether the sententia is grand enough, that divine examples can be subsumed under it without a crude anthropomorphism that even to the analogue of reason seems to be such? or whether examples of divine things so conduct themselves, that from them, through an argument from the lesser to the greater, divine things can be beautifully gathered by the analogue of reason?
An in utrisque casibus omnia vere se habeant, secundum exactum analogi rationis iudicium, theoprepos. § 435, 399. In Phaedri l. III. f. 17. primum licet quaerere, an aesopicis divina fabulis miscere conveniat?
Whether in both cases all things truly stand, according to the exact judgment of the analogue of reason, theoprepos. §§ 435, 399. In Phaedrus book III, fable 17, first it is permitted to ask, whether it is fitting to mix divine things with Aesopic fables?
Sed hoc mittamus: Deinde Minervae admiranti, quare Divi sibi steriles arbores legerent,
But let us pass over this: Then, to Minerva wondering why the gods chose for themselves sterile trees,
Olim quas vellent esse in tutela sua,
The Gods in days of yore made choice of such Trees as they wished to be under their protection.,
caussam dixit Iuppiter:
Jupiter gave the reason:
Honore fructum ne videamur vendere.
That we may not seem to sell the honor for the fruit.
Minerva olivam propter fructum praefert, et corrigit sententiam suam, iamque sic sentit
Minerva prefers the olive because of its fruit, and corrects her own sententia, and now judges thus:
Deorum genitor atque hominum sator: / Nisi utile est, quod facimus, stulta est gloria.
Then said the Father of the Gods and the Creator of men: “[...] unless what we do is useful, vain is our glory.”
Quaestio decima quarta: An sententia satis grandis est,
The fourteenth question: whether the sententia is grand enough,
ut eidem sine anthropomorphismo,
that divine examples can be subsumed under it without a crude anthropomorphism
qui vel analogo rationis talis esse videatur,
that even to the analogue of reason seems to be such?
crasso possint exempla divina subsumi?
or whether examples of divine
an exempla divinorum ita se gerant, ut ex iis
things so conduct themselves, that from them,
per argumentum a minori ad maius,
through an argument from the lesser to the greater,
divina pulcre per analogon rationis colligi possint?
divine things can be beautifully gathered by the analogue of reason?
An in utrisque casibus omnia vere se habeant,
Whether in both cases all things truly stand,
secundum exactum analogi rationis iudicium, theoprepos.
according to the exact judgment of the analogue of reason, theoprepos.
§ 435, 399. In Phaedri l. III. f. 17.
§§ 435, 399. In Phaedrus book III, fable 17,
primum licet quaerere,
first it is permitted to ask, whether it
an aesopicis divina fabulis miscere conveniat?
is fitting to mix divine things with Aesopic fables?
Sed hoc mittamus:
But let us pass over this: Then,
Deinde Minervae admiranti, quare Divi sibi steriles arbores legerent,
to Minerva wondering why the gods chose for themselves sterile trees,
Olim quas vellent esse in tutela sua,
The Gods in days of yore made choice of such Trees as they wished to be under their protection.,
caussam dixit Iuppiter:
Jupiter gave the reason:
Honore fructum ne videamur vendere.
That we may not seem to sell the honor for the fruit.
Minerva olivam propter fructum praefert,
Minerva prefers the olive because of its fruit,
et corrigit sententiam suam, iamque sic sentit
and corrects her own sententia, and now judges thus:
Deorum genitor atque hominum sator: / Nisi utile est, quod facimus, stulta est gloria.
Then said the Father of the Gods and the Creator of men: “[...] unless what we do is useful, vain is our glory.”
Quaestio decima quarta: An sententia satis grandis est, ut eidem sine anthropomorphismo, qui vel analogo rationis talis esse videatur, crasso possint exempla divina subsumi? an exempla divinorum ita se gerant, ut ex iis per argumentum a minori ad maius, divina pulcre per analogon rationis colligi possint? / The fourteenth question: whether the sententia is grand enough, that divine examples can be subsumed under it without a crude anthropomorphism that even to the analogue of reason seems to be such? or whether examples of divine things so conduct themselves, that from them, through an argument from the lesser to the greater, divine things can be beautifully gathered by the analogue of reason?
An in utrisque casibus omnia vere se habeant, secundum exactum analogi rationis iudicium, theoprepos. § 435, 399. In Phaedri l. III. f. 17. primum licet quaerere, an aesopicis divina fabulis miscere conveniat? / Whether in both cases all things truly stand, according to the exact judgment of the analogue of reason, theoprepos. §§ 435, 399. In Phaedrus book III, fable 17, first it is permitted to ask, whether it is fitting to mix divine things with Aesopic fables?
Sed hoc mittamus: Deinde Minervae admiranti, quare Divi sibi steriles arbores legerent, / But let us pass over this: Then, to Minerva wondering why the gods chose for themselves sterile trees,
Olim quas vellent esse in tutela sua,
The Gods in days of yore made choice of such Trees as they wished to be under their protection.,
caussam dixit Iuppiter: / Jupiter gave the reason:
Honore fructum ne videamur vendere.
That we may not seem to sell the honor for the fruit.
Minerva olivam propter fructum praefert, et corrigit sententiam suam, iamque sic sentit / Minerva prefers the olive because of its fruit, and corrects her own sententia, and now judges thus:
Deorum genitor atque hominum sator: / Nisi utile est, quod facimus, stulta est gloria.
Then said the Father of the Gods and the Creator of men: “[...] unless what we do is useful, vain is our glory.”
§ 609
Sententia dicitur dictae fabulae:
The sententia of the said fable is called:
Nihil agere, quod non prosit, fabella admonet.
This little Fable admonishes us to do nothing that is not profitable.
Iam ego quaeritur, an declaretur exemplo ficto aliter, quam supponendo, per ipsas Iovis curas posteriores stultam fuisse gloriam; dum
Now therefore it is asked whether this is declared by the invented example otherwise than by supposing, through Jupiter's own later concerns, that the glory was foolish; while
Quercus Iovi / Et myrtus Veneri placuit, Phoebo laurea, / Pinus Cybellae, populus celsa Herculi
The Oak pleased Jupiter, the Myrtle Venus, the Laurel Phoebus, the Pine Cybele, the lofty Poplar Hercules.
et inanem colorem fuisse, grandem illam caussam et aetiologiam, quam primo adduxerat, Iuppiter, quae sane tanta est, ut eam multi interpretum ne assequuti quidem sint, et lectionem mutare nequicquam laborarint: ideo steriles nostras facimus, relinquendo mortalibus frugiferas, ne his pro divino nobis praestando cultu fructum vendere videamur. Interim sunt tamen narratae arbores in tutela divorum, qui memorantur, per mundum poeticum, ad hunc usque diem. Quot simul observantur deesse verisimilitudines? § 608. Verum ubi non detegas turpitudines eiusmodi; quam primum a vera religione recesseris?
and that that grand cause and aetiology, which Jupiter had first brought forward, was an empty color, which indeed is so great that many interpreters have not even followed it, and have labored in vain to change the reading: therefore we make our own trees sterile, leaving fruitful ones to mortals, lest we seem to sell fruit to them in exchange for divine worship to be offered to us. Meanwhile, however, the narrated trees are in the protection of the gods who are mentioned, throughout the poetic world, even to this day. How many verisimilitudes are observed to be lacking at the same time? § 608. But where would you not uncover uglinesses of this sort, as soon as you have withdrawn from true religion?
Sententia dicitur dictae fabulae:
The sententia of the said fable is called:
Nihil agere, quod non prosit, fabella admonet.
This little Fable admonishes us to do nothing that is not profitable.
Iam ego quaeritur, an declaretur exemplo ficto aliter, quam supponendo, per ipsas Iovis curas posteriores stultam fuisse gloriam; dum
Now therefore it is asked whether this is declared by the invented example otherwise than by supposing, through Jupiter's own later concerns, that the glory was foolish; while
Quercus Iovi / Et myrtus Veneri placuit, Phoebo laurea, / Pinus Cybellae, populus celsa Herculi
The Oak pleased Jupiter, the Myrtle Venus, the Laurel Phoebus, the Pine Cybele, the lofty Poplar Hercules.
et inanem colorem fuisse, grandem illam caussam et aetiologiam, quam primo adduxerat, Iuppiter, quae sane tanta est, ut eam multi interpretum ne assequuti quidem sint, et lectionem mutare nequicquam laborarint: ideo steriles nostras facimus, relinquendo mortalibus frugiferas, ne his pro divino nobis praestando cultu fructum vendere videamur.
and that that grand cause and aetiology, which Jupiter had first brought forward, was an empty color, which indeed is so great that many interpreters have not even followed it, and have labored in vain to change the reading: therefore we make our own trees sterile, leaving fruitful ones to mortals, lest we seem to sell fruit to them in exchange for divine worship to be offered to us.
Interim sunt tamen narratae arbores in tutela divorum, qui memorantur, per mundum poeticum, ad hunc usque diem.
Meanwhile, however, the narrated trees are in the protection of the gods who are mentioned, throughout the poetic world, even to this day.
Quot simul observantur deesse verisimilitudines? § 608. Verum ubi non detegas turpitudines eiusmodi; quam primum a vera religione recesseris?
How many verisimilitudes are observed to be lacking at the same time? § 608. But where would you not uncover uglinesses of this sort, as soon as you have withdrawn from true religion?
Sententia dicitur dictae fabulae:
The sententia of the said fable is called:
Nihil agere, quod non prosit, fabella admonet.
This little Fable admonishes us to do nothing that is not profitable.
Iam ego quaeritur, an declaretur
Now therefore it is asked whether this is declared
exemplo ficto aliter, quam supponendo,
by the invented example otherwise than by supposing,
per ipsas Iovis curas posteriores stultam fuisse gloriam; dum
through Jupiter's own later concerns, that the glory was foolish; while
Quercus Iovi / Et myrtus Veneri placuit, Phoebo laurea, / Pinus Cybellae, populus celsa Herculi
The Oak pleased Jupiter, the Myrtle Venus, the Laurel Phoebus, the Pine Cybele, the lofty Poplar Hercules.
et inanem colorem fuisse, grandem illam caussam et aetiologiam,
and that that grand cause and aetiology,
quam primo adduxerat, Iuppiter,
which Jupiter had first brought forward,
quae sane tanta est,
was an empty color, which indeed is
ut eam multi interpretum ne assequuti quidem sint,
so great that many interpreters have not even followed it,
et lectionem mutare nequicquam laborarint:
and have labored in vain to change the reading:
ideo steriles nostras facimus,
therefore we make our own trees sterile, leaving fruitful ones
relinquendo mortalibus frugiferas, ne his
to mortals, lest we seem to sell fruit
pro divino nobis praestando cultu fructum vendere videamur.
to them in exchange for divine worship to be offered to us.
Interim sunt tamen narratae arbores in tutela divorum,
Meanwhile, however, the narrated trees are in the protection of the
qui memorantur, per mundum poeticum,
gods who are mentioned, throughout the poetic world,
ad hunc usque diem.
even to this day.
Quot simul
How many verisimilitudes are observed to be lacking at the same time?
observantur deesse verisimilitudines? § 608. Verum ubi non detegas turpitudines eiusmodi;
§ 608. But where would you not uncover uglinesses of
quam primum a vera religione recesseris?
this sort, as soon as you have withdrawn from true religion?
Sententia dicitur dictae fabulae: / The sententia of the said fable is called:
Nihil agere, quod non prosit, fabella admonet.
This little Fable admonishes us to do nothing that is not profitable.
Iam ego quaeritur, an declaretur exemplo ficto aliter, quam supponendo, per ipsas Iovis curas posteriores stultam fuisse gloriam; dum / Now therefore it is asked whether this is declared by the invented example otherwise than by supposing, through Jupiter's own later concerns, that the glory was foolish; while
Quercus Iovi / Et myrtus Veneri placuit, Phoebo laurea, / Pinus Cybellae, populus celsa Herculi
The Oak pleased Jupiter, the Myrtle Venus, the Laurel Phoebus, the Pine Cybele, the lofty Poplar Hercules.
et inanem colorem fuisse, grandem illam caussam et aetiologiam, quam primo adduxerat, Iuppiter, quae sane tanta est, ut eam multi interpretum ne assequuti quidem sint, et lectionem mutare nequicquam laborarint: ideo steriles nostras facimus, relinquendo mortalibus frugiferas, ne his pro divino nobis praestando cultu fructum vendere videamur. / and that that grand cause and aetiology, which Jupiter had first brought forward, was an empty color, which indeed is so great that many interpreters have not even followed it, and have labored in vain to change the reading: therefore we make our own trees sterile, leaving fruitful ones to mortals, lest we seem to sell fruit to them in exchange for divine worship to be offered to us.
Interim sunt tamen narratae arbores in tutela divorum, qui memorantur, per mundum poeticum, ad hunc usque diem. / Meanwhile, however, the narrated trees are in the protection of the gods who are mentioned, throughout the poetic world, even to this day.
Quot simul observantur deesse verisimilitudines? § 608. Verum ubi non detegas turpitudines eiusmodi; quam primum a vera religione recesseris? / How many verisimilitudes are observed to be lacking at the same time? § 608. But where would you not uncover uglinesses of this sort, as soon as you have withdrawn from true religion?
§ 610
Decimum quintum quaeritur, an praeter verisimilitudines sibi cum aliis communes fabulis, Milesia praesertim amoris, nunc caeci, nunc probe perspicacis, veritatem verisimilitudinemque, praecipue moralem, latius dictam, ubique servarit, § 433, 495? An sententias, quas illustratum it, laudabilium effata, et de facto tantum enunciantes aliquid, quod solet contingere illi, qui amores
It is asked fifteenth whether, besides verisimilitudes common to itself with other fables, especially the Milesian fable of love, now blind, now thoroughly sharp-sighted, has everywhere preserved truth and verisimilitude, especially moral verisimilitude more broadly so called, §§ 433, 495? Whether the sententiae which it goes to illustrate, sayings of praiseworthy persons, and uttering only concerning fact something that usually happens to the one who loves,
Aut metuat dulces, aut experiatur amaros,
you well deserve the heifer, so does he,
with all who either fear the sweets of love,
or taste its bitterness.
satis vel implicite per decursum fictae narrationis et ipsum eventum, et characteres personarum, quae iisdem utuntur, ceu principiis practicis, sufficienter discreverit? § 549.
sufficiently or implicitly through the course of the fictive narrative and the event itself, and through the characters of the persons who use the same things as practical principles? § 549.
Decimum quintum quaeritur, an praeter verisimilitudines sibi cum aliis communes fabulis, Milesia praesertim amoris, nunc caeci, nunc probe perspicacis, veritatem verisimilitudinemque, praecipue moralem, latius dictam, ubique servarit, § 433, 495? An sententias, quas illustratum it, laudabilium effata, et de facto tantum enunciantes aliquid, quod solet contingere illi, qui amores
It is asked fifteenth whether, besides verisimilitudes common to itself with other fables, especially the Milesian fable of love, now blind, now thoroughly sharp-sighted, has everywhere preserved truth and verisimilitude, especially moral verisimilitude more broadly so called, §§ 433, 495? Whether the sententiae which it goes to illustrate, sayings of praiseworthy persons, and uttering only concerning fact something that usually happens to the one who loves,
Aut metuat dulces, aut experiatur amaros,
you well deserve the heifer, so does he,
with all who either fear the sweets of love,
or taste its bitterness.
satis vel implicite per decursum fictae narrationis et ipsum eventum, et characteres personarum, quae iisdem utuntur, ceu principiis practicis, sufficienter discreverit? § 549.
sufficiently or implicitly through the course of the fictive narrative and the event itself, and through the characters of the persons who use the same things as practical principles? § 549.
Decimum quintum quaeritur, an praeter verisimilitudines sibi
It is asked fifteenth whether, besides verisimilitudes common to
cum aliis communes fabulis, Milesia praesertim amoris,
itself with other fables, especially the Milesian fable of love,
nunc caeci, nunc probe perspicacis,
now blind, now thoroughly sharp-sighted, has everywhere
veritatem verisimilitudinemque, praecipue moralem, latius dictam,
preserved truth and verisimilitude, especially moral verisimilitude more broadly
ubique servarit, § 433, 495? An sententias, quas illustratum it,
so called, §§ 433, 495? Whether the sententiae which it
laudabilium effata,
goes to illustrate, sayings of praiseworthy persons,
et de facto tantum enunciantes aliquid,
and uttering only concerning fact something
quod solet contingere illi, qui amores
that usually happens to the one who loves,
Aut metuat dulces, aut experiatur amaros,
you well deserve the heifer, so does he,
with all who either fear the sweets of love,
or taste its bitterness.
satis vel implicite per decursum fictae
sufficiently or implicitly through the course of the fictive
narrationis et ipsum eventum, et characteres personarum,
narrative and the event itself, and through the characters of the persons
quae iisdem utuntur, ceu principiis practicis, sufficienter discreverit? § 549.
who use the same things as practical principles? § 549.
Decimum quintum quaeritur, an praeter verisimilitudines sibi cum aliis communes fabulis, Milesia praesertim amoris, nunc caeci, nunc probe perspicacis, veritatem verisimilitudinemque, praecipue moralem, latius dictam, ubique servarit, § 433, 495? An sententias, quas illustratum it, laudabilium effata, et de facto tantum enunciantes aliquid, quod solet contingere illi, qui amores / It is asked fifteenth whether, besides verisimilitudes common to itself with other fables, especially the Milesian fable of love, now blind, now thoroughly sharp-sighted, has everywhere preserved truth and verisimilitude, especially moral verisimilitude more broadly so called, §§ 433, 495? Whether the sententiae which it goes to illustrate, sayings of praiseworthy persons, and uttering only concerning fact something that usually happens to the one who loves,
Aut metuat dulces, aut experiatur amaros,
you well deserve the heifer, so does he,
with all who either fear the sweets of love,
or taste its bitterness.
satis vel implicite per decursum fictae narrationis et ipsum eventum, et characteres personarum, quae iisdem utuntur, ceu principiis practicis, sufficienter discreverit? § 549. / sufficiently or implicitly through the course of the fictive narrative and the event itself, and through the characters of the persons who use the same things as practical principles? § 549.
§ 611
Sententiae fabularum Milesiarum venustius practicae, § 610. illae scilicet, quae finis ultimus et scopus sunt totius operis, redeunt ad duas has generales maxime formulas, vel illam Veneris:
The more gracefully practical maxims of Milesian fables, § 610, namely those which are the final end and aim of the whole work, return to these two especially general formulas, either that one of Venus:
Nunc amet, qui nunquam amavit, quique / amavit, nunc amet!
Tomorn who ne'er hath loved shall love, and who hath loved shall love
tomorn.
vel hanc de bene multis amoribus non minus veram, etiam aesthetice: Non amet, qui nondum amavit, quique / amavit, non amet. Hinc, prout paraeneticam, vel elencticam suam sibi sumpsit auctor primariam sententiam, § 576. verisimilitudinem moralem strictius etiam dictam, § 435. observare sancte debet, ne quid commendet, bonis moribus repugnans, ne quid dissuadeat in exemplo docens, quod virtus ex §§ 211, 214. considerata, vel omnino postulet vel certe non, nisi morosa, reprehendat, §§ 467, 470.
or this one, concerning very many loves no less true, even aesthetically: Let him not love, who has not yet loved, and whoever has loved, let him not love. Hence, according as the author has taken for himself an exhortative or an elenctic primary sententia, § 576, he must sacredly observe moral verisimilitude, even so called in the stricter sense, § 435, lest he recommend anything repugnant to good morals, lest, teaching in an example, he dissuade anything which virtue, considered from §§ 211, 214, either altogether demands or at least does not censure, unless morose, §§ 467, 470.
Sententiae fabularum Milesiarum venustius practicae, § 610. illae scilicet, quae finis ultimus et scopus sunt totius operis, redeunt ad duas has generales maxime formulas, vel illam Veneris:
The more gracefully practical maxims of Milesian fables, § 610, namely those which are the final end and aim of the whole work, return to these two especially general formulas, either that one of Venus:
Nunc amet, qui nunquam amavit, quique / amavit, nunc amet!
Tomorn who ne'er hath loved shall love, and who hath loved shall love
tomorn.
vel hanc de bene multis amoribus non minus veram, etiam aesthetice: Non amet, qui nondum amavit, quique / amavit, non amet.
or this one, concerning very many loves no less true, even aesthetically: Let him not love, who has not yet loved, and whoever has loved, let him not love.
Hinc, prout paraeneticam, vel elencticam suam sibi sumpsit auctor primariam sententiam, § 576. verisimilitudinem moralem strictius etiam dictam, § 435. observare sancte debet, ne quid commendet, bonis moribus repugnans, ne quid dissuadeat in exemplo docens, quod virtus ex §§ 211, 214. considerata, vel omnino postulet vel certe non, nisi morosa, reprehendat, §§ 467, 470.
Hence, according as the author has taken for himself an exhortative or an elenctic primary sententia, § 576, he must sacredly observe moral verisimilitude, even so called in the stricter sense, § 435, lest he recommend anything repugnant to good morals, lest, teaching in an example, he dissuade anything which virtue, considered from §§ 211, 214, either altogether demands or at least does not censure, unless morose, §§ 467, 470.
Sententiae fabularum Milesiarum venustius practicae, § 610.
The more gracefully practical maxims of Milesian fables, § 610,
illae scilicet, quae finis ultimus et scopus sunt totius operis,
namely those which are the final end and aim of the whole
redeunt ad duas has generales maxime formulas,
work, return to these two especially general formulas,
vel illam Veneris:
either that one of Venus:
Nunc amet, qui nunquam amavit, quique / amavit, nunc amet!
Tomorn who ne'er hath loved shall love, and who hath loved shall love
tomorn.
vel hanc de bene multis amoribus non minus veram, etiam aesthetice:
or this one, concerning very many loves no less true, even aesthetically:
Non amet, qui nondum
Let him not love, who has not yet loved,
amavit, quique / amavit, non amet.
and whoever has loved, let him not love.
Hinc, prout paraeneticam, vel elencticam suam sibi
Hence, according as the author has taken for himself
sumpsit auctor primariam sententiam, § 576.
an exhortative or an elenctic primary sententia, § 576,
verisimilitudinem moralem strictius etiam dictam,
he must sacredly observe moral verisimilitude, even so
§ 435.
called in the stricter sense, § 435,
observare sancte debet, ne quid commendet, bonis moribus repugnans,
lest he recommend anything repugnant
ne quid dissuadeat in exemplo
to good morals, lest, teaching in an example,
docens, quod virtus ex §§ 211, 214.
he dissuade anything which virtue, considered from §§ 211, 214,
considerata, vel omnino postulet vel certe non,
either altogether demands or at least does not censure,
nisi morosa, reprehendat, §§ 467, 470.
unless morose, §§ 467, 470.
Sententiae fabularum Milesiarum venustius practicae, § 610. illae scilicet, quae finis ultimus et scopus sunt totius operis, redeunt ad duas has generales maxime formulas, vel illam Veneris: / The more gracefully practical maxims of Milesian fables, § 610, namely those which are the final end and aim of the whole work, return to these two especially general formulas, either that one of Venus:
Nunc amet, qui nunquam amavit, quique / amavit, nunc amet!
Tomorn who ne'er hath loved shall love, and who hath loved shall love
tomorn.
vel hanc de bene multis amoribus non minus veram, etiam aesthetice: Non amet, qui nondum amavit, quique / amavit, non amet. / or this one, concerning very many loves no less true, even aesthetically: Let him not love, who has not yet loved, and whoever has loved, let him not love.
Hinc, prout paraeneticam, vel elencticam suam sibi sumpsit auctor primariam sententiam, § 576. verisimilitudinem moralem strictius etiam dictam, § 435. observare sancte debet, ne quid commendet, bonis moribus repugnans, ne quid dissuadeat in exemplo docens, quod virtus ex §§ 211, 214. considerata, vel omnino postulet vel certe non, nisi morosa, reprehendat, §§ 467, 470. / Hence, according as the author has taken for himself an exhortative or an elenctic primary sententia, § 576, he must sacredly observe moral verisimilitude, even so called in the stricter sense, § 435, lest he recommend anything repugnant to good morals, lest, teaching in an example, he dissuade anything which virtue, considered from §§ 211, 214, either altogether demands or at least does not censure, unless morose, §§ 467, 470.
§ 612
Decima sexta claudit agmen quaestio: An fabula heroica, praeter verisimilitudinem sibi cum aliis fabulis communem, hanc sibi propriam servat strenue, qua persona herois praecipui semper eadem sibi constet, et una, ἀρετήν quidem et aliquam remissionem aliquando passa, sublimis tamen vel in eo, ut sponte colligatur et elevetur denuo pristinum et eximium in decus, S. XXI. XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas Cartagine videbatur ipsi Iovi exspectans,
The sixteenth question closes the line: whether heroic fable, besides the verisimilitude common to it with other fables, vigorously preserves this one proper to itself, by which the person of the chief hero always stands consistent with itself and one, with respect to arete, indeed, having sometimes suffered some relaxation, yet sublime even in this, that spontaneously it is gathered together and elevated again into its former and exceptional honor, S. XXI. XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas at Carthage seemed, even to Jupiter himself, waiting,
Quem nulla accendit magnarum gloria rerum, / Nec super ipse sua molitur laude laborem,
If such a glory and event supreme
enkindle not his bosom; if such task
to his own honor speak not;
tamen haud ita multo post adeo soporem ipse denuo suis excusserat oculis, ut magnifice, neque tamen magniloquentiae, crimen incurrens, hortari posset Ascanium l. XII. 435:
nevertheless, not so much later, he had himself again shaken sleep so much from his eyes, that magnificently, and yet not incurring the charge of grandiloquence, he could exhort Ascanius, book XII.435:
Disce, puer, virtutem ex me verumque laborem / Fortunam ex aliis. Te pater Aeneas et avunculus excitet Hector.
“My boy”, he cried,
“What valor is and patient, genuine toil
learn thou of me; let others guide thy feet
to prosperous fortune. Let this hand and sword
defend thee through the war and lead thee on
to high rewards. Thou also play the man!
And when thy riper vigor soon shall bloom,
forget not in thy heart to ponder well
the story of our line. Heed honor's call,
like Sire Aeneas and Hector thy close kin.”
Decima sexta claudit agmen quaestio: An fabula heroica, praeter verisimilitudinem sibi cum aliis fabulis communem, hanc sibi propriam servat strenue, qua persona herois praecipui semper eadem sibi constet, et una, ἀρετήν quidem et aliquam remissionem aliquando passa, sublimis tamen vel in eo, ut sponte colligatur et elevetur denuo pristinum et eximium in decus, S. XXI. XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas Cartagine videbatur ipsi Iovi exspectans,
The sixteenth question closes the line: whether heroic fable, besides the verisimilitude common to it with other fables, vigorously preserves this one proper to itself, by which the person of the chief hero always stands consistent with itself and one, with respect to arete, indeed, having sometimes suffered some relaxation, yet sublime even in this, that spontaneously it is gathered together and elevated again into its former and exceptional honor, S. XXI. XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas at Carthage seemed, even to Jupiter himself, waiting,
Quem nulla accendit magnarum gloria rerum, / Nec super ipse sua molitur laude laborem,
If such a glory and event supreme
enkindle not his bosom; if such task
to his own honor speak not;
tamen haud ita multo post adeo soporem ipse denuo suis excusserat oculis, ut magnifice, neque tamen magniloquentiae, crimen incurrens, hortari posset Ascanium l. XII. 435:
nevertheless, not so much later, he had himself again shaken sleep so much from his eyes, that magnificently, and yet not incurring the charge of grandiloquence, he could exhort Ascanius, book XII.435:
Disce, puer, virtutem ex me verumque laborem / Fortunam ex aliis. Te pater Aeneas et avunculus excitet Hector.
“My boy”, he cried,
“What valor is and patient, genuine toil
learn thou of me; let others guide thy feet
to prosperous fortune. Let this hand and sword
defend thee through the war and lead thee on
to high rewards. Thou also play the man!
And when thy riper vigor soon shall bloom,
forget not in thy heart to ponder well
the story of our line. Heed honor's call,
like Sire Aeneas and Hector thy close kin.”
Decima sexta claudit agmen quaestio:
The sixteenth question closes the line:
An fabula heroica, praeter verisimilitudinem sibi cum aliis fabulis
whether heroic fable, besides the verisimilitude common to it with other fables,
communem, hanc sibi propriam servat strenue,
vigorously preserves this one proper to itself, by
qua persona herois praecipui semper eadem sibi constet,
which the person of the chief hero always stands consistent
et una, ἀρετήν quidem et aliquam
with itself and one, with respect to arete, indeed,
remissionem aliquando passa, sublimis tamen vel in eo,
having sometimes suffered some relaxation, yet sublime even in this,
ut sponte colligatur et elevetur denuo
that spontaneously it is gathered together and elevated again
pristinum et eximium in decus, S. XXI.
into its former and exceptional honor, S. XXI.
XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas Cartagine videbatur ipsi Iovi exspectans,
XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas at Carthage seemed, even to Jupiter himself, waiting,
Quem nulla accendit magnarum gloria rerum, / Nec super ipse sua molitur laude laborem,
If such a glory and event supreme
enkindle not his bosom; if such task
to his own honor speak not;
tamen haud ita multo post adeo soporem ipse denuo
nevertheless, not so much later, he had himself again
suis excusserat oculis, ut magnifice,
shaken sleep so much from his eyes, that magnificently,
neque tamen magniloquentiae,
and yet not incurring the charge of grandiloquence,
crimen incurrens, hortari posset Ascanium l. XII. 435:
he could exhort Ascanius, book XII.435:
Disce, puer, virtutem ex me verumque laborem / Fortunam ex aliis. Te pater Aeneas et avunculus excitet Hector.
“My boy”, he cried,
“What valor is and patient, genuine toil
learn thou of me; let others guide thy feet
to prosperous fortune. Let this hand and sword
defend thee through the war and lead thee on
to high rewards. Thou also play the man!
And when thy riper vigor soon shall bloom,
forget not in thy heart to ponder well
the story of our line. Heed honor's call,
like Sire Aeneas and Hector thy close kin.”
Decima sexta claudit agmen quaestio: An fabula heroica, praeter verisimilitudinem sibi cum aliis fabulis communem, hanc sibi propriam servat strenue, qua persona herois praecipui semper eadem sibi constet, et una, ἀρετήν quidem et aliquam remissionem aliquando passa, sublimis tamen vel in eo, ut sponte colligatur et elevetur denuo pristinum et eximium in decus, S. XXI. XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas Cartagine videbatur ipsi Iovi exspectans, / The sixteenth question closes the line: whether heroic fable, besides the verisimilitude common to it with other fables, vigorously preserves this one proper to itself, by which the person of the chief hero always stands consistent with itself and one, with respect to arete, indeed, having sometimes suffered some relaxation, yet sublime even in this, that spontaneously it is gathered together and elevated again into its former and exceptional honor, S. XXI. XXVI. §§ 433, 538. Aeneas at Carthage seemed, even to Jupiter himself, waiting,
Quem nulla accendit magnarum gloria rerum, / Nec super ipse sua molitur laude laborem,
If such a glory and event supreme
enkindle not his bosom; if such task
to his own honor speak not;
tamen haud ita multo post adeo soporem ipse denuo suis excusserat oculis, ut magnifice, neque tamen magniloquentiae, crimen incurrens, hortari posset Ascanium l. XII. 435: / nevertheless, not so much later, he had himself again shaken sleep so much from his eyes, that magnificently, and yet not incurring the charge of grandiloquence, he could exhort Ascanius, book XII.435:
Disce, puer, virtutem ex me verumque laborem / Fortunam ex aliis. Te pater Aeneas et avunculus excitet Hector.
“My boy”, he cried,
“What valor is and patient, genuine toil
learn thou of me; let others guide thy feet
to prosperous fortune. Let this hand and sword
defend thee through the war and lead thee on
to high rewards. Thou also play the man!
And when thy riper vigor soon shall bloom,
forget not in thy heart to ponder well
the story of our line. Heed honor's call,
like Sire Aeneas and Hector thy close kin.”
§ 613
Veritatem aestheticam S. XXVII. probe distinguens a falsitate aesthetica, S. XXVIII. venustius exhibens in verisimilitudinibus, S. XXVIIII. per fictiones varias, S. XXX, et ipsas aliquando poeticas, S. XXXI. non sine fabulis: S. XXXII. quae narrat, fingit, immo fabulari censetur, ubi probationibus indigent, si belle probat, S. XXXIII, uti suum ubique veritatis studium, S. XXXIIII. quamcunque sequatur verisimilitudinis speciem, S. XXXV. tunc etiam, quando fit poeta, S. XXXVI. venuste prodit: erit ille,
Properly distinguishing aesthetic truth, S. XXVII, from aesthetic falsity, S. XXVIII, displaying more gracefully in verisimilitudes, S. XXVIIII, through various fictions, S. XXX, and sometimes those very poetic ones, S. XXXI, not without fables, S. XXXII, which he narrates, invents, indeed is judged to fabulate, where they need proofs, if he proves beautifully, S. XXXIII, as everywhere his own zeal for truth, S. XXXIIII, whatever species of verisimilitude he follows, S. XXXV, then also, when he becomes a poet, S. XXXVI, gracefully brings forth: he will be that one,
Iudice me, non sordidus auctor / Naturae verique, § 104. Hor.
in your opinion, no inconsiderable judge of truth and nature.
Veritatem aestheticam S. XXVII. probe distinguens a falsitate aesthetica, S. XXVIII. venustius exhibens in verisimilitudinibus, S. XXVIIII. per fictiones varias, S. XXX, et ipsas aliquando poeticas, S. XXXI. non sine fabulis: S. XXXII. quae narrat, fingit, immo fabulari censetur, ubi probationibus indigent, si belle probat, S. XXXIII, uti suum ubique veritatis studium, S. XXXIIII. quamcunque sequatur verisimilitudinis speciem, S. XXXV. tunc etiam, quando fit poeta, S. XXXVI. venuste prodit: erit ille,
Properly distinguishing aesthetic truth, S. XXVII, from aesthetic falsity, S. XXVIII, displaying more gracefully in verisimilitudes, S. XXVIIII, through various fictions, S. XXX, and sometimes those very poetic ones, S. XXXI, not without fables, S. XXXII, which he narrates, invents, indeed is judged to fabulate, where they need proofs, if he proves beautifully, S. XXXIII, as everywhere his own zeal for truth, S. XXXIIII, whatever species of verisimilitude he follows, S. XXXV, then also, when he becomes a poet, S. XXXVI, gracefully brings forth: he will be that one,
Iudice me, non sordidus auctor / Naturae verique, § 104. Hor.
in your opinion, no inconsiderable judge of truth and nature.
Veritatem aestheticam S. XXVII.
Properly distinguishing aesthetic truth, S. XXVII,
probe distinguens a falsitate aesthetica, S. XXVIII.
from aesthetic falsity, S. XXVIII,
venustius exhibens in verisimilitudinibus, S. XXVIIII.
displaying more gracefully in verisimilitudes, S. XXVIIII,
per fictiones varias, S. XXX,
through various fictions, S. XXX,
et ipsas aliquando poeticas, S. XXXI.
and sometimes those very poetic ones, S. XXXI,
non sine fabulis: S. XXXII. quae narrat,
not without fables, S. XXXII, which he narrates, invents,
fingit, immo fabulari censetur, ubi probationibus indigent,
indeed is judged to fabulate, where they need proofs,
si belle probat, S. XXXIII,
if he proves beautifully, S. XXXIII,
uti suum ubique veritatis studium, S.
as everywhere his own zeal for truth, S.
XXXIIII. quamcunque sequatur verisimilitudinis speciem, S. XXXV.
XXXIIII, whatever species of verisimilitude he follows, S. XXXV,
tunc etiam, quando fit poeta, S. XXXVI.
then also, when he becomes a poet, S. XXXVI,
venuste prodit: erit ille,
gracefully brings forth: he will be that one,
Iudice me, non sordidus auctor / Naturae verique, § 104. Hor.
in your opinion, no inconsiderable judge of truth and nature.
Veritatem aestheticam S. XXVII. probe distinguens a falsitate aesthetica, S. XXVIII. venustius exhibens in verisimilitudinibus, S. XXVIIII. per fictiones varias, S. XXX, et ipsas aliquando poeticas, S. XXXI. non sine fabulis: S. XXXII. quae narrat, fingit, immo fabulari censetur, ubi probationibus indigent, si belle probat, S. XXXIII, uti suum ubique veritatis studium, S. XXXIIII. quamcunque sequatur verisimilitudinis speciem, S. XXXV. tunc etiam, quando fit poeta, S. XXXVI. venuste prodit: erit ille, / Properly distinguishing aesthetic truth, S. XXVII, from aesthetic falsity, S. XXVIII, displaying more gracefully in verisimilitudes, S. XXVIIII, through various fictions, S. XXX, and sometimes those very poetic ones, S. XXXI, not without fables, S. XXXII, which he narrates, invents, indeed is judged to fabulate, where they need proofs, if he proves beautifully, S. XXXIII, as everywhere his own zeal for truth, S. XXXIIII, whatever species of verisimilitude he follows, S. XXXV, then also, when he becomes a poet, S. XXXVI, gracefully brings forth: he will be that one,
Iudice me, non sordidus auctor / Naturae verique, § 104. Hor.
in your opinion, no inconsiderable judge of truth and nature.
§ 614
AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM
CAPUT I
HEURISTICA
SECTIO XXXVII
LUX AESTHETICA
Verioris in cogitando § 18. pulcritudinis § 17. elegantiarumque studiosus quarto loco § 115, 177, 423. LUCEM, claritatem, et perspicuitatem cogitatorum omnium sectetur, M. § 531. sed AESTHETICAM, quae vel analogo rationis ad discrimina rei percipienda sufficiat. § 22. M. § 531. Perspicuitatem, ut unam ex primis virtutibus eloquentiae luculenter commendans Quintilianus VIII. 2. rectissime distinguit perspicuitatem in verbis, quae non est huius loci, § 13. et rerum perspicuitatem, qua obiecta venustae meditationis sint dilucida et negligenter quoque audientibus attendentibus aperta.
AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM
CHAPTER I
HEURISTICS
SECTION XXXVII
AESTHETIC LIGHT
The one devoted to truer beauty in thinking, § 18, § 17, and to the elegances, in the fourth place, § 115, 177, 423, should pursue LIGHT, clarity, and perspicuity of all things thought, M. § 531, but AESTHETIC light, clarity, and perspicuity, which may suffice even for the analogue of reason to perceive the distinctions of the thing, § 22, M. § 531. Quintilian, brightly commending perspicuity as one of the first virtues of eloquence, VIII. 2, most rightly distinguishes perspicuity in words, which is not the concern of this place, § 13, and perspicuity of things, by which the objects of graceful meditation are clear and open even to those hearing and attending negligently.
AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM
CAPUT I
HEURISTICA
SECTIO XXXVII
LUX AESTHETICA
Verioris in cogitando § 18. pulcritudinis § 17. elegantiarumque studiosus quarto loco § 115, 177, 423. LUCEM, claritatem, et perspicuitatem cogitatorum omnium sectetur, M. § 531. sed AESTHETICAM, quae vel analogo rationis ad discrimina rei percipienda sufficiat. § 22. M. § 531. Perspicuitatem, ut unam ex primis virtutibus eloquentiae luculenter commendans Quintilianus VIII. 2. rectissime distinguit perspicuitatem in verbis, quae non est huius loci, § 13. et rerum perspicuitatem, qua obiecta venustae meditationis sint dilucida et negligenter quoque audientibus attendentibus aperta.
AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM
CHAPTER I
HEURISTICS
SECTION XXXVII
AESTHETIC LIGHT
The one devoted to truer beauty in thinking, § 18, § 17, and to the elegances, in the fourth place, § 115, 177, 423, should pursue LIGHT, clarity, and perspicuity of all things thought, M. § 531, but AESTHETIC light, clarity, and perspicuity, which may suffice even for the analogue of reason to perceive the distinctions of the thing, § 22, M. § 531. Quintilian, brightly commending perspicuity as one of the first virtues of eloquence, VIII. 2, most rightly distinguishes perspicuity in words, which is not the concern of this place, § 13, and perspicuity of things, by which the objects of graceful meditation are clear and open even to those hearing and attending negligently.
AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM CAPUT I HEURISTICA SECTIO XXXVII LUX AESTHETICA
AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM CHAPTER I HEURISTICS SECTION XXXVII AESTHETIC
Verioris in cogitando § 18.
LIGHT The one devoted to truer beauty in thinking, § 18,
pulcritudinis § 17. elegantiarumque studiosus quarto loco
§ 17, and to the elegances, in the fourth place,
§ 115, 177, 423. LUCEM, claritatem,
§ 115, 177, 423, should pursue LIGHT, clarity,
et perspicuitatem cogitatorum omnium sectetur, M.
and perspicuity of all things thought, M.
§ 531. sed AESTHETICAM, quae
§ 531, but AESTHETIC light, clarity, and perspicuity,
vel analogo rationis
which may suffice even for the analogue of reason
ad discrimina rei percipienda sufficiat. § 22. M.
to perceive the distinctions of the thing, § 22, M.
§ 531. Perspicuitatem, ut unam ex primis
§ 531. Quintilian, brightly commending perspicuity as one of the
virtutibus eloquentiae luculenter commendans Quintilianus VIII. 2.
first virtues of eloquence, VIII. 2,
rectissime distinguit perspicuitatem in verbis,
most rightly distinguishes perspicuity in words, which
quae non est huius loci, § 13.
is not the concern of this place, § 13,
et rerum perspicuitatem, qua obiecta
and perspicuity of things, by which the objects
venustae meditationis sint dilucida et negligenter
of graceful meditation are clear and open even to
quoque audientibus attendentibus aperta.
those hearing and attending negligently.
AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM CAPUT I HEURISTICA SECTIO XXXVII LUX AESTHETICA Verioris in cogitando § 18. pulcritudinis § 17. elegantiarumque studiosus quarto loco § 115, 177, 423. LUCEM, claritatem, et perspicuitatem cogitatorum omnium sectetur, M. § 531. sed AESTHETICAM, quae vel analogo rationis ad discrimina rei percipienda sufficiat. § 22. M. § 531. Perspicuitatem, ut unam ex primis virtutibus eloquentiae luculenter commendans Quintilianus VIII. 2. rectissime distinguit perspicuitatem in verbis, quae non est huius loci, § 13. et rerum perspicuitatem, qua obiecta venustae meditationis sint dilucida et negligenter quoque audientibus attendentibus aperta. / AESTHETICORUM GENERALIUM CHAPTER I HEURISTICS SECTION XXXVII AESTHETIC LIGHT The one devoted to truer beauty in thinking, § 18, § 17, and to the elegances, in the fourth place, § 115, 177, 423, should pursue LIGHT, clarity, and perspicuity of all things thought, M. § 531, but AESTHETIC light, clarity, and perspicuity, which may suffice even for the analogue of reason to perceive the distinctions of the thing, § 22, M. § 531. Quintilian, brightly commending perspicuity as one of the first virtues of eloquence, VIII. 2, most rightly distinguishes perspicuity in words, which is not the concern of this place, § 13, and perspicuity of things, by which the objects of graceful meditation are clear and open even to those hearing and attending negligently.
§ 615
Huic si negligenter attendentem audientemve placeat et eum dicere, qui non intendat percipiendis rebus, quae tractantur, intellectus rationisque suae vires et nervos, ut ita dicam, rigidius: eo lubens in Quintiliani sententiam. Eam vero mentem optimo fuisse rhetori paene mihi persuaserim, quoniam caussam asserti subiungit,
If it pleases one to call even him a negligently attending or hearing person who does not more rigidly stretch, so to speak, the powers and sinews of his understanding and reason for perceiving the things that are being treated: so far I willingly go into Quintilian's opinion. Indeed I would almost persuade myself that this was the mind of the best rhetorician, since he adds the cause of the assertion:
non semper esse tam acrem iudicis (spectatoris, lectoris, auditoris) intensionem, ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat, et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intelligentiae suae lumen.
the attention of the judge is not always so keen that he will dispel obscurities without assistance, and bring the light of his intelligence to bear on the dark places of our speech.
Sin eum modo negligenter audientem attendentemve vocare placeat, qui multis cogitationibus avocatur, et distractus omnino, vel animo volutans ab iis, quae tu cogites, diversissima, vel ebrius oscitans et somno sit proximus, breviter, qui nec analogon rationis advertere tuis cogitationibus velit aut possit: huic etiamsi quaedam a te venustius cogitanda minus aperta sint, ea tamen pulcra luce propterea destitui nondum universim concesserim.
Here the "judge" is the spectator, reader, or hearer. But if it pleases one to call only him a negligently hearing or attending person who is called away by many thoughts and wholly distracted, either turning over in his mind things most diverse from those which you think, or drunk, yawning, and near to sleep, briefly, who neither wishes nor is able to turn the analogue of reason toward your thoughts: to this person, even if certain things to be thought more gracefully by you are less open, I would nevertheless not yet universally grant that they are for that reason deprived of beautiful light.
Huic si negligenter attendentem audientemve placeat et eum dicere, qui non intendat percipiendis rebus, quae tractantur, intellectus rationisque suae vires et nervos, ut ita dicam, rigidius: eo lubens in Quintiliani sententiam.
If it pleases one to call even him a negligently attending or hearing person who does not more rigidly stretch, so to speak, the powers and sinews of his understanding and reason for perceiving the things that are being treated: so far I willingly go into Quintilian's opinion.
Eam vero mentem optimo fuisse rhetori paene mihi persuaserim, quoniam caussam asserti subiungit,
Indeed I would almost persuade myself that this was the mind of the best rhetorician, since he adds the cause of the assertion:
non semper esse tam acrem iudicis (spectatoris, lectoris, auditoris) intensionem, ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat, et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intelligentiae suae lumen.
the attention of the judge is not always so keen that he will dispel obscurities without assistance, and bring the light of his intelligence to bear on the dark places of our speech.
Sin eum modo negligenter audientem attendentemve vocare placeat, qui multis cogitationibus avocatur, et distractus omnino, vel animo volutans ab iis, quae tu cogites, diversissima, vel ebrius oscitans et somno sit proximus, breviter, qui nec analogon rationis advertere tuis cogitationibus velit aut possit: huic etiamsi quaedam a te venustius cogitanda minus aperta sint, ea tamen pulcra luce propterea destitui nondum universim concesserim.
Here the "judge" is the spectator, reader, or hearer. But if it pleases one to call only him a negligently hearing or attending person who is called away by many thoughts and wholly distracted, either turning over in his mind things most diverse from those which you think, or drunk, yawning, and near to sleep, briefly, who neither wishes nor is able to turn the analogue of reason toward your thoughts: to this person, even if certain things to be thought more gracefully by you are less open, I would nevertheless not yet universally grant that they are for that reason deprived of beautiful light.
Huic si
If it pleases one to call even him
negligenter attendentem audientemve placeat et eum dicere,
a negligently attending or hearing person who
qui non intendat percipiendis rebus, quae
does not more rigidly stretch, so to speak,
tractantur, intellectus rationisque suae vires et nervos,
the powers and sinews of his understanding and reason for perceiving
ut ita dicam, rigidius:
the things that are being treated:
eo lubens in Quintiliani sententiam.
so far I willingly go into Quintilian's opinion.
Eam vero mentem optimo fuisse
Indeed I would almost persuade myself that this was
rhetori paene mihi persuaserim,
the mind of the best rhetorician, since he adds
quoniam caussam asserti subiungit,
the cause of the assertion:
non semper esse tam acrem iudicis (spectatoris, lectoris, auditoris) intensionem, ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat, et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intelligentiae suae lumen.
the attention of the judge is not always so keen that he will dispel obscurities without assistance, and bring the light of his intelligence to bear on the dark places of our speech.
Sin eum modo
Here the "judge" is the spectator, reader, or hearer.
negligenter audientem attendentemve vocare placeat, qui multis cogitationibus avocatur,
But if it pleases one to call only him a negligently hearing or attending person who is called away
et distractus omnino,
by many thoughts and wholly distracted, either
vel animo volutans ab iis, quae tu cogites, diversissima,
turning over in his mind things most diverse from
vel ebrius oscitans
those which you think, or drunk, yawning,
et somno sit proximus, breviter,
and near to sleep, briefly, who neither
qui nec analogon
wishes nor is able to turn the analogue of
rationis advertere tuis cogitationibus velit aut possit:
reason toward your thoughts: to
huic etiamsi quaedam
this person, even if certain things to be thought
a te venustius cogitanda minus aperta sint,
more gracefully by you are less open, I
ea tamen pulcra luce propterea
would nevertheless not yet universally grant that they are
destitui nondum universim concesserim.
for that reason deprived of beautiful light.
Huic si negligenter attendentem audientemve placeat et eum dicere, qui non intendat percipiendis rebus, quae tractantur, intellectus rationisque suae vires et nervos, ut ita dicam, rigidius: eo lubens in Quintiliani sententiam. / If it pleases one to call even him a negligently attending or hearing person who does not more rigidly stretch, so to speak, the powers and sinews of his understanding and reason for perceiving the things that are being treated: so far I willingly go into Quintilian's opinion.
Eam vero mentem optimo fuisse rhetori paene mihi persuaserim, quoniam caussam asserti subiungit, / Indeed I would almost persuade myself that this was the mind of the best rhetorician, since he adds the cause of the assertion:
non semper esse tam acrem iudicis (spectatoris, lectoris, auditoris) intensionem, ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat, et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intelligentiae suae lumen.
the attention of the judge is not always so keen that he will dispel obscurities without assistance, and bring the light of his intelligence to bear on the dark places of our speech.
Sin eum modo negligenter audientem attendentemve vocare placeat, qui multis cogitationibus avocatur, et distractus omnino, vel animo volutans ab iis, quae tu cogites, diversissima, vel ebrius oscitans et somno sit proximus, breviter, qui nec analogon rationis advertere tuis cogitationibus velit aut possit: huic etiamsi quaedam a te venustius cogitanda minus aperta sint, ea tamen pulcra luce propterea destitui nondum universim concesserim. / Here the "judge" is the spectator, reader, or hearer. But if it pleases one to call only him a negligently hearing or attending person who is called away by many thoughts and wholly distracted, either turning over in his mind things most diverse from those which you think, or drunk, yawning, and near to sleep, briefly, who neither wishes nor is able to turn the analogue of reason toward your thoughts: to this person, even if certain things to be thought more gracefully by you are less open, I would nevertheless not yet universally grant that they are for that reason deprived of beautiful light.
§ 616
Tam clara, quae meditamur ad elegantiae regulas, omnia esse debere, ut in animum audientis oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, incurrat, non sine ratione negaverim, § 615. Sit caussarum patrono
I would deny, not without reason, § 615, that all things which we meditate according to the rules of elegance ought to be so clear that the discourse rushes into the hearer's mind, as the sun into the eyes, even if attention is not directed to it. Let the advocate of cases have it as his care
curandum non, ut intelligere possit iudex, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere.
Therefore our aim must be not to put him in a position to understand our argument, but to force him to understand it..
Non omnis venuste cogitaturus est patronus caussae, nec omnis, quem ille, ceu praecipuum suum obiectum personale, recte considerat, iudex est eiusmodi, quales esse solebant Romanorum pedanei.
Not everyone who is going to think gracefully is an advocate of a case, nor is everyone whom he rightly considers as his principal personal object a judge of the sort that the Roman pedanei used to be.
Tam clara, quae meditamur ad elegantiae regulas, omnia esse debere, ut in animum audientis oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, incurrat, non sine ratione negaverim, § 615. Sit caussarum patrono
I would deny, not without reason, § 615, that all things which we meditate according to the rules of elegance ought to be so clear that the discourse rushes into the hearer's mind, as the sun into the eyes, even if attention is not directed to it. Let the advocate of cases have it as his care
curandum non, ut intelligere possit iudex, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere.
Therefore our aim must be not to put him in a position to understand our argument, but to force him to understand it..
Non omnis venuste cogitaturus est patronus caussae, nec omnis, quem ille, ceu praecipuum suum obiectum personale, recte considerat, iudex est eiusmodi, quales esse solebant Romanorum pedanei.
Not everyone who is going to think gracefully is an advocate of a case, nor is everyone whom he rightly considers as his principal personal object a judge of the sort that the Roman pedanei used to be.
Tam clara, quae
I would deny, not without reason, § 615,
meditamur ad elegantiae regulas,
that all things which we meditate according to the rules
omnia esse debere, ut in animum audientis oratio,
of elegance ought to be so clear
ut sol in oculos,
that the discourse rushes into the hearer's mind,
etiamsi in eam non intendatur,
as the sun into the eyes, even if
incurrat, non sine ratione negaverim, § 615.
attention is not directed to it. Let the advocate of cases
Sit caussarum patrono
have it as his care
curandum non, ut intelligere possit iudex, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere.
Therefore our aim must be not to put him in a position to understand our argument, but to force him to understand it..
Non omnis venuste cogitaturus est
Not everyone who is going to think gracefully is
patronus caussae, nec omnis, quem ille,
an advocate of a case, nor is everyone whom
ceu praecipuum suum obiectum personale, recte considerat,
he rightly considers as his principal personal object a
iudex est eiusmodi, quales esse solebant Romanorum pedanei.
judge of the sort that the Roman pedanei used to be.
Tam clara, quae meditamur ad elegantiae regulas, omnia esse debere, ut in animum audientis oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, incurrat, non sine ratione negaverim, § 615. Sit caussarum patrono / I would deny, not without reason, § 615, that all things which we meditate according to the rules of elegance ought to be so clear that the discourse rushes into the hearer's mind, as the sun into the eyes, even if attention is not directed to it. Let the advocate of cases have it as his care
curandum non, ut intelligere possit iudex, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere.
Therefore our aim must be not to put him in a position to understand our argument, but to force him to understand it..
Non omnis venuste cogitaturus est patronus caussae, nec omnis, quem ille, ceu praecipuum suum obiectum personale, recte considerat, iudex est eiusmodi, quales esse solebant Romanorum pedanei. / Not everyone who is going to think gracefully is an advocate of a case, nor is everyone whom he rightly considers as his principal personal object a judge of the sort that the Roman pedanei used to be.
§ 617
LUCEM et perspicuitatem AESTHETICAM ipsa veritas iubet distinguere in ABSOLUTAM, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, § 614. et COMPARATIVAM, eum absolutae gradum, qui non, nisi quibusdam venustius meditandis, affundendus est, cuius exemplum § 616. vidimus. Claritatis intensio per distinctionem, adaequationem, profunditatem, intelligentiaeque veluti puritatem, M. § 657. prorsus non est lux aesthetica, § 614. hinc nec absoluta, nec comparativa, sed logica. Hinc nec intenditur directo, tanquam finis primarius, a pulcre cogitaturo, § 14. licet et prodesse non nunquam eidem inter venuste cogitandum possit, si eam de themate suam fecerit, § 551. et per indirectum, quando partes thematis non ita paucae sensitiva in luce refulgent, obtineatur simul totius conceptus extensive distinctus, M. § 634. intellectui pulcro, M. § 637.
Truth itself commands that AESTHETIC LIGHT and perspicuity be distinguished into ABSOLUTE, necessary for all beautiful thinking, § 614, and COMPARATIVE, that degree of the absolute which is to be poured upon only certain things to be meditated more gracefully; we have seen an example of this in § 616. The intensification of clarity through distinction, adequation, depth, and as it were purity of understanding, M. § 657, is not at all aesthetic light, § 614; hence it is neither absolute nor comparative, but logical. Hence it is not directly intended, as a primary end, by one about to think beautifully, § 14, although it can sometimes also be useful to the same person while thinking gracefully, if he has made it his own concerning the theme, § 551, and indirectly, when not a few parts of the theme shine in sensory light, an extensively distinct concept of the whole is at the same time obtained, M. § 634, for the beautiful understanding, M. § 637.
LUCEM et perspicuitatem AESTHETICAM ipsa veritas iubet distinguere in ABSOLUTAM, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, § 614. et COMPARATIVAM, eum absolutae gradum, qui non, nisi quibusdam venustius meditandis, affundendus est, cuius exemplum § 616. vidimus. Claritatis intensio per distinctionem, adaequationem, profunditatem, intelligentiaeque veluti puritatem, M. § 657. prorsus non est lux aesthetica, § 614. hinc nec absoluta, nec comparativa, sed logica.
Truth itself commands that AESTHETIC LIGHT and perspicuity be distinguished into ABSOLUTE, necessary for all beautiful thinking, § 614, and COMPARATIVE, that degree of the absolute which is to be poured upon only certain things to be meditated more gracefully; we have seen an example of this in § 616. The intensification of clarity through distinction, adequation, depth, and as it were purity of understanding, M. § 657, is not at all aesthetic light, § 614; hence it is neither absolute nor comparative, but logical.
Hinc nec intenditur directo, tanquam finis primarius, a pulcre cogitaturo, § 14. licet et prodesse non nunquam eidem inter venuste cogitandum possit, si eam de themate suam fecerit, § 551. et per indirectum, quando partes thematis non ita paucae sensitiva in luce refulgent, obtineatur simul totius conceptus extensive distinctus, M. § 634. intellectui pulcro, M. § 637.
Hence it is not directly intended, as a primary end, by one about to think beautifully, § 14, although it can sometimes also be useful to the same person while thinking gracefully, if he has made it his own concerning the theme, § 551, and indirectly, when not a few parts of the theme shine in sensory light, an extensively distinct concept of the whole is at the same time obtained, M. § 634, for the beautiful understanding, M. § 637.
LUCEM et perspicuitatem AESTHETICAM
Truth itself commands that AESTHETIC LIGHT and perspicuity
ipsa veritas iubet distinguere in ABSOLUTAM, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam,
be distinguished into ABSOLUTE, necessary
§ 614. et COMPARATIVAM,
for all beautiful thinking, § 614, and COMPARATIVE,
eum absolutae gradum,
that degree of the absolute which is to be
qui non, nisi quibusdam venustius meditandis, affundendus
poured upon only certain things to be meditated more gracefully;
est, cuius exemplum § 616.
we have seen an example of this in § 616.
vidimus. Claritatis intensio per distinctionem, adaequationem, profunditatem,
The intensification of clarity through distinction, adequation, depth,
intelligentiaeque veluti puritatem, M. § 657.
and as it were purity of understanding, M. § 657,
prorsus non est lux aesthetica, § 614.
is not at all aesthetic light, § 614;
hinc nec absoluta, nec comparativa, sed logica.
hence it is neither absolute nor comparative, but logical.
Hinc nec intenditur directo, tanquam finis primarius,
Hence it is not directly intended, as a primary
a pulcre cogitaturo, § 14.
end, by one about to think beautifully, § 14,
licet et prodesse non nunquam eidem inter
although it can sometimes also be useful to the
venuste cogitandum possit, si
same person while thinking gracefully, if he has made
eam de themate suam fecerit, § 551.
it his own concerning the theme, § 551,
et per indirectum, quando partes thematis non
and indirectly, when not a few
ita paucae sensitiva in luce refulgent,
parts of the theme shine in sensory light,
obtineatur simul totius conceptus extensive distinctus,
an extensively distinct concept of the whole is at the same time
M. § 634. intellectui pulcro, M. § 637.
obtained, M. § 634, for the beautiful understanding, M. § 637.
LUCEM et perspicuitatem AESTHETICAM ipsa veritas iubet distinguere in ABSOLUTAM, omni pulcre cogitando necessariam, § 614. et COMPARATIVAM, eum absolutae gradum, qui non, nisi quibusdam venustius meditandis, affundendus est, cuius exemplum § 616. vidimus. Claritatis intensio per distinctionem, adaequationem, profunditatem, intelligentiaeque veluti puritatem, M. § 657. prorsus non est lux aesthetica, § 614. hinc nec absoluta, nec comparativa, sed logica. / Truth itself commands that AESTHETIC LIGHT and perspicuity be distinguished into ABSOLUTE, necessary for all beautiful thinking, § 614, and COMPARATIVE, that degree of the absolute which is to be poured upon only certain things to be meditated more gracefully; we have seen an example of this in § 616. The intensification of clarity through distinction, adequation, depth, and as it were purity of understanding, M. § 657, is not at all aesthetic light, § 614; hence it is neither absolute nor comparative, but logical.
Hinc nec intenditur directo, tanquam finis primarius, a pulcre cogitaturo, § 14. licet et prodesse non nunquam eidem inter venuste cogitandum possit, si eam de themate suam fecerit, § 551. et per indirectum, quando partes thematis non ita paucae sensitiva in luce refulgent, obtineatur simul totius conceptus extensive distinctus, M. § 634. intellectui pulcro, M. § 637. / Hence it is not directly intended, as a primary end, by one about to think beautifully, § 14, although it can sometimes also be useful to the same person while thinking gracefully, if he has made it his own concerning the theme, § 551, and indirectly, when not a few parts of the theme shine in sensory light, an extensively distinct concept of the whole is at the same time obtained, M. § 634, for the beautiful understanding, M. § 637.
§ 618
Omnis itaque lux aesthetica, quam in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sensitiva, claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio, § 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa vero vividarum cogitationum et materiae nitor ac splendor. M. § 531. Neroni Tacitus Ann. XIII. 3.
Therefore all aesthetic light which you directly intend in things will be sensory perspicuity of things, the extension of clarity through a multitude of marks, § 617, even when absolute; but comparative aesthetic light will be the brightness and splendor of vivid thoughts and of the matter, M. § 531. Tacitus, Annals XIII.3, writes:
puerilibus statim annis coelanti, pingenti, cantus aut regimen equorum exercenti, et aliquando carmina pangenti, (quae farrago variarum occupationum!) vividum animum
Nero from early boyhood turned his lively genius in other directions; he carved, painted, sang, or practised the management of horses, occasionally composing verses which showed that he had the rudiments of learning.
tribuit. Spurinnae Plinius ep. III. 1. inde putat
What a medley of various occupations! Pliny, Letters III. 1, thinks from this that
agile corpus esse et vividum,
The consequence is that, though he has passed his seventy-seventh year, his hearing and eyesight are as good as ever, his body is still active and alert, and the only symptom of his age is his wisdom.,
quod non solum,
because not only,
quoad honestum fuit, obierat officia, gesserat magistratus, provincias rexerat, multoque labore meruerat otium,
for he undertook official duties, held magistracies, and governed provinces as long as it became him to do so, and earned his present leisure by abundant toil.,
sed etiam
but also,
senex ambulabat mane millia passuum tria, nec minus animum, quam corpus, exercebat, mox vehiculum ascendebat,
In the morning he keeps his couch; at the second hour he calls for his shoes and walks three miles, exercising mind as well as body. If he has friends with him the time is passed in conversation on the noblest of themes, otherwise a book is read aloud, and sometimes this is done even when his friends are present, but never in such a way as to bore them. Then he sits down, and there is more reading aloud or more talk for preference; afterwards he enters his carriage.,
e. c. Ubi mira denuo motuum variatio, quotidianaeque vivendi rationis vicissitudo.
etc. Here again is a wonderful variation of movements and alternation of a daily manner of living.
Omnis itaque lux aesthetica, quam in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sensitiva, claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio, § 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa vero vividarum cogitationum et materiae nitor ac splendor. M. § 531. Neroni Tacitus Ann. XIII. 3.
Therefore all aesthetic light which you directly intend in things will be sensory perspicuity of things, the extension of clarity through a multitude of marks, § 617, even when absolute; but comparative aesthetic light will be the brightness and splendor of vivid thoughts and of the matter, M. § 531. Tacitus, Annals XIII.3, writes:
puerilibus statim annis coelanti, pingenti, cantus aut regimen equorum exercenti, et aliquando carmina pangenti, (quae farrago variarum occupationum!) vividum animum
Nero from early boyhood turned his lively genius in other directions; he carved, painted, sang, or practised the management of horses, occasionally composing verses which showed that he had the rudiments of learning.
tribuit. Spurinnae Plinius ep. III. 1. inde putat
What a medley of various occupations! Pliny, Letters III. 1, thinks from this that
agile corpus esse et vividum,
The consequence is that, though he has passed his seventy-seventh year, his hearing and eyesight are as good as ever, his body is still active and alert, and the only symptom of his age is his wisdom.,
quod non solum,
because not only,
quoad honestum fuit, obierat officia, gesserat magistratus, provincias rexerat, multoque labore meruerat otium,
for he undertook official duties, held magistracies, and governed provinces as long as it became him to do so, and earned his present leisure by abundant toil.,
sed etiam
but also,
senex ambulabat mane millia passuum tria, nec minus animum, quam corpus, exercebat, mox vehiculum ascendebat,
In the morning he keeps his couch; at the second hour he calls for his shoes and walks three miles, exercising mind as well as body. If he has friends with him the time is passed in conversation on the noblest of themes, otherwise a book is read aloud, and sometimes this is done even when his friends are present, but never in such a way as to bore them. Then he sits down, and there is more reading aloud or more talk for preference; afterwards he enters his carriage.,
e. c. Ubi mira denuo motuum variatio, quotidianaeque vivendi rationis vicissitudo.
etc. Here again is a wonderful variation of movements and alternation of a daily manner of living.
Omnis itaque lux aesthetica, quam
Therefore all aesthetic light which you directly intend
in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sensitiva,
in things will be sensory
claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio,
perspicuity of things, the extension of clarity through a multitude of marks,
§ 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa vero vividarum cogitationum
§ 617, even when absolute; but comparative aesthetic light will
et materiae nitor ac splendor.
be the brightness and splendor of vivid thoughts and of the matter,
M. § 531. Neroni Tacitus Ann. XIII. 3.
M. § 531. Tacitus, Annals XIII.3, writes:
puerilibus statim annis coelanti, pingenti, cantus aut regimen equorum exercenti, et aliquando carmina pangenti, (quae farrago variarum occupationum!) vividum animum
Nero from early boyhood turned his lively genius in other directions; he carved, painted, sang, or practised the management of horses, occasionally composing verses which showed that he had the rudiments of learning.
tribuit. Spurinnae Plinius ep. III.
What a medley of various occupations! Pliny, Letters III.
1. inde putat
1, thinks from this that
agile corpus esse et vividum,
The consequence is that, though he has passed his seventy-seventh year, his hearing and eyesight are as good as ever, his body is still active and alert, and the only symptom of his age is his wisdom.,
quod non solum,
because not only,
quoad honestum fuit, obierat officia, gesserat magistratus, provincias rexerat, multoque labore meruerat otium,
for he undertook official duties, held magistracies, and governed provinces as long as it became him to do so, and earned his present leisure by abundant toil.,
sed etiam
but also,
senex ambulabat mane millia passuum tria, nec minus animum, quam corpus, exercebat, mox vehiculum ascendebat,
In the morning he keeps his couch; at the second hour he calls for his shoes and walks three miles, exercising mind as well as body. If he has friends with him the time is passed in conversation on the noblest of themes, otherwise a book is read aloud, and sometimes this is done even when his friends are present, but never in such a way as to bore them. Then he sits down, and there is more reading aloud or more talk for preference; afterwards he enters his carriage.,
e. c. Ubi mira denuo motuum variatio,
etc. Here again is a wonderful variation
quotidianaeque vivendi rationis vicissitudo.
of movements and alternation of a daily manner of living.
Omnis itaque lux aesthetica, quam in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sensitiva, claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio, § 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa vero vividarum cogitationum et materiae nitor ac splendor. M. § 531. Neroni Tacitus Ann. XIII. 3. / Therefore all aesthetic light which you directly intend in things will be sensory perspicuity of things, the extension of clarity through a multitude of marks, § 617, even when absolute; but comparative aesthetic light will be the brightness and splendor of vivid thoughts and of the matter, M. § 531. Tacitus, Annals XIII.3, writes:
puerilibus statim annis coelanti, pingenti, cantus aut regimen equorum exercenti, et aliquando carmina pangenti, (quae farrago variarum occupationum!) vividum animum
Nero from early boyhood turned his lively genius in other directions; he carved, painted, sang, or practised the management of horses, occasionally composing verses which showed that he had the rudiments of learning.
tribuit. Spurinnae Plinius ep. III. 1. inde putat / What a medley of various occupations! Pliny, Letters III. 1, thinks from this that
agile corpus esse et vividum,
The consequence is that, though he has passed his seventy-seventh year, his hearing and eyesight are as good as ever, his body is still active and alert, and the only symptom of his age is his wisdom.,
quod non solum, / because not only,
quoad honestum fuit, obierat officia, gesserat magistratus, provincias rexerat, multoque labore meruerat otium,
for he undertook official duties, held magistracies, and governed provinces as long as it became him to do so, and earned his present leisure by abundant toil.,
sed etiam / but also,
senex ambulabat mane millia passuum tria, nec minus animum, quam corpus, exercebat, mox vehiculum ascendebat,
In the morning he keeps his couch; at the second hour he calls for his shoes and walks three miles, exercising mind as well as body. If he has friends with him the time is passed in conversation on the noblest of themes, otherwise a book is read aloud, and sometimes this is done even when his friends are present, but never in such a way as to bore them. Then he sits down, and there is more reading aloud or more talk for preference; afterwards he enters his carriage.,
e. c. Ubi mira denuo motuum variatio, quotidianaeque vivendi rationis vicissitudo. / etc. Here again is a wonderful variation of movements and alternation of a daily manner of living.
§ 619
Hinc iure mihi meo videor eas demum cogitationes dicere posse vividas, in quibus peculiaris quaedam varietas, et subita veluti notarum se mutuo prementium celeritas deprehenditur, ex quarum eminenti diffusione nitor et splendor ille meditationis exsurgat in parte, cuius totum esse tamen debet perspicuum et absolute clarum: Sic Quintilianus IIII. 1. licet ipsum exordium recte poscat dilucidum, § 617. tamen
Hence, by my own right, I seem able to call only those thoughts vivid in which a certain peculiar variety and a sudden speed, as it were, of marks pressing upon one another is perceived; from their eminent diffusion that brightness and splendor of meditation arises in the part, the whole of which nevertheless ought to be perspicuous and absolutely clear. Thus Quintilian IV. 1, although he rightly requires the exordium itself to be clear, § 617, nevertheless
magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus, certos locos tantum admittit, quorum naturalis ubertas licentias aliquas notari circumfuso nitore non patiatur.
For our position is not yet established, the attention of the audience is still fresh and imposes restraint upon us: as soon as we have won their good-will and kindled their interest, they will tolerate such freedom, more especially when we have reached topics whose natural richness prevents any licence of expression being noticed in the midst of the prevailing splendour of the passage..
Quemadmodum hic naturalem ubertatem nitoris quasi matrem veneratur: ita Cicero de claris or. 36.
Just as he here venerates natural abundance as almost the mother of brightness, so Cicero, On Famous Orators 36, attributes to Hyperides, Aeschines, etc.,
Hyperidi, Aeschini, e. c. hanc copiam, succum illum et sanguinem incorruptum
He was soon rivalled by his cotemporaries Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, and Demades (none of whose writings are extant) with many others that might be mentioned: for this age was adorned with a profusion of good orators; and the genuine strength and vigour of Eloquence appears to me to have subsisted to the end of this period.,
tribuit,
in quo naturalis fuerit, non fucatus nitor.
which was distinguished by a natural beauty of composition without disguise or affectation.,
§ 104, 115.
§ 104, 115.
Hinc iure mihi meo videor eas demum cogitationes dicere posse vividas, in quibus peculiaris quaedam varietas, et subita veluti notarum se mutuo prementium celeritas deprehenditur, ex quarum eminenti diffusione nitor et splendor ille meditationis exsurgat in parte, cuius totum esse tamen debet perspicuum et absolute clarum: Sic Quintilianus IIII. 1. licet ipsum exordium recte poscat dilucidum, § 617. tamen
Hence, by my own right, I seem able to call only those thoughts vivid in which a certain peculiar variety and a sudden speed, as it were, of marks pressing upon one another is perceived; from their eminent diffusion that brightness and splendor of meditation arises in the part, the whole of which nevertheless ought to be perspicuous and absolutely clear. Thus Quintilian IV. 1, although he rightly requires the exordium itself to be clear, § 617, nevertheless
magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus, certos locos tantum admittit, quorum naturalis ubertas licentias aliquas notari circumfuso nitore non patiatur.
For our position is not yet established, the attention of the audience is still fresh and imposes restraint upon us: as soon as we have won their good-will and kindled their interest, they will tolerate such freedom, more especially when we have reached topics whose natural richness prevents any licence of expression being noticed in the midst of the prevailing splendour of the passage..
Quemadmodum hic naturalem ubertatem nitoris quasi matrem veneratur: ita Cicero de claris or. 36.
Just as he here venerates natural abundance as almost the mother of brightness, so Cicero, On Famous Orators 36, attributes to Hyperides, Aeschines, etc.,
Hyperidi, Aeschini, e. c. hanc copiam, succum illum et sanguinem incorruptum
He was soon rivalled by his cotemporaries Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, and Demades (none of whose writings are extant) with many others that might be mentioned: for this age was adorned with a profusion of good orators; and the genuine strength and vigour of Eloquence appears to me to have subsisted to the end of this period.,
tribuit,
in quo naturalis fuerit, non fucatus nitor.
which was distinguished by a natural beauty of composition without disguise or affectation.,
§ 104, 115.
§ 104, 115.
Hinc iure mihi meo videor eas demum
Hence, by my own right, I seem able to
cogitationes dicere posse vividas, in quibus peculiaris quaedam varietas,
call only those thoughts vivid in which a certain peculiar variety
et subita veluti notarum
and a sudden speed, as it were,
se mutuo prementium celeritas deprehenditur,
of marks pressing upon one another is perceived;
ex quarum eminenti diffusione nitor et splendor ille
from their eminent diffusion that brightness and splendor of
meditationis exsurgat in parte, cuius totum
meditation arises in the part, the whole of which
esse tamen debet perspicuum et absolute clarum:
nevertheless ought to be perspicuous and absolutely clear.
Sic Quintilianus IIII. 1. licet ipsum
Thus Quintilian IV. 1, although he rightly requires the
exordium recte poscat dilucidum, § 617. tamen
exordium itself to be clear, § 617, nevertheless
magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus, certos locos tantum admittit, quorum naturalis ubertas licentias aliquas notari circumfuso nitore non patiatur.
For our position is not yet established, the attention of the audience is still fresh and imposes restraint upon us: as soon as we have won their good-will and kindled their interest, they will tolerate such freedom, more especially when we have reached topics whose natural richness prevents any licence of expression being noticed in the midst of the prevailing splendour of the passage..
Quemadmodum hic naturalem ubertatem nitoris
Just as he here venerates natural abundance as almost
quasi matrem veneratur: ita Cicero de claris or.
the mother of brightness, so Cicero, On Famous Orators
36.
36, attributes to Hyperides, Aeschines, etc.,
Hyperidi, Aeschini, e. c. hanc copiam, succum illum et sanguinem incorruptum
He was soon rivalled by his cotemporaries Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, and Demades (none of whose writings are extant) with many others that might be mentioned: for this age was adorned with a profusion of good orators; and the genuine strength and vigour of Eloquence appears to me to have subsisted to the end of this period.,
tribuit,
in quo naturalis fuerit, non fucatus nitor.
which was distinguished by a natural beauty of composition without disguise or affectation.,
§ 104, 115.
§ 104, 115.
Hinc iure mihi meo videor eas demum cogitationes dicere posse vividas, in quibus peculiaris quaedam varietas, et subita veluti notarum se mutuo prementium celeritas deprehenditur, ex quarum eminenti diffusione nitor et splendor ille meditationis exsurgat in parte, cuius totum esse tamen debet perspicuum et absolute clarum: Sic Quintilianus IIII. 1. licet ipsum exordium recte poscat dilucidum, § 617. tamen / Hence, by my own right, I seem able to call only those thoughts vivid in which a certain peculiar variety and a sudden speed, as it were, of marks pressing upon one another is perceived; from their eminent diffusion that brightness and splendor of meditation arises in the part, the whole of which nevertheless ought to be perspicuous and absolutely clear. Thus Quintilian IV. 1, although he rightly requires the exordium itself to be clear, § 617, nevertheless
magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus, certos locos tantum admittit, quorum naturalis ubertas licentias aliquas notari circumfuso nitore non patiatur.
For our position is not yet established, the attention of the audience is still fresh and imposes restraint upon us: as soon as we have won their good-will and kindled their interest, they will tolerate such freedom, more especially when we have reached topics whose natural richness prevents any licence of expression being noticed in the midst of the prevailing splendour of the passage..
Quemadmodum hic naturalem ubertatem nitoris quasi matrem veneratur: ita Cicero de claris or. 36. / Just as he here venerates natural abundance as almost the mother of brightness, so Cicero, On Famous Orators 36, attributes to Hyperides, Aeschines, etc.,
Hyperidi, Aeschini, e. c. hanc copiam, succum illum et sanguinem incorruptum
He was soon rivalled by his cotemporaries Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, and Demades (none of whose writings are extant) with many others that might be mentioned: for this age was adorned with a profusion of good orators; and the genuine strength and vigour of Eloquence appears to me to have subsisted to the end of this period.,
tribuit, /
in quo naturalis fuerit, non fucatus nitor.
which was distinguished by a natural beauty of composition without disguise or affectation.,
§ 104, 115. / § 104, 115.
§ 620
Nitida vividitas venustae meditationis ne confundatur cum eius ardore ac vita, § 22. de qua deinceps curatius. Recte pulcreque coniunguntur, quoties fieri potest, ut cogitationes non splendeant solum, sed et ardeant. § 142, 143. cf. Quint. VIII. 3. Natura tamen sua disiunctae sunt in cogitando veneres, per accuratam harum theoriam separatim expendendae. Deprehenditur etiam una non raro sine altera. Hac ratione Cicero de legibus I. 6.
Let the bright vividness of graceful meditation not be confused with its ardor and life, § 22, about which more carefully hereafter. They are rightly and beautifully joined as often as possible, so that thoughts not only shine, but also burn, § 142, 143; compare Quintilian VIII. 3. Yet by their own nature these charms in thinking are separate and must be weighed separately by an accurate theory of them. One is also discovered not rarely without the other. In this way Cicero, On the Laws I. 6,
Antipatrum narrat inflasse paullo vehementius,
Fannius' contemporary, Antipater, to be sure, blew a somewhat more forceful strain.
ac eius antecessores,
than his predecessors
et habuisse illum vires agrestes quidem atque horridas, (vi movendi vitaque non destitutum) sine nitore tamen et palaestra.
and showed some power, though of a rough and rustic character, lacking in polish and the skill that comes from training.
§ 619, 256.
(not lacking force of movement and life). § 619, 256.
Nitida vividitas venustae meditationis ne confundatur cum eius ardore ac vita, § 22. de qua deinceps curatius.
Let the bright vividness of graceful meditation not be confused with its ardor and life, § 22, about which more carefully hereafter.
Recte pulcreque coniunguntur, quoties fieri potest, ut cogitationes non splendeant solum, sed et ardeant. § 142, 143. cf. Quint. VIII. 3. Natura tamen sua disiunctae sunt in cogitando veneres, per accuratam harum theoriam separatim expendendae.
They are rightly and beautifully joined as often as possible, so that thoughts not only shine, but also burn, § 142, 143; compare Quintilian VIII. 3. Yet by their own nature these charms in thinking are separate and must be weighed separately by an accurate theory of them.
Deprehenditur etiam una non raro sine altera.
One is also discovered not rarely without the other.
Hac ratione Cicero de legibus I. 6.
In this way Cicero, On the Laws I. 6,
Antipatrum narrat inflasse paullo vehementius,
Fannius' contemporary, Antipater, to be sure, blew a somewhat more forceful strain.
ac eius antecessores,
than his predecessors
et habuisse illum vires agrestes quidem atque horridas, (vi movendi vitaque non destitutum) sine nitore tamen et palaestra.
and showed some power, though of a rough and rustic character, lacking in polish and the skill that comes from training.
§ 619, 256.
(not lacking force of movement and life). § 619, 256.
Nitida vividitas venustae meditationis ne confundatur
Let the bright vividness of graceful meditation not be
cum eius ardore ac vita, § 22. de qua deinceps curatius.
confused with its ardor and life, § 22, about which more carefully hereafter.
Recte pulcreque coniunguntur, quoties fieri potest,
They are rightly and beautifully joined as often
ut cogitationes non splendeant solum, sed et ardeant.
as possible, so that thoughts not only shine, but also burn,
§ 142, 143. cf. Quint. VIII. 3.
§ 142, 143; compare Quintilian VIII. 3.
Natura tamen sua disiunctae
Yet by their own nature these charms in thinking
sunt in cogitando veneres, per
are separate and must be weighed separately by an
accuratam harum theoriam separatim expendendae.
accurate theory of them.
Deprehenditur etiam una non raro sine altera.
One is also discovered not rarely without the other.
Hac ratione Cicero de legibus I. 6.
In this way Cicero, On the Laws I. 6,
Antipatrum narrat inflasse paullo vehementius,
Fannius' contemporary, Antipater, to be sure, blew a somewhat more forceful strain.
ac eius antecessores,
than his predecessors
et habuisse illum vires agrestes quidem atque horridas, (vi movendi vitaque non destitutum) sine nitore tamen et palaestra.
and showed some power, though of a rough and rustic character, lacking in polish and the skill that comes from training.
§ 619, 256.
(not lacking force of movement and life). § 619, 256.
Nitida vividitas venustae meditationis ne confundatur cum eius ardore ac vita, § 22. de qua deinceps curatius. / Let the bright vividness of graceful meditation not be confused with its ardor and life, § 22, about which more carefully hereafter.
Recte pulcreque coniunguntur, quoties fieri potest, ut cogitationes non splendeant solum, sed et ardeant. § 142, 143. cf. Quint. VIII. 3. Natura tamen sua disiunctae sunt in cogitando veneres, per accuratam harum theoriam separatim expendendae. / They are rightly and beautifully joined as often as possible, so that thoughts not only shine, but also burn, § 142, 143; compare Quintilian VIII. 3. Yet by their own nature these charms in thinking are separate and must be weighed separately by an accurate theory of them.
Deprehenditur etiam una non raro sine altera. / One is also discovered not rarely without the other.
Hac ratione Cicero de legibus I. 6. / In this way Cicero, On the Laws I. 6,
Antipatrum narrat inflasse paullo vehementius,
Fannius' contemporary, Antipater, to be sure, blew a somewhat more forceful strain.
ac eius antecessores, / than his predecessors
et habuisse illum vires agrestes quidem atque horridas, (vi movendi vitaque non destitutum) sine nitore tamen et palaestra.
and showed some power, though of a rough and rustic character, lacking in polish and the skill that comes from training.
§ 619, 256. / (not lacking force of movement and life). § 619, 256.
§ 621
Idem Cicero de finibus IIII. 5. Catoni forsan non obiecturus Stoicam huius politicorum theoriam eum non tantundem movere et ad bene merendum de republica compellere, ac se suam academicam, libere tamen Catoni obiicit Stoica de politicis definire partirique squalidius, dum academicorum de iisdem niteat oratio, quoniam
The same Cicero, On Ends IV. 5, perhaps not about to object to Cato that his Stoic theory of political matters did not move him and compel him to deserve well of the republic as much as his own Academic theory moved Cicero, yet freely objects to Cato that the Stoics define and divide political matters more roughly, while the discourse of the Academics on the same matters shines, because
multa de republica scripserint, multa de legibus, multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus reliquerint bene dicendi.
How many books have these men written on the republic! how many on laws! How many precepts in art, and, more than that, how many instances of good speaking in orations have they bequeathed to us!.
Ex quo loco mihi nunc sufficit nitoris veram notionem eruere, Ciceronis autem obiectionem meam non facio, § 251, 252. Nostrum iam ad finem conferamus tandem eundem de claris or. 238. ubi
From this passage it is now enough for me to draw out the true notion of brightness; I do not, however, make Cicero's objection my own, § 251, 252. Let us now finally bring the same author to our end from On Famous Orators 238, where he describes
valde nitentem et plane horridam orationem,
He was neither copious, nor dry and barren; neither [n]eat and embellished, nor wholly inelegant.
ut adversa fronte pugnantes describit.
as if fighting on opposite fronts.
Idem Cicero de finibus IIII. 5. Catoni forsan non obiecturus Stoicam huius politicorum theoriam eum non tantundem movere et ad bene merendum de republica compellere, ac se suam academicam, libere tamen Catoni obiicit Stoica de politicis definire partirique squalidius, dum academicorum de iisdem niteat oratio, quoniam
The same Cicero, On Ends IV. 5, perhaps not about to object to Cato that his Stoic theory of political matters did not move him and compel him to deserve well of the republic as much as his own Academic theory moved Cicero, yet freely objects to Cato that the Stoics define and divide political matters more roughly, while the discourse of the Academics on the same matters shines, because
multa de republica scripserint, multa de legibus, multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus reliquerint bene dicendi.
How many books have these men written on the republic! how many on laws! How many precepts in art, and, more than that, how many instances of good speaking in orations have they bequeathed to us!.
Ex quo loco mihi nunc sufficit nitoris veram notionem eruere, Ciceronis autem obiectionem meam non facio, § 251, 252. Nostrum iam ad finem conferamus tandem eundem de claris or. 238. ubi
From this passage it is now enough for me to draw out the true notion of brightness; I do not, however, make Cicero's objection my own, § 251, 252. Let us now finally bring the same author to our end from On Famous Orators 238, where he describes
valde nitentem et plane horridam orationem,
He was neither copious, nor dry and barren; neither [n]eat and embellished, nor wholly inelegant.
ut adversa fronte pugnantes describit.
as if fighting on opposite fronts.
Idem Cicero de finibus IIII. 5.
The same Cicero, On Ends IV. 5,
Catoni forsan non obiecturus
perhaps not about to object to Cato that
Stoicam huius politicorum theoriam eum non tantundem
his Stoic theory of political matters did not
movere et ad bene merendum
move him and compel him to deserve well of
de republica compellere, ac se suam academicam,
the republic as much as his own Academic
libere tamen Catoni
theory moved Cicero, yet freely objects to Cato that
obiicit Stoica de politicis definire partirique
the Stoics define and divide political matters more roughly,
squalidius, dum academicorum de iisdem niteat oratio, quoniam
while the discourse of the Academics on the same matters shines, because
multa de republica scripserint, multa de legibus, multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus reliquerint bene dicendi.
How many books have these men written on the republic! how many on laws! How many precepts in art, and, more than that, how many instances of good speaking in orations have they bequeathed to us!.
Ex quo loco mihi nunc sufficit
From this passage it is now enough for me
nitoris veram notionem eruere, Ciceronis
to draw out the true notion of brightness;
autem obiectionem meam non facio, § 251, 252.
I do not, however, make Cicero's objection my own, § 251, 252.
Nostrum iam ad
Let us now finally bring the same author to
finem conferamus tandem eundem de claris or. 238. ubi
our end from On Famous Orators 238, where he describes
valde nitentem et plane horridam orationem,
He was neither copious, nor dry and barren; neither [n]eat and embellished, nor wholly inelegant.
ut adversa fronte pugnantes describit.
as if fighting on opposite fronts.
Idem Cicero de finibus IIII. 5. Catoni forsan non obiecturus Stoicam huius politicorum theoriam eum non tantundem movere et ad bene merendum de republica compellere, ac se suam academicam, libere tamen Catoni obiicit Stoica de politicis definire partirique squalidius, dum academicorum de iisdem niteat oratio, quoniam / The same Cicero, On Ends IV. 5, perhaps not about to object to Cato that his Stoic theory of political matters did not move him and compel him to deserve well of the republic as much as his own Academic theory moved Cicero, yet freely objects to Cato that the Stoics define and divide political matters more roughly, while the discourse of the Academics on the same matters shines, because
multa de republica scripserint, multa de legibus, multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus reliquerint bene dicendi.
How many books have these men written on the republic! how many on laws! How many precepts in art, and, more than that, how many instances of good speaking in orations have they bequeathed to us!.
Ex quo loco mihi nunc sufficit nitoris veram notionem eruere, Ciceronis autem obiectionem meam non facio, § 251, 252. Nostrum iam ad finem conferamus tandem eundem de claris or. 238. ubi / From this passage it is now enough for me to draw out the true notion of brightness; I do not, however, make Cicero's objection my own, § 251, 252. Let us now finally bring the same author to our end from On Famous Orators 238, where he describes
valde nitentem et plane horridam orationem,
He was neither copious, nor dry and barren; neither [n]eat and embellished, nor wholly inelegant.
ut adversa fronte pugnantes describit. / as if fighting on opposite fronts.
§ 622
Iam bis naturalem, non fucatum, requiri nitorem vidimus, § 619. Neque magis necessarium esse videatur monitum de quaquam ex primariis cogitationum elegantiis, ac de hoc venustae meditationis nitore, § 22. Quoniam in nulla facilius a recta naturae imitatione deflectitur.
We have now twice seen that natural brightness, not cosmetically colored brightness, is required, § 619. Nor should a warning seem more necessary concerning any of the primary elegances of thoughts than concerning this brightness of graceful meditation, § 22, because in none is one more easily turned away from the right imitation of nature.
Atque etiam, qui specie capiuntur, vulsis, levatisque, et inustas comas acu comantibus, et non suo colore nitidis, plus esse formae putant, quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulcritudo corporis venire videatur ex malis moribus.
There are even some who are captivated by the shams of artifice and think that there is more beauty in those who pluck out superfluous hair or use depilatories, who dress their locks by scorching them with the curling iron and glow with a complexion that is not their own, than can ever be conferred by nature pure and simple, so that it really seems as if physical beauty depended entirely on moral hideousness..
Quint. II. 5. Erit autem naturalis in cogitando nitor, 1) cui capiendo naturales animi dotes, non distortae cum violentia, non intensae vehementius sufficiant, ut profluens secundum naturam meditatio nihil ex ingenio habere videatur, § 104.
Quintilian II. 5. Natural brightness in thinking will be, first, that for grasping which the natural gifts of the mind suffice, not distorted with violence, not intensified too vehemently, so that meditation flowing according to nature may seem to have nothing from contrivance, § 104.
Iam bis naturalem, non fucatum, requiri nitorem vidimus, § 619. Neque magis necessarium esse videatur monitum de quaquam ex primariis cogitationum elegantiis, ac de hoc venustae meditationis nitore, § 22. Quoniam in nulla facilius a recta naturae imitatione deflectitur.
We have now twice seen that natural brightness, not cosmetically colored brightness, is required, § 619. Nor should a warning seem more necessary concerning any of the primary elegances of thoughts than concerning this brightness of graceful meditation, § 22, because in none is one more easily turned away from the right imitation of nature.
Atque etiam, qui specie capiuntur, vulsis, levatisque, et inustas comas acu comantibus, et non suo colore nitidis, plus esse formae putant, quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulcritudo corporis venire videatur ex malis moribus.
There are even some who are captivated by the shams of artifice and think that there is more beauty in those who pluck out superfluous hair or use depilatories, who dress their locks by scorching them with the curling iron and glow with a complexion that is not their own, than can ever be conferred by nature pure and simple, so that it really seems as if physical beauty depended entirely on moral hideousness..
Quint. II. 5. Erit autem naturalis in cogitando nitor, 1) cui capiendo naturales animi dotes, non distortae cum violentia, non intensae vehementius sufficiant, ut profluens secundum naturam meditatio nihil ex ingenio habere videatur, § 104.
Quintilian II. 5. Natural brightness in thinking will be, first, that for grasping which the natural gifts of the mind suffice, not distorted with violence, not intensified too vehemently, so that meditation flowing according to nature may seem to have nothing from contrivance, § 104.
Iam bis naturalem,
We have now twice seen that natural brightness,
non fucatum, requiri nitorem vidimus, § 619.
not cosmetically colored brightness, is required, § 619.
Neque magis necessarium esse videatur
Nor should a warning seem more necessary
monitum de quaquam ex primariis cogitationum elegantiis,
concerning any of the primary elegances
ac de hoc venustae meditationis nitore, § 22.
of thoughts than concerning this brightness of graceful meditation, § 22,
Quoniam in nulla facilius
because in none is one more easily turned away
a recta naturae imitatione deflectitur.
from the right imitation of nature.
Atque etiam, qui specie capiuntur, vulsis, levatisque, et inustas comas acu comantibus, et non suo colore nitidis, plus esse formae putant, quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulcritudo corporis venire videatur ex malis moribus.
There are even some who are captivated by the shams of artifice and think that there is more beauty in those who pluck out superfluous hair or use depilatories, who dress their locks by scorching them with the curling iron and glow with a complexion that is not their own, than can ever be conferred by nature pure and simple, so that it really seems as if physical beauty depended entirely on moral hideousness..
Quint. II. 5. Erit autem naturalis in
Quintilian II. 5. Natural brightness in thinking will be,
cogitando nitor, 1) cui capiendo naturales animi dotes,
first, that for grasping which the natural gifts of the
non distortae cum violentia, non intensae vehementius
mind suffice, not distorted with violence, not intensified too vehemently,
sufficiant, ut profluens secundum naturam meditatio nihil
so that meditation flowing according to nature may seem
ex ingenio habere videatur, § 104.
to have nothing from contrivance, § 104.
Iam bis naturalem, non fucatum, requiri nitorem vidimus, § 619. Neque magis necessarium esse videatur monitum de quaquam ex primariis cogitationum elegantiis, ac de hoc venustae meditationis nitore, § 22. Quoniam in nulla facilius a recta naturae imitatione deflectitur. / We have now twice seen that natural brightness, not cosmetically colored brightness, is required, § 619. Nor should a warning seem more necessary concerning any of the primary elegances of thoughts than concerning this brightness of graceful meditation, § 22, because in none is one more easily turned away from the right imitation of nature.
Atque etiam, qui specie capiuntur, vulsis, levatisque, et inustas comas acu comantibus, et non suo colore nitidis, plus esse formae putant, quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulcritudo corporis venire videatur ex malis moribus.
There are even some who are captivated by the shams of artifice and think that there is more beauty in those who pluck out superfluous hair or use depilatories, who dress their locks by scorching them with the curling iron and glow with a complexion that is not their own, than can ever be conferred by nature pure and simple, so that it really seems as if physical beauty depended entirely on moral hideousness..
Quint. II. 5. Erit autem naturalis in cogitando nitor, 1) cui capiendo naturales animi dotes, non distortae cum violentia, non intensae vehementius sufficiant, ut profluens secundum naturam meditatio nihil ex ingenio habere videatur, § 104. / Quintilian II. 5. Natural brightness in thinking will be, first, that for grasping which the natural gifts of the mind suffice, not distorted with violence, not intensified too vehemently, so that meditation flowing according to nature may seem to have nothing from contrivance, § 104.
§ 623
Naturalis in cogitando nitor erit 2) materiis et rebus, de quibus cogites, sic aptus, accommodatus, et quasi proprius, ut ex iisdem earumque cogitatione necessario potius enasci, quam in eandem inferri illinique decoris caussa deprehendatur. Huius hinc amicus elegantiae, si qua tractata per internas ac innatas opes posse nitescere desperat, relinquit ea potius, quam ut peregrinis pigmentis cogat splendescere, 3) eorum, quorum potissimum caussa cogitas, naturali captui, horizonti, ingenio, genio, indoli, ipsis, ut ita dicam, oculis adeo proportionatus, ut ab his sine fatigatione possit imbibi, nec eos praestringens, lumine tamen satians, collustrans amabiliter, non urens incommode. Tertium hoc naturalis nitoris requisitum non satis attendentes, eundem ubique negant deprehendi, quando cogitata e. g. legunt suae naturae, cogitandi sentiendique rationi, genio, principalibus studiis minus consentanea, quamvis largiri debeant eos se non esse, quos praesertim auctor vel docere, vel delectare secum decreverat, § 104. cf. Cic. de or. I. 81.
Natural brightness in thinking will be, second, so fit, accommodated, and as it were proper to the materials and things about which you think, that it is perceived to be born necessarily from those things and from the thought of them, rather than to be brought into that thought and smeared upon it for the sake of adornment. Hence the friend of this elegance, if he despairs that any things, once handled, can shine by internal and innate resources, leaves them rather than forcing them to gleam with foreign pigments. Third, it will be so proportioned to the natural grasp, horizon, talent, genius, disposition, indeed, so to speak, to the very eyes of those chiefly for whose sake you think, that it can be drunk in by them without fatigue, not dazzling them, yet satisfying them with light, pleasantly illuminating them, not burning them inconveniently. Those who do not sufficiently attend to this third requisite of natural brightness deny that it is found everywhere when, for example, they read thoughts less consonant with their own nature, manner of thinking and feeling, genius, and principal studies; although they ought to concede that they themselves are not those whom the author had especially resolved either to teach or to delight, § 104; compare Cicero, On the Orator I. 81.
Naturalis in cogitando nitor erit 2) materiis et rebus, de quibus cogites, sic aptus, accommodatus, et quasi proprius, ut ex iisdem earumque cogitatione necessario potius enasci, quam in eandem inferri illinique decoris caussa deprehendatur.
Natural brightness in thinking will be, second, so fit, accommodated, and as it were proper to the materials and things about which you think, that it is perceived to be born necessarily from those things and from the thought of them, rather than to be brought into that thought and smeared upon it for the sake of adornment.
Huius hinc amicus elegantiae, si qua tractata per internas ac innatas opes posse nitescere desperat, relinquit ea potius, quam ut peregrinis pigmentis cogat splendescere, 3) eorum, quorum potissimum caussa cogitas, naturali captui, horizonti, ingenio, genio, indoli, ipsis, ut ita dicam, oculis adeo proportionatus, ut ab his sine fatigatione possit imbibi, nec eos praestringens, lumine tamen satians, collustrans amabiliter, non urens incommode.
Hence the friend of this elegance, if he despairs that any things, once handled, can shine by internal and innate resources, leaves them rather than forcing them to gleam with foreign pigments. Third, it will be so proportioned to the natural grasp, horizon, talent, genius, disposition, indeed, so to speak, to the very eyes of those chiefly for whose sake you think, that it can be drunk in by them without fatigue, not dazzling them, yet satisfying them with light, pleasantly illuminating them, not burning them inconveniently.
Tertium hoc naturalis nitoris requisitum non satis attendentes, eundem ubique negant deprehendi, quando cogitata e. g. legunt suae naturae, cogitandi sentiendique rationi, genio, principalibus studiis minus consentanea, quamvis largiri debeant eos se non esse, quos praesertim auctor vel docere, vel delectare secum decreverat, § 104. cf. Cic. de or. I. 81.
Those who do not sufficiently attend to this third requisite of natural brightness deny that it is found everywhere when, for example, they read thoughts less consonant with their own nature, manner of thinking and feeling, genius, and principal studies; although they ought to concede that they themselves are not those whom the author had especially resolved either to teach or to delight, § 104; compare Cicero, On the Orator I. 81.
Naturalis in cogitando nitor erit
Natural brightness in thinking will be, second,
2)
so fit, accommodated, and as it were proper to
materiis et rebus, de quibus cogites, sic aptus,
the materials and things about which you think,
accommodatus, et quasi proprius, ut ex
that it is perceived to be born necessarily from
iisdem earumque cogitatione necessario
those things and from the thought of them,
potius enasci, quam in eandem
rather than to be brought into that thought and
inferri illinique decoris caussa deprehendatur.
smeared upon it for the sake of adornment.
Huius hinc amicus elegantiae,
Hence the friend of this elegance,
si qua tractata
if he despairs that any things, once handled,
per internas ac innatas opes posse
can shine by internal and innate resources,
nitescere desperat, relinquit ea potius, quam ut peregrinis pigmentis
leaves them rather than forcing them to gleam with foreign pigments.
cogat splendescere, 3) eorum, quorum potissimum caussa cogitas,
Third, it will be so proportioned to the
naturali captui, horizonti, ingenio, genio, indoli,
natural grasp, horizon, talent, genius, disposition, indeed, so to
ipsis, ut ita dicam,
speak, to the very eyes of those chiefly
oculis adeo proportionatus, ut ab his
for whose sake you think, that it can be
sine fatigatione possit imbibi, nec
drunk in by them without fatigue, not dazzling them,
eos praestringens, lumine tamen satians, collustrans amabiliter, non urens incommode.
yet satisfying them with light, pleasantly illuminating them, not burning them inconveniently.
Tertium hoc naturalis
Those who do not sufficiently attend to this
nitoris requisitum non satis attendentes, eundem ubique negant deprehendi,
third requisite of natural brightness deny that it is
quando cogitata e. g.
found everywhere when, for example, they
legunt suae naturae,
read thoughts less consonant with their own nature,
cogitandi sentiendique rationi, genio, principalibus studiis
manner of thinking and feeling, genius, and principal studies;
minus consentanea, quamvis largiri debeant eos se non esse,
although they ought to concede that they themselves are not those
quos praesertim auctor vel docere, vel delectare secum decreverat,
whom the author had especially resolved either to teach or
§ 104. cf. Cic. de or. I. 81.
to delight, § 104; compare Cicero, On the Orator I. 81.
Naturalis in cogitando nitor erit 2) materiis et rebus, de quibus cogites, sic aptus, accommodatus, et quasi proprius, ut ex iisdem earumque cogitatione necessario potius enasci, quam in eandem inferri illinique decoris caussa deprehendatur. / Natural brightness in thinking will be, second, so fit, accommodated, and as it were proper to the materials and things about which you think, that it is perceived to be born necessarily from those things and from the thought of them, rather than to be brought into that thought and smeared upon it for the sake of adornment.
Huius hinc amicus elegantiae, si qua tractata per internas ac innatas opes posse nitescere desperat, relinquit ea potius, quam ut peregrinis pigmentis cogat splendescere, 3) eorum, quorum potissimum caussa cogitas, naturali captui, horizonti, ingenio, genio, indoli, ipsis, ut ita dicam, oculis adeo proportionatus, ut ab his sine fatigatione possit imbibi, nec eos praestringens, lumine tamen satians, collustrans amabiliter, non urens incommode. / Hence the friend of this elegance, if he despairs that any things, once handled, can shine by internal and innate resources, leaves them rather than forcing them to gleam with foreign pigments. Third, it will be so proportioned to the natural grasp, horizon, talent, genius, disposition, indeed, so to speak, to the very eyes of those chiefly for whose sake you think, that it can be drunk in by them without fatigue, not dazzling them, yet satisfying them with light, pleasantly illuminating them, not burning them inconveniently.
Tertium hoc naturalis nitoris requisitum non satis attendentes, eundem ubique negant deprehendi, quando cogitata e. g. legunt suae naturae, cogitandi sentiendique rationi, genio, principalibus studiis minus consentanea, quamvis largiri debeant eos se non esse, quos praesertim auctor vel docere, vel delectare secum decreverat, § 104. cf. Cic. de or. I. 81. / Those who do not sufficiently attend to this third requisite of natural brightness deny that it is found everywhere when, for example, they read thoughts less consonant with their own nature, manner of thinking and feeling, genius, and principal studies; although they ought to concede that they themselves are not those whom the author had especially resolved either to teach or to delight, § 104; compare Cicero, On the Orator I. 81.
§ 624
In picturis alios horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca, contra alios nitida, laeta, collustrata delectat. Quid est, quo praescriptum aliquod aut formulam exprimas, quum in suo quodque genere praestet, et genera plura sint? Hac ego religione non sum ab hoc conatu repulsus, existimavique in omnibus rebus esse aliquid optimum,
Thus also in painting, some are pleased with a rough, a wild, and a dark and cloudy style; while others prefer that which is clear, and lively, and well covered with light. How then shall we strike out a general rule or model, when there are several manners, and each of them has a certain perfection of its own? But this difficulty has not deterred me from the undertaking; nor have I altered my opinion that in all things there is a something which comprehends the highest excellence of the kind.
(pulcerrimum,
By this scruple I have not been driven away from this attempt, and I have judged that in all things there is something best (most beautiful),
etiamsi lateret, (multos) idque ab eo posse, qui eius rei gnarus esset, indicari.
and which, though not generally discernible, is sufficiently conspicuous to him, who is skilled in the subject.
Cic. orator. 36. Si quos in aestheticis absoluta pulcritudinis luce destituta, § 617. absolute horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca delectant, falluntur illi, nubemque pro Iunone, per me licet, amplectantur. Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in pictura, modo sint omnia luce, quam absolutam diximus, conspicua, non omnia, sed quaedam tantum, comparative lucida
Cicero, Orator 36. If in aesthetic matters things deprived of the absolute light of beauty, § 617, things absolutely rough, uncultivated, hidden, and opaque, delight anyone, they are deceived, and, as far as I am concerned, may embrace a cloud instead of Juno. But in every beauty generally, as in painting, provided that all things are conspicuous by the light which we have called absolute, not all things, but only certain things, are comparatively luminous.
Ore floridula nitent,
Alba parthenice velut,
Luteumve papaver,
For sheenly shines her flowery face
Where the white chamomiles contend
With poppies blushing red.
Cat.
quaedam sunt vere, sunt belle perspicua, quanquam, cum nitidis illis et admodum collustratis ubi comparentur, appareant opaca, quaeque primo obtutu iudicentur horrida, § 621. Eleganter, non omnia, sed
like white parthenice,
or yellow poppy, Catullus. Some things are truly and beautifully perspicuous, although, when they are compared with those bright and highly illuminated things, they appear opaque and are judged rough at first glance, § 621. Elegantly, not all things, but
plura nitent in carmine.
But when I meet with beauties thickly sown,.
Hor.
Horace.
In picturis alios horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca, contra alios nitida, laeta, collustrata delectat. Quid est, quo praescriptum aliquod aut formulam exprimas, quum in suo quodque genere praestet, et genera plura sint? Hac ego religione non sum ab hoc conatu repulsus, existimavique in omnibus rebus esse aliquid optimum,
Thus also in painting, some are pleased with a rough, a wild, and a dark and cloudy style; while others prefer that which is clear, and lively, and well covered with light. How then shall we strike out a general rule or model, when there are several manners, and each of them has a certain perfection of its own? But this difficulty has not deterred me from the undertaking; nor have I altered my opinion that in all things there is a something which comprehends the highest excellence of the kind.
(pulcerrimum,
By this scruple I have not been driven away from this attempt, and I have judged that in all things there is something best (most beautiful),
etiamsi lateret, (multos) idque ab eo posse, qui eius rei gnarus esset, indicari.
and which, though not generally discernible, is sufficiently conspicuous to him, who is skilled in the subject.
Cic. orator. 36. Si quos in aestheticis absoluta pulcritudinis luce destituta, § 617. absolute horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca delectant, falluntur illi, nubemque pro Iunone, per me licet, amplectantur.
Cicero, Orator 36. If in aesthetic matters things deprived of the absolute light of beauty, § 617, things absolutely rough, uncultivated, hidden, and opaque, delight anyone, they are deceived, and, as far as I am concerned, may embrace a cloud instead of Juno.
Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in pictura, modo sint omnia luce, quam absolutam diximus, conspicua, non omnia, sed quaedam tantum, comparative lucida
But in every beauty generally, as in painting, provided that all things are conspicuous by the light which we have called absolute, not all things, but only certain things, are comparatively luminous.
Ore floridula nitent,
Alba parthenice velut,
Luteumve papaver,
For sheenly shines her flowery face
Where the white chamomiles contend
With poppies blushing red.
Cat.
quaedam sunt vere, sunt belle perspicua, quanquam, cum nitidis illis et admodum collustratis ubi comparentur, appareant opaca, quaeque primo obtutu iudicentur horrida, § 621. Eleganter, non omnia, sed
like white parthenice,
or yellow poppy, Catullus. Some things are truly and beautifully perspicuous, although, when they are compared with those bright and highly illuminated things, they appear opaque and are judged rough at first glance, § 621. Elegantly, not all things, but
plura nitent in carmine.
But when I meet with beauties thickly sown,.
Hor.
Horace.
In picturis alios horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca, contra alios nitida, laeta, collustrata delectat. Quid est, quo praescriptum aliquod aut formulam exprimas, quum in suo quodque genere praestet, et genera plura sint? Hac ego religione non sum ab hoc conatu repulsus, existimavique in omnibus rebus esse aliquid optimum,
Thus also in painting, some are pleased with a rough, a wild, and a dark and cloudy style; while others prefer that which is clear, and lively, and well covered with light. How then shall we strike out a general rule or model, when there are several manners, and each of them has a certain perfection of its own? But this difficulty has not deterred me from the undertaking; nor have I altered my opinion that in all things there is a something which comprehends the highest excellence of the kind.
(pulcerrimum,
By this scruple I have not been driven away from this attempt, and I have judged that in all things there is something best (most beautiful),
etiamsi lateret, (multos) idque ab eo posse, qui eius rei gnarus esset, indicari.
and which, though not generally discernible, is sufficiently conspicuous to him, who is skilled in the subject.
Cic. orator. 36. Si quos in aestheticis
Cicero, Orator 36. If in aesthetic matters things
absoluta pulcritudinis luce destituta, § 617.
deprived of the absolute light of beauty, § 617,
absolute horrida, inculta, abdita et
things absolutely rough, uncultivated, hidden, and opaque, delight anyone,
opaca delectant, falluntur illi, nubemque pro
they are deceived, and, as far as I am concerned,
Iunone, per me licet, amplectantur.
may embrace a cloud instead of Juno.
Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in
But in every beauty generally, as in painting,
pictura, modo sint omnia luce,
provided that all things are conspicuous by the light
quam absolutam diximus, conspicua, non omnia,
which we have called absolute, not all things,
sed quaedam tantum, comparative lucida
but only certain things, are comparatively luminous.
Ore floridula nitent,
Alba parthenice velut,
Luteumve papaver,
For sheenly shines her flowery face
Where the white chamomiles contend
With poppies blushing red.
Cat. quaedam sunt vere,
like white parthenice, or yellow poppy, Catullus.
sunt belle perspicua, quanquam,
Some things are truly and beautifully perspicuous, although,
cum nitidis illis et admodum collustratis ubi
when they are compared with those bright and highly illuminated things,
comparentur, appareant opaca, quaeque primo obtutu iudicentur horrida, § 621.
they appear opaque and are judged rough at first glance, § 621.
Eleganter, non omnia, sed
Elegantly, not all things, but
plura nitent in carmine.
But when I meet with beauties thickly sown,.
Hor.
Horace.
In picturis alios horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca, contra alios nitida, laeta, collustrata delectat. Quid est, quo praescriptum aliquod aut formulam exprimas, quum in suo quodque genere praestet, et genera plura sint? Hac ego religione non sum ab hoc conatu repulsus, existimavique in omnibus rebus esse aliquid optimum,
Thus also in painting, some are pleased with a rough, a wild, and a dark and cloudy style; while others prefer that which is clear, and lively, and well covered with light. How then shall we strike out a general rule or model, when there are several manners, and each of them has a certain perfection of its own? But this difficulty has not deterred me from the undertaking; nor have I altered my opinion that in all things there is a something which comprehends the highest excellence of the kind.
(pulcerrimum, / By this scruple I have not been driven away from this attempt, and I have judged that in all things there is something best (most beautiful),
etiamsi lateret, (multos) idque ab eo posse, qui eius rei gnarus esset, indicari.
and which, though not generally discernible, is sufficiently conspicuous to him, who is skilled in the subject.
Cic. orator. 36. Si quos in aestheticis absoluta pulcritudinis luce destituta, § 617. absolute horrida, inculta, abdita et opaca delectant, falluntur illi, nubemque pro Iunone, per me licet, amplectantur. / Cicero, Orator 36. If in aesthetic matters things deprived of the absolute light of beauty, § 617, things absolutely rough, uncultivated, hidden, and opaque, delight anyone, they are deceived, and, as far as I am concerned, may embrace a cloud instead of Juno.
Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in pictura, modo sint omnia luce, quam absolutam diximus, conspicua, non omnia, sed quaedam tantum, comparative lucida / But in every beauty generally, as in painting, provided that all things are conspicuous by the light which we have called absolute, not all things, but only certain things, are comparatively luminous.
Ore floridula nitent,
Alba parthenice velut,
Luteumve papaver,
For sheenly shines her flowery face
Where the white chamomiles contend
With poppies blushing red.
Cat. quaedam sunt vere, sunt belle perspicua, quanquam, cum nitidis illis et admodum collustratis ubi comparentur, appareant opaca, quaeque primo obtutu iudicentur horrida, § 621. Eleganter, non omnia, sed / like white parthenice, or yellow poppy, Catullus. Some things are truly and beautifully perspicuous, although, when they are compared with those bright and highly illuminated things, they appear opaque and are judged rough at first glance, § 621. Elegantly, not all things, but
plura nitent in carmine.
But when I meet with beauties thickly sown,.
Hor. / Horace.
§ 625
GENUS COGITANDI luce absoluta aesthetica non destitutum si dicamus SIMPLICITER DILUCIDUM et perspicuum (sensitivae) § 617. sicuti comparativa etiam luce fulgens NITIDUM et splendidum: praeeuntem sequimur Quintilianum VIII. 3. quando:
If we call a KIND OF THINKING not deprived of absolute aesthetic light SIMPLY CLEAR and perspicuous (with respect to sensory cognition), § 617, just as we call one also shining with comparative light BRIGHT and splendid, we follow Quintilian as our guide, VIII. 3. For he says:
Emendate quidem, ait, et dilucide
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.,
§ 619.
§ 619, is a slender reward, and it is more to be free from faults than to seem to have attained some great virtue.
dicentium tenue praemium est, magisque vitiis carere est, quam ut aliquam magnam virtutem adeptus esse videaris. — Non assequutus esset Cicero docendo tantum iudicem, et utiliter demum, ac latine perspicueque docendo,
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.
If in his defence of Cornelius Cicero had confined himself merely to instructing the judge and speaking in clear and idiomatic Latin without a thought beyond the interests of his case, would he ever have compelled the Roman people to proclaim their admiration not merely by acclamation, but by thunders of applause? No, it was the sublimity and splendour, the brilliance and the weight of his eloquence that evoked such clamorous enthusiasm.;
quod eum assequutum esse nitore fulgentium armorum, § 282. vidimus.
we have seen that he attained it by the brightness of gleaming arms, § 282.
Sed hic ornatur, (licet enim repetere, § 622.) virilis, fortis, ac sanctus sit, nec effoeminatam levitatem, nec fuco eminentem colorem amet, sanguine et viribus niteat.
But such ornament must, as I have already said, be bold, manly and chaste, free from all effeminate smoothness and the false hues derived from artificial dyes, and must glow with health and vigour.
§ 619.
This repeats the point (§622); see also §619.
Hoc autem adeo verum est, ut, cum in hac maxima parte sint vicina virtutibus vitia,
So true is this, that although, where ornament is concerned, vice and virtue are never far apart, those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue.,
§ 622.
§ 622,
etiam qui vitiis utuntur, virtutis tamen his nomen imponant. Quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus. Non nego hanc esse virtutem. Sed illis eam non tribuo.
those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue. Therefore let none of our decadents accuse me of being an enemy to those who speak with grace and finish. I do not deny the existence of such a virtue, I merely deny that they possess it..
GENUS COGITANDI luce absoluta aesthetica non destitutum si dicamus SIMPLICITER DILUCIDUM et perspicuum (sensitivae) § 617. sicuti comparativa etiam luce fulgens NITIDUM et splendidum: praeeuntem sequimur Quintilianum VIII. 3. quando:
If we call a KIND OF THINKING not deprived of absolute aesthetic light SIMPLY CLEAR and perspicuous (with respect to sensory cognition), § 617, just as we call one also shining with comparative light BRIGHT and splendid, we follow Quintilian as our guide, VIII. 3. For he says:
Emendate quidem, ait, et dilucide
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.,
§ 619.
§ 619, is a slender reward, and it is more to be free from faults than to seem to have attained some great virtue.
dicentium tenue praemium est, magisque vitiis carere est, quam ut aliquam magnam virtutem adeptus esse videaris. — Non assequutus esset Cicero docendo tantum iudicem, et utiliter demum, ac latine perspicueque docendo,
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.
If in his defence of Cornelius Cicero had confined himself merely to instructing the judge and speaking in clear and idiomatic Latin without a thought beyond the interests of his case, would he ever have compelled the Roman people to proclaim their admiration not merely by acclamation, but by thunders of applause? No, it was the sublimity and splendour, the brilliance and the weight of his eloquence that evoked such clamorous enthusiasm.;
quod eum assequutum esse nitore fulgentium armorum, § 282. vidimus.
we have seen that he attained it by the brightness of gleaming arms, § 282.
Sed hic ornatur, (licet enim repetere, § 622.) virilis, fortis, ac sanctus sit, nec effoeminatam levitatem, nec fuco eminentem colorem amet, sanguine et viribus niteat.
But such ornament must, as I have already said, be bold, manly and chaste, free from all effeminate smoothness and the false hues derived from artificial dyes, and must glow with health and vigour.
§ 619.
This repeats the point (§622); see also §619.
Hoc autem adeo verum est, ut, cum in hac maxima parte sint vicina virtutibus vitia,
So true is this, that although, where ornament is concerned, vice and virtue are never far apart, those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue.,
§ 622.
§ 622,
etiam qui vitiis utuntur, virtutis tamen his nomen imponant. Quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus. Non nego hanc esse virtutem. Sed illis eam non tribuo.
those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue. Therefore let none of our decadents accuse me of being an enemy to those who speak with grace and finish. I do not deny the existence of such a virtue, I merely deny that they possess it..
GENUS COGITANDI luce
If we call a KIND OF THINKING not deprived
absoluta aesthetica non destitutum si dicamus SIMPLICITER DILUCIDUM
of absolute aesthetic light SIMPLY CLEAR
et perspicuum (sensitivae) § 617.
and perspicuous (with respect to sensory cognition), § 617,
sicuti comparativa etiam luce fulgens
just as we call one also shining with comparative
NITIDUM et splendidum: praeeuntem sequimur Quintilianum VIII.
light BRIGHT and splendid, we follow Quintilian as our guide, VIII.
3. quando:
3. For he says:
Emendate quidem, ait, et dilucide
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.,
§ 619.
§ 619, is a slender reward, and it is more to be free from faults than to seem to have attained some great virtue.
dicentium tenue praemium est, magisque vitiis carere est, quam ut aliquam magnam virtutem adeptus esse videaris. — Non assequutus esset Cicero docendo tantum iudicem, et utiliter demum, ac latine perspicueque docendo,
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.
If in his defence of Cornelius Cicero had confined himself merely to instructing the judge and speaking in clear and idiomatic Latin without a thought beyond the interests of his case, would he ever have compelled the Roman people to proclaim their admiration not merely by acclamation, but by thunders of applause? No, it was the sublimity and splendour, the brilliance and the weight of his eloquence that evoked such clamorous enthusiasm.;
quod eum assequutum esse nitore fulgentium armorum,
we have seen that he attained it by the brightness of
§ 282. vidimus.
gleaming arms, § 282.
Sed hic ornatur, (licet enim repetere, § 622.) virilis, fortis, ac sanctus sit, nec effoeminatam levitatem, nec fuco eminentem colorem amet, sanguine et viribus niteat.
But such ornament must, as I have already said, be bold, manly and chaste, free from all effeminate smoothness and the false hues derived from artificial dyes, and must glow with health and vigour.
§ 619.
This repeats the point (§622); see also §619.
Hoc autem adeo verum est, ut, cum in hac maxima parte sint vicina virtutibus vitia,
So true is this, that although, where ornament is concerned, vice and virtue are never far apart, those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue.,
§ 622.
§ 622,
etiam qui vitiis utuntur, virtutis tamen his nomen imponant. Quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus. Non nego hanc esse virtutem. Sed illis eam non tribuo.
those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue. Therefore let none of our decadents accuse me of being an enemy to those who speak with grace and finish. I do not deny the existence of such a virtue, I merely deny that they possess it..
GENUS COGITANDI luce absoluta aesthetica non destitutum si dicamus SIMPLICITER DILUCIDUM et perspicuum (sensitivae) § 617. sicuti comparativa etiam luce fulgens NITIDUM et splendidum: praeeuntem sequimur Quintilianum VIII. 3. quando: / If we call a KIND OF THINKING not deprived of absolute aesthetic light SIMPLY CLEAR and perspicuous (with respect to sensory cognition), § 617, just as we call one also shining with comparative light BRIGHT and splendid, we follow Quintilian as our guide, VIII. 3. For he says:
Emendate quidem, ait, et dilucide
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.,
§ 619. / § 619, is a slender reward, and it is more to be free from faults than to seem to have attained some great virtue.
dicentium tenue praemium est, magisque vitiis carere est, quam ut aliquam magnam virtutem adeptus esse videaris. — Non assequutus esset Cicero docendo tantum iudicem, et utiliter demum, ac latine perspicueque docendo,
For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.
If in his defence of Cornelius Cicero had confined himself merely to instructing the judge and speaking in clear and idiomatic Latin without a thought beyond the interests of his case, would he ever have compelled the Roman people to proclaim their admiration not merely by acclamation, but by thunders of applause? No, it was the sublimity and splendour, the brilliance and the weight of his eloquence that evoked such clamorous enthusiasm.;
quod eum assequutum esse nitore fulgentium armorum, § 282. vidimus. / we have seen that he attained it by the brightness of gleaming arms, § 282.
Sed hic ornatur, (licet enim repetere, § 622.) virilis, fortis, ac sanctus sit, nec effoeminatam levitatem, nec fuco eminentem colorem amet, sanguine et viribus niteat.
But such ornament must, as I have already said, be bold, manly and chaste, free from all effeminate smoothness and the false hues derived from artificial dyes, and must glow with health and vigour.
§ 619. / This repeats the point (§622); see also §619.
Hoc autem adeo verum est, ut, cum in hac maxima parte sint vicina virtutibus vitia,
So true is this, that although, where ornament is concerned, vice and virtue are never far apart, those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue.,
§ 622. / § 622,
etiam qui vitiis utuntur, virtutis tamen his nomen imponant. Quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus. Non nego hanc esse virtutem. Sed illis eam non tribuo.
those who employ a vicious style of embellishment disguise their vices with the name of virtue. Therefore let none of our decadents accuse me of being an enemy to those who speak with grace and finish. I do not deny the existence of such a virtue, I merely deny that they possess it..