Aesthetica

Pari artificio, quae videantur synonymiae, vel exergasiae, coniungi possunt, tanquam aequipollentes, quarum tamen acutior lector vel auditor, unam videat rationem, in elegantibus, sufficientem alterius, § 900, 146. Confirmaturus, § 878–885. satisfacturus et reprehendens § 899. memor, probantia quaedam vel refellentia in umbras coniecturus, venuste nonnunquam recurret ad praeteritionem, § 148. Nec poenitet huc INTERROGATIONEM retulisse, § 332. seu crypticam declarationem nos optare, ut aliquis conscientiam suam de veritate alicuius rei dicat, vel cogitet. Prudens enim si caveris modo, ne interroges, ubi personale tuum obiectum primarium vel haesurum, vel omnino dissensurum, praevideri poterat, sine ulteriori addita persuasione: una apta interrogatione multum obtinebis, ut auditor e. c. ipse sibi tradat, et in mentem denuo revocet, quicquid rationum de re, quam afferis, iam noverat, et simul tibi concilietur non raro, quem suae iam scientiae non parum confidere non invitus animadvertit, § 840. aliquando sensibilius moveatur, quem invites intra se descendere sensus animi scrutaturum intimos, et ea certa sibi iam dudum deprehendere, quae nunc bona vel mala dicuntur. § 142.

By a similar art, things that seem to be synonymies or exergasiae can be joined as equivalent, while nevertheless a sharper reader or hearer sees one reason, in elegant things, sufficient for the other, §§900, 146. One who will confirm, §§878–885, satisfy, and reprehend, §899, mindful that he will cast certain proving or refuting things into shadows, will sometimes gracefully recur to praeterition, §148. Nor do I regret having referred INTERROGATION here, §332, or the cryptic declaration that we desire someone to say or think his consciousness of the truth of some matter. For if you prudently take care not to interrogate where your primary personal object could be foreseen to stick fast or altogether dissent, without further persuasion added, by one apt interrogation you will obtain much: that the hearer, for example, gives himself and recalls again to mind whatever reasons about the matter you bring forward he had already known; and at the same time he will not rarely be reconciled to you, since he notices not unwillingly that you trust his knowledge not a little, §840; sometimes he is moved more sensibly, when you invite him to descend within himself to search the inmost senses of the mind and to find there, already long ago certain to him, the things that are now called good or evil, §142.

Pari artificio, quae videantur synonymiae, vel exergasiae, coniungi possunt, tanquam aequipollentes, quarum tamen acutior lector vel auditor, unam videat rationem, in elegantibus, sufficientem alterius, § 900, 146. Confirmaturus, § 878–885. satisfacturus et reprehendens § 899. memor, probantia quaedam vel refellentia in umbras coniecturus, venuste nonnunquam recurret ad praeteritionem, § 148. Nec poenitet huc INTERROGATIONEM retulisse, § 332. seu crypticam declarationem nos optare, ut aliquis conscientiam suam de veritate alicuius rei dicat, vel cogitet.

By a similar art, things that seem to be synonymies or exergasiae can be joined as equivalent, while nevertheless a sharper reader or hearer sees one reason, in elegant things, sufficient for the other, §§900, 146. One who will confirm, §§878–885, satisfy, and reprehend, §899, mindful that he will cast certain proving or refuting things into shadows, will sometimes gracefully recur to praeterition, §148. Nor do I regret having referred INTERROGATION here, §332, or the cryptic declaration that we desire someone to say or think his consciousness of the truth of some matter.

Prudens enim si caveris modo, ne interroges, ubi personale tuum obiectum primarium vel haesurum, vel omnino dissensurum, praevideri poterat, sine ulteriori addita persuasione: una apta interrogatione multum obtinebis, ut auditor e. c. ipse sibi tradat, et in mentem denuo revocet, quicquid rationum de re, quam afferis, iam noverat, et simul tibi concilietur non raro, quem suae iam scientiae non parum confidere non invitus animadvertit, § 840. aliquando sensibilius moveatur, quem invites intra se descendere sensus animi scrutaturum intimos, et ea certa sibi iam dudum deprehendere, quae nunc bona vel mala dicuntur. § 142.

For if you prudently take care not to interrogate where your primary personal object could be foreseen to stick fast or altogether dissent, without further persuasion added, by one apt interrogation you will obtain much: that the hearer, for example, gives himself and recalls again to mind whatever reasons about the matter you bring forward he had already known; and at the same time he will not rarely be reconciled to you, since he notices not unwillingly that you trust his knowledge not a little, §840; sometimes he is moved more sensibly, when you invite him to descend within himself to search the inmost senses of the mind and to find there, already long ago certain to him, the things that are now called good or evil, §142.

Repetitio; cum multis suis speciebus heic etiam repetatur, vel ob id ipsum, quod non solum persuadet, § 333. sed tamen magnam persuadendi vim habet, non inepta quaevis, et tautologica, sed aetiologiarum praecipuarum in rotundam aliquam brevitatem contractarum. § 545. Omnis enim aetiologia vivide cogitata quum sit argumentum persuasorium, § 839. illarum eam, sine qua non posse videatur absolvi persuasio posse, dicamus cum veteribus RATIONEM per eminentiam, et aetiologiarum rationumve potissimam, FIRMAMENTUM, cf. Cicero de Inv. I. 18, 19. Rationem et firmamentum vel iisdem, vel paullulum inflexis cogitandi modis breviter, sed iterato cogitandam sistere, vel hoc habet efficaciae ad persuadendum, ut firmius haereat animis obiecti tui personalis, cui potissimum argumento confidis. § 342–345. Non sine persuadendi lenocinio pervigilium Veneris toties repetit:

Repetition, with its many species, should also be repeated here, if only because it not only persuades, §333, but nevertheless has great force for persuading; not any inept and tautological repetition, but repetition of principal aetiologies contracted into some rounded brevity, §545. For since every vividly thought aetiology is a persuasive argument, §839, let us call that one of them without which persuasion seems unable to be completed, with the ancients, REASON by eminence, and the most powerful of aetiologies or reasons, FIRMAMENT; compare Cicero, De inventione I.18–19. To present the reason and firmament briefly, but repeatedly, either in the same modes of thinking or in slightly inflected ones, has this much efficacy for persuading: that the argument in which you chiefly trust sticks more firmly in the minds of your personal object, §§342–345. Not without persuasive charm does the Pervigilium Veneris repeat so often:

Repetitio; cum multis suis speciebus heic etiam repetatur, vel ob id ipsum, quod non solum persuadet, § 333. sed tamen magnam persuadendi vim habet, non inepta quaevis, et tautologica, sed aetiologiarum praecipuarum in rotundam aliquam brevitatem contractarum. § 545. Omnis enim aetiologia vivide cogitata quum sit argumentum persuasorium, § 839. illarum eam, sine qua non posse videatur absolvi persuasio posse, dicamus cum veteribus RATIONEM per eminentiam, et aetiologiarum rationumve potissimam, FIRMAMENTUM, cf. Cicero de Inv.

Repetition, with its many species, should also be repeated here, if only because it not only persuades, §333, but nevertheless has great force for persuading; not any inept and tautological repetition, but repetition of principal aetiologies contracted into some rounded brevity, §545. For since every vividly thought aetiology is a persuasive argument, §839, let us call that one of them without which persuasion seems unable to be completed, with the ancients, REASON by eminence, and the most powerful of aetiologies or reasons, FIRMAMENT; compare Cicero, De inventione I.18–19.

I. 18, 19. Rationem et firmamentum vel iisdem, vel paullulum inflexis cogitandi modis breviter, sed iterato cogitandam sistere, vel hoc habet efficaciae ad persuadendum, ut firmius haereat animis obiecti tui personalis, cui potissimum argumento confidis. § 342–345. Non sine persuadendi lenocinio pervigilium Veneris toties repetit:

To present the reason and firmament briefly, but repeatedly, either in the same modes of thinking or in slightly inflected ones, has this much efficacy for persuading: that the argument in which you chiefly trust sticks more firmly in the minds of your personal object, §§342–345. Not without persuasive charm does the Pervigilium Veneris repeat so often:

In his argumentis commendetur probationum climax et ea gradatio, § 334. qua totum certissima sua parte certius esse redditum, non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinatum videatur, § 250, 879. Cauturus vel umbram anticlimacis in probando, ne facile persuadearis eorum consiliis, qui debilius argumentum fortioribus interferere suadent, quod praemittere non audeas. § 879. An unquam venustus a certioribus in incertiora decursus, nisi forsan in iocis pyrrhonicis? In hyperbolis confirmantium e. g. sole meridiano clarius est, et reprehendentium e. g. contra solem loquutos praeferantur crypticae, quae sic limites certitudinis improbabilitatisque assignandae transgrediantur, ut id ipsum factum esse vix ac ne vix quidem appareat. § 339.

In these arguments let the climax of proofs and that gradation be commended, §334, by which the whole seems to have been rendered more certain by its most certain part, examined not by a goldsmith's balance but by a certain popular scale, §§250, 879. About to beware even the shadow of anticlimax in proving, do not easily be persuaded by the counsels of those who advise inserting a weaker argument among stronger ones because you do not dare put it first, §879. Has there ever been a graceful descent from more certain things into less certain ones, unless perhaps in Pyrrhonian jokes? In the hyperboles of confirmers, for example it is clearer than the midday sun, and of reprehenders, for example they spoke against the sun, cryptic ones should be preferred, which so transgress the limits of certitude and improbability to be assigned that this very fact scarcely, and not even scarcely, appears to have happened, §339.

In his argumentis commendetur probationum climax et ea gradatio, § 334. qua totum certissima sua parte certius esse redditum, non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinatum videatur, § 250, 879. Cauturus vel umbram anticlimacis in probando, ne facile persuadearis eorum consiliis, qui debilius argumentum fortioribus interferere suadent, quod praemittere non audeas. § 879. An unquam venustus a certioribus in incertiora decursus, nisi forsan in iocis pyrrhonicis?

In these arguments let the climax of proofs and that gradation be commended, §334, by which the whole seems to have been rendered more certain by its most certain part, examined not by a goldsmith's balance but by a certain popular scale, §§250, 879. About to beware even the shadow of anticlimax in proving, do not easily be persuaded by the counsels of those who advise inserting a weaker argument among stronger ones because you do not dare put it first, §879. Has there ever been a graceful descent from more certain things into less certain ones, unless perhaps in Pyrrhonian jokes?

In hyperbolis confirmantium e. g. sole meridiano clarius est, et reprehendentium e. g. contra solem loquutos praeferantur crypticae, quae sic limites certitudinis improbabilitatisque assignandae transgrediantur, ut id ipsum factum esse vix ac ne vix quidem appareat. § 339.

In the hyperboles of confirmers, for example it is clearer than the midday sun, and of reprehenders, for example they spoke against the sun, cryptic ones should be preferred, which so transgress the limits of certitude and improbability to be assigned that this very fact scarcely, and not even scarcely, appears to have happened, §339.

Non nego Quintiliani regulam § 903.

I do not deny Quintilian's rule, §903:

(de persuadendis suis obiectis personalibus probe persuasus). Inst. V. 13. Moneo tantum, ne nimiae certitudinis ostentator de fide periclitetur. Hinc agnosco casus, in quibus belle ad confirmandum reprehendendumve possit adhiberi DUBITATIO, narratio vel simulatio status animi, cui rationes pro quadam sententia pugnantes et contra eandem connumeranti censentur aequales, praesertim si venuste transeas ab hac ad bellam evidentiae parrhesiam. § 349. S. L.

I extend this rule to everyone who would persuade beautifully, whether speaking or thinking what is to be signified, provided that the person is well persuaded concerning the object of persuasion. Institutio V.13. I only warn that the exhibitor of too much certitude should not endanger his credibility. Hence I recognize cases in which DUBITATION can beautifully be used for confirming or reprehending: the narration or simulation of a state of mind in which the reasons fighting for a certain opinion and those counted against it are judged equal, especially if you gracefully pass from this to the beautiful parrhesia of evidence, §349, Sect. L.

Non nego Quintiliani regulam § 903.

I do not deny Quintilian's rule, §903:

(de persuadendis suis obiectis personalibus probe persuasus). Inst. V. 13. Moneo tantum, ne nimiae certitudinis ostentator de fide periclitetur.

I extend this rule to everyone who would persuade beautifully, whether speaking or thinking what is to be signified, provided that the person is well persuaded concerning the object of persuasion. Institutio V.13.

Hinc agnosco casus, in quibus belle ad confirmandum reprehendendumve possit adhiberi DUBITATIO, narratio vel simulatio status animi, cui rationes pro quadam sententia pugnantes et contra eandem connumeranti censentur aequales, praesertim si venuste transeas ab hac ad bellam evidentiae parrhesiam. § 349. S. L.

I only warn that the exhibitor of too much certitude should not endanger his credibility. Hence I recognize cases in which DUBITATION can beautifully be used for confirming or reprehending: the narration or simulation of a state of mind in which the reasons fighting for a certain opinion and those counted against it are judged equal, especially if you gracefully pass from this to the beautiful parrhesia of evidence, §349, Sect. L.