§ 876
Ad locum aesthetices de pulcris ratiocinationibus rite formandis ablegemus excutienda, quae Cicero habet de inductionibus n. 51–56. et tractationem de ratiocinationibus venustis tam simplicibus, quam concatenatis, qua patebit illas esse posse ac solere tripertitas, neque tamen semper vel tot constare partibus necessario: has vel trium tantum partium esse posse, solere tamen quatuor, vel quinque partibus absolvi, quanquam plures etiam articulos non omnino reformident. Unde diiudicari poterit controversia, de qua Cicero l. c. 57–76. Nunc solum notemus eiusdem iudicium, quo abhorrere censet ab usu oratorio (hinc multo magis a poetico, generatim aesthetico)
Let us send away to the place in aesthetics concerning the right formation of beautiful ratiocinations the things to be examined which Cicero has concerning inductions, numbers 51–56, and the treatment of graceful ratiocinations, both simple and concatenated. There it will become clear that the former can be and usually are tripartite, and yet do not always necessarily consist of so many parts; the latter can be of only three parts, but usually are completed by four or five parts, although they do not altogether fear more joints. From this the controversy about which Cicero speaks there, 57–76, can be judged. Now let us note only his judgment, by which he thinks that
multa et obscura (κατ' αἴσθησιν, § 631.) de quibus certum est artificium constitutum, (logicum) quibus scilicet rationibus tractentur argumentationes in philosophia.
But we wish it to be understood that we hold the doctrine that argumentations are handled in philosophy in many other manners, and those too at times obscure ones, concerning which, however, there is still some definite system laid down. But still those methods appear to us to be inconsistent with the practice of an orator.
These matters are obscure to sense (§631), and the established art is logical art; they are abhorrent from oratorical use, and hence much more from poetic and generally aesthetic use.
Ad locum aesthetices de pulcris ratiocinationibus rite formandis ablegemus excutienda, quae Cicero habet de inductionibus n. 51–56. et tractationem de ratiocinationibus venustis tam simplicibus, quam concatenatis, qua patebit illas esse posse ac solere tripertitas, neque tamen semper vel tot constare partibus necessario: has vel trium tantum partium esse posse, solere tamen quatuor, vel quinque partibus absolvi, quanquam plures etiam articulos non omnino reformident.
Let us send away to the place in aesthetics concerning the right formation of beautiful ratiocinations the things to be examined which Cicero has concerning inductions, numbers 51–56, and the treatment of graceful ratiocinations, both simple and concatenated. There it will become clear that the former can be and usually are tripartite, and yet do not always necessarily consist of so many parts; the latter can be of only three parts, but usually are completed by four or five parts, although they do not altogether fear more joints.
Unde diiudicari poterit controversia, de qua Cicero l. c. 57–76. Nunc solum notemus eiusdem iudicium, quo abhorrere censet ab usu oratorio (hinc multo magis a poetico, generatim aesthetico)
From this the controversy about which Cicero speaks there, 57–76, can be judged. Now let us note only his judgment, by which he thinks that
multa et obscura (κατ' αἴσθησιν, § 631.) de quibus certum est artificium constitutum, (logicum) quibus scilicet rationibus tractentur argumentationes in philosophia.
But we wish it to be understood that we hold the doctrine that argumentations are handled in philosophy in many other manners, and those too at times obscure ones, concerning which, however, there is still some definite system laid down. But still those methods appear to us to be inconsistent with the practice of an orator.
These matters are obscure to sense (§631), and the established art is logical art; they are abhorrent from oratorical use, and hence much more from poetic and generally aesthetic use.
Ad locum aesthetices
Let us send away to the place in aesthetics
de pulcris ratiocinationibus rite formandis ablegemus excutienda,
concerning the right formation of beautiful
quae Cicero habet de inductionibus n.
ratiocinations the things to be examined which Cicero has concerning inductions, numbers
51–56. et tractationem de ratiocinationibus venustis tam simplicibus, quam concatenatis,
51–56, and the treatment of graceful ratiocinations, both simple and concatenated.
qua patebit illas esse posse
There it will become clear that the former can
ac solere tripertitas, neque
be and usually are tripartite, and yet do not
tamen semper vel tot constare partibus
always necessarily consist of so many parts;
necessario: has vel trium tantum partium
the latter can be of only three parts,
esse posse, solere tamen quatuor, vel quinque partibus
but usually are completed by four or five parts,
absolvi, quanquam plures etiam articulos non omnino reformident.
although they do not altogether fear more joints.
Unde diiudicari poterit controversia, de qua Cicero l. c.
From this the controversy about which Cicero speaks there,
57–76. Nunc solum notemus eiusdem iudicium,
57–76, can be judged.
quo abhorrere censet ab usu oratorio (hinc
Now let us note only his judgment,
multo magis a poetico, generatim aesthetico)
by which he thinks that
multa et obscura (κατ' αἴσθησιν, § 631.) de quibus certum est artificium constitutum, (logicum) quibus scilicet rationibus tractentur argumentationes in philosophia.
But we wish it to be understood that we hold the doctrine that argumentations are handled in philosophy in many other manners, and those too at times obscure ones, concerning which, however, there is still some definite system laid down. But still those methods appear to us to be inconsistent with the practice of an orator.
These matters are obscure to sense (§631), and the established art is logical art; they are abhorrent from oratorical use, and hence much more from poetic and generally aesthetic use.
Ad locum aesthetices de pulcris ratiocinationibus rite formandis ablegemus excutienda, quae Cicero habet de inductionibus n. 51–56. et tractationem de ratiocinationibus venustis tam simplicibus, quam concatenatis, qua patebit illas esse posse ac solere tripertitas, neque tamen semper vel tot constare partibus necessario: has vel trium tantum partium esse posse, solere tamen quatuor, vel quinque partibus absolvi, quanquam plures etiam articulos non omnino reformident. / Let us send away to the place in aesthetics concerning the right formation of beautiful ratiocinations the things to be examined which Cicero has concerning inductions, numbers 51–56, and the treatment of graceful ratiocinations, both simple and concatenated. There it will become clear that the former can be and usually are tripartite, and yet do not always necessarily consist of so many parts; the latter can be of only three parts, but usually are completed by four or five parts, although they do not altogether fear more joints.
Unde diiudicari poterit controversia, de qua Cicero l. c. 57–76. Nunc solum notemus eiusdem iudicium, quo abhorrere censet ab usu oratorio (hinc multo magis a poetico, generatim aesthetico) / From this the controversy about which Cicero speaks there, 57–76, can be judged. Now let us note only his judgment, by which he thinks that
multa et obscura (κατ' αἴσθησιν, § 631.) de quibus certum est artificium constitutum, (logicum) quibus scilicet rationibus tractentur argumentationes in philosophia.
But we wish it to be understood that we hold the doctrine that argumentations are handled in philosophy in many other manners, and those too at times obscure ones, concerning which, however, there is still some definite system laid down. But still those methods appear to us to be inconsistent with the practice of an orator.
/ These matters are obscure to sense (§631), and the established art is logical art; they are abhorrent from oratorical use, and hence much more from poetic and generally aesthetic use.
§ 877
Praebet enim occasionem concessae § 862, 863. libertati nunc adiungendi consilium expresse dissuasorium, in venustis confirmationibus ne adhibeas ratiocinationes, quarum forma secundum logices artificium legitima logicorum gnaris sine ulla crypsi, sine ullo saltu, sine ullis additamentis variationibusve retenta statim appareat, quosque formales logici dicunt. Logices imperitis formales eiusmodi syllogismos qualemcunque, maiorem tamen, certitudinem, ac alios, dare, nunquam expertus sum, nec a priori convictus, si cum vere persuasoriis, uti fas est, comparentur. Periti logices aut operae pretium iudicabunt aliquam tuarum ratiocinationum etiam in formali rationis certitudine maiori contemplari, et tunc ipsi formam tuis logicam induere poterunt: aut certitudinem eiusmodi, nunc certe, non desiderant, hinc nec his proderis, vel placebis singulariter. Interim horizontem nunc tuum transcendens, § 121. manca, § 159. μέλος aestheticum negligens, § 193, 194. male tenuia, § 232. sicca, exilia, arida, exsanguia, ieiuna, § 246. studium veri male locatum, nunc tuo, verisimilitudinis aestheticae studio praeferens, § 555, 561. probans non persuadens, § 541. aesthetice obscura, § 633, 636. cogitare, neque tamen aesthetice solidus iudicaberis. § 840, 842.
For this gives occasion to add now to the liberty conceded in §§862, 863 an expressly dissuasive counsel: in graceful confirmations do not use ratiocinations whose form, legitimate according to the art of logic, appears at once to those skilled in logic, retained without any concealment, without any leap, without any additions or variations, and which logicians call formal. I have never experienced that formal syllogisms of this kind give to those unskilled in logic any certitude, or greater certitude than others, nor have I been convinced a priori, if they are compared, as is proper, with truly persuasive ones. Those skilled in logic will either judge it worthwhile to contemplate one of your ratiocinations also in the greater formal certitude of reason, and then they themselves can put logical form upon your arguments; or they do not, for now, desire certitude of this kind, and hence you will not help or please these people especially. Meanwhile, by thinking in a way that transcends your present horizon, §121, is maimed, §159, neglects aesthetic μέλος, §§193, 194, is badly plain, §232, dry, thin, arid, bloodless, and meager, §246, prefers a badly placed study of truth to your present study of aesthetic verisimilitude, §§555, 561, proves but does not persuade, §541, and is aesthetically obscure, §§633, 636, you will still not be judged aesthetically solid, §§840, 842.
Praebet enim occasionem concessae § 862, 863. libertati nunc adiungendi consilium expresse dissuasorium, in venustis confirmationibus ne adhibeas ratiocinationes, quarum forma secundum logices artificium legitima logicorum gnaris sine ulla crypsi, sine ullo saltu, sine ullis additamentis variationibusve retenta statim appareat, quosque formales logici dicunt.
For this gives occasion to add now to the liberty conceded in §§862, 863 an expressly dissuasive counsel: in graceful confirmations do not use ratiocinations whose form, legitimate according to the art of logic, appears at once to those skilled in logic, retained without any concealment, without any leap, without any additions or variations, and which logicians call formal.
Logices imperitis formales eiusmodi syllogismos qualemcunque, maiorem tamen, certitudinem, ac alios, dare, nunquam expertus sum, nec a priori convictus, si cum vere persuasoriis, uti fas est, comparentur.
I have never experienced that formal syllogisms of this kind give to those unskilled in logic any certitude, or greater certitude than others, nor have I been convinced a priori, if they are compared, as is proper, with truly persuasive ones.
Periti logices aut operae pretium iudicabunt aliquam tuarum ratiocinationum etiam in formali rationis certitudine maiori contemplari, et tunc ipsi formam tuis logicam induere poterunt: aut certitudinem eiusmodi, nunc certe, non desiderant, hinc nec his proderis, vel placebis singulariter.
Those skilled in logic will either judge it worthwhile to contemplate one of your ratiocinations also in the greater formal certitude of reason, and then they themselves can put logical form upon your arguments; or they do not, for now, desire certitude of this kind, and hence you will not help or please these people especially.
Interim horizontem nunc tuum transcendens, § 121. manca, § 159. μέλος aestheticum negligens, § 193, 194. male tenuia, § 232. sicca, exilia, arida, exsanguia, ieiuna, § 246. studium veri male locatum, nunc tuo, verisimilitudinis aestheticae studio praeferens, § 555, 561. probans non persuadens, § 541. aesthetice obscura, § 633, 636. cogitare, neque tamen aesthetice solidus iudicaberis. § 840, 842.
Meanwhile, by thinking in a way that transcends your present horizon, §121, is maimed, §159, neglects aesthetic μέλος, §§193, 194, is badly plain, §232, dry, thin, arid, bloodless, and meager, §246, prefers a badly placed study of truth to your present study of aesthetic verisimilitude, §§555, 561, proves but does not persuade, §541, and is aesthetically obscure, §§633, 636, you will still not be judged aesthetically solid, §§840, 842.
Praebet enim occasionem
For this gives occasion to add now to the
concessae § 862, 863. libertati nunc adiungendi consilium expresse dissuasorium,
liberty conceded in §§862, 863 an expressly dissuasive counsel:
in venustis confirmationibus ne adhibeas ratiocinationes, quarum forma
in graceful confirmations do not use ratiocinations whose form,
secundum logices
legitimate according to the art of logic,
artificium legitima logicorum
appears at once to those skilled in logic,
gnaris sine ulla crypsi, sine ullo saltu,
retained without any concealment, without any leap,
sine ullis additamentis variationibusve retenta statim appareat, quosque formales logici dicunt.
without any additions or variations, and which logicians call formal.
Logices imperitis formales eiusmodi syllogismos qualemcunque,
I have never experienced that formal syllogisms of this
maiorem tamen, certitudinem,
kind give to those unskilled in logic any certitude,
ac alios, dare, nunquam expertus sum,
or greater certitude than others, nor have I been
nec a priori convictus, si
convinced a priori, if they are compared,
cum vere persuasoriis, uti fas est, comparentur.
as is proper, with truly persuasive ones.
Periti logices aut operae pretium iudicabunt
Those skilled in logic will either judge it worthwhile
aliquam tuarum ratiocinationum etiam in
to contemplate one of your ratiocinations also in the
formali rationis certitudine maiori contemplari,
greater formal certitude of reason,
et tunc ipsi formam tuis logicam induere poterunt:
and then they themselves can put logical form upon
aut certitudinem eiusmodi, nunc certe, non
your arguments; or they do not, for now,
desiderant, hinc nec
desire certitude of this kind, and hence you will
his proderis, vel placebis singulariter.
not help or please these people especially.
Interim horizontem nunc tuum transcendens, § 121.
Meanwhile, by thinking in a way that transcends your present horizon, §121,
manca, § 159. μέλος aestheticum negligens, § 193, 194.
is maimed, §159, neglects aesthetic μέλος, §§193, 194,
male tenuia, § 232. sicca, exilia, arida, exsanguia, ieiuna, § 246.
is badly plain, §232, dry, thin, arid, bloodless, and meager, §246,
studium veri male locatum,
prefers a badly placed study of truth to
nunc tuo, verisimilitudinis aestheticae studio praeferens, § 555, 561.
your present study of aesthetic verisimilitude, §§555, 561,
probans non persuadens, § 541.
proves but does not persuade, §541,
aesthetice obscura, § 633, 636.
and is aesthetically obscure, §§633, 636,
cogitare, neque tamen aesthetice solidus iudicaberis. § 840, 842.
you will still not be judged aesthetically solid, §§840, 842.
Praebet enim occasionem concessae § 862, 863. libertati nunc adiungendi consilium expresse dissuasorium, in venustis confirmationibus ne adhibeas ratiocinationes, quarum forma secundum logices artificium legitima logicorum gnaris sine ulla crypsi, sine ullo saltu, sine ullis additamentis variationibusve retenta statim appareat, quosque formales logici dicunt. / For this gives occasion to add now to the liberty conceded in §§862, 863 an expressly dissuasive counsel: in graceful confirmations do not use ratiocinations whose form, legitimate according to the art of logic, appears at once to those skilled in logic, retained without any concealment, without any leap, without any additions or variations, and which logicians call formal.
Logices imperitis formales eiusmodi syllogismos qualemcunque, maiorem tamen, certitudinem, ac alios, dare, nunquam expertus sum, nec a priori convictus, si cum vere persuasoriis, uti fas est, comparentur. / I have never experienced that formal syllogisms of this kind give to those unskilled in logic any certitude, or greater certitude than others, nor have I been convinced a priori, if they are compared, as is proper, with truly persuasive ones.
Periti logices aut operae pretium iudicabunt aliquam tuarum ratiocinationum etiam in formali rationis certitudine maiori contemplari, et tunc ipsi formam tuis logicam induere poterunt: aut certitudinem eiusmodi, nunc certe, non desiderant, hinc nec his proderis, vel placebis singulariter. / Those skilled in logic will either judge it worthwhile to contemplate one of your ratiocinations also in the greater formal certitude of reason, and then they themselves can put logical form upon your arguments; or they do not, for now, desire certitude of this kind, and hence you will not help or please these people especially.
Interim horizontem nunc tuum transcendens, § 121. manca, § 159. μέλος aestheticum negligens, § 193, 194. male tenuia, § 232. sicca, exilia, arida, exsanguia, ieiuna, § 246. studium veri male locatum, nunc tuo, verisimilitudinis aestheticae studio praeferens, § 555, 561. probans non persuadens, § 541. aesthetice obscura, § 633, 636. cogitare, neque tamen aesthetice solidus iudicaberis. § 840, 842. / Meanwhile, by thinking in a way that transcends your present horizon, §121, is maimed, §159, neglects aesthetic μέλος, §§193, 194, is badly plain, §232, dry, thin, arid, bloodless, and meager, §246, prefers a badly placed study of truth to your present study of aesthetic verisimilitude, §§555, 561, proves but does not persuade, §541, and is aesthetically obscure, §§633, 636, you will still not be judged aesthetically solid, §§840, 842.
§ 878
Confirmaturus potius materiam suarum probationum curans, secundum S. XII. poterit hylen quandam et quasi silvam rationum aliquando detegere 1) coordinatarum plurium, quaeque singulae connectantur quidem satis belle cum confirmando, videantur tamen a se invicem satis independentes, 2) subordinatarum inter se, sic, ut totae quidem et integrae series ad confirmandum usque diductae non ita multae sint, ad harum autem singulas multae tanquam ulteriores probationes concurrant, et in bene longam plurium membrorum probantium concatenationem possint concrescere. Si brevitas quasdam relinquere iusserit, posteriores venustius; ac primo loco descriptae, recidentur. Numerus enim et quasi synathroismus quidam novorum semper novorumque argumentorum plus gratiae, plus vividitatis habebit, ac unius argumenti transcendens forte patientiam analogi rationis protensio. Haec intensivam veri conscientiam, certitudinem rationis amabilem sagacitati, maiorem exhiberet, fateor, sed illa copiosius probare visa rationis analogo nunc quaerendam maiorem extensivam veri conscientiam pollicetur, sensitivam evidentiam, § 847.
One who will confirm, caring rather for the matter of his proofs according to Sect. XII, will sometimes be able to uncover a certain matter, and as it were forest, of reasons: 1) several coordinate reasons, each of which is indeed joined beautifully enough with what is to be confirmed, yet seem sufficiently independent of one another; 2) reasons subordinated among themselves, so that whole and complete series led out to what is to be confirmed are not very many, but many further proofs converge upon each of these and can grow together into a long concatenation of several proving members. If brevity orders that some be left out, the later kind just described will be more gracefully cut away than the first. For a number, and as it were a certain gathering, of always new arguments will have more grace and more vividness than the extension of one argument, perhaps beyond the patience of the analogue of reason. I admit that this latter would exhibit a greater intensive consciousness of the true, a certitude of reason lovable to sagacity; but the former, seeming to prove more abundantly, promises to the analogue of reason the greater extensive consciousness of the true now to be sought, sensory evidence, §847.
Confirmaturus potius materiam suarum probationum curans, secundum S. XII. poterit hylen quandam et quasi silvam rationum aliquando detegere 1) coordinatarum plurium, quaeque singulae connectantur quidem satis belle cum confirmando, videantur tamen a se invicem satis independentes, 2) subordinatarum inter se, sic, ut totae quidem et integrae series ad confirmandum usque diductae non ita multae sint, ad harum autem singulas multae tanquam ulteriores probationes concurrant, et in bene longam plurium membrorum probantium concatenationem possint concrescere.
One who will confirm, caring rather for the matter of his proofs according to Sect. XII, will sometimes be able to uncover a certain matter, and as it were forest, of reasons: 1) several coordinate reasons, each of which is indeed joined beautifully enough with what is to be confirmed, yet seem sufficiently independent of one another; 2) reasons subordinated among themselves, so that whole and complete series led out to what is to be confirmed are not very many, but many further proofs converge upon each of these and can grow together into a long concatenation of several proving members.
Si brevitas quasdam relinquere iusserit, posteriores venustius; ac primo loco descriptae, recidentur.
If brevity orders that some be left out, the later kind just described will be more gracefully cut away than the first.
Numerus enim et quasi synathroismus quidam novorum semper novorumque argumentorum plus gratiae, plus vividitatis habebit, ac unius argumenti transcendens forte patientiam analogi rationis protensio.
For a number, and as it were a certain gathering, of always new arguments will have more grace and more vividness than the extension of one argument, perhaps beyond the patience of the analogue of reason.
Haec intensivam veri conscientiam, certitudinem rationis amabilem sagacitati, maiorem exhiberet, fateor, sed illa copiosius probare visa rationis analogo nunc quaerendam maiorem extensivam veri conscientiam pollicetur, sensitivam evidentiam, § 847.
I admit that this latter would exhibit a greater intensive consciousness of the true, a certitude of reason lovable to sagacity; but the former, seeming to prove more abundantly, promises to the analogue of reason the greater extensive consciousness of the true now to be sought, sensory evidence, §847.
Confirmaturus potius materiam suarum probationum curans,
One who will confirm, caring rather for the matter of his proofs
secundum S. XII. poterit hylen quandam
according to Sect. XII, will sometimes be able to
et quasi silvam rationum aliquando detegere
uncover a certain matter, and as it were forest, of reasons:
1) coordinatarum plurium, quaeque singulae connectantur quidem satis
1) several coordinate reasons, each of which is indeed
belle cum confirmando,
joined beautifully enough with what is to be confirmed,
videantur tamen a se invicem satis independentes,
yet seem sufficiently independent of one another;
2) subordinatarum inter se, sic,
2) reasons subordinated among themselves, so
ut totae quidem et integrae series ad
that whole and complete series led out to
confirmandum usque diductae non ita multae sint,
what is to be confirmed are not very many,
ad harum autem singulas multae tanquam ulteriores probationes concurrant,
but many further proofs converge upon each of these
et in bene longam plurium membrorum
and can grow together into a long
probantium concatenationem possint concrescere.
concatenation of several proving members.
Si brevitas quasdam relinquere iusserit, posteriores venustius;
If brevity orders that some be left out, the later kind just
ac primo loco descriptae, recidentur.
described will be more gracefully cut away than the first.
Numerus enim et quasi synathroismus quidam novorum
For a number, and as it were a certain gathering,
semper novorumque argumentorum plus gratiae,
of always new arguments will have more grace
plus vividitatis habebit, ac unius argumenti
and more vividness than the extension of one argument,
transcendens forte patientiam analogi rationis protensio.
perhaps beyond the patience of the analogue of reason.
Haec intensivam veri conscientiam,
I admit that this latter would exhibit a greater intensive consciousness of
certitudinem rationis amabilem sagacitati,
the true, a certitude of reason lovable to sagacity;
maiorem exhiberet, fateor, sed illa copiosius probare visa rationis
but the former, seeming to prove more abundantly,
analogo nunc quaerendam maiorem extensivam
promises to the analogue of reason the greater extensive
veri conscientiam pollicetur, sensitivam evidentiam, § 847.
consciousness of the true now to be sought, sensory evidence, §847.
Confirmaturus potius materiam suarum probationum curans, secundum S. XII. poterit hylen quandam et quasi silvam rationum aliquando detegere 1) coordinatarum plurium, quaeque singulae connectantur quidem satis belle cum confirmando, videantur tamen a se invicem satis independentes, 2) subordinatarum inter se, sic, ut totae quidem et integrae series ad confirmandum usque diductae non ita multae sint, ad harum autem singulas multae tanquam ulteriores probationes concurrant, et in bene longam plurium membrorum probantium concatenationem possint concrescere. / One who will confirm, caring rather for the matter of his proofs according to Sect. XII, will sometimes be able to uncover a certain matter, and as it were forest, of reasons: 1) several coordinate reasons, each of which is indeed joined beautifully enough with what is to be confirmed, yet seem sufficiently independent of one another; 2) reasons subordinated among themselves, so that whole and complete series led out to what is to be confirmed are not very many, but many further proofs converge upon each of these and can grow together into a long concatenation of several proving members.
Si brevitas quasdam relinquere iusserit, posteriores venustius; ac primo loco descriptae, recidentur. / If brevity orders that some be left out, the later kind just described will be more gracefully cut away than the first.
Numerus enim et quasi synathroismus quidam novorum semper novorumque argumentorum plus gratiae, plus vividitatis habebit, ac unius argumenti transcendens forte patientiam analogi rationis protensio. / For a number, and as it were a certain gathering, of always new arguments will have more grace and more vividness than the extension of one argument, perhaps beyond the patience of the analogue of reason.
Haec intensivam veri conscientiam, certitudinem rationis amabilem sagacitati, maiorem exhiberet, fateor, sed illa copiosius probare visa rationis analogo nunc quaerendam maiorem extensivam veri conscientiam pollicetur, sensitivam evidentiam, § 847. / I admit that this latter would exhibit a greater intensive consciousness of the true, a certitude of reason lovable to sagacity; but the former, seeming to prove more abundantly, promises to the analogue of reason the greater extensive consciousness of the true now to be sought, sensory evidence, §847.
§ 879
Neque tamen argumenta confirmaturus numeret solum, § 878, sed etiam ponderet, § 177. quantum ex quovis veritas et verisimilitudo confirmandi patere possit, iudicans, M. § 697. ut digna relatu possit adhibere secundum iustam lucis et umbrae dispensationem singula collocando, § 666. reiectis omnino FRIVOLIS; quorum vis dilucide probandi vel nulla, vel infinite parva. § 839, 191. Nec ea temere speres, saltim ut umbras, graviora comitari posse. § 661. Quid enim? si vel unius eiusmodi probationis ex umbra protrahatur admirabilis imbecillitas, et evidenter ponatur ob oculos, quam ineptum sit ad persuadendum? Tunc sane vel optimis aliis meras contemtus et oblivionis tenebras poterit adspergere. § 665.
Yet one who will confirm should not merely count arguments, §878, but also weigh them, §177, judging how much the truth and verisimilitude of what is to be confirmed can lie open from each, Metaphysics §697, so that he can use those worthy of being related by placing each according to the just distribution of light and shade, §666, and rejecting altogether FRIVOLOUS arguments, whose force for clearly proving is either none or infinitely small, §§839, 191. Nor should you rashly hope that such arguments can accompany weightier ones even as shadows, §661. For what if the admirable weakness of even one proof of this kind should be drawn out from the shade and placed evidently before the eyes, showing how unfit it is for persuading? Then indeed it could sprinkle even the best other proofs with sheer darkness of contempt and oblivion, §665.
Satius est, omni ante actae vitae se abstinere convicio, quam levibus, aut frivolis, aut manifesto falsis reum incessere, quia fides caeteris detrahitur, et qui nihil obiicit, omisisse credi potest maledicta, tanquam supervacua, qui vana congerit, confitetur vanum in anteactis argumentum, in quibus vinci, quam tacere, maluerit.
Consequently it is better to abstain from casting any slur on the past life of the accused than to attack him with slight or frivolous charges which are manifestly false, since such a proceeding discredits the rest of our argument. Further, the advocate who brings no charges against the accused may be believed to have omitted all reference to past offences on the ground that such reference was not necessary, while the advocate who heaps up baseless charges thereby admits that his only argument is to be found in the past life of the accused, and that he has deliberately preferred to risk defeat on this point rather than say nothing at all about it.,
Quintilianus Inst. or. L. VII, c. 2. de coniectura.
Quintilian, Institutio oratoria VII.2, on conjecture.
Neque tamen argumenta confirmaturus numeret solum, § 878, sed etiam ponderet, § 177. quantum ex quovis veritas et verisimilitudo confirmandi patere possit, iudicans, M. § 697. ut digna relatu possit adhibere secundum iustam lucis et umbrae dispensationem singula collocando, § 666. reiectis omnino FRIVOLIS; quorum vis dilucide probandi vel nulla, vel infinite parva. § 839, 191. Nec ea temere speres, saltim ut umbras, graviora comitari posse. § 661. Quid enim? si vel unius eiusmodi probationis ex umbra protrahatur admirabilis imbecillitas, et evidenter ponatur ob oculos, quam ineptum sit ad persuadendum?
Yet one who will confirm should not merely count arguments, §878, but also weigh them, §177, judging how much the truth and verisimilitude of what is to be confirmed can lie open from each, Metaphysics §697, so that he can use those worthy of being related by placing each according to the just distribution of light and shade, §666, and rejecting altogether FRIVOLOUS arguments, whose force for clearly proving is either none or infinitely small, §§839, 191. Nor should you rashly hope that such arguments can accompany weightier ones even as shadows, §661. For what if the admirable weakness of even one proof of this kind should be drawn out from the shade and placed evidently before the eyes, showing how unfit it is for persuading?
Tunc sane vel optimis aliis meras contemtus et oblivionis tenebras poterit adspergere. § 665.
Then indeed it could sprinkle even the best other proofs with sheer darkness of contempt and oblivion, §665.
Satius est, omni ante actae vitae se abstinere convicio, quam levibus, aut frivolis, aut manifesto falsis reum incessere, quia fides caeteris detrahitur, et qui nihil obiicit, omisisse credi potest maledicta, tanquam supervacua, qui vana congerit, confitetur vanum in anteactis argumentum, in quibus vinci, quam tacere, maluerit.
Consequently it is better to abstain from casting any slur on the past life of the accused than to attack him with slight or frivolous charges which are manifestly false, since such a proceeding discredits the rest of our argument. Further, the advocate who brings no charges against the accused may be believed to have omitted all reference to past offences on the ground that such reference was not necessary, while the advocate who heaps up baseless charges thereby admits that his only argument is to be found in the past life of the accused, and that he has deliberately preferred to risk defeat on this point rather than say nothing at all about it.,
Quintilianus Inst. or. L. VII, c. 2. de coniectura.
Quintilian, Institutio oratoria VII.2, on conjecture.
Neque tamen argumenta
Yet one who will confirm should not merely count arguments,
confirmaturus numeret solum, § 878, sed etiam ponderet, § 177.
§878, but also weigh them, §177,
quantum ex quovis veritas et verisimilitudo
judging how much the truth and verisimilitude of what
confirmandi patere possit, iudicans, M.
is to be confirmed can lie open from
§ 697. ut digna relatu possit
each, Metaphysics §697, so that he can use
adhibere secundum
those worthy of being related by placing each according
iustam lucis et umbrae dispensationem singula collocando, § 666.
to the just distribution of light and shade, §666,
reiectis omnino FRIVOLIS; quorum vis dilucide probandi vel nulla,
and rejecting altogether FRIVOLOUS arguments, whose force for clearly proving
vel infinite parva. § 839, 191.
is either none or infinitely small, §§839, 191.
Nec ea temere speres, saltim ut umbras, graviora comitari posse.
Nor should you rashly hope that such arguments can
§ 661. Quid enim?
accompany weightier ones even as shadows, §661. For what
si vel unius eiusmodi probationis
if the admirable weakness of even one proof of
ex umbra protrahatur admirabilis imbecillitas,
this kind should be drawn out from the shade
et evidenter ponatur ob oculos,
and placed evidently before the eyes,
quam ineptum sit ad persuadendum?
showing how unfit it is for persuading?
Tunc sane vel optimis aliis
Then indeed it could sprinkle even the best other
meras contemtus et oblivionis tenebras poterit adspergere. § 665.
proofs with sheer darkness of contempt and oblivion, §665.
Satius est, omni ante actae vitae se abstinere convicio, quam levibus, aut frivolis, aut manifesto falsis reum incessere, quia fides caeteris detrahitur, et qui nihil obiicit, omisisse credi potest maledicta, tanquam supervacua, qui vana congerit, confitetur vanum in anteactis argumentum, in quibus vinci, quam tacere, maluerit.
Consequently it is better to abstain from casting any slur on the past life of the accused than to attack him with slight or frivolous charges which are manifestly false, since such a proceeding discredits the rest of our argument. Further, the advocate who brings no charges against the accused may be believed to have omitted all reference to past offences on the ground that such reference was not necessary, while the advocate who heaps up baseless charges thereby admits that his only argument is to be found in the past life of the accused, and that he has deliberately preferred to risk defeat on this point rather than say nothing at all about it.,
Quintilianus Inst. or. L. VII, c. 2. de coniectura.
Quintilian, Institutio oratoria VII.2, on conjecture.
Neque tamen argumenta confirmaturus numeret solum, § 878, sed etiam ponderet, § 177. quantum ex quovis veritas et verisimilitudo confirmandi patere possit, iudicans, M. § 697. ut digna relatu possit adhibere secundum iustam lucis et umbrae dispensationem singula collocando, § 666. reiectis omnino FRIVOLIS; quorum vis dilucide probandi vel nulla, vel infinite parva. § 839, 191. Nec ea temere speres, saltim ut umbras, graviora comitari posse. § 661. Quid enim? si vel unius eiusmodi probationis ex umbra protrahatur admirabilis imbecillitas, et evidenter ponatur ob oculos, quam ineptum sit ad persuadendum? / Yet one who will confirm should not merely count arguments, §878, but also weigh them, §177, judging how much the truth and verisimilitude of what is to be confirmed can lie open from each, Metaphysics §697, so that he can use those worthy of being related by placing each according to the just distribution of light and shade, §666, and rejecting altogether FRIVOLOUS arguments, whose force for clearly proving is either none or infinitely small, §§839, 191. Nor should you rashly hope that such arguments can accompany weightier ones even as shadows, §661. For what if the admirable weakness of even one proof of this kind should be drawn out from the shade and placed evidently before the eyes, showing how unfit it is for persuading?
Tunc sane vel optimis aliis meras contemtus et oblivionis tenebras poterit adspergere. § 665. / Then indeed it could sprinkle even the best other proofs with sheer darkness of contempt and oblivion, §665.
Satius est, omni ante actae vitae se abstinere convicio, quam levibus, aut frivolis, aut manifesto falsis reum incessere, quia fides caeteris detrahitur, et qui nihil obiicit, omisisse credi potest maledicta, tanquam supervacua, qui vana congerit, confitetur vanum in anteactis argumentum, in quibus vinci, quam tacere, maluerit.
Consequently it is better to abstain from casting any slur on the past life of the accused than to attack him with slight or frivolous charges which are manifestly false, since such a proceeding discredits the rest of our argument. Further, the advocate who brings no charges against the accused may be believed to have omitted all reference to past offences on the ground that such reference was not necessary, while the advocate who heaps up baseless charges thereby admits that his only argument is to be found in the past life of the accused, and that he has deliberately preferred to risk defeat on this point rather than say nothing at all about it.,
Quintilianus Inst. or. L. VII, c. 2. de coniectura. / Quintilian, Institutio oratoria VII.2, on conjecture.
§ 880
Confirmaturus si solam verisimilitudinem § 483. illustrantibus § 730. in argumentis eligendis acquieverit; me quidem arbitro, satisfecit officio nunc suo, § 839, 855. eam tamen verisimilitudinis speciem vel gradum, quem promiserat, vel res, vel obiectum ipsius personale praesertim attendendum rite postulaverit, illustrare quum per naturam ipsam iubeatur, § 104. argumenta tantum heterogeneam a quaesita verisimilitudinem, vel eodem gradu minorem illustratura, vel omittet omnino, vel in umbras saltim coniiciet, luci his unice reservatis, quae talem et tantam verisimilitudinem exhibent, qualis et quanta poscebatur, S. XXXV. Exempla legem generalem declarabunt, § 730. determinatiores regulae.
If one who will confirm has acquiesced, in choosing arguments, in arguments that illustrate only verisimilitude, §483, §730, in my judgment he has satisfied his present office, §§839, 855. Yet since through nature itself he is ordered to illustrate that species or degree of verisimilitude which he had promised, or which the matter or especially the personal object of it to be attended rightly required, §104, he will either omit altogether or at least cast into shadows arguments that would illustrate only a verisimilitude heterogeneous to the one sought, or lesser in the same degree, reserving light only for those that exhibit such and so great a verisimilitude as was demanded, Sect. XXXV. Examples will declare the general law, §730, and more determinate rules.
Confirmaturus si solam verisimilitudinem § 483. illustrantibus § 730. in argumentis eligendis acquieverit; me quidem arbitro, satisfecit officio nunc suo, § 839, 855. eam tamen verisimilitudinis speciem vel gradum, quem promiserat, vel res, vel obiectum ipsius personale praesertim attendendum rite postulaverit, illustrare quum per naturam ipsam iubeatur, § 104. argumenta tantum heterogeneam a quaesita verisimilitudinem, vel eodem gradu minorem illustratura, vel omittet omnino, vel in umbras saltim coniiciet, luci his unice reservatis, quae talem et tantam verisimilitudinem exhibent, qualis et quanta poscebatur, S. XXXV. Exempla legem generalem declarabunt, § 730. determinatiores regulae.
If one who will confirm has acquiesced, in choosing arguments, in arguments that illustrate only verisimilitude, §483, §730, in my judgment he has satisfied his present office, §§839, 855. Yet since through nature itself he is ordered to illustrate that species or degree of verisimilitude which he had promised, or which the matter or especially the personal object of it to be attended rightly required, §104, he will either omit altogether or at least cast into shadows arguments that would illustrate only a verisimilitude heterogeneous to the one sought, or lesser in the same degree, reserving light only for those that exhibit such and so great a verisimilitude as was demanded, Sect. XXXV. Examples will declare the general law, §730, and more determinate rules.
Confirmaturus si solam
If one who will confirm has acquiesced,
verisimilitudinem § 483.
in choosing arguments, in arguments that illustrate only verisimilitude, §483,
illustrantibus § 730. in argumentis eligendis acquieverit;
§730, in my
me quidem arbitro, satisfecit officio nunc suo, § 839, 855.
judgment he has satisfied his present office, §§839, 855.
eam tamen verisimilitudinis
Yet since through nature itself he is ordered to
speciem vel gradum, quem promiserat,
illustrate that species or degree of verisimilitude which he had promised,
vel res, vel obiectum ipsius personale praesertim attendendum rite postulaverit,
or which the matter or especially the personal object of
illustrare quum per naturam ipsam iubeatur, § 104.
it to be attended rightly required, §104,
argumenta tantum heterogeneam a quaesita verisimilitudinem,
he will either omit altogether or at least cast into shadows arguments that would illustrate only a verisimilitude
vel eodem gradu minorem illustratura, vel omittet omnino,
heterogeneous to the one sought, or
vel in umbras saltim coniiciet, luci his unice reservatis,
lesser in the same degree, reserving
quae talem et
light only for those that exhibit such and so
tantam verisimilitudinem exhibent, qualis et quanta poscebatur, S.
great a verisimilitude as was demanded, Sect.
XXXV. Exempla legem generalem declarabunt, § 730. determinatiores regulae.
XXXV. Examples will declare the general law, §730, and more determinate rules.
Confirmaturus si solam verisimilitudinem § 483. illustrantibus § 730. in argumentis eligendis acquieverit; me quidem arbitro, satisfecit officio nunc suo, § 839, 855. eam tamen verisimilitudinis speciem vel gradum, quem promiserat, vel res, vel obiectum ipsius personale praesertim attendendum rite postulaverit, illustrare quum per naturam ipsam iubeatur, § 104. argumenta tantum heterogeneam a quaesita verisimilitudinem, vel eodem gradu minorem illustratura, vel omittet omnino, vel in umbras saltim coniiciet, luci his unice reservatis, quae talem et tantam verisimilitudinem exhibent, qualis et quanta poscebatur, S. XXXV. Exempla legem generalem declarabunt, § 730. determinatiores regulae. / If one who will confirm has acquiesced, in choosing arguments, in arguments that illustrate only verisimilitude, §483, §730, in my judgment he has satisfied his present office, §§839, 855. Yet since through nature itself he is ordered to illustrate that species or degree of verisimilitude which he had promised, or which the matter or especially the personal object of it to be attended rightly required, §104, he will either omit altogether or at least cast into shadows arguments that would illustrate only a verisimilitude heterogeneous to the one sought, or lesser in the same degree, reserving light only for those that exhibit such and so great a verisimilitude as was demanded, Sect. XXXV. Examples will declare the general law, §730, and more determinate rules.
§ 881
Si de possibilitate naturali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 432. aut de morali latius dicta, § 435. argumentis absolutam tantum confirmaturis, vel nullus, vel in umbra tantum locus est, § 431, 880. Si de veritate morali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 435. argumentis possibilitatem eiusdem moralem latius dictam § 433. tantum confirmaturis vel nullus, vel in umbris unice locus est. § 880. Si quaeritur unitas actionis, loci, temporis hypothetica, § 439. argumentis unitatem generalium absolutam confirmaturis nullus, nisi forsan in umbris, locus est. § 880. Si de veritate obiecti singulari, s. existentia quaeritur, argumentis veritatem generalium, sub quibus obiectum contineatur, unice confirmaturis, aut nullus, aut unicus in umbris, locus est. § 440, 880. Si quaeritur, an aliquid sit strictissime verum, argumentis quamcunque possibilitatem eiusdem tantum, vel veritatem heterocosmicam declaraturis, aut nullus, aut umbra sola, locus est. § 441, 880.
If the natural possibility of some object is in question, §432, or moral possibility broadly so called, §435, arguments that would confirm only absolute possibility have either no place or only a place in shade, §§431, 880. If the moral truth of some object is in question, §435, arguments that would confirm only its moral possibility broadly so called, §433, have either no place or only a place in the shadows, §880. If the hypothetical unity of action, place, or time is in question, §439, arguments that would confirm the absolute unity of generalities have no place, unless perhaps in the shadows, §880. If the singular truth of an object, or its existence, is in question, arguments that would confirm only the truth of the generalities under which the object is contained have either no place or a single one in the shadows, §§440, 880. If the question is whether something is true in the strictest sense, arguments that would declare only any possibility of it, or its heterocosmic truth, have either no place or only the shade, §§441, 880.
Si de possibilitate naturali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 432. aut de morali latius dicta, § 435. argumentis absolutam tantum confirmaturis, vel nullus, vel in umbra tantum locus est, § 431, 880. Si de veritate morali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 435. argumentis possibilitatem eiusdem moralem latius dictam § 433. tantum confirmaturis vel nullus, vel in umbris unice locus est. § 880. Si quaeritur unitas actionis, loci, temporis hypothetica, § 439. argumentis unitatem generalium absolutam confirmaturis nullus, nisi forsan in umbris, locus est. § 880. Si de veritate obiecti singulari, s. existentia quaeritur, argumentis veritatem generalium, sub quibus obiectum contineatur, unice confirmaturis, aut nullus, aut unicus in umbris, locus est. § 440, 880. Si quaeritur, an aliquid sit strictissime verum, argumentis quamcunque possibilitatem eiusdem tantum, vel veritatem heterocosmicam declaraturis, aut nullus, aut umbra sola, locus est. § 441, 880.
If the natural possibility of some object is in question, §432, or moral possibility broadly so called, §435, arguments that would confirm only absolute possibility have either no place or only a place in shade, §§431, 880. If the moral truth of some object is in question, §435, arguments that would confirm only its moral possibility broadly so called, §433, have either no place or only a place in the shadows, §880. If the hypothetical unity of action, place, or time is in question, §439, arguments that would confirm the absolute unity of generalities have no place, unless perhaps in the shadows, §880. If the singular truth of an object, or its existence, is in question, arguments that would confirm only the truth of the generalities under which the object is contained have either no place or a single one in the shadows, §§440, 880. If the question is whether something is true in the strictest sense, arguments that would declare only any possibility of it, or its heterocosmic truth, have either no place or only the shade, §§441, 880.
Si de possibilitate naturali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 432.
If the natural possibility of some object is in question, §432,
aut de morali latius dicta, § 435.
or moral possibility broadly so called, §435,
argumentis absolutam tantum confirmaturis, vel nullus,
arguments that would confirm only absolute possibility have either
vel in umbra tantum locus est, § 431, 880.
no place or only a place in shade, §§431, 880.
Si de veritate morali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 435.
If the moral truth of some object is in question, §435,
argumentis possibilitatem eiusdem moralem latius dictam § 433.
arguments that would confirm only its moral possibility broadly so called, §433,
tantum confirmaturis vel nullus,
have either no place or only a
vel in umbris unice locus est. § 880.
place in the shadows, §880.
Si quaeritur unitas actionis, loci,
If the hypothetical unity of action, place, or time is
temporis hypothetica, § 439. argumentis unitatem generalium absolutam
in question, §439, arguments that would confirm the absolute
confirmaturis nullus, nisi forsan in umbris, locus est.
unity of generalities have no place, unless perhaps in the shadows,
§ 880. Si de veritate obiecti singulari, s.
§880. If the singular truth of an object, or its
existentia quaeritur, argumentis veritatem
existence, is in question, arguments that would confirm only
generalium, sub quibus obiectum contineatur,
the truth of the generalities under which the object is contained
unice confirmaturis, aut nullus, aut unicus in umbris, locus est.
have either no place or a single one in the shadows,
§ 440, 880. Si quaeritur, an aliquid sit
§§440, 880. If the question is whether something is
strictissime verum, argumentis quamcunque possibilitatem eiusdem tantum,
true in the strictest sense, arguments that would declare only
vel veritatem heterocosmicam declaraturis,
any possibility of it, or its heterocosmic truth,
aut nullus, aut umbra sola, locus est. § 441, 880.
have either no place or only the shade, §§441, 880.
Si de possibilitate naturali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 432. aut de morali latius dicta, § 435. argumentis absolutam tantum confirmaturis, vel nullus, vel in umbra tantum locus est, § 431, 880. Si de veritate morali cuiusdam obiecti quaeritur, § 435. argumentis possibilitatem eiusdem moralem latius dictam § 433. tantum confirmaturis vel nullus, vel in umbris unice locus est. § 880. Si quaeritur unitas actionis, loci, temporis hypothetica, § 439. argumentis unitatem generalium absolutam confirmaturis nullus, nisi forsan in umbris, locus est. § 880. Si de veritate obiecti singulari, s. existentia quaeritur, argumentis veritatem generalium, sub quibus obiectum contineatur, unice confirmaturis, aut nullus, aut unicus in umbris, locus est. § 440, 880. Si quaeritur, an aliquid sit strictissime verum, argumentis quamcunque possibilitatem eiusdem tantum, vel veritatem heterocosmicam declaraturis, aut nullus, aut umbra sola, locus est. § 441, 880. / If the natural possibility of some object is in question, §432, or moral possibility broadly so called, §435, arguments that would confirm only absolute possibility have either no place or only a place in shade, §§431, 880. If the moral truth of some object is in question, §435, arguments that would confirm only its moral possibility broadly so called, §433, have either no place or only a place in the shadows, §880. If the hypothetical unity of action, place, or time is in question, §439, arguments that would confirm the absolute unity of generalities have no place, unless perhaps in the shadows, §880. If the singular truth of an object, or its existence, is in question, arguments that would confirm only the truth of the generalities under which the object is contained have either no place or a single one in the shadows, §§440, 880. If the question is whether something is true in the strictest sense, arguments that would declare only any possibility of it, or its heterocosmic truth, have either no place or only the shade, §§441, 880.
§ 882
Confirmaturus fictiones strictissime veras, § 506. si meras strictius historicas § 509. vel omnino poeticas, § 511. ad persuadendum afferret, etiamsi vel nostro illae, vel poetarum mundo hae non viderentur contradicere, § 513. nec Utopiam saperent, § 514. analogicae § 476. nec prorsus ignotae, § 518. nec anomala figmenta, § 520. immo si fictis huiusmodi lucem potissimam affuderit, iure censebitur mendacium mendacio tegere, ne perpluat, § 881.
One who will confirm fictions that are true in the strictest sense, §506, if he were to bring forward merely stricter historical fictions, §509, or altogether poetic ones, §511, for persuading, even if the former did not seem to contradict our world, or the latter the poets' world, §513, nor tasted of Utopia, §514, being analogical, §476, nor entirely unknown, §518, nor anomalous fictions, §520; indeed, if he has poured the principal light upon fictions of this kind, he will rightly be judged to cover a lie with a lie, lest it rain through, §881.
Confirmaturus fictiones strictissime veras, § 506. si meras strictius historicas § 509. vel omnino poeticas, § 511. ad persuadendum afferret, etiamsi vel nostro illae, vel poetarum mundo hae non viderentur contradicere, § 513. nec Utopiam saperent, § 514. analogicae § 476. nec prorsus ignotae, § 518. nec anomala figmenta, § 520. immo si fictis huiusmodi lucem potissimam affuderit, iure censebitur mendacium mendacio tegere, ne perpluat, § 881.
One who will confirm fictions that are true in the strictest sense, §506, if he were to bring forward merely stricter historical fictions, §509, or altogether poetic ones, §511, for persuading, even if the former did not seem to contradict our world, or the latter the poets' world, §513, nor tasted of Utopia, §514, being analogical, §476, nor entirely unknown, §518, nor anomalous fictions, §520; indeed, if he has poured the principal light upon fictions of this kind, he will rightly be judged to cover a lie with a lie, lest it rain through, §881.
Confirmaturus fictiones strictissime veras,
One who will confirm fictions that are true in the strictest sense,
§ 506. si meras strictius historicas § 509.
§506, if he were to bring forward merely stricter historical fictions, §509,
vel omnino poeticas, § 511. ad persuadendum afferret,
or altogether poetic ones, §511, for persuading,
etiamsi vel nostro illae, vel poetarum mundo hae non viderentur contradicere,
even if the former did not seem to contradict
§ 513.
our world, or the latter the poets' world, §513,
nec Utopiam saperent, § 514. analogicae § 476.
nor tasted of Utopia, §514, being analogical, §476,
nec prorsus ignotae, § 518. nec anomala figmenta, § 520.
nor entirely unknown, §518, nor anomalous fictions, §520;
immo si
indeed, if he has poured the principal light upon
fictis huiusmodi lucem potissimam affuderit,
fictions of this kind, he will rightly be
iure censebitur mendacium mendacio tegere,
judged to cover a lie with a lie,
ne perpluat, § 881.
lest it rain through, §881.
Confirmaturus fictiones strictissime veras, § 506. si meras strictius historicas § 509. vel omnino poeticas, § 511. ad persuadendum afferret, etiamsi vel nostro illae, vel poetarum mundo hae non viderentur contradicere, § 513. nec Utopiam saperent, § 514. analogicae § 476. nec prorsus ignotae, § 518. nec anomala figmenta, § 520. immo si fictis huiusmodi lucem potissimam affuderit, iure censebitur mendacium mendacio tegere, ne perpluat, § 881. / One who will confirm fictions that are true in the strictest sense, §506, if he were to bring forward merely stricter historical fictions, §509, or altogether poetic ones, §511, for persuading, even if the former did not seem to contradict our world, or the latter the poets' world, §513, nor tasted of Utopia, §514, being analogical, §476, nor entirely unknown, §518, nor anomalous fictions, §520; indeed, if he has poured the principal light upon fictions of this kind, he will rightly be judged to cover a lie with a lie, lest it rain through, §881.
§ 883
Si de verisimilitudine strictissime dicta dati obiecti quaeritur, § 530. confirmaturus omittat fabulas, § 526. historicas etiam, multo magis poeticas, § 527. saltim ne multum in iis haereat, § 881. nisi forsan aliquando in strictius probabilibus, § 532. aut narrationibus eiusmodi, quae strictissime vera continere, fabulosis immixta, § 526, 527. potest aesthetice saltim probabile reddere, § 583. In ultimo casu confirmaturus provocans ad ea, quae in narrationibus, quae fabulae dicuntur, strictissime vera esse satis ostendit, § 485, 847. non habet, generatim caussam, cur haec argumenta vel taceat, vel obumbret, § 880.
If the question concerns verisimilitude strictly so called of a given object, §530, the one confirming should omit fables, §526, even historical fables, and much more poetic ones, §527, or at least should not linger much in them, §881, unless perhaps sometimes in stricter probabilities, §532, or in narratives of such a kind that what they contain as strictly true, mixed with fabulous things, can make them at least aesthetically probable, §§526, 527, §583. In the last case, one confirming by appealing to those things which he has sufficiently shown to be strictly true in narratives called fables, §§485, 847, generally has no reason why he should either be silent about these arguments or cast them into shade, §880.
Si de verisimilitudine strictissime dicta dati obiecti quaeritur, § 530. confirmaturus omittat fabulas, § 526. historicas etiam, multo magis poeticas, § 527. saltim ne multum in iis haereat, § 881. nisi forsan aliquando in strictius probabilibus, § 532. aut narrationibus eiusmodi, quae strictissime vera continere, fabulosis immixta, § 526, 527. potest aesthetice saltim probabile reddere, § 583. In ultimo casu confirmaturus provocans ad ea, quae in narrationibus, quae fabulae dicuntur, strictissime vera esse satis ostendit, § 485, 847. non habet, generatim caussam, cur haec argumenta vel taceat, vel obumbret, § 880.
If the question concerns verisimilitude strictly so called of a given object, §530, the one confirming should omit fables, §526, even historical fables, and much more poetic ones, §527, or at least should not linger much in them, §881, unless perhaps sometimes in stricter probabilities, §532, or in narratives of such a kind that what they contain as strictly true, mixed with fabulous things, can make them at least aesthetically probable, §§526, 527, §583. In the last case, one confirming by appealing to those things which he has sufficiently shown to be strictly true in narratives called fables, §§485, 847, generally has no reason why he should either be silent about these arguments or cast them into shade, §880.
Si de verisimilitudine strictissime dicta dati obiecti
If the question concerns verisimilitude strictly so called of a given object,
quaeritur, § 530. confirmaturus omittat fabulas, § 526.
§530, the one confirming should omit fables, §526,
historicas etiam, multo magis poeticas, § 527.
even historical fables, and much more poetic ones, §527,
saltim ne multum in iis haereat, § 881.
or at least should not linger much in them, §881,
nisi forsan aliquando in strictius probabilibus, § 532.
unless perhaps sometimes in stricter probabilities, §532,
aut narrationibus eiusmodi, quae strictissime vera continere,
or in narratives of such a kind that what they contain
fabulosis immixta, § 526, 527.
as strictly true, mixed with fabulous things,
potest aesthetice saltim probabile reddere, § 583.
can make them at least aesthetically probable, §§526, 527, §583.
In ultimo casu confirmaturus provocans ad ea,
In the last case, one confirming by appealing to those
quae in narrationibus,
things which he has sufficiently shown to be strictly true in narratives
quae fabulae dicuntur, strictissime vera esse satis ostendit, § 485, 847.
called fables, §§485, 847,
non habet, generatim caussam,
generally has no reason why he should
cur haec argumenta vel taceat, vel obumbret, § 880.
either be silent about these arguments or cast them into shade, §880.
Si de verisimilitudine strictissime dicta dati obiecti quaeritur, § 530. confirmaturus omittat fabulas, § 526. historicas etiam, multo magis poeticas, § 527. saltim ne multum in iis haereat, § 881. nisi forsan aliquando in strictius probabilibus, § 532. aut narrationibus eiusmodi, quae strictissime vera continere, fabulosis immixta, § 526, 527. potest aesthetice saltim probabile reddere, § 583. In ultimo casu confirmaturus provocans ad ea, quae in narrationibus, quae fabulae dicuntur, strictissime vera esse satis ostendit, § 485, 847. non habet, generatim caussam, cur haec argumenta vel taceat, vel obumbret, § 880. / If the question concerns verisimilitude strictly so called of a given object, §530, the one confirming should omit fables, §526, even historical fables, and much more poetic ones, §527, or at least should not linger much in them, §881, unless perhaps sometimes in stricter probabilities, §532, or in narratives of such a kind that what they contain as strictly true, mixed with fabulous things, can make them at least aesthetically probable, §§526, 527, §583. In the last case, one confirming by appealing to those things which he has sufficiently shown to be strictly true in narratives called fables, §§485, 847, generally has no reason why he should either be silent about these arguments or cast them into shade, §880.
§ 884
Aestheticodogmatica confirmaturus quum satisfaciat officio, nunc suo, licet non adscendat ultra verisimilitudinem dogmaticam, § 577. dilucide propinandam, § 839. non est generatim, cur abstineat a commemorandis, vel etiam in aliquo nitore sistendis argumentis persuasoriis logice forsan dubiis aut improbabilibus, probabilibus tamen aesthetice, vel ab ipso commode ad hanc probabilitatem evehendis, § 486. Genus cogitandi strictius aesthetico-historicum studiosum veri ac solidi nec patietur sua confirmaturum vel intra possibilitatum quarumcunque rationes, § 881. vel intra nitide pingendam aliquam poeticam verisimilitudinem subsistere, § 880, nec ad rationales credibilitatis, auctoritatis testium, interpretationis locorum ambiguorum, diiudicationis contradictionum apparentium, geographiae, chronologiae, genealogiae, e. c. calculos et discussiones assurgere, § 580, 583. Hinc historicorum, venustae simul soliditati, § 839. ac logicae criticorum accurationi litare volentium, tot prodromi, notae, marginalia, appendices, e. c. § 584, 847.
When one about to confirm aesthetic-dogmatic matters satisfies his present office, although he does not ascend beyond dogmatic verisimilitude, §577, to be offered clearly, §839, there is generally no reason why he should abstain from commemorating, or even setting in some brightness, persuasive arguments perhaps logically doubtful or improbable, yet aesthetically probable, or conveniently raised by him to this probability, §486. The more strictly aesthetic-historical kind of thinking, studious of the true and solid, will not allow its confirmer either to remain within reasons of any possibilities whatever, §881, or within some poetic verisimilitude to be brightly painted, §880, nor to rise to rational calculations and discussions of credibility, authority of witnesses, interpretation of ambiguous passages, judging apparent contradictions, geography, chronology, genealogy, and so forth, §§580, 583. Hence so many prolegomena, notes, marginalia, appendices, and so forth from historians who wish to sacrifice at once to graceful solidity, §839, and to the logical accuracy of critics, §§584, 847.
Aestheticodogmatica confirmaturus quum satisfaciat officio, nunc suo, licet non adscendat ultra verisimilitudinem dogmaticam, § 577. dilucide propinandam, § 839. non est generatim, cur abstineat a commemorandis, vel etiam in aliquo nitore sistendis argumentis persuasoriis logice forsan dubiis aut improbabilibus, probabilibus tamen aesthetice, vel ab ipso commode ad hanc probabilitatem evehendis, § 486. Genus cogitandi strictius aesthetico-historicum studiosum veri ac solidi nec patietur sua confirmaturum vel intra possibilitatum quarumcunque rationes, § 881. vel intra nitide pingendam aliquam poeticam verisimilitudinem subsistere, § 880, nec ad rationales credibilitatis, auctoritatis testium, interpretationis locorum ambiguorum, diiudicationis contradictionum apparentium, geographiae, chronologiae, genealogiae, e. c. calculos et discussiones assurgere, § 580, 583. Hinc historicorum, venustae simul soliditati, § 839. ac logicae criticorum accurationi litare volentium, tot prodromi, notae, marginalia, appendices, e. c. § 584, 847.
When one about to confirm aesthetic-dogmatic matters satisfies his present office, although he does not ascend beyond dogmatic verisimilitude, §577, to be offered clearly, §839, there is generally no reason why he should abstain from commemorating, or even setting in some brightness, persuasive arguments perhaps logically doubtful or improbable, yet aesthetically probable, or conveniently raised by him to this probability, §486. The more strictly aesthetic-historical kind of thinking, studious of the true and solid, will not allow its confirmer either to remain within reasons of any possibilities whatever, §881, or within some poetic verisimilitude to be brightly painted, §880, nor to rise to rational calculations and discussions of credibility, authority of witnesses, interpretation of ambiguous passages, judging apparent contradictions, geography, chronology, genealogy, and so forth, §§580, 583. Hence so many prolegomena, notes, marginalia, appendices, and so forth from historians who wish to sacrifice at once to graceful solidity, §839, and to the logical accuracy of critics, §§584, 847.
Aestheticodogmatica confirmaturus quum satisfaciat officio,
When one about to confirm aesthetic-dogmatic matters satisfies his present office,
nunc suo, licet non adscendat ultra verisimilitudinem dogmaticam, § 577.
although he does not ascend beyond dogmatic verisimilitude, §577,
dilucide propinandam, § 839. non est generatim,
to be offered clearly, §839, there is generally
cur abstineat a commemorandis,
no reason why he should abstain from commemorating,
vel etiam in aliquo nitore
or even setting in some brightness,
sistendis argumentis persuasoriis logice forsan dubiis aut improbabilibus,
persuasive arguments perhaps logically doubtful or improbable,
probabilibus tamen aesthetice, vel ab ipso commode ad hanc probabilitatem
yet aesthetically probable, or conveniently raised by him to this probability,
evehendis, § 486. Genus cogitandi strictius aesthetico-historicum
§486. The more strictly aesthetic-historical kind of thinking,
studiosum veri ac solidi
studious of the true and solid,
nec patietur sua confirmaturum vel intra possibilitatum quarumcunque rationes,
will not allow its confirmer either to remain within reasons
§ 881. vel intra nitide pingendam
of any possibilities whatever, §881, or within some
aliquam poeticam verisimilitudinem subsistere, § 880,
poetic verisimilitude to be brightly painted, §880,
nec ad rationales credibilitatis,
nor to rise to rational calculations and discussions of credibility,
auctoritatis testium, interpretationis locorum ambiguorum, diiudicationis contradictionum apparentium,
authority of witnesses, interpretation of ambiguous passages, judging apparent
geographiae, chronologiae, genealogiae, e. c.
contradictions, geography, chronology, genealogy,
calculos et discussiones assurgere, § 580, 583.
and so forth, §§580, 583.
Hinc historicorum, venustae
Hence so many prolegomena, notes, marginalia, appendices,
simul
and so forth from historians who wish to sacrifice
soliditati, § 839.
at once to graceful solidity, §839,
ac logicae criticorum accurationi litare volentium,
and to the logical accuracy of critics,
tot prodromi, notae, marginalia, appendices, e. c. § 584, 847.
§§584, 847.
Aestheticodogmatica confirmaturus quum satisfaciat officio, nunc suo, licet non adscendat ultra verisimilitudinem dogmaticam, § 577. dilucide propinandam, § 839. non est generatim, cur abstineat a commemorandis, vel etiam in aliquo nitore sistendis argumentis persuasoriis logice forsan dubiis aut improbabilibus, probabilibus tamen aesthetice, vel ab ipso commode ad hanc probabilitatem evehendis, § 486. Genus cogitandi strictius aesthetico-historicum studiosum veri ac solidi nec patietur sua confirmaturum vel intra possibilitatum quarumcunque rationes, § 881. vel intra nitide pingendam aliquam poeticam verisimilitudinem subsistere, § 880, nec ad rationales credibilitatis, auctoritatis testium, interpretationis locorum ambiguorum, diiudicationis contradictionum apparentium, geographiae, chronologiae, genealogiae, e. c. calculos et discussiones assurgere, § 580, 583. Hinc historicorum, venustae simul soliditati, § 839. ac logicae criticorum accurationi litare volentium, tot prodromi, notae, marginalia, appendices, e. c. § 584, 847. / When one about to confirm aesthetic-dogmatic matters satisfies his present office, although he does not ascend beyond dogmatic verisimilitude, §577, to be offered clearly, §839, there is generally no reason why he should abstain from commemorating, or even setting in some brightness, persuasive arguments perhaps logically doubtful or improbable, yet aesthetically probable, or conveniently raised by him to this probability, §486. The more strictly aesthetic-historical kind of thinking, studious of the true and solid, will not allow its confirmer either to remain within reasons of any possibilities whatever, §881, or within some poetic verisimilitude to be brightly painted, §880, nor to rise to rational calculations and discussions of credibility, authority of witnesses, interpretation of ambiguous passages, judging apparent contradictions, geography, chronology, genealogy, and so forth, §§580, 583. Hence so many prolegomena, notes, marginalia, appendices, and so forth from historians who wish to sacrifice at once to graceful solidity, §839, and to the logical accuracy of critics, §§584, 847.
§ 885
Confirmaturus habeat argumenta persuasionis satis multa: non sufficit inde frivola, nec quaesitam verisimilitudinem promittentia reiicere: cogitandorum explicite cuiusvis satis etiam pro dignitate lucis, vividitatis, et claritatis affundendum est extensivae, § 618. quo collustrentur ipsae res, quae ad persuadendum adhibentur, ea potissimum parte sui, latere, vel facie, quae NERVUM PROBANDI contineat, necessitatem positis his admittendi simul veritatem confirmandi, § 855, 839. Hinc coordinatarum etiam rationum, § 878. nec ineptarum ob § 879–884. si plures in hyle persuasurorum argumentorum adhuc supersint, quam ut quaevis per brevitatem rotundam satis luci suae possit exponi: praestat aliquas earundem aesthetice firmiores in omni suo naturali nitore proferre, § 625, 622. ne neglectis quidem veris coloribus, § 688. vel floridissimis, § 693. ad non mediocrem usque, si fieri potest, thaumaturgiam, § 808. quam omnibus nimium cumulatis, singulis punctim et concisim, aut tamen iusto brevius, expositis obruere forsan et obtundere lectores e. c. primarios, non vere persuadere. § 839, 634.
One who will confirm should have sufficiently many arguments of persuasion. It is not enough, then, to reject frivolous arguments and those not promising the verisimilitude sought; enough extensive light, vividness, and clarity must also be poured, according to the dignity of each thing explicitly to be thought, §618, so that the very things used for persuading may be illuminated, especially in that part, side, or face of themselves which contains the NERVE OF PROVING: the necessity, once these things are posited, of at the same time admitting the truth of what is to be confirmed, §§855, 839. Hence even among coordinate reasons, §878, and reasons not inept by §§879–884, if more arguments still remain in the matter of things to be persuaded than each can be exposed sufficiently to its light through rounded brevity, it is better to bring forward some of the aesthetically stronger ones in all their natural brightness, §§625, 622, not even neglecting true colors, §688, even the most florid, §693, up to no moderate thaumaturgy, if it can be done, §808, than by too great a heap of all, each set out point by point and concisely, or yet more briefly than is just, perhaps to overwhelm and blunt the primary readers and not truly persuade, §§839, 634.
Confirmaturus habeat argumenta persuasionis satis multa: non sufficit inde frivola, nec quaesitam verisimilitudinem promittentia reiicere: cogitandorum explicite cuiusvis satis etiam pro dignitate lucis, vividitatis, et claritatis affundendum est extensivae, § 618. quo collustrentur ipsae res, quae ad persuadendum adhibentur, ea potissimum parte sui, latere, vel facie, quae NERVUM PROBANDI contineat, necessitatem positis his admittendi simul veritatem confirmandi, § 855, 839. Hinc coordinatarum etiam rationum, § 878. nec ineptarum ob § 879–884. si plures in hyle persuasurorum argumentorum adhuc supersint, quam ut quaevis per brevitatem rotundam satis luci suae possit exponi: praestat aliquas earundem aesthetice firmiores in omni suo naturali nitore proferre, § 625, 622. ne neglectis quidem veris coloribus, § 688. vel floridissimis, § 693. ad non mediocrem usque, si fieri potest, thaumaturgiam, § 808. quam omnibus nimium cumulatis, singulis punctim et concisim, aut tamen iusto brevius, expositis obruere forsan et obtundere lectores e. c. primarios, non vere persuadere. § 839, 634.
One who will confirm should have sufficiently many arguments of persuasion. It is not enough, then, to reject frivolous arguments and those not promising the verisimilitude sought; enough extensive light, vividness, and clarity must also be poured, according to the dignity of each thing explicitly to be thought, §618, so that the very things used for persuading may be illuminated, especially in that part, side, or face of themselves which contains the NERVE OF PROVING: the necessity, once these things are posited, of at the same time admitting the truth of what is to be confirmed, §§855, 839. Hence even among coordinate reasons, §878, and reasons not inept by §§879–884, if more arguments still remain in the matter of things to be persuaded than each can be exposed sufficiently to its light through rounded brevity, it is better to bring forward some of the aesthetically stronger ones in all their natural brightness, §§625, 622, not even neglecting true colors, §688, even the most florid, §693, up to no moderate thaumaturgy, if it can be done, §808, than by too great a heap of all, each set out point by point and concisely, or yet more briefly than is just, perhaps to overwhelm and blunt the primary readers and not truly persuade, §§839, 634.
Confirmaturus habeat argumenta persuasionis
One who will confirm should have sufficiently many arguments of persuasion.
satis multa: non sufficit inde frivola,
It is not enough, then, to reject frivolous
nec quaesitam verisimilitudinem promittentia reiicere:
arguments and those not promising the verisimilitude sought; enough
cogitandorum explicite cuiusvis satis etiam pro
extensive light, vividness, and clarity must also be poured,
dignitate lucis, vividitatis, et claritatis affundendum est extensivae, § 618.
according to the dignity of each thing explicitly to be thought, §618,
quo collustrentur ipsae res, quae ad persuadendum adhibentur,
so that the very things used for persuading may
ea potissimum parte sui, latere,
be illuminated, especially in that part, side,
vel facie, quae NERVUM PROBANDI contineat,
or face of themselves which contains the NERVE OF PROVING:
necessitatem positis his admittendi
the necessity, once these things are posited,
simul veritatem
of at the same time admitting the truth of
confirmandi, § 855, 839.
what is to be confirmed, §§855, 839.
Hinc coordinatarum etiam rationum, § 878.
Hence even among coordinate reasons, §878,
nec ineptarum ob § 879–884.
and reasons not inept by §§879–884,
si plures in hyle persuasurorum argumentorum adhuc supersint,
if more arguments still remain in the matter of things to
quam ut
be persuaded than each can be exposed sufficiently to
quaevis per brevitatem rotundam satis luci suae possit exponi:
its light through rounded brevity, it is
praestat aliquas earundem aesthetice firmiores
better to bring forward some of the aesthetically stronger
in omni suo naturali nitore proferre, § 625, 622.
ones in all their natural brightness, §§625, 622,
ne neglectis quidem veris coloribus, § 688.
not even neglecting true colors, §688,
vel floridissimis, § 693. ad non mediocrem usque,
even the most florid, §693, up to no moderate thaumaturgy,
si fieri potest, thaumaturgiam, § 808.
if it can be done, §808,
quam omnibus
than by too great a heap of all,
nimium cumulatis, singulis punctim et concisim,
each set out point by point and concisely,
aut tamen iusto brevius,
or yet more briefly than is just,
expositis obruere forsan et obtundere lectores e. c.
perhaps to overwhelm and blunt the
primarios, non vere persuadere. § 839, 634.
primary readers and not truly persuade, §§839, 634.
Confirmaturus habeat argumenta persuasionis satis multa: non sufficit inde frivola, nec quaesitam verisimilitudinem promittentia reiicere: cogitandorum explicite cuiusvis satis etiam pro dignitate lucis, vividitatis, et claritatis affundendum est extensivae, § 618. quo collustrentur ipsae res, quae ad persuadendum adhibentur, ea potissimum parte sui, latere, vel facie, quae NERVUM PROBANDI contineat, necessitatem positis his admittendi simul veritatem confirmandi, § 855, 839. Hinc coordinatarum etiam rationum, § 878. nec ineptarum ob § 879–884. si plures in hyle persuasurorum argumentorum adhuc supersint, quam ut quaevis per brevitatem rotundam satis luci suae possit exponi: praestat aliquas earundem aesthetice firmiores in omni suo naturali nitore proferre, § 625, 622. ne neglectis quidem veris coloribus, § 688. vel floridissimis, § 693. ad non mediocrem usque, si fieri potest, thaumaturgiam, § 808. quam omnibus nimium cumulatis, singulis punctim et concisim, aut tamen iusto brevius, expositis obruere forsan et obtundere lectores e. c. primarios, non vere persuadere. § 839, 634. / One who will confirm should have sufficiently many arguments of persuasion. It is not enough, then, to reject frivolous arguments and those not promising the verisimilitude sought; enough extensive light, vividness, and clarity must also be poured, according to the dignity of each thing explicitly to be thought, §618, so that the very things used for persuading may be illuminated, especially in that part, side, or face of themselves which contains the NERVE OF PROVING: the necessity, once these things are posited, of at the same time admitting the truth of what is to be confirmed, §§855, 839. Hence even among coordinate reasons, §878, and reasons not inept by §§879–884, if more arguments still remain in the matter of things to be persuaded than each can be exposed sufficiently to its light through rounded brevity, it is better to bring forward some of the aesthetically stronger ones in all their natural brightness, §§625, 622, not even neglecting true colors, §688, even the most florid, §693, up to no moderate thaumaturgy, if it can be done, §808, than by too great a heap of all, each set out point by point and concisely, or yet more briefly than is just, perhaps to overwhelm and blunt the primary readers and not truly persuade, §§839, 634.
§ 886
SECTIO LII
REPREHENSIO
Quanquam reprehensio nonnunquam tantum animo confirmandi thesin per indirectam probationem tentari potest; § 854. nos tamen eam heic considerabimus in gravioribus illis casibus, ubi contrarium a nobis confirmando, huic oppositum, et theseos nostrae antithesis obiecto nostro primario posset aliquid veritatis in se continens videri, vel multum. § 855. Dissentientes enim aesthetice refutare, vel reprehendere pulcre cogitaturis magis est necessarium, ac demonstratori logico refutare conclusionibus suis rigide demonstratis contradicentes, quia 1) est in opinione multorum, licet praeiudicata, positum, contra quae multa possint obiici (quomodocunque, quantulacunque,) certa non videri, § 870.
SECTION LII
REPREHENSION
Although reprehension can sometimes be attempted only with the mind of confirming a thesis by indirect proof, §854, nevertheless we shall consider it here in those graver cases where, while we confirm the contrary, the opposite to it, the antithesis of our thesis, could seem to our primary object to contain some truth in itself, or much, §855. For to refute dissenters aesthetically, or to reprehend them, is more necessary for those about to think beautifully than it is for a logical demonstrator to refute those contradicting his rigorously demonstrated conclusions, because 1) it is placed in the opinion of many, although prejudiced, that things against which many objections can be made, however and however small, do not seem certain, §870.
SECTIO LII
REPREHENSIO
Quanquam reprehensio nonnunquam tantum animo confirmandi thesin per indirectam probationem tentari potest; § 854. nos tamen eam heic considerabimus in gravioribus illis casibus, ubi contrarium a nobis confirmando, huic oppositum, et theseos nostrae antithesis obiecto nostro primario posset aliquid veritatis in se continens videri, vel multum. § 855. Dissentientes enim aesthetice refutare, vel reprehendere pulcre cogitaturis magis est necessarium, ac demonstratori logico refutare conclusionibus suis rigide demonstratis contradicentes, quia 1) est in opinione multorum, licet praeiudicata, positum, contra quae multa possint obiici (quomodocunque, quantulacunque,) certa non videri, § 870.
SECTION LII
REPREHENSION
Although reprehension can sometimes be attempted only with the mind of confirming a thesis by indirect proof, §854, nevertheless we shall consider it here in those graver cases where, while we confirm the contrary, the opposite to it, the antithesis of our thesis, could seem to our primary object to contain some truth in itself, or much, §855. For to refute dissenters aesthetically, or to reprehend them, is more necessary for those about to think beautifully than it is for a logical demonstrator to refute those contradicting his rigorously demonstrated conclusions, because 1) it is placed in the opinion of many, although prejudiced, that things against which many objections can be made, however and however small, do not seem certain, §870.
SECTIO LII REPREHENSIO Quanquam reprehensio nonnunquam
SECTION LII REPREHENSION Although reprehension can sometimes be attempted
tantum animo confirmandi thesin per indirectam probationem tentari
only with the mind of confirming a thesis by indirect proof,
potest; § 854. nos tamen eam heic considerabimus
§854, nevertheless we shall consider it here
in gravioribus illis casibus, ubi contrarium a nobis confirmando,
in those graver cases where, while we confirm
huic oppositum, et theseos nostrae antithesis
the contrary, the opposite to it, the antithesis of our thesis,
obiecto nostro primario posset aliquid veritatis in se
could seem to our primary object to contain some truth in itself,
continens videri, vel multum. § 855. Dissentientes enim aesthetice
or much, §855. For to refute dissenters aesthetically,
refutare, vel reprehendere
or to reprehend them, is more necessary for those
pulcre cogitaturis magis est necessarium,
about to think beautifully than it is for
ac demonstratori logico refutare conclusionibus suis rigide demonstratis contradicentes,
a logical demonstrator to refute those contradicting his rigorously demonstrated conclusions,
quia 1) est in opinione multorum,
because 1) it is placed in the opinion of many,
licet praeiudicata, positum, contra quae multa possint obiici
although prejudiced, that things against which many objections can be made,
(quomodocunque, quantulacunque,) certa non videri, § 870.
however and however small, do not seem certain, §870.
SECTIO LII REPREHENSIO Quanquam reprehensio nonnunquam tantum animo confirmandi thesin per indirectam probationem tentari potest; § 854. nos tamen eam heic considerabimus in gravioribus illis casibus, ubi contrarium a nobis confirmando, huic oppositum, et theseos nostrae antithesis obiecto nostro primario posset aliquid veritatis in se continens videri, vel multum. § 855. Dissentientes enim aesthetice refutare, vel reprehendere pulcre cogitaturis magis est necessarium, ac demonstratori logico refutare conclusionibus suis rigide demonstratis contradicentes, quia 1) est in opinione multorum, licet praeiudicata, positum, contra quae multa possint obiici (quomodocunque, quantulacunque,) certa non videri, § 870. / SECTION LII REPREHENSION Although reprehension can sometimes be attempted only with the mind of confirming a thesis by indirect proof, §854, nevertheless we shall consider it here in those graver cases where, while we confirm the contrary, the opposite to it, the antithesis of our thesis, could seem to our primary object to contain some truth in itself, or much, §855. For to refute dissenters aesthetically, or to reprehend them, is more necessary for those about to think beautifully than it is for a logical demonstrator to refute those contradicting his rigorously demonstrated conclusions, because 1) it is placed in the opinion of many, although prejudiced, that things against which many objections can be made, however and however small, do not seem certain, §870.
§ 887
2) Vere etiam probabilitas omnis, tam logica, quam aesthetica, non tantum auctis rationibus pro tua sententia pugnantibus, sed etiam imminutis et dilutis rationibus, contra eandem quae fecissent, crescit et intenditur. § 485. Hinc et probabilitatibus logicis magis necessarium est rationes dubitandi infirmare, vel intellectui falsitatem contradicendorum exponere, quam demonstrationibus, quas completas et mathematicas dixeris. 3) Non adeo levi momento tuas in partes probabilitatis aestheticae pertrahetur trutina, ac logicae, nec adeo acutum cernimus sensitive, ac intellectualiter, quae pars rationum superponderet. Hinc persuasioni aestheticae consulitur, non addendo solum pondera parti, quae subsidere, sed et demendo parti, quae debeat notabilius alleviari, quo haec videbitur falsis, hoc illa videbitur sensitive veris similior. § 483, 489.
2) In truth, every probability, both logical and aesthetic, grows and is intensified not only by increasing the reasons fighting for your opinion, but also by diminishing and dissolving the reasons that would have made against it, §485. Hence even for logical probabilities it is more necessary to weaken reasons for doubting, or to expose to the intellect the falsity of things contradicted, than for demonstrations that you would call complete and mathematical. 3) The scale of aesthetic probability will not be drawn to your side by so light a weight as the scale of logic, nor do we discern sensibly, as sharply as intellectually, which part of the reasons weighs more. Hence aesthetic persuasion is helped not only by adding weights to the side that ought to sink, but also by removing them from the side that ought to be lightened more noticeably; the more this side appears false, the more that side will appear sensibly like the true, §§483, 489.
2) Vere etiam probabilitas omnis, tam logica, quam aesthetica, non tantum auctis rationibus pro tua sententia pugnantibus, sed etiam imminutis et dilutis rationibus, contra eandem quae fecissent, crescit et intenditur. § 485. Hinc et probabilitatibus logicis magis necessarium est rationes dubitandi infirmare, vel intellectui falsitatem contradicendorum exponere, quam demonstrationibus, quas completas et mathematicas dixeris. 3) Non adeo levi momento tuas in partes probabilitatis aestheticae pertrahetur trutina, ac logicae, nec adeo acutum cernimus sensitive, ac intellectualiter, quae pars rationum superponderet.
2) In truth, every probability, both logical and aesthetic, grows and is intensified not only by increasing the reasons fighting for your opinion, but also by diminishing and dissolving the reasons that would have made against it, §485. Hence even for logical probabilities it is more necessary to weaken reasons for doubting, or to expose to the intellect the falsity of things contradicted, than for demonstrations that you would call complete and mathematical. 3) The scale of aesthetic probability will not be drawn to your side by so light a weight as the scale of logic, nor do we discern sensibly, as sharply as intellectually, which part of the reasons weighs more.
Hinc persuasioni aestheticae consulitur, non addendo solum pondera parti, quae subsidere, sed et demendo parti, quae debeat notabilius alleviari, quo haec videbitur falsis, hoc illa videbitur sensitive veris similior. § 483, 489.
Hence aesthetic persuasion is helped not only by adding weights to the side that ought to sink, but also by removing them from the side that ought to be lightened more noticeably; the more this side appears false, the more that side will appear sensibly like the true, §§483, 489.
2) Vere etiam probabilitas omnis, tam logica,
2) In truth, every probability, both logical
quam aesthetica, non tantum
and aesthetic, grows and is intensified not only by
auctis rationibus pro tua sententia pugnantibus,
increasing the reasons fighting for your opinion,
sed etiam imminutis et dilutis rationibus,
but also by diminishing and dissolving the
contra eandem quae fecissent, crescit et intenditur. § 485.
reasons that would have made against it, §485.
Hinc et probabilitatibus logicis magis necessarium est
Hence even for logical probabilities it is more necessary
rationes dubitandi infirmare,
to weaken reasons for doubting, or to expose to
vel intellectui falsitatem contradicendorum exponere,
the intellect the falsity of things contradicted, than
quam demonstrationibus, quas completas et mathematicas
for demonstrations that you would call complete and mathematical.
dixeris. 3) Non
3) The scale of aesthetic probability will not
adeo levi momento tuas in partes probabilitatis aestheticae pertrahetur trutina,
be drawn to your side by so light a weight as the
ac logicae, nec adeo acutum
scale of logic, nor do we discern sensibly,
cernimus sensitive, ac intellectualiter, quae pars rationum superponderet.
as sharply as intellectually, which part of the reasons weighs more.
Hinc persuasioni aestheticae consulitur, non addendo
Hence aesthetic persuasion is helped not only by adding
solum pondera parti, quae subsidere,
weights to the side that ought to sink,
sed et demendo parti,
but also by removing them from the
quae debeat notabilius alleviari, quo
side that ought to be lightened more noticeably;
haec videbitur falsis,
the more this side appears false,
hoc illa videbitur sensitive veris similior. § 483, 489.
the more that side will appear sensibly like the true, §§483, 489.
2) Vere etiam probabilitas omnis, tam logica, quam aesthetica, non tantum auctis rationibus pro tua sententia pugnantibus, sed etiam imminutis et dilutis rationibus, contra eandem quae fecissent, crescit et intenditur. § 485. Hinc et probabilitatibus logicis magis necessarium est rationes dubitandi infirmare, vel intellectui falsitatem contradicendorum exponere, quam demonstrationibus, quas completas et mathematicas dixeris. 3) Non adeo levi momento tuas in partes probabilitatis aestheticae pertrahetur trutina, ac logicae, nec adeo acutum cernimus sensitive, ac intellectualiter, quae pars rationum superponderet. / 2) In truth, every probability, both logical and aesthetic, grows and is intensified not only by increasing the reasons fighting for your opinion, but also by diminishing and dissolving the reasons that would have made against it, §485. Hence even for logical probabilities it is more necessary to weaken reasons for doubting, or to expose to the intellect the falsity of things contradicted, than for demonstrations that you would call complete and mathematical. 3) The scale of aesthetic probability will not be drawn to your side by so light a weight as the scale of logic, nor do we discern sensibly, as sharply as intellectually, which part of the reasons weighs more.
Hinc persuasioni aestheticae consulitur, non addendo solum pondera parti, quae subsidere, sed et demendo parti, quae debeat notabilius alleviari, quo haec videbitur falsis, hoc illa videbitur sensitive veris similior. § 483, 489. / Hence aesthetic persuasion is helped not only by adding weights to the side that ought to sink, but also by removing them from the side that ought to be lightened more noticeably; the more this side appears false, the more that side will appear sensibly like the true, §§483, 489.
§ 888
Vere Columella dixerit:
Columella may truly have said:
Reprehendisse peccantem non satis est, si non et recti viam doceas,
For it is not enough, that he has reproved one that has done a fault, if he does not teach him the way to do right.,
et recte iungat utrumque belle cogitaturus, § 854, 855. tamen § 886, 887. rationes nobis dedisse videmur, ex quibus ex parte possit intelligi, qui fiat, ut in sensitivae cognitionis sphaera paedagogos facilius invenias, quam patres; qui tentent,
and one who will think beautifully rightly joins both, §§854, 855. Yet §§886, 887 seem to have given us reasons from which it can partly be understood how it happens that, in the sphere of sensory cognition, you find pedagogues more easily than fathers, those who attempt
ab exitio possint reprehendere cunctos,
"And lest the winds blew back again, no force
Could rein things in nor hold from sure career
On to disaster."
quam qui nondum in devia lapsos directe ducant in amorem optimi, satyricos tandem facilius, quam paraeneticos. Optimum est, quod Cicero virtuti tribuit, si sensibus nostris Aristippi voluptas blandiatur, Qu. ac. I. 139. si similibus in casibus, ut practicis, ita etiam theoreticis, viri boni suada,
more easily than those who directly lead those not yet fallen into byways into love of the best; finally satirists more easily than paraenetics. What Cicero attributes to virtue is best, if Aristippus' pleasure flatters our senses, Academic Questions I.139, if in similar cases, both practical and theoretical, the persuasion of a good man
revocat, vel potius reprehendit manu. Pecudum illos esse maturos
However, I see how enticingly Pleasure flatters our senses. I find myself drifting into agreement with Epicurus or Aristippus. Virtue summons me away or rather plucks me back with her hand: she declares that those inclinations are of the beasts that perish, while man she associates with God..
dicit. Hominem iungit deo. § 829, 838.
It says they are ripe for cattle. It joins the human being to god, §§829, 838.
Vere Columella dixerit:
Columella may truly have said:
Reprehendisse peccantem non satis est, si non et recti viam doceas,
For it is not enough, that he has reproved one that has done a fault, if he does not teach him the way to do right.,
et recte iungat utrumque belle cogitaturus, § 854, 855. tamen § 886, 887. rationes nobis dedisse videmur, ex quibus ex parte possit intelligi, qui fiat, ut in sensitivae cognitionis sphaera paedagogos facilius invenias, quam patres; qui tentent,
and one who will think beautifully rightly joins both, §§854, 855. Yet §§886, 887 seem to have given us reasons from which it can partly be understood how it happens that, in the sphere of sensory cognition, you find pedagogues more easily than fathers, those who attempt
ab exitio possint reprehendere cunctos,
"And lest the winds blew back again, no force
Could rein things in nor hold from sure career
On to disaster."
quam qui nondum in devia lapsos directe ducant in amorem optimi, satyricos tandem facilius, quam paraeneticos.
more easily than those who directly lead those not yet fallen into byways into love of the best; finally satirists more easily than paraenetics.
Optimum est, quod Cicero virtuti tribuit, si sensibus nostris Aristippi voluptas blandiatur, Qu. ac. I. 139. si similibus in casibus, ut practicis, ita etiam theoreticis, viri boni suada,
What Cicero attributes to virtue is best, if Aristippus' pleasure flatters our senses, Academic Questions I.139, if in similar cases, both practical and theoretical, the persuasion of a good man
revocat, vel potius reprehendit manu. Pecudum illos esse maturos
However, I see how enticingly Pleasure flatters our senses. I find myself drifting into agreement with Epicurus or Aristippus. Virtue summons me away or rather plucks me back with her hand: she declares that those inclinations are of the beasts that perish, while man she associates with God..
dicit. Hominem iungit deo. § 829, 838.
It says they are ripe for cattle. It joins the human being to god, §§829, 838.
Vere Columella dixerit:
Columella may truly have said:
Reprehendisse peccantem non satis est, si non et recti viam doceas,
For it is not enough, that he has reproved one that has done a fault, if he does not teach him the way to do right.,
et recte iungat utrumque belle cogitaturus, § 854, 855.
and one who will think beautifully rightly joins both, §§854, 855.
tamen § 886, 887. rationes nobis dedisse videmur,
Yet §§886, 887 seem to have given us reasons
ex quibus ex parte possit intelligi,
from which it can partly be understood how
qui fiat, ut in sensitivae cognitionis
it happens that, in the sphere of sensory cognition,
sphaera paedagogos facilius invenias, quam patres; qui tentent,
you find pedagogues more easily than fathers, those who attempt
ab exitio possint reprehendere cunctos,
"And lest the winds blew back again, no force
Could rein things in nor hold from sure career
On to disaster."
quam qui nondum in devia lapsos directe
more easily than those who directly lead those
ducant in amorem optimi,
not yet fallen into byways into love of the best;
satyricos tandem facilius, quam paraeneticos.
finally satirists more easily than paraenetics.
Optimum est, quod Cicero virtuti tribuit,
What Cicero attributes to virtue is best,
si sensibus nostris Aristippi voluptas blandiatur, Qu. ac.
if Aristippus' pleasure flatters our senses, Academic
I. 139. si similibus in casibus, ut practicis,
Questions I.139, if in similar cases, both practical
ita etiam theoreticis, viri boni suada,
and theoretical, the persuasion of a good man
revocat, vel potius reprehendit manu. Pecudum illos esse maturos
However, I see how enticingly Pleasure flatters our senses. I find myself drifting into agreement with Epicurus or Aristippus. Virtue summons me away or rather plucks me back with her hand: she declares that those inclinations are of the beasts that perish, while man she associates with God..
dicit. Hominem iungit deo.
It says they are ripe for cattle. It joins the
§ 829, 838.
human being to god, §§829, 838.
Vere Columella dixerit: / Columella may truly have said:
Reprehendisse peccantem non satis est, si non et recti viam doceas,
For it is not enough, that he has reproved one that has done a fault, if he does not teach him the way to do right.,
et recte iungat utrumque belle cogitaturus, § 854, 855. tamen § 886, 887. rationes nobis dedisse videmur, ex quibus ex parte possit intelligi, qui fiat, ut in sensitivae cognitionis sphaera paedagogos facilius invenias, quam patres; qui tentent, / and one who will think beautifully rightly joins both, §§854, 855. Yet §§886, 887 seem to have given us reasons from which it can partly be understood how it happens that, in the sphere of sensory cognition, you find pedagogues more easily than fathers, those who attempt
ab exitio possint reprehendere cunctos,
"And lest the winds blew back again, no force
Could rein things in nor hold from sure career
On to disaster."
quam qui nondum in devia lapsos directe ducant in amorem optimi, satyricos tandem facilius, quam paraeneticos. / more easily than those who directly lead those not yet fallen into byways into love of the best; finally satirists more easily than paraenetics.
Optimum est, quod Cicero virtuti tribuit, si sensibus nostris Aristippi voluptas blandiatur, Qu. ac. I. 139. si similibus in casibus, ut practicis, ita etiam theoreticis, viri boni suada, / What Cicero attributes to virtue is best, if Aristippus' pleasure flatters our senses, Academic Questions I.139, if in similar cases, both practical and theoretical, the persuasion of a good man
revocat, vel potius reprehendit manu. Pecudum illos esse maturos
However, I see how enticingly Pleasure flatters our senses. I find myself drifting into agreement with Epicurus or Aristippus. Virtue summons me away or rather plucks me back with her hand: she declares that those inclinations are of the beasts that perish, while man she associates with God..
dicit. Hominem iungit deo. § 829, 838. / It says they are ripe for cattle. It joins the human being to god, §§829, 838.
§ 889
Reprehensioni fontes aperire hoc minus necessarium est, si vere Salustius ad Caesarem:
It is less necessary to open sources for reprehension, if Sallust truly says to Caesar:
Ad reprehendenda aliena facta, aut dicta, ardet omnibus animus. Vix satis apertum os, aut lingua promta videtur, quae meditata pectore evoluat.
Most men have, or pretend to have, sufficient ability to sit in judgment; indeed, all are so eager to censure the doings or sayings of other men that hardly any mouth is sufficiently open, or any tongue sufficiently ready, to give utterance to the thoughts of their hearts..
Vix tamen eandem definiverat Cicero de inv. I. 61.
Yet Cicero had scarcely defined the same thing, De inventione I.61, as that
per quam argumentando adversariorum confirmatio,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 886, 855.
§§886, 855,
diluitur aut infirmatur, aut allevatur,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 887, 854. quum eundem huic fontem tribuit, quo utitur confirmatio, 62. de quo § 861–873. et praesertim § 874. ubi dicta verissime simul omni reprehensionum fonti conveniunt. § 65.
§§887, 854, when he attributes to it the same source which confirmation uses, 62, concerning which §§861–873 speak, and especially §874, where the things said most truly fit at the same time every source of reprehensions, §65.
Reprehensioni fontes aperire hoc minus necessarium est, si vere Salustius ad Caesarem:
It is less necessary to open sources for reprehension, if Sallust truly says to Caesar:
Ad reprehendenda aliena facta, aut dicta, ardet omnibus animus. Vix satis apertum os, aut lingua promta videtur, quae meditata pectore evoluat.
Most men have, or pretend to have, sufficient ability to sit in judgment; indeed, all are so eager to censure the doings or sayings of other men that hardly any mouth is sufficiently open, or any tongue sufficiently ready, to give utterance to the thoughts of their hearts..
Vix tamen eandem definiverat Cicero de inv. I. 61.
Yet Cicero had scarcely defined the same thing, De inventione I.61, as that
per quam argumentando adversariorum confirmatio,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 886, 855.
§§886, 855,
diluitur aut infirmatur, aut allevatur,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 887, 854. quum eundem huic fontem tribuit, quo utitur confirmatio, 62. de quo § 861–873. et praesertim § 874. ubi dicta verissime simul omni reprehensionum fonti conveniunt. § 65.
§§887, 854, when he attributes to it the same source which confirmation uses, 62, concerning which §§861–873 speak, and especially §874, where the things said most truly fit at the same time every source of reprehensions, §65.
Reprehensioni fontes aperire hoc minus necessarium est,
It is less necessary to open sources for reprehension,
si vere Salustius ad Caesarem:
if Sallust truly says to Caesar:
Ad reprehendenda aliena facta, aut dicta, ardet omnibus animus. Vix satis apertum os, aut lingua promta videtur, quae meditata pectore evoluat.
Most men have, or pretend to have, sufficient ability to sit in judgment; indeed, all are so eager to censure the doings or sayings of other men that hardly any mouth is sufficiently open, or any tongue sufficiently ready, to give utterance to the thoughts of their hearts..
Vix tamen eandem definiverat Cicero de inv.
Yet Cicero had scarcely defined the same thing, De inventione
I. 61.
I.61, as that
per quam argumentando adversariorum confirmatio,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 886, 855.
§§886, 855,
diluitur aut infirmatur, aut allevatur,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 887, 854. quum eundem huic fontem tribuit,
§§887, 854, when he attributes
quo utitur confirmatio, 62.
to it the same source which confirmation uses, 62,
de quo § 861–873. et praesertim § 874.
concerning which §§861–873 speak, and especially §874,
ubi dicta verissime
where the things said most truly fit at the
simul omni reprehensionum fonti conveniunt. § 65.
same time every source of reprehensions, §65.
Reprehensioni fontes aperire hoc minus necessarium est, si vere Salustius ad Caesarem: / It is less necessary to open sources for reprehension, if Sallust truly says to Caesar:
Ad reprehendenda aliena facta, aut dicta, ardet omnibus animus. Vix satis apertum os, aut lingua promta videtur, quae meditata pectore evoluat.
Most men have, or pretend to have, sufficient ability to sit in judgment; indeed, all are so eager to censure the doings or sayings of other men that hardly any mouth is sufficiently open, or any tongue sufficiently ready, to give utterance to the thoughts of their hearts..
Vix tamen eandem definiverat Cicero de inv. I. 61. / Yet Cicero had scarcely defined the same thing, De inventione I.61, as that
per quam argumentando adversariorum confirmatio,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 886, 855. / §§886, 855,
diluitur aut infirmatur, aut allevatur,
Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is reduced to nothing.,
§ 887, 854. quum eundem huic fontem tribuit, quo utitur confirmatio, 62. de quo § 861–873. et praesertim § 874. ubi dicta verissime simul omni reprehensionum fonti conveniunt. § 65. / §§887, 854, when he attributes to it the same source which confirmation uses, 62, concerning which §§861–873 speak, and especially §874, where the things said most truly fit at the same time every source of reprehensions, §65.
§ 890
Sint interim haec reprehensuris consilia: 1) non argumentorum solum, et praemissarum, sed conclusionis etiam primario impugnandae pingatur falsitas. § 839. Quod in ipsis logicis refutationibus est utile: heic magis iudico necessarium, § 887. quoniam multi sic comparati sumus, ut tacite nobiscum statuamus, etiamsi vel perperam, vel ex minus idoneis praemissis, hucusque probata sit quaedam conclusio; nondum tamen eandem iam ideo falsam esse, posse satis veram, et nobis adhuc ignota ratione vel iam probatam esse rite, vel a nobis doctiore probandam propediem. Huic non ita falsae multorum opinioni succus in dato reprehensionis exemplo subducitur, si non subsistamus in subruendis antitheseos argumentis, sed et ipsam hanc conclusionem ita declaremus esse falsam aesthetice S. XXVIII. ut obiectum nostrum primarium, non datis solum, sed et forsan inveniendis quibuscunque fulcris, tamen eandem sustineri posse desperet. § 455.
Meanwhile let these be counsels for those who will reprehend: 1) the falsity not only of the arguments and premises, but also of the conclusion, must primarily be painted as something to be attacked, §839. This is useful even in logical refutations; here I judge it more necessary, §887, because many of us are so disposed that we tacitly decide with ourselves that, even if some conclusion has been proved up to now wrongly or from less suitable premises, it is not yet therefore false, and can be true enough, and by a reason still unknown to us either already rightly proved or soon to be proved by someone more learned than we are. The sap is withdrawn from this not entirely false opinion of many people in a given example of reprehension if we do not stop at undermining the arguments of the antithesis, but also declare that the conclusion itself is aesthetically false, Sect. XXVIII, so that our primary object despairs that it could be sustained not only by the supports given, but perhaps by any supports to be found, §455.
Sint interim haec reprehensuris consilia: 1) non argumentorum solum, et praemissarum, sed conclusionis etiam primario impugnandae pingatur falsitas. § 839. Quod in ipsis logicis refutationibus est utile: heic magis iudico necessarium, § 887. quoniam multi sic comparati sumus, ut tacite nobiscum statuamus, etiamsi vel perperam, vel ex minus idoneis praemissis, hucusque probata sit quaedam conclusio; nondum tamen eandem iam ideo falsam esse, posse satis veram, et nobis adhuc ignota ratione vel iam probatam esse rite, vel a nobis doctiore probandam propediem.
Meanwhile let these be counsels for those who will reprehend: 1) the falsity not only of the arguments and premises, but also of the conclusion, must primarily be painted as something to be attacked, §839. This is useful even in logical refutations; here I judge it more necessary, §887, because many of us are so disposed that we tacitly decide with ourselves that, even if some conclusion has been proved up to now wrongly or from less suitable premises, it is not yet therefore false, and can be true enough, and by a reason still unknown to us either already rightly proved or soon to be proved by someone more learned than we are.
Huic non ita falsae multorum opinioni succus in dato reprehensionis exemplo subducitur, si non subsistamus in subruendis antitheseos argumentis, sed et ipsam hanc conclusionem ita declaremus esse falsam aesthetice S. XXVIII. ut obiectum nostrum primarium, non datis solum, sed et forsan inveniendis quibuscunque fulcris, tamen eandem sustineri posse desperet. § 455.
The sap is withdrawn from this not entirely false opinion of many people in a given example of reprehension if we do not stop at undermining the arguments of the antithesis, but also declare that the conclusion itself is aesthetically false, Sect. XXVIII, so that our primary object despairs that it could be sustained not only by the supports given, but perhaps by any supports to be found, §455.
Sint interim haec reprehensuris
Meanwhile let these be counsels for those who will reprehend:
consilia: 1) non argumentorum solum,
1) the falsity not only of the arguments
et praemissarum, sed conclusionis etiam
and premises, but also of the conclusion,
primario impugnandae pingatur falsitas. § 839.
must primarily be painted as something to be attacked, §839.
Quod in ipsis logicis refutationibus
This is useful even in logical refutations;
est utile: heic magis iudico necessarium, § 887.
here I judge it more necessary, §887,
quoniam multi sic comparati sumus, ut tacite nobiscum statuamus,
because many of us are so disposed that we tacitly decide with
etiamsi vel perperam, vel
ourselves that, even if some conclusion has been proved
ex minus idoneis praemissis,
up to now wrongly or from less suitable premises,
hucusque probata sit quaedam conclusio; nondum tamen eandem iam ideo falsam
it is not yet therefore false,
esse, posse satis veram, et
and can be true enough, and by a reason
nobis adhuc ignota ratione vel iam
still unknown to us either already rightly proved or
probatam esse rite, vel a nobis doctiore probandam propediem.
soon to be proved by someone more learned than we are.
Huic non ita falsae
The sap is withdrawn from this not entirely false
multorum opinioni succus in dato reprehensionis exemplo subducitur,
opinion of many people in a given example of
si non subsistamus in subruendis antitheseos argumentis,
reprehension if we do not stop at undermining the arguments
sed et ipsam hanc conclusionem
of the antithesis, but also declare that the conclusion
ita declaremus esse falsam aesthetice S. XXVIII.
itself is aesthetically false, Sect. XXVIII,
ut obiectum nostrum primarium,
so that our primary object despairs that
non datis solum,
it could be sustained not only by the supports given,
sed et forsan inveniendis quibuscunque fulcris, tamen eandem sustineri posse desperet. § 455.
but perhaps by any supports to be found, §455.
Sint interim haec reprehensuris consilia: 1) non argumentorum solum, et praemissarum, sed conclusionis etiam primario impugnandae pingatur falsitas. § 839. Quod in ipsis logicis refutationibus est utile: heic magis iudico necessarium, § 887. quoniam multi sic comparati sumus, ut tacite nobiscum statuamus, etiamsi vel perperam, vel ex minus idoneis praemissis, hucusque probata sit quaedam conclusio; nondum tamen eandem iam ideo falsam esse, posse satis veram, et nobis adhuc ignota ratione vel iam probatam esse rite, vel a nobis doctiore probandam propediem. / Meanwhile let these be counsels for those who will reprehend: 1) the falsity not only of the arguments and premises, but also of the conclusion, must primarily be painted as something to be attacked, §839. This is useful even in logical refutations; here I judge it more necessary, §887, because many of us are so disposed that we tacitly decide with ourselves that, even if some conclusion has been proved up to now wrongly or from less suitable premises, it is not yet therefore false, and can be true enough, and by a reason still unknown to us either already rightly proved or soon to be proved by someone more learned than we are.
Huic non ita falsae multorum opinioni succus in dato reprehensionis exemplo subducitur, si non subsistamus in subruendis antitheseos argumentis, sed et ipsam hanc conclusionem ita declaremus esse falsam aesthetice S. XXVIII. ut obiectum nostrum primarium, non datis solum, sed et forsan inveniendis quibuscunque fulcris, tamen eandem sustineri posse desperet. § 455. / The sap is withdrawn from this not entirely false opinion of many people in a given example of reprehension if we do not stop at undermining the arguments of the antithesis, but also declare that the conclusion itself is aesthetically false, Sect. XXVIII, so that our primary object despairs that it could be sustained not only by the supports given, but perhaps by any supports to be found, §455.
§ 891
Huic consilio § 890. satisfacit partim iam ipsa confirmatio, partim artificium nostrae directae probationi, et antitheseos praemissarum, vel formae probandi, vel utrarumque subversioni iungendi ex ipsa sumta eadem conclusione et antithesi deducta, dilucide, vel etiam splendide deducta, magnam tamen analogo rationis falsitatem et incongruentiam eiusdem tandem et velut ex improviso ob oculos ponentia, § 853, 884. Cicero de Inv. I. 63.
The counsel of §890 is satisfied partly already by confirmation itself, partly by the art of joining to our direct proof the subversion of the antithesis' premises, or of the form of proving, or of both, things taken from that very conclusion and drawn from the antithesis, drawn clearly or even splendidly, yet finally and almost unexpectedly placing before the eyes of the analogue of reason the great falsity and incongruity of the same thing, §§853, 884. Cicero, De inventione I.63:
omnis argumentatio reprehenditur, si aut ex iis, quae sumta sunt, non conceditur unum, plurave, (negando praemissas) aut his concessis complexio confici ex his negatur: aut si genus ipsum argumentationis vitiosum esse ostenditur (negando formam vel certam, vel legitimam omnino) aut si contra firmam argumentationem alia aeque firma, aut firmior, ponitur.
All argumentation is reprehended when anything, whether it be one thing only, or more than one of those positions which are assumed, is not granted, or if, though they are granted, it is denied that the conclusion legitimately follows from them, or if it is shown that the very kind of argumentation is faulty, or if in opposition to one form and reliable sort of argumentation another is employed which is equally firm and convincing.
The first case denies the premises; the second denies the form, whether a particular form or legitimate form altogether.
Huic consilio § 890. satisfacit partim iam ipsa confirmatio, partim artificium nostrae directae probationi, et antitheseos praemissarum, vel formae probandi, vel utrarumque subversioni iungendi ex ipsa sumta eadem conclusione et antithesi deducta, dilucide, vel etiam splendide deducta, magnam tamen analogo rationis falsitatem et incongruentiam eiusdem tandem et velut ex improviso ob oculos ponentia, § 853, 884. Cicero de Inv. I. 63.
The counsel of §890 is satisfied partly already by confirmation itself, partly by the art of joining to our direct proof the subversion of the antithesis' premises, or of the form of proving, or of both, things taken from that very conclusion and drawn from the antithesis, drawn clearly or even splendidly, yet finally and almost unexpectedly placing before the eyes of the analogue of reason the great falsity and incongruity of the same thing, §§853, 884. Cicero, De inventione I.63:
omnis argumentatio reprehenditur, si aut ex iis, quae sumta sunt, non conceditur unum, plurave, (negando praemissas) aut his concessis complexio confici ex his negatur: aut si genus ipsum argumentationis vitiosum esse ostenditur (negando formam vel certam, vel legitimam omnino) aut si contra firmam argumentationem alia aeque firma, aut firmior, ponitur.
All argumentation is reprehended when anything, whether it be one thing only, or more than one of those positions which are assumed, is not granted, or if, though they are granted, it is denied that the conclusion legitimately follows from them, or if it is shown that the very kind of argumentation is faulty, or if in opposition to one form and reliable sort of argumentation another is employed which is equally firm and convincing.
The first case denies the premises; the second denies the form, whether a particular form or legitimate form altogether.
Huic consilio § 890. satisfacit partim iam ipsa confirmatio,
The counsel of §890 is satisfied partly already by confirmation
partim artificium nostrae directae probationi,
itself, partly by the art of joining to our direct proof
et antitheseos praemissarum, vel formae probandi,
the subversion of the antithesis' premises, or of the form of
vel utrarumque subversioni iungendi ex ipsa sumta
proving, or of both, things taken from that
eadem conclusione et antithesi deducta, dilucide,
very conclusion and drawn from the antithesis, drawn clearly
vel etiam splendide deducta, magnam tamen
or even splendidly, yet finally and almost unexpectedly placing
analogo rationis
before the eyes of the analogue of reason the
falsitatem et incongruentiam eiusdem tandem et velut ex
great falsity and incongruity
improviso ob oculos ponentia, § 853, 884. Cicero de Inv. I. 63.
of the same thing, §§853, 884. Cicero, De inventione I.63:
omnis argumentatio reprehenditur, si aut ex iis, quae sumta sunt, non conceditur unum, plurave, (negando praemissas) aut his concessis complexio confici ex his negatur: aut si genus ipsum argumentationis vitiosum esse ostenditur (negando formam vel certam, vel legitimam omnino) aut si contra firmam argumentationem alia aeque firma, aut firmior, ponitur.
All argumentation is reprehended when anything, whether it be one thing only, or more than one of those positions which are assumed, is not granted, or if, though they are granted, it is denied that the conclusion legitimately follows from them, or if it is shown that the very kind of argumentation is faulty, or if in opposition to one form and reliable sort of argumentation another is employed which is equally firm and convincing.
The first case denies the premises; the second denies the form, whether a particular form or legitimate form altogether.
Huic consilio § 890. satisfacit partim iam ipsa confirmatio, partim artificium nostrae directae probationi, et antitheseos praemissarum, vel formae probandi, vel utrarumque subversioni iungendi ex ipsa sumta eadem conclusione et antithesi deducta, dilucide, vel etiam splendide deducta, magnam tamen analogo rationis falsitatem et incongruentiam eiusdem tandem et velut ex improviso ob oculos ponentia, § 853, 884. Cicero de Inv. I. 63. / The counsel of §890 is satisfied partly already by confirmation itself, partly by the art of joining to our direct proof the subversion of the antithesis' premises, or of the form of proving, or of both, things taken from that very conclusion and drawn from the antithesis, drawn clearly or even splendidly, yet finally and almost unexpectedly placing before the eyes of the analogue of reason the great falsity and incongruity of the same thing, §§853, 884. Cicero, De inventione I.63:
omnis argumentatio reprehenditur, si aut ex iis, quae sumta sunt, non conceditur unum, plurave, (negando praemissas) aut his concessis complexio confici ex his negatur: aut si genus ipsum argumentationis vitiosum esse ostenditur (negando formam vel certam, vel legitimam omnino) aut si contra firmam argumentationem alia aeque firma, aut firmior, ponitur.
All argumentation is reprehended when anything, whether it be one thing only, or more than one of those positions which are assumed, is not granted, or if, though they are granted, it is denied that the conclusion legitimately follows from them, or if it is shown that the very kind of argumentation is faulty, or if in opposition to one form and reliable sort of argumentation another is employed which is equally firm and convincing.
/ The first case denies the premises; the second denies the form, whether a particular form or legitimate form altogether.
§ 892
In eadem reprehensione possunt plura membra disiunctionis a Cicerone positae post se invicem tentari, § 891. modo 2) armis adversarii semper parentur contraria arma, quae plus verae lucis fundere videantur, ut nostrorum lumen maius obscuret illa. S. XXXX. Non aeque firma placent tantum, quantum firmiora, § 891. Huc praeiudicia in reprehendendis latentia detegere, § 870. eadem cum praemissis aliis falsis per instantias evidentiores infringere. S. L. comparationibus paralogismos reprehendendorum eludere, quorum evidentes praemissae tamen aperte falsam dent conclusionem; S. XXVIII. saltus illegitimos et supplendi impossibilitatem ob oculos ponere, e. c. quae logici docent, eleganter et ad analogi rationis modulos exsequi. § 844.
In the same reprehension several members of the disjunction set down by Cicero can be tried one after another, §891, provided that 2) contrary weapons are always prepared from the weapons of the adversary, which may seem to pour out more true light, so that the greater light of our weapons obscures theirs, Sect. XXXX. Equally firm weapons do not please as much as firmer ones, §891. To this belongs detecting prejudices hidden in the things to be reprehended, §870, breaking them together with other false premises by more evident instances, Sect. L, eluding by comparisons the paralogisms of those to be reprehended, whose evident premises nevertheless openly give a false conclusion, Sect. XXVIII, setting before the eyes illegitimate leaps and the impossibility of supplementing them, and so forth: to execute elegantly and according to the measures of the analogue of reason the things logicians teach, §844.
In eadem reprehensione possunt plura membra disiunctionis a Cicerone positae post se invicem tentari, § 891. modo 2) armis adversarii semper parentur contraria arma, quae plus verae lucis fundere videantur, ut nostrorum lumen maius obscuret illa.
In the same reprehension several members of the disjunction set down by Cicero can be tried one after another, §891, provided that 2) contrary weapons are always prepared from the weapons of the adversary, which may seem to pour out more true light, so that the greater light of our weapons obscures theirs, Sect.
S. XXXX. Non aeque firma placent tantum, quantum firmiora, § 891. Huc praeiudicia in reprehendendis latentia detegere, § 870. eadem cum praemissis aliis falsis per instantias evidentiores infringere.
XXXX. Equally firm weapons do not please as much as firmer ones, §891. To this belongs detecting prejudices hidden in the things to be reprehended, §870, breaking them together with other false premises by more evident instances, Sect.
S. L. comparationibus paralogismos reprehendendorum eludere, quorum evidentes praemissae tamen aperte falsam dent conclusionem; S. XXVIII. saltus illegitimos et supplendi impossibilitatem ob oculos ponere, e. c. quae logici docent, eleganter et ad analogi rationis modulos exsequi. § 844.
L, eluding by comparisons the paralogisms of those to be reprehended, whose evident premises nevertheless openly give a false conclusion, Sect. XXVIII, setting before the eyes illegitimate leaps and the impossibility of supplementing them, and so forth: to execute elegantly and according to the measures of the analogue of reason the things logicians teach, §844.
In eadem reprehensione possunt plura membra
In the same reprehension several members of the
disiunctionis a Cicerone positae post se invicem tentari, § 891.
disjunction set down by Cicero can be tried one after another, §891,
modo 2) armis
provided that 2) contrary weapons are always prepared from
adversarii semper parentur contraria arma,
the weapons of the adversary, which may seem to
quae plus verae lucis fundere videantur,
pour out more true light, so
ut nostrorum lumen maius obscuret illa.
that the greater light of our weapons obscures theirs, Sect.
S. XXXX. Non aeque firma placent tantum,
XXXX. Equally firm weapons do not please as much as
quantum firmiora, § 891. Huc praeiudicia
firmer ones, §891. To this belongs detecting prejudices
in reprehendendis latentia detegere, § 870.
hidden in the things to be reprehended, §870,
eadem cum praemissis aliis falsis per instantias evidentiores
breaking them together with other false premises by more evident instances,
infringere.
Sect.
S. L. comparationibus paralogismos reprehendendorum
L, eluding by comparisons the paralogisms of those to be reprehended,
eludere, quorum evidentes praemissae tamen aperte falsam dent conclusionem;
whose evident premises nevertheless openly give a false conclusion,
S. XXVIII. saltus illegitimos et
Sect. XXVIII, setting before the eyes illegitimate leaps and
supplendi impossibilitatem ob oculos ponere, e. c. quae
the impossibility of supplementing them, and so forth:
logici docent, eleganter et ad
to execute elegantly and according to the measures of
analogi rationis modulos exsequi. § 844.
the analogue of reason the things logicians teach, §844.
In eadem reprehensione possunt plura membra disiunctionis a Cicerone positae post se invicem tentari, § 891. modo 2) armis adversarii semper parentur contraria arma, quae plus verae lucis fundere videantur, ut nostrorum lumen maius obscuret illa. / In the same reprehension several members of the disjunction set down by Cicero can be tried one after another, §891, provided that 2) contrary weapons are always prepared from the weapons of the adversary, which may seem to pour out more true light, so that the greater light of our weapons obscures theirs, Sect.
S. XXXX. Non aeque firma placent tantum, quantum firmiora, § 891. Huc praeiudicia in reprehendendis latentia detegere, § 870. eadem cum praemissis aliis falsis per instantias evidentiores infringere. / XXXX. Equally firm weapons do not please as much as firmer ones, §891. To this belongs detecting prejudices hidden in the things to be reprehended, §870, breaking them together with other false premises by more evident instances, Sect.
S. L. comparationibus paralogismos reprehendendorum eludere, quorum evidentes praemissae tamen aperte falsam dent conclusionem; S. XXVIII. saltus illegitimos et supplendi impossibilitatem ob oculos ponere, e. c. quae logici docent, eleganter et ad analogi rationis modulos exsequi. § 844. / L, eluding by comparisons the paralogisms of those to be reprehended, whose evident premises nevertheless openly give a false conclusion, Sect. XXVIII, setting before the eyes illegitimate leaps and the impossibility of supplementing them, and so forth: to execute elegantly and according to the measures of the analogue of reason the things logicians teach, §844.
§ 893
In primis 3) utiliter, ad hominem quae dicuntur argumenta, quem reprehendis, armis propriis aggrediendo adhibebuntur, quoniam hominem ipsi sibi contradicentem tanquam auctorem veritatis sequi, vix est, qui sibi persuadere possit, hinc labefactatur hoc modo certe praeiudicium auctoritatis, quod pro patronis antitheseos pugnare potuisset, tanquam aesthetice saltim solidis, § 839.
Especially 3) arguments called ad hominem will usefully be employed by attacking the person you reprehend with his own weapons, since there is scarcely anyone who can persuade himself to follow as an author of truth a person contradicting himself; hence in this way at least the prejudice of authority is shaken, which could have fought for the patrons of the antithesis as at least aesthetically solid, §839.
Artificis est invenire in actione adversarii, quae in semet ipsa pugnent, aut pugnare videantur.
On the other hand it is a task for a real artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent, in the speech of his opponent,,
Quint. inst. V. 13. quod totum caput heic legi meretur. 4) In reprehendendo hoc magis sollicitus esto de genere cogitandi satis digno, § 223. quo minus aestheticus cum logico suadere potest abstinentiam ab omnibus affectiones animi moventibus, § 22. quo difficilius est aliquando vehementer, neque tamen iracunde agere, § 722–725.
Quintilian, Institutio V.13; that whole chapter deserves to be read here. 4) In reprehending, be the more solicitous about a sufficiently dignified kind of thinking, §223, because the aesthetician, no more than the logician, can advise abstinence from all things that move the affections of the mind, §22, and because it is sometimes difficult to act vehemently and yet not angrily, §§722–725.
In primis 3) utiliter, ad hominem quae dicuntur argumenta, quem reprehendis, armis propriis aggrediendo adhibebuntur, quoniam hominem ipsi sibi contradicentem tanquam auctorem veritatis sequi, vix est, qui sibi persuadere possit, hinc labefactatur hoc modo certe praeiudicium auctoritatis, quod pro patronis antitheseos pugnare potuisset, tanquam aesthetice saltim solidis, § 839.
Especially 3) arguments called ad hominem will usefully be employed by attacking the person you reprehend with his own weapons, since there is scarcely anyone who can persuade himself to follow as an author of truth a person contradicting himself; hence in this way at least the prejudice of authority is shaken, which could have fought for the patrons of the antithesis as at least aesthetically solid, §839.
Artificis est invenire in actione adversarii, quae in semet ipsa pugnent, aut pugnare videantur.
On the other hand it is a task for a real artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent, in the speech of his opponent,,
Quint. inst. V. 13. quod totum caput heic legi meretur. 4) In reprehendendo hoc magis sollicitus esto de genere cogitandi satis digno, § 223. quo minus aestheticus cum logico suadere potest abstinentiam ab omnibus affectiones animi moventibus, § 22. quo difficilius est aliquando vehementer, neque tamen iracunde agere, § 722–725.
Quintilian, Institutio V.13; that whole chapter deserves to be read here. 4) In reprehending, be the more solicitous about a sufficiently dignified kind of thinking, §223, because the aesthetician, no more than the logician, can advise abstinence from all things that move the affections of the mind, §22, and because it is sometimes difficult to act vehemently and yet not angrily, §§722–725.
In primis 3) utiliter, ad hominem
Especially 3) arguments called ad hominem will usefully
quae dicuntur argumenta, quem reprehendis,
be employed by attacking the person you reprehend
armis propriis aggrediendo adhibebuntur, quoniam hominem ipsi
with his own weapons, since there is scarcely anyone
sibi contradicentem tanquam auctorem veritatis sequi,
who can persuade himself to follow as an author of truth
vix est, qui sibi persuadere possit,
a person contradicting himself;
hinc labefactatur hoc modo certe praeiudicium auctoritatis,
hence in this way at least the prejudice of authority
quod pro patronis
is shaken, which could have fought for the patrons
antitheseos pugnare potuisset, tanquam aesthetice saltim solidis, § 839.
of the antithesis as at least aesthetically solid, §839.
Artificis est invenire in actione adversarii, quae in semet ipsa pugnent, aut pugnare videantur.
On the other hand it is a task for a real artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent, in the speech of his opponent,,
Quint. inst. V. 13. quod totum caput heic
Quintilian, Institutio V.13; that whole chapter deserves to be read here.
legi meretur. 4) In reprehendendo hoc magis sollicitus
4) In reprehending, be the more solicitous
esto de genere cogitandi satis digno, § 223.
about a sufficiently dignified kind of thinking, §223,
quo minus aestheticus cum logico
because the aesthetician, no more than the logician,
suadere potest abstinentiam ab omnibus
can advise abstinence from all things that move
affectiones animi moventibus, § 22.
the affections of the mind, §22,
quo difficilius est aliquando vehementer,
and because it is sometimes difficult to act vehemently
neque tamen iracunde agere, § 722–725.
and yet not angrily, §§722–725.
In primis 3) utiliter, ad hominem quae dicuntur argumenta, quem reprehendis, armis propriis aggrediendo adhibebuntur, quoniam hominem ipsi sibi contradicentem tanquam auctorem veritatis sequi, vix est, qui sibi persuadere possit, hinc labefactatur hoc modo certe praeiudicium auctoritatis, quod pro patronis antitheseos pugnare potuisset, tanquam aesthetice saltim solidis, § 839. / Especially 3) arguments called ad hominem will usefully be employed by attacking the person you reprehend with his own weapons, since there is scarcely anyone who can persuade himself to follow as an author of truth a person contradicting himself; hence in this way at least the prejudice of authority is shaken, which could have fought for the patrons of the antithesis as at least aesthetically solid, §839.
Artificis est invenire in actione adversarii, quae in semet ipsa pugnent, aut pugnare videantur.
On the other hand it is a task for a real artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent, in the speech of his opponent,,
Quint. inst. V. 13. quod totum caput heic legi meretur. 4) In reprehendendo hoc magis sollicitus esto de genere cogitandi satis digno, § 223. quo minus aestheticus cum logico suadere potest abstinentiam ab omnibus affectiones animi moventibus, § 22. quo difficilius est aliquando vehementer, neque tamen iracunde agere, § 722–725. / Quintilian, Institutio V.13; that whole chapter deserves to be read here. 4) In reprehending, be the more solicitous about a sufficiently dignified kind of thinking, §223, because the aesthetician, no more than the logician, can advise abstinence from all things that move the affections of the mind, §22, and because it is sometimes difficult to act vehemently and yet not angrily, §§722–725.
§ 894
Ultimum dignitatis consilium § 182. heic etiam, tanquam ex ipsis eleganter cogitandi fontibus § 866. fluens considerari velim, non tantum, quatenus idem virtus et pietas postulant, § 183. Quod in obscoenis sibi permiserunt antiquorum non pauci, § 184. in reprehendendo paene plures similem eidem licentiam sumserunt, ut adeo rationibus impugnare veterem, sed malum, morem eo magis necessarium videatur, quo pluribus eum, alioquin satis insignibus, exemplis hodierni imitatores eiusdem facile tueantur. Quomodo reprehendat apud Homerum heros heroa, quis nescit? Sed quanto iam in hoc Aeneis Virgilii moratior est?
I would wish the final counsel of dignity, §182, to be considered here also, as flowing from the very sources of elegant thinking, §866, and not only insofar as virtue and piety demand the same thing, §183. What not a few of the ancients permitted themselves in obscene matters, §184, almost more permitted themselves a similar license in reprehending, so that to attack the old, but bad, custom by reasons seems all the more necessary, since modern imitators of it can easily defend it with many examples, otherwise distinguished enough. Who does not know how hero reprehends hero in Homer? But how much more moral in this very respect is Virgil's Aeneid? As for Demosthenes,
In hoc ipso (Demosthene) diligenter examinans verborum omnium pondera reprehendit Aeschines quaedam et exagitat, illudensque dura, odiosa, intolerabilia esse dicit. Quinetiam quaerit ab ipso, quum quidem eum belluam appellet, utrum illa verba, an portenta sint: ut Aeschini ne Demosthenes quidem videatur Attice dicere.
even in him, thus carefully weighing and poising his every word Aeschines could find several expressions to turn into ridicule:—for giving a loose to his raillery, he calls them harsh, and detestable, and too shocking to be endured; and styling the author of them a very monster, he tauntingly asks him whether such expressions could be considered as words or not rather as absolute frights and prodigies. So that to Aeschines not even Demosthenes himself was perfectly Attic;
Cic. Or. 26. Ad reprehensionem hanc belluae cuius est erubescere? Demosthenis, an potius Aeschinis?
Cicero, Orator 26. In this reprehension of the beast, whose part is it to blush? Demosthenes', or rather Aeschines'?
Ultimum dignitatis consilium § 182. heic etiam, tanquam ex ipsis eleganter cogitandi fontibus § 866. fluens considerari velim, non tantum, quatenus idem virtus et pietas postulant, § 183. Quod in obscoenis sibi permiserunt antiquorum non pauci, § 184. in reprehendendo paene plures similem eidem licentiam sumserunt, ut adeo rationibus impugnare veterem, sed malum, morem eo magis necessarium videatur, quo pluribus eum, alioquin satis insignibus, exemplis hodierni imitatores eiusdem facile tueantur.
I would wish the final counsel of dignity, §182, to be considered here also, as flowing from the very sources of elegant thinking, §866, and not only insofar as virtue and piety demand the same thing, §183. What not a few of the ancients permitted themselves in obscene matters, §184, almost more permitted themselves a similar license in reprehending, so that to attack the old, but bad, custom by reasons seems all the more necessary, since modern imitators of it can easily defend it with many examples, otherwise distinguished enough.
Quomodo reprehendat apud Homerum heros heroa, quis nescit?
Who does not know how hero reprehends hero in Homer?
Sed quanto iam in hoc Aeneis Virgilii moratior est?
But how much more moral in this very respect is Virgil's Aeneid? As for Demosthenes,
In hoc ipso (Demosthene) diligenter examinans verborum omnium pondera reprehendit Aeschines quaedam et exagitat, illudensque dura, odiosa, intolerabilia esse dicit. Quinetiam quaerit ab ipso, quum quidem eum belluam appellet, utrum illa verba, an portenta sint: ut Aeschini ne Demosthenes quidem videatur Attice dicere.
even in him, thus carefully weighing and poising his every word Aeschines could find several expressions to turn into ridicule:—for giving a loose to his raillery, he calls them harsh, and detestable, and too shocking to be endured; and styling the author of them a very monster, he tauntingly asks him whether such expressions could be considered as words or not rather as absolute frights and prodigies. So that to Aeschines not even Demosthenes himself was perfectly Attic;
Cic. Or. 26. Ad reprehensionem hanc belluae cuius est erubescere?
Cicero, Orator 26. In this reprehension of the beast, whose part is it to blush?
Demosthenis, an potius Aeschinis?
Demosthenes', or rather Aeschines'?
Ultimum dignitatis consilium § 182.
I would wish the final counsel of dignity, §182,
heic etiam, tanquam ex ipsis
to be considered here also, as flowing from the
eleganter cogitandi fontibus § 866.
very sources of elegant thinking, §866,
fluens considerari velim, non tantum, quatenus idem virtus et pietas postulant,
and not only insofar as virtue and piety demand
§ 183. Quod
the same thing, §183. What not a few of
in obscoenis sibi permiserunt antiquorum non pauci, § 184.
the ancients permitted themselves in obscene matters, §184,
in reprehendendo paene plures similem eidem licentiam sumserunt,
almost more permitted themselves a similar license in reprehending,
ut adeo rationibus impugnare veterem, sed malum,
so that to attack the old, but bad,
morem eo magis necessarium
custom by reasons seems all the more necessary,
videatur, quo pluribus eum, alioquin satis insignibus,
since modern imitators of it can easily
exemplis hodierni imitatores eiusdem facile tueantur.
defend it with many examples, otherwise distinguished enough.
Quomodo reprehendat apud Homerum heros heroa, quis nescit?
Who does not know how hero reprehends hero in Homer?
Sed quanto iam in hoc Aeneis Virgilii
But how much more moral in this very respect is Virgil's Aeneid?
moratior est?
As for Demosthenes,
In hoc ipso (Demosthene) diligenter examinans verborum omnium pondera reprehendit Aeschines quaedam et exagitat, illudensque dura, odiosa, intolerabilia esse dicit. Quinetiam quaerit ab ipso, quum quidem eum belluam appellet, utrum illa verba, an portenta sint: ut Aeschini ne Demosthenes quidem videatur Attice dicere.
even in him, thus carefully weighing and poising his every word Aeschines could find several expressions to turn into ridicule:—for giving a loose to his raillery, he calls them harsh, and detestable, and too shocking to be endured; and styling the author of them a very monster, he tauntingly asks him whether such expressions could be considered as words or not rather as absolute frights and prodigies. So that to Aeschines not even Demosthenes himself was perfectly Attic;
Cic. Or. 26. Ad reprehensionem hanc
Cicero, Orator 26. In this reprehension of the beast,
belluae cuius est erubescere?
whose part is it to blush?
Demosthenis, an potius Aeschinis?
Demosthenes', or rather Aeschines'?
Ultimum dignitatis consilium § 182. heic etiam, tanquam ex ipsis eleganter cogitandi fontibus § 866. fluens considerari velim, non tantum, quatenus idem virtus et pietas postulant, § 183. Quod in obscoenis sibi permiserunt antiquorum non pauci, § 184. in reprehendendo paene plures similem eidem licentiam sumserunt, ut adeo rationibus impugnare veterem, sed malum, morem eo magis necessarium videatur, quo pluribus eum, alioquin satis insignibus, exemplis hodierni imitatores eiusdem facile tueantur. / I would wish the final counsel of dignity, §182, to be considered here also, as flowing from the very sources of elegant thinking, §866, and not only insofar as virtue and piety demand the same thing, §183. What not a few of the ancients permitted themselves in obscene matters, §184, almost more permitted themselves a similar license in reprehending, so that to attack the old, but bad, custom by reasons seems all the more necessary, since modern imitators of it can easily defend it with many examples, otherwise distinguished enough.
Quomodo reprehendat apud Homerum heros heroa, quis nescit? / Who does not know how hero reprehends hero in Homer?
Sed quanto iam in hoc Aeneis Virgilii moratior est? / But how much more moral in this very respect is Virgil's Aeneid? As for Demosthenes,
In hoc ipso (Demosthene) diligenter examinans verborum omnium pondera reprehendit Aeschines quaedam et exagitat, illudensque dura, odiosa, intolerabilia esse dicit. Quinetiam quaerit ab ipso, quum quidem eum belluam appellet, utrum illa verba, an portenta sint: ut Aeschini ne Demosthenes quidem videatur Attice dicere.
even in him, thus carefully weighing and poising his every word Aeschines could find several expressions to turn into ridicule:—for giving a loose to his raillery, he calls them harsh, and detestable, and too shocking to be endured; and styling the author of them a very monster, he tauntingly asks him whether such expressions could be considered as words or not rather as absolute frights and prodigies. So that to Aeschines not even Demosthenes himself was perfectly Attic;
Cic. Or. 26. Ad reprehensionem hanc belluae cuius est erubescere? / Cicero, Orator 26. In this reprehension of the beast, whose part is it to blush?
Demosthenis, an potius Aeschinis? / Demosthenes', or rather Aeschines'?
§ 895
Quanto rectius hic, qui nil molitur inique, Cassius contra Plancium et huius patronum, Ciceronem, cui tamen iam graviora atque magna videntur, quod
How much more rightly here Cassius, who contrives nothing unfairly, against Plancius and his patron Cicero, to whom nevertheless these things already seem rather grave and great, because
Ciceronis discessum, quem saepe deflerat Cassius, nunc quasi reprehendere et subaccusare voluit, dicens non Ciceroni auxilium, sed Ciceronem auxilio defuisse?
These things are, however, of but little importance; but those points are serious and weighty, that you wish now to find fault with, and in an underhand manner, to accuse my departure from the city, which you had often wept over. For you have said that assistance was not wanting to me, but that I was wanting to those who were willing to assist me.,
Cic. pro Plancio 86. Quis nescit eundem discessum non reprehendi, sed etiam exagitari potuisse duris, odiosis, quaeque Ciceroni visa essent intolerabilia, verbis illudendo tam facta, quam non facta, nisi belle, § 893. praetulisset accusator Plancii submissum dicendi genus in illius patronum? § 725. Utinam ipse Cicero in Pisonem, virum censorium, in ipsum Antonium, eleganti modestia vehementiam ubique temperasset. § 722–724.
Cicero, Pro Plancio 86. Who does not know that the same departure could not only have been reprehended but even attacked with harsh, hateful words, which would have seemed intolerable to Cicero, by mocking both things done and not done, unless, beautifully, §893, the accuser of Plancius had preferred a subdued kind of speaking against that man's patron? §725. Would that Cicero himself, against Piso, a man of censorial rank, and against Antony himself, had everywhere tempered vehemence with elegant modesty, §§722–724.
Quanto rectius hic, qui nil molitur inique, Cassius contra Plancium et huius patronum, Ciceronem, cui tamen iam graviora atque magna videntur, quod
How much more rightly here Cassius, who contrives nothing unfairly, against Plancius and his patron Cicero, to whom nevertheless these things already seem rather grave and great, because
Ciceronis discessum, quem saepe deflerat Cassius, nunc quasi reprehendere et subaccusare voluit, dicens non Ciceroni auxilium, sed Ciceronem auxilio defuisse?
These things are, however, of but little importance; but those points are serious and weighty, that you wish now to find fault with, and in an underhand manner, to accuse my departure from the city, which you had often wept over. For you have said that assistance was not wanting to me, but that I was wanting to those who were willing to assist me.,
Cic. pro Plancio 86. Quis nescit eundem discessum non reprehendi, sed etiam exagitari potuisse duris, odiosis, quaeque Ciceroni visa essent intolerabilia, verbis illudendo tam facta, quam non facta, nisi belle, § 893. praetulisset accusator Plancii submissum dicendi genus in illius patronum? § 725. Utinam ipse Cicero in Pisonem, virum censorium, in ipsum Antonium, eleganti modestia vehementiam ubique temperasset. § 722–724.
Cicero, Pro Plancio 86. Who does not know that the same departure could not only have been reprehended but even attacked with harsh, hateful words, which would have seemed intolerable to Cicero, by mocking both things done and not done, unless, beautifully, §893, the accuser of Plancius had preferred a subdued kind of speaking against that man's patron? §725. Would that Cicero himself, against Piso, a man of censorial rank, and against Antony himself, had everywhere tempered vehemence with elegant modesty, §§722–724.
Quanto rectius hic, qui nil molitur inique, Cassius
How much more rightly here Cassius,
contra Plancium et huius patronum,
who contrives nothing unfairly, against Plancius and his patron
Ciceronem, cui tamen iam graviora atque magna videntur,
Cicero, to whom nevertheless these things already seem rather grave and great,
quod
because
Ciceronis discessum, quem saepe deflerat Cassius, nunc quasi reprehendere et subaccusare voluit, dicens non Ciceroni auxilium, sed Ciceronem auxilio defuisse?
These things are, however, of but little importance; but those points are serious and weighty, that you wish now to find fault with, and in an underhand manner, to accuse my departure from the city, which you had often wept over. For you have said that assistance was not wanting to me, but that I was wanting to those who were willing to assist me.,
Cic. pro Plancio 86. Quis nescit
Cicero, Pro Plancio 86. Who does not know that
eundem discessum non reprehendi,
the same departure could not only have been reprehended
sed etiam exagitari potuisse duris, odiosis, quaeque
but even attacked with harsh, hateful words,
Ciceroni visa essent intolerabilia, verbis
which would have seemed intolerable to Cicero,
illudendo tam facta, quam non facta, nisi belle, § 893.
by mocking both things done and not done, unless, beautifully, §893,
praetulisset accusator Plancii submissum dicendi
the accuser of Plancius had preferred a subdued kind
genus in illius patronum? § 725.
of speaking against that man's patron? §725.
Utinam ipse Cicero in Pisonem, virum censorium,
Would that Cicero himself, against Piso, a man of censorial
in ipsum Antonium, eleganti modestia
rank, and against Antony himself, had everywhere tempered vehemence with elegant modesty,
vehementiam ubique temperasset. § 722–724.
§§722–724.
Quanto rectius hic, qui nil molitur inique, Cassius contra Plancium et huius patronum, Ciceronem, cui tamen iam graviora atque magna videntur, quod / How much more rightly here Cassius, who contrives nothing unfairly, against Plancius and his patron Cicero, to whom nevertheless these things already seem rather grave and great, because
Ciceronis discessum, quem saepe deflerat Cassius, nunc quasi reprehendere et subaccusare voluit, dicens non Ciceroni auxilium, sed Ciceronem auxilio defuisse?
These things are, however, of but little importance; but those points are serious and weighty, that you wish now to find fault with, and in an underhand manner, to accuse my departure from the city, which you had often wept over. For you have said that assistance was not wanting to me, but that I was wanting to those who were willing to assist me.,
Cic. pro Plancio 86. Quis nescit eundem discessum non reprehendi, sed etiam exagitari potuisse duris, odiosis, quaeque Ciceroni visa essent intolerabilia, verbis illudendo tam facta, quam non facta, nisi belle, § 893. praetulisset accusator Plancii submissum dicendi genus in illius patronum? § 725. Utinam ipse Cicero in Pisonem, virum censorium, in ipsum Antonium, eleganti modestia vehementiam ubique temperasset. § 722–724. / Cicero, Pro Plancio 86. Who does not know that the same departure could not only have been reprehended but even attacked with harsh, hateful words, which would have seemed intolerable to Cicero, by mocking both things done and not done, unless, beautifully, §893, the accuser of Plancius had preferred a subdued kind of speaking against that man's patron? §725. Would that Cicero himself, against Piso, a man of censorial rank, and against Antony himself, had everywhere tempered vehemence with elegant modesty, §§722–724.
§ 896
Non iambos Archilochi, non hendecasyllabos Catulli, non Nasonis Ibin, aut alia, caeteroquin venusta, sed ob neglectum bene moratum cogitandi genus turpiter reprehendentium
Not the iambics of Archilochus, not the hendecasyllables of Catullus, not Ovid's Ibis, or other things otherwise graceful, but shamefully reprehending through neglect of a well-moralized kind of thinking:
Tincta Lycambaeo sanguine tela moror.
"Afterwards, shouldst thou persist, the bold Iambic measure shall provide me with weapons against thee, steeped in the blood of Lycambes."
§ 893, 186. Si non itur, qua eundum est, nec eundum est gravitati aestheticae, qua itur § 189. Nondum audeo praecipere generatim pulcre reprehensuris, ut abstineant omnino ab omnibus, quae personalia vel magis barbare personalitates dicunt, ab omnibus, quae singularem illum hominem, cui contradixeris, proxime tangunt, eiusque patriam, genus, ingenium, mores, vitam, adolescentiam, et si qua sunt alia, § 752–757. fidenter tamen procul esse iubeo, si quis gratiis litare voluerit, vel in adversariis ipsis rimari obiecta humillima et abiecta, § 195. quoniam omnino non possunt exponi § 224, 225. strictius morato cogitandi genere § 227, vel absolute tantum tali. § 228.
§§893, 186. If one does not go where one must go, one must not go by the aesthetic gravity by which one goes, §189. I do not yet dare to prescribe generally to those who will reprehend beautifully that they abstain altogether from all things called personalia, or more barbarously personalities, from all things that most nearly touch the singular person whom you have contradicted, his country, family, genius, morals, life, youth, and whatever else there may be, §§752–757. Yet confidently I order them to stay far away, if one wishes to sacrifice to the Graces, from searching out the lowest and most abject objects even in adversaries themselves, §195, since they absolutely cannot be displayed, §§224, 225, by a more strictly moralized kind of thinking, §227, or by one only absolutely such, §228.
Non iambos Archilochi, non hendecasyllabos Catulli, non Nasonis Ibin, aut alia, caeteroquin venusta, sed ob neglectum bene moratum cogitandi genus turpiter reprehendentium
Not the iambics of Archilochus, not the hendecasyllables of Catullus, not Ovid's Ibis, or other things otherwise graceful, but shamefully reprehending through neglect of a well-moralized kind of thinking:
Tincta Lycambaeo sanguine tela moror.
"Afterwards, shouldst thou persist, the bold Iambic measure shall provide me with weapons against thee, steeped in the blood of Lycambes."
§ 893, 186. Si non itur, qua eundum est, nec eundum est gravitati aestheticae, qua itur § 189. Nondum audeo praecipere generatim pulcre reprehensuris, ut abstineant omnino ab omnibus, quae personalia vel magis barbare personalitates dicunt, ab omnibus, quae singularem illum hominem, cui contradixeris, proxime tangunt, eiusque patriam, genus, ingenium, mores, vitam, adolescentiam, et si qua sunt alia, § 752–757. fidenter tamen procul esse iubeo, si quis gratiis litare voluerit, vel in adversariis ipsis rimari obiecta humillima et abiecta, § 195. quoniam omnino non possunt exponi § 224, 225. strictius morato cogitandi genere § 227, vel absolute tantum tali. § 228.
§§893, 186. If one does not go where one must go, one must not go by the aesthetic gravity by which one goes, §189. I do not yet dare to prescribe generally to those who will reprehend beautifully that they abstain altogether from all things called personalia, or more barbarously personalities, from all things that most nearly touch the singular person whom you have contradicted, his country, family, genius, morals, life, youth, and whatever else there may be, §§752–757. Yet confidently I order them to stay far away, if one wishes to sacrifice to the Graces, from searching out the lowest and most abject objects even in adversaries themselves, §195, since they absolutely cannot be displayed, §§224, 225, by a more strictly moralized kind of thinking, §227, or by one only absolutely such, §228.
Non iambos Archilochi, non hendecasyllabos Catulli,
Not the iambics of Archilochus, not the hendecasyllables of Catullus,
non Nasonis Ibin, aut alia, caeteroquin venusta,
not Ovid's Ibis, or other things otherwise graceful,
sed ob neglectum bene moratum cogitandi genus turpiter reprehendentium
but shamefully reprehending through neglect of a well-moralized kind of thinking:
Tincta Lycambaeo sanguine tela moror.
"Afterwards, shouldst thou persist, the bold Iambic measure shall provide me with weapons against thee, steeped in the blood of Lycambes."
§ 893, 186. Si non itur,
§§893, 186. If one does not go
qua eundum est, nec eundum est gravitati aestheticae,
where one must go, one must not go by the aesthetic
qua itur § 189.
gravity by which one goes, §189.
Nondum audeo praecipere generatim
I do not yet dare to prescribe generally to
pulcre reprehensuris,
those who will reprehend beautifully
ut abstineant omnino ab omnibus, quae personalia
that they abstain altogether from all things called personalia,
vel magis barbare personalitates dicunt, ab omnibus,
or more barbarously personalities, from all
quae singularem illum hominem,
things that most nearly touch the singular person whom
cui contradixeris, proxime tangunt, eiusque patriam, genus, ingenium,
you have contradicted, his country, family, genius,
mores, vitam, adolescentiam, et si qua sunt alia, § 752–757.
morals, life, youth, and whatever else there may be, §§752–757.
fidenter tamen procul esse iubeo,
Yet confidently I order them to stay far away,
si quis gratiis litare voluerit, vel in
if one wishes to sacrifice to the Graces,
adversariis ipsis rimari obiecta humillima et abiecta,
from searching out the lowest and most abject
§ 195.
objects even in adversaries themselves, §195,
quoniam omnino non possunt exponi § 224, 225.
since they absolutely cannot be displayed, §§224, 225,
strictius morato cogitandi
by a more strictly moralized kind of thinking,
genere § 227, vel absolute tantum tali. § 228.
§227, or by one only absolutely such, §228.
Non iambos Archilochi, non hendecasyllabos Catulli, non Nasonis Ibin, aut alia, caeteroquin venusta, sed ob neglectum bene moratum cogitandi genus turpiter reprehendentium / Not the iambics of Archilochus, not the hendecasyllables of Catullus, not Ovid's Ibis, or other things otherwise graceful, but shamefully reprehending through neglect of a well-moralized kind of thinking:
Tincta Lycambaeo sanguine tela moror.
"Afterwards, shouldst thou persist, the bold Iambic measure shall provide me with weapons against thee, steeped in the blood of Lycambes."
§ 893, 186. Si non itur, qua eundum est, nec eundum est gravitati aestheticae, qua itur § 189. Nondum audeo praecipere generatim pulcre reprehensuris, ut abstineant omnino ab omnibus, quae personalia vel magis barbare personalitates dicunt, ab omnibus, quae singularem illum hominem, cui contradixeris, proxime tangunt, eiusque patriam, genus, ingenium, mores, vitam, adolescentiam, et si qua sunt alia, § 752–757. fidenter tamen procul esse iubeo, si quis gratiis litare voluerit, vel in adversariis ipsis rimari obiecta humillima et abiecta, § 195. quoniam omnino non possunt exponi § 224, 225. strictius morato cogitandi genere § 227, vel absolute tantum tali. § 228. / §§893, 186. If one does not go where one must go, one must not go by the aesthetic gravity by which one goes, §189. I do not yet dare to prescribe generally to those who will reprehend beautifully that they abstain altogether from all things called personalia, or more barbarously personalities, from all things that most nearly touch the singular person whom you have contradicted, his country, family, genius, morals, life, youth, and whatever else there may be, §§752–757. Yet confidently I order them to stay far away, if one wishes to sacrifice to the Graces, from searching out the lowest and most abject objects even in adversaries themselves, §195, since they absolutely cannot be displayed, §§224, 225, by a more strictly moralized kind of thinking, §227, or by one only absolutely such, §228.
§ 897
Ne peccem ipse praestans, quod dissuadeo, non abiecta vel obtutu primo iuvat, exempla proferre. Sufficiat una Senecae apocolocyntosis in Claudium, qua Stoicus ille minus decantatam, forte tamen minus eluendam laudi virtutis suae maculam inussit, quam avaritia. Quis crederet? Philosophus, quantus Seneca videtur, exsul in Sardinia descenderat ad lacrumas et supplicationes in Polybium Claudii libertum profusas; in quibus sapientiae Claudii plus, quam satis est, adulatur, revocatus ab eodem Claudio, non tam malo, quam simplici, multisque beneficiis cumulatus, quantum ab eodem aliquid proficisci poterat, quod eius nomine fiebat, eundem imperatorem suum post eius mortem ore Neronis laudat propter sapientiam adeo, ut risum moverit audientibus, et idem sub tempus, urgente nulla ratione politica, tamen tam acerbe ridet, veneno exstinctum, ut nec ab hoc sibi temperare ioco posset, quem nunquam sine indignatione legi:
Lest I myself commit what I dissuade by performing it, it is useful to bring forward examples that are not abject at first glance. Let one example suffice: Seneca's Apocolocyntosis against Claudius, by which that Stoic branded upon the praise of his own virtue a stain less often recited, yet perhaps less washable, than avarice. Who would believe it? A philosopher, as great as Seneca seems, had descended as an exile in Sardinia to tears and supplications poured out to Polybius, Claudius' freedman; in these he flatters Claudius' wisdom more than enough; recalled by the same Claudius, not so much bad as simple, and heaped with many benefits, as much as anything could proceed from him which was done in his name, he praises the same emperor, after his death, by the mouth of Nero, so much for wisdom that he moved laughter in his hearers, and at the same time, with no political reason pressing, nevertheless laughs so bitterly at him, extinguished by poison, that he could not even temper himself from this joke, which I have never read without indignation:
Ultima vox eius haec inter homines audita est, quum maiorem sonitum emisisset illa parte, qua facilius loquebatur: Vae me! puto, concacavi me.
The last words he was heard to speak in this world were these. When he had made a great noise with that part of him which talked easiest, he cried out, “Oh dear, oh dear! I think I have made a mess of myself.”.
Paene pudet haec scripsisse post Senecam.
I am almost ashamed to have written these things after Seneca.
Ne peccem ipse praestans, quod dissuadeo, non abiecta vel obtutu primo iuvat, exempla proferre.
Lest I myself commit what I dissuade by performing it, it is useful to bring forward examples that are not abject at first glance.
Sufficiat una Senecae apocolocyntosis in Claudium, qua Stoicus ille minus decantatam, forte tamen minus eluendam laudi virtutis suae maculam inussit, quam avaritia.
Let one example suffice: Seneca's Apocolocyntosis against Claudius, by which that Stoic branded upon the praise of his own virtue a stain less often recited, yet perhaps less washable, than avarice.
Quis crederet?
Who would believe it?
Philosophus, quantus Seneca videtur, exsul in Sardinia descenderat ad lacrumas et supplicationes in Polybium Claudii libertum profusas; in quibus sapientiae Claudii plus, quam satis est, adulatur, revocatus ab eodem Claudio, non tam malo, quam simplici, multisque beneficiis cumulatus, quantum ab eodem aliquid proficisci poterat, quod eius nomine fiebat, eundem imperatorem suum post eius mortem ore Neronis laudat propter sapientiam adeo, ut risum moverit audientibus, et idem sub tempus, urgente nulla ratione politica, tamen tam acerbe ridet, veneno exstinctum, ut nec ab hoc sibi temperare ioco posset, quem nunquam sine indignatione legi:
A philosopher, as great as Seneca seems, had descended as an exile in Sardinia to tears and supplications poured out to Polybius, Claudius' freedman; in these he flatters Claudius' wisdom more than enough; recalled by the same Claudius, not so much bad as simple, and heaped with many benefits, as much as anything could proceed from him which was done in his name, he praises the same emperor, after his death, by the mouth of Nero, so much for wisdom that he moved laughter in his hearers, and at the same time, with no political reason pressing, nevertheless laughs so bitterly at him, extinguished by poison, that he could not even temper himself from this joke, which I have never read without indignation:
Ultima vox eius haec inter homines audita est, quum maiorem sonitum emisisset illa parte, qua facilius loquebatur: Vae me! puto, concacavi me.
The last words he was heard to speak in this world were these. When he had made a great noise with that part of him which talked easiest, he cried out, “Oh dear, oh dear! I think I have made a mess of myself.”.
Paene pudet haec scripsisse post Senecam.
I am almost ashamed to have written these things after Seneca.
Ne peccem ipse praestans, quod dissuadeo,
Lest I myself commit what I dissuade by performing it,
non abiecta vel obtutu primo iuvat,
it is useful to bring forward
exempla proferre.
examples that are not abject at first glance.
Sufficiat una Senecae apocolocyntosis in Claudium,
Let one example suffice: Seneca's Apocolocyntosis against Claudius,
qua Stoicus ille minus decantatam,
by which that Stoic branded upon the
forte tamen minus eluendam laudi
praise of his own virtue a stain less often recited,
virtutis suae maculam inussit, quam avaritia.
yet perhaps less washable, than avarice.
Quis crederet?
Who would believe it?
Philosophus, quantus Seneca videtur,
A philosopher, as great as Seneca seems,
exsul in Sardinia descenderat ad
had descended as an exile in Sardinia to
lacrumas et supplicationes in Polybium Claudii libertum profusas;
tears and supplications poured out to Polybius, Claudius' freedman;
in quibus sapientiae Claudii plus, quam satis est,
in these he flatters Claudius' wisdom more than enough;
adulatur, revocatus ab eodem Claudio, non tam malo,
recalled by the same Claudius, not so much bad
quam simplici, multisque beneficiis cumulatus,
as simple, and heaped with many benefits, as much
quantum ab eodem aliquid proficisci poterat,
as anything could proceed from him which was
quod eius nomine fiebat, eundem imperatorem
done in his name, he praises the same emperor,
suum post eius mortem ore Neronis
after his death, by the mouth of Nero,
laudat propter sapientiam adeo, ut risum moverit audientibus,
so much for wisdom that he moved laughter in his
et idem sub tempus,
hearers, and at the same time,
urgente nulla ratione politica,
with no political reason pressing,
tamen tam acerbe ridet, veneno exstinctum,
nevertheless laughs so bitterly at him, extinguished by poison,
ut nec ab hoc sibi
that he could not even temper himself from this joke,
temperare ioco posset, quem nunquam sine indignatione legi:
which I have never read without indignation:
Ultima vox eius haec inter homines audita est, quum maiorem sonitum emisisset illa parte, qua facilius loquebatur: Vae me! puto, concacavi me.
The last words he was heard to speak in this world were these. When he had made a great noise with that part of him which talked easiest, he cried out, “Oh dear, oh dear! I think I have made a mess of myself.”.
Paene pudet haec scripsisse post Senecam.
I am almost ashamed to have written these things after Seneca.
Ne peccem ipse praestans, quod dissuadeo, non abiecta vel obtutu primo iuvat, exempla proferre. / Lest I myself commit what I dissuade by performing it, it is useful to bring forward examples that are not abject at first glance.
Sufficiat una Senecae apocolocyntosis in Claudium, qua Stoicus ille minus decantatam, forte tamen minus eluendam laudi virtutis suae maculam inussit, quam avaritia. / Let one example suffice: Seneca's Apocolocyntosis against Claudius, by which that Stoic branded upon the praise of his own virtue a stain less often recited, yet perhaps less washable, than avarice.
Quis crederet? / Who would believe it?
Philosophus, quantus Seneca videtur, exsul in Sardinia descenderat ad lacrumas et supplicationes in Polybium Claudii libertum profusas; in quibus sapientiae Claudii plus, quam satis est, adulatur, revocatus ab eodem Claudio, non tam malo, quam simplici, multisque beneficiis cumulatus, quantum ab eodem aliquid proficisci poterat, quod eius nomine fiebat, eundem imperatorem suum post eius mortem ore Neronis laudat propter sapientiam adeo, ut risum moverit audientibus, et idem sub tempus, urgente nulla ratione politica, tamen tam acerbe ridet, veneno exstinctum, ut nec ab hoc sibi temperare ioco posset, quem nunquam sine indignatione legi: / A philosopher, as great as Seneca seems, had descended as an exile in Sardinia to tears and supplications poured out to Polybius, Claudius' freedman; in these he flatters Claudius' wisdom more than enough; recalled by the same Claudius, not so much bad as simple, and heaped with many benefits, as much as anything could proceed from him which was done in his name, he praises the same emperor, after his death, by the mouth of Nero, so much for wisdom that he moved laughter in his hearers, and at the same time, with no political reason pressing, nevertheless laughs so bitterly at him, extinguished by poison, that he could not even temper himself from this joke, which I have never read without indignation:
Ultima vox eius haec inter homines audita est, quum maiorem sonitum emisisset illa parte, qua facilius loquebatur: Vae me! puto, concacavi me.
The last words he was heard to speak in this world were these. When he had made a great noise with that part of him which talked easiest, he cried out, “Oh dear, oh dear! I think I have made a mess of myself.”.
Paene pudet haec scripsisse post Senecam. / I am almost ashamed to have written these things after Seneca.
§ 898
Iniuriae verbales, quae vel simplicem honorem laedunt, turpissimae quidem in reprehensionibus sunt, quae maiestatem sublimium tueri debeant § 317. turpiores in medio cogitandi genere, quod civilitatem et mores intensi iam honoris postulat, § 278. neque tamen in ipso tenui cogitandi genere carent turpitudine, § 262. Prius impetitus eiusmodi luto si fueris, nec a retorsionibus abstinere debeas aggressori, debes tibi, debes spectatoribus, et ipsi magnanimitati aestheticae. § 189, 275. SS. XXIIII–XXVI. Ad hunc lapidem Lydium argumentum ab invidia, consequentiarum synathroismos, immeritas vel immodicas irrisiones examinemus, memores nationis et saeculi, § 867. quorum huic ferenda quae videantur, illi tamen ἦθος omnino iam laedere iudicabuntur. § 213, 212.
Verbal injuries, which wound even simple honor, are certainly most shameful in reprehensions that ought to guard the majesty of sublime things, §317; more shameful in the middle kind of thinking, which demands civility and the manners of already intensified honor, §278; and yet they do not lack shamefulness even in the plain kind of thinking itself, §262. If you have first been attacked with mud of this kind, you owe it not to the aggressor, but to yourself, to the spectators, and to aesthetic magnanimity itself, that you abstain from retorts, §§189, 275, Sects. XXIIII–XXVI. Let us examine by this touchstone the argument from envy, gatherings of consequences, and undeserved or immoderate mockeries, mindful of nation and century, §867; things that seem bearable to one nation and age will nevertheless be judged altogether to wound ἦθος in another, §§213, 212.
Iniuriae verbales, quae vel simplicem honorem laedunt, turpissimae quidem in reprehensionibus sunt, quae maiestatem sublimium tueri debeant § 317. turpiores in medio cogitandi genere, quod civilitatem et mores intensi iam honoris postulat, § 278. neque tamen in ipso tenui cogitandi genere carent turpitudine, § 262. Prius impetitus eiusmodi luto si fueris, nec a retorsionibus abstinere debeas aggressori, debes tibi, debes spectatoribus, et ipsi magnanimitati aestheticae. § 189, 275. SS. XXIIII–XXVI. Ad hunc lapidem Lydium argumentum ab invidia, consequentiarum synathroismos, immeritas vel immodicas irrisiones examinemus, memores nationis et saeculi, § 867. quorum huic ferenda quae videantur, illi tamen ἦθος omnino iam laedere iudicabuntur. § 213, 212.
Verbal injuries, which wound even simple honor, are certainly most shameful in reprehensions that ought to guard the majesty of sublime things, §317; more shameful in the middle kind of thinking, which demands civility and the manners of already intensified honor, §278; and yet they do not lack shamefulness even in the plain kind of thinking itself, §262. If you have first been attacked with mud of this kind, you owe it not to the aggressor, but to yourself, to the spectators, and to aesthetic magnanimity itself, that you abstain from retorts, §§189, 275, Sects. XXIIII–XXVI. Let us examine by this touchstone the argument from envy, gatherings of consequences, and undeserved or immoderate mockeries, mindful of nation and century, §867; things that seem bearable to one nation and age will nevertheless be judged altogether to wound ἦθος in another, §§213, 212.
Iniuriae verbales, quae vel simplicem honorem laedunt,
Verbal injuries, which wound even simple honor, are certainly
turpissimae quidem in reprehensionibus sunt,
most shameful in reprehensions that ought to guard
quae maiestatem sublimium tueri debeant § 317.
the majesty of sublime things, §317;
turpiores in medio cogitandi genere,
more shameful in the middle kind of thinking, which
quod civilitatem et mores intensi iam honoris postulat, § 278.
demands civility and the manners of already intensified honor, §278;
neque tamen in
and yet they do not lack shamefulness even in
ipso tenui cogitandi genere carent turpitudine, § 262.
the plain kind of thinking itself, §262.
Prius impetitus eiusmodi luto si
If you have first been
fueris,
attacked with mud of this kind,
nec a retorsionibus abstinere debeas aggressori, debes
you owe it not to the aggressor, but to yourself,
tibi, debes spectatoribus, et ipsi magnanimitati aestheticae.
to the spectators, and to aesthetic magnanimity itself, that
§ 189, 275. SS. XXIIII–XXVI.
you abstain from retorts, §§189, 275, Sects. XXIIII–XXVI.
Ad hunc lapidem Lydium argumentum ab invidia,
Let us examine by this touchstone the argument from envy,
consequentiarum synathroismos, immeritas vel immodicas irrisiones examinemus,
gatherings of consequences, and undeserved or immoderate mockeries, mindful
memores nationis et saeculi, § 867. quorum huic
of nation and century, §867; things that seem bearable
ferenda quae videantur, illi tamen
to one nation and age will nevertheless be judged
ἦθος omnino iam laedere iudicabuntur. § 213, 212.
altogether to wound ἦθος in another, §§213, 212.
Iniuriae verbales, quae vel simplicem honorem laedunt, turpissimae quidem in reprehensionibus sunt, quae maiestatem sublimium tueri debeant § 317. turpiores in medio cogitandi genere, quod civilitatem et mores intensi iam honoris postulat, § 278. neque tamen in ipso tenui cogitandi genere carent turpitudine, § 262. Prius impetitus eiusmodi luto si fueris, nec a retorsionibus abstinere debeas aggressori, debes tibi, debes spectatoribus, et ipsi magnanimitati aestheticae. § 189, 275. SS. XXIIII–XXVI. Ad hunc lapidem Lydium argumentum ab invidia, consequentiarum synathroismos, immeritas vel immodicas irrisiones examinemus, memores nationis et saeculi, § 867. quorum huic ferenda quae videantur, illi tamen ἦθος omnino iam laedere iudicabuntur. § 213, 212. / Verbal injuries, which wound even simple honor, are certainly most shameful in reprehensions that ought to guard the majesty of sublime things, §317; more shameful in the middle kind of thinking, which demands civility and the manners of already intensified honor, §278; and yet they do not lack shamefulness even in the plain kind of thinking itself, §262. If you have first been attacked with mud of this kind, you owe it not to the aggressor, but to yourself, to the spectators, and to aesthetic magnanimity itself, that you abstain from retorts, §§189, 275, Sects. XXIIII–XXVI. Let us examine by this touchstone the argument from envy, gatherings of consequences, and undeserved or immoderate mockeries, mindful of nation and century, §867; things that seem bearable to one nation and age will nevertheless be judged altogether to wound ἦθος in another, §§213, 212.
§ 899
Et bonis moribus facilius obedies, et inanem operam insumere saepius supersedebis, si tibi dictum putes 5) neutiquam reprehendenda tibi esse omnia, quae contra tuas sententias, vel dicta sint, vel dici possint, sed ea tantum, quae suspicaris obiecto tuo personali primario verisimilia, nisi reprehendas, quaeque speraveris post reprehensionem tuam ab eodem in aesthetice falsis habenda; § 887. Par ratio responsionum ad reprehensiones aliorum in nos nostraque directarum; § 886, 898.
You will both obey good morals more easily and more often refrain from spending empty labor if you think this said to you, 5) that you are by no means to reprehend all things that have been said, or can be said, against your opinions, but only those things that you suspect will be verisimilar to your primary personal object if you do not reprehend them, and which you hope, after your reprehension, will be held by the same object among aesthetically false things, §887. The same ratio applies to responses to the reprehensions of others directed against us and our things, §§886, 898.
Quemadmodum illud stultissime praecipitur, quod defendi non possit, silentio dissimulandum, siquidem est id, de quo iudex pronunciaturus est: ita alii, diligentia lapsi, verbis etiam, vel sententiolis omnibus respondendum putant, quae contra dici posse autumant, quod est et infinitum et supervacuum
Consequently I regard as the height of folly the advice that is given in such cases, that what cannot be defended should be ignored and passed over in silence, at any rate if the point in question is that on which the judge has to give his decision.
[...]
On the other hand there are some who suffer from excess of zeal, and think it their duty to reply to every word and even every trifling reflexion, a task which is at once endless and superfluous.,
§ 171.
§171.
Sit, cui respondeas. Cave vitium nimium solliciti, et circa omnia momenta luctantis.
Unless we do this, we shall have no chance of employing objections, since there is no adversary to whom we can reply. There is another serious fault into which pleaders fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points.,
Quint. inst. V. XIII. Quot scriptis galeatus ille prologus aptari potuisset minus eleganter, quem belle praemisit Cicero l. I. de finibus bonorum et malorum?
Quintilian, Institutio V.13. To how many writings could that helmeted prologue have been less elegantly fitted which Cicero beautifully placed before book I of On the Ends of Goods and Evils?
Et bonis moribus facilius obedies, et inanem operam insumere saepius supersedebis, si tibi dictum putes 5) neutiquam reprehendenda tibi esse omnia, quae contra tuas sententias, vel dicta sint, vel dici possint, sed ea tantum, quae suspicaris obiecto tuo personali primario verisimilia, nisi reprehendas, quaeque speraveris post reprehensionem tuam ab eodem in aesthetice falsis habenda; § 887. Par ratio responsionum ad reprehensiones aliorum in nos nostraque directarum; § 886, 898.
You will both obey good morals more easily and more often refrain from spending empty labor if you think this said to you, 5) that you are by no means to reprehend all things that have been said, or can be said, against your opinions, but only those things that you suspect will be verisimilar to your primary personal object if you do not reprehend them, and which you hope, after your reprehension, will be held by the same object among aesthetically false things, §887. The same ratio applies to responses to the reprehensions of others directed against us and our things, §§886, 898.
Quemadmodum illud stultissime praecipitur, quod defendi non possit, silentio dissimulandum, siquidem est id, de quo iudex pronunciaturus est: ita alii, diligentia lapsi, verbis etiam, vel sententiolis omnibus respondendum putant, quae contra dici posse autumant, quod est et infinitum et supervacuum
Consequently I regard as the height of folly the advice that is given in such cases, that what cannot be defended should be ignored and passed over in silence, at any rate if the point in question is that on which the judge has to give his decision.
[...]
On the other hand there are some who suffer from excess of zeal, and think it their duty to reply to every word and even every trifling reflexion, a task which is at once endless and superfluous.,
§ 171.
§171.
Sit, cui respondeas. Cave vitium nimium solliciti, et circa omnia momenta luctantis.
Unless we do this, we shall have no chance of employing objections, since there is no adversary to whom we can reply. There is another serious fault into which pleaders fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points.,
Quint. inst. V. XIII. Quot scriptis galeatus ille prologus aptari potuisset minus eleganter, quem belle praemisit Cicero l. I. de finibus bonorum et malorum?
Quintilian, Institutio V.13. To how many writings could that helmeted prologue have been less elegantly fitted which Cicero beautifully placed before book I of On the Ends of Goods and Evils?
Et bonis moribus facilius obedies,
You will both obey good morals more
et inanem operam insumere saepius supersedebis,
easily and more often refrain from spending empty labor
si tibi dictum putes
if you think this said to you,
5) neutiquam reprehendenda tibi esse omnia,
5) that you are by no means to reprehend all things that
quae contra tuas sententias, vel dicta sint, vel dici possint,
have been said, or can be said, against your opinions,
sed ea tantum,
but only those things that you suspect will
quae suspicaris obiecto tuo personali primario verisimilia,
be verisimilar to your primary personal object if you do
nisi reprehendas, quaeque speraveris post reprehensionem
not reprehend them, and which you hope, after your reprehension,
tuam ab eodem in aesthetice falsis habenda;
will be held by the same object among aesthetically false things,
§ 887. Par ratio responsionum ad
§887. The same ratio applies to responses to the
reprehensiones aliorum in nos nostraque directarum;
reprehensions of others directed
§ 886, 898.
against us and our things, §§886, 898.
Quemadmodum illud stultissime praecipitur, quod defendi non possit, silentio dissimulandum, siquidem est id, de quo iudex pronunciaturus est: ita alii, diligentia lapsi, verbis etiam, vel sententiolis omnibus respondendum putant, quae contra dici posse autumant, quod est et infinitum et supervacuum
Consequently I regard as the height of folly the advice that is given in such cases, that what cannot be defended should be ignored and passed over in silence, at any rate if the point in question is that on which the judge has to give his decision.
[...]
On the other hand there are some who suffer from excess of zeal, and think it their duty to reply to every word and even every trifling reflexion, a task which is at once endless and superfluous.,
§ 171.
§171.
Sit, cui respondeas. Cave vitium nimium solliciti, et circa omnia momenta luctantis.
Unless we do this, we shall have no chance of employing objections, since there is no adversary to whom we can reply. There is another serious fault into which pleaders fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points.,
Quint. inst. V. XIII. Quot scriptis galeatus
Quintilian, Institutio V.13. To how many writings could that
ille prologus aptari potuisset minus eleganter,
helmeted prologue have been less elegantly
quem belle praemisit Cicero l. I.
fitted which Cicero beautifully placed before book I
de finibus bonorum et malorum?
of On the Ends of Goods and Evils?
Et bonis moribus facilius obedies, et inanem operam insumere saepius supersedebis, si tibi dictum putes 5) neutiquam reprehendenda tibi esse omnia, quae contra tuas sententias, vel dicta sint, vel dici possint, sed ea tantum, quae suspicaris obiecto tuo personali primario verisimilia, nisi reprehendas, quaeque speraveris post reprehensionem tuam ab eodem in aesthetice falsis habenda; § 887. Par ratio responsionum ad reprehensiones aliorum in nos nostraque directarum; § 886, 898. / You will both obey good morals more easily and more often refrain from spending empty labor if you think this said to you, 5) that you are by no means to reprehend all things that have been said, or can be said, against your opinions, but only those things that you suspect will be verisimilar to your primary personal object if you do not reprehend them, and which you hope, after your reprehension, will be held by the same object among aesthetically false things, §887. The same ratio applies to responses to the reprehensions of others directed against us and our things, §§886, 898.
Quemadmodum illud stultissime praecipitur, quod defendi non possit, silentio dissimulandum, siquidem est id, de quo iudex pronunciaturus est: ita alii, diligentia lapsi, verbis etiam, vel sententiolis omnibus respondendum putant, quae contra dici posse autumant, quod est et infinitum et supervacuum
Consequently I regard as the height of folly the advice that is given in such cases, that what cannot be defended should be ignored and passed over in silence, at any rate if the point in question is that on which the judge has to give his decision.
[...]
On the other hand there are some who suffer from excess of zeal, and think it their duty to reply to every word and even every trifling reflexion, a task which is at once endless and superfluous.,
§ 171. / §171.
Sit, cui respondeas. Cave vitium nimium solliciti, et circa omnia momenta luctantis.
Unless we do this, we shall have no chance of employing objections, since there is no adversary to whom we can reply. There is another serious fault into which pleaders fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points.,
Quint. inst. V. XIII. Quot scriptis galeatus ille prologus aptari potuisset minus eleganter, quem belle praemisit Cicero l. I. de finibus bonorum et malorum? / Quintilian, Institutio V.13. To how many writings could that helmeted prologue have been less elegantly fitted which Cicero beautifully placed before book I of On the Ends of Goods and Evils?
§ 900
SECTIO LIII
ARGUMENTA PERSUASORIA
ARGUMENTA, quorum (vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime consideranda) vis est sensitivam datae perceptioni certitudinem conciliare, sunt PERSUASORIA § 829. Ergo omnia argumenta, omnes figurae vivide probantes, S. XXXIII. verisimilitudinemque pulcram illustrantes, Sect. XXXIII. erunt persuasoriae, § 26. Habes ansam intendendi tuorum argumentorum efficaciam eleganter, § 142. si probantia potissimum illustres, et pingentia veritati consecres aestheticae, quoniam tunc illa non probabunt solum, haec non splendorem solum afferent, sed utraque simul persuadebunt. § 143. Sic pleonasmus apparens, cuius otiose positum ad dandam alterius hypothesin et determinationem, vel omnino medium terminum, negotiosum est, confirmabit, § 145, 855. e. g. Hisce meis oculis vidi, contra id:
SECTION LIII
PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENTS whose force, whether sole, stronger, or now especially to be considered, is to reconcile sensory certitude to a given perception, are PERSUASIVE, §829. Therefore all arguments, all figures vividly proving, Sect. XXXIII, and illustrating beautiful verisimilitude, Sect. XXXIII, will be persuasive, §26. You have an opportunity to intensify the efficacy of your arguments elegantly, §142, if you especially illustrate the proving arguments and consecrate the painting arguments to aesthetic truth, since then the former will not only prove, and the latter not only bring splendor, but both will also persuade, §143. Thus an apparent pleonasm, whose thing placed idly for giving another's hypothesis and determination, or altogether a middle term, is busy, will confirm, §§145, 855; for example, I saw it with these very eyes of mine, against this:
Vidimus? an qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt?
"May we believe it, or are lovers still
by their own fancies fooled?"
SECTIO LIII
ARGUMENTA PERSUASORIA
ARGUMENTA, quorum (vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime consideranda) vis est sensitivam datae perceptioni certitudinem conciliare, sunt PERSUASORIA § 829. Ergo omnia argumenta, omnes figurae vivide probantes, S. XXXIII. verisimilitudinemque pulcram illustrantes, Sect.
SECTION LIII
PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENTS whose force, whether sole, stronger, or now especially to be considered, is to reconcile sensory certitude to a given perception, are PERSUASIVE, §829. Therefore all arguments, all figures vividly proving, Sect. XXXIII, and illustrating beautiful verisimilitude, Sect.
XXXIII. erunt persuasoriae, § 26. Habes ansam intendendi tuorum argumentorum efficaciam eleganter, § 142. si probantia potissimum illustres, et pingentia veritati consecres aestheticae, quoniam tunc illa non probabunt solum, haec non splendorem solum afferent, sed utraque simul persuadebunt. § 143. Sic pleonasmus apparens, cuius otiose positum ad dandam alterius hypothesin et determinationem, vel omnino medium terminum, negotiosum est, confirmabit, § 145, 855. e. g. Hisce meis oculis vidi, contra id:
XXXIII, will be persuasive, §26. You have an opportunity to intensify the efficacy of your arguments elegantly, §142, if you especially illustrate the proving arguments and consecrate the painting arguments to aesthetic truth, since then the former will not only prove, and the latter not only bring splendor, but both will also persuade, §143. Thus an apparent pleonasm, whose thing placed idly for giving another's hypothesis and determination, or altogether a middle term, is busy, will confirm, §§145, 855; for example, I saw it with these very eyes of mine, against this:
Vidimus? an qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt?
"May we believe it, or are lovers still
by their own fancies fooled?"
SECTIO LIII ARGUMENTA PERSUASORIA ARGUMENTA, quorum
SECTION LIII PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS whose force,
(vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime consideranda)
whether sole, stronger, or now especially to be considered,
vis est sensitivam datae perceptioni certitudinem conciliare,
is to reconcile sensory certitude to a given
sunt PERSUASORIA § 829. Ergo omnia argumenta, omnes figurae vivide probantes, S.
perception, are PERSUASIVE, §829. Therefore all arguments, all figures vividly proving, Sect.
XXXIII. verisimilitudinemque pulcram illustrantes, Sect.
XXXIII, and illustrating beautiful verisimilitude, Sect.
XXXIII. erunt persuasoriae, § 26. Habes ansam
XXXIII, will be persuasive, §26. You have an opportunity
intendendi tuorum argumentorum efficaciam eleganter, § 142.
to intensify the efficacy of your arguments elegantly, §142,
si probantia potissimum illustres, et pingentia
if you especially illustrate the proving arguments and
veritati consecres aestheticae, quoniam
consecrate the painting arguments to aesthetic truth,
tunc illa non probabunt solum,
since then the former will not only prove,
haec non splendorem solum afferent,
and the latter not only bring splendor,
sed utraque simul persuadebunt. § 143.
but both will also persuade, §143.
Sic pleonasmus apparens, cuius otiose positum ad
Thus an apparent pleonasm, whose thing placed idly for
dandam alterius hypothesin et determinationem, vel omnino medium terminum,
giving another's hypothesis and determination, or altogether a middle term,
negotiosum est, confirmabit, § 145, 855. e.
is busy, will confirm, §§145, 855; for example, I
g. Hisce meis oculis vidi, contra id:
saw it with these very eyes of mine, against this:
Vidimus? an qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt?
"May we believe it, or are lovers still
by their own fancies fooled?"
SECTIO LIII ARGUMENTA PERSUASORIA ARGUMENTA, quorum (vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime consideranda) vis est sensitivam datae perceptioni certitudinem conciliare, sunt PERSUASORIA § 829. Ergo omnia argumenta, omnes figurae vivide probantes, S. XXXIII. verisimilitudinemque pulcram illustrantes, Sect. / SECTION LIII PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS whose force, whether sole, stronger, or now especially to be considered, is to reconcile sensory certitude to a given perception, are PERSUASIVE, §829. Therefore all arguments, all figures vividly proving, Sect. XXXIII, and illustrating beautiful verisimilitude, Sect.
XXXIII. erunt persuasoriae, § 26. Habes ansam intendendi tuorum argumentorum efficaciam eleganter, § 142. si probantia potissimum illustres, et pingentia veritati consecres aestheticae, quoniam tunc illa non probabunt solum, haec non splendorem solum afferent, sed utraque simul persuadebunt. § 143. Sic pleonasmus apparens, cuius otiose positum ad dandam alterius hypothesin et determinationem, vel omnino medium terminum, negotiosum est, confirmabit, § 145, 855. e. g. Hisce meis oculis vidi, contra id: / XXXIII, will be persuasive, §26. You have an opportunity to intensify the efficacy of your arguments elegantly, §142, if you especially illustrate the proving arguments and consecrate the painting arguments to aesthetic truth, since then the former will not only prove, and the latter not only bring splendor, but both will also persuade, §143. Thus an apparent pleonasm, whose thing placed idly for giving another's hypothesis and determination, or altogether a middle term, is busy, will confirm, §§145, 855; for example, I saw it with these very eyes of mine, against this:
Vidimus? an qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt?
"May we believe it, or are lovers still
by their own fancies fooled?"