Aesthetica

7) Quibus utique deest quaedam dignitas relativa ac comparativa, neque tamen absoluta, § 188, e.g. Epaminondam saltasse commode, scienterque tibiis cantasse. Corn. Huc Anacreon et celebris Catulli passer, vivens, c. 2, ac mortuus, c. 3:

7) Things to which a certain relative and comparative dignity is certainly lacking, but not absolute dignity, § 188; for example, that "Epaminondas danced gracefully and sang skillfully to the pipes." Cornelius. Here belong Anacreon and the celebrated sparrow of Catullus, living in poem 2 and dead in poem 3:

e.c.

etc.

7) Quibus utique deest quaedam dignitas relativa ac comparativa, neque tamen absoluta, § 188, e.g. Epaminondam saltasse commode, scienterque tibiis cantasse.

7) Things to which a certain relative and comparative dignity is certainly lacking, but not absolute dignity, § 188; for example, that "Epaminondas danced gracefully and sang skillfully to the pipes." Cornelius.

Corn. Huc Anacreon et celebris Catulli passer, vivens, c. 2, ac mortuus, c. 3:

Here belong Anacreon and the celebrated sparrow of Catullus, living in poem 2 and dead in poem 3:

e.c.

etc.

Quibus et magnitudo convenit et dignitas absoluta, §§ 182, 185, materiae, relativam et magnitudinem, § 180, et dignitatem habebunt 1) myricae, minimam, cum aliqua latitudine, quae deceat aestheticum, §§ 15, 16, honore uno ex minoribus dignae, tenues. Huc et personas, obiecta personalia, pertinere ne dubites, referamus et nos, post Demetrium,

The materials to which both absolute magnitude and dignity are suited, §§ 182, 185, will have relative magnitude, § 180, and dignity as follows. 1) Tamarisks, the least, with some breadth that befits the aesthetician, §§ 15, 16, worthy of one of the lesser honors: slender things. Lest you doubt that persons too, personal objects, belong here, after Demetrius let us also refer to this Vulteius Mena by name,

e.c. Hor. I. ep. 7.55.

etc. Horace, Epistles I.7.55.

Quibus et magnitudo convenit et dignitas absoluta, §§ 182, 185, materiae, relativam et magnitudinem, § 180, et dignitatem habebunt 1) myricae, minimam, cum aliqua latitudine, quae deceat aestheticum, §§ 15, 16, honore uno ex minoribus dignae, tenues.

The materials to which both absolute magnitude and dignity are suited, §§ 182, 185, will have relative magnitude, § 180, and dignity as follows. 1) Tamarisks, the least, with some breadth that befits the aesthetician, §§ 15, 16, worthy of one of the lesser honors: slender things.

Huc et personas, obiecta personalia, pertinere ne dubites, referamus et nos, post Demetrium,

Lest you doubt that persons too, personal objects, belong here, after Demetrius let us also refer to this Vulteius Mena by name,

e.c. Hor. I. ep. 7.55.

etc. Horace, Epistles I.7.55.

II. Silvae, maximam, cum eadem aestheticum decente latitudine, § 202, honore uno ex maximis dignae, excellente magnae, grandes atque sublimes. Non pugnabo contra Senecam, quando magnitudinem et dignitatem rerum intrinsecam spectans:

II. Woods, the greatest, with the same breadth befitting the aesthetician, § 202, worthy of one of the greatest honors, excellently great, grand, and sublime. I shall not fight with Seneca when, looking at the intrinsic magnitude and dignity of things, he says:

nisi forsan in effatum ultimum, de Ira I. 16. Nobis autem hic sermo est de magnitudine et dignitate obiectiva, non quatenus ipsis obiectis inhaeret, sed quatenus obiectis inhaerens, quicquid illud sit, rationem propiorem continet, ut de obiectis magnae dignaeque cogitationes formari possint, §§ 189, 18.

§ 195, also morally—except perhaps as to the final saying, De ira I.16. But our discourse here concerns objective magnitude and dignity, not insofar as it inheres in the objects themselves, but insofar as what inheres in the objects, whatever it may be, contains the nearer reason why great and worthy thoughts can be formed about the objects, §§ 189, 18.

II. Silvae, maximam, cum eadem aestheticum decente latitudine, § 202, honore uno ex maximis dignae, excellente magnae, grandes atque sublimes.

II. Woods, the greatest, with the same breadth befitting the aesthetician, § 202, worthy of one of the greatest honors, excellently great, grand, and sublime.

Non pugnabo contra Senecam, quando magnitudinem et dignitatem rerum intrinsecam spectans:

I shall not fight with Seneca when, looking at the intrinsic magnitude and dignity of things, he says:

nisi forsan in effatum ultimum, de Ira I. 16.

§ 195, also morally—except perhaps as to the final saying, De ira I.16.

Nobis autem hic sermo est de magnitudine et dignitate obiectiva, non quatenus ipsis obiectis inhaeret, sed quatenus obiectis inhaerens, quicquid illud sit, rationem propiorem continet, ut de obiectis magnae dignaeque cogitationes formari possint, §§ 189, 18.

But our discourse here concerns objective magnitude and dignity, not insofar as it inheres in the objects themselves, but insofar as what inheres in the objects, whatever it may be, contains the nearer reason why great and worthy thoughts can be formed about the objects, §§ 189, 18.

Sicut itaque recti quidam habitus, non abiecti quidem ac humiles, tenues tamen illi possunt esse, § 202, partim in destitutis magnitudine quadam relative maiori naturali, partim expertes multis variis consectariisque, etiam moralibus, sed per analogon rationis observabilioribus, §§ 181, 182; ita pravi quidam habitus et facinora videantur esse posse magna pulcre cogitaturo materia, vel omnino grandis, quando 1) varia eorum, etiam ad materiale remotum et proximum realia pertinentia, M. § 914, ipsumque formale simul habeant magnitudinem naturalem per plura etiam consectaria, denuo vel ex materiali, vel ex formali mali effluentia per ipsum analogon rationis detegenda; 2) non tam ipsorum formale dictorum, quam huius ingens deformitas thema pulcre sistendum ob oculos aesthetice meditaturo sumitur, quod utique fieri potest dignissime, §§ 18, 203. Ita Catilinae scelus et Ciceroni et Salustio thema grande fuisse videatur, § 89. Nec facile, nisi in eiusmodi thematibus, aliquis, ex Petronii consilio,

Therefore, just as certain right dispositions, though not abject and low, can nevertheless be slender, § 202, partly because they lack a certain relatively greater natural magnitude, partly because they lack many varied consequences, even moral ones, that are more observable through the analogue of reason, §§ 181, 182; so certain depraved dispositions and crimes may seem able to be great material, or altogether grand material, for one who is going to think beautifully, when 1) their various aspects, even those real aspects belonging to remote and proximate material, Metaphysics § 914, and also the formal element itself, at the same time have natural magnitude through several consequences, again flowing either from the material or from the formal element of evil and to be detected by the analogue of reason; 2) not so much the formal element of the said things themselves as its immense deformity is taken as the theme to be placed beautifully before the eyes by one meditating aesthetically, which can certainly be done most worthily, §§ 18, 203. Thus Catiline's crime seems to have been a grand theme for both Cicero and Sallust, § 89. Nor easily, except in themes of this kind, would someone, by Petronius' counsel,

Sicut itaque recti quidam habitus, non abiecti quidem ac humiles, tenues tamen illi possunt esse, § 202, partim in destitutis magnitudine quadam relative maiori naturali, partim expertes multis variis consectariisque, etiam moralibus, sed per analogon rationis observabilioribus, §§ 181, 182; ita pravi quidam habitus et facinora videantur esse posse magna pulcre cogitaturo materia, vel omnino grandis, quando 1) varia eorum, etiam ad materiale remotum et proximum realia pertinentia, M. § 914, ipsumque formale simul habeant magnitudinem naturalem per plura etiam consectaria, denuo vel ex materiali, vel ex formali mali effluentia per ipsum analogon rationis detegenda; 2) non tam ipsorum formale dictorum, quam huius ingens deformitas thema pulcre sistendum ob oculos aesthetice meditaturo sumitur, quod utique fieri potest dignissime, §§ 18, 203. Ita Catilinae scelus et Ciceroni et Salustio thema grande fuisse videatur, § 89. Nec facile, nisi in eiusmodi thematibus, aliquis, ex Petronii consilio,

Therefore, just as certain right dispositions, though not abject and low, can nevertheless be slender, § 202, partly because they lack a certain relatively greater natural magnitude, partly because they lack many varied consequences, even moral ones, that are more observable through the analogue of reason, §§ 181, 182; so certain depraved dispositions and crimes may seem able to be great material, or altogether grand material, for one who is going to think beautifully, when 1) their various aspects, even those real aspects belonging to remote and proximate material, Metaphysics § 914, and also the formal element itself, at the same time have natural magnitude through several consequences, again flowing either from the material or from the formal element of evil and to be detected by the analogue of reason; 2) not so much the formal element of the said things themselves as its immense deformity is taken as the theme to be placed beautifully before the eyes by one meditating aesthetically, which can certainly be done most worthily, §§ 18, 203. Thus Catiline's crime seems to have been a grand theme for both Cicero and Sallust, § 89. Nor easily, except in themes of this kind, would someone, by Petronius' counsel,

Nec excludam obiectis aesthetice grandibus, § 203, ea, quibus est magnitudo naturalis tantum, § 187, relative una ex maximis, etiamsi moraliter videantur indifferentia, si sistantur in dignitate, negativa quidem tantum, § 193, quam tamen summa cum diligentia tuearis, § 203. Ita Lucr. I. 720 grandia de Sicilia:

Nor shall I exclude from aesthetically grand objects, § 203, those things which have only natural magnitude, § 187, relatively one of the greatest, even if they seem morally indifferent, provided they are presented with dignity, indeed only negative dignity, § 193, which nevertheless you must guard with the greatest diligence, § 203. Thus Lucretius I.720 says grand things about Sicily:

An satis dignum, quando pergit:

Is it sufficiently dignified when he continues,

Equidem

For my part, intending to think grandly, I would not have added:

grandia cogitaturus non addidissem:

nor

cf. Aen. III. 571 sqq.

Compare Aeneid III.571 ff.

Nec excludam obiectis aesthetice grandibus, § 203, ea, quibus est magnitudo naturalis tantum, § 187, relative una ex maximis, etiamsi moraliter videantur indifferentia, si sistantur in dignitate, negativa quidem tantum, § 193, quam tamen summa cum diligentia tuearis, § 203. Ita Lucr. I. 720 grandia de Sicilia:

Nor shall I exclude from aesthetically grand objects, § 203, those things which have only natural magnitude, § 187, relatively one of the greatest, even if they seem morally indifferent, provided they are presented with dignity, indeed only negative dignity, § 193, which nevertheless you must guard with the greatest diligence, § 203. Thus Lucretius I.720 says grand things about Sicily:

An satis dignum, quando pergit:

Is it sufficiently dignified when he continues,

Equidem

For my part, intending to think grandly, I would not have added:

grandia cogitaturus non addidissem:

nor

cf. Aen. III. 571 sqq.

Compare Aeneid III.571 ff.

Interim in ipsis generice maximis, § 203, eminent, quibus ad magnitudinem naturalem et dignitatem negativam, quas ex maximis dixeris, accedat etiam dignitas aliqua positiva, § 193. Huc referrem, si Ciceronem ex animi sententia scripsisse putarem, de nat. deorum l. II. 166:

Meanwhile, among the generically greatest things themselves, § 203, those stand out to which, in addition to natural magnitude and negative dignity, which you would call among the greatest, there also accedes some positive dignity, § 193. Here I would refer, if I thought Cicero had written from the conviction of his mind, De natura deorum II.166:

167:

167:

168:

168:

Interim in ipsis generice maximis, § 203, eminent, quibus ad magnitudinem naturalem et dignitatem negativam, quas ex maximis dixeris, accedat etiam dignitas aliqua positiva, § 193. Huc referrem, si Ciceronem ex animi sententia scripsisse putarem, de nat. deorum l. II. 166:

Meanwhile, among the generically greatest things themselves, § 203, those stand out to which, in addition to natural magnitude and negative dignity, which you would call among the greatest, there also accedes some positive dignity, § 193. Here I would refer, if I thought Cicero had written from the conviction of his mind, De natura deorum II.166:

167:

167:

168:

168:

Sunt enim utique, quod Quintilianus habet, VIII. 3, alia aliis honestiora, sublimiora, e.c. sicut et magis minusve tenuia, § 202. Neque tenuitas, neque sublimitas heic consideranda est illa, quam intellectus forsan et ratio sola tandem in distincte, quantum fieri potest, repraesentatis detegat, §§ 15, 16, sed a minimis ad maxima observabilium et pulcre sistendorum elegans per analogon rationis, non sine dignitate, paullatim exsurgens complexus materiarum omnis, dividatur in partes aequales tres. Infima erit aesthetice tenuis, suprema aesthetice sublimis, quaevis suos iterum gradus et magnitudinis et dignitatis comprehensa. § 203.

For there are certainly, as Quintilian has it, VIII.3, "some things more honorable, more sublime than others," etc., just as there are things more or less slender, § 202. Neither slenderness nor sublimity is to be considered here as that which perhaps intellect and reason alone finally detect in things represented distinctly, as far as possible, §§ 15, 16. Rather, the whole complex of materials, elegantly and gradually rising through the analogue of reason from the least to the greatest of things observable and to be beautifully presented, not without dignity, should be divided into three equal parts. The lowest will be aesthetically slender, the highest aesthetically sublime, each again containing its own degrees of magnitude and dignity. § 203.

Sunt enim utique, quod Quintilianus habet, VIII. 3, alia aliis honestiora, sublimiora, e.c. sicut et magis minusve tenuia, § 202. Neque tenuitas, neque sublimitas heic consideranda est illa, quam intellectus forsan et ratio sola tandem in distincte, quantum fieri potest, repraesentatis detegat, §§ 15, 16, sed a minimis ad maxima observabilium et pulcre sistendorum elegans per analogon rationis, non sine dignitate, paullatim exsurgens complexus materiarum omnis, dividatur in partes aequales tres.

For there are certainly, as Quintilian has it, VIII.3, "some things more honorable, more sublime than others," etc., just as there are things more or less slender, § 202. Neither slenderness nor sublimity is to be considered here as that which perhaps intellect and reason alone finally detect in things represented distinctly, as far as possible, §§ 15, 16. Rather, the whole complex of materials, elegantly and gradually rising through the analogue of reason from the least to the greatest of things observable and to be beautifully presented, not without dignity, should be divided into three equal parts.

Infima erit aesthetice tenuis, suprema aesthetice sublimis, quaevis suos iterum gradus et magnitudinis et dignitatis comprehensa. § 203.

The lowest will be aesthetically slender, the highest aesthetically sublime, each again containing its own degrees of magnitude and dignity. § 203.

III. Arbusta, mediam inter tenuia et sublimia § 207 partem occupantia, materiae mediocres, interiectae, intermediae; et quasi temperatae, vicinae tenui sublimique, utriusque participes, vel, utriusque, si verum quaerimus, potius expertes. Cic. Huc e.g. Pamphili descriptio apud Ter. Andr. I. 1:

III. Shrubs, occupying the middle part between slender and sublime things, § 207, are middling materials, interposed, intermediate, and, as it were, tempered; neighboring the slender and the sublime, partakers of both, or, if we seek the truth, rather lacking both. Cicero. Here belongs, for example, the description of Pamphilus in Terence, Andria I.1:

e.c.

etc.

III. Arbusta, mediam inter tenuia et sublimia § 207 partem occupantia, materiae mediocres, interiectae, intermediae; et quasi temperatae, vicinae tenui sublimique, utriusque participes, vel, utriusque, si verum quaerimus, potius expertes.

III. Shrubs, occupying the middle part between slender and sublime things, § 207, are middling materials, interposed, intermediate, and, as it were, tempered; neighboring the slender and the sublime, partakers of both, or, if we seek the truth, rather lacking both.

Cic. Huc e.g. Pamphili descriptio apud Ter. Andr. I. 1:

Cicero. Here belongs, for example, the description of Pamphilus in Terence, Andria I.1:

e.c.

etc.

Longinus videtur magnum, § 177, etiam relative tale, § 203, et in magnis eiusmodi maximum confundere, quando:

Longinus seems to confuse the great, § 177, even what is relatively such, § 203, and the greatest among such great things, when he says,

ait, S. VII, exemplaque adducit generatim honores et dignitates, et quae habent

Section VII; and he adduces as examples generally honors and dignities, and things that have

caussam inserens, quia sapienti nequeant videri bona eximia, quorum contemtus sit aureae mediocritatis, quaeque contemnentes, quando ea habere possunt, magis admiramur, quam iisdem fruentes, § 207. Quando porro characterem bonorum sublimium exhibet, si sint

inserting as the reason that to the wise person those things cannot seem exceptional goods whose contempt belongs to golden mediocrity, and that we admire those who despise them, when they can have them, more than those who enjoy them, § 207. When further he exhibits the character of sublime goods, if they are

quaeritur an huic maiori quicquam unquam certo subsumi possit. Si possit, erit illud sane non magnum, sed maximum, e.g. quando S. VIII poscit,

it is asked whether anything can ever with certainty be subsumed under this higher class. If it can, that will surely not be great, but greatest; for example, when in Section VIII he demands

confer Senecam citatum, § 203.

Compare Seneca cited at § 203.

Longinus videtur magnum, § 177, etiam relative tale, § 203, et in magnis eiusmodi maximum confundere, quando:

Longinus seems to confuse the great, § 177, even what is relatively such, § 203, and the greatest among such great things, when he says,

ait, S. VII, exemplaque adducit generatim honores et dignitates, et quae habent

Section VII; and he adduces as examples generally honors and dignities, and things that have

caussam inserens, quia sapienti nequeant videri bona eximia, quorum contemtus sit aureae mediocritatis, quaeque contemnentes, quando ea habere possunt, magis admiramur, quam iisdem fruentes, § 207. Quando porro characterem bonorum sublimium exhibet, si sint

inserting as the reason that to the wise person those things cannot seem exceptional goods whose contempt belongs to golden mediocrity, and that we admire those who despise them, when they can have them, more than those who enjoy them, § 207. When further he exhibits the character of sublime goods, if they are

quaeritur an huic maiori quicquam unquam certo subsumi possit.

it is asked whether anything can ever with certainty be subsumed under this higher class.

Si possit, erit illud sane non magnum, sed maximum, e.g. quando S. VIII poscit,

If it can, that will surely not be great, but greatest; for example, when in Section VIII he demands

confer Senecam citatum, § 203.

Compare Seneca cited at § 203.

Recte Longinus S. VIII sublime, § 203, distinguit a pathetico, quia quaedam

Longinus rightly distinguishes the sublime, § 203, from the pathetic in Section VIII, because certain

Sen. et esse sublime potest sine perturbationibus animi, § 205, fidenter tamen simul affirmans, nihil tam magnificum esse, quam affectum vehementem, ubi opus est. § 206. In quaestione, quam multis expendit, S. XXXXIII sqq., an praestet magnitudo (relativam intellige sublimitatem, § 203) inter quaedam, quae peccent, mediocribus, per omnia sanis et vitio carentibus, § 208, habebit omnino sibi affirmanti facilem in assentiendo philosophum aestheticum, si sublimitas et eam ambientia recte cogitanda sint adeo pulcra, ut subductis macularum adhaerentium summis, priorum tamen aggregatum pulcrius ac venustius sit residuum, ac mediocre quoddam aliud thema sic cogitatum, ut etiamsi non appareant eius gradui pulcritudinis subtrahendae maculae, tamen aggregatum pulcre cogitandorum de eodem infra priorem summam subsistat. Addamus ob sublimitatem sociam multa, quae in mediocribus, § 208, non viderentur solum, sed et essent maculae, nec has quidem esse, sed tantum videri, vere exceptiones non inelegantes, § 25.

Seneca; and the sublime can exist without disturbances of the soul, § 205. Yet at the same time he confidently affirms that nothing is so magnificent as vehement affect when it is needed, § 206. In the question which he discusses at length, Section XXXXIII ff., whether magnitude – understand relative sublimity, § 203 – among things that have certain faults surpasses mediocre things wholly sound and free of fault, § 208, the aesthetic philosopher will certainly assent easily to him when he affirms it, provided that the sublimity and the things surrounding it to be rightly thought are so beautiful that, after the sums of adhering stains have been subtracted, the remaining aggregate of the former is still more beautiful and charming than some other mediocre theme thought in such a way that, even if no stains to be subtracted from its degree of beauty appear, nevertheless the aggregate of things to be beautifully thought about it stands below the former sum. Let us add that, because of accompanying sublimity, many things which in mediocre matters, § 208, would not only seem to be stains but would be stains, are not even stains here, but only seem so: truly not inelegant exceptions, § 25.

Recte Longinus S. VIII sublime, § 203, distinguit a pathetico, quia quaedam

Longinus rightly distinguishes the sublime, § 203, from the pathetic in Section VIII, because certain

Sen. et esse sublime potest sine perturbationibus animi, § 205, fidenter tamen simul affirmans, nihil tam magnificum esse, quam affectum vehementem, ubi opus est. § 206. In quaestione, quam multis expendit, S. XXXXIII sqq., an praestet magnitudo (relativam intellige sublimitatem, § 203) inter quaedam, quae peccent, mediocribus, per omnia sanis et vitio carentibus, § 208, habebit omnino sibi affirmanti facilem in assentiendo philosophum aestheticum, si sublimitas et eam ambientia recte cogitanda sint adeo pulcra, ut subductis macularum adhaerentium summis, priorum tamen aggregatum pulcrius ac venustius sit residuum, ac mediocre quoddam aliud thema sic cogitatum, ut etiamsi non appareant eius gradui pulcritudinis subtrahendae maculae, tamen aggregatum pulcre cogitandorum de eodem infra priorem summam subsistat.

Seneca; and the sublime can exist without disturbances of the soul, § 205. Yet at the same time he confidently affirms that nothing is so magnificent as vehement affect when it is needed, § 206. In the question which he discusses at length, Section XXXXIII ff., whether magnitude – understand relative sublimity, § 203 – among things that have certain faults surpasses mediocre things wholly sound and free of fault, § 208, the aesthetic philosopher will certainly assent easily to him when he affirms it, provided that the sublimity and the things surrounding it to be rightly thought are so beautiful that, after the sums of adhering stains have been subtracted, the remaining aggregate of the former is still more beautiful and charming than some other mediocre theme thought in such a way that, even if no stains to be subtracted from its degree of beauty appear, nevertheless the aggregate of things to be beautifully thought about it stands below the former sum.

Addamus ob sublimitatem sociam multa, quae in mediocribus, § 208, non viderentur solum, sed et essent maculae, nec has quidem esse, sed tantum videri, vere exceptiones non inelegantes, § 25.

Let us add that, because of accompanying sublimity, many things which in mediocre matters, § 208, would not only seem to be stains but would be stains, are not even stains here, but only seem so: truly not inelegant exceptions, § 25.

Virtutem bonosque mores heic tantum consideramus, quatenus phaenomena fiunt, aut per commercium hominum externamque vivendi rationem observantur, non exclusis ipsis virtutum umbris, § 45. quarum discrimen a vera virtute, non nisi per intellectum ac rationem detegeretur, §§ 15, 16. Unde patebit cultus externi divini, morum, rituum, cerimoniarum ac consuetudinum, perspicaciae declaratae, disciplinae corporis comioris, curae status externi, officiorum humanitatis generatim et praesertim decori, tam positivi, quam negativi, nonnihil aliam esse rationem ad ethica graviora, ac solet intelligi a meditante vitae praecepta beatae, quantum eius fieri potest, per puram rationem, E. §§ 110–383. e.c.

Virtue and good morals are considered here only insofar as they become phenomena, or are observed through the commerce of human beings and the external manner of living; the very shadows of virtues, § 45, are not excluded, whose difference from true virtue would be detected only through intellect and reason, §§ 15, 16. From this it will be evident that external divine worship, morals, rites, ceremonies and customs, declared perspicacity, the discipline of a more courteous body, care of external status, duties of humanity generally and especially of decorum, both positive and negative, have a somewhat different relation to the weightier ethical matters than is usually understood by one meditating, through pure reason as far as this can be done, on the precepts of the blessed life, Ethics §§ 110–383, etc.

Virtutem bonosque mores heic tantum consideramus, quatenus phaenomena fiunt, aut per commercium hominum externamque vivendi rationem observantur, non exclusis ipsis virtutum umbris, § 45. quarum discrimen a vera virtute, non nisi per intellectum ac rationem detegeretur, §§ 15, 16. Unde patebit cultus externi divini, morum, rituum, cerimoniarum ac consuetudinum, perspicaciae declaratae, disciplinae corporis comioris, curae status externi, officiorum humanitatis generatim et praesertim decori, tam positivi, quam negativi, nonnihil aliam esse rationem ad ethica graviora, ac solet intelligi a meditante vitae praecepta beatae, quantum eius fieri potest, per puram rationem, E. §§ 110–383. e.c.

Virtue and good morals are considered here only insofar as they become phenomena, or are observed through the commerce of human beings and the external manner of living; the very shadows of virtues, § 45, are not excluded, whose difference from true virtue would be detected only through intellect and reason, §§ 15, 16. From this it will be evident that external divine worship, morals, rites, ceremonies and customs, declared perspicacity, the discipline of a more courteous body, care of external status, duties of humanity generally and especially of decorum, both positive and negative, have a somewhat different relation to the weightier ethical matters than is usually understood by one meditating, through pure reason as far as this can be done, on the precepts of the blessed life, Ethics §§ 110–383, etc.