Aesthetica

Genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum vel thema habet propius, quid agendum, vel omittendum sit, enuncians, vel minus. Hoc est theoreticum, illud practicum. Practicum denuo vel habet thema commendandum, paraeneticum, vel dissuadendum, elencticum. Quemadmodum Ciceronis et rhetorica et philosophica scripta sunt exempla generis cogitandi aestheticodogmatici, ita officia praesertim practici; Lucretius est exemplum cogitandi generis aestheticotheoretici. Saturae elenctici. In his Iuvenalis, quam omnino ficta promittat exempla, mavult experiri,

The aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking either has a theme more nearly declaring what is to be done, or omitted, or it has this less nearly. This is theoretical; that is practical. The practical kind again either has a theme to be recommended, paraenetic, or to be dissuaded from, elenctic. Just as both the rhetorical and philosophical writings of Cicero are examples of the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking, so the Offices especially are examples of the practical kind; Lucretius is an example of the aestheticotheoretical kind of thinking. Satires are examples of the elenctic kind. Among these, Juvenal, although he promises wholly fictive examples, prefers to test

Genus cogitandi aestheticodogmaticum vel thema habet propius, quid agendum, vel omittendum sit, enuncians, vel minus.

The aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking either has a theme more nearly declaring what is to be done, or omitted, or it has this less nearly.

Hoc est theoreticum, illud practicum.

This is theoretical; that is practical.

Practicum denuo vel habet thema commendandum, paraeneticum, vel dissuadendum, elencticum.

The practical kind again either has a theme to be recommended, paraenetic, or to be dissuaded from, elenctic.

Quemadmodum Ciceronis et rhetorica et philosophica scripta sunt exempla generis cogitandi aestheticodogmatici, ita officia praesertim practici; Lucretius est exemplum cogitandi generis aestheticotheoretici.

Just as both the rhetorical and philosophical writings of Cicero are examples of the aestheticodogmatic kind of thinking, so the Offices especially are examples of the practical kind; Lucretius is an example of the aestheticotheoretical kind of thinking.

Saturae elenctici.

Satires are examples of the elenctic kind.

In his Iuvenalis, quam omnino ficta promittat exempla, mavult experiri,

Among these, Juvenal, although he promises wholly fictive examples, prefers to test

Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis cuiuscunque generis, § 576. 7) si vel maxime complete certo cognoscenda tractet, tamen nunc non adscendet ultra verisimilitudinem aliquam, quam dicemus dogmaticam, qua dogma non quidem complete certum redditur, neque tamen ulla in eodem falsitas, repugnantia interna, vel contradictio cum complete certis, aut hoc saltim dogmate certioribus, nulla incohaerentia cum principiis, unde deducendum foret, aut cum inde derivandis consectariis totalis, e. c. nec intellectu, nec ratione, nec rationis analogo, quantae hae facultates in praecipuis obiectis personalibus supponendae sunt, appercipiatur. § 483.

The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters of whatever kind, § 576, 7) if it treats things to be known, even in the highest degree, with complete certainty, nevertheless it will not now ascend beyond a certain verisimilitude, which we shall call dogmatic, by which a dogma is indeed not rendered completely certain, and yet no falsity in the same, no internal repugnance, or contradiction with completely certain things, or at least with things more certain than this dogma, no incoherence with the principles from which it would have to be deduced, or with the consequences to be derived from it, a total incoherence, and so on. May it be perceived neither by the understanding, nor by reason, nor by the analogue of reason, to the degree that these faculties are to be supposed in the principal personal objects. § 483.

Studium veritatis in aestheticodogmaticis cuiuscunque generis, § 576. 7) si vel maxime complete certo cognoscenda tractet, tamen nunc non adscendet ultra verisimilitudinem aliquam, quam dicemus dogmaticam, qua dogma non quidem complete certum redditur, neque tamen ulla in eodem falsitas, repugnantia interna, vel contradictio cum complete certis, aut hoc saltim dogmate certioribus, nulla incohaerentia cum principiis, unde deducendum foret, aut cum inde derivandis consectariis totalis, e. c. nec intellectu, nec ratione, nec rationis analogo, quantae hae facultates in praecipuis obiectis personalibus supponendae sunt, appercipiatur. § 483.

The study of truth in aestheticodogmatic matters of whatever kind, § 576, 7) if it treats things to be known, even in the highest degree, with complete certainty, nevertheless it will not now ascend beyond a certain verisimilitude, which we shall call dogmatic, by which a dogma is indeed not rendered completely certain, and yet no falsity in the same, no internal repugnance, or contradiction with completely certain things, or at least with things more certain than this dogma, no incoherence with the principles from which it would have to be deduced, or with the consequences to be derived from it, a total incoherence, and so on. May it be perceived neither by the understanding, nor by reason, nor by the analogue of reason, to the degree that these faculties are to be supposed in the principal personal objects. § 483.

Nam definitiones statim, quando non exasciantur ad logicae artis severas regulas, aut in descriptiones iterum pulcras affabre resolvuntur, propositiones generales si enthymematice omissis iudiciis intuitivis, ex quibus formatae sunt, tamen exhibentur, ut experientiae, non axiomata solum et postulata secundaria miscentur primariis, sed et theoremata multa et problemata indemonstrabilium instar sumuntur, aut probantur saltibus logice illegitimis, etiamsi pulcris, formis crypticis, de quibus convincendus non sit complete certus, interim elegantibus et oratoriis, scholia si regnant, et plurimum absorbent loci: quid aliud ex tali meditatione, si vel maxime complete certum thema habeat, nunc prodibit, nisi dogmatica verisimilitudo? § 577.

For definitions at once, when they are not hewn to the severe rules of the logical art, or are again artfully resolved into beautiful descriptions, if general propositions, after the intuitive judgments from which they have been formed have been omitted enthymematically, are nevertheless exhibited as experiences, not only are secondary axioms and postulates mixed with primary ones, but also many theorems and problems are taken after the fashion of indemonstrable things, or are proved by leaps logically illegitimate, although beautiful, by cryptic forms, about which the one to be convinced is not completely certain, meanwhile elegant and oratorical, if scholia rule, and absorb most of the place: what else will now come forth from such a meditation, even if it has a theme in the highest degree completely certain, except dogmatic verisimilitude? § 577.

Nam definitiones statim, quando non exasciantur ad logicae artis severas regulas, aut in descriptiones iterum pulcras affabre resolvuntur, propositiones generales si enthymematice omissis iudiciis intuitivis, ex quibus formatae sunt, tamen exhibentur, ut experientiae, non axiomata solum et postulata secundaria miscentur primariis, sed et theoremata multa et problemata indemonstrabilium instar sumuntur, aut probantur saltibus logice illegitimis, etiamsi pulcris, formis crypticis, de quibus convincendus non sit complete certus, interim elegantibus et oratoriis, scholia si regnant, et plurimum absorbent loci: quid aliud ex tali meditatione, si vel maxime complete certum thema habeat, nunc prodibit, nisi dogmatica verisimilitudo? § 577.

For definitions at once, when they are not hewn to the severe rules of the logical art, or are again artfully resolved into beautiful descriptions, if general propositions, after the intuitive judgments from which they have been formed have been omitted enthymematically, are nevertheless exhibited as experiences, not only are secondary axioms and postulates mixed with primary ones, but also many theorems and problems are taken after the fashion of indemonstrable things, or are proved by leaps logically illegitimate, although beautiful, by cryptic forms, about which the one to be convinced is not completely certain, meanwhile elegant and oratorical, if scholia rule, and absorb most of the place: what else will now come forth from such a meditation, even if it has a theme in the highest degree completely certain, except dogmatic verisimilitude? § 577.

Si locus permitteret, uberius ex historia philosophica posset ostendi confusionem huius dogmata cogitandi generis et accurate logici ac intellectualis § 568. fontem esse, ex quo 1) philosophi et omnes paene reliqui eruditi tot per saecula soliditate et certitudine superati sint a mathematicis, quibus sua suis exponendo semper verum fuit intellectum et rationem praesertim instruere, non promittendo solum, sed et praestando. 2) Platonis, haec duo cogitandi genera semper combinantis, ne dicam confundentis, discipuli, in tantam lapsi sunt incertitudinem, exceptis Aristotelicis, quorum praeceptor acroamaticis suis scriptis ostendit, quantum intersit inter logice verum, et aesthetice verisimile, si philosophemur. 3) Aeternae dogmaticorum scepticorumque, et nunc his, nunc illis viciniorum, lites. § 9.

If space permitted, it could be shown more abundantly from philosophical history that the confusion of this dogmas kind of thinking and of the accurately logical and intellectual kind, § 568, is the source, from which 1) philosophers and almost all the remaining learned people, through so many centuries, have been surpassed in solidity and certainty by mathematicians, for whom, in setting forth their own things to their own people, it was always true especially to instruct understanding and reason, not only by promising, but also by performing. 2) The disciples of Plato, who was always combining these two kinds of thinking, not to say confusing them, fell into so great an uncertainty, the Aristotelians excepted, whose teacher in his acroamatic writings showed, how much difference there is between the logically true and the aesthetically verisimilar, if we philosophize. 3) The eternal quarrels of dogmatists and skeptics, and of those now nearer to these, now nearer to those. § 9.

Si locus permitteret, uberius ex historia philosophica posset ostendi confusionem huius dogmata cogitandi generis et accurate logici ac intellectualis § 568. fontem esse, ex quo 1) philosophi et omnes paene reliqui eruditi tot per saecula soliditate et certitudine superati sint a mathematicis, quibus sua suis exponendo semper verum fuit intellectum et rationem praesertim instruere, non promittendo solum, sed et praestando. 2) Platonis, haec duo cogitandi genera semper combinantis, ne dicam confundentis, discipuli, in tantam lapsi sunt incertitudinem, exceptis Aristotelicis, quorum praeceptor acroamaticis suis scriptis ostendit, quantum intersit inter logice verum, et aesthetice verisimile, si philosophemur. 3) Aeternae dogmaticorum scepticorumque, et nunc his, nunc illis viciniorum, lites. § 9.

If space permitted, it could be shown more abundantly from philosophical history that the confusion of this dogmas kind of thinking and of the accurately logical and intellectual kind, § 568, is the source, from which 1) philosophers and almost all the remaining learned people, through so many centuries, have been surpassed in solidity and certainty by mathematicians, for whom, in setting forth their own things to their own people, it was always true especially to instruct understanding and reason, not only by promising, but also by performing. 2) The disciples of Plato, who was always combining these two kinds of thinking, not to say confusing them, fell into so great an uncertainty, the Aristotelians excepted, whose teacher in his acroamatic writings showed, how much difference there is between the logically true and the aesthetically verisimilar, if we philosophize. 3) The eternal quarrels of dogmatists and skeptics, and of those now nearer to these, now nearer to those. § 9.

Studium veritatis aestheticum absolutum § XXXIIII. se comparative exseret in summo suo gradu perfectionis etiam materialis maxime curiosum in genere cogitandi aesthetico historico, § 466, cuius 1) genus maxime ordinarium est, res facti, singularia praeterita, describens, 2) non negligendum, aesthetico statum animi praesentem exprimens, 3) non ita crebro, saepius tamen, ac videtur, observandum futura praevidens. Medium, si dicas empiricum, tertium manticum cogitandi genus: genus cogitandi aestheticohistoricum erit vel strictius historicum, vel empiricum, vel manticum.

The absolute aesthetic study of truth, Section XXXIV, will exert itself comparatively in its highest degree of perfection, even material perfection, as most curious in the aesthetico-historical kind of thinking, § 466, of which 1) the most ordinary kind is the one describing matters of fact, past singulars, 2) a not-to-be-neglected one, aesthetically expressing the present state of the mind, 3) a not so frequent one, yet more often to be observed than it seems, foreseeing future things. If you call the middle kind of thinking empirical, the third mantic: the aestheticohistorical kind of thinking will be either more strictly historical, or empirical, or mantic.

Studium veritatis aestheticum absolutum § XXXIIII. se comparative exseret in summo suo gradu perfectionis etiam materialis maxime curiosum in genere cogitandi aesthetico historico, § 466, cuius 1) genus maxime ordinarium est, res facti, singularia praeterita, describens, 2) non negligendum, aesthetico statum animi praesentem exprimens, 3) non ita crebro, saepius tamen, ac videtur, observandum futura praevidens.

The absolute aesthetic study of truth, Section XXXIV, will exert itself comparatively in its highest degree of perfection, even material perfection, as most curious in the aesthetico-historical kind of thinking, § 466, of which 1) the most ordinary kind is the one describing matters of fact, past singulars, 2) a not-to-be-neglected one, aesthetically expressing the present state of the mind, 3) a not so frequent one, yet more often to be observed than it seems, foreseeing future things.

Medium, si dicas empiricum, tertium manticum cogitandi genus: genus cogitandi aestheticohistoricum erit vel strictius historicum, vel empiricum, vel manticum.

If you call the middle kind of thinking empirical, the third mantic: the aestheticohistorical kind of thinking will be either more strictly historical, or empirical, or mantic.

Exempla primi sunt generis eleganter cogitandi, de quo § 580, clari scriptores, quibus veteris populi Romani prospera vel adversa memorata sunt, secundi tum epistolae non ita paucae, quas Cicero, et Plinius de rebus ad se pertinentibus tunc, quum eae fierent, perscripserunt, tum carmina inter amandum dolendumve scripta de amore vel tristitia,

Examples of the first kind of elegant thinking, concerning which see § 580, are the famous writers by whom the prosperous or adverse affairs of the ancient Roman people have been recorded, of the second kind, then, are not a few letters which Cicero and Pliny wrote in detail about matters concerning themselves at the time when those things were happening, and also poems written amid loving or grieving, about love or sadness,

e. c.

etc.

Exempla primi sunt generis eleganter cogitandi, de quo § 580, clari scriptores, quibus veteris populi Romani prospera vel adversa memorata sunt, secundi tum epistolae non ita paucae, quas Cicero, et Plinius de rebus ad se pertinentibus tunc, quum eae fierent, perscripserunt, tum carmina inter amandum dolendumve scripta de amore vel tristitia,

Examples of the first kind of elegant thinking, concerning which see § 580, are the famous writers by whom the prosperous or adverse affairs of the ancient Roman people have been recorded, of the second kind, then, are not a few letters which Cicero and Pliny wrote in detail about matters concerning themselves at the time when those things were happening, and also poems written amid loving or grieving, about love or sadness,

e. c.

etc.

Cogitandi genus aestheticomanticum nolim in solis vaticiniis veris fictisve quaeri, e. g. ecl. Virg. IIII. sed praestat illud intermixtum aliis observare, quoties in futura dirigendus ex praesentibus, vel praeteritis, vel omnino generalibus est, citra divinationem etiam omnem extraordinariam, animus. e. g.

I would not want the aestheticomantic kind of thinking to be sought only in true or fictive prophecies, for example Virgil's fourth eclogue. but it is better to observe it intermixed with other things, as often as the mind is to be directed toward future things from present things, or past things, or things wholly general, even without any extraordinary divination. For example:

Virg.

Virgil.

Hor. I. od. 7.

Horace, Book I, Ode 7.

Cogitandi genus aestheticomanticum nolim in solis vaticiniis veris fictisve quaeri, e. g. ecl. Virg. IIII. sed praestat illud intermixtum aliis observare, quoties in futura dirigendus ex praesentibus, vel praeteritis, vel omnino generalibus est, citra divinationem etiam omnem extraordinariam, animus. e. g.

I would not want the aestheticomantic kind of thinking to be sought only in true or fictive prophecies, for example Virgil's fourth eclogue. but it is better to observe it intermixed with other things, as often as the mind is to be directed toward future things from present things, or past things, or things wholly general, even without any extraordinary divination. For example:

Virg.

Virgil.

Hor. I. od. 7.

Horace, Book I, Ode 7.

Genus pulcre cogitandi strictius historicum, et in aestheticis tam empiricum, quam manticum, differunt 1) a logica et critica severiori cura historici, saltim bene praeliminari, qua per memoriam et iudicium intellectuale, multumque rationis usum suam sibi materiem ex magna traditionum, rumorum, famae, calumniarum, fictionum, fabularum e. c. farragine seligit, ante, quam eleganti, quae placuerunt, contexat iucundae narrationis tela, 2) a logica experimentatorum et observatorum veri nominis inter philosophos sollicitudine, qua rem sensam iudiciis intuitivis et experientiis stricte dictis ita sistunt intellectui, ut vitium subreptionis pro virili caveatur, et enthymematice omissae maiores, opiniones praeconceptae: 2) a logica et rationali providentia, qua politicus e. g. futurum suae reipublicae statum, quasi ex aliqua specula, metitur.

The more strictly historical kind of thinking beautifully, and in aesthetic matters both the empirical and the mantic kind, differ 1) from the more severe logical and critical care of the historian, at least when it has been well preliminarily prepared, by which, through memory and intellectual judgment, and much use of reason, he selects for himself his material from the great jumble of traditions, rumors, report, slanders, fictions, fables, and so on, before he weaves the things that have pleased him into the elegant webs of agreeable narration, 2) from the logical solicitude of experimenters and observers truly so called among philosophers, by which they so present the sensed thing to the understanding through intuitive judgments and experiences strictly so called, so that, so far as possible, the fault of surreption is guarded against, as are major premises omitted enthymematically and preconceived opinions: 2) from the logical and rational foresight by which, for example, the statesman measures the future condition of his republic, as if from some watchtower.

Genus pulcre cogitandi strictius historicum, et in aestheticis tam empiricum, quam manticum, differunt 1) a logica et critica severiori cura historici, saltim bene praeliminari, qua per memoriam et iudicium intellectuale, multumque rationis usum suam sibi materiem ex magna traditionum, rumorum, famae, calumniarum, fictionum, fabularum e. c. farragine seligit, ante, quam eleganti, quae placuerunt, contexat iucundae narrationis tela, 2) a logica experimentatorum et observatorum veri nominis inter philosophos sollicitudine, qua rem sensam iudiciis intuitivis et experientiis stricte dictis ita sistunt intellectui, ut vitium subreptionis pro virili caveatur, et enthymematice omissae maiores, opiniones praeconceptae: 2) a logica et rationali providentia, qua politicus e. g. futurum suae reipublicae statum, quasi ex aliqua specula, metitur.

The more strictly historical kind of thinking beautifully, and in aesthetic matters both the empirical and the mantic kind, differ 1) from the more severe logical and critical care of the historian, at least when it has been well preliminarily prepared, by which, through memory and intellectual judgment, and much use of reason, he selects for himself his material from the great jumble of traditions, rumors, report, slanders, fictions, fables, and so on, before he weaves the things that have pleased him into the elegant webs of agreeable narration, 2) from the logical solicitude of experimenters and observers truly so called among philosophers, by which they so present the sensed thing to the understanding through intuitive judgments and experiences strictly so called, so that, so far as possible, the fault of surreption is guarded against, as are major premises omitted enthymematically and preconceived opinions: 2) from the logical and rational foresight by which, for example, the statesman measures the future condition of his republic, as if from some watchtower.

Studium hoc veri in aestheticohistoricis, quoniam maximam partem inferioribus animi facultatibus exercetur, § 583, non fictionibus solum latius dictis, § 505, indiget, sed in meditationibus etiam paululum extendendis interferet complete certo a se cognitis, ut strictissime vera, tum generalia minus certa, tum singularia, quae num vere sint huius universi possibilia, complete convictum non est. § 507. Hinc neque hoc veri studium assurget ultra verisimilitudinem, § 483, neque tamen qualemcunque sataget attingere, sed sicut in interspersis suis generalibus dogmaticam, § 577, amplectetur, sic in ideis strictissime dictam, § 530, ne strictius quidem dictas fictiones historicas omnes refugientem, § 509, tamen et in his aversam ab omnibus, quae falsitatis moralis, levis partium studii, credulitatisve iure possent accusari, et poeticarum omnium fictionum, et utopiam et mundos, praeter hunc, optimos, quoties historica fide suas cogitationes obligat. § 566.

This study of truth in aestheticohistorical matters, since for the greatest part it is exercised by the lower faculties of the soul, § 583, needs not only fictions more broadly so called, § 505, but in meditations even to be extended a little it will also insert among things known by it with complete certainty as true in the strictest sense, both general things less certain, and singular things concerning which it has not been completely convinced whether they are truly possible in this universe. § 507. Hence this study of truth will not rise beyond verisimilitude, § 483, and yet it will not strive to attain just any sort whatever, but just as in its interspersed general things it will embrace dogmatic verisimilitude, § 577, so in ideas it will embrace verisimilitude most strictly so called, § 530, not even fleeing all historical fictions more strictly so called, § 509, yet even in these averse from all things that could rightly be accused of moral falsity, slight party-zeal, or credulity, and all poetic fictions, and utopia and worlds, besides this one, the best, whenever it binds its thoughts by historical faith. § 566.

Studium hoc veri in aestheticohistoricis, quoniam maximam partem inferioribus animi facultatibus exercetur, § 583, non fictionibus solum latius dictis, § 505, indiget, sed in meditationibus etiam paululum extendendis interferet complete certo a se cognitis, ut strictissime vera, tum generalia minus certa, tum singularia, quae num vere sint huius universi possibilia, complete convictum non est. § 507. Hinc neque hoc veri studium assurget ultra verisimilitudinem, § 483, neque tamen qualemcunque sataget attingere, sed sicut in interspersis suis generalibus dogmaticam, § 577, amplectetur, sic in ideis strictissime dictam, § 530, ne strictius quidem dictas fictiones historicas omnes refugientem, § 509, tamen et in his aversam ab omnibus, quae falsitatis moralis, levis partium studii, credulitatisve iure possent accusari, et poeticarum omnium fictionum, et utopiam et mundos, praeter hunc, optimos, quoties historica fide suas cogitationes obligat. § 566.

This study of truth in aestheticohistorical matters, since for the greatest part it is exercised by the lower faculties of the soul, § 583, needs not only fictions more broadly so called, § 505, but in meditations even to be extended a little it will also insert among things known by it with complete certainty as true in the strictest sense, both general things less certain, and singular things concerning which it has not been completely convinced whether they are truly possible in this universe. § 507. Hence this study of truth will not rise beyond verisimilitude, § 483, and yet it will not strive to attain just any sort whatever, but just as in its interspersed general things it will embrace dogmatic verisimilitude, § 577, so in ideas it will embrace verisimilitude most strictly so called, § 530, not even fleeing all historical fictions more strictly so called, § 509, yet even in these averse from all things that could rightly be accused of moral falsity, slight party-zeal, or credulity, and all poetic fictions, and utopia and worlds, besides this one, the best, whenever it binds its thoughts by historical faith. § 566.

Sectio XXXVI. Studium veri poeticum. Aestheticum veri studium absolutum, § XXXIIII, in aliis iam indicatis rationibus potest moveri ad genus cogitandi poeticum, § 566, quando 1) venustae plenitudini requisitorum non satis historia porrigit, et aperte mavult vir bonus hinc mentiri copiam pulcriorem excogitans, quam callide fidem historicam corrumpere. 2) Quando plus dignitatis, vel etiam maiestatis dabunt, ficta exempla heterocosmica, quam historica, semper aliquid humani passa, quod supprimere saepe permittit ne strictissime quidem dicta verisimilitudo, § 584. 3) Quando moralis plus veritatis, characterum, loci, temporis maior unitas sperari potest, et observabilior ac, ut ita dicam, contractior nexus, ex heterocosmicis, quam ex rebus in hoc universo propter rationes superiores distractioribus, aut propter imbecillitatem humanam inconstantioribus. 4) Quando ob anticipationes suorum potiorum in spectatoribus sperare potest notius ipsis heterocosmicum fore, quam eventum huius mundi, sed in parte eiusdem his admodum incognita situm. Sunt in mundo fabularum milesiarum, aut fabellarum aesopicarum satis versati multi hospites in historicis. 5) Quando fictionibus faciliorem fidem sperat, quam strictissime veris. Hoc non ita raro posse sperari fidem invenies apud eos, qui noverint, quoties, quot hominibus opus sit dicere: non putaram, 6) quando veritas strictissime dicta praevidetur alia omnia, quam eam habitura vitam, quae potissimum intenditur. § 561.

Section XXXVI. The poetic study of truth. The absolute aesthetic study of truth, Section XXXIV, in other already indicated respects can be moved toward the poetic kind of thinking, § 566, when 1) history does not provide enough for the graceful fullness of requisites, and the good man openly prefers from this point to lie, devising a more beautiful abundance, rather than cunningly corrupt historical faith. 2) When fictive heterocosmic examples will give more dignity, or even majesty, than historical ones, which always have suffered something human, which not even verisimilitude in the strictest sense often permits to be suppressed, § 584. 3) When more moral truth, a greater unity of characters, place, and time can be hoped for, and a more observable and, so to speak, more contracted connection from heterocosmic things, than from things in this universe, more scattered on account of higher reasons, or more inconstant on account of human weakness. 4) When on account of anticipations of his more important things in the spectators he can hope that the heterocosmic will be better known to them, than an event of this world, but one situated in a part of the same quite unknown to them. Many who are guests in historical matters are sufficiently versed in the world of Milesian tales or Aesopic little fables. 5) When he hopes for easier belief for fictions than for things true in the strictest sense. You will find that this faith can be hoped for not so rarely among those who have known how often, to how many people, it is necessary to say: I had not thought it, 6) when truth in the strictest sense is foreseen to be going to have any life other than that which is chiefly intended. § 561.

Sectio XXXVI. Studium veri poeticum.

Section XXXVI. The poetic study of truth.

Aestheticum veri studium absolutum, § XXXIIII, in aliis iam indicatis rationibus potest moveri ad genus cogitandi poeticum, § 566, quando 1) venustae plenitudini requisitorum non satis historia porrigit, et aperte mavult vir bonus hinc mentiri copiam pulcriorem excogitans, quam callide fidem historicam corrumpere. 2) Quando plus dignitatis, vel etiam maiestatis dabunt, ficta exempla heterocosmica, quam historica, semper aliquid humani passa, quod supprimere saepe permittit ne strictissime quidem dicta verisimilitudo, § 584. 3) Quando moralis plus veritatis, characterum, loci, temporis maior unitas sperari potest, et observabilior ac, ut ita dicam, contractior nexus, ex heterocosmicis, quam ex rebus in hoc universo propter rationes superiores distractioribus, aut propter imbecillitatem humanam inconstantioribus. 4) Quando ob anticipationes suorum potiorum in spectatoribus sperare potest notius ipsis heterocosmicum fore, quam eventum huius mundi, sed in parte eiusdem his admodum incognita situm.

The absolute aesthetic study of truth, Section XXXIV, in other already indicated respects can be moved toward the poetic kind of thinking, § 566, when 1) history does not provide enough for the graceful fullness of requisites, and the good man openly prefers from this point to lie, devising a more beautiful abundance, rather than cunningly corrupt historical faith. 2) When fictive heterocosmic examples will give more dignity, or even majesty, than historical ones, which always have suffered something human, which not even verisimilitude in the strictest sense often permits to be suppressed, § 584. 3) When more moral truth, a greater unity of characters, place, and time can be hoped for, and a more observable and, so to speak, more contracted connection from heterocosmic things, than from things in this universe, more scattered on account of higher reasons, or more inconstant on account of human weakness. 4) When on account of anticipations of his more important things in the spectators he can hope that the heterocosmic will be better known to them, than an event of this world, but one situated in a part of the same quite unknown to them.

Sunt in mundo fabularum milesiarum, aut fabellarum aesopicarum satis versati multi hospites in historicis. 5) Quando fictionibus faciliorem fidem sperat, quam strictissime veris.

Many who are guests in historical matters are sufficiently versed in the world of Milesian tales or Aesopic little fables. 5) When he hopes for easier belief for fictions than for things true in the strictest sense.

Hoc non ita raro posse sperari fidem invenies apud eos, qui noverint, quoties, quot hominibus opus sit dicere: non putaram, 6) quando veritas strictissime dicta praevidetur alia omnia, quam eam habitura vitam, quae potissimum intenditur. § 561.

You will find that this faith can be hoped for not so rarely among those who have known how often, to how many people, it is necessary to say: I had not thought it, 6) when truth in the strictest sense is foreseen to be going to have any life other than that which is chiefly intended. § 561.