§ 826
7) Utile est, si fieri potest, in tractandis ostendere, sed sine iactantia, multa superesse nondum culta novalia; prae se ferentem plus sollicitudinis, quid ex tot novis potissimum eligat, quam unde nonnihil novi possit corradere. Hinc denuo colligas, quam necessaria venustis ingeniis pulcra sit eruditio, § 65. qua noverint terras in republica litteraria cognitas et incognitas, ac harum et terminos inter se, et incognitarum sensim colenda latifundia. 8) Aut vere tractata a paucis sibi obiecta legere, saltim non temere post Homerum Iliada, Aeneida post Virgilium scribere, aut consilii erit mox audituris declarare, cur ea, quae videantur exhausta, pro nunc et sic, et his circumstantibus, in quibus nunc versemur, vere non sint, § 820. sed largum et novum nonnihil post messem promittant spicilegium, e. c.
7) It is useful, if it can be done, in treating matters to show, but without boasting, that many fallow fields not yet cultivated remain; displaying more anxiety about what especially to choose from so many new things than about where he can scrape together something new. From this again you may gather how necessary beautiful erudition is for graceful talents, §65, by which they know the known and unknown lands in the republic of letters, both the boundaries among these and the broad estates of the unknown gradually to be cultivated. 8) It will be counsel either to choose objects truly treated by few, at least not rashly to write an Iliad after Homer or an Aeneid after Virgil, or soon to declare to those about to hear why things that seem exhausted, for now and in this way and in these circumstances in which we now are, are truly not exhausted, §820, but promise some generous and new gleaning after the harvest, and so forth.
7) Utile est, si fieri potest, in tractandis ostendere, sed sine iactantia, multa superesse nondum culta novalia; prae se ferentem plus sollicitudinis, quid ex tot novis potissimum eligat, quam unde nonnihil novi possit corradere.
7) It is useful, if it can be done, in treating matters to show, but without boasting, that many fallow fields not yet cultivated remain; displaying more anxiety about what especially to choose from so many new things than about where he can scrape together something new.
Hinc denuo colligas, quam necessaria venustis ingeniis pulcra sit eruditio, § 65. qua noverint terras in republica litteraria cognitas et incognitas, ac harum et terminos inter se, et incognitarum sensim colenda latifundia. 8) Aut vere tractata a paucis sibi obiecta legere, saltim non temere post Homerum Iliada, Aeneida post Virgilium scribere, aut consilii erit mox audituris declarare, cur ea, quae videantur exhausta, pro nunc et sic, et his circumstantibus, in quibus nunc versemur, vere non sint, § 820. sed largum et novum nonnihil post messem promittant spicilegium, e. c.
From this again you may gather how necessary beautiful erudition is for graceful talents, §65, by which they know the known and unknown lands in the republic of letters, both the boundaries among these and the broad estates of the unknown gradually to be cultivated. 8) It will be counsel either to choose objects truly treated by few, at least not rashly to write an Iliad after Homer or an Aeneid after Virgil, or soon to declare to those about to hear why things that seem exhausted, for now and in this way and in these circumstances in which we now are, are truly not exhausted, §820, but promise some generous and new gleaning after the harvest, and so forth.
7) Utile est, si fieri potest,
7) It is useful, if it can be done,
in tractandis ostendere, sed sine iactantia,
in treating matters to show, but without boasting,
multa superesse nondum culta novalia;
that many fallow fields not yet cultivated remain;
prae se ferentem plus sollicitudinis, quid ex
displaying more anxiety about what especially to choose from
tot novis potissimum eligat, quam unde nonnihil novi possit
so many new things than about where he can
corradere.
scrape together something new.
Hinc denuo colligas, quam necessaria venustis
From this again you may gather how necessary
ingeniis pulcra sit eruditio, § 65.
beautiful erudition is for graceful talents, §65,
qua noverint terras in republica litteraria cognitas et
by which they know the known and
incognitas, ac
unknown lands in the republic of letters,
harum et terminos inter se, et incognitarum
both the boundaries among these and the broad estates
sensim colenda latifundia.
of the unknown gradually to be cultivated.
8) Aut vere tractata a paucis sibi obiecta legere,
8) It will be counsel either to choose objects truly
saltim non temere post Homerum Iliada,
treated by few, at least not rashly to write an Iliad
Aeneida post Virgilium scribere,
after Homer or an Aeneid after Virgil,
aut consilii erit mox audituris declarare, cur ea,
or soon to declare to those about
quae videantur exhausta,
to hear why things that seem exhausted,
pro nunc et sic, et his circumstantibus,
for now and in this way and in these circumstances
in quibus nunc versemur, vere non sint, § 820.
in which we now are, are truly not exhausted, §820,
sed largum et novum nonnihil post messem promittant spicilegium, e.
but promise some generous and new gleaning after the harvest, and so
c.
forth.
7) Utile est, si fieri potest, in tractandis ostendere, sed sine iactantia, multa superesse nondum culta novalia; prae se ferentem plus sollicitudinis, quid ex tot novis potissimum eligat, quam unde nonnihil novi possit corradere. / 7) It is useful, if it can be done, in treating matters to show, but without boasting, that many fallow fields not yet cultivated remain; displaying more anxiety about what especially to choose from so many new things than about where he can scrape together something new.
Hinc denuo colligas, quam necessaria venustis ingeniis pulcra sit eruditio, § 65. qua noverint terras in republica litteraria cognitas et incognitas, ac harum et terminos inter se, et incognitarum sensim colenda latifundia. 8) Aut vere tractata a paucis sibi obiecta legere, saltim non temere post Homerum Iliada, Aeneida post Virgilium scribere, aut consilii erit mox audituris declarare, cur ea, quae videantur exhausta, pro nunc et sic, et his circumstantibus, in quibus nunc versemur, vere non sint, § 820. sed largum et novum nonnihil post messem promittant spicilegium, e. c. / From this again you may gather how necessary beautiful erudition is for graceful talents, §65, by which they know the known and unknown lands in the republic of letters, both the boundaries among these and the broad estates of the unknown gradually to be cultivated. 8) It will be counsel either to choose objects truly treated by few, at least not rashly to write an Iliad after Homer or an Aeneid after Virgil, or soon to declare to those about to hear why things that seem exhausted, for now and in this way and in these circumstances in which we now are, are truly not exhausted, §820, but promise some generous and new gleaning after the harvest, and so forth.
§ 827
Optimum tandem novitatis impetrandae consilium erit iis, qui uti eodem poterunt: 9) Quae dives vena de cogitando, sibi iam probe perspecto, § 639. didicit olim et ipsa secum est meditata, veluti provisionaliter, nunc potius ipsa secundum naturales pulcritudinis regulas cogitet, disponat, exprimat, quam ut caecus imitator sequatur archetypon, § 714, 715. Tunc enim, non inepta, quae fiat aliquibus minorum gentium ingeniis exemplar et originale, naturalem suum, sibi proprium, genium sequens, solis aeternis venustatum legibus restrictum, caetera liberum,
The best counsel for obtaining novelty will finally belong to those who can use it: 9) what a rich vein concerning thought, already well examined by itself, §639, once learned and meditated with itself, as if provisionally, let it now rather think, arrange, and express according to natural rules of beauty, than follow an archetype as a blind imitator, §§714–715. Then, following its own natural, proper genius, not an inept one that becomes an example and original for some talents of lesser nations, restricted only by the eternal laws of graces and otherwise free, it
non imitabitur arum,
Unde referre pedem vetet aut pudor, aut operis lex,
"nor by imitating throw yourself into straits, whence either shame or the rules of your work may forbid you to retreat."
naturae potius in omnibus et subiectis et obiectis nonnihil diversae non coacto, non affectato, ingenio novitatem, velut aliud agendo, sine anxia sollicitudine, quantum satis est, impetrabit, § 823. Non vitae humanae picturas iam arte factas, non exempla saeculi cuiusdam pristini iam expressa nescio cuius penicillo potissimum, sed ipsam rerum naturam, suique, quod vivit, saeculi
Rather, in all subjects and objects, by nature somewhat different, by a genius not forced and not affected, it will obtain novelty enough, as if doing something else, without anxious solicitude, §823.
Respícere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo
Doctum imitatorem, ac veras hinc ducere voces,
I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life.
§ 613. quae non esse simul non poterunt novae, quoniam scena saeculi mutatur assidue, dum
§613, which cannot fail also to be new, since the scene of the age changes constantly, while
Nil sub sole novi est.
"there is no new thing under the sun."
§ 813.
§813.
Optimum tandem novitatis impetrandae consilium erit iis, qui uti eodem poterunt: 9) Quae dives vena de cogitando, sibi iam probe perspecto, § 639. didicit olim et ipsa secum est meditata, veluti provisionaliter, nunc potius ipsa secundum naturales pulcritudinis regulas cogitet, disponat, exprimat, quam ut caecus imitator sequatur archetypon, § 714, 715. Tunc enim, non inepta, quae fiat aliquibus minorum gentium ingeniis exemplar et originale, naturalem suum, sibi proprium, genium sequens, solis aeternis venustatum legibus restrictum, caetera liberum,
The best counsel for obtaining novelty will finally belong to those who can use it: 9) what a rich vein concerning thought, already well examined by itself, §639, once learned and meditated with itself, as if provisionally, let it now rather think, arrange, and express according to natural rules of beauty, than follow an archetype as a blind imitator, §§714–715. Then, following its own natural, proper genius, not an inept one that becomes an example and original for some talents of lesser nations, restricted only by the eternal laws of graces and otherwise free, it
non imitabitur arum,
Unde referre pedem vetet aut pudor, aut operis lex,
"nor by imitating throw yourself into straits, whence either shame or the rules of your work may forbid you to retreat."
naturae potius in omnibus et subiectis et obiectis nonnihil diversae non coacto, non affectato, ingenio novitatem, velut aliud agendo, sine anxia sollicitudine, quantum satis est, impetrabit, § 823. Non vitae humanae picturas iam arte factas, non exempla saeculi cuiusdam pristini iam expressa nescio cuius penicillo potissimum, sed ipsam rerum naturam, suique, quod vivit, saeculi
Rather, in all subjects and objects, by nature somewhat different, by a genius not forced and not affected, it will obtain novelty enough, as if doing something else, without anxious solicitude, §823.
Respícere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo
Doctum imitatorem, ac veras hinc ducere voces,
I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life.
§ 613. quae non esse simul non poterunt novae, quoniam scena saeculi mutatur assidue, dum
§613, which cannot fail also to be new, since the scene of the age changes constantly, while
Nil sub sole novi est.
"there is no new thing under the sun."
§ 813.
§813.
Optimum tandem novitatis impetrandae consilium erit iis,
The best counsel for obtaining novelty will finally belong
qui uti eodem poterunt:
to those who can use it:
9) Quae dives vena de cogitando,
9) what a rich vein concerning thought,
sibi iam probe perspecto, § 639.
already well examined by itself, §639,
didicit olim et ipsa secum est meditata,
once learned and meditated with itself,
veluti provisionaliter, nunc potius ipsa
as if provisionally, let it now rather think, arrange,
secundum naturales pulcritudinis regulas cogitet, disponat,
and express according to natural rules of beauty,
exprimat, quam ut caecus imitator sequatur
than follow an archetype as a blind imitator, §§714–715.
archetypon, § 714, 715. Tunc enim, non inepta,
Then, following its own natural, proper genius, not an inept
quae fiat aliquibus minorum gentium ingeniis exemplar et originale,
one that becomes an example and original
naturalem suum, sibi proprium, genium sequens,
for some talents of lesser nations, restricted only by
solis aeternis venustatum legibus restrictum, caetera liberum,
the eternal laws of graces and otherwise free, it
non imitabitur arum,
Unde referre pedem vetet aut pudor, aut operis lex,
"nor by imitating throw yourself into straits, whence either shame or the rules of your work may forbid you to retreat."
naturae potius in omnibus et subiectis et obiectis
Rather, in all subjects and objects,
nonnihil diversae non coacto, non affectato, ingenio novitatem,
by nature somewhat different,
velut aliud agendo, sine anxia sollicitudine, quantum satis est, impetrabit, § 823.
by a genius
Non vitae humanae picturas iam arte factas, non exempla
not forced and not affected,
saeculi cuiusdam pristini iam expressa nescio cuius penicillo potissimum,
it will obtain novelty enough, as if doing something
sed ipsam rerum naturam, suique, quod vivit, saeculi
else, without anxious solicitude, §823.
Respícere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo
Doctum imitatorem, ac veras hinc ducere voces,
I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life.
§ 613. quae non esse simul non poterunt
§613, which cannot fail also to be new,
novae, quoniam scena saeculi mutatur assidue, dum
since the scene of the age changes constantly, while
Nil sub sole novi est.
"there is no new thing under the sun."
§ 813.
§813.
Optimum tandem novitatis impetrandae consilium erit iis, qui uti eodem poterunt: 9) Quae dives vena de cogitando, sibi iam probe perspecto, § 639. didicit olim et ipsa secum est meditata, veluti provisionaliter, nunc potius ipsa secundum naturales pulcritudinis regulas cogitet, disponat, exprimat, quam ut caecus imitator sequatur archetypon, § 714, 715. Tunc enim, non inepta, quae fiat aliquibus minorum gentium ingeniis exemplar et originale, naturalem suum, sibi proprium, genium sequens, solis aeternis venustatum legibus restrictum, caetera liberum, / The best counsel for obtaining novelty will finally belong to those who can use it: 9) what a rich vein concerning thought, already well examined by itself, §639, once learned and meditated with itself, as if provisionally, let it now rather think, arrange, and express according to natural rules of beauty, than follow an archetype as a blind imitator, §§714–715. Then, following its own natural, proper genius, not an inept one that becomes an example and original for some talents of lesser nations, restricted only by the eternal laws of graces and otherwise free, it
non imitabitur arum,
Unde referre pedem vetet aut pudor, aut operis lex,
"nor by imitating throw yourself into straits, whence either shame or the rules of your work may forbid you to retreat."
naturae potius in omnibus et subiectis et obiectis nonnihil diversae non coacto, non affectato, ingenio novitatem, velut aliud agendo, sine anxia sollicitudine, quantum satis est, impetrabit, § 823. Non vitae humanae picturas iam arte factas, non exempla saeculi cuiusdam pristini iam expressa nescio cuius penicillo potissimum, sed ipsam rerum naturam, suique, quod vivit, saeculi / Rather, in all subjects and objects, by nature somewhat different, by a genius not forced and not affected, it will obtain novelty enough, as if doing something else, without anxious solicitude, §823.
Respícere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo
Doctum imitatorem, ac veras hinc ducere voces,
I should direct the learned imitator to have a regard to the mode of nature and manners, and thence draw his expressions to the life.
§ 613. quae non esse simul non poterunt novae, quoniam scena saeculi mutatur assidue, dum / §613, which cannot fail also to be new, since the scene of the age changes constantly, while
Nil sub sole novi est.
"there is no new thing under the sun."
§ 813. / §813.
§ 828
Novitatis post procurationem altera thaumaturgiae cura sit spectatorum vel auditorum curiositas, § 808. quam obtinebunt argumenta ad eandem moventia, de quibus supra, § 22, 26. Quibus duobus positis orietur admiratio, quam primum antiqua forsan in tuis meditationibus occurrant, neque tamen obsoleta videantur, et nova non tantum symbolice cognoscantur audianturve talia, sed etiam obiecta tua personalia intueantur illa, ut talia, M. § 620. Hinc denuo colligas, quam utilis ad naturalem pulcritudinem sit penitior cognitio sui obiecti personalis primarii, quoniam, quae sunt uni hominum admirabilia maxime, non possunt eadem alterius etiam semper et certo ferre secum admirationem. § 679–681.
After procuring novelty, the second care of thaumaturgy should be the curiosity of spectators or hearers, §808, which arguments moving it will obtain, about which above, §§22, 26. Once these two are posited, admiration will arise as soon as perhaps ancient things occur in your meditations and nevertheless do not seem obsolete, and new things are not only symbolically known or heard as such, but your personal objects also intuit them as such, Metaphysics §620. Hence again you may gather how useful for natural beauty is a deeper knowledge of one's primary personal object, because the things that are most admirable to one person cannot always and certainly carry admiration for another too, §§679–681.
Novitatis post procurationem altera thaumaturgiae cura sit spectatorum vel auditorum curiositas, § 808. quam obtinebunt argumenta ad eandem moventia, de quibus supra, § 22, 26. Quibus duobus positis orietur admiratio, quam primum antiqua forsan in tuis meditationibus occurrant, neque tamen obsoleta videantur, et nova non tantum symbolice cognoscantur audianturve talia, sed etiam obiecta tua personalia intueantur illa, ut talia, M. § 620. Hinc denuo colligas, quam utilis ad naturalem pulcritudinem sit penitior cognitio sui obiecti personalis primarii, quoniam, quae sunt uni hominum admirabilia maxime, non possunt eadem alterius etiam semper et certo ferre secum admirationem. § 679–681.
After procuring novelty, the second care of thaumaturgy should be the curiosity of spectators or hearers, §808, which arguments moving it will obtain, about which above, §§22, 26. Once these two are posited, admiration will arise as soon as perhaps ancient things occur in your meditations and nevertheless do not seem obsolete, and new things are not only symbolically known or heard as such, but your personal objects also intuit them as such, Metaphysics §620. Hence again you may gather how useful for natural beauty is a deeper knowledge of one's primary personal object, because the things that are most admirable to one person cannot always and certainly carry admiration for another too, §§679–681.
Novitatis post procurationem altera thaumaturgiae
After procuring novelty, the second care of thaumaturgy
cura sit spectatorum vel auditorum curiositas, § 808.
should be the curiosity of spectators or hearers, §808,
quam obtinebunt argumenta ad eandem moventia, de quibus supra, § 22, 26.
which arguments moving it will obtain, about which above, §§22, 26.
Quibus duobus positis orietur admiratio,
Once these two are posited, admiration
quam primum antiqua forsan
will arise as soon as perhaps ancient things occur
in tuis meditationibus occurrant, neque tamen obsoleta
in your meditations and nevertheless do not seem obsolete,
videantur, et nova non tantum symbolice cognoscantur audianturve talia,
and new things are not only symbolically known or heard
sed etiam obiecta tua personalia intueantur illa,
as such, but your personal objects also intuit them
ut talia, M. § 620. Hinc denuo colligas,
as such, Metaphysics §620. Hence again you
quam utilis ad naturalem pulcritudinem sit penitior
may gather how useful for natural beauty is a
cognitio sui obiecti personalis primarii, quoniam, quae
deeper knowledge of one's primary personal object,
sunt uni hominum admirabilia maxime,
because the things that are most admirable
non possunt eadem alterius etiam semper et certo ferre secum admirationem.
to one person cannot always and certainly carry admiration
§ 679–681.
for another too, §§679–681.
Novitatis post procurationem altera thaumaturgiae cura sit spectatorum vel auditorum curiositas, § 808. quam obtinebunt argumenta ad eandem moventia, de quibus supra, § 22, 26. Quibus duobus positis orietur admiratio, quam primum antiqua forsan in tuis meditationibus occurrant, neque tamen obsoleta videantur, et nova non tantum symbolice cognoscantur audianturve talia, sed etiam obiecta tua personalia intueantur illa, ut talia, M. § 620. Hinc denuo colligas, quam utilis ad naturalem pulcritudinem sit penitior cognitio sui obiecti personalis primarii, quoniam, quae sunt uni hominum admirabilia maxime, non possunt eadem alterius etiam semper et certo ferre secum admirationem. § 679–681. / After procuring novelty, the second care of thaumaturgy should be the curiosity of spectators or hearers, §808, which arguments moving it will obtain, about which above, §§22, 26. Once these two are posited, admiration will arise as soon as perhaps ancient things occur in your meditations and nevertheless do not seem obsolete, and new things are not only symbolically known or heard as such, but your personal objects also intuit them as such, Metaphysics §620. Hence again you may gather how useful for natural beauty is a deeper knowledge of one's primary personal object, because the things that are most admirable to one person cannot always and certainly carry admiration for another too, §§679–681.
§ 829
SECTIO XXXXVIIII
PERSUASIO AESTHETICA
Praesentium cogitationum in primariis § 113, 177, 423, 614. quintam numeramus, § 22. certudinem sensitivam, analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis conscientiam et lucem, PERSUASIONEM, sed AESTHETICAM, § 22. M. § 531. Haec enim etiamsi nonnunquam simul impulsionem ad agendum et incitationem involvat: habet tamen et in theoreticis locum, et singula probe perpensuris cum fructu distinguetur a vita cognitionis in sequentibus animadvertenda, cuius est conditio antecedens persuasio, quae nonnunquam pro consequente ponitur, § 796.
SECTION XXXXVIIII
AESTHETIC PERSUASION
Among the primary matters of present thoughts, §§113, 177, 423, 614, we count as fifth, §22, sensory certitude, the consciousness and light of truth and verisimilitude also to be obtained by the analogue of reason: PERSUASION, but AESTHETIC persuasion, §22; Metaphysics §531. For although this sometimes also involves impulse to action and incitation, it nevertheless has place in theoretical matters too, and, for those weighing individual things well, it will fruitfully be distinguished from the life of cognition to be noticed in what follows, of which persuasion is the antecedent condition, sometimes put for the consequent, §796.
SECTIO XXXXVIIII
PERSUASIO AESTHETICA
Praesentium cogitationum in primariis § 113, 177, 423, 614. quintam numeramus, § 22. certudinem sensitivam, analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis conscientiam et lucem, PERSUASIONEM, sed AESTHETICAM, § 22. M. § 531. Haec enim etiamsi nonnunquam simul impulsionem ad agendum et incitationem involvat: habet tamen et in theoreticis locum, et singula probe perpensuris cum fructu distinguetur a vita cognitionis in sequentibus animadvertenda, cuius est conditio antecedens persuasio, quae nonnunquam pro consequente ponitur, § 796.
SECTION XXXXVIIII
AESTHETIC PERSUASION
Among the primary matters of present thoughts, §§113, 177, 423, 614, we count as fifth, §22, sensory certitude, the consciousness and light of truth and verisimilitude also to be obtained by the analogue of reason: PERSUASION, but AESTHETIC persuasion, §22; Metaphysics §531. For although this sometimes also involves impulse to action and incitation, it nevertheless has place in theoretical matters too, and, for those weighing individual things well, it will fruitfully be distinguished from the life of cognition to be noticed in what follows, of which persuasion is the antecedent condition, sometimes put for the consequent, §796.
SECTIO XXXXVIIII PERSUASIO AESTHETICA Praesentium cogitationum in primariis
SECTION XXXXVIIII AESTHETIC PERSUASION Among the primary
§ 113, 177, 423, 614.
matters of present thoughts, §§113, 177, 423, 614,
quintam numeramus, § 22. certudinem sensitivam,
we count as fifth, §22, sensory certitude, the
analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis
consciousness and light of truth and verisimilitude also to
conscientiam et lucem,
be obtained by the analogue of reason:
PERSUASIONEM, sed AESTHETICAM, § 22. M. § 531.
PERSUASION, but AESTHETIC persuasion, §22; Metaphysics §531.
Haec enim etiamsi nonnunquam simul impulsionem ad agendum et incitationem
For although this sometimes also involves impulse to action and incitation,
involvat: habet tamen et in theoreticis locum, et
it nevertheless has place in theoretical matters too, and,
singula probe
for those weighing individual things well,
perpensuris cum fructu distinguetur a vita
it will fruitfully be distinguished from the life of
cognitionis in sequentibus animadvertenda,
cognition to be noticed in what follows,
cuius est conditio antecedens persuasio,
of which persuasion is the antecedent condition, sometimes
quae nonnunquam pro consequente ponitur, § 796.
put for the consequent, §796.
SECTIO XXXXVIIII PERSUASIO AESTHETICA Praesentium cogitationum in primariis § 113, 177, 423, 614. quintam numeramus, § 22. certudinem sensitivam, analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis conscientiam et lucem, PERSUASIONEM, sed AESTHETICAM, § 22. M. § 531. Haec enim etiamsi nonnunquam simul impulsionem ad agendum et incitationem involvat: habet tamen et in theoreticis locum, et singula probe perpensuris cum fructu distinguetur a vita cognitionis in sequentibus animadvertenda, cuius est conditio antecedens persuasio, quae nonnunquam pro consequente ponitur, § 796. / SECTION XXXXVIIII AESTHETIC PERSUASION Among the primary matters of present thoughts, §§113, 177, 423, 614, we count as fifth, §22, sensory certitude, the consciousness and light of truth and verisimilitude also to be obtained by the analogue of reason: PERSUASION, but AESTHETIC persuasion, §22; Metaphysics §531. For although this sometimes also involves impulse to action and incitation, it nevertheless has place in theoretical matters too, and, for those weighing individual things well, it will fruitfully be distinguished from the life of cognition to be noticed in what follows, of which persuasion is the antecedent condition, sometimes put for the consequent, §796.
§ 830
Plato tantum apud Dionysium auctoritate potuit, valuitque eloquentia,
Plato had so much authority with Dionysius, and eloquence had such force,
ut persuaserit tyrannidis finem facere, libertatemque reddere Syracusanis.
Plato, however, had so much influence over Dionysius by his authority, and produced such an effect on him by his eloquence, that he persuaded him to put an end to his tyranny, and to restore liberty to the Syracusans;.
Persuasio aderat, § 829. quanquam Dionysius, ab hac voluntate deterritus Philisti consilio, aliquanto crudelior esse coepit. Corn. in Dione. Persuasionem aliqui nunc logici dicunt erroneam certitudinis opinionem, eum animi statum, quo nos certos per errorem putamus. Ex qua vocabulorum ambiguitate, sunt, qui sibi fenestram aperiunt, orationem ad persuadendum idoneam omnem lenociniis potius et fuco, § 688. quam veris accensendi venustatibus. Neque negandum est errore descripto laborantes persuasos non raro dici. Sic apud Ciceronem de nat. deorum I. 61. Cotta, ipse pontifex,
Persuasion was present, §829, although Dionysius, deterred from this will by Philistus' counsel, began to be somewhat crueler, Cornelius in Dion. Some logicians now call persuasion an erroneous opinion of certitude, that state of mind in which we think ourselves certain through error. From this ambiguity of words there are some who open a window for themselves to count every speech suitable for persuading among enticements and false coloring, §688, rather than among true graces to be kindled. Nor must it be denied that people laboring under the described error are not rarely called persuaded. Thus in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I.61, Cotta, himself a pontiff,
qui ceremonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitratur, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi sibi, non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velit.
I, who am a priest, and who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods, which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but proved to a demonstration;.
Pari ratione Virg.
In the same way Virgil:
Nec tibi iam prudens quisquam persuadeat auctor
Tellurem Borea rigidam spirante movere,
"Let none persuade thee, howso weighty-wise,
To stir the soil when stiff with Boreas' breath."
Georg. II. 316.
Georgics II.316. Cicero, De inventione II.37:
Si in anteacta vita aliquae turpitudines erunt: aut falso venisse in eam existimationem dicentur, aut ex aliquorum invidia, aut obtrectatione, aut falsa opinione, aut imprudentiae, necessitudini, persuasioni, adolescentiae; aut alicui non malitiosae animi affectioni tribuentur,
But if there have been any acts of baseness in his previous life, or if they be said to have undeservedly acquired such a reputation, or if his actions are to be attributed by the envy, or love of detraction, or mistaken opinion of some people, either to ignorance, or necessity, or to the persuasion of young men, or to any other affection of mind in which there is no vice,.
Cic. de Inv. II. 37. Heic etiam persuasioni sinistrum esse significatum quis negaverit?
Who would deny that here too persuasion has an unfavorable meaning?
Plato tantum apud Dionysium auctoritate potuit, valuitque eloquentia,
Plato had so much authority with Dionysius, and eloquence had such force,
ut persuaserit tyrannidis finem facere, libertatemque reddere Syracusanis.
Plato, however, had so much influence over Dionysius by his authority, and produced such an effect on him by his eloquence, that he persuaded him to put an end to his tyranny, and to restore liberty to the Syracusans;.
Persuasio aderat, § 829. quanquam Dionysius, ab hac voluntate deterritus Philisti consilio, aliquanto crudelior esse coepit.
Persuasion was present, §829, although Dionysius, deterred from this will by Philistus' counsel, began to be somewhat crueler, Cornelius in Dion.
Corn. in Dione. Persuasionem aliqui nunc logici dicunt erroneam certitudinis opinionem, eum animi statum, quo nos certos per errorem putamus.
Some logicians now call persuasion an erroneous opinion of certitude, that state of mind in which we think ourselves certain through error.
Ex qua vocabulorum ambiguitate, sunt, qui sibi fenestram aperiunt, orationem ad persuadendum idoneam omnem lenociniis potius et fuco, § 688. quam veris accensendi venustatibus.
From this ambiguity of words there are some who open a window for themselves to count every speech suitable for persuading among enticements and false coloring, §688, rather than among true graces to be kindled.
Neque negandum est errore descripto laborantes persuasos non raro dici. Sic apud Ciceronem de nat. deorum I. 61. Cotta, ipse pontifex,
Nor must it be denied that people laboring under the described error are not rarely called persuaded. Thus in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I.61, Cotta, himself a pontiff,
qui ceremonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitratur, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi sibi, non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velit.
I, who am a priest, and who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods, which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but proved to a demonstration;.
Pari ratione Virg.
In the same way Virgil:
Nec tibi iam prudens quisquam persuadeat auctor
Tellurem Borea rigidam spirante movere,
"Let none persuade thee, howso weighty-wise,
To stir the soil when stiff with Boreas' breath."
Georg.
Georgics II.316.
II. 316.
Cicero, De inventione II.37:
Si in anteacta vita aliquae turpitudines erunt: aut falso venisse in eam existimationem dicentur, aut ex aliquorum invidia, aut obtrectatione, aut falsa opinione, aut imprudentiae, necessitudini, persuasioni, adolescentiae; aut alicui non malitiosae animi affectioni tribuentur,
But if there have been any acts of baseness in his previous life, or if they be said to have undeservedly acquired such a reputation, or if his actions are to be attributed by the envy, or love of detraction, or mistaken opinion of some people, either to ignorance, or necessity, or to the persuasion of young men, or to any other affection of mind in which there is no vice,.
Cic. de Inv. II. 37. Heic etiam persuasioni sinistrum esse significatum quis negaverit?
Who would deny that here too persuasion has an unfavorable meaning?
Plato tantum apud Dionysium auctoritate potuit, valuitque eloquentia,
Plato had so much authority with Dionysius, and eloquence had such force,
ut persuaserit tyrannidis finem facere, libertatemque reddere Syracusanis.
Plato, however, had so much influence over Dionysius by his authority, and produced such an effect on him by his eloquence, that he persuaded him to put an end to his tyranny, and to restore liberty to the Syracusans;.
Persuasio aderat, § 829. quanquam Dionysius,
Persuasion was present, §829, although Dionysius,
ab hac voluntate deterritus Philisti consilio,
deterred from this will by Philistus' counsel,
aliquanto crudelior esse coepit.
began to be somewhat crueler, Cornelius in Dion.
Corn. in Dione. Persuasionem aliqui nunc logici dicunt
Some logicians now call persuasion an
erroneam certitudinis opinionem, eum animi statum,
erroneous opinion of certitude, that state
quo nos certos per errorem putamus.
of mind in which we think ourselves certain through error.
Ex qua vocabulorum ambiguitate, sunt,
From this ambiguity of words there are
qui sibi fenestram aperiunt,
some who open a window for
orationem ad persuadendum idoneam
themselves to count every speech suitable for persuading
omnem lenociniis potius et fuco, § 688.
among enticements and false coloring, §688,
quam veris accensendi venustatibus.
rather than among true graces to be kindled.
Neque negandum est errore descripto laborantes
Nor must it be denied that people laboring under
persuasos non raro dici. Sic
the described error are not rarely called persuaded.
apud Ciceronem de nat. deorum I. 61.
Thus in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods
Cotta, ipse pontifex,
I.61, Cotta, himself a pontiff,
qui ceremonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitratur, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi sibi, non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velit.
I, who am a priest, and who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods, which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but proved to a demonstration;.
Pari ratione Virg.
In the same way Virgil:
Nec tibi iam prudens quisquam persuadeat auctor
Tellurem Borea rigidam spirante movere,
"Let none persuade thee, howso weighty-wise,
To stir the soil when stiff with Boreas' breath."
Georg.
Georgics II.316.
II. 316.
Cicero, De inventione II.37:
Si in anteacta vita aliquae turpitudines erunt: aut falso venisse in eam existimationem dicentur, aut ex aliquorum invidia, aut obtrectatione, aut falsa opinione, aut imprudentiae, necessitudini, persuasioni, adolescentiae; aut alicui non malitiosae animi affectioni tribuentur,
But if there have been any acts of baseness in his previous life, or if they be said to have undeservedly acquired such a reputation, or if his actions are to be attributed by the envy, or love of detraction, or mistaken opinion of some people, either to ignorance, or necessity, or to the persuasion of young men, or to any other affection of mind in which there is no vice,.
Cic. de Inv. II. 37. Heic etiam persuasioni sinistrum
Who would deny that here too persuasion has
esse significatum quis negaverit?
an unfavorable meaning?
Plato tantum apud Dionysium auctoritate potuit, valuitque eloquentia, / Plato had so much authority with Dionysius, and eloquence had such force,
ut persuaserit tyrannidis finem facere, libertatemque reddere Syracusanis.
Plato, however, had so much influence over Dionysius by his authority, and produced such an effect on him by his eloquence, that he persuaded him to put an end to his tyranny, and to restore liberty to the Syracusans;.
Persuasio aderat, § 829. quanquam Dionysius, ab hac voluntate deterritus Philisti consilio, aliquanto crudelior esse coepit. / Persuasion was present, §829, although Dionysius, deterred from this will by Philistus' counsel, began to be somewhat crueler, Cornelius in Dion.
Corn. in Dione. Persuasionem aliqui nunc logici dicunt erroneam certitudinis opinionem, eum animi statum, quo nos certos per errorem putamus. / Some logicians now call persuasion an erroneous opinion of certitude, that state of mind in which we think ourselves certain through error.
Ex qua vocabulorum ambiguitate, sunt, qui sibi fenestram aperiunt, orationem ad persuadendum idoneam omnem lenociniis potius et fuco, § 688. quam veris accensendi venustatibus. / From this ambiguity of words there are some who open a window for themselves to count every speech suitable for persuading among enticements and false coloring, §688, rather than among true graces to be kindled.
Neque negandum est errore descripto laborantes persuasos non raro dici. Sic apud Ciceronem de nat. deorum I. 61. Cotta, ipse pontifex, / Nor must it be denied that people laboring under the described error are not rarely called persuaded. Thus in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I.61, Cotta, himself a pontiff,
qui ceremonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitratur, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi sibi, non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velit.
I, who am a priest, and who think that religions and ceremonies ought sacredly to be maintained, am certainly desirous to have the existence of the Gods, which is the principal point in debate, not only fixed in opinion, but proved to a demonstration;.
Pari ratione Virg. / In the same way Virgil:
Nec tibi iam prudens quisquam persuadeat auctor
Tellurem Borea rigidam spirante movere,
"Let none persuade thee, howso weighty-wise,
To stir the soil when stiff with Boreas' breath."
Georg. / Georgics II.316.
II. 316. / Cicero, De inventione II.37:
Si in anteacta vita aliquae turpitudines erunt: aut falso venisse in eam existimationem dicentur, aut ex aliquorum invidia, aut obtrectatione, aut falsa opinione, aut imprudentiae, necessitudini, persuasioni, adolescentiae; aut alicui non malitiosae animi affectioni tribuentur,
But if there have been any acts of baseness in his previous life, or if they be said to have undeservedly acquired such a reputation, or if his actions are to be attributed by the envy, or love of detraction, or mistaken opinion of some people, either to ignorance, or necessity, or to the persuasion of young men, or to any other affection of mind in which there is no vice,.
Cic. de Inv. II. 37. Heic etiam persuasioni sinistrum esse significatum quis negaverit? / Who would deny that here too persuasion has an unfavorable meaning?
§ 831
Idem tamen Cicero l. 6. officium oratoriae facultatis dicit, dicere apposite ad persuasionem, finem, dictione persuadere, illius nempe facultatis oratoriae, cui
Yet the same Cicero, book I.6, says that the office of the oratorical faculty is to speak suitably for persuasion, and its end to persuade by speaking, namely of that oratorical faculty for which
moderatrix omnium rerum praesto sit sapientia,
For it is from this source that the most numerous advantages accrue to the republic, if only it be accompanied by wisdom, that governor of all human affairs.,
4. sane non ferens scopum alterius errorem. Quis autem non videt hic Ciceronem in ultimo loco persuasionem veram intendere, qualis illa de qua Horatius Serm. I. 6. 8.
4, certainly not bearing another's error as its aim. Who does not see that here Cicero in the latter place intends true persuasion, such as that about which Horace, Satires I.6.8, says:
persuade hoc tibi vere,
Ante potestatem Tulli, atque ignobile regnum,
Multos saepe viros nullis maioribus ortos
Et vixisse probos, amplis et honoribus auctos.
"You persuade yourself, with truth, that before the dominions of Tullius, and the reign of one born a slave, frequently numbers of men descended from ancestors of no rank, have both lived as men of merit, and have been distinguished by the greatest honors:"
Idem tamen Cicero l. 6. officium oratoriae facultatis dicit, dicere apposite ad persuasionem, finem, dictione persuadere, illius nempe facultatis oratoriae, cui
Yet the same Cicero, book I.6, says that the office of the oratorical faculty is to speak suitably for persuasion, and its end to persuade by speaking, namely of that oratorical faculty for which
moderatrix omnium rerum praesto sit sapientia,
For it is from this source that the most numerous advantages accrue to the republic, if only it be accompanied by wisdom, that governor of all human affairs.,
4. sane non ferens scopum alterius errorem.
4, certainly not bearing another's error as its aim.
Quis autem non videt hic Ciceronem in ultimo loco persuasionem veram intendere, qualis illa de qua Horatius Serm. I. 6. 8.
Who does not see that here Cicero in the latter place intends true persuasion, such as that about which Horace, Satires I.6.8, says:
persuade hoc tibi vere,
Ante potestatem Tulli, atque ignobile regnum,
Multos saepe viros nullis maioribus ortos
Et vixisse probos, amplis et honoribus auctos.
"You persuade yourself, with truth, that before the dominions of Tullius, and the reign of one born a slave, frequently numbers of men descended from ancestors of no rank, have both lived as men of merit, and have been distinguished by the greatest honors:"
Idem tamen Cicero l. 6.
Yet the same Cicero, book I.6, says that
officium oratoriae facultatis dicit,
the office of the oratorical faculty is
dicere apposite ad persuasionem, finem, dictione persuadere,
to speak suitably for persuasion, and its end to persuade
illius nempe facultatis oratoriae, cui
by speaking, namely of that oratorical faculty for which
moderatrix omnium rerum praesto sit sapientia,
For it is from this source that the most numerous advantages accrue to the republic, if only it be accompanied by wisdom, that governor of all human affairs.,
4. sane non ferens scopum alterius errorem.
4, certainly not bearing another's error as its aim.
Quis autem non videt hic Ciceronem in ultimo
Who does not see that here Cicero in the
loco persuasionem veram intendere,
latter place intends true persuasion, such
qualis illa de qua Horatius Serm. I. 6. 8.
as that about which Horace, Satires I.6.8, says:
persuade hoc tibi vere,
Ante potestatem Tulli, atque ignobile regnum,
Multos saepe viros nullis maioribus ortos
Et vixisse probos, amplis et honoribus auctos.
"You persuade yourself, with truth, that before the dominions of Tullius, and the reign of one born a slave, frequently numbers of men descended from ancestors of no rank, have both lived as men of merit, and have been distinguished by the greatest honors:"
Idem tamen Cicero l. 6. officium oratoriae facultatis dicit, dicere apposite ad persuasionem, finem, dictione persuadere, illius nempe facultatis oratoriae, cui / Yet the same Cicero, book I.6, says that the office of the oratorical faculty is to speak suitably for persuasion, and its end to persuade by speaking, namely of that oratorical faculty for which
moderatrix omnium rerum praesto sit sapientia,
For it is from this source that the most numerous advantages accrue to the republic, if only it be accompanied by wisdom, that governor of all human affairs.,
4. sane non ferens scopum alterius errorem. / 4, certainly not bearing another's error as its aim.
Quis autem non videt hic Ciceronem in ultimo loco persuasionem veram intendere, qualis illa de qua Horatius Serm. I. 6. 8. / Who does not see that here Cicero in the latter place intends true persuasion, such as that about which Horace, Satires I.6.8, says:
persuade hoc tibi vere,
Ante potestatem Tulli, atque ignobile regnum,
Multos saepe viros nullis maioribus ortos
Et vixisse probos, amplis et honoribus auctos.
"You persuade yourself, with truth, that before the dominions of Tullius, and the reign of one born a slave, frequently numbers of men descended from ancestors of no rank, have both lived as men of merit, and have been distinguished by the greatest honors:"
§ 832
Quam autem in primo § 831. citato loco persuasionem adolescentiae vocaverat Cicero, huius exemplum Quintilianus habet II. 4. ex extemporali garrulitate derivans parentum imperitorum inane gaudium, adolescentibus autem
But the persuasion of youth which Cicero had named in the first passage cited in §831 has an example in Quintilian II.4, who derives from extemporaneous garrulity the empty joy of unskilled parents, but for adolescents
contemtum operis, inverecundam frontem, consuetudinem pessime dicendi, malarum exercitationem, et, quod magnos quoque profectus frequenter perdiderit, arrogantem de se persuasionem.
Such proceedings fill ignorant parents with senseless pride, while the boys themselves lose all respect for their work, adopt a conceited bearing, and acquire the habit of speaking in the worst style and actually practising their faults, while they develop an arrogant conviction of their own talents which often proves fatal even to the most genuine proficiency..
Neque melior est persuasio, de qua l. 1.
Nor is the persuasion better about which in book I he says:
Nihil, inquit, peius est iis, qui paullulum aliquid ultra primas litteras progressi falsam sibi scientiae persuasionem induerunt.
There are none worse than those, who as soon as they have progressed beyond a knowledge of the alphabet delude themselves into the belief that they are the possessors of real knowledge..
Habemus itaque facilem viam ambiguitatis tollendae. Conscientia veritatis distincta, convictio est; indistincta et sensitiva, persuasio. Haec indistincta veritatis conscientia est, quemadmodum omnis cognitio, vel vera, vera persuasio, § 831. vel falsa, falsa persuasio.
Therefore we have an easy way of removing the ambiguity. Distinct consciousness of truth is conviction; indistinct and sensory consciousness is persuasion. This indistinct consciousness of truth, like all cognition, is either true, true persuasion, §831, or false, false persuasion.
Quam autem in primo § 831. citato loco persuasionem adolescentiae vocaverat Cicero, huius exemplum Quintilianus habet II. 4. ex extemporali garrulitate derivans parentum imperitorum inane gaudium, adolescentibus autem
But the persuasion of youth which Cicero had named in the first passage cited in §831 has an example in Quintilian II.4, who derives from extemporaneous garrulity the empty joy of unskilled parents, but for adolescents
contemtum operis, inverecundam frontem, consuetudinem pessime dicendi, malarum exercitationem, et, quod magnos quoque profectus frequenter perdiderit, arrogantem de se persuasionem.
Such proceedings fill ignorant parents with senseless pride, while the boys themselves lose all respect for their work, adopt a conceited bearing, and acquire the habit of speaking in the worst style and actually practising their faults, while they develop an arrogant conviction of their own talents which often proves fatal even to the most genuine proficiency..
Neque melior est persuasio, de qua l. 1.
Nor is the persuasion better about which in book I he says:
Nihil, inquit, peius est iis, qui paullulum aliquid ultra primas litteras progressi falsam sibi scientiae persuasionem induerunt.
There are none worse than those, who as soon as they have progressed beyond a knowledge of the alphabet delude themselves into the belief that they are the possessors of real knowledge..
Habemus itaque facilem viam ambiguitatis tollendae.
Therefore we have an easy way of removing the ambiguity.
Conscientia veritatis distincta, convictio est; indistincta et sensitiva, persuasio.
Distinct consciousness of truth is conviction; indistinct and sensory consciousness is persuasion.
Haec indistincta veritatis conscientia est, quemadmodum omnis cognitio, vel vera, vera persuasio, § 831. vel falsa, falsa persuasio.
This indistinct consciousness of truth, like all cognition, is either true, true persuasion, §831, or false, false persuasion.
Quam autem
But the persuasion of youth which Cicero had named
in primo § 831.
in the first passage cited in §831
citato loco persuasionem adolescentiae vocaverat Cicero, huius exemplum Quintilianus habet II.
has an example in Quintilian II.4, who
4. ex extemporali garrulitate derivans parentum
derives from extemporaneous garrulity the empty joy of unskilled parents,
imperitorum inane gaudium, adolescentibus autem
but for adolescents
contemtum operis, inverecundam frontem, consuetudinem pessime dicendi, malarum exercitationem, et, quod magnos quoque profectus frequenter perdiderit, arrogantem de se persuasionem.
Such proceedings fill ignorant parents with senseless pride, while the boys themselves lose all respect for their work, adopt a conceited bearing, and acquire the habit of speaking in the worst style and actually practising their faults, while they develop an arrogant conviction of their own talents which often proves fatal even to the most genuine proficiency..
Neque melior est persuasio, de qua l.
Nor is the persuasion better about which in book I
1.
he says:
Nihil, inquit, peius est iis, qui paullulum aliquid ultra primas litteras progressi falsam sibi scientiae persuasionem induerunt.
There are none worse than those, who as soon as they have progressed beyond a knowledge of the alphabet delude themselves into the belief that they are the possessors of real knowledge..
Habemus itaque facilem viam ambiguitatis tollendae.
Therefore we have an easy way of removing the ambiguity.
Conscientia veritatis distincta, convictio est;
Distinct consciousness of truth is conviction;
indistincta et sensitiva, persuasio.
indistinct and sensory consciousness is persuasion.
Haec indistincta veritatis conscientia est, quemadmodum omnis cognitio,
This indistinct consciousness of truth, like all cognition,
vel vera, vera persuasio, § 831. vel falsa, falsa persuasio.
is either true, true persuasion, §831, or false, false persuasion.
Quam autem in primo § 831. citato loco persuasionem adolescentiae vocaverat Cicero, huius exemplum Quintilianus habet II. 4. ex extemporali garrulitate derivans parentum imperitorum inane gaudium, adolescentibus autem / But the persuasion of youth which Cicero had named in the first passage cited in §831 has an example in Quintilian II.4, who derives from extemporaneous garrulity the empty joy of unskilled parents, but for adolescents
contemtum operis, inverecundam frontem, consuetudinem pessime dicendi, malarum exercitationem, et, quod magnos quoque profectus frequenter perdiderit, arrogantem de se persuasionem.
Such proceedings fill ignorant parents with senseless pride, while the boys themselves lose all respect for their work, adopt a conceited bearing, and acquire the habit of speaking in the worst style and actually practising their faults, while they develop an arrogant conviction of their own talents which often proves fatal even to the most genuine proficiency..
Neque melior est persuasio, de qua l. 1. / Nor is the persuasion better about which in book I he says:
Nihil, inquit, peius est iis, qui paullulum aliquid ultra primas litteras progressi falsam sibi scientiae persuasionem induerunt.
There are none worse than those, who as soon as they have progressed beyond a knowledge of the alphabet delude themselves into the belief that they are the possessors of real knowledge..
Habemus itaque facilem viam ambiguitatis tollendae. / Therefore we have an easy way of removing the ambiguity.
Conscientia veritatis distincta, convictio est; indistincta et sensitiva, persuasio. / Distinct consciousness of truth is conviction; indistinct and sensory consciousness is persuasion.
Haec indistincta veritatis conscientia est, quemadmodum omnis cognitio, vel vera, vera persuasio, § 831. vel falsa, falsa persuasio. / This indistinct consciousness of truth, like all cognition, is either true, true persuasion, §831, or false, false persuasion.
§ 833
Persuasio generatim est phaenomenon animae, quo se veritatem appercipere putat, sicuti viator novam
Persuasion generally is a phenomenon of the soul by which it thinks that it apperceives truth, just as the traveler
videt, aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam.
"Beheld her near him through the murky gloom,
As when, in her young month and crescent pale,
One sees th' o'er-clouded moon, or thinks he sees."
De hac Quintilianus I. 2. quando negat
Quintilian I.2 speaks of this when he denies
esse dissimulandum, nonnullos esse, qui ab hoc prope publico more,
It would, however, be folly to shut our eyes to the fact that there are some who disagree with this preference for public education owing to a certain prejudice in favour of private tuition.
praeceptores publicos adeundi, privata persuasione dissentiant. Nunc enim ponit hanc persuasionem tantum, ut constantem usu et experientia. Dein demum examinaturus, an vera sit, an falsa, § 832. Quando vero per hoc examen scholas publicas vitantium
of going to public teachers. For now he posits this persuasion only as constant by use and experience. Only then, about to examine whether it is true or false, §832. But when through this examination he asserts that the minds of those avoiding public schools
haerere aut languescere mentem, aut quendam velut in opaco situm ducere, aut contra tumescere inani persuasione
His mind requires constant stimulus and excitement, whereas retirement such as has just been mentioned induces languor and the mind becomes mildewed like things that are left in the dark, or else flies to the opposite extreme and becomes puffed up with empty conceit;,
asserit, non persuasionis simpliciter, sed definite et accuratius inanis i. e. falsae persuasionis meminit, § 832.
he is not mentioning persuasion simply, but definitely and more accurately empty, that is, false persuasion, §832.
Persuasio generatim est phaenomenon animae, quo se veritatem appercipere putat, sicuti viator novam
Persuasion generally is a phenomenon of the soul by which it thinks that it apperceives truth, just as the traveler
videt, aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam.
"Beheld her near him through the murky gloom,
As when, in her young month and crescent pale,
One sees th' o'er-clouded moon, or thinks he sees."
De hac Quintilianus I. 2. quando negat
Quintilian I.2 speaks of this when he denies
esse dissimulandum, nonnullos esse, qui ab hoc prope publico more,
It would, however, be folly to shut our eyes to the fact that there are some who disagree with this preference for public education owing to a certain prejudice in favour of private tuition.
praeceptores publicos adeundi, privata persuasione dissentiant.
of going to public teachers.
Nunc enim ponit hanc persuasionem tantum, ut constantem usu et experientia.
For now he posits this persuasion only as constant by use and experience.
Dein demum examinaturus, an vera sit, an falsa, § 832. Quando vero per hoc examen scholas publicas vitantium
Only then, about to examine whether it is true or false, §832. But when through this examination he asserts that the minds of those avoiding public schools
haerere aut languescere mentem, aut quendam velut in opaco situm ducere, aut contra tumescere inani persuasione
His mind requires constant stimulus and excitement, whereas retirement such as has just been mentioned induces languor and the mind becomes mildewed like things that are left in the dark, or else flies to the opposite extreme and becomes puffed up with empty conceit;,
asserit, non persuasionis simpliciter, sed definite et accuratius inanis i. e. falsae persuasionis meminit, § 832.
he is not mentioning persuasion simply, but definitely and more accurately empty, that is, false persuasion, §832.
Persuasio generatim est phaenomenon animae,
Persuasion generally is a phenomenon of the
quo se veritatem appercipere putat,
soul by which it thinks that it apperceives truth,
sicuti viator novam
just as the traveler
videt, aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam.
"Beheld her near him through the murky gloom,
As when, in her young month and crescent pale,
One sees th' o'er-clouded moon, or thinks he sees."
De hac Quintilianus I. 2. quando negat
Quintilian I.2 speaks of this when he denies
esse dissimulandum, nonnullos esse, qui ab hoc prope publico more,
It would, however, be folly to shut our eyes to the fact that there are some who disagree with this preference for public education owing to a certain prejudice in favour of private tuition.
praeceptores publicos adeundi, privata persuasione dissentiant.
of going to public teachers.
Nunc enim ponit hanc persuasionem tantum,
For now he posits this persuasion only
ut constantem usu et experientia.
as constant by use and experience.
Dein demum examinaturus, an vera sit, an falsa, § 832.
Only then, about to examine whether it is true or false, §832.
Quando vero per hoc
But when through this examination he asserts that the
examen scholas publicas vitantium
minds of those avoiding public schools
haerere aut languescere mentem, aut quendam velut in opaco situm ducere, aut contra tumescere inani persuasione
His mind requires constant stimulus and excitement, whereas retirement such as has just been mentioned induces languor and the mind becomes mildewed like things that are left in the dark, or else flies to the opposite extreme and becomes puffed up with empty conceit;,
asserit, non persuasionis simpliciter,
he is not mentioning persuasion simply,
sed definite et accuratius inanis i. e. falsae persuasionis meminit, § 832.
but definitely and more accurately empty, that is, false persuasion, §832.
Persuasio generatim est phaenomenon animae, quo se veritatem appercipere putat, sicuti viator novam / Persuasion generally is a phenomenon of the soul by which it thinks that it apperceives truth, just as the traveler
videt, aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam.
"Beheld her near him through the murky gloom,
As when, in her young month and crescent pale,
One sees th' o'er-clouded moon, or thinks he sees."
De hac Quintilianus I. 2. quando negat / Quintilian I.2 speaks of this when he denies
esse dissimulandum, nonnullos esse, qui ab hoc prope publico more,
It would, however, be folly to shut our eyes to the fact that there are some who disagree with this preference for public education owing to a certain prejudice in favour of private tuition.
praeceptores publicos adeundi, privata persuasione dissentiant. / of going to public teachers.
Nunc enim ponit hanc persuasionem tantum, ut constantem usu et experientia. / For now he posits this persuasion only as constant by use and experience.
Dein demum examinaturus, an vera sit, an falsa, § 832. Quando vero per hoc examen scholas publicas vitantium / Only then, about to examine whether it is true or false, §832. But when through this examination he asserts that the minds of those avoiding public schools
haerere aut languescere mentem, aut quendam velut in opaco situm ducere, aut contra tumescere inani persuasione
His mind requires constant stimulus and excitement, whereas retirement such as has just been mentioned induces languor and the mind becomes mildewed like things that are left in the dark, or else flies to the opposite extreme and becomes puffed up with empty conceit;,
asserit, non persuasionis simpliciter, sed definite et accuratius inanis i. e. falsae persuasionis meminit, § 832. / he is not mentioning persuasion simply, but definitely and more accurately empty, that is, false persuasion, §832.
§ 834
Perlegenti Quintiliani II. 15. apparebit, quot controversias evitemus et ictus per latus rhetorices aestheticam etiam vel vim, vel scientiam, vel usum, vel artem petentes, exigua corporis declinatione, quando non generatim persuasionem, § 833. sed aestheticam a pulcre cogitaturis postulamus, § 829. nec hanc solam solius rhetorices finem, sed in finibus primariis omnium venustius cogitandorum constituimus, § 5. Nec rhetorica, nec eius mater aesthetica, pravitas quaedam artis est, i. e. κακοτεχνία, dum utraque sit opifex persuadendi, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, ac, si liceat cum Ennio canere,
To one reading Quintilian II.15 it will appear how many controversies we avoid, and how many blows, aimed through the side of rhetoric also at aesthetics as power, science, use, or art, we evade by a slight inclination of the body, when we require from those about to think beautifully not persuasion in general, §833, but aesthetic persuasion, §829; nor do we establish this alone as the sole end of rhetoric, but place it among the primary ends of all things to be thought more gracefully, §5. Neither rhetoric nor its mother aesthetics is some depravity of art, that is, κακοτεχνία, since each is a maker of persuading, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, and, if it is permitted to sing with Ennius,
Suadae medulla.
"the very marrow and quintessence of Persuasion."
Aesthetica, quam minus inadaequate, ac Plato rhetoricen, describas, nec, ut Plato, non artem, sed peritiam verum et peritiam, et artem quandam gratiae ac voluptatis, § 1. non qualemcunque persuasionem fabricatur, sed, quae se deceat, bonam, et vere elegantem, nec est, quam Athenaeus rhetoricen dicit, ars fallendi, § 830. Nec enim est, nec esse rhetoricam iubet, 1) vim dicendi cogitandive, qua in quaque re possit esse persuadibile, si per hunc titulum omnia oratori subiecisse videtur Aristoteles. S. VIII. Aversatur potius inanem quorundam sophistarum iactantiam, qui non solum de rebus omnibus, sed etiam de unaquaque re partem in utramque contrariarum aequali cum auditorum persuasione se mentem suam exposituros circulatorie promittunt. § 818.
Aesthetics, which you would describe less inadequately than Plato described rhetoric, not, as Plato did, as not an art but a skill, but rather as both skill and a certain art of grace and pleasure, §1, does not fashion persuasion of any kind whatsoever, but one that befits it, good and truly elegant; nor is it what Athenaeus calls rhetoric, an art of deceiving, §830. For it neither is, nor orders rhetoric to be, 1) a power of speaking or thinking by which in any matter something persuasive can be found, if by this title Aristotle seems to have subjected all things to the orator, Sect. VIII. Rather, it turns away from the empty boasting of certain sophists, who promise, like showmen, to set forth their mind not only on all matters, but also on each side of every contrary, with equal persuasion of their hearers, §818.
Perlegenti Quintiliani II. 15. apparebit, quot controversias evitemus et ictus per latus rhetorices aestheticam etiam vel vim, vel scientiam, vel usum, vel artem petentes, exigua corporis declinatione, quando non generatim persuasionem, § 833. sed aestheticam a pulcre cogitaturis postulamus, § 829. nec hanc solam solius rhetorices finem, sed in finibus primariis omnium venustius cogitandorum constituimus, § 5. Nec rhetorica, nec eius mater aesthetica, pravitas quaedam artis est, i. e. κακοτεχνία, dum utraque sit opifex persuadendi, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, ac, si liceat cum Ennio canere,
To one reading Quintilian II.15 it will appear how many controversies we avoid, and how many blows, aimed through the side of rhetoric also at aesthetics as power, science, use, or art, we evade by a slight inclination of the body, when we require from those about to think beautifully not persuasion in general, §833, but aesthetic persuasion, §829; nor do we establish this alone as the sole end of rhetoric, but place it among the primary ends of all things to be thought more gracefully, §5. Neither rhetoric nor its mother aesthetics is some depravity of art, that is, κακοτεχνία, since each is a maker of persuading, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, and, if it is permitted to sing with Ennius,
Suadae medulla.
"the very marrow and quintessence of Persuasion."
Aesthetica, quam minus inadaequate, ac Plato rhetoricen, describas, nec, ut Plato, non artem, sed peritiam verum et peritiam, et artem quandam gratiae ac voluptatis, § 1. non qualemcunque persuasionem fabricatur, sed, quae se deceat, bonam, et vere elegantem, nec est, quam Athenaeus rhetoricen dicit, ars fallendi, § 830. Nec enim est, nec esse rhetoricam iubet, 1) vim dicendi cogitandive, qua in quaque re possit esse persuadibile, si per hunc titulum omnia oratori subiecisse videtur Aristoteles.
Aesthetics, which you would describe less inadequately than Plato described rhetoric, not, as Plato did, as not an art but a skill, but rather as both skill and a certain art of grace and pleasure, §1, does not fashion persuasion of any kind whatsoever, but one that befits it, good and truly elegant; nor is it what Athenaeus calls rhetoric, an art of deceiving, §830. For it neither is, nor orders rhetoric to be, 1) a power of speaking or thinking by which in any matter something persuasive can be found, if by this title Aristotle seems to have subjected all things to the orator, Sect.
S. VIII. Aversatur potius inanem quorundam sophistarum iactantiam, qui non solum de rebus omnibus, sed etiam de unaquaque re partem in utramque contrariarum aequali cum auditorum persuasione se mentem suam exposituros circulatorie promittunt. § 818.
VIII. Rather, it turns away from the empty boasting of certain sophists, who promise, like showmen, to set forth their mind not only on all matters, but also on each side of every contrary, with equal persuasion of their hearers, §818.
Perlegenti Quintiliani II. 15.
To one reading Quintilian II.15 it
apparebit, quot controversias evitemus
will appear how many controversies we avoid,
et ictus per latus
and how many blows, aimed through the side of
rhetorices aestheticam etiam vel vim, vel scientiam, vel
rhetoric also at aesthetics as power, science, use,
usum, vel artem petentes, exigua corporis declinatione,
or art, we evade by a slight inclination
quando
of the body, when we require from those about
non generatim persuasionem, § 833.
to think beautifully not persuasion in general, §833,
sed aestheticam a pulcre cogitaturis postulamus, § 829.
but aesthetic persuasion, §829;
nec hanc solam solius rhetorices
nor do we establish this alone as the sole end of rhetoric,
finem, sed in finibus primariis omnium venustius cogitandorum constituimus,
but place it among the primary ends of all things
§ 5.
to be thought more gracefully, §5.
Nec rhetorica, nec eius mater aesthetica, pravitas quaedam artis
Neither rhetoric nor its mother aesthetics is some depravity of art,
est, i. e. κακοτεχνία, dum utraque sit opifex persuadendi,
that is, κακοτεχνία, since each is a maker of persuading,
πειθοῦς δημιουργός, ac, si liceat cum Ennio canere,
πειθοῦς δημιουργός, and, if it is permitted to sing with Ennius,
Suadae medulla.
"the very marrow and quintessence of Persuasion."
Aesthetica, quam minus inadaequate,
Aesthetics, which you would describe less inadequately
ac Plato rhetoricen, describas, nec, ut Plato,
than Plato described rhetoric, not, as Plato did,
non artem, sed peritiam
as not an art but a skill,
verum et peritiam, et artem
but rather as both skill and a certain art
quandam gratiae ac voluptatis, § 1. non qualemcunque persuasionem fabricatur,
of grace and pleasure, §1, does not fashion persuasion of any
sed, quae se deceat, bonam, et vere elegantem,
kind whatsoever, but one that befits it, good and truly elegant;
nec est, quam Athenaeus rhetoricen dicit, ars fallendi, § 830.
nor is it what Athenaeus calls rhetoric, an art of deceiving, §830.
Nec enim est, nec esse
For it neither is, nor orders rhetoric to be,
rhetoricam iubet, 1) vim dicendi cogitandive,
1) a power of speaking or thinking by
qua in quaque re possit esse persuadibile,
which in any matter something persuasive can be found,
si per hunc titulum omnia
if by this title Aristotle seems to have subjected
oratori subiecisse videtur Aristoteles.
all things to the orator, Sect.
S. VIII. Aversatur potius inanem quorundam
VIII. Rather, it turns away from the empty
sophistarum iactantiam, qui
boasting of certain sophists, who promise, like showmen,
non solum de rebus omnibus,
to set forth their mind not only on all
sed etiam de unaquaque re partem in utramque contrariarum
matters, but also on each side of every contrary,
aequali cum auditorum persuasione se mentem suam exposituros circulatorie promittunt. § 818.
with equal persuasion of their hearers, §818.
Perlegenti Quintiliani II. 15. apparebit, quot controversias evitemus et ictus per latus rhetorices aestheticam etiam vel vim, vel scientiam, vel usum, vel artem petentes, exigua corporis declinatione, quando non generatim persuasionem, § 833. sed aestheticam a pulcre cogitaturis postulamus, § 829. nec hanc solam solius rhetorices finem, sed in finibus primariis omnium venustius cogitandorum constituimus, § 5. Nec rhetorica, nec eius mater aesthetica, pravitas quaedam artis est, i. e. κακοτεχνία, dum utraque sit opifex persuadendi, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, ac, si liceat cum Ennio canere, / To one reading Quintilian II.15 it will appear how many controversies we avoid, and how many blows, aimed through the side of rhetoric also at aesthetics as power, science, use, or art, we evade by a slight inclination of the body, when we require from those about to think beautifully not persuasion in general, §833, but aesthetic persuasion, §829; nor do we establish this alone as the sole end of rhetoric, but place it among the primary ends of all things to be thought more gracefully, §5. Neither rhetoric nor its mother aesthetics is some depravity of art, that is, κακοτεχνία, since each is a maker of persuading, πειθοῦς δημιουργός, and, if it is permitted to sing with Ennius,
Suadae medulla.
"the very marrow and quintessence of Persuasion."
Aesthetica, quam minus inadaequate, ac Plato rhetoricen, describas, nec, ut Plato, non artem, sed peritiam verum et peritiam, et artem quandam gratiae ac voluptatis, § 1. non qualemcunque persuasionem fabricatur, sed, quae se deceat, bonam, et vere elegantem, nec est, quam Athenaeus rhetoricen dicit, ars fallendi, § 830. Nec enim est, nec esse rhetoricam iubet, 1) vim dicendi cogitandive, qua in quaque re possit esse persuadibile, si per hunc titulum omnia oratori subiecisse videtur Aristoteles. / Aesthetics, which you would describe less inadequately than Plato described rhetoric, not, as Plato did, as not an art but a skill, but rather as both skill and a certain art of grace and pleasure, §1, does not fashion persuasion of any kind whatsoever, but one that befits it, good and truly elegant; nor is it what Athenaeus calls rhetoric, an art of deceiving, §830. For it neither is, nor orders rhetoric to be, 1) a power of speaking or thinking by which in any matter something persuasive can be found, if by this title Aristotle seems to have subjected all things to the orator, Sect.
S. VIII. Aversatur potius inanem quorundam sophistarum iactantiam, qui non solum de rebus omnibus, sed etiam de unaquaque re partem in utramque contrariarum aequali cum auditorum persuasione se mentem suam exposituros circulatorie promittunt. § 818. / VIII. Rather, it turns away from the empty boasting of certain sophists, who promise, like showmen, to set forth their mind not only on all matters, but also on each side of every contrary, with equal persuasion of their hearers, §818.
§ 835
Nec ipsa persuadet, nec persuadere patitur rhetoricen, matris consiliorum tenacem, § 835. 2) uti persuadent, vel ducunt in id, quod volunt, meretrices, adulatores, corruptores, S. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nec est tantum, nec esse suam tantum patitur rhetoricen, 3) quam Ariston, Critolai peripatetici discipulus, affirmat, scientiam videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis, si popularem persuasionem contumeliosius interpreteris in auditores, quam nihil putes doctis profuturam. Surgit altius, suamque post se trahit rhetoricen, ultra quaestiones civiles in magis sublimia, S. XXI. et transcendentem aurae popularis arbitrium, § 397. caecusque vulgares, § 396. in persuadendo magnanimitatem, S. XXVI.
Nor does aesthetics itself persuade, nor does it allow rhetoric, tenacious of its mother's counsels, §835, to persuade 2) as prostitutes, flatterers, and corrupters persuade, or lead into what they wish, Sects. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nor is it only, nor does it allow its rhetoric to be only, 3) what Ariston, a pupil of Critolaus the Peripatetic, affirms: the science of seeing and acting in civil questions through speech of popular persuasion, if you interpret popular persuasion more insultingly toward hearers, as something you think will profit the learned nothing. It rises higher, and draws its rhetoric after itself, beyond civil questions into more sublime things, Sect. XXI, and, transcending the judgment of the popular breeze, §397, and the blind common people, §396, into magnanimity in persuading, Sect. XXVI.
Nec ipsa persuadet, nec persuadere patitur rhetoricen, matris consiliorum tenacem, § 835. 2) uti persuadent, vel ducunt in id, quod volunt, meretrices, adulatores, corruptores, S. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nec est tantum, nec esse suam tantum patitur rhetoricen, 3) quam Ariston, Critolai peripatetici discipulus, affirmat, scientiam videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis, si popularem persuasionem contumeliosius interpreteris in auditores, quam nihil putes doctis profuturam.
Nor does aesthetics itself persuade, nor does it allow rhetoric, tenacious of its mother's counsels, §835, to persuade 2) as prostitutes, flatterers, and corrupters persuade, or lead into what they wish, Sects. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nor is it only, nor does it allow its rhetoric to be only, 3) what Ariston, a pupil of Critolaus the Peripatetic, affirms: the science of seeing and acting in civil questions through speech of popular persuasion, if you interpret popular persuasion more insultingly toward hearers, as something you think will profit the learned nothing.
Surgit altius, suamque post se trahit rhetoricen, ultra quaestiones civiles in magis sublimia, S. XXI. et transcendentem aurae popularis arbitrium, § 397. caecusque vulgares, § 396. in persuadendo magnanimitatem, S. XXVI.
It rises higher, and draws its rhetoric after itself, beyond civil questions into more sublime things, Sect. XXI, and, transcending the judgment of the popular breeze, §397, and the blind common people, §396, into magnanimity in persuading, Sect. XXVI.
Nec ipsa persuadet, nec persuadere patitur rhetoricen,
Nor does aesthetics itself persuade, nor does it allow rhetoric,
matris consiliorum tenacem, § 835.
tenacious of its mother's counsels, §835,
2) uti persuadent,
to persuade 2) as prostitutes, flatterers, and corrupters persuade,
vel ducunt in id, quod volunt, meretrices, adulatores, corruptores, S.
or lead into what they wish, Sects.
XV, XVI, XXIII. Nec est tantum,
XV, XVI, XXIII. Nor is it only,
nec esse suam tantum
nor does it allow its rhetoric to be only,
patitur rhetoricen, 3) quam Ariston, Critolai peripatetici
3) what Ariston, a pupil of Critolaus the Peripatetic,
discipulus, affirmat, scientiam videndi et agendi in
affirms: the science of seeing and acting in
quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis,
civil questions through speech of popular persuasion,
si popularem persuasionem contumeliosius interpreteris
if you interpret popular persuasion more insultingly toward hearers,
in auditores, quam nihil putes doctis profuturam.
as something you think will profit the learned nothing.
Surgit altius, suamque post se trahit rhetoricen, ultra
It rises higher, and draws its rhetoric after itself,
quaestiones civiles in magis sublimia, S. XXI.
beyond civil questions into more sublime things, Sect. XXI,
et transcendentem aurae popularis arbitrium, § 397.
and, transcending the judgment of the popular breeze, §397,
caecusque vulgares, § 396. in persuadendo magnanimitatem, S.
and the blind common people, §396, into magnanimity in persuading,
XXVI.
Sect. XXVI.
Nec ipsa persuadet, nec persuadere patitur rhetoricen, matris consiliorum tenacem, § 835. 2) uti persuadent, vel ducunt in id, quod volunt, meretrices, adulatores, corruptores, S. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nec est tantum, nec esse suam tantum patitur rhetoricen, 3) quam Ariston, Critolai peripatetici discipulus, affirmat, scientiam videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis, si popularem persuasionem contumeliosius interpreteris in auditores, quam nihil putes doctis profuturam. / Nor does aesthetics itself persuade, nor does it allow rhetoric, tenacious of its mother's counsels, §835, to persuade 2) as prostitutes, flatterers, and corrupters persuade, or lead into what they wish, Sects. XV, XVI, XXIII. Nor is it only, nor does it allow its rhetoric to be only, 3) what Ariston, a pupil of Critolaus the Peripatetic, affirms: the science of seeing and acting in civil questions through speech of popular persuasion, if you interpret popular persuasion more insultingly toward hearers, as something you think will profit the learned nothing.
Surgit altius, suamque post se trahit rhetoricen, ultra quaestiones civiles in magis sublimia, S. XXI. et transcendentem aurae popularis arbitrium, § 397. caecusque vulgares, § 396. in persuadendo magnanimitatem, S. XXVI. / It rises higher, and draws its rhetoric after itself, beyond civil questions into more sublime things, Sect. XXI, and, transcending the judgment of the popular breeze, §397, and the blind common people, §396, into magnanimity in persuading, Sect. XXVI.
§ 836
Aesthetica nec ipsa sectatur, neque suam concedit rhetoricen ita sectari persuasibilia, ut 4) veris credibilia praeferat, S. XXVII, XXXIII. licet nonnunquam veris aliquibus, § 429–430. praeferat alia, etiam vera, et simul ex ἔξοχον illud, § 484. prae se ferentia, quo facilius inveniant fidem. Nec enim persuasurus aestheticus, nec ex huius academia profectus, orator, ut sunt Corn. Celsi verba:
Aesthetics neither itself pursues, nor grants that its rhetoric should so pursue, persuadable things that 4) it prefers credible things to true things, Sects. XXVII, XXXIII, although sometimes, before certain truths, §§429–430, it prefers other things, also true, which at the same time display that ἔξοχον, §484, by which they more easily find belief. For neither the aesthetic persuader, nor the orator who has gone forth from this academy, in the words of Cornelius Celsus,
simile tantum veri petit,
The orator only aims at the semblance of truth,,
sed veritatem ipsam, saepius etiam strictissimam, § 566. S. XXXV. licet modestus inventa sua malit a potiori verisimilia nuncupare, § 483. quam vera mortalibus, quorum norunt paucissimi, quae sit et quotuplex veritas, semper una, S. XXXVIII.
but truth itself, often even the strictest truth, §566, Sect. XXXV, although modestly he would rather name his discoveries, for the most part, verisimilar, §483, than true for mortals, of whom very few know what truth is, and how manifold, though always one, Sect. XXXVIII.
Aesthetica nec ipsa sectatur, neque suam concedit rhetoricen ita sectari persuasibilia, ut 4) veris credibilia praeferat, S. XXVII, XXXIII. licet nonnunquam veris aliquibus, § 429–430. praeferat alia, etiam vera, et simul ex ἔξοχον illud, § 484. prae se ferentia, quo facilius inveniant fidem.
Aesthetics neither itself pursues, nor grants that its rhetoric should so pursue, persuadable things that 4) it prefers credible things to true things, Sects. XXVII, XXXIII, although sometimes, before certain truths, §§429–430, it prefers other things, also true, which at the same time display that ἔξοχον, §484, by which they more easily find belief.
Nec enim persuasurus aestheticus, nec ex huius academia profectus, orator, ut sunt Corn. Celsi verba:
For neither the aesthetic persuader, nor the orator who has gone forth from this academy, in the words of Cornelius Celsus,
simile tantum veri petit,
The orator only aims at the semblance of truth,,
sed veritatem ipsam, saepius etiam strictissimam, § 566. S. XXXV. licet modestus inventa sua malit a potiori verisimilia nuncupare, § 483. quam vera mortalibus, quorum norunt paucissimi, quae sit et quotuplex veritas, semper una, S. XXXVIII.
but truth itself, often even the strictest truth, §566, Sect. XXXV, although modestly he would rather name his discoveries, for the most part, verisimilar, §483, than true for mortals, of whom very few know what truth is, and how manifold, though always one, Sect. XXXVIII.
Aesthetica nec ipsa sectatur, neque suam concedit rhetoricen ita sectari
Aesthetics neither itself pursues, nor grants that its rhetoric should so pursue,
persuasibilia, ut 4) veris credibilia praeferat, S.
persuadable things that 4) it prefers credible things to true
XXVII, XXXIII. licet nonnunquam veris aliquibus, § 429–430.
things, Sects. XXVII, XXXIII, although sometimes, before certain truths, §§429–430,
praeferat alia, etiam vera,
it prefers other things, also true,
et simul ex ἔξοχον illud, § 484.
which at the same time display that ἔξοχον, §484,
prae se ferentia, quo facilius inveniant fidem.
by which they more easily find belief.
Nec enim persuasurus aestheticus, nec
For neither the aesthetic persuader, nor the orator who
ex huius academia profectus, orator, ut sunt Corn.
has gone forth from this academy, in the words of Cornelius
Celsi verba:
Celsus,
simile tantum veri petit,
The orator only aims at the semblance of truth,,
sed veritatem ipsam, saepius etiam strictissimam, § 566.
but truth itself, often even the strictest truth, §566,
S. XXXV. licet modestus inventa sua malit
Sect. XXXV, although modestly he would rather name his discoveries,
a potiori verisimilia nuncupare, § 483.
for the most part, verisimilar, §483,
quam vera mortalibus, quorum norunt paucissimi,
than true for mortals, of whom very few
quae sit et quotuplex veritas, semper una, S. XXXVIII.
know what truth is, and how manifold, though always one, Sect. XXXVIII.
Aesthetica nec ipsa sectatur, neque suam concedit rhetoricen ita sectari persuasibilia, ut 4) veris credibilia praeferat, S. XXVII, XXXIII. licet nonnunquam veris aliquibus, § 429–430. praeferat alia, etiam vera, et simul ex ἔξοχον illud, § 484. prae se ferentia, quo facilius inveniant fidem. / Aesthetics neither itself pursues, nor grants that its rhetoric should so pursue, persuadable things that 4) it prefers credible things to true things, Sects. XXVII, XXXIII, although sometimes, before certain truths, §§429–430, it prefers other things, also true, which at the same time display that ἔξοχον, §484, by which they more easily find belief.
Nec enim persuasurus aestheticus, nec ex huius academia profectus, orator, ut sunt Corn. Celsi verba: / For neither the aesthetic persuader, nor the orator who has gone forth from this academy, in the words of Cornelius Celsus,
simile tantum veri petit,
The orator only aims at the semblance of truth,,
sed veritatem ipsam, saepius etiam strictissimam, § 566. S. XXXV. licet modestus inventa sua malit a potiori verisimilia nuncupare, § 483. quam vera mortalibus, quorum norunt paucissimi, quae sit et quotuplex veritas, semper una, S. XXXVIII. / but truth itself, often even the strictest truth, §566, Sect. XXXV, although modestly he would rather name his discoveries, for the most part, verisimilar, §483, than true for mortals, of whom very few know what truth is, and how manifold, though always one, Sect. XXXVIII.
§ 837
5) Uti mangones, qui colorem fuco, et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur. S. XXXXI, XXXXII.
5) As hucksters do, who feign color by false coloring and true strength by empty fattening, Sects. XXXXI, XXXXII.
5) Uti mangones, qui colorem fuco, et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur.
5) As hucksters do, who feign color by false coloring and true strength by empty fattening, Sects.
S. XXXXI, XXXXII.
XXXXI, XXXXII.
5) Uti mangones, qui colorem fuco,
5) As hucksters do, who feign color by
et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur.
false coloring and true strength by empty fattening, Sects.
S. XXXXI, XXXXII.
XXXXI, XXXXII.
5) Uti mangones, qui colorem fuco, et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur. / 5) As hucksters do, who feign color by false coloring and true strength by empty fattening, Sects.
S. XXXXI, XXXXII. / XXXXI, XXXXII.
§ 838
Recte itaque reiiciant logici persuasionem falsam et falsi, seu de falso, § 830. Recte tamen amabit bellum ingenium veram persuasionem, § 831. et veri vel verisimilis, § 837. aestheticam, § 834–837. eiusque habitum, suadam et SUADELAM; non illam volgivagam § 831–837. sed aestheticam, § 829. Nec enim eam,
Rightly, therefore, may logicians reject false persuasion and persuasion of the false, or concerning the false, §830. Yet rightly will a beautiful mind love true persuasion, §831, and aesthetic persuasion of the true or of the verisimilar, §837, §§834–837, and its habit, suada and SUADELA; not that common, wandering persuasion of §§831–837, but aesthetic persuasion, §829. For not that one
Quae bene nummatum decorat Suadela Venusque,
"and [the goddesses], Persuasion and Venus, graced the well-moneyed man."
Hor. ep. 16, 36. sed, quam in Periclis labris scripsit Eupolis
Horace, Epistles I.6.36, but that one which Eupolis wrote had
sedisse,
that amiable Goddess, who is said by Eupolis to have dwelt on the lips of Pericles.
Cic. de cl. or. 59.
on the lips of Pericles, Cicero, Brutus 59:
Te facimus, Suadela, deam, caeloque locamus.
"Thou wouldst have no divinity, O Fortune, if we had but wisdom; it is we that make a goddess of thee, and place thee in the skies."
Recte itaque reiiciant logici persuasionem falsam et falsi, seu de falso, § 830. Recte tamen amabit bellum ingenium veram persuasionem, § 831. et veri vel verisimilis, § 837. aestheticam, § 834–837. eiusque habitum, suadam et SUADELAM; non illam volgivagam § 831–837. sed aestheticam, § 829. Nec enim eam,
Rightly, therefore, may logicians reject false persuasion and persuasion of the false, or concerning the false, §830. Yet rightly will a beautiful mind love true persuasion, §831, and aesthetic persuasion of the true or of the verisimilar, §837, §§834–837, and its habit, suada and SUADELA; not that common, wandering persuasion of §§831–837, but aesthetic persuasion, §829. For not that one
Quae bene nummatum decorat Suadela Venusque,
"and [the goddesses], Persuasion and Venus, graced the well-moneyed man."
Hor. ep. 16, 36. sed, quam in Periclis labris scripsit Eupolis
Horace, Epistles I.6.36, but that one which Eupolis wrote had
sedisse,
that amiable Goddess, who is said by Eupolis to have dwelt on the lips of Pericles.
Cic. de cl. or. 59.
on the lips of Pericles, Cicero, Brutus 59:
Te facimus, Suadela, deam, caeloque locamus.
"Thou wouldst have no divinity, O Fortune, if we had but wisdom; it is we that make a goddess of thee, and place thee in the skies."
Recte itaque reiiciant logici persuasionem falsam et falsi,
Rightly, therefore, may logicians reject false persuasion and persuasion of the false,
seu de falso, § 830. Recte tamen amabit
or concerning the false, §830. Yet rightly will a
bellum ingenium veram persuasionem, § 831.
beautiful mind love true persuasion, §831,
et veri vel verisimilis, § 837.
and aesthetic persuasion of the true or of the verisimilar, §837,
aestheticam, § 834–837. eiusque habitum, suadam et SUADELAM;
§§834–837, and its habit, suada and SUADELA;
non illam volgivagam § 831–837.
not that common, wandering persuasion of §§831–837,
sed aestheticam, § 829. Nec enim eam,
but aesthetic persuasion, §829. For not that one
Quae bene nummatum decorat Suadela Venusque,
"and [the goddesses], Persuasion and Venus, graced the well-moneyed man."
Hor. ep. 16, 36. sed, quam in Periclis labris
Horace, Epistles I.6.36, but that one which
scripsit Eupolis
Eupolis wrote had
sedisse,
that amiable Goddess, who is said by Eupolis to have dwelt on the lips of Pericles.
Cic. de cl. or. 59.
on the lips of Pericles, Cicero, Brutus 59:
Te facimus, Suadela, deam, caeloque locamus.
"Thou wouldst have no divinity, O Fortune, if we had but wisdom; it is we that make a goddess of thee, and place thee in the skies."
Recte itaque reiiciant logici persuasionem falsam et falsi, seu de falso, § 830. Recte tamen amabit bellum ingenium veram persuasionem, § 831. et veri vel verisimilis, § 837. aestheticam, § 834–837. eiusque habitum, suadam et SUADELAM; non illam volgivagam § 831–837. sed aestheticam, § 829. Nec enim eam, / Rightly, therefore, may logicians reject false persuasion and persuasion of the false, or concerning the false, §830. Yet rightly will a beautiful mind love true persuasion, §831, and aesthetic persuasion of the true or of the verisimilar, §837, §§834–837, and its habit, suada and SUADELA; not that common, wandering persuasion of §§831–837, but aesthetic persuasion, §829. For not that one
Quae bene nummatum decorat Suadela Venusque,
"and [the goddesses], Persuasion and Venus, graced the well-moneyed man."
Hor. ep. 16, 36. sed, quam in Periclis labris scripsit Eupolis / Horace, Epistles I.6.36, but that one which Eupolis wrote had
sedisse,
that amiable Goddess, who is said by Eupolis to have dwelt on the lips of Pericles.
Cic. de cl. or. 59. / on the lips of Pericles, Cicero, Brutus 59:
Te facimus, Suadela, deam, caeloque locamus.
"Thou wouldst have no divinity, O Fortune, if we had but wisdom; it is we that make a goddess of thee, and place thee in the skies."
§ 839
Aesthetice persuasurus dare noverit suis 1) verisimilitudinem secundum § 423–613, et huic lucem necessariam, § 624–824. His enim datis dabitur quaesita persuasio, § 829. Verisimilitudo, quantam studium veritatis absolutum ubique postulat, § 555. absoluta saltim luce § 617. simpliciter dilucida, § 625. PERSUASIONEM in aestheticis ABSOLUTAM, quantam autem verisimilitudinem studium veritatis comparativum in data meditatione requisiverit, S. XXXV. proportionate nitens, § 625, persuasionem COMPARATIVAM exhibebit. Utramque, quantam pulcritudo totius desiderat, accurate praestans est AESTHAETICE SOLIDUS, vel hanc negligens, vel illius omnino contemtae reus est AESTHETICE SUPERFICIARIUS.
One who is going to persuade aesthetically should know how to give his own hearers 1) verisimilitude according to §§423–613, and to this the necessary light, §§624–824. For when these are given, the persuasion sought will be given, §829. Verisimilitude, as much as the absolute study of truth everywhere demands, §555, simply clear with at least absolute light, §§617, 625, will exhibit ABSOLUTE PERSUASION in aesthetics; but verisimilitude, as much as the comparative study of truth in a given meditation has required, Sect. XXXV, shining proportionately, §625, will exhibit COMPARATIVE persuasion. One who accurately furnishes both, as much as the beauty of the whole desires, is AESTHETICALLY SOLID; one who neglects the latter, or is guilty of utterly despising the former, is AESTHETICALLY SUPERFICIAL.
Aesthetice persuasurus dare noverit suis 1) verisimilitudinem secundum § 423–613, et huic lucem necessariam, § 624–824. His enim datis dabitur quaesita persuasio, § 829. Verisimilitudo, quantam studium veritatis absolutum ubique postulat, § 555. absoluta saltim luce § 617. simpliciter dilucida, § 625. PERSUASIONEM in aestheticis ABSOLUTAM, quantam autem verisimilitudinem studium veritatis comparativum in data meditatione requisiverit, S. XXXV. proportionate nitens, § 625, persuasionem COMPARATIVAM exhibebit.
One who is going to persuade aesthetically should know how to give his own hearers 1) verisimilitude according to §§423–613, and to this the necessary light, §§624–824. For when these are given, the persuasion sought will be given, §829. Verisimilitude, as much as the absolute study of truth everywhere demands, §555, simply clear with at least absolute light, §§617, 625, will exhibit ABSOLUTE PERSUASION in aesthetics; but verisimilitude, as much as the comparative study of truth in a given meditation has required, Sect. XXXV, shining proportionately, §625, will exhibit COMPARATIVE persuasion.
Utramque, quantam pulcritudo totius desiderat, accurate praestans est AESTHAETICE SOLIDUS, vel hanc negligens, vel illius omnino contemtae reus est AESTHETICE SUPERFICIARIUS.
One who accurately furnishes both, as much as the beauty of the whole desires, is AESTHETICALLY SOLID; one who neglects the latter, or is guilty of utterly despising the former, is AESTHETICALLY SUPERFICIAL.
Aesthetice persuasurus dare
One who is going to persuade aesthetically should know
noverit suis 1) verisimilitudinem secundum § 423–613,
how to give his own hearers 1) verisimilitude according to §§423–613,
et huic lucem necessariam, § 624–824.
and to this the necessary light, §§624–824.
His enim datis dabitur quaesita persuasio,
For when these are given, the persuasion
§ 829. Verisimilitudo,
sought will be given, §829. Verisimilitude,
quantam studium veritatis absolutum ubique postulat, § 555.
as much as the absolute study of truth everywhere demands, §555,
absoluta saltim luce § 617.
simply clear with at least absolute light, §§617,
simpliciter dilucida, § 625. PERSUASIONEM in aestheticis
625, will exhibit ABSOLUTE PERSUASION in aesthetics;
ABSOLUTAM, quantam autem verisimilitudinem
but verisimilitude, as much as the comparative
studium veritatis comparativum in data meditatione requisiverit, S.
study of truth in a given meditation has required,
XXXV. proportionate nitens, § 625, persuasionem COMPARATIVAM exhibebit.
Sect. XXXV, shining proportionately, §625, will exhibit COMPARATIVE persuasion.
Utramque, quantam pulcritudo totius desiderat,
One who accurately furnishes both, as much as
accurate praestans est AESTHAETICE SOLIDUS,
the beauty of the whole desires, is AESTHETICALLY SOLID;
vel hanc negligens, vel illius omnino contemtae
one who neglects the latter, or is guilty of
reus est AESTHETICE SUPERFICIARIUS.
utterly despising the former, is AESTHETICALLY SUPERFICIAL.
Aesthetice persuasurus dare noverit suis 1) verisimilitudinem secundum § 423–613, et huic lucem necessariam, § 624–824. His enim datis dabitur quaesita persuasio, § 829. Verisimilitudo, quantam studium veritatis absolutum ubique postulat, § 555. absoluta saltim luce § 617. simpliciter dilucida, § 625. PERSUASIONEM in aestheticis ABSOLUTAM, quantam autem verisimilitudinem studium veritatis comparativum in data meditatione requisiverit, S. XXXV. proportionate nitens, § 625, persuasionem COMPARATIVAM exhibebit. / One who is going to persuade aesthetically should know how to give his own hearers 1) verisimilitude according to §§423–613, and to this the necessary light, §§624–824. For when these are given, the persuasion sought will be given, §829. Verisimilitude, as much as the absolute study of truth everywhere demands, §555, simply clear with at least absolute light, §§617, 625, will exhibit ABSOLUTE PERSUASION in aesthetics; but verisimilitude, as much as the comparative study of truth in a given meditation has required, Sect. XXXV, shining proportionately, §625, will exhibit COMPARATIVE persuasion.
Utramque, quantam pulcritudo totius desiderat, accurate praestans est AESTHAETICE SOLIDUS, vel hanc negligens, vel illius omnino contemtae reus est AESTHETICE SUPERFICIARIUS. / One who accurately furnishes both, as much as the beauty of the whole desires, is AESTHETICALLY SOLID; one who neglects the latter, or is guilty of utterly despising the former, is AESTHETICALLY SUPERFICIAL.
§ 840
Est pygmaeorum § 559. quaedam natio, quae se nunc philosopham putat, nunc mathematicam, cuique sua sunt omnia, sed sua sola, sicut inferorum porta Virgilio, VI.
There is a certain nation of pygmies, §559, which now thinks itself philosophical, now mathematical, and to which all its own things, but only its own, are solid, like the gate of the underworld in Virgil VI:
Solido: ex adamante columnae,
Vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi exscindere ferro
Caelicolae valeant. Stat ferrea turris ad auras.
"A mighty gate is there
Columned in adamant; no human power,
Nor even the gods, against this gate prevail.
Tall tower of steel it has;"
Illi suo vivant abundantes ingenio, nobis autem, logicam soliditatem suo loco plurimi facientibus, nunc
Let them live abounding in their own genius. For us, however, who value logical solidity highly in its own place, now
Florescant solido Paphiae de robore myrtus.
"But reared from truncheons olives answer best,
As vines from layers, and from the solid wood
The Paphian myrtles;"
ACCURATUM est leges suas exactius sequens, et accurate probans SOLIDUS est. Veritatem itaque, quam debebat secundum regulas verisimilitudinis exactius exponens luci secundum huius regulas accurate, prout aestheticum decet, cur ille non sit solidus in suo genere, in sua sphaera, ac horizonte?
What follows its laws more exactly is ACCURATE, and what proves accurately is SOLID. Therefore, if someone expounds the truth which he owed according to the rules of verisimilitude more exactly, and accurately according to the rules of light, as befits the aesthetic, why should he not be solid in his own kind, in his own sphere and horizon?
Est pygmaeorum § 559. quaedam natio, quae se nunc philosopham putat, nunc mathematicam, cuique sua sunt omnia, sed sua sola, sicut inferorum porta Virgilio, VI.
There is a certain nation of pygmies, §559, which now thinks itself philosophical, now mathematical, and to which all its own things, but only its own, are solid, like the gate of the underworld in Virgil VI:
Solido: ex adamante columnae,
Vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi exscindere ferro
Caelicolae valeant. Stat ferrea turris ad auras.
"A mighty gate is there
Columned in adamant; no human power,
Nor even the gods, against this gate prevail.
Tall tower of steel it has;"
Illi suo vivant abundantes ingenio, nobis autem, logicam soliditatem suo loco plurimi facientibus, nunc
Let them live abounding in their own genius. For us, however, who value logical solidity highly in its own place, now
Florescant solido Paphiae de robore myrtus.
"But reared from truncheons olives answer best,
As vines from layers, and from the solid wood
The Paphian myrtles;"
ACCURATUM est leges suas exactius sequens, et accurate probans SOLIDUS est.
What follows its laws more exactly is ACCURATE, and what proves accurately is SOLID.
Veritatem itaque, quam debebat secundum regulas verisimilitudinis exactius exponens luci secundum huius regulas accurate, prout aestheticum decet, cur ille non sit solidus in suo genere, in sua sphaera, ac horizonte?
Therefore, if someone expounds the truth which he owed according to the rules of verisimilitude more exactly, and accurately according to the rules of light, as befits the aesthetic, why should he not be solid in his own kind, in his own sphere and horizon?
Est pygmaeorum § 559. quaedam natio,
There is a certain nation of pygmies, §559,
quae se nunc philosopham putat, nunc mathematicam,
which now thinks itself philosophical, now mathematical,
cuique sua sunt omnia,
and to which all its own things,
sed sua sola,
but only its own, are solid,
sicut inferorum porta Virgilio, VI.
like the gate of the underworld in Virgil VI:
Solido: ex adamante columnae,
Vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi exscindere ferro
Caelicolae valeant. Stat ferrea turris ad auras.
"A mighty gate is there
Columned in adamant; no human power,
Nor even the gods, against this gate prevail.
Tall tower of steel it has;"
Illi suo vivant abundantes ingenio,
Let them live abounding in their own genius.
nobis autem, logicam soliditatem suo loco
For us, however, who value logical solidity highly in its own place,
plurimi facientibus, nunc
now
Florescant solido Paphiae de robore myrtus.
"But reared from truncheons olives answer best,
As vines from layers, and from the solid wood
The Paphian myrtles;"
ACCURATUM est leges suas exactius sequens,
What follows its laws more exactly is ACCURATE,
et accurate probans SOLIDUS est.
and what proves accurately is SOLID.
Veritatem itaque, quam debebat
Therefore, if someone expounds the truth which he owed
secundum regulas verisimilitudinis exactius
according to the rules of verisimilitude more exactly,
exponens luci secundum huius regulas accurate, prout
and accurately according to the rules of light,
aestheticum decet, cur ille non sit
as befits the aesthetic, why should he not be
solidus in suo genere, in sua sphaera, ac horizonte?
solid in his own kind, in his own sphere and horizon?
Est pygmaeorum § 559. quaedam natio, quae se nunc philosopham putat, nunc mathematicam, cuique sua sunt omnia, sed sua sola, sicut inferorum porta Virgilio, VI. / There is a certain nation of pygmies, §559, which now thinks itself philosophical, now mathematical, and to which all its own things, but only its own, are solid, like the gate of the underworld in Virgil VI:
Solido: ex adamante columnae,
Vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi exscindere ferro
Caelicolae valeant. Stat ferrea turris ad auras.
"A mighty gate is there
Columned in adamant; no human power,
Nor even the gods, against this gate prevail.
Tall tower of steel it has;"
Illi suo vivant abundantes ingenio, nobis autem, logicam soliditatem suo loco plurimi facientibus, nunc / Let them live abounding in their own genius. For us, however, who value logical solidity highly in its own place, now
Florescant solido Paphiae de robore myrtus.
"But reared from truncheons olives answer best,
As vines from layers, and from the solid wood
The Paphian myrtles;"
ACCURATUM est leges suas exactius sequens, et accurate probans SOLIDUS est. / What follows its laws more exactly is ACCURATE, and what proves accurately is SOLID.
Veritatem itaque, quam debebat secundum regulas verisimilitudinis exactius exponens luci secundum huius regulas accurate, prout aestheticum decet, cur ille non sit solidus in suo genere, in sua sphaera, ac horizonte? / Therefore, if someone expounds the truth which he owed according to the rules of verisimilitude more exactly, and accurately according to the rules of light, as befits the aesthetic, why should he not be solid in his own kind, in his own sphere and horizon?
§ 841
Nolim vere venustos tela retorquere in philosophos illos vel quasi, aut mathematicos, quibus sola sua solida videntur, uti Epicureus ille apud Ciceronem de fin. I, 61. qui
I would not wish the truly graceful to hurl weapons back at those philosophers, or quasi-philosophers, or mathematicians, to whom only their own things seem solid, as with that Epicurean in Cicero, De finibus I.61, who says that
se melius et verius ait perspicere, neque stultorum quemquam beatum, neque sapientium non esse beatum,
The conclusion is that no foolish man can be happy, nor any wise man fail to be happy. This is a truth that we establish far more conclusively than do the Stoics.,
ac Stoici, qui
and as with the Stoics, who
negent quicquam esse bonum, nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum, non tam solido, quam splendido, nomine.
For they maintain that nothing is good save that vague phantom which they entitle Moral Worth, a title more splendid than substantial;.
Idem Torquatus, quam soliditatem negarat Stoicis, eandem poetis denegat; et mathematicis 71.
The same Torquatus denies to poets the solidity he had denied to the Stoics, and to mathematicians, 71:
In ille tempus in evoluendis poetis, uti ego et Triarius, te hortatore, fecimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas, omnisque puerilis delectatio? aut, sicut Plato, se in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret? quae a falsis profecta initiis, vera esse nequeunt, et, si vera essent, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus?
Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better?
Nolim vere venustos tela retorquere in philosophos illos vel quasi, aut mathematicos, quibus sola sua solida videntur, uti Epicureus ille apud Ciceronem de fin. I, 61. qui
I would not wish the truly graceful to hurl weapons back at those philosophers, or quasi-philosophers, or mathematicians, to whom only their own things seem solid, as with that Epicurean in Cicero, De finibus I.61, who says that
se melius et verius ait perspicere, neque stultorum quemquam beatum, neque sapientium non esse beatum,
The conclusion is that no foolish man can be happy, nor any wise man fail to be happy. This is a truth that we establish far more conclusively than do the Stoics.,
ac Stoici, qui
and as with the Stoics, who
negent quicquam esse bonum, nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum, non tam solido, quam splendido, nomine.
For they maintain that nothing is good save that vague phantom which they entitle Moral Worth, a title more splendid than substantial;.
Idem Torquatus, quam soliditatem negarat Stoicis, eandem poetis denegat; et mathematicis 71.
The same Torquatus denies to poets the solidity he had denied to the Stoics, and to mathematicians, 71:
In ille tempus in evoluendis poetis, uti ego et Triarius, te hortatore, fecimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas, omnisque puerilis delectatio? aut, sicut Plato, se in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret? quae a falsis profecta initiis, vera esse nequeunt, et, si vera essent, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus?
Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better?
Nolim vere venustos tela retorquere in
I would not wish the truly graceful to hurl
philosophos illos vel quasi,
weapons back at those philosophers, or quasi-philosophers,
aut mathematicos, quibus sola sua solida
or mathematicians, to whom only their own things seem solid,
videntur, uti Epicureus ille apud Ciceronem de fin.
as with that Epicurean in Cicero, De finibus
I, 61. qui
I.61, who says that
se melius et verius ait perspicere, neque stultorum quemquam beatum, neque sapientium non esse beatum,
The conclusion is that no foolish man can be happy, nor any wise man fail to be happy. This is a truth that we establish far more conclusively than do the Stoics.,
ac Stoici, qui
and as with the Stoics, who
negent quicquam esse bonum, nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum, non tam solido, quam splendido, nomine.
For they maintain that nothing is good save that vague phantom which they entitle Moral Worth, a title more splendid than substantial;.
Idem Torquatus, quam soliditatem negarat Stoicis,
The same Torquatus denies to poets the solidity he had
eandem poetis denegat; et mathematicis 71.
denied to the Stoics, and to mathematicians, 71:
In ille tempus in evoluendis poetis, uti ego et Triarius, te hortatore, fecimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas, omnisque puerilis delectatio? aut, sicut Plato, se in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret? quae a falsis profecta initiis, vera esse nequeunt, et, si vera essent, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus?
Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better?
Nolim vere venustos tela retorquere in philosophos illos vel quasi, aut mathematicos, quibus sola sua solida videntur, uti Epicureus ille apud Ciceronem de fin. I, 61. qui / I would not wish the truly graceful to hurl weapons back at those philosophers, or quasi-philosophers, or mathematicians, to whom only their own things seem solid, as with that Epicurean in Cicero, De finibus I.61, who says that
se melius et verius ait perspicere, neque stultorum quemquam beatum, neque sapientium non esse beatum,
The conclusion is that no foolish man can be happy, nor any wise man fail to be happy. This is a truth that we establish far more conclusively than do the Stoics.,
ac Stoici, qui / and as with the Stoics, who
negent quicquam esse bonum, nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum, non tam solido, quam splendido, nomine.
For they maintain that nothing is good save that vague phantom which they entitle Moral Worth, a title more splendid than substantial;.
Idem Torquatus, quam soliditatem negarat Stoicis, eandem poetis denegat; et mathematicis 71. / The same Torquatus denies to poets the solidity he had denied to the Stoics, and to mathematicians, 71:
In ille tempus in evoluendis poetis, uti ego et Triarius, te hortatore, fecimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas, omnisque puerilis delectatio? aut, sicut Plato, se in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret? quae a falsis profecta initiis, vera esse nequeunt, et, si vera essent, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus?
Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better?
§ 842
Quid enim? dum eruditi cavillatores sibi vicissim obiiciunt, rebus illius, quem adversarium aliquis sibi legit, nihil subesse solidi, patitur interim veritas, et distrahuntur spectatores neutrarum partium in vere molestam circa vera tantum non omnia fluctuationem, sicut aegrotus inter medicorum rixas exspirans. Est sua philosophis, est mathematicis soliditas, sed est etiam, alius quidem generis, § 829. sicuti veritas proponenda, historicis, oratoribus, poetis, § 423, 424. sicut lux huic veritati circumfundenda, § 614, 617. sic etiam ex his resultans certitudo, quae convictionem pariens logicam et intellectualem soliditatem, persuasionem producens aestheticam soliditatem auctoris demonstrabit. § 839.
For what happens? While learned cavillers mutually object that nothing solid underlies the matters of the person each has chosen as adversary, truth meanwhile suffers, and spectators of neither party are distracted into a truly troublesome fluctuation about almost all truths, like a sick person dying amid the quarrels of physicians. Philosophers have their solidity, mathematicians have theirs, but historians, orators, and poets also have another kind, §829: just as truth is to be proposed, §§423, 424, and just as light is to be poured around this truth, §§614, 617, so also the certitude resulting from these, which, by producing conviction, will show the logical and intellectual solidity of an author, and, by producing persuasion, will show his aesthetic solidity, §839.
Quid enim? dum eruditi cavillatores sibi vicissim obiiciunt, rebus illius, quem adversarium aliquis sibi legit, nihil subesse solidi, patitur interim veritas, et distrahuntur spectatores neutrarum partium in vere molestam circa vera tantum non omnia fluctuationem, sicut aegrotus inter medicorum rixas exspirans.
For what happens? While learned cavillers mutually object that nothing solid underlies the matters of the person each has chosen as adversary, truth meanwhile suffers, and spectators of neither party are distracted into a truly troublesome fluctuation about almost all truths, like a sick person dying amid the quarrels of physicians.
Est sua philosophis, est mathematicis soliditas, sed est etiam, alius quidem generis, § 829. sicuti veritas proponenda, historicis, oratoribus, poetis, § 423, 424. sicut lux huic veritati circumfundenda, § 614, 617. sic etiam ex his resultans certitudo, quae convictionem pariens logicam et intellectualem soliditatem, persuasionem producens aestheticam soliditatem auctoris demonstrabit. § 839.
Philosophers have their solidity, mathematicians have theirs, but historians, orators, and poets also have another kind, §829: just as truth is to be proposed, §§423, 424, and just as light is to be poured around this truth, §§614, 617, so also the certitude resulting from these, which, by producing conviction, will show the logical and intellectual solidity of an author, and, by producing persuasion, will show his aesthetic solidity, §839.
Quid enim? dum eruditi cavillatores sibi vicissim obiiciunt,
For what happens? While learned cavillers mutually object that nothing
rebus illius, quem adversarium aliquis sibi legit,
solid underlies the matters of the person each has
nihil subesse solidi, patitur interim veritas,
chosen as adversary, truth meanwhile suffers,
et distrahuntur spectatores neutrarum partium in
and spectators of neither party are distracted into
vere molestam circa vera tantum non
a truly troublesome fluctuation about almost all truths,
omnia fluctuationem, sicut aegrotus inter medicorum rixas exspirans.
like a sick person dying amid the quarrels of physicians.
Est sua philosophis, est mathematicis soliditas,
Philosophers have their solidity, mathematicians have theirs,
sed est etiam, alius quidem generis, § 829.
but historians, orators, and poets also have another kind, §829:
sicuti veritas proponenda, historicis, oratoribus, poetis, § 423, 424.
just as truth is to be proposed, §§423, 424,
sicut lux huic veritati circumfundenda,
and just as light is to be poured around this truth,
§ 614, 617. sic etiam ex his
§§614, 617, so also the certitude resulting from these,
resultans certitudo, quae convictionem pariens logicam et intellectualem soliditatem,
which, by producing conviction, will show the logical and intellectual solidity
persuasionem producens
of an author, and, by producing persuasion,
aestheticam soliditatem auctoris demonstrabit. § 839.
will show his aesthetic solidity, §839.
Quid enim? dum eruditi cavillatores sibi vicissim obiiciunt, rebus illius, quem adversarium aliquis sibi legit, nihil subesse solidi, patitur interim veritas, et distrahuntur spectatores neutrarum partium in vere molestam circa vera tantum non omnia fluctuationem, sicut aegrotus inter medicorum rixas exspirans. / For what happens? While learned cavillers mutually object that nothing solid underlies the matters of the person each has chosen as adversary, truth meanwhile suffers, and spectators of neither party are distracted into a truly troublesome fluctuation about almost all truths, like a sick person dying amid the quarrels of physicians.
Est sua philosophis, est mathematicis soliditas, sed est etiam, alius quidem generis, § 829. sicuti veritas proponenda, historicis, oratoribus, poetis, § 423, 424. sicut lux huic veritati circumfundenda, § 614, 617. sic etiam ex his resultans certitudo, quae convictionem pariens logicam et intellectualem soliditatem, persuasionem producens aestheticam soliditatem auctoris demonstrabit. § 839. / Philosophers have their solidity, mathematicians have theirs, but historians, orators, and poets also have another kind, §829: just as truth is to be proposed, §§423, 424, and just as light is to be poured around this truth, §§614, 617, so also the certitude resulting from these, which, by producing conviction, will show the logical and intellectual solidity of an author, and, by producing persuasion, will show his aesthetic solidity, §839.
§ 843
Aesthetica persuasio 1) occupatur circa ea, de quibus completa datur et scientifica certitudo, de quibus auctor forsan habeat, et utiliter, intellectualem etiam convictionem, immo et circa argumenta materiarum eiusmodi rigide ac severe demonstrantia, quae et quatenus sunt simul persuasibilia, § 425, 617, 829. horizonti logico et aesthetico communia, § 125. quatenus supra hunc non adscendunt, § 121, 485. Hinc optime diiudicatur toties agitata quaestio, num philosophica, et probationes, ex natura rerum petitae, deceant oratorem, e. g. sacrum, nec rotunde neganda, nec affirmanda, quoniam quaedam satis facilem admittentia persuasionem in philosophicis occurrunt et quaestionibus et argumentationibus: quaedam autem vix idoneis ad persuadendum includi rationibus poterunt, et omnia pari ratione modoque, ac ad convictionem scientificam propinantur, nequicquam turbis auditorum promiscuuis occinerentur.
Aesthetic persuasion 1) is occupied with those things concerning which complete and scientific certitude is given, concerning which the author perhaps has, and usefully has, intellectual conviction too; indeed it is occupied even with arguments that demonstrate matters of this kind rigorously and severely, insofar as they are at the same time persuadable, §§425, 617, 829, common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, §125, insofar as they do not ascend above this horizon, §§121, 485. Hence the often-agitated question, whether philosophical matters and proofs drawn from the nature of things befit an orator, for example a sacred orator, is best judged neither by a flat denial nor by an affirmation, since some things admitting persuasion readily enough occur in philosophical questions and argumentations; but some could hardly be included in reasons fit for persuading, and all of them, in the same ratio and mode in which they are offered for scientific conviction, would be sung in vain to mixed crowds of hearers.
Aesthetica persuasio 1) occupatur circa ea, de quibus completa datur et scientifica certitudo, de quibus auctor forsan habeat, et utiliter, intellectualem etiam convictionem, immo et circa argumenta materiarum eiusmodi rigide ac severe demonstrantia, quae et quatenus sunt simul persuasibilia, § 425, 617, 829. horizonti logico et aesthetico communia, § 125. quatenus supra hunc non adscendunt, § 121, 485. Hinc optime diiudicatur toties agitata quaestio, num philosophica, et probationes, ex natura rerum petitae, deceant oratorem, e. g. sacrum, nec rotunde neganda, nec affirmanda, quoniam quaedam satis facilem admittentia persuasionem in philosophicis occurrunt et quaestionibus et argumentationibus: quaedam autem vix idoneis ad persuadendum includi rationibus poterunt, et omnia pari ratione modoque, ac ad convictionem scientificam propinantur, nequicquam turbis auditorum promiscuuis occinerentur.
Aesthetic persuasion 1) is occupied with those things concerning which complete and scientific certitude is given, concerning which the author perhaps has, and usefully has, intellectual conviction too; indeed it is occupied even with arguments that demonstrate matters of this kind rigorously and severely, insofar as they are at the same time persuadable, §§425, 617, 829, common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, §125, insofar as they do not ascend above this horizon, §§121, 485. Hence the often-agitated question, whether philosophical matters and proofs drawn from the nature of things befit an orator, for example a sacred orator, is best judged neither by a flat denial nor by an affirmation, since some things admitting persuasion readily enough occur in philosophical questions and argumentations; but some could hardly be included in reasons fit for persuading, and all of them, in the same ratio and mode in which they are offered for scientific conviction, would be sung in vain to mixed crowds of hearers.
Aesthetica persuasio 1) occupatur circa ea,
Aesthetic persuasion 1) is occupied with those things
de quibus completa datur et scientifica certitudo,
concerning which complete and scientific certitude is given,
de quibus auctor forsan habeat, et utiliter,
concerning which the author perhaps has, and usefully has,
intellectualem etiam convictionem, immo et
intellectual conviction too; indeed it is occupied even
circa argumenta materiarum eiusmodi rigide ac severe
with arguments that demonstrate matters of this kind rigorously and severely,
demonstrantia, quae et quatenus sunt simul persuasibilia,
insofar as they are at the same time persuadable,
§ 425, 617, 829. horizonti logico et aesthetico communia, § 125.
§§425, 617, 829, common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, §125,
quatenus supra hunc non adscendunt, § 121, 485.
insofar as they do not ascend above this horizon, §§121, 485.
Hinc optime diiudicatur toties agitata quaestio, num philosophica,
Hence the often-agitated question, whether philosophical
et probationes, ex natura rerum petitae,
matters and proofs drawn from the nature of things befit
deceant oratorem, e. g. sacrum,
an orator, for example a sacred orator,
nec rotunde neganda,
is best judged neither by a flat denial nor
nec affirmanda, quoniam quaedam satis facilem admittentia persuasionem
by an affirmation, since some things admitting persuasion
in philosophicis occurrunt et quaestionibus et argumentationibus:
readily enough occur in philosophical questions and argumentations;
quaedam autem vix idoneis ad persuadendum
but some could hardly be included in reasons fit for persuading,
includi rationibus poterunt, et
and all of them,
omnia pari ratione modoque, ac
in the same ratio and mode in which
ad convictionem scientificam propinantur,
they are offered for scientific conviction, would be sung
nequicquam turbis auditorum promiscuuis occinerentur.
in vain to mixed crowds of hearers.
Aesthetica persuasio 1) occupatur circa ea, de quibus completa datur et scientifica certitudo, de quibus auctor forsan habeat, et utiliter, intellectualem etiam convictionem, immo et circa argumenta materiarum eiusmodi rigide ac severe demonstrantia, quae et quatenus sunt simul persuasibilia, § 425, 617, 829. horizonti logico et aesthetico communia, § 125. quatenus supra hunc non adscendunt, § 121, 485. Hinc optime diiudicatur toties agitata quaestio, num philosophica, et probationes, ex natura rerum petitae, deceant oratorem, e. g. sacrum, nec rotunde neganda, nec affirmanda, quoniam quaedam satis facilem admittentia persuasionem in philosophicis occurrunt et quaestionibus et argumentationibus: quaedam autem vix idoneis ad persuadendum includi rationibus poterunt, et omnia pari ratione modoque, ac ad convictionem scientificam propinantur, nequicquam turbis auditorum promiscuuis occinerentur. / Aesthetic persuasion 1) is occupied with those things concerning which complete and scientific certitude is given, concerning which the author perhaps has, and usefully has, intellectual conviction too; indeed it is occupied even with arguments that demonstrate matters of this kind rigorously and severely, insofar as they are at the same time persuadable, §§425, 617, 829, common to the logical and aesthetic horizon, §125, insofar as they do not ascend above this horizon, §§121, 485. Hence the often-agitated question, whether philosophical matters and proofs drawn from the nature of things befit an orator, for example a sacred orator, is best judged neither by a flat denial nor by an affirmation, since some things admitting persuasion readily enough occur in philosophical questions and argumentations; but some could hardly be included in reasons fit for persuading, and all of them, in the same ratio and mode in which they are offered for scientific conviction, would be sung in vain to mixed crowds of hearers.
§ 844
Persuasio aesthetica 2) dum directo sensitivam tractandorum certitudinem intendit, nonnunquam persuadendo de partibus per indirectum intellectui pulcro rationisque sagacitati totum obiiciet, non sine convictione simul, certum, § 428, 617. Erit eiusmodi tunc convictio extensive nonnunquam maior, et poterit numero notarum fortior esse, ac alia intensive distinctior, et scientiis aptior, M. § 532. Neque tamen ab aesthetico primario intenditur, quatenus est convictio, sed quatenus ad eam persuasionibus partium aptime necessariis deducebamur. Horatio Troiani belli scriptor
Aesthetic persuasion 2), while it directly aims at sensory certitude of the things being treated, will sometimes, by persuading concerning the parts, indirectly present the whole as certain, not without conviction as well, to the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason, §§428, 617. Such conviction will then sometimes be greater extensively, and can be stronger by the number of marks, than another conviction more distinct intensively and more apt for the sciences, Metaphysics §532. Yet it is not primarily intended by the aesthetician insofar as it is conviction, but insofar as we were most suitably led to it by persuasions of the parts. For Horace, the writer of the Trojan War
Quid sit pulcrum; quid turpe, quid utile, quid non;
Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit,
"who teaches more clearly, and better than Chrysippus and Crantor, what is honorable, what shameful, what profitable, what not so."
Non haerebimus in comparationibus, § 842. Sufficit exemplum obiecta demonstrationum moralium esse etiam obiecta poetae; qui persuadeat de iisdem, de quibus illae convincant, imo convincat intellectum tandem pulcrum et rationis sagacitatem de iisdem, de quibus illae convicerant intellectum purum et rationis soliditatem, M. § 637, 645.
We shall not linger over comparisons, §842. The example is enough: the objects of moral demonstrations are also objects of the poet, who persuades concerning the same things about which those demonstrations convince, indeed finally convinces the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason concerning the same things about which they had convinced pure intellect and the solidity of reason, Metaphysics §§637, 645.
Persuasio aesthetica 2) dum directo sensitivam tractandorum certitudinem intendit, nonnunquam persuadendo de partibus per indirectum intellectui pulcro rationisque sagacitati totum obiiciet, non sine convictione simul, certum, § 428, 617. Erit eiusmodi tunc convictio extensive nonnunquam maior, et poterit numero notarum fortior esse, ac alia intensive distinctior, et scientiis aptior, M. § 532. Neque tamen ab aesthetico primario intenditur, quatenus est convictio, sed quatenus ad eam persuasionibus partium aptime necessariis deducebamur.
Aesthetic persuasion 2), while it directly aims at sensory certitude of the things being treated, will sometimes, by persuading concerning the parts, indirectly present the whole as certain, not without conviction as well, to the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason, §§428, 617. Such conviction will then sometimes be greater extensively, and can be stronger by the number of marks, than another conviction more distinct intensively and more apt for the sciences, Metaphysics §532. Yet it is not primarily intended by the aesthetician insofar as it is conviction, but insofar as we were most suitably led to it by persuasions of the parts.
Horatio Troiani belli scriptor
For Horace, the writer of the Trojan War
Quid sit pulcrum; quid turpe, quid utile, quid non;
Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit,
"who teaches more clearly, and better than Chrysippus and Crantor, what is honorable, what shameful, what profitable, what not so."
Non haerebimus in comparationibus, § 842. Sufficit exemplum obiecta demonstrationum moralium esse etiam obiecta poetae; qui persuadeat de iisdem, de quibus illae convincant, imo convincat intellectum tandem pulcrum et rationis sagacitatem de iisdem, de quibus illae convicerant intellectum purum et rationis soliditatem, M. § 637, 645.
We shall not linger over comparisons, §842. The example is enough: the objects of moral demonstrations are also objects of the poet, who persuades concerning the same things about which those demonstrations convince, indeed finally convinces the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason concerning the same things about which they had convinced pure intellect and the solidity of reason, Metaphysics §§637, 645.
Persuasio aesthetica 2) dum directo sensitivam
Aesthetic persuasion 2), while it directly aims at
tractandorum certitudinem intendit, nonnunquam
sensory certitude of the things being treated, will sometimes,
persuadendo de partibus per indirectum intellectui pulcro rationisque sagacitati totum
by persuading concerning the parts, indirectly present the whole as certain,
obiiciet, non sine convictione simul,
not without conviction as well, to the beautiful intellect and
certum, § 428, 617.
the sagacity of reason, §§428, 617.
Erit eiusmodi tunc convictio extensive nonnunquam maior,
Such conviction will then sometimes be greater
et poterit numero notarum fortior
extensively, and can be stronger by the number of marks,
esse, ac alia intensive distinctior, et scientiis
than another conviction more distinct intensively and more apt for the sciences,
aptior, M. § 532. Neque tamen ab aesthetico primario intenditur,
Metaphysics §532. Yet it is not primarily intended
quatenus est convictio,
by the aesthetician insofar as it is conviction,
sed quatenus ad
but insofar as we were most suitably led to
eam persuasionibus partium aptime necessariis deducebamur.
it by persuasions of the parts.
Horatio Troiani belli scriptor
For Horace, the writer of the Trojan War
Quid sit pulcrum; quid turpe, quid utile, quid non;
Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit,
"who teaches more clearly, and better than Chrysippus and Crantor, what is honorable, what shameful, what profitable, what not so."
Non haerebimus in comparationibus, § 842.
We shall not linger over comparisons, §842.
Sufficit exemplum obiecta demonstrationum moralium esse
The example is enough: the objects of moral demonstrations
etiam obiecta poetae;
are also objects of the poet,
qui persuadeat de iisdem, de quibus illae convincant,
who persuades concerning the same things about which those demonstrations convince,
imo convincat intellectum tandem pulcrum et
indeed finally convinces the beautiful intellect and the
rationis sagacitatem de iisdem,
sagacity of reason concerning the same
de quibus illae convicerant intellectum purum
things about which they had convinced pure intellect
et rationis soliditatem, M. § 637, 645.
and the solidity of reason, Metaphysics §§637, 645.
Persuasio aesthetica 2) dum directo sensitivam tractandorum certitudinem intendit, nonnunquam persuadendo de partibus per indirectum intellectui pulcro rationisque sagacitati totum obiiciet, non sine convictione simul, certum, § 428, 617. Erit eiusmodi tunc convictio extensive nonnunquam maior, et poterit numero notarum fortior esse, ac alia intensive distinctior, et scientiis aptior, M. § 532. Neque tamen ab aesthetico primario intenditur, quatenus est convictio, sed quatenus ad eam persuasionibus partium aptime necessariis deducebamur. / Aesthetic persuasion 2), while it directly aims at sensory certitude of the things being treated, will sometimes, by persuading concerning the parts, indirectly present the whole as certain, not without conviction as well, to the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason, §§428, 617. Such conviction will then sometimes be greater extensively, and can be stronger by the number of marks, than another conviction more distinct intensively and more apt for the sciences, Metaphysics §532. Yet it is not primarily intended by the aesthetician insofar as it is conviction, but insofar as we were most suitably led to it by persuasions of the parts.
Horatio Troiani belli scriptor / For Horace, the writer of the Trojan War
Quid sit pulcrum; quid turpe, quid utile, quid non;
Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit,
"who teaches more clearly, and better than Chrysippus and Crantor, what is honorable, what shameful, what profitable, what not so."
Non haerebimus in comparationibus, § 842. Sufficit exemplum obiecta demonstrationum moralium esse etiam obiecta poetae; qui persuadeat de iisdem, de quibus illae convincant, imo convincat intellectum tandem pulcrum et rationis sagacitatem de iisdem, de quibus illae convicerant intellectum purum et rationis soliditatem, M. § 637, 645. / We shall not linger over comparisons, §842. The example is enough: the objects of moral demonstrations are also objects of the poet, who persuades concerning the same things about which those demonstrations convince, indeed finally convinces the beautiful intellect and the sagacity of reason concerning the same things about which they had convinced pure intellect and the solidity of reason, Metaphysics §§637, 645.
§ 845
Persuasio aesthetica 3) occupatur circa aesthetice probabilia, sive logice simul sint probabilia, sive minus, § 485. modo tanta non sit improbabilitas logica, nunc etiam animis tuorum praesens, ut omnem destruens probabilitatem aestheticam persuasionem simul omnem auferat. § 486. Huc argumenta Horatii persuasibilia ad navem I. od. 3.
Aesthetic persuasion 3) is occupied with aesthetically probable things, whether they are also logically probable or not, §485, provided there is not such logical improbability, now also present to the minds of your hearers, that, by destroying every aesthetic probability, it also removes every persuasion, §486. To this belong Horace's persuasible arguments to the ship in Ode I.3:
Sic te diva potens Cypri,
Sic fratres Helenae, lucida sidera,
Ventorumque regat pater
Obstrictis aliis, praeter Iapyga.
"Thus may Cyprus' heavenly queen,
Thus Helen's brethren, stars of brightest sheen,
Guide thee! May the sire of wind
Each truant gale, save only Zephyr, bind!"
Logice improbabile est, et navim bonis votis verbisque moveri, et tutelam navis navim regere, et gemellos illos ignes, qui boni sunt instar ominis apud nautas, fratres esse Helenae, et esse lucida sidera, et esse ventorum patrem. Neque tamen erant aesthetice improbabilia Virgilio, poetae adeo mythologiae gnaro, ut ex navibus etiam nymphas fabricaverit, in quas utique cadit persuasio passiva et activa, § 836.
It is logically improbable both that a ship is moved by good wishes and words, and that the tutelary power of the ship guides the ship, and that those twin fires, which are like a good omen among sailors, are Helen's brothers, and are bright stars, and that there is a father of the winds. Yet they were not aesthetically improbable to Virgil, a poet so skilled in mythology that he even fashioned nymphs from ships, to whom passive and active persuasion certainly applies, §836.
Persuasio aesthetica 3) occupatur circa aesthetice probabilia, sive logice simul sint probabilia, sive minus, § 485. modo tanta non sit improbabilitas logica, nunc etiam animis tuorum praesens, ut omnem destruens probabilitatem aestheticam persuasionem simul omnem auferat. § 486. Huc argumenta Horatii persuasibilia ad navem I. od. 3.
Aesthetic persuasion 3) is occupied with aesthetically probable things, whether they are also logically probable or not, §485, provided there is not such logical improbability, now also present to the minds of your hearers, that, by destroying every aesthetic probability, it also removes every persuasion, §486. To this belong Horace's persuasible arguments to the ship in Ode I.3:
Sic te diva potens Cypri,
Sic fratres Helenae, lucida sidera,
Ventorumque regat pater
Obstrictis aliis, praeter Iapyga.
"Thus may Cyprus' heavenly queen,
Thus Helen's brethren, stars of brightest sheen,
Guide thee! May the sire of wind
Each truant gale, save only Zephyr, bind!"
Logice improbabile est, et navim bonis votis verbisque moveri, et tutelam navis navim regere, et gemellos illos ignes, qui boni sunt instar ominis apud nautas, fratres esse Helenae, et esse lucida sidera, et esse ventorum patrem.
It is logically improbable both that a ship is moved by good wishes and words, and that the tutelary power of the ship guides the ship, and that those twin fires, which are like a good omen among sailors, are Helen's brothers, and are bright stars, and that there is a father of the winds.
Neque tamen erant aesthetice improbabilia Virgilio, poetae adeo mythologiae gnaro, ut ex navibus etiam nymphas fabricaverit, in quas utique cadit persuasio passiva et activa, § 836.
Yet they were not aesthetically improbable to Virgil, a poet so skilled in mythology that he even fashioned nymphs from ships, to whom passive and active persuasion certainly applies, §836.
Persuasio aesthetica 3) occupatur circa aesthetice probabilia,
Aesthetic persuasion 3) is occupied with aesthetically probable
sive logice simul sint probabilia, sive minus, § 485.
things, whether they are also logically probable or not, §485,
modo tanta non sit improbabilitas logica,
provided there is not such logical improbability, now
nunc etiam animis tuorum praesens,
also present to the minds of your hearers,
ut omnem destruens probabilitatem aestheticam persuasionem
that, by destroying every aesthetic probability, it also removes every persuasion,
simul omnem auferat. § 486. Huc argumenta Horatii persuasibilia
§486. To this belong Horace's persuasible
ad navem I. od. 3.
arguments to the ship in Ode I.3:
Sic te diva potens Cypri,
Sic fratres Helenae, lucida sidera,
Ventorumque regat pater
Obstrictis aliis, praeter Iapyga.
"Thus may Cyprus' heavenly queen,
Thus Helen's brethren, stars of brightest sheen,
Guide thee! May the sire of wind
Each truant gale, save only Zephyr, bind!"
Logice improbabile est,
It is logically improbable both that a ship is
et navim bonis votis verbisque moveri,
moved by good wishes and words,
et tutelam navis navim regere,
and that the tutelary power of the
et gemellos illos ignes, qui
ship guides the ship, and that those twin fires,
boni sunt instar ominis apud nautas, fratres
which are like a good omen among sailors,
esse Helenae, et esse lucida sidera,
are Helen's brothers, and are bright stars,
et esse ventorum patrem.
and that there is a father of the winds.
Neque tamen erant aesthetice improbabilia Virgilio,
Yet they were not aesthetically improbable to Virgil,
poetae adeo mythologiae gnaro,
a poet so skilled in mythology
ut ex navibus etiam nymphas fabricaverit, in quas
that he even fashioned nymphs from ships,
utique cadit persuasio passiva et activa, § 836.
to whom passive and active persuasion certainly applies, §836.
Persuasio aesthetica 3) occupatur circa aesthetice probabilia, sive logice simul sint probabilia, sive minus, § 485. modo tanta non sit improbabilitas logica, nunc etiam animis tuorum praesens, ut omnem destruens probabilitatem aestheticam persuasionem simul omnem auferat. § 486. Huc argumenta Horatii persuasibilia ad navem I. od. 3. / Aesthetic persuasion 3) is occupied with aesthetically probable things, whether they are also logically probable or not, §485, provided there is not such logical improbability, now also present to the minds of your hearers, that, by destroying every aesthetic probability, it also removes every persuasion, §486. To this belong Horace's persuasible arguments to the ship in Ode I.3:
Sic te diva potens Cypri,
Sic fratres Helenae, lucida sidera,
Ventorumque regat pater
Obstrictis aliis, praeter Iapyga.
"Thus may Cyprus' heavenly queen,
Thus Helen's brethren, stars of brightest sheen,
Guide thee! May the sire of wind
Each truant gale, save only Zephyr, bind!"
Logice improbabile est, et navim bonis votis verbisque moveri, et tutelam navis navim regere, et gemellos illos ignes, qui boni sunt instar ominis apud nautas, fratres esse Helenae, et esse lucida sidera, et esse ventorum patrem. / It is logically improbable both that a ship is moved by good wishes and words, and that the tutelary power of the ship guides the ship, and that those twin fires, which are like a good omen among sailors, are Helen's brothers, and are bright stars, and that there is a father of the winds.
Neque tamen erant aesthetice improbabilia Virgilio, poetae adeo mythologiae gnaro, ut ex navibus etiam nymphas fabricaverit, in quas utique cadit persuasio passiva et activa, § 836. / Yet they were not aesthetically improbable to Virgil, a poet so skilled in mythology that he even fashioned nymphs from ships, to whom passive and active persuasion certainly applies, §836.
§ 846
Persuasio aesthetica lubentissime propter thaumaturgiam, § 824, occupatur 4) in iis, quae fuerant tuis etiam aesthetice dubia et improbabilia; si vires tibi noveris ad tuos de iisdem nihilo minus aesthetice certos reddendos. § 818. Hanc hypothesin quia negligunt plerique declamatores suasoriarum, morem eorum paradoxa sectandi ridet in se ipso Iuvenalis. Sat. I.
Aesthetic persuasion, most willingly because of thaumaturgy, §824, is occupied 4) with those things that had been aesthetically doubtful and improbable even to your own hearers, if you know your powers for nevertheless making them aesthetically certain about the same things, §818. Because most declaimers of suasoriae neglect this hypothesis, Juvenal mocks in himself their custom of chasing paradoxes, Satires I:
et nos
Consilium Sullae dedimus, privatus ut altum
Dormiret.
"And yet I too have shirked my hand away from the rod. I too have given
advice to Sylla, that he should enjoy a sound sleep by returning to a
private station."
Nunc autem eadem Satyra felicius persuadet de morum corruptione, ne iudiciis quidem et poenis coercenda, aesthetice improbabili:
But now the same satire more happily persuades concerning a corruption of morals, not to be checked even by judgments and penalties, aesthetically improbable:
Quum populum gregibus comitum premat hic spoliator
Pupilli prostantis, et hic damnatus inani
Iudicio. Quid enim salvis infamia nummis?
Exsul ab octava Marius bibit, et fruitur Dis
Iratis. At tu, victrix provincia, ploras.
"when here, the plunderer of his ward (reduced by him to the vilest gains) presses on the people with his crowds of menials, and there, he that was condemned by a powerless sentence. (For what cares he for infamy while he retains the plunder?) Marius, though an exile, drinks from the eighth hour, and laughs at the angry gods, while thou, O Province, victorious in the suit, art in tears!"
Persuasio aesthetica lubentissime propter thaumaturgiam, § 824, occupatur 4) in iis, quae fuerant tuis etiam aesthetice dubia et improbabilia; si vires tibi noveris ad tuos de iisdem nihilo minus aesthetice certos reddendos. § 818. Hanc hypothesin quia negligunt plerique declamatores suasoriarum, morem eorum paradoxa sectandi ridet in se ipso Iuvenalis. Sat. I.
Aesthetic persuasion, most willingly because of thaumaturgy, §824, is occupied 4) with those things that had been aesthetically doubtful and improbable even to your own hearers, if you know your powers for nevertheless making them aesthetically certain about the same things, §818. Because most declaimers of suasoriae neglect this hypothesis, Juvenal mocks in himself their custom of chasing paradoxes, Satires I:
et nos
Consilium Sullae dedimus, privatus ut altum
Dormiret.
"And yet I too have shirked my hand away from the rod. I too have given
advice to Sylla, that he should enjoy a sound sleep by returning to a
private station."
Nunc autem eadem Satyra felicius persuadet de morum corruptione, ne iudiciis quidem et poenis coercenda, aesthetice improbabili:
But now the same satire more happily persuades concerning a corruption of morals, not to be checked even by judgments and penalties, aesthetically improbable:
Quum populum gregibus comitum premat hic spoliator
Pupilli prostantis, et hic damnatus inani
Iudicio. Quid enim salvis infamia nummis?
Exsul ab octava Marius bibit, et fruitur Dis
Iratis. At tu, victrix provincia, ploras.
"when here, the plunderer of his ward (reduced by him to the vilest gains) presses on the people with his crowds of menials, and there, he that was condemned by a powerless sentence. (For what cares he for infamy while he retains the plunder?) Marius, though an exile, drinks from the eighth hour, and laughs at the angry gods, while thou, O Province, victorious in the suit, art in tears!"
Persuasio aesthetica lubentissime propter thaumaturgiam, § 824,
Aesthetic persuasion, most willingly because of thaumaturgy, §824,
occupatur 4) in iis, quae fuerant tuis etiam
is occupied 4) with those things that had been
aesthetice dubia et improbabilia;
aesthetically doubtful and improbable even to your own hearers,
si vires tibi noveris ad tuos de iisdem
if you know your powers for nevertheless
nihilo minus aesthetice certos reddendos. § 818.
making them aesthetically certain about the same things, §818.
Hanc hypothesin quia negligunt plerique declamatores suasoriarum,
Because most declaimers of suasoriae
morem eorum paradoxa sectandi ridet in se ipso Iuvenalis.
neglect this hypothesis, Juvenal mocks in himself their custom of chasing
Sat. I.
paradoxes, Satires I:
et nos
Consilium Sullae dedimus, privatus ut altum
Dormiret.
"And yet I too have shirked my hand away from the rod. I too have given
advice to Sylla, that he should enjoy a sound sleep by returning to a
private station."
Nunc autem eadem Satyra felicius persuadet de morum corruptione,
But now the same satire more happily persuades concerning a corruption
ne iudiciis quidem et poenis
of morals, not to be checked even by judgments and penalties,
coercenda, aesthetice improbabili:
aesthetically improbable:
Quum populum gregibus comitum premat hic spoliator
Pupilli prostantis, et hic damnatus inani
Iudicio. Quid enim salvis infamia nummis?
Exsul ab octava Marius bibit, et fruitur Dis
Iratis. At tu, victrix provincia, ploras.
"when here, the plunderer of his ward (reduced by him to the vilest gains) presses on the people with his crowds of menials, and there, he that was condemned by a powerless sentence. (For what cares he for infamy while he retains the plunder?) Marius, though an exile, drinks from the eighth hour, and laughs at the angry gods, while thou, O Province, victorious in the suit, art in tears!"
Persuasio aesthetica lubentissime propter thaumaturgiam, § 824, occupatur 4) in iis, quae fuerant tuis etiam aesthetice dubia et improbabilia; si vires tibi noveris ad tuos de iisdem nihilo minus aesthetice certos reddendos. § 818. Hanc hypothesin quia negligunt plerique declamatores suasoriarum, morem eorum paradoxa sectandi ridet in se ipso Iuvenalis. Sat. I. / Aesthetic persuasion, most willingly because of thaumaturgy, §824, is occupied 4) with those things that had been aesthetically doubtful and improbable even to your own hearers, if you know your powers for nevertheless making them aesthetically certain about the same things, §818. Because most declaimers of suasoriae neglect this hypothesis, Juvenal mocks in himself their custom of chasing paradoxes, Satires I:
et nos
Consilium Sullae dedimus, privatus ut altum
Dormiret.
"And yet I too have shirked my hand away from the rod. I too have given
advice to Sylla, that he should enjoy a sound sleep by returning to a
private station."
Nunc autem eadem Satyra felicius persuadet de morum corruptione, ne iudiciis quidem et poenis coercenda, aesthetice improbabili: / But now the same satire more happily persuades concerning a corruption of morals, not to be checked even by judgments and penalties, aesthetically improbable:
Quum populum gregibus comitum premat hic spoliator
Pupilli prostantis, et hic damnatus inani
Iudicio. Quid enim salvis infamia nummis?
Exsul ab octava Marius bibit, et fruitur Dis
Iratis. At tu, victrix provincia, ploras.
"when here, the plunderer of his ward (reduced by him to the vilest gains) presses on the people with his crowds of menials, and there, he that was condemned by a powerless sentence. (For what cares he for infamy while he retains the plunder?) Marius, though an exile, drinks from the eighth hour, and laughs at the angry gods, while thou, O Province, victorious in the suit, art in tears!"
§ 847
SECTIO L
EVIDENTIA AESTHETICA
Verisimilibus eiusmodi, § 843–846. dum aesthetica suada, § 838. circumfundit perspicuitatem sensitivam, § 618. nascitur inde evidentia, M. § 531. sensitiva, quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum, ad sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis analogon. Hanc evidentiam, quoniam immediatam, intuitivam et per se patentem plurimi iudicant, non raro praeferunt argumentando demum eliciendae, si vel illa maxime tandem intellectum convincat. Plurimorum sententiam Cotta profert apud Ciceronem de nat. deor. III. 9.
SECTION L
AESTHETIC EVIDENCE
When aesthetic suada, §838, pours sensory perspicuity, §618, around verisimilitudes of this kind, §§843–846, there arises sensory evidence, Metaphysics §531, which others have called demonstration to the eye, to the senses, and palpable, the analogue of intellectually convincing demonstration. Because many judge this evidence immediate, intuitive, and self-evident, they often prefer it to evidence finally elicited by arguing, even if the latter at last convinces the intellect. Cotta gives the opinion of many in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods III.9:
Ego neque in caussis, si quid est evidens (sensitive) de quo inter omnes convenit (nec enim de evidentibus intellectui omnibus inter omnes convenit, neque sunt omnia de quibus inter omnes convenire dicitur, intellectualiter evidentia) argumentari soleo. Perspicuitas enim (sensitiva) argumentatione elevatur (quum intellectualis potius intendatur) nec si id facerem in caussis forensibus, idem facerem in hac subtilitate sermonis — Sed quia non confidebas, tam esse id perspicuum, quam tu velis, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. Mihi enim unum satis erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse; Sed tu auctoritates omnes contemnis, ratione pugnas. Patere igitur, rationem meam cum tua ratione contendere. Affers haec omnia argumenta, cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam, argumentando dubiam facis.
for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading, yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which requires the nicest distinction. [...] But the truth is, that it was because you did not think that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that you therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them against yours. The proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not so;
Here "evident" and "perspicuity" are sensory: not everything evident to the intellect is universally agreed, nor is everything universally agreed intellectually evident; the contrast is with intellectual perspicuity.
SECTIO L
EVIDENTIA AESTHETICA
Verisimilibus eiusmodi, § 843–846. dum aesthetica suada, § 838. circumfundit perspicuitatem sensitivam, § 618. nascitur inde evidentia, M. § 531. sensitiva, quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum, ad sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis analogon.
SECTION L
AESTHETIC EVIDENCE
When aesthetic suada, §838, pours sensory perspicuity, §618, around verisimilitudes of this kind, §§843–846, there arises sensory evidence, Metaphysics §531, which others have called demonstration to the eye, to the senses, and palpable, the analogue of intellectually convincing demonstration.
Hanc evidentiam, quoniam immediatam, intuitivam et per se patentem plurimi iudicant, non raro praeferunt argumentando demum eliciendae, si vel illa maxime tandem intellectum convincat.
Because many judge this evidence immediate, intuitive, and self-evident, they often prefer it to evidence finally elicited by arguing, even if the latter at last convinces the intellect.
Plurimorum sententiam Cotta profert apud Ciceronem de nat. deor. III. 9.
Cotta gives the opinion of many in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods III.9:
Ego neque in caussis, si quid est evidens (sensitive) de quo inter omnes convenit (nec enim de evidentibus intellectui omnibus inter omnes convenit, neque sunt omnia de quibus inter omnes convenire dicitur, intellectualiter evidentia) argumentari soleo. Perspicuitas enim (sensitiva) argumentatione elevatur (quum intellectualis potius intendatur) nec si id facerem in caussis forensibus, idem facerem in hac subtilitate sermonis — Sed quia non confidebas, tam esse id perspicuum, quam tu velis, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. Mihi enim unum satis erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse; Sed tu auctoritates omnes contemnis, ratione pugnas. Patere igitur, rationem meam cum tua ratione contendere. Affers haec omnia argumenta, cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam, argumentando dubiam facis.
for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading, yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which requires the nicest distinction. [...] But the truth is, that it was because you did not think that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that you therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them against yours. The proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not so;
Here "evident" and "perspicuity" are sensory: not everything evident to the intellect is universally agreed, nor is everything universally agreed intellectually evident; the contrast is with intellectual perspicuity.
SECTIO L EVIDENTIA AESTHETICA Verisimilibus eiusmodi, § 843–846.
SECTION L AESTHETIC EVIDENCE When
dum aesthetica suada, § 838. circumfundit perspicuitatem sensitivam, § 618.
aesthetic suada, §838, pours sensory perspicuity, §618,
nascitur inde evidentia, M.
around verisimilitudes of this kind, §§843–846, there arises sensory evidence, Metaphysics
§ 531. sensitiva, quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum,
§531, which others have called demonstration to the eye,
ad sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis analogon.
to the senses, and palpable, the analogue of intellectually convincing demonstration.
Hanc evidentiam, quoniam immediatam, intuitivam
Because many judge this evidence immediate, intuitive,
et per se patentem plurimi iudicant,
and self-evident, they often
non raro praeferunt argumentando demum eliciendae,
prefer it to evidence finally elicited
si vel illa maxime tandem intellectum convincat.
by arguing, even if the latter at last convinces the intellect.
Plurimorum sententiam Cotta profert apud Ciceronem
Cotta gives the opinion of many in Cicero,
de nat. deor. III. 9.
On the Nature of the Gods III.9:
Ego neque in caussis, si quid est evidens (sensitive) de quo inter omnes convenit (nec enim de evidentibus intellectui omnibus inter omnes convenit, neque sunt omnia de quibus inter omnes convenire dicitur, intellectualiter evidentia) argumentari soleo. Perspicuitas enim (sensitiva) argumentatione elevatur (quum intellectualis potius intendatur) nec si id facerem in caussis forensibus, idem facerem in hac subtilitate sermonis — Sed quia non confidebas, tam esse id perspicuum, quam tu velis, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. Mihi enim unum satis erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse; Sed tu auctoritates omnes contemnis, ratione pugnas. Patere igitur, rationem meam cum tua ratione contendere. Affers haec omnia argumenta, cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam, argumentando dubiam facis.
for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading, yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which requires the nicest distinction. [...] But the truth is, that it was because you did not think that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that you therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them against yours. The proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not so;
Here "evident" and "perspicuity" are sensory: not everything evident to the intellect is universally agreed, nor is everything universally agreed intellectually evident; the contrast is with intellectual perspicuity.
SECTIO L EVIDENTIA AESTHETICA Verisimilibus eiusmodi, § 843–846. dum aesthetica suada, § 838. circumfundit perspicuitatem sensitivam, § 618. nascitur inde evidentia, M. § 531. sensitiva, quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum, ad sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis analogon. / SECTION L AESTHETIC EVIDENCE When aesthetic suada, §838, pours sensory perspicuity, §618, around verisimilitudes of this kind, §§843–846, there arises sensory evidence, Metaphysics §531, which others have called demonstration to the eye, to the senses, and palpable, the analogue of intellectually convincing demonstration.
Hanc evidentiam, quoniam immediatam, intuitivam et per se patentem plurimi iudicant, non raro praeferunt argumentando demum eliciendae, si vel illa maxime tandem intellectum convincat. / Because many judge this evidence immediate, intuitive, and self-evident, they often prefer it to evidence finally elicited by arguing, even if the latter at last convinces the intellect.
Plurimorum sententiam Cotta profert apud Ciceronem de nat. deor. III. 9. / Cotta gives the opinion of many in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods III.9:
Ego neque in caussis, si quid est evidens (sensitive) de quo inter omnes convenit (nec enim de evidentibus intellectui omnibus inter omnes convenit, neque sunt omnia de quibus inter omnes convenire dicitur, intellectualiter evidentia) argumentari soleo. Perspicuitas enim (sensitiva) argumentatione elevatur (quum intellectualis potius intendatur) nec si id facerem in caussis forensibus, idem facerem in hac subtilitate sermonis — Sed quia non confidebas, tam esse id perspicuum, quam tu velis, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. Mihi enim unum satis erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse; Sed tu auctoritates omnes contemnis, ratione pugnas. Patere igitur, rationem meam cum tua ratione contendere. Affers haec omnia argumenta, cur dii sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam, argumentando dubiam facis.
for, when I plead, I do not dwell upon any point agreed to be self-evident, because long reasoning only serves to confound the clearest matters; besides, though I might take this method in pleading, yet I should not make use of it in such a discourse as this, which requires the nicest distinction. [...] But the truth is, that it was because you did not think that the existence of the Gods was so evident as you could wish that you therefore brought so many proofs. It was sufficient for me to believe it on the tradition of our ancestors; and since you disregard authorities, and appeal to reason, permit my reason to defend them against yours. The proofs on which you found the existence of the Gods tend only to render a proposition doubtful that, in my opinion, is not so;
/ Here "evident" and "perspicuity" are sensory: not everything evident to the intellect is universally agreed, nor is everything universally agreed intellectually evident; the contrast is with intellectual perspicuity.
§ 848
Eandem in sententiam exorsus erat orationem suam Lucilius. II. 4.
Lucilius had begun his speech in the same opinion, II.4, saying:
Quid potest, inquiens, esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum caelum suspeximus, caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis? — Quod qui dubitat, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius?
for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed? [...] And if any one doubts this, I really do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this?
Consentiunt in hoc, numinis exsistentiam esse hominibus, sensitive etiam, evidentem, in hoc dissentiunt, quod hanc evidentiam cum intellectuali coniungere non male laborat Lucilius, argumentorum autem evidentiam minus bene Cotta reiicit. § 847.
They agree in this, that the existence of deity is evident to human beings, even sensibly; they disagree in this, that Lucilius works not badly to join this evidence with intellectual evidence, while Cotta less well rejects the evidence of arguments, §847.
Eandem in sententiam exorsus erat orationem suam Lucilius. II. 4.
Lucilius had begun his speech in the same opinion, II.4, saying:
Quid potest, inquiens, esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum caelum suspeximus, caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis? — Quod qui dubitat, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius?
for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed? [...] And if any one doubts this, I really do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this?
Consentiunt in hoc, numinis exsistentiam esse hominibus, sensitive etiam, evidentem, in hoc dissentiunt, quod hanc evidentiam cum intellectuali coniungere non male laborat Lucilius, argumentorum autem evidentiam minus bene Cotta reiicit. § 847.
They agree in this, that the existence of deity is evident to human beings, even sensibly; they disagree in this, that Lucilius works not badly to join this evidence with intellectual evidence, while Cotta less well rejects the evidence of arguments, §847.
Eandem in sententiam exorsus erat orationem suam Lucilius.
Lucilius had begun his speech in the same opinion,
II. 4.
II.4, saying:
Quid potest, inquiens, esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum caelum suspeximus, caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis? — Quod qui dubitat, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius?
for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed? [...] And if any one doubts this, I really do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this?
Consentiunt in hoc, numinis exsistentiam esse hominibus,
They agree in this, that the existence of deity is evident
sensitive etiam, evidentem, in hoc
to human beings, even sensibly; they disagree in this,
dissentiunt, quod hanc evidentiam
that Lucilius works not badly to join this evidence
cum intellectuali coniungere non male laborat Lucilius, argumentorum autem evidentiam
with intellectual evidence,
minus bene Cotta reiicit. § 847.
while Cotta less well rejects the evidence of arguments, §847.
Eandem in sententiam exorsus erat orationem suam Lucilius. II. 4. / Lucilius had begun his speech in the same opinion, II.4, saying:
Quid potest, inquiens, esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, quum caelum suspeximus, caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis? — Quod qui dubitat, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius?
for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed? [...] And if any one doubts this, I really do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this?
Consentiunt in hoc, numinis exsistentiam esse hominibus, sensitive etiam, evidentem, in hoc dissentiunt, quod hanc evidentiam cum intellectuali coniungere non male laborat Lucilius, argumentorum autem evidentiam minus bene Cotta reiicit. § 847. / They agree in this, that the existence of deity is evident to human beings, even sensibly; they disagree in this, that Lucilius works not badly to join this evidence with intellectual evidence, while Cotta less well rejects the evidence of arguments, §847.
§ 849
Quemadmodum autem vel mathematice convicti sibi videntur aliqui per evidentiam intellectualem, falsa tamen aliquando persuasione: sic et sensitivam evidentiam veram a falsa distinguere necesse est. § 832. Illam sequitur aesthetica, § 835, 838. licet nonnunquam per humanum errorem in evidentiam possit deducere; cui non parum admixtum sit falsae persuasionis, § 830. Ἀυτομάρτυρον Livius, VIII. 9. bellum huius rei exemplum exhibet narrans Decium
But just as some people seem to themselves mathematically convinced through intellectual evidence, yet sometimes by false persuasion, so it is necessary to distinguish true sensory evidence from false, §832. Aesthetics follows the former, §§835, 838, although sometimes through human error it can lead into evidence in which no small amount of false persuasion is mixed, §830. Livy VIII.9 presents a fine self-witnessing example of this matter when he narrates Decius
se pro legionibus devoventem, incinctumque cinctu Gabino se in medios hostes immittentem.
Come, as public pontiff of the Roman people, dictate to me the words in which I may devote myself for the legions. [...] He, girding himself in a Gabine cincture, and fully armed, mounted his horse, and rushed into the midst of the enemy..
Postquam enim quaedam ex persuasione spectatorum falsa retulit:
After he reported certain things false from the spectators' persuasion, he continues:
Evidentissimum,
This was most evident,
pergit,
was this:
id fuit, quod, quacunque equo invectus est, ibi haud secus, quam pestifero sidere icti, pavebant: ubi vero corruit obrutus telis, inde iam haud dubie consternatae cohortes Latinorum fugam ac vastitatem late fecerunt.
because, in whatever direction he was carried with his horse, there they became panic-stricken, as if struck by some pestilential constellation; but when he fell overwhelmed with darts, instantly the cohorts of the Latins, thrown into manifest consternation, took to flight, leaving a void to a considerable extent..
Quemadmodum autem vel mathematice convicti sibi videntur aliqui per evidentiam intellectualem, falsa tamen aliquando persuasione: sic et sensitivam evidentiam veram a falsa distinguere necesse est. § 832. Illam sequitur aesthetica, § 835, 838. licet nonnunquam per humanum errorem in evidentiam possit deducere; cui non parum admixtum sit falsae persuasionis, § 830. Ἀυτομάρτυρον Livius, VIII. 9. bellum huius rei exemplum exhibet narrans Decium
But just as some people seem to themselves mathematically convinced through intellectual evidence, yet sometimes by false persuasion, so it is necessary to distinguish true sensory evidence from false, §832. Aesthetics follows the former, §§835, 838, although sometimes through human error it can lead into evidence in which no small amount of false persuasion is mixed, §830. Livy VIII.9 presents a fine self-witnessing example of this matter when he narrates Decius
se pro legionibus devoventem, incinctumque cinctu Gabino se in medios hostes immittentem.
Come, as public pontiff of the Roman people, dictate to me the words in which I may devote myself for the legions. [...] He, girding himself in a Gabine cincture, and fully armed, mounted his horse, and rushed into the midst of the enemy..
Postquam enim quaedam ex persuasione spectatorum falsa retulit:
After he reported certain things false from the spectators' persuasion, he continues:
Evidentissimum,
This was most evident,
pergit,
was this:
id fuit, quod, quacunque equo invectus est, ibi haud secus, quam pestifero sidere icti, pavebant: ubi vero corruit obrutus telis, inde iam haud dubie consternatae cohortes Latinorum fugam ac vastitatem late fecerunt.
because, in whatever direction he was carried with his horse, there they became panic-stricken, as if struck by some pestilential constellation; but when he fell overwhelmed with darts, instantly the cohorts of the Latins, thrown into manifest consternation, took to flight, leaving a void to a considerable extent..
Quemadmodum autem vel mathematice
But just as some people seem to themselves mathematically
convicti sibi videntur aliqui per evidentiam intellectualem, falsa
convinced through intellectual evidence,
tamen aliquando persuasione: sic et sensitivam
yet sometimes by false persuasion, so it is necessary
evidentiam veram a falsa distinguere necesse est.
to distinguish true sensory evidence from false,
§ 832. Illam sequitur aesthetica, § 835, 838.
§832. Aesthetics follows the former, §§835, 838,
licet nonnunquam per humanum errorem in evidentiam possit deducere;
although sometimes through human error it can lead into evidence in which
cui non parum admixtum sit falsae persuasionis, § 830.
no small amount of false persuasion is mixed, §830.
Ἀυτομάρτυρον Livius, VIII. 9.
Livy VIII.9 presents a fine
bellum huius rei exemplum exhibet narrans Decium
self-witnessing example of this matter when he narrates Decius
se pro legionibus devoventem, incinctumque cinctu Gabino se in medios hostes immittentem.
Come, as public pontiff of the Roman people, dictate to me the words in which I may devote myself for the legions. [...] He, girding himself in a Gabine cincture, and fully armed, mounted his horse, and rushed into the midst of the enemy..
Postquam enim quaedam ex persuasione spectatorum falsa retulit:
After he reported certain things false from the spectators' persuasion, he continues:
Evidentissimum,
This was most evident,
pergit,
was this:
id fuit, quod, quacunque equo invectus est, ibi haud secus, quam pestifero sidere icti, pavebant: ubi vero corruit obrutus telis, inde iam haud dubie consternatae cohortes Latinorum fugam ac vastitatem late fecerunt.
because, in whatever direction he was carried with his horse, there they became panic-stricken, as if struck by some pestilential constellation; but when he fell overwhelmed with darts, instantly the cohorts of the Latins, thrown into manifest consternation, took to flight, leaving a void to a considerable extent..
Quemadmodum autem vel mathematice convicti sibi videntur aliqui per evidentiam intellectualem, falsa tamen aliquando persuasione: sic et sensitivam evidentiam veram a falsa distinguere necesse est. § 832. Illam sequitur aesthetica, § 835, 838. licet nonnunquam per humanum errorem in evidentiam possit deducere; cui non parum admixtum sit falsae persuasionis, § 830. Ἀυτομάρτυρον Livius, VIII. 9. bellum huius rei exemplum exhibet narrans Decium / But just as some people seem to themselves mathematically convinced through intellectual evidence, yet sometimes by false persuasion, so it is necessary to distinguish true sensory evidence from false, §832. Aesthetics follows the former, §§835, 838, although sometimes through human error it can lead into evidence in which no small amount of false persuasion is mixed, §830. Livy VIII.9 presents a fine self-witnessing example of this matter when he narrates Decius
se pro legionibus devoventem, incinctumque cinctu Gabino se in medios hostes immittentem.
Come, as public pontiff of the Roman people, dictate to me the words in which I may devote myself for the legions. [...] He, girding himself in a Gabine cincture, and fully armed, mounted his horse, and rushed into the midst of the enemy..
Postquam enim quaedam ex persuasione spectatorum falsa retulit: / After he reported certain things false from the spectators' persuasion, he continues:
Evidentissimum,
This was most evident,
pergit, / was this:
id fuit, quod, quacunque equo invectus est, ibi haud secus, quam pestifero sidere icti, pavebant: ubi vero corruit obrutus telis, inde iam haud dubie consternatae cohortes Latinorum fugam ac vastitatem late fecerunt.
because, in whatever direction he was carried with his horse, there they became panic-stricken, as if struck by some pestilential constellation; but when he fell overwhelmed with darts, instantly the cohorts of the Latins, thrown into manifest consternation, took to flight, leaving a void to a considerable extent..
§ 850
Hanc ob caussam Cicero top. 97. postulat, narratione:
For this reason Cicero, Topics 97, requires in narration
ut ad suos fines spectent, i. e. ut planae sint, ut breves,
And also he must attend to his relations of facts, so that they may have a bearing on his object, that is to say, that they may be plain, and brief, and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.,
§ 170.
that is, that they be plain, brief, §170,
ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae, ut cum dignitate. Quae quanquam in tota oratione (omni venusta meditatione) esse debent, tamen magis sunt propria narrandi.
and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.
Plana heic credibilitas multos evidentiae numeros absolvet. § 847. Idem de am. 27. quando ait amicitiam oriri
The same requirement holds in every graceful meditation. Plain credibility here will complete many counts of evidence, §847. Likewise in On Friendship 27, when he says that friendship arises
magis applicatione quadam animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione, quantum illa utilitatis sit habitura, quod quidem, quale sit, in bestiis etiam quibusdam deprehendi posse, multo tamen evidentius in homine:
Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford. What this feeling is may be perceived even in the case of certain animals, which, up to a certain time, so love their offspring and are so loved by them, that their impulses are easily seen. But this is much more evident in man;,
multo verius et clarius, hinc etiam ipso sensu certius evidentioris nomine complectitur.
he embraces under the name of the more evident what is much truer and clearer, and hence also more certain to sense itself.
Hanc ob caussam Cicero top. 97. postulat, narratione:
For this reason Cicero, Topics 97, requires in narration
ut ad suos fines spectent, i. e. ut planae sint, ut breves,
And also he must attend to his relations of facts, so that they may have a bearing on his object, that is to say, that they may be plain, and brief, and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.,
§ 170.
that is, that they be plain, brief, §170,
ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae, ut cum dignitate. Quae quanquam in tota oratione (omni venusta meditatione) esse debent, tamen magis sunt propria narrandi.
and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.
Plana heic credibilitas multos evidentiae numeros absolvet. § 847. Idem de am. 27. quando ait amicitiam oriri
The same requirement holds in every graceful meditation. Plain credibility here will complete many counts of evidence, §847. Likewise in On Friendship 27, when he says that friendship arises
magis applicatione quadam animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione, quantum illa utilitatis sit habitura, quod quidem, quale sit, in bestiis etiam quibusdam deprehendi posse, multo tamen evidentius in homine:
Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford. What this feeling is may be perceived even in the case of certain animals, which, up to a certain time, so love their offspring and are so loved by them, that their impulses are easily seen. But this is much more evident in man;,
multo verius et clarius, hinc etiam ipso sensu certius evidentioris nomine complectitur.
he embraces under the name of the more evident what is much truer and clearer, and hence also more certain to sense itself.
Hanc ob caussam Cicero top. 97. postulat, narratione:
For this reason Cicero, Topics 97, requires in narration
ut ad suos fines spectent, i. e. ut planae sint, ut breves,
And also he must attend to his relations of facts, so that they may have a bearing on his object, that is to say, that they may be plain, and brief, and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.,
§ 170.
that is, that they be plain, brief, §170,
ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae, ut cum dignitate. Quae quanquam in tota oratione (omni venusta meditatione) esse debent, tamen magis sunt propria narrandi.
and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.
Plana heic credibilitas multos evidentiae numeros absolvet.
The same requirement holds in every graceful meditation. Plain credibility here will complete many counts of evidence,
§ 847. Idem de am. 27. quando ait amicitiam oriri
§847. Likewise in On Friendship 27, when he says that friendship arises
magis applicatione quadam animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione, quantum illa utilitatis sit habitura, quod quidem, quale sit, in bestiis etiam quibusdam deprehendi posse, multo tamen evidentius in homine:
Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford. What this feeling is may be perceived even in the case of certain animals, which, up to a certain time, so love their offspring and are so loved by them, that their impulses are easily seen. But this is much more evident in man;,
multo verius
he embraces under the name of the more evident
et clarius,
what is much truer and clearer,
hinc etiam ipso sensu certius evidentioris nomine complectitur.
and hence also more certain to sense itself.
Hanc ob caussam Cicero top. 97. postulat, narratione: / For this reason Cicero, Topics 97, requires in narration
ut ad suos fines spectent, i. e. ut planae sint, ut breves,
And also he must attend to his relations of facts, so that they may have a bearing on his object, that is to say, that they may be plain, and brief, and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.,
§ 170. / that is, that they be plain, brief, §170,
ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae, ut cum dignitate. Quae quanquam in tota oratione (omni venusta meditatione) esse debent, tamen magis sunt propria narrandi.
and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.
Plana heic credibilitas multos evidentiae numeros absolvet. § 847. Idem de am. 27. quando ait amicitiam oriri / The same requirement holds in every graceful meditation. Plain credibility here will complete many counts of evidence, §847. Likewise in On Friendship 27, when he says that friendship arises
magis applicatione quadam animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione, quantum illa utilitatis sit habitura, quod quidem, quale sit, in bestiis etiam quibusdam deprehendi posse, multo tamen evidentius in homine:
Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford. What this feeling is may be perceived even in the case of certain animals, which, up to a certain time, so love their offspring and are so loved by them, that their impulses are easily seen. But this is much more evident in man;,
multo verius et clarius, hinc etiam ipso sensu certius evidentioris nomine complectitur. / he embraces under the name of the more evident what is much truer and clearer, and hence also more certain to sense itself.