§ 851
Conciliabimus itaque venustis meditationibus pulcram illam evidentiam, de qua huiusque, 1) vero nostro § 423–613. suam lucem dando § 614–828. 2) oppositis huic vero falsis et erroribus fucum veritatis detrahendo. § 763.
Therefore we shall reconcile to graceful meditations that beautiful evidence discussed so far, 1) by giving our truth, §§423–613, its own light, §§614–828; 2) by stripping the falsehoods and errors opposed to this truth of the false coloring of truth, §763.
Quum duae caussae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt animum atque intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut, quanta ea luce circumfusa sint, possint agnoscere. Alterum est, quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti, atque decepti quidam, quum ea dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promtu habere, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus, et captiones discutere.
Wherefore, as there are two causes which oppose what is manifest and evident, it is necessary also to provide oneself with an equal number of aids. For this is the first obstacle, that men do not sufficiently exert and fix their minds upon those things which are evident, so as to be able to understand how great the light is with which they are surrounded. The second is, that some men, being deluded and deceived by fallacious and captious interrogatories, when they cannot clear them up, abandon the truth. It is right, therefore, for us to have those answers ready which may be given in defence of the evidentness of a thing,—and we have already spoken of them,—and to be armed, in order to be able to encounter the questions of those people, and to scatter their captious objections to the winds: and this is what I propose to do next.,
Cic. quaest. ac. IIII. 46.
Cicero, Academic Questions IV.46.
Conciliabimus itaque venustis meditationibus pulcram illam evidentiam, de qua huiusque, 1) vero nostro § 423–613. suam lucem dando § 614–828. 2) oppositis huic vero falsis et erroribus fucum veritatis detrahendo. § 763.
Therefore we shall reconcile to graceful meditations that beautiful evidence discussed so far, 1) by giving our truth, §§423–613, its own light, §§614–828; 2) by stripping the falsehoods and errors opposed to this truth of the false coloring of truth, §763.
Quum duae caussae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt animum atque intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut, quanta ea luce circumfusa sint, possint agnoscere. Alterum est, quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti, atque decepti quidam, quum ea dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promtu habere, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus, et captiones discutere.
Wherefore, as there are two causes which oppose what is manifest and evident, it is necessary also to provide oneself with an equal number of aids. For this is the first obstacle, that men do not sufficiently exert and fix their minds upon those things which are evident, so as to be able to understand how great the light is with which they are surrounded. The second is, that some men, being deluded and deceived by fallacious and captious interrogatories, when they cannot clear them up, abandon the truth. It is right, therefore, for us to have those answers ready which may be given in defence of the evidentness of a thing,—and we have already spoken of them,—and to be armed, in order to be able to encounter the questions of those people, and to scatter their captious objections to the winds: and this is what I propose to do next.,
Cic. quaest. ac. IIII. 46.
Cicero, Academic Questions IV.46.
Conciliabimus itaque venustis meditationibus pulcram illam evidentiam,
Therefore we shall reconcile to graceful meditations that beautiful evidence
de qua huiusque, 1) vero nostro § 423–613.
discussed so far, 1) by giving our truth, §§423–613,
suam lucem dando § 614–828. 2) oppositis huic vero falsis
its own light, §§614–828; 2) by stripping the falsehoods
et erroribus fucum veritatis detrahendo.
and errors opposed to this truth of the false coloring of
§ 763.
truth, §763.
Quum duae caussae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt animum atque intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut, quanta ea luce circumfusa sint, possint agnoscere. Alterum est, quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti, atque decepti quidam, quum ea dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promtu habere, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus, et captiones discutere.
Wherefore, as there are two causes which oppose what is manifest and evident, it is necessary also to provide oneself with an equal number of aids. For this is the first obstacle, that men do not sufficiently exert and fix their minds upon those things which are evident, so as to be able to understand how great the light is with which they are surrounded. The second is, that some men, being deluded and deceived by fallacious and captious interrogatories, when they cannot clear them up, abandon the truth. It is right, therefore, for us to have those answers ready which may be given in defence of the evidentness of a thing,—and we have already spoken of them,—and to be armed, in order to be able to encounter the questions of those people, and to scatter their captious objections to the winds: and this is what I propose to do next.,
Cic. quaest. ac. IIII. 46.
Cicero, Academic Questions IV.46.
Conciliabimus itaque venustis meditationibus pulcram illam evidentiam, de qua huiusque, 1) vero nostro § 423–613. suam lucem dando § 614–828. 2) oppositis huic vero falsis et erroribus fucum veritatis detrahendo. § 763. / Therefore we shall reconcile to graceful meditations that beautiful evidence discussed so far, 1) by giving our truth, §§423–613, its own light, §§614–828; 2) by stripping the falsehoods and errors opposed to this truth of the false coloring of truth, §763.
Quum duae caussae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt animum atque intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut, quanta ea luce circumfusa sint, possint agnoscere. Alterum est, quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti, atque decepti quidam, quum ea dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promtu habere, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus, et captiones discutere.
Wherefore, as there are two causes which oppose what is manifest and evident, it is necessary also to provide oneself with an equal number of aids. For this is the first obstacle, that men do not sufficiently exert and fix their minds upon those things which are evident, so as to be able to understand how great the light is with which they are surrounded. The second is, that some men, being deluded and deceived by fallacious and captious interrogatories, when they cannot clear them up, abandon the truth. It is right, therefore, for us to have those answers ready which may be given in defence of the evidentness of a thing,—and we have already spoken of them,—and to be armed, in order to be able to encounter the questions of those people, and to scatter their captious objections to the winds: and this is what I propose to do next.,
Cic. quaest. ac. IIII. 46. / Cicero, Academic Questions IV.46.
§ 852
Perspicuum et evidens saepe Ciceroni sunt in synonymis. Ita enim sub aliena persona latens. 17.
The perspicuous and the evident are often synonyms for Cicero. Thus, hiding under another person, 17, he says:
ἐνάργειαν, inquit, graecarum perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus, fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba.
there is nothing clearer than ἐνάργεια, as the Greeks call it, and which we may call perspicuity, or evidentness if you like,—coining words, if you will permit us to do so, that this fellow (meaning me) may not think that he is the only person to whom such liberties are permitted..
Quoniam autem philosophis non opus est synonymis, veri demum perspicuitatem evidentiam dicimus: ita, ut omnia quidem evidentia simul concedamus esse perspicua; propterea quod nihil est clarius ἐναργείᾳ, neque tamen omnia perspicua iam hoc ipso largiamur esse simul evidentia. § 614. ἐνάργεια a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae
But since philosophers do not need synonyms, we call only the perspicuity of the true evidence: in such a way that we indeed concede that all evident things are also perspicuous, because nothing is clearer than ἐνάργεια, but we do not therefore grant that all perspicuous things are at once evident, §614. ἐνάργεια is named by Cicero illustration and evidence, which
non tam dicere videtur, quam ostendere.
From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence.,
Quint. VI. 2. Nos quidem evidentiam omnem illustrare non negabimus, § 730. quoniam et nos putamus orationem nullam illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse, neque tamen omni illustrationi suam evidentiam inesse concedimus. § 731.
Quintilian VI.2. We indeed will not deny that all evidence illustrates, §730, since we too think no speech can be found more illustrative than evidence itself; yet we do not concede that every illustration has its own evidence, §731.
Plus est evidentia, vel, ut alii dicunt ἐνάργεια, repraesentatio, quam perspicuitas et illustratio. Magna virtus est res, de quibus loquimur, clare, atque ut cerni videantur, cum experientiae consueta certitudine, enunciare.
Consequently we must place among ornaments that ἐνάργεια which I mentioned in the rules which I laid down for the statement of facts, because vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation, is something more than mere clearness, since the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice.
It is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly.,
Quint. VIII. 3.
with the customary certitude of experience, Quintilian VIII.3.
Perspicuum et evidens saepe Ciceroni sunt in synonymis.
The perspicuous and the evident are often synonyms for Cicero.
Ita enim sub aliena persona latens. 17.
Thus, hiding under another person, 17, he says:
ἐνάργειαν, inquit, graecarum perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus, fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba.
there is nothing clearer than ἐνάργεια, as the Greeks call it, and which we may call perspicuity, or evidentness if you like,—coining words, if you will permit us to do so, that this fellow (meaning me) may not think that he is the only person to whom such liberties are permitted..
Quoniam autem philosophis non opus est synonymis, veri demum perspicuitatem evidentiam dicimus: ita, ut omnia quidem evidentia simul concedamus esse perspicua; propterea quod nihil est clarius ἐναργείᾳ, neque tamen omnia perspicua iam hoc ipso largiamur esse simul evidentia. § 614. ἐνάργεια a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae
But since philosophers do not need synonyms, we call only the perspicuity of the true evidence: in such a way that we indeed concede that all evident things are also perspicuous, because nothing is clearer than ἐνάργεια, but we do not therefore grant that all perspicuous things are at once evident, §614. ἐνάργεια is named by Cicero illustration and evidence, which
non tam dicere videtur, quam ostendere.
From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence.,
Quint. VI. 2. Nos quidem evidentiam omnem illustrare non negabimus, § 730. quoniam et nos putamus orationem nullam illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse, neque tamen omni illustrationi suam evidentiam inesse concedimus. § 731.
Quintilian VI.2. We indeed will not deny that all evidence illustrates, §730, since we too think no speech can be found more illustrative than evidence itself; yet we do not concede that every illustration has its own evidence, §731.
Plus est evidentia, vel, ut alii dicunt ἐνάργεια, repraesentatio, quam perspicuitas et illustratio. Magna virtus est res, de quibus loquimur, clare, atque ut cerni videantur, cum experientiae consueta certitudine, enunciare.
Consequently we must place among ornaments that ἐνάργεια which I mentioned in the rules which I laid down for the statement of facts, because vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation, is something more than mere clearness, since the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice.
It is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly.,
Quint. VIII. 3.
with the customary certitude of experience, Quintilian VIII.3.
Perspicuum et evidens saepe Ciceroni sunt in synonymis.
The perspicuous and the evident are often synonyms for Cicero.
Ita enim sub aliena persona latens. 17.
Thus, hiding under another person, 17, he says:
ἐνάργειαν, inquit, graecarum perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus, fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba.
there is nothing clearer than ἐνάργεια, as the Greeks call it, and which we may call perspicuity, or evidentness if you like,—coining words, if you will permit us to do so, that this fellow (meaning me) may not think that he is the only person to whom such liberties are permitted..
Quoniam autem philosophis non opus est synonymis,
But since philosophers do not need synonyms,
veri demum perspicuitatem evidentiam
we call only the perspicuity of the true evidence:
dicimus: ita, ut omnia quidem
in such a way that we indeed concede that
evidentia simul concedamus esse perspicua;
all evident things are also perspicuous,
propterea quod nihil est clarius ἐναργείᾳ,
because nothing is clearer than ἐνάργεια,
neque tamen omnia perspicua
but we do not therefore grant that all perspicuous
iam hoc ipso largiamur esse simul evidentia. § 614.
things are at once evident, §614.
ἐνάργεια a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae
ἐνάργεια is named by Cicero illustration and evidence, which
non tam dicere videtur, quam ostendere.
From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence.,
Quint. VI. 2. Nos quidem evidentiam omnem illustrare
Quintilian VI.2. We indeed will not deny that all evidence illustrates,
non negabimus, § 730. quoniam et nos
§730, since we too think no speech
putamus orationem nullam illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri
can be found more illustrative than evidence itself;
posse, neque tamen omni illustrationi suam evidentiam
yet we do not concede that every illustration has its own evidence,
inesse concedimus. § 731.
§731.
Plus est evidentia, vel, ut alii dicunt ἐνάργεια, repraesentatio, quam perspicuitas et illustratio. Magna virtus est res, de quibus loquimur, clare, atque ut cerni videantur, cum experientiae consueta certitudine, enunciare.
Consequently we must place among ornaments that ἐνάργεια which I mentioned in the rules which I laid down for the statement of facts, because vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation, is something more than mere clearness, since the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice.
It is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly.,
Quint. VIII. 3.
with the customary certitude of experience, Quintilian VIII.3.
Perspicuum et evidens saepe Ciceroni sunt in synonymis. / The perspicuous and the evident are often synonyms for Cicero.
Ita enim sub aliena persona latens. 17. / Thus, hiding under another person, 17, he says:
ἐνάργειαν, inquit, graecarum perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus, fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba.
there is nothing clearer than ἐνάργεια, as the Greeks call it, and which we may call perspicuity, or evidentness if you like,—coining words, if you will permit us to do so, that this fellow (meaning me) may not think that he is the only person to whom such liberties are permitted..
Quoniam autem philosophis non opus est synonymis, veri demum perspicuitatem evidentiam dicimus: ita, ut omnia quidem evidentia simul concedamus esse perspicua; propterea quod nihil est clarius ἐναργείᾳ, neque tamen omnia perspicua iam hoc ipso largiamur esse simul evidentia. § 614. ἐνάργεια a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae / But since philosophers do not need synonyms, we call only the perspicuity of the true evidence: in such a way that we indeed concede that all evident things are also perspicuous, because nothing is clearer than ἐνάργεια, but we do not therefore grant that all perspicuous things are at once evident, §614. ἐνάργεια is named by Cicero illustration and evidence, which
non tam dicere videtur, quam ostendere.
From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence.,
Quint. VI. 2. Nos quidem evidentiam omnem illustrare non negabimus, § 730. quoniam et nos putamus orationem nullam illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse, neque tamen omni illustrationi suam evidentiam inesse concedimus. § 731. / Quintilian VI.2. We indeed will not deny that all evidence illustrates, §730, since we too think no speech can be found more illustrative than evidence itself; yet we do not concede that every illustration has its own evidence, §731.
Plus est evidentia, vel, ut alii dicunt ἐνάργεια, repraesentatio, quam perspicuitas et illustratio. Magna virtus est res, de quibus loquimur, clare, atque ut cerni videantur, cum experientiae consueta certitudine, enunciare.
Consequently we must place among ornaments that ἐνάργεια which I mentioned in the rules which I laid down for the statement of facts, because vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation, is something more than mere clearness, since the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice.
It is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly.,
Quint. VIII. 3. / with the customary certitude of experience, Quintilian VIII.3.
§ 853
Quo clarius, sensitive tamen, § 614. hinc quo vividius, § 619. quo plures, quo maiores veritates persuadendo sistuntur obiectis tuis personalibus ob oculos mentis: hoc maior erit persuasio, hoc maior eam comitabitur evidentia, M. § 880. Hinc ob persuasionem, quam praestare possis, maximam nova nascitur ingeniis venustis obligatio legendi sibi, quae possint, verissima themata, quoniam, caetera si fuerint paria, quo quid est verius, hoc idem erit persuasibilius et ostendi poterit evidentius. § 555.
The more clearly, though sensibly, §614, and hence the more vividly, §619, the more and the greater truths are set by persuasion before the mental eyes of your personal objects, the greater the persuasion will be, and the greater the evidence accompanying it, Metaphysics §880. Hence, because of the persuasion you can furnish, a very great new obligation arises for graceful talents to choose for themselves the truest themes they can, since, other things being equal, the truer something is, the more persuasible it will be and the more evidently it can be shown, §555.
Quo clarius, sensitive tamen, § 614. hinc quo vividius, § 619. quo plures, quo maiores veritates persuadendo sistuntur obiectis tuis personalibus ob oculos mentis: hoc maior erit persuasio, hoc maior eam comitabitur evidentia, M. § 880. Hinc ob persuasionem, quam praestare possis, maximam nova nascitur ingeniis venustis obligatio legendi sibi, quae possint, verissima themata, quoniam, caetera si fuerint paria, quo quid est verius, hoc idem erit persuasibilius et ostendi poterit evidentius. § 555.
The more clearly, though sensibly, §614, and hence the more vividly, §619, the more and the greater truths are set by persuasion before the mental eyes of your personal objects, the greater the persuasion will be, and the greater the evidence accompanying it, Metaphysics §880. Hence, because of the persuasion you can furnish, a very great new obligation arises for graceful talents to choose for themselves the truest themes they can, since, other things being equal, the truer something is, the more persuasible it will be and the more evidently it can be shown, §555.
Quo clarius, sensitive tamen, § 614.
The more clearly, though sensibly, §614,
hinc quo vividius, § 619.
and hence the more vividly, §619,
quo plures, quo maiores veritates
the more and the greater truths are
persuadendo sistuntur obiectis tuis
set by persuasion before the mental eyes of your
personalibus ob oculos mentis: hoc maior erit persuasio,
personal objects, the greater the persuasion will be,
hoc maior eam comitabitur evidentia, M.
and the greater the evidence accompanying it, Metaphysics
§ 880. Hinc ob persuasionem, quam praestare possis,
§880. Hence, because of the persuasion you can furnish,
maximam nova nascitur ingeniis venustis obligatio
a very great new obligation arises for graceful
legendi sibi, quae possint, verissima themata,
talents to choose for themselves the truest themes they
quoniam, caetera si fuerint paria, quo quid est
can, since, other things being equal, the truer something is,
verius, hoc idem erit persuasibilius et ostendi poterit evidentius.
the more persuasible it will be and the more evidently
§ 555.
it can be shown, §555.
Quo clarius, sensitive tamen, § 614. hinc quo vividius, § 619. quo plures, quo maiores veritates persuadendo sistuntur obiectis tuis personalibus ob oculos mentis: hoc maior erit persuasio, hoc maior eam comitabitur evidentia, M. § 880. Hinc ob persuasionem, quam praestare possis, maximam nova nascitur ingeniis venustis obligatio legendi sibi, quae possint, verissima themata, quoniam, caetera si fuerint paria, quo quid est verius, hoc idem erit persuasibilius et ostendi poterit evidentius. § 555. / The more clearly, though sensibly, §614, and hence the more vividly, §619, the more and the greater truths are set by persuasion before the mental eyes of your personal objects, the greater the persuasion will be, and the greater the evidence accompanying it, Metaphysics §880. Hence, because of the persuasion you can furnish, a very great new obligation arises for graceful talents to choose for themselves the truest themes they can, since, other things being equal, the truer something is, the more persuasible it will be and the more evidently it can be shown, §555.
§ 854
Persuasio aesthetica etiam, sicut logica, vel erit directa et ostensiva, qua verum esse, quod ponimus, vel admodum verisimile declaremus evidenter, ad oppositum illi falsum minus attendentes; vel apogogica et per indirectum procedens, deducens ad aesthetice falsum et falso simile, vel incongruum, qua circumdamus nostris, quae ponimus, veritatis verisimilitudinisque lucem, detecta falsitate his repugnantium, § 851.
Aesthetic persuasion too, like logical persuasion, will be either direct and ostensive, by which we evidently declare that what we posit is true or highly verisimilar, attending less to the false thing opposed to it; or it will be apagogic and proceed indirectly, leading down to what is aesthetically false and like the false, or incongruous, by which we surround the things we posit with the light of truth and verisimilitude, once the falsity of things opposed to them has been detected, §851.
Persuasio aesthetica etiam, sicut logica, vel erit directa et ostensiva, qua verum esse, quod ponimus, vel admodum verisimile declaremus evidenter, ad oppositum illi falsum minus attendentes; vel apogogica et per indirectum procedens, deducens ad aesthetice falsum et falso simile, vel incongruum, qua circumdamus nostris, quae ponimus, veritatis verisimilitudinisque lucem, detecta falsitate his repugnantium, § 851.
Aesthetic persuasion too, like logical persuasion, will be either direct and ostensive, by which we evidently declare that what we posit is true or highly verisimilar, attending less to the false thing opposed to it; or it will be apagogic and proceed indirectly, leading down to what is aesthetically false and like the false, or incongruous, by which we surround the things we posit with the light of truth and verisimilitude, once the falsity of things opposed to them has been detected, §851.
Persuasio aesthetica etiam, sicut logica, vel
Aesthetic persuasion too, like logical persuasion,
erit directa et ostensiva,
will be either direct and ostensive,
qua verum esse,
by which we evidently declare that what we posit is
quod ponimus, vel admodum verisimile declaremus evidenter,
true or highly verisimilar, attending less
ad oppositum illi falsum minus attendentes;
to the false thing opposed to it; or it will
vel apogogica et per indirectum procedens,
be apagogic and proceed indirectly, leading
deducens ad aesthetice falsum et falso
down to what is aesthetically false and like the false,
simile, vel incongruum, qua
or incongruous, by which we surround the things
circumdamus nostris, quae ponimus, veritatis verisimilitudinisque
we posit with the light of truth and verisimilitude,
lucem, detecta falsitate his repugnantium, § 851.
once the falsity of things opposed to them has been detected, §851.
Persuasio aesthetica etiam, sicut logica, vel erit directa et ostensiva, qua verum esse, quod ponimus, vel admodum verisimile declaremus evidenter, ad oppositum illi falsum minus attendentes; vel apogogica et per indirectum procedens, deducens ad aesthetice falsum et falso simile, vel incongruum, qua circumdamus nostris, quae ponimus, veritatis verisimilitudinisque lucem, detecta falsitate his repugnantium, § 851. / Aesthetic persuasion too, like logical persuasion, will be either direct and ostensive, by which we evidently declare that what we posit is true or highly verisimilar, attending less to the false thing opposed to it; or it will be apagogic and proceed indirectly, leading down to what is aesthetically false and like the false, or incongruous, by which we surround the things we posit with the light of truth and verisimilitude, once the falsity of things opposed to them has been detected, §851.
§ 855
SECTIO LI
CONFIRMATIO
Persuasio directa et ostensiva CONFIRMATIO est, sicut apogogica, persuadens falsitatem oppositi, logicae refutationis analogon, REPREHENSIO, quam et infirmationem contrarii dixeris. Ita coniungit hanc duplicem persuadendi viam Cicero de Div. II. 38.
SECTION LI
CONFIRMATION
Direct and ostensive persuasion is CONFIRMATION, just as apagogic persuasion, persuading the falsity of the opposite, the analogue of logical refutation, is REPREHENSION, which you may also call the weakening of the contrary. Cicero joins this double way of persuading in On Divination II.38: You indeed, he says,
Tu quidem, inquiens, non hostiarum casum confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortes collatione hostiarum.
although you really do not strengthen the cause of sacrifices by comparing them to lots; but you do weaken the cause of lots by comparing them with sacrifices..
Immo iam citra artem ipsa natura facultatem utramque coniunctam iudicat, quoniam
Indeed nature itself, already before art, judges both faculties joined, because
ita nati sumus, ut ea, quae intenderemus, confirmare, et id, quod contra diceretur, refellere possemus.
we are so formed by nature as to be able to flatter, and to insinuate ourselves, as suppliants, into the favour of those from whom we wish to obtain anything, as well as to terrify our enemies by menaces, to relate matters of fact, to confirm what we assert, to refute what is said against us, and, finally, to use entreaty or lamentation; particulars in which the whole faculties of the orator are employed,
de or. I. 90. Rhetores idem narrat iubere ut, inter alia,
On the Orator I.90. He reports that rhetoricians likewise command that, among other things,
nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus, deinde contraria refutare.
to confirm what makes for us by arguments and reasoning, and refute what makes for the adversary,
I. 90.
I.90.
SECTIO LI
CONFIRMATIO
Persuasio directa et ostensiva CONFIRMATIO est, sicut apogogica, persuadens falsitatem oppositi, logicae refutationis analogon, REPREHENSIO, quam et infirmationem contrarii dixeris.
SECTION LI
CONFIRMATION
Direct and ostensive persuasion is CONFIRMATION, just as apagogic persuasion, persuading the falsity of the opposite, the analogue of logical refutation, is REPREHENSION, which you may also call the weakening of the contrary.
Ita coniungit hanc duplicem persuadendi viam Cicero de Div. II. 38.
Cicero joins this double way of persuading in On Divination II.38: You indeed, he says,
Tu quidem, inquiens, non hostiarum casum confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortes collatione hostiarum.
although you really do not strengthen the cause of sacrifices by comparing them to lots; but you do weaken the cause of lots by comparing them with sacrifices..
Immo iam citra artem ipsa natura facultatem utramque coniunctam iudicat, quoniam
Indeed nature itself, already before art, judges both faculties joined, because
ita nati sumus, ut ea, quae intenderemus, confirmare, et id, quod contra diceretur, refellere possemus.
we are so formed by nature as to be able to flatter, and to insinuate ourselves, as suppliants, into the favour of those from whom we wish to obtain anything, as well as to terrify our enemies by menaces, to relate matters of fact, to confirm what we assert, to refute what is said against us, and, finally, to use entreaty or lamentation; particulars in which the whole faculties of the orator are employed,
de or. I. 90. Rhetores idem narrat iubere ut, inter alia,
On the Orator I.90. He reports that rhetoricians likewise command that, among other things,
nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus, deinde contraria refutare.
to confirm what makes for us by arguments and reasoning, and refute what makes for the adversary,
I. 90.
I.90.
SECTIO LI CONFIRMATIO Persuasio directa et ostensiva CONFIRMATIO est,
SECTION LI CONFIRMATION Direct and ostensive persuasion is
sicut apogogica, persuadens falsitatem oppositi,
CONFIRMATION, just as apagogic persuasion, persuading the falsity of the opposite,
logicae refutationis analogon, REPREHENSIO,
the analogue of logical refutation, is REPREHENSION,
quam et infirmationem contrarii dixeris.
which you may also call the weakening of the contrary.
Ita coniungit hanc duplicem persuadendi viam Cicero de
Cicero joins this double way of persuading in On Divination II.38:
Div. II. 38.
You indeed, he says,
Tu quidem, inquiens, non hostiarum casum confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortes collatione hostiarum.
although you really do not strengthen the cause of sacrifices by comparing them to lots; but you do weaken the cause of lots by comparing them with sacrifices..
Immo iam citra artem
Indeed nature itself, already before art,
ipsa natura facultatem utramque coniunctam iudicat, quoniam
judges both faculties joined, because
ita nati sumus, ut ea, quae intenderemus, confirmare, et id, quod contra diceretur, refellere possemus.
we are so formed by nature as to be able to flatter, and to insinuate ourselves, as suppliants, into the favour of those from whom we wish to obtain anything, as well as to terrify our enemies by menaces, to relate matters of fact, to confirm what we assert, to refute what is said against us, and, finally, to use entreaty or lamentation; particulars in which the whole faculties of the orator are employed,
de or. I. 90. Rhetores idem narrat iubere ut,
On the Orator I.90. He reports that rhetoricians likewise command that,
inter alia,
among other things,
nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus, deinde contraria refutare.
to confirm what makes for us by arguments and reasoning, and refute what makes for the adversary,
I. 90.
I.90.
SECTIO LI CONFIRMATIO Persuasio directa et ostensiva CONFIRMATIO est, sicut apogogica, persuadens falsitatem oppositi, logicae refutationis analogon, REPREHENSIO, quam et infirmationem contrarii dixeris. / SECTION LI CONFIRMATION Direct and ostensive persuasion is CONFIRMATION, just as apagogic persuasion, persuading the falsity of the opposite, the analogue of logical refutation, is REPREHENSION, which you may also call the weakening of the contrary.
Ita coniungit hanc duplicem persuadendi viam Cicero de Div. II. 38. / Cicero joins this double way of persuading in On Divination II.38: You indeed, he says,
Tu quidem, inquiens, non hostiarum casum confirmas sortium similitudine, sed infirmas sortes collatione hostiarum.
although you really do not strengthen the cause of sacrifices by comparing them to lots; but you do weaken the cause of lots by comparing them with sacrifices..
Immo iam citra artem ipsa natura facultatem utramque coniunctam iudicat, quoniam / Indeed nature itself, already before art, judges both faculties joined, because
ita nati sumus, ut ea, quae intenderemus, confirmare, et id, quod contra diceretur, refellere possemus.
we are so formed by nature as to be able to flatter, and to insinuate ourselves, as suppliants, into the favour of those from whom we wish to obtain anything, as well as to terrify our enemies by menaces, to relate matters of fact, to confirm what we assert, to refute what is said against us, and, finally, to use entreaty or lamentation; particulars in which the whole faculties of the orator are employed,
de or. I. 90. Rhetores idem narrat iubere ut, inter alia, / On the Orator I.90. He reports that rhetoricians likewise command that, among other things,
nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus, deinde contraria refutare.
to confirm what makes for us by arguments and reasoning, and refute what makes for the adversary,
I. 90. / I.90.
§ 856
Poetarum non minus est, ac oratorum, persuadere, § 829. Hinc persuasurus, licet infeliciter, Lucretius, et reprehendit, II. 174.
It belongs no less to poets than to orators to persuade, §829. Hence Lucretius, about to persuade, although unhappily, both reprehends, II.174:
generis humani
omnia caussa
Constituisse deos dum fingunt, omnibus rebus
Magnopere a vera lapsi ratione videntur
"Lest humankind should perish. When they feign
That gods have stablished all things but for man,
They seem in all ways mightily to lapse
From reason's truth"
et confirmat. 177.
and confirms, 177:
Nam quamvis rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam
Naturam mundi, quae tanta est praedita culpa.
Quae tibi posterius, Memmi, faciemus aperta.
Nunc locus est, ut opinor, in his illud quoque rebus
Confirmare tibi, nullam rem posse sua vi
Corpoream sursum ferri, sursumque meare.
Nec tibi dent in eo flammarum corpora fraudem,
"for ev'n if ne'er I knew
What seeds primordial are, yet would I dare
This to affirm, ev'n from deep judgment based
Upon the ways and conduct of the skies-
This to maintain by many a fact besides-
That in no wise the nature of the world
For us was builded by a power divine-
So great the faults it stands encumbered with:
The which, my Memmius, later on, for thee
We will clear up.
...
Now is the place, meseems, in these affairs
To prove for thee this too: nothing corporeal
Of its own force can e'er be upward borne,
Or upward go- nor let the bodies of flames
Deceive thee here:"
et ita pergit refellendo.
and so he proceeds by refuting.
Poetarum non minus est, ac oratorum, persuadere, § 829. Hinc persuasurus, licet infeliciter, Lucretius, et reprehendit, II. 174.
It belongs no less to poets than to orators to persuade, §829. Hence Lucretius, about to persuade, although unhappily, both reprehends, II.174:
generis humani
omnia caussa
Constituisse deos dum fingunt, omnibus rebus
Magnopere a vera lapsi ratione videntur
"Lest humankind should perish. When they feign
That gods have stablished all things but for man,
They seem in all ways mightily to lapse
From reason's truth"
et confirmat. 177.
and confirms, 177:
Nam quamvis rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam
Naturam mundi, quae tanta est praedita culpa.
Quae tibi posterius, Memmi, faciemus aperta.
Nunc locus est, ut opinor, in his illud quoque rebus
Confirmare tibi, nullam rem posse sua vi
Corpoream sursum ferri, sursumque meare.
Nec tibi dent in eo flammarum corpora fraudem,
"for ev'n if ne'er I knew
What seeds primordial are, yet would I dare
This to affirm, ev'n from deep judgment based
Upon the ways and conduct of the skies-
This to maintain by many a fact besides-
That in no wise the nature of the world
For us was builded by a power divine-
So great the faults it stands encumbered with:
The which, my Memmius, later on, for thee
We will clear up.
...
Now is the place, meseems, in these affairs
To prove for thee this too: nothing corporeal
Of its own force can e'er be upward borne,
Or upward go- nor let the bodies of flames
Deceive thee here:"
et ita pergit refellendo.
and so he proceeds by refuting.
Poetarum non minus est, ac oratorum, persuadere, § 829.
It belongs no less to poets than to orators to persuade, §829.
Hinc persuasurus, licet infeliciter, Lucretius,
Hence Lucretius, about to persuade,
et reprehendit, II. 174.
although unhappily, both reprehends, II.174:
generis humani
omnia caussa
Constituisse deos dum fingunt, omnibus rebus
Magnopere a vera lapsi ratione videntur
"Lest humankind should perish. When they feign
That gods have stablished all things but for man,
They seem in all ways mightily to lapse
From reason's truth"
et confirmat. 177.
and confirms, 177:
Nam quamvis rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam
Naturam mundi, quae tanta est praedita culpa.
Quae tibi posterius, Memmi, faciemus aperta.
Nunc locus est, ut opinor, in his illud quoque rebus
Confirmare tibi, nullam rem posse sua vi
Corpoream sursum ferri, sursumque meare.
Nec tibi dent in eo flammarum corpora fraudem,
"for ev'n if ne'er I knew
What seeds primordial are, yet would I dare
This to affirm, ev'n from deep judgment based
Upon the ways and conduct of the skies-
This to maintain by many a fact besides-
That in no wise the nature of the world
For us was builded by a power divine-
So great the faults it stands encumbered with:
The which, my Memmius, later on, for thee
We will clear up.
...
Now is the place, meseems, in these affairs
To prove for thee this too: nothing corporeal
Of its own force can e'er be upward borne,
Or upward go- nor let the bodies of flames
Deceive thee here:"
et ita pergit refellendo.
and so he proceeds by refuting.
Poetarum non minus est, ac oratorum, persuadere, § 829. Hinc persuasurus, licet infeliciter, Lucretius, et reprehendit, II. 174. / It belongs no less to poets than to orators to persuade, §829. Hence Lucretius, about to persuade, although unhappily, both reprehends, II.174:
generis humani
omnia caussa
Constituisse deos dum fingunt, omnibus rebus
Magnopere a vera lapsi ratione videntur
"Lest humankind should perish. When they feign
That gods have stablished all things but for man,
They seem in all ways mightily to lapse
From reason's truth"
et confirmat. 177. / and confirms, 177:
Nam quamvis rerum ignorem primordia quae sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis caeli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam
Naturam mundi, quae tanta est praedita culpa.
Quae tibi posterius, Memmi, faciemus aperta.
Nunc locus est, ut opinor, in his illud quoque rebus
Confirmare tibi, nullam rem posse sua vi
Corpoream sursum ferri, sursumque meare.
Nec tibi dent in eo flammarum corpora fraudem,
"for ev'n if ne'er I knew
What seeds primordial are, yet would I dare
This to affirm, ev'n from deep judgment based
Upon the ways and conduct of the skies-
This to maintain by many a fact besides-
That in no wise the nature of the world
For us was builded by a power divine-
So great the faults it stands encumbered with:
The which, my Memmius, later on, for thee
We will clear up.
...
Now is the place, meseems, in these affairs
To prove for thee this too: nothing corporeal
Of its own force can e'er be upward borne,
Or upward go- nor let the bodies of flames
Deceive thee here:"
et ita pergit refellendo. / and so he proceeds by refuting.
§ 857
Primum heic postulatum est, si quid intendis, ut illud sine dubitatione confirmes, etiamsi non semper omnis tolli possit incertitudo. Licet aliquando deesse non nihil plenae persuasioni, vel analogo rationis patere possit, ille tamen status, quo rationes in utramque contrariorum partem compares videantur et aequales, animo prius tuo, dein tuorum animis evellendus omnino est, nisi irritum persuadendi conatum in te rideri velis. Certitudo quaedam cum quadam incertitudine potest consistere, sed nulla certitudo, hinc nulla persuasio, nulla evidentia, confirmatio nulla cum incertitudine totali dubitantium. Hinc ipsi dubitationis catholicae patroni quam primum belle volunt aliquem in hanc aleam inducere, consiliorum suorum eo usque solent oblivisci, ut de nulla re minus dubitare videantur, ac de eo, dubitandum esse de omnibus.
The first requirement here is that, if you intend something, you confirm it without doubt, even if all uncertainty cannot always be removed. Although at times it may be clear, even to the analogue of reason, that something is lacking for full persuasion, nevertheless that state in which the reasons seem compared on either side of contraries and equal must be altogether torn first from your own mind, then from the minds of your hearers, unless you wish the vain attempt at persuading to be laughed at in you. A certain certitude can coexist with a certain uncertainty, but no certitude, hence no persuasion, no evidence, no confirmation, can coexist with the total uncertainty of doubters. Hence even the patrons of universal doubt, as soon as they wish beautifully to lead someone into this hazard, usually forget their counsels to such a degree that they seem to doubt nothing less than this: that one must doubt everything.
Primum heic postulatum est, si quid intendis, ut illud sine dubitatione confirmes, etiamsi non semper omnis tolli possit incertitudo.
The first requirement here is that, if you intend something, you confirm it without doubt, even if all uncertainty cannot always be removed.
Licet aliquando deesse non nihil plenae persuasioni, vel analogo rationis patere possit, ille tamen status, quo rationes in utramque contrariorum partem compares videantur et aequales, animo prius tuo, dein tuorum animis evellendus omnino est, nisi irritum persuadendi conatum in te rideri velis.
Although at times it may be clear, even to the analogue of reason, that something is lacking for full persuasion, nevertheless that state in which the reasons seem compared on either side of contraries and equal must be altogether torn first from your own mind, then from the minds of your hearers, unless you wish the vain attempt at persuading to be laughed at in you.
Certitudo quaedam cum quadam incertitudine potest consistere, sed nulla certitudo, hinc nulla persuasio, nulla evidentia, confirmatio nulla cum incertitudine totali dubitantium.
A certain certitude can coexist with a certain uncertainty, but no certitude, hence no persuasion, no evidence, no confirmation, can coexist with the total uncertainty of doubters.
Hinc ipsi dubitationis catholicae patroni quam primum belle volunt aliquem in hanc aleam inducere, consiliorum suorum eo usque solent oblivisci, ut de nulla re minus dubitare videantur, ac de eo, dubitandum esse de omnibus.
Hence even the patrons of universal doubt, as soon as they wish beautifully to lead someone into this hazard, usually forget their counsels to such a degree that they seem to doubt nothing less than this: that one must doubt everything.
Primum heic postulatum est, si quid intendis,
The first requirement here is that, if you intend
ut illud sine dubitatione confirmes,
something, you confirm it without doubt, even
etiamsi non semper omnis tolli possit incertitudo.
if all uncertainty cannot always be removed.
Licet aliquando deesse non nihil plenae persuasioni,
Although at times it may be clear, even to
vel analogo rationis patere possit,
the analogue of reason, that something is lacking for full
ille tamen status, quo rationes in utramque
persuasion, nevertheless that state in which the
contrariorum partem compares videantur et aequales,
reasons seem compared on either side of contraries and equal
animo prius tuo, dein
must be altogether torn first from your own mind,
tuorum animis evellendus omnino est,
then from the minds of your hearers,
nisi irritum persuadendi conatum
unless you wish the vain attempt at persuading to
in te rideri velis.
be laughed at in you.
Certitudo quaedam cum quadam incertitudine potest consistere,
A certain certitude can coexist with a certain uncertainty,
sed nulla certitudo, hinc nulla persuasio, nulla evidentia,
but no certitude, hence no persuasion, no evidence,
confirmatio nulla cum incertitudine totali dubitantium.
no confirmation, can coexist with the total uncertainty of doubters.
Hinc ipsi dubitationis catholicae patroni quam
Hence even the patrons of universal doubt,
primum belle volunt aliquem in hanc aleam inducere,
as soon as they wish beautifully to lead someone into
consiliorum suorum eo usque solent oblivisci,
this hazard, usually forget their counsels
ut de nulla re
to such a degree that they seem to doubt
minus dubitare videantur, ac de eo, dubitandum esse de omnibus.
nothing less than this: that one must doubt everything.
Primum heic postulatum est, si quid intendis, ut illud sine dubitatione confirmes, etiamsi non semper omnis tolli possit incertitudo. / The first requirement here is that, if you intend something, you confirm it without doubt, even if all uncertainty cannot always be removed.
Licet aliquando deesse non nihil plenae persuasioni, vel analogo rationis patere possit, ille tamen status, quo rationes in utramque contrariorum partem compares videantur et aequales, animo prius tuo, dein tuorum animis evellendus omnino est, nisi irritum persuadendi conatum in te rideri velis. / Although at times it may be clear, even to the analogue of reason, that something is lacking for full persuasion, nevertheless that state in which the reasons seem compared on either side of contraries and equal must be altogether torn first from your own mind, then from the minds of your hearers, unless you wish the vain attempt at persuading to be laughed at in you.
Certitudo quaedam cum quadam incertitudine potest consistere, sed nulla certitudo, hinc nulla persuasio, nulla evidentia, confirmatio nulla cum incertitudine totali dubitantium. / A certain certitude can coexist with a certain uncertainty, but no certitude, hence no persuasion, no evidence, no confirmation, can coexist with the total uncertainty of doubters.
Hinc ipsi dubitationis catholicae patroni quam primum belle volunt aliquem in hanc aleam inducere, consiliorum suorum eo usque solent oblivisci, ut de nulla re minus dubitare videantur, ac de eo, dubitandum esse de omnibus. / Hence even the patrons of universal doubt, as soon as they wish beautifully to lead someone into this hazard, usually forget their counsels to such a degree that they seem to doubt nothing less than this: that one must doubt everything.
§ 858
Deinde ne rationibus et argumentis unquam aggrediaris confirmare, de quibus se iam satis immediate certos esse tui sibi persuaserunt. § 847. Persuasorie negat Epicurus
Next, never attempt by reasons and arguments to confirm things about which your hearers have persuaded themselves that they are already sufficiently immediately certain, §847. Epicurus persuasively denies that
opus esse ratione, neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas appetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri hoc putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel, quorum nil oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. Altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera promta et aperta indicari.
Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.),
§ 851. Cic. de fin. I. 30. Quemadmodum demonstrator identicas indemonstrabiles ex nullis amplius argumentis efficit, ita persuasionem confirmaturus in iudiciis, quae suorum sensibus aut analogo rationis per se satis evidentia videantur, ulterioris probationis incurius, acquiescit.
§851; Cicero, De finibus I.30. Just as a demonstrator does not produce indemonstrable identities from further arguments, so one who will confirm persuasion rests, unconcerned with further proof, in judgments that seem sufficiently evident in themselves to the senses or analogue of reason of his hearers.
Deinde ne rationibus et argumentis unquam aggrediaris confirmare, de quibus se iam satis immediate certos esse tui sibi persuaserunt. § 847. Persuasorie negat Epicurus
Next, never attempt by reasons and arguments to confirm things about which your hearers have persuaded themselves that they are already sufficiently immediately certain, §847. Epicurus persuasively denies that
opus esse ratione, neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas appetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri hoc putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel, quorum nil oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. Altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera promta et aperta indicari.
Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.),
§ 851. Cic. de fin. I. 30. Quemadmodum demonstrator identicas indemonstrabiles ex nullis amplius argumentis efficit, ita persuasionem confirmaturus in iudiciis, quae suorum sensibus aut analogo rationis per se satis evidentia videantur, ulterioris probationis incurius, acquiescit.
§851; Cicero, De finibus I.30. Just as a demonstrator does not produce indemonstrable identities from further arguments, so one who will confirm persuasion rests, unconcerned with further proof, in judgments that seem sufficiently evident in themselves to the senses or analogue of reason of his hearers.
Deinde ne rationibus et argumentis unquam aggrediaris confirmare,
Next, never attempt by reasons and arguments to confirm
de quibus se iam
things about which your hearers have persuaded themselves
satis immediate certos esse tui sibi persuaserunt. § 847.
that they are already sufficiently immediately certain, §847.
Persuasorie negat Epicurus
Epicurus persuasively denies that
opus esse ratione, neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas appetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri hoc putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel, quorum nil oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. Altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera promta et aperta indicari.
Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.),
§ 851. Cic. de fin. I. 30.
§851; Cicero, De finibus I.30. Just as
Quemadmodum demonstrator identicas indemonstrabiles ex nullis amplius argumentis
a demonstrator does not produce indemonstrable identities from further arguments,
efficit, ita persuasionem confirmaturus
so one who will confirm persuasion rests,
in iudiciis,
unconcerned with further proof, in
quae suorum sensibus aut analogo rationis per se
judgments that seem sufficiently evident in themselves to
satis evidentia videantur, ulterioris probationis incurius, acquiescit.
the senses or analogue of reason of his hearers.
Deinde ne rationibus et argumentis unquam aggrediaris confirmare, de quibus se iam satis immediate certos esse tui sibi persuaserunt. § 847. Persuasorie negat Epicurus / Next, never attempt by reasons and arguments to confirm things about which your hearers have persuaded themselves that they are already sufficiently immediately certain, §847. Epicurus persuasively denies that
opus esse ratione, neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas appetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri hoc putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel, quorum nil oporteret exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem. Altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera promta et aperta indicari.
Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.),
§ 851. Cic. de fin. I. 30. Quemadmodum demonstrator identicas indemonstrabiles ex nullis amplius argumentis efficit, ita persuasionem confirmaturus in iudiciis, quae suorum sensibus aut analogo rationis per se satis evidentia videantur, ulterioris probationis incurius, acquiescit. / §851; Cicero, De finibus I.30. Just as a demonstrator does not produce indemonstrable identities from further arguments, so one who will confirm persuasion rests, unconcerned with further proof, in judgments that seem sufficiently evident in themselves to the senses or analogue of reason of his hearers.
§ 859
Porro, si rationibus evincenda sunt, quae confirmare lubet, argumentis a priori petitis, vel praeferas eleganter persuasurus, vel saltim adiungas, quoties illud fieri potest, rationes a posteriori. Potest a priori confirmari divinatio, tamen, modo ad persuadendum magis idoneo,
Furthermore, if the things you want to confirm must be proved by reasons, then, when you are about to persuade elegantly, either prefer arguments sought a posteriori to those sought a priori, or at least add them whenever this can be done. Divination can be confirmed a priori; nevertheless, in a way more suitable for persuading, Cratippus is accustomed to conclude the reason from the very examples of true prophecies and dreams as follows:
ex ipsis exemplis verarum vaticinationum et somniorum Cratippus solet rationem concludere hoc modo: Si sine oculis non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere: qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. Item igitur, si sine divinatione non potest et officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem quis, quum divinationem habeat, aliquando errare, nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel ita esse aliquid divinatum, ut nihil fortuito cecidisse videatur. Sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia. Esse igitur divinationem confitendum est.
And so, after giving examples of true prophecies through frenzy and dreams, Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way: “Though without eyes it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has even once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, therefore, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may sometimes be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet it is enough to establish the existence of divination that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore, the existence of divination must be conceded.”,
Cic. de div. I. 71.
Cicero, On Divination I.71.
Porro, si rationibus evincenda sunt, quae confirmare lubet, argumentis a priori petitis, vel praeferas eleganter persuasurus, vel saltim adiungas, quoties illud fieri potest, rationes a posteriori. Potest a priori confirmari divinatio, tamen, modo ad persuadendum magis idoneo,
Furthermore, if the things you want to confirm must be proved by reasons, then, when you are about to persuade elegantly, either prefer arguments sought a posteriori to those sought a priori, or at least add them whenever this can be done. Divination can be confirmed a priori; nevertheless, in a way more suitable for persuading, Cratippus is accustomed to conclude the reason from the very examples of true prophecies and dreams as follows:
ex ipsis exemplis verarum vaticinationum et somniorum Cratippus solet rationem concludere hoc modo: Si sine oculis non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere: qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. Item igitur, si sine divinatione non potest et officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem quis, quum divinationem habeat, aliquando errare, nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel ita esse aliquid divinatum, ut nihil fortuito cecidisse videatur. Sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia. Esse igitur divinationem confitendum est.
And so, after giving examples of true prophecies through frenzy and dreams, Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way: “Though without eyes it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has even once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, therefore, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may sometimes be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet it is enough to establish the existence of divination that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore, the existence of divination must be conceded.”,
Cic. de div. I. 71.
Cicero, On Divination I.71.
Porro, si rationibus evincenda
Furthermore, if the things you want to confirm must
sunt,
be proved by reasons, then, when you are
quae confirmare lubet, argumentis a
about to persuade elegantly, either prefer arguments sought a
priori petitis,
posteriori to those sought a priori, or
vel praeferas eleganter persuasurus, vel saltim adiungas, quoties illud
at least add them whenever this can be done.
fieri potest, rationes a posteriori.
Divination can be confirmed a priori;
Potest a priori confirmari divinatio,
nevertheless, in a way more suitable for persuading, Cratippus
tamen, modo ad
is accustomed to conclude the reason from the very
persuadendum magis idoneo,
examples of true prophecies and dreams as follows:
ex ipsis exemplis verarum vaticinationum et somniorum Cratippus solet rationem concludere hoc modo: Si sine oculis non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere: qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. Item igitur, si sine divinatione non potest et officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem quis, quum divinationem habeat, aliquando errare, nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel ita esse aliquid divinatum, ut nihil fortuito cecidisse videatur. Sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia. Esse igitur divinationem confitendum est.
And so, after giving examples of true prophecies through frenzy and dreams, Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way: “Though without eyes it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has even once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, therefore, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may sometimes be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet it is enough to establish the existence of divination that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore, the existence of divination must be conceded.”,
Cic. de div. I. 71.
Cicero, On Divination I.71.
Porro, si rationibus evincenda sunt, quae confirmare lubet, argumentis a priori petitis, vel praeferas eleganter persuasurus, vel saltim adiungas, quoties illud fieri potest, rationes a posteriori. Potest a priori confirmari divinatio, tamen, modo ad persuadendum magis idoneo, / Furthermore, if the things you want to confirm must be proved by reasons, then, when you are about to persuade elegantly, either prefer arguments sought a posteriori to those sought a priori, or at least add them whenever this can be done. Divination can be confirmed a priori; nevertheless, in a way more suitable for persuading, Cratippus is accustomed to conclude the reason from the very examples of true prophecies and dreams as follows:
ex ipsis exemplis verarum vaticinationum et somniorum Cratippus solet rationem concludere hoc modo: Si sine oculis non potest exstare officium et munus oculorum, possunt autem aliquando oculi non fungi suo munere: qui vel semel ita est usus oculis, ut vera cerneret, is habet sensum oculorum vera cernentium. Item igitur, si sine divinatione non potest et officium et munus divinationis exstare, potest autem quis, quum divinationem habeat, aliquando errare, nec vera cernere, satis est ad confirmandam divinationem semel ita esse aliquid divinatum, ut nihil fortuito cecidisse videatur. Sunt autem eius generis innumerabilia. Esse igitur divinationem confitendum est.
And so, after giving examples of true prophecies through frenzy and dreams, Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way: “Though without eyes it is impossible to perform the act and function of sight, and though the eyes sometimes cannot perform their appointed function, yet when a person has even once so employed his eyes as to see things as they are, he has a realization of what correct vision is. Likewise, therefore, although without the power of divination it is impossible for the act and function of divining to exist, and though one with that power may sometimes be mistaken and may make erroneous prophecies, yet it is enough to establish the existence of divination that a single event has been so clearly foretold as to exclude the hypothesis of chance. But there are many such instances; therefore, the existence of divination must be conceded.”,
Cic. de div. I. 71. / Cicero, On Divination I.71.
§ 860
Si tuis in meditationibus admittant aliquam argumentorum etiam confirmationem 1) generaliora quaedam et abstractiora 2) magis determinata, individua, et singularia, utraque tamen confirmare tempus et locus non permittant: illa lemmatum instar ex disciplinis intellectualibus quasi nota sumas potius, et in horum probationem operam impendas, quam vice versa. § 677, 752. Plinius l. XXXVII. in prooemio sumens
If in your meditations certain more general and abstract things and certain more determinate, individual, and singular things admit some confirmation of arguments, yet time and place do not permit both to be confirmed, take the former rather as lemmas, as though known from intellectual disciplines, and spend your labor on proving the latter, rather than the reverse, §§677, 752. Pliny, book XXXVII, in the preface, assuming that gems are the majesty of nature compressed into a narrow space and that
gemmas in arctum coactam rerum naturae maiestatem, Ismeniae aetate scalpi smaragdos solitos
a subject in which the majestic might of Nature presents itself to us,
contracted within a very limited space
In the time of Ismenias, long after his day, it would appear to have become the practice to engrave smaragdi even,
confirmat
confirms this by
edicto Alexandri M. quo vetuit in gemma se ab alio scalpi, quam a Pyrgotele,
a fact which is established by an edict of Alexander the Great, forbidding his portrait to be cut upon this stone by any other engraver than Pyrgoteles, who, no doubt, was the most famous adept in this art.,
non dubie, § 857. clarissimo artis eius. c. I.
no doubt, §857, the most famous artist of that craft, chapter I.
Si tuis in meditationibus admittant aliquam argumentorum etiam confirmationem 1) generaliora quaedam et abstractiora 2) magis determinata, individua, et singularia, utraque tamen confirmare tempus et locus non permittant: illa lemmatum instar ex disciplinis intellectualibus quasi nota sumas potius, et in horum probationem operam impendas, quam vice versa. § 677, 752. Plinius l. XXXVII. in prooemio sumens
If in your meditations certain more general and abstract things and certain more determinate, individual, and singular things admit some confirmation of arguments, yet time and place do not permit both to be confirmed, take the former rather as lemmas, as though known from intellectual disciplines, and spend your labor on proving the latter, rather than the reverse, §§677, 752. Pliny, book XXXVII, in the preface, assuming that gems are the majesty of nature compressed into a narrow space and that
gemmas in arctum coactam rerum naturae maiestatem, Ismeniae aetate scalpi smaragdos solitos
a subject in which the majestic might of Nature presents itself to us,
contracted within a very limited space
In the time of Ismenias, long after his day, it would appear to have become the practice to engrave smaragdi even,
confirmat
confirms this by
edicto Alexandri M. quo vetuit in gemma se ab alio scalpi, quam a Pyrgotele,
a fact which is established by an edict of Alexander the Great, forbidding his portrait to be cut upon this stone by any other engraver than Pyrgoteles, who, no doubt, was the most famous adept in this art.,
non dubie, § 857. clarissimo artis eius. c. I.
no doubt, §857, the most famous artist of that craft, chapter I.
Si tuis in meditationibus admittant aliquam argumentorum etiam
If in your meditations certain more
confirmationem 1) generaliora quaedam et abstractiora 2) magis determinata,
general and abstract things and certain more determinate,
individua, et singularia, utraque tamen confirmare
individual, and singular things admit some confirmation of arguments,
tempus et locus non permittant:
yet time and place do not permit
illa lemmatum
both to be confirmed, take the former rather as lemmas,
instar ex disciplinis intellectualibus quasi nota sumas potius,
as though known from intellectual disciplines,
et in horum probationem operam impendas, quam vice versa.
and spend your labor on proving the latter, rather than the reverse,
§ 677, 752. Plinius l. XXXVII.
§§677, 752. Pliny, book XXXVII, in the preface,
in prooemio sumens
assuming that gems are the majesty of nature compressed into a narrow space and that
gemmas in arctum coactam rerum naturae maiestatem, Ismeniae aetate scalpi smaragdos solitos
a subject in which the majestic might of Nature presents itself to us,
contracted within a very limited space
In the time of Ismenias, long after his day, it would appear to have become the practice to engrave smaragdi even,
confirmat
confirms this by
edicto Alexandri M. quo vetuit in gemma se ab alio scalpi, quam a Pyrgotele,
a fact which is established by an edict of Alexander the Great, forbidding his portrait to be cut upon this stone by any other engraver than Pyrgoteles, who, no doubt, was the most famous adept in this art.,
non dubie, § 857. clarissimo artis eius. c. I.
no doubt, §857, the most famous artist of that craft, chapter I.
Si tuis in meditationibus admittant aliquam argumentorum etiam confirmationem 1) generaliora quaedam et abstractiora 2) magis determinata, individua, et singularia, utraque tamen confirmare tempus et locus non permittant: illa lemmatum instar ex disciplinis intellectualibus quasi nota sumas potius, et in horum probationem operam impendas, quam vice versa. § 677, 752. Plinius l. XXXVII. in prooemio sumens / If in your meditations certain more general and abstract things and certain more determinate, individual, and singular things admit some confirmation of arguments, yet time and place do not permit both to be confirmed, take the former rather as lemmas, as though known from intellectual disciplines, and spend your labor on proving the latter, rather than the reverse, §§677, 752. Pliny, book XXXVII, in the preface, assuming that gems are the majesty of nature compressed into a narrow space and that
gemmas in arctum coactam rerum naturae maiestatem, Ismeniae aetate scalpi smaragdos solitos
a subject in which the majestic might of Nature presents itself to us,
contracted within a very limited space
In the time of Ismenias, long after his day, it would appear to have become the practice to engrave smaragdi even,
confirmat / confirms this by
edicto Alexandri M. quo vetuit in gemma se ab alio scalpi, quam a Pyrgotele,
a fact which is established by an edict of Alexander the Great, forbidding his portrait to be cut upon this stone by any other engraver than Pyrgoteles, who, no doubt, was the most famous adept in this art.,
non dubie, § 857. clarissimo artis eius. c. I. / no doubt, §857, the most famous artist of that craft, chapter I.
§ 861
ARGUMENTATIO completam certitudinem exhibens est NECESSARIA, incompletam, in aliquantulum incertis, quae praestet, sola est probabilis. Dubias enim et multo magis improbabiles nullam certitudinem, nullam persuasionem secum ferre, confirmationem nullam iam vidimus. § 857, 485. Hinc recte Cicero de inv. I. 44.
ARGUMENTATION exhibiting complete certitude is NECESSARY; argumentation that furnishes incomplete certitude, in somewhat uncertain matters, is only probable. For we have already seen that doubtful things, and much more improbable things, bring no certitude, no persuasion, no confirmation with them, §§857, 485. Hence Cicero rightly says, De inventione I.44:
Omnis argumentatio aut probabilis aut necessaria debebit esse.
But all argumentation, which can be derived from those topics which we have mentioned, ought to be either probable or unavoidable..
Nisi fallitur in describenda necessaria:
Unless he errs in describing the necessary:
necessario,
Enumeration is a statement in which, when many matters have been stated and all other arguments invalidated, the one which remains is inevitably proved;,
pergens,
he continues,
demonstrantur ea, quae aliter, ac dicuntur, nec fieri, nec probari possunt,
Those things are demonstrated irrefutably which can neither be done nor proved in any other manner whatever than that in which they are stated;;
labitur saltim in adiuncto exemplo: Si peperit, cum viro concubuit.
at least he slips in the example added: If she has given birth, she has lain with a man.
ARGUMENTATIO completam certitudinem exhibens est NECESSARIA, incompletam, in aliquantulum incertis, quae praestet, sola est probabilis.
ARGUMENTATION exhibiting complete certitude is NECESSARY; argumentation that furnishes incomplete certitude, in somewhat uncertain matters, is only probable.
Dubias enim et multo magis improbabiles nullam certitudinem, nullam persuasionem secum ferre, confirmationem nullam iam vidimus. § 857, 485. Hinc recte Cicero de inv. I. 44.
For we have already seen that doubtful things, and much more improbable things, bring no certitude, no persuasion, no confirmation with them, §§857, 485. Hence Cicero rightly says, De inventione I.44:
Omnis argumentatio aut probabilis aut necessaria debebit esse.
But all argumentation, which can be derived from those topics which we have mentioned, ought to be either probable or unavoidable..
Nisi fallitur in describenda necessaria:
Unless he errs in describing the necessary:
necessario,
Enumeration is a statement in which, when many matters have been stated and all other arguments invalidated, the one which remains is inevitably proved;,
pergens,
he continues,
demonstrantur ea, quae aliter, ac dicuntur, nec fieri, nec probari possunt,
Those things are demonstrated irrefutably which can neither be done nor proved in any other manner whatever than that in which they are stated;;
labitur saltim in adiuncto exemplo: Si peperit, cum viro concubuit.
at least he slips in the example added: If she has given birth, she has lain with a man.
ARGUMENTATIO completam certitudinem exhibens est NECESSARIA,
ARGUMENTATION exhibiting complete certitude is NECESSARY;
incompletam, in aliquantulum incertis,
argumentation that furnishes incomplete certitude, in somewhat uncertain
quae praestet, sola est probabilis.
matters, is only probable.
Dubias enim
For we have already seen that doubtful things,
et multo magis improbabiles nullam certitudinem,
and much more improbable things, bring no certitude,
nullam persuasionem secum ferre, confirmationem nullam iam vidimus.
no persuasion, no confirmation with them,
§ 857, 485. Hinc recte Cicero de inv. I. 44.
§§857, 485. Hence Cicero rightly says, De inventione I.44:
Omnis argumentatio aut probabilis aut necessaria debebit esse.
But all argumentation, which can be derived from those topics which we have mentioned, ought to be either probable or unavoidable..
Nisi fallitur in describenda necessaria:
Unless he errs in describing the necessary:
necessario,
Enumeration is a statement in which, when many matters have been stated and all other arguments invalidated, the one which remains is inevitably proved;,
pergens,
he continues,
demonstrantur ea, quae aliter, ac dicuntur, nec fieri, nec probari possunt,
Those things are demonstrated irrefutably which can neither be done nor proved in any other manner whatever than that in which they are stated;;
labitur saltim in adiuncto exemplo:
at least he slips in the example added:
Si peperit, cum viro concubuit.
If she has given birth, she has lain with a man.
ARGUMENTATIO completam certitudinem exhibens est NECESSARIA, incompletam, in aliquantulum incertis, quae praestet, sola est probabilis. / ARGUMENTATION exhibiting complete certitude is NECESSARY; argumentation that furnishes incomplete certitude, in somewhat uncertain matters, is only probable.
Dubias enim et multo magis improbabiles nullam certitudinem, nullam persuasionem secum ferre, confirmationem nullam iam vidimus. § 857, 485. Hinc recte Cicero de inv. I. 44. / For we have already seen that doubtful things, and much more improbable things, bring no certitude, no persuasion, no confirmation with them, §§857, 485. Hence Cicero rightly says, De inventione I.44:
Omnis argumentatio aut probabilis aut necessaria debebit esse.
But all argumentation, which can be derived from those topics which we have mentioned, ought to be either probable or unavoidable..
Nisi fallitur in describenda necessaria: / Unless he errs in describing the necessary:
necessario,
Enumeration is a statement in which, when many matters have been stated and all other arguments invalidated, the one which remains is inevitably proved;,
pergens, / he continues,
demonstrantur ea, quae aliter, ac dicuntur, nec fieri, nec probari possunt,
Those things are demonstrated irrefutably which can neither be done nor proved in any other manner whatever than that in which they are stated;;
labitur saltim in adiuncto exemplo: Si peperit, cum viro concubuit. / at least he slips in the example added: If she has given birth, she has lain with a man.
§ 862
Si confirmaturus eleganter tibi permiseris aliquando necessariam aliquam etiam argumentationem tangere, quae scilicet ad logices formulam exacta formae simul completam certitudinem intellectui approbaret: ab huius tamen, formae scilicet legitimae, venustis occultationibus nunc minus abstinere tuum est, quoniam tibi sufficere potest argumenti scientifici satis evidentem analogo rationis propinare verisimilitudinem § 483, 829. Ad hanc autem completa formae convictio non requiritur. Hinc Cicero
If, when about to confirm elegantly, you have sometimes allowed yourself to touch some necessary argumentation, which, if examined according to the formula of logic, would also approve complete certitude of form to the intellect, nevertheless it is now less your business to abstain from graceful concealments of this, namely of legitimate form, since it can be enough for you to offer to the analogue of reason a sufficiently evident verisimilitude of a scientific argument, §§483, 829. For complete conviction of form is not required for this. Hence Cicero advises treating
genus etiam argumentandi, quod in necessaria
This sort of arguing, which is conversant with irrefutable demonstration,,
§ 861. demonstratione § 847. versatur, suadet tractare maxime aut per complexionem, dilemma enthymematico-crypticum, aut per enumerationem, syllogismum disiunctivum tollendo ponentem, sed denuo satis crypticum, aut per simplicem conclusionem, cuius exemplum ponit syllogismum hypotheticum modi ponentis enthymematicum. 45.
§861, §847, especially either by complexio, an enthymematic-cryptic dilemma, or by enumeration, a disjunctive syllogism that, by denying, affirms, but again sufficiently cryptic, or by simple conclusion, for which he sets down as example an enthymematic hypothetical syllogism in the affirming mode, 45.
Si confirmaturus eleganter tibi permiseris aliquando necessariam aliquam etiam argumentationem tangere, quae scilicet ad logices formulam exacta formae simul completam certitudinem intellectui approbaret: ab huius tamen, formae scilicet legitimae, venustis occultationibus nunc minus abstinere tuum est, quoniam tibi sufficere potest argumenti scientifici satis evidentem analogo rationis propinare verisimilitudinem § 483, 829. Ad hanc autem completa formae convictio non requiritur.
If, when about to confirm elegantly, you have sometimes allowed yourself to touch some necessary argumentation, which, if examined according to the formula of logic, would also approve complete certitude of form to the intellect, nevertheless it is now less your business to abstain from graceful concealments of this, namely of legitimate form, since it can be enough for you to offer to the analogue of reason a sufficiently evident verisimilitude of a scientific argument, §§483, 829. For complete conviction of form is not required for this.
Hinc Cicero
Hence Cicero advises treating
genus etiam argumentandi, quod in necessaria
This sort of arguing, which is conversant with irrefutable demonstration,,
§ 861. demonstratione § 847. versatur, suadet tractare maxime aut per complexionem, dilemma enthymematico-crypticum, aut per enumerationem, syllogismum disiunctivum tollendo ponentem, sed denuo satis crypticum, aut per simplicem conclusionem, cuius exemplum ponit syllogismum hypotheticum modi ponentis enthymematicum. 45.
§861, §847, especially either by complexio, an enthymematic-cryptic dilemma, or by enumeration, a disjunctive syllogism that, by denying, affirms, but again sufficiently cryptic, or by simple conclusion, for which he sets down as example an enthymematic hypothetical syllogism in the affirming mode, 45.
Si confirmaturus eleganter
If, when about to confirm elegantly,
tibi permiseris aliquando necessariam aliquam etiam argumentationem
you have sometimes allowed yourself to touch some necessary argumentation,
tangere, quae scilicet ad logices formulam exacta
which, if examined according to the formula of logic,
formae simul completam certitudinem intellectui approbaret:
would also approve complete certitude of
ab huius tamen, formae scilicet legitimae,
form to the intellect, nevertheless
venustis occultationibus nunc minus abstinere
it is now less your business to abstain from
tuum est, quoniam
graceful concealments of this, namely of legitimate form,
tibi sufficere potest argumenti scientifici
since it can be enough for you to offer
satis evidentem analogo rationis propinare verisimilitudinem
to the analogue of reason a sufficiently evident verisimilitude
§ 483, 829.
of a scientific argument, §§483, 829.
Ad hanc autem completa formae convictio non requiritur.
For complete conviction of form is not required for this.
Hinc Cicero
Hence Cicero advises treating
genus etiam argumentandi, quod in necessaria
This sort of arguing, which is conversant with irrefutable demonstration,,
§ 861. demonstratione § 847. versatur, suadet tractare maxime aut per complexionem,
§861, §847, especially either by complexio,
dilemma enthymematico-crypticum, aut per enumerationem,
an enthymematic-cryptic dilemma, or by enumeration,
syllogismum disiunctivum tollendo ponentem,
a disjunctive syllogism that, by denying, affirms,
sed denuo satis crypticum, aut per simplicem conclusionem,
but again sufficiently cryptic, or by simple conclusion,
cuius exemplum ponit
for which he sets down as example an enthymematic
syllogismum hypotheticum modi ponentis enthymematicum. 45.
hypothetical syllogism in the affirming mode, 45.
Si confirmaturus eleganter tibi permiseris aliquando necessariam aliquam etiam argumentationem tangere, quae scilicet ad logices formulam exacta formae simul completam certitudinem intellectui approbaret: ab huius tamen, formae scilicet legitimae, venustis occultationibus nunc minus abstinere tuum est, quoniam tibi sufficere potest argumenti scientifici satis evidentem analogo rationis propinare verisimilitudinem § 483, 829. Ad hanc autem completa formae convictio non requiritur. / If, when about to confirm elegantly, you have sometimes allowed yourself to touch some necessary argumentation, which, if examined according to the formula of logic, would also approve complete certitude of form to the intellect, nevertheless it is now less your business to abstain from graceful concealments of this, namely of legitimate form, since it can be enough for you to offer to the analogue of reason a sufficiently evident verisimilitude of a scientific argument, §§483, 829. For complete conviction of form is not required for this.
Hinc Cicero / Hence Cicero advises treating
genus etiam argumentandi, quod in necessaria
This sort of arguing, which is conversant with irrefutable demonstration,,
§ 861. demonstratione § 847. versatur, suadet tractare maxime aut per complexionem, dilemma enthymematico-crypticum, aut per enumerationem, syllogismum disiunctivum tollendo ponentem, sed denuo satis crypticum, aut per simplicem conclusionem, cuius exemplum ponit syllogismum hypotheticum modi ponentis enthymematicum. 45. / §861, §847, especially either by complexio, an enthymematic-cryptic dilemma, or by enumeration, a disjunctive syllogism that, by denying, affirms, but again sufficiently cryptic, or by simple conclusion, for which he sets down as example an enthymematic hypothetical syllogism in the affirming mode, 45.
§ 863
Addit quidem Cicero:
Cicero indeed adds:
sive hoc diligenter videre oportebit, ne quo pacto genus hoc refelli possit, ut ne confirmatio modum in se argumentationis habeat et quandam similitudinem necessariae conclusionis, verum ipsa argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat.
And it will be desirable to look to this very carefully, in order that this sort of inference may not be refuted in any manner, so that the proof may not only have some sort of argument in it, and some resemblance to an unavoidable conclusion, but that the very argument itself may proceed on irrefutable reasons..
Verum, aequus interpres animadvertet 1) diligentiam in foro aesthetico debitam postulari, non accurationem logicorum mathematicam, 2) sicuti confirmatio tantum intenditur persuasoria, ita nec cavendum esse, ut ne logicis quidem subtilitatibus et purioris rationis intensissima vi tua possit argumentatio refelli, sed ut ne possit reprehendi, § 855. ut ne vel ad sensum et coram analogi rationis tribunali falsitatem in eadem aliquam aestheticam S. XXVIII, detegere sit in promtu, 3) paralogismos utique et mera sophismata reiici, quibus nihil insit virium ad persuadendum, sed inanis tantum certitudinis species, § 837. sufficere tamen Ciceroni, ut argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat, nec eum requirere, ut omnis haec et sufficiens inter argumentandum ratio, qua pote, manifestissime rationis ipsius perspicientiae subiiciatur, § 862, 843.
But a fair interpreter will notice 1) that diligence due in the aesthetic forum is required, not the mathematical accuracy of logicians; 2) that, just as only persuasive confirmation is intended, so one need not beware lest one's argumentation be refuted even by logical subtleties and the most intense force of pure reason, but lest it be reprehended, §855, lest some aesthetic falsity in it, even to sense and before the tribunal of the analogue of reason, Sect. XXVIII, be ready to be detected; 3) that paralogisms and mere sophisms are indeed rejected, since they contain no force for persuading, but only an empty appearance of certitude, §837, yet it is enough for Cicero that the argumentation stand from necessary reason, and he does not require that all this reason, sufficient during argumentation, be subjected, as far as possible, most manifestly to the clear view of reason itself, §§862, 843.
Addit quidem Cicero:
Cicero indeed adds:
sive hoc diligenter videre oportebit, ne quo pacto genus hoc refelli possit, ut ne confirmatio modum in se argumentationis habeat et quandam similitudinem necessariae conclusionis, verum ipsa argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat.
And it will be desirable to look to this very carefully, in order that this sort of inference may not be refuted in any manner, so that the proof may not only have some sort of argument in it, and some resemblance to an unavoidable conclusion, but that the very argument itself may proceed on irrefutable reasons..
Verum, aequus interpres animadvertet 1) diligentiam in foro aesthetico debitam postulari, non accurationem logicorum mathematicam, 2) sicuti confirmatio tantum intenditur persuasoria, ita nec cavendum esse, ut ne logicis quidem subtilitatibus et purioris rationis intensissima vi tua possit argumentatio refelli, sed ut ne possit reprehendi, § 855. ut ne vel ad sensum et coram analogi rationis tribunali falsitatem in eadem aliquam aestheticam S. XXVIII, detegere sit in promtu, 3) paralogismos utique et mera sophismata reiici, quibus nihil insit virium ad persuadendum, sed inanis tantum certitudinis species, § 837. sufficere tamen Ciceroni, ut argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat, nec eum requirere, ut omnis haec et sufficiens inter argumentandum ratio, qua pote, manifestissime rationis ipsius perspicientiae subiiciatur, § 862, 843.
But a fair interpreter will notice 1) that diligence due in the aesthetic forum is required, not the mathematical accuracy of logicians; 2) that, just as only persuasive confirmation is intended, so one need not beware lest one's argumentation be refuted even by logical subtleties and the most intense force of pure reason, but lest it be reprehended, §855, lest some aesthetic falsity in it, even to sense and before the tribunal of the analogue of reason, Sect. XXVIII, be ready to be detected; 3) that paralogisms and mere sophisms are indeed rejected, since they contain no force for persuading, but only an empty appearance of certitude, §837, yet it is enough for Cicero that the argumentation stand from necessary reason, and he does not require that all this reason, sufficient during argumentation, be subjected, as far as possible, most manifestly to the clear view of reason itself, §§862, 843.
Addit quidem Cicero:
Cicero indeed adds:
sive hoc diligenter videre oportebit, ne quo pacto genus hoc refelli possit, ut ne confirmatio modum in se argumentationis habeat et quandam similitudinem necessariae conclusionis, verum ipsa argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat.
And it will be desirable to look to this very carefully, in order that this sort of inference may not be refuted in any manner, so that the proof may not only have some sort of argument in it, and some resemblance to an unavoidable conclusion, but that the very argument itself may proceed on irrefutable reasons..
Verum, aequus interpres animadvertet 1) diligentiam
But a fair interpreter will notice 1) that diligence
in foro aesthetico debitam postulari,
due in the aesthetic forum is required,
non accurationem logicorum mathematicam,
not the mathematical accuracy of logicians;
2) sicuti confirmatio tantum intenditur persuasoria,
2) that, just as only persuasive
ita nec cavendum esse, ut
confirmation is intended, so one need not
ne logicis
beware lest one's argumentation be refuted even by logical
quidem subtilitatibus et purioris rationis
subtleties and the most intense force of pure reason,
intensissima vi tua possit argumentatio refelli, sed ut ne possit reprehendi, § 855.
but lest it be reprehended, §855,
ut ne vel
lest some aesthetic falsity in it,
ad sensum et coram analogi rationis
even to sense and before the tribunal of the analogue of reason,
tribunali falsitatem in eadem aliquam aestheticam S.
Sect.
XXVIII, detegere sit in promtu,
XXVIII, be ready to be detected;
3) paralogismos utique et mera sophismata
3) that paralogisms and mere sophisms are indeed rejected,
reiici, quibus nihil insit virium ad persuadendum,
since they contain no force for persuading,
sed inanis tantum certitudinis species, § 837.
but only an empty appearance of certitude, §837,
sufficere tamen Ciceroni,
yet it is enough for Cicero
ut argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat,
that the argumentation stand from necessary reason, and he
nec eum requirere, ut omnis haec et sufficiens inter argumentandum
does not require that all this reason, sufficient during argumentation,
ratio, qua pote,
be subjected, as far as possible, most
manifestissime rationis ipsius perspicientiae subiiciatur, § 862, 843.
manifestly to the clear view of reason itself, §§862, 843.
Addit quidem Cicero: / Cicero indeed adds:
sive hoc diligenter videre oportebit, ne quo pacto genus hoc refelli possit, ut ne confirmatio modum in se argumentationis habeat et quandam similitudinem necessariae conclusionis, verum ipsa argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat.
And it will be desirable to look to this very carefully, in order that this sort of inference may not be refuted in any manner, so that the proof may not only have some sort of argument in it, and some resemblance to an unavoidable conclusion, but that the very argument itself may proceed on irrefutable reasons..
Verum, aequus interpres animadvertet 1) diligentiam in foro aesthetico debitam postulari, non accurationem logicorum mathematicam, 2) sicuti confirmatio tantum intenditur persuasoria, ita nec cavendum esse, ut ne logicis quidem subtilitatibus et purioris rationis intensissima vi tua possit argumentatio refelli, sed ut ne possit reprehendi, § 855. ut ne vel ad sensum et coram analogi rationis tribunali falsitatem in eadem aliquam aestheticam S. XXVIII, detegere sit in promtu, 3) paralogismos utique et mera sophismata reiici, quibus nihil insit virium ad persuadendum, sed inanis tantum certitudinis species, § 837. sufficere tamen Ciceroni, ut argumentatio ex necessaria ratione consistat, nec eum requirere, ut omnis haec et sufficiens inter argumentandum ratio, qua pote, manifestissime rationis ipsius perspicientiae subiiciatur, § 862, 843. / But a fair interpreter will notice 1) that diligence due in the aesthetic forum is required, not the mathematical accuracy of logicians; 2) that, just as only persuasive confirmation is intended, so one need not beware lest one's argumentation be refuted even by logical subtleties and the most intense force of pure reason, but lest it be reprehended, §855, lest some aesthetic falsity in it, even to sense and before the tribunal of the analogue of reason, Sect. XXVIII, be ready to be detected; 3) that paralogisms and mere sophisms are indeed rejected, since they contain no force for persuading, but only an empty appearance of certitude, §837, yet it is enough for Cicero that the argumentation stand from necessary reason, and he does not require that all this reason, sufficient during argumentation, be subjected, as far as possible, most manifestly to the clear view of reason itself, §§862, 843.
§ 864
Incidas eleganter meditaturus in iudicium, quale logici demonstrativum dicimus, quodque hinc utique per scientias indiget demonstratione, sit tamen idem, quantum noveris, apud tuos in confesso, de quo constet inter omnes, sit etiam in promtu necessaria quaedam argumentatio, cuius tamen praevideas vel omnem ambitum, vel aliquam partem, quam resecare nequeas, tuis minus perspicuam ac evidentem futuram, ac ipsa iam est conclusio. Hoc in casu totam illam tuam argumentationem necessariam lubens omitte iudiciique tui demonstrativi, sed simul per se satis nunc evidentis animadversione mediocri contentus acquiesce, § 858, 847. Eadem regula modum et fines praescribet, quousque in analysi argumentorum per prosyllogismos adscendere e re sit eleganter confirmaturi.
When meditating elegantly, you may fall upon a judgment of the sort we logicians call demonstrative, and which therefore certainly needs demonstration through the sciences, yet the same judgment, so far as you know, is admitted among your hearers, agreed upon by all, and there is also at hand some necessary argumentation whose whole circuit, or some part which you cannot cut away, you foresee will be less perspicuous and evident to your hearers than the conclusion itself already is. In this case gladly omit that whole necessary argumentation, and rest content with a moderate noticing of your demonstrative judgment, which is at the same time sufficiently evident in itself for now, §§858, 847. The same rule will prescribe the measure and limits up to which it is useful for one confirming elegantly to ascend in the analysis of arguments through prosyllogisms.
Incidas eleganter meditaturus in iudicium, quale logici demonstrativum dicimus, quodque hinc utique per scientias indiget demonstratione, sit tamen idem, quantum noveris, apud tuos in confesso, de quo constet inter omnes, sit etiam in promtu necessaria quaedam argumentatio, cuius tamen praevideas vel omnem ambitum, vel aliquam partem, quam resecare nequeas, tuis minus perspicuam ac evidentem futuram, ac ipsa iam est conclusio.
When meditating elegantly, you may fall upon a judgment of the sort we logicians call demonstrative, and which therefore certainly needs demonstration through the sciences, yet the same judgment, so far as you know, is admitted among your hearers, agreed upon by all, and there is also at hand some necessary argumentation whose whole circuit, or some part which you cannot cut away, you foresee will be less perspicuous and evident to your hearers than the conclusion itself already is.
Hoc in casu totam illam tuam argumentationem necessariam lubens omitte iudiciique tui demonstrativi, sed simul per se satis nunc evidentis animadversione mediocri contentus acquiesce, § 858, 847. Eadem regula modum et fines praescribet, quousque in analysi argumentorum per prosyllogismos adscendere e re sit eleganter confirmaturi.
In this case gladly omit that whole necessary argumentation, and rest content with a moderate noticing of your demonstrative judgment, which is at the same time sufficiently evident in itself for now, §§858, 847. The same rule will prescribe the measure and limits up to which it is useful for one confirming elegantly to ascend in the analysis of arguments through prosyllogisms.
Incidas eleganter meditaturus in iudicium,
When meditating elegantly, you may fall upon
quale logici demonstrativum
a judgment of the sort we logicians call demonstrative,
dicimus, quodque hinc utique per scientias
and which therefore certainly needs demonstration through the sciences,
indiget demonstratione, sit tamen idem, quantum noveris,
yet the same judgment,
apud tuos in confesso, de quo constet inter
so far as you know, is admitted among your hearers,
omnes, sit etiam in
agreed upon by all, and there is also at
promtu necessaria quaedam argumentatio, cuius tamen praevideas
hand some necessary argumentation whose whole circuit,
vel omnem ambitum, vel aliquam partem, quam
or some part which you cannot cut away,
resecare nequeas, tuis minus perspicuam ac evidentem futuram,
you foresee will be less perspicuous and evident to your
ac ipsa iam est conclusio.
hearers than the conclusion itself already is.
Hoc in casu totam illam tuam argumentationem
In this case gladly omit that whole necessary argumentation,
necessariam lubens omitte iudiciique tui demonstrativi,
and rest content with a moderate noticing of your demonstrative
sed simul per se
judgment, which is at the same time
satis nunc evidentis animadversione mediocri contentus acquiesce, § 858, 847.
sufficiently evident in itself for now, §§858, 847.
Eadem regula modum et fines praescribet,
The same rule will prescribe the measure and limits up to
quousque
which it is useful for one confirming elegantly to
in analysi argumentorum per prosyllogismos adscendere e re sit eleganter confirmaturi.
ascend in the analysis of arguments through prosyllogisms.
Incidas eleganter meditaturus in iudicium, quale logici demonstrativum dicimus, quodque hinc utique per scientias indiget demonstratione, sit tamen idem, quantum noveris, apud tuos in confesso, de quo constet inter omnes, sit etiam in promtu necessaria quaedam argumentatio, cuius tamen praevideas vel omnem ambitum, vel aliquam partem, quam resecare nequeas, tuis minus perspicuam ac evidentem futuram, ac ipsa iam est conclusio. / When meditating elegantly, you may fall upon a judgment of the sort we logicians call demonstrative, and which therefore certainly needs demonstration through the sciences, yet the same judgment, so far as you know, is admitted among your hearers, agreed upon by all, and there is also at hand some necessary argumentation whose whole circuit, or some part which you cannot cut away, you foresee will be less perspicuous and evident to your hearers than the conclusion itself already is.
Hoc in casu totam illam tuam argumentationem necessariam lubens omitte iudiciique tui demonstrativi, sed simul per se satis nunc evidentis animadversione mediocri contentus acquiesce, § 858, 847. Eadem regula modum et fines praescribet, quousque in analysi argumentorum per prosyllogismos adscendere e re sit eleganter confirmaturi. / In this case gladly omit that whole necessary argumentation, and rest content with a moderate noticing of your demonstrative judgment, which is at the same time sufficiently evident in itself for now, §§858, 847. The same rule will prescribe the measure and limits up to which it is useful for one confirming elegantly to ascend in the analysis of arguments through prosyllogisms.
§ 865
Incidas in meditationibus aestheticis in propositionem demonstrativam, quam indigere confirmationibus argumentorum probe praevideas, habeas autem argumentationem necessariam in promtu, sed simul aliam aliquam probabilem tantum. Interim in illa praesagiat animus haesuros tuos, obiectum tuum personale primarium, in ipso probationis cardine, velut oblato quodam nodo Gordio, defuturam illi necessario tuo argumento relativam vel omni, vel magna ex parte, sensitivam evidentiam, intellectualem autem horizontem tuorum, nunc certe, transcendere. Hanc autem, probabilem scilicet, alteram probationem planam sperare possis et perspicuam fore tuis et oppido evidentem vel ipsi rationis analogo. Hic praefer argumentationem probabilem necessariae. Incertum certo? certo veris credibilia? § 837. Utique. Verum non ideo, quia praeferendum incertum est, sed quia tuis est sensitive certius intellectualiter certis, quae nunc certe, non intelligunt. Non ideo, quia credibile non est certo verum, sed quia tuis tamen hoc probabile est credibilius, ac illa certo vera, quorum ipsos, nunc certe, transcendit evidentia. § 839.
You may fall in aesthetic meditations upon a demonstrative proposition which you clearly foresee to need confirmations of arguments, and you may have at hand a necessary argumentation, but at the same time another that is only probable. Meanwhile, in the necessary one, your mind foresees that your hearers, your primary personal object, will stick at the very hinge of the proof, as if some Gordian knot were offered, that relative sensory evidence, either altogether or in great part, will be lacking to that necessary argument of yours, and that for now it will transcend the intellectual horizon of your hearers. But you can hope that this other proof, namely the probable one, will be plain and perspicuous to your hearers and very evident even to the analogue of reason. Here prefer the probable argumentation to the necessary. The uncertain to the certain? credible things to certainly true things? §837. Indeed. But not because the uncertain is to be preferred, but because for your hearers it is sensibly more certain than intellectually certain things which, for now, they do not understand. Not because the credible is not certainly true, but because this probable thing is nevertheless more credible to your hearers than those certainly true things whose evidence, for now, transcends them, §839.
Incidas in meditationibus aestheticis in propositionem demonstrativam, quam indigere confirmationibus argumentorum probe praevideas, habeas autem argumentationem necessariam in promtu, sed simul aliam aliquam probabilem tantum.
You may fall in aesthetic meditations upon a demonstrative proposition which you clearly foresee to need confirmations of arguments, and you may have at hand a necessary argumentation, but at the same time another that is only probable.
Interim in illa praesagiat animus haesuros tuos, obiectum tuum personale primarium, in ipso probationis cardine, velut oblato quodam nodo Gordio, defuturam illi necessario tuo argumento relativam vel omni, vel magna ex parte, sensitivam evidentiam, intellectualem autem horizontem tuorum, nunc certe, transcendere.
Meanwhile, in the necessary one, your mind foresees that your hearers, your primary personal object, will stick at the very hinge of the proof, as if some Gordian knot were offered, that relative sensory evidence, either altogether or in great part, will be lacking to that necessary argument of yours, and that for now it will transcend the intellectual horizon of your hearers.
Hanc autem, probabilem scilicet, alteram probationem planam sperare possis et perspicuam fore tuis et oppido evidentem vel ipsi rationis analogo.
But you can hope that this other proof, namely the probable one, will be plain and perspicuous to your hearers and very evident even to the analogue of reason.
Hic praefer argumentationem probabilem necessariae.
Here prefer the probable argumentation to the necessary.
Incertum certo? certo veris credibilia? § 837. Utique.
The uncertain to the certain? credible things to certainly true things? §837. Indeed.
Verum non ideo, quia praeferendum incertum est, sed quia tuis est sensitive certius intellectualiter certis, quae nunc certe, non intelligunt.
But not because the uncertain is to be preferred, but because for your hearers it is sensibly more certain than intellectually certain things which, for now, they do not understand.
Non ideo, quia credibile non est certo verum, sed quia tuis tamen hoc probabile est credibilius, ac illa certo vera, quorum ipsos, nunc certe, transcendit evidentia. § 839.
Not because the credible is not certainly true, but because this probable thing is nevertheless more credible to your hearers than those certainly true things whose evidence, for now, transcends them, §839.
Incidas in meditationibus aestheticis in propositionem demonstrativam,
You may fall in aesthetic meditations upon a demonstrative proposition which
quam indigere confirmationibus argumentorum
you clearly foresee to need confirmations of arguments,
probe praevideas, habeas autem argumentationem necessariam in promtu,
and you may have at hand a necessary argumentation,
sed simul aliam aliquam probabilem tantum.
but at the same time another that is only probable.
Interim in illa praesagiat animus haesuros tuos,
Meanwhile, in the necessary one, your mind foresees that your
obiectum tuum personale primarium,
hearers, your primary personal object, will stick
in ipso probationis cardine, velut
at the very hinge of the proof,
oblato quodam nodo Gordio,
as if some Gordian knot were offered,
defuturam
that relative sensory evidence, either altogether or in great part,
illi necessario tuo argumento relativam vel
will be lacking to that necessary argument of yours,
omni, vel magna ex parte, sensitivam evidentiam,
and that for now it will transcend
intellectualem autem horizontem tuorum, nunc certe, transcendere.
the intellectual horizon of your hearers.
Hanc autem,
But you can hope that this other proof,
probabilem scilicet, alteram probationem planam sperare possis
namely the probable one, will be plain
et perspicuam fore tuis et oppido evidentem vel
and perspicuous to your hearers and very evident even
ipsi rationis analogo.
to the analogue of reason.
Hic praefer argumentationem probabilem necessariae.
Here prefer the probable argumentation to the necessary.
Incertum certo? certo veris credibilia?
The uncertain to the certain? credible
§ 837. Utique.
things to certainly true things? §837. Indeed.
Verum non ideo, quia praeferendum incertum est,
But not because the uncertain is to be preferred,
sed quia tuis est sensitive
but because for your hearers it is sensibly more
certius intellectualiter certis, quae nunc certe, non intelligunt.
certain than intellectually certain things which, for now, they do not understand.
Non ideo, quia credibile non est certo
Not because the credible is not certainly true,
verum, sed quia tuis tamen hoc probabile est credibilius,
but because this probable thing is nevertheless more credible
ac illa certo vera, quorum ipsos,
to your hearers than those certainly true things whose
nunc certe, transcendit evidentia. § 839.
evidence, for now, transcends them, §839.
Incidas in meditationibus aestheticis in propositionem demonstrativam, quam indigere confirmationibus argumentorum probe praevideas, habeas autem argumentationem necessariam in promtu, sed simul aliam aliquam probabilem tantum. / You may fall in aesthetic meditations upon a demonstrative proposition which you clearly foresee to need confirmations of arguments, and you may have at hand a necessary argumentation, but at the same time another that is only probable.
Interim in illa praesagiat animus haesuros tuos, obiectum tuum personale primarium, in ipso probationis cardine, velut oblato quodam nodo Gordio, defuturam illi necessario tuo argumento relativam vel omni, vel magna ex parte, sensitivam evidentiam, intellectualem autem horizontem tuorum, nunc certe, transcendere. / Meanwhile, in the necessary one, your mind foresees that your hearers, your primary personal object, will stick at the very hinge of the proof, as if some Gordian knot were offered, that relative sensory evidence, either altogether or in great part, will be lacking to that necessary argument of yours, and that for now it will transcend the intellectual horizon of your hearers.
Hanc autem, probabilem scilicet, alteram probationem planam sperare possis et perspicuam fore tuis et oppido evidentem vel ipsi rationis analogo. / But you can hope that this other proof, namely the probable one, will be plain and perspicuous to your hearers and very evident even to the analogue of reason.
Hic praefer argumentationem probabilem necessariae. / Here prefer the probable argumentation to the necessary.
Incertum certo? certo veris credibilia? § 837. Utique. / The uncertain to the certain? credible things to certainly true things? §837. Indeed.
Verum non ideo, quia praeferendum incertum est, sed quia tuis est sensitive certius intellectualiter certis, quae nunc certe, non intelligunt. / But not because the uncertain is to be preferred, but because for your hearers it is sensibly more certain than intellectually certain things which, for now, they do not understand.
Non ideo, quia credibile non est certo verum, sed quia tuis tamen hoc probabile est credibilius, ac illa certo vera, quorum ipsos, nunc certe, transcendit evidentia. § 839. / Not because the credible is not certainly true, but because this probable thing is nevertheless more credible to your hearers than those certainly true things whose evidence, for now, transcends them, §839.
§ 866
Probabile, quando Cicero dicit, 46. quod fieri solet, § 484. exhibet occasionem observandi quartam ἤθους speciem; § 195, 495, 698. qua moratum cogitandi genus § 226. 1) velut aliud agendo, tacite suos de probatis auctoris moribus intimius semper intimiusque persuadeat, § 227. ita, ut illi suo sibi marte tandem personam cogitantis et characterem moralem, ut amabilem absolute, sic nunc simpliciter honestum, nunc nobilem, nunc omnino grandem, prouti materiis, obiectis et dynamometriae suae naturali proportionate se pingere voluerit, § 462. evidenter deprehendisse videantur. § 213.
When Cicero calls probable what is accustomed to happen, 46, §484, he presents an occasion for observing a fourth species of ἤθος, §§195, 495, 698, by which the moralized kind of thinking, §226, 1) as though doing something else, tacitly persuades its hearers ever more intimately about the approved morals of the author, §227, so that they at last seem to have discovered by their own effort the person of the thinker and his moral character, as lovable absolutely, so now simply honorable, now noble, now altogether grand, according as he wished to paint himself proportionately to his materials, objects, and natural dynamometry, §462, §§213.
Probabile, quando Cicero dicit, 46. quod fieri solet, § 484. exhibet occasionem observandi quartam ἤθους speciem; § 195, 495, 698. qua moratum cogitandi genus § 226. 1) velut aliud agendo, tacite suos de probatis auctoris moribus intimius semper intimiusque persuadeat, § 227. ita, ut illi suo sibi marte tandem personam cogitantis et characterem moralem, ut amabilem absolute, sic nunc simpliciter honestum, nunc nobilem, nunc omnino grandem, prouti materiis, obiectis et dynamometriae suae naturali proportionate se pingere voluerit, § 462. evidenter deprehendisse videantur. § 213.
When Cicero calls probable what is accustomed to happen, 46, §484, he presents an occasion for observing a fourth species of ἤθος, §§195, 495, 698, by which the moralized kind of thinking, §226, 1) as though doing something else, tacitly persuades its hearers ever more intimately about the approved morals of the author, §227, so that they at last seem to have discovered by their own effort the person of the thinker and his moral character, as lovable absolutely, so now simply honorable, now noble, now altogether grand, according as he wished to paint himself proportionately to his materials, objects, and natural dynamometry, §462, §§213.
Probabile, quando Cicero dicit, 46.
When Cicero calls probable what is accustomed to happen, 46,
quod fieri solet, § 484. exhibet occasionem
§484, he presents an occasion for
observandi quartam ἤθους speciem; § 195, 495, 698.
observing a fourth species of ἤθος, §§195, 495, 698,
qua moratum cogitandi genus § 226.
by which the moralized kind of thinking, §226,
1) velut aliud agendo,
1) as though doing something else,
tacite suos de probatis
tacitly persuades its hearers ever more intimately about
auctoris moribus intimius semper intimiusque persuadeat, § 227.
the approved morals of the author, §227,
ita, ut illi suo sibi marte tandem
so that they at last seem to have discovered
personam cogitantis et characterem moralem,
by their own effort the person of the thinker and his moral
ut amabilem absolute, sic nunc simpliciter honestum,
character, as lovable absolutely, so now simply honorable,
nunc nobilem, nunc omnino grandem, prouti
now noble, now altogether grand, according as he wished
materiis, obiectis
to paint himself proportionately to his materials, objects,
et dynamometriae suae naturali proportionate se pingere voluerit, § 462.
and natural dynamometry, §462,
evidenter deprehendisse videantur. § 213.
§§213.
Probabile, quando Cicero dicit, 46. quod fieri solet, § 484. exhibet occasionem observandi quartam ἤθους speciem; § 195, 495, 698. qua moratum cogitandi genus § 226. 1) velut aliud agendo, tacite suos de probatis auctoris moribus intimius semper intimiusque persuadeat, § 227. ita, ut illi suo sibi marte tandem personam cogitantis et characterem moralem, ut amabilem absolute, sic nunc simpliciter honestum, nunc nobilem, nunc omnino grandem, prouti materiis, obiectis et dynamometriae suae naturali proportionate se pingere voluerit, § 462. evidenter deprehendisse videantur. § 213. / When Cicero calls probable what is accustomed to happen, 46, §484, he presents an occasion for observing a fourth species of ἤθος, §§195, 495, 698, by which the moralized kind of thinking, §226, 1) as though doing something else, tacitly persuades its hearers ever more intimately about the approved morals of the author, §227, so that they at last seem to have discovered by their own effort the person of the thinker and his moral character, as lovable absolutely, so now simply honorable, now noble, now altogether grand, according as he wished to paint himself proportionately to his materials, objects, and natural dynamometry, §462, §§213.
§ 867
Ἦθος persuasorium § 866. 2) memor illorum, qui nihil rectum, nisi quod ipsorum moribus conveniat, putabunt, Corn. pr. quos noveris non esse paucissimos, si qua cum iisdem congruant, quae velit persuadere, ea more maiorum et institutis sacrosanctis ritibus, ipsis gentium consuetudinibus, diuturnoque moratiorum usu commendando triumphabit; si qua persuadenda dissentire videantur ab iisdem, ea sibi non sumit tractanda, nisi sub hypothesi § 846. 3) de morum optimorum verissima pulcritudine, de vera vitiorum turpitudine per naturales maxime colores utrorumque laborat intime suos persuadere, § 574. 4) in moribus strictissime veris scapham scapham non dicit solum, sed etiam confirmat, quando pulcre potest et vitiis pulcella, et foeda virtutibus larva detrahi, § 580.
Persuasive ἦθος, §866, 2) mindful of those who will think nothing right except what agrees with their own customs, Cornelius, preface, and whom you know are not very few, will triumph, if the things it wants to persuade agree with them, by commending them through ancestral custom, sacred rites, the very practices of nations, and the long usage of the more moral; if the things to be persuaded seem to dissent from these, it does not take them up for treatment except under the hypothesis of §846. 3) It labors most intimately to persuade its hearers, through the natural colors of each, concerning the truest beauty of the best morals and the true ugliness of vices, §574. 4) In morals strictly true, it not only calls a skiff a skiff, but also confirms it, when the pretty mask can beautifully be torn from vices and the foul mask from virtues, §580.
Ἦθος persuasorium § 866. 2) memor illorum, qui nihil rectum, nisi quod ipsorum moribus conveniat, putabunt, Corn. pr. quos noveris non esse paucissimos, si qua cum iisdem congruant, quae velit persuadere, ea more maiorum et institutis sacrosanctis ritibus, ipsis gentium consuetudinibus, diuturnoque moratiorum usu commendando triumphabit; si qua persuadenda dissentire videantur ab iisdem, ea sibi non sumit tractanda, nisi sub hypothesi § 846. 3) de morum optimorum verissima pulcritudine, de vera vitiorum turpitudine per naturales maxime colores utrorumque laborat intime suos persuadere, § 574. 4) in moribus strictissime veris scapham scapham non dicit solum, sed etiam confirmat, quando pulcre potest et vitiis pulcella, et foeda virtutibus larva detrahi, § 580.
Persuasive ἦθος, §866, 2) mindful of those who will think nothing right except what agrees with their own customs, Cornelius, preface, and whom you know are not very few, will triumph, if the things it wants to persuade agree with them, by commending them through ancestral custom, sacred rites, the very practices of nations, and the long usage of the more moral; if the things to be persuaded seem to dissent from these, it does not take them up for treatment except under the hypothesis of §846. 3) It labors most intimately to persuade its hearers, through the natural colors of each, concerning the truest beauty of the best morals and the true ugliness of vices, §574. 4) In morals strictly true, it not only calls a skiff a skiff, but also confirms it, when the pretty mask can beautifully be torn from vices and the foul mask from virtues, §580.
Ἦθος persuasorium § 866. 2) memor illorum,
Persuasive ἦθος, §866, 2) mindful of those who
qui nihil rectum, nisi quod ipsorum moribus
will think nothing right except what agrees with their own customs,
conveniat, putabunt, Corn. pr. quos noveris non
Cornelius, preface, and whom you know are not very few,
esse paucissimos, si qua cum iisdem congruant,
will triumph, if the things it
quae velit persuadere,
wants to persuade agree with them,
ea more maiorum et institutis sacrosanctis ritibus,
by commending them through ancestral custom, sacred rites,
ipsis gentium consuetudinibus,
the very practices of nations, and the long
diuturnoque moratiorum usu commendando triumphabit; si
usage of the more moral; if the things to
qua persuadenda dissentire videantur ab iisdem,
be persuaded seem to dissent from these, it
ea sibi non sumit tractanda,
does not take them up for treatment
nisi sub hypothesi § 846.
except under the hypothesis of §846.
3) de morum optimorum verissima pulcritudine, de vera vitiorum
3) It labors most intimately to persuade its hearers,
turpitudine per naturales maxime colores
through the natural colors of each,
utrorumque laborat intime suos persuadere,
concerning the truest beauty of the best morals and the true ugliness
§ 574. 4) in moribus strictissime veris
of vices, §574. 4) In morals strictly true,
scapham scapham non dicit solum,
it not only calls a skiff a skiff,
sed etiam confirmat, quando pulcre potest et vitiis pulcella,
but also confirms it, when the pretty mask can beautifully be torn
et foeda virtutibus larva detrahi, § 580.
from vices and the foul mask from virtues, §580.
Ἦθος persuasorium § 866. 2) memor illorum, qui nihil rectum, nisi quod ipsorum moribus conveniat, putabunt, Corn. pr. quos noveris non esse paucissimos, si qua cum iisdem congruant, quae velit persuadere, ea more maiorum et institutis sacrosanctis ritibus, ipsis gentium consuetudinibus, diuturnoque moratiorum usu commendando triumphabit; si qua persuadenda dissentire videantur ab iisdem, ea sibi non sumit tractanda, nisi sub hypothesi § 846. 3) de morum optimorum verissima pulcritudine, de vera vitiorum turpitudine per naturales maxime colores utrorumque laborat intime suos persuadere, § 574. 4) in moribus strictissime veris scapham scapham non dicit solum, sed etiam confirmat, quando pulcre potest et vitiis pulcella, et foeda virtutibus larva detrahi, § 580. / Persuasive ἦθος, §866, 2) mindful of those who will think nothing right except what agrees with their own customs, Cornelius, preface, and whom you know are not very few, will triumph, if the things it wants to persuade agree with them, by commending them through ancestral custom, sacred rites, the very practices of nations, and the long usage of the more moral; if the things to be persuaded seem to dissent from these, it does not take them up for treatment except under the hypothesis of §846. 3) It labors most intimately to persuade its hearers, through the natural colors of each, concerning the truest beauty of the best morals and the true ugliness of vices, §574. 4) In morals strictly true, it not only calls a skiff a skiff, but also confirms it, when the pretty mask can beautifully be torn from vices and the foul mask from virtues, §580.
§ 868
Ἦθος persuasorium 5) mores et facta, de quibus dubitari potest, nunc in bonam, nunc in malam partem interpretatur, non sine probabilitate, saltim aesthetica, secundum regulas veritatis moralis, de qua § 435, 467. secundum easdem 6) historice fingendis moribus et factis eam probabilitatem circumdabit, ut, licet, quomodo acta res sit, ignoremus, ius tamen iurandae credulitatis vix perhorresceremus persuasi non aliter agi potuisse, § 509. 7) in ipsis fictionibus moralium poeticis observabit certitudinem ex analogia cum mundo poetico § 511, 513. et earundem interna verisimilitudine resultantem, § 589. ut spectator tuus persuadeatur, non quidem, quae facta sunt, tamen verissime narrari, qualia fieri debent, heterocosmica; § 586. 8) ubique lucem et umbram in nuda veritate moralium pingenda sic temperabit, § 666. ut haec aliquando plena in luce refulgeat, § 625. nunc subindicetur tantum pluribus ad cogitandum spectatori relictis, § 654–662. nunc strictissime vera pateant analogo rationis et fidei historicae, § 441. nunc in ipsis fabulis dominari veritatem, § 556. vivide sentiens in admirationem simul, splendidorum mendaciorum, § 477. rapiatur spectator bene locata thaumaturgia, § 808.
Persuasive ἦθος 5) interprets morals and deeds about which one can doubt now in a good part, now in a bad part, not without probability, at least aesthetic probability, according to the rules of moral truth discussed in §§435, 467. According to the same rules, 6) it will pour such probability around morals and deeds to be historically invented that, although we do not know how the thing happened, we would scarcely shudder at the right of sworn credulity, persuaded that it could not have been done otherwise, §509. 7) In poetic fictions of morals themselves it will observe the certitude resulting from analogy with the poetic world, §§511, 513, and from their internal verisimilitude, §589, so that your spectator is persuaded that, not indeed things that happened, but heterocosmic things such as ought to happen, are most truly narrated, §586. 8) Everywhere it will so temper light and shade in painting the naked truth of morals, §666, that this truth sometimes shines in full light, §625, now is only hinted, with more things left for the spectator to think, §§654–662, now things strictly true lie open to the analogue of reason and historical faith, §441, now, even in fables, truth rules, §556, and the spectator, vividly sensing this, is at the same time carried into admiration by a well-placed thaumaturgy of splendid fictions, §§477, 808.
Ἦθος persuasorium 5) mores et facta, de quibus dubitari potest, nunc in bonam, nunc in malam partem interpretatur, non sine probabilitate, saltim aesthetica, secundum regulas veritatis moralis, de qua § 435, 467. secundum easdem 6) historice fingendis moribus et factis eam probabilitatem circumdabit, ut, licet, quomodo acta res sit, ignoremus, ius tamen iurandae credulitatis vix perhorresceremus persuasi non aliter agi potuisse, § 509. 7) in ipsis fictionibus moralium poeticis observabit certitudinem ex analogia cum mundo poetico § 511, 513. et earundem interna verisimilitudine resultantem, § 589. ut spectator tuus persuadeatur, non quidem, quae facta sunt, tamen verissime narrari, qualia fieri debent, heterocosmica; § 586. 8) ubique lucem et umbram in nuda veritate moralium pingenda sic temperabit, § 666. ut haec aliquando plena in luce refulgeat, § 625. nunc subindicetur tantum pluribus ad cogitandum spectatori relictis, § 654–662. nunc strictissime vera pateant analogo rationis et fidei historicae, § 441. nunc in ipsis fabulis dominari veritatem, § 556. vivide sentiens in admirationem simul, splendidorum mendaciorum, § 477. rapiatur spectator bene locata thaumaturgia, § 808.
Persuasive ἦθος 5) interprets morals and deeds about which one can doubt now in a good part, now in a bad part, not without probability, at least aesthetic probability, according to the rules of moral truth discussed in §§435, 467. According to the same rules, 6) it will pour such probability around morals and deeds to be historically invented that, although we do not know how the thing happened, we would scarcely shudder at the right of sworn credulity, persuaded that it could not have been done otherwise, §509. 7) In poetic fictions of morals themselves it will observe the certitude resulting from analogy with the poetic world, §§511, 513, and from their internal verisimilitude, §589, so that your spectator is persuaded that, not indeed things that happened, but heterocosmic things such as ought to happen, are most truly narrated, §586. 8) Everywhere it will so temper light and shade in painting the naked truth of morals, §666, that this truth sometimes shines in full light, §625, now is only hinted, with more things left for the spectator to think, §§654–662, now things strictly true lie open to the analogue of reason and historical faith, §441, now, even in fables, truth rules, §556, and the spectator, vividly sensing this, is at the same time carried into admiration by a well-placed thaumaturgy of splendid fictions, §§477, 808.
Ἦθος persuasorium 5) mores et facta,
Persuasive ἦθος 5) interprets morals and deeds
de quibus dubitari potest, nunc in bonam,
about which one can doubt now in a good
nunc in malam partem interpretatur, non sine probabilitate,
part, now in a bad part, not without probability,
saltim aesthetica, secundum regulas veritatis moralis,
at least aesthetic probability, according to the rules of moral truth discussed
de qua § 435, 467. secundum easdem
in §§435, 467. According to the same rules,
6) historice fingendis moribus et
6) it will pour such probability around morals and
factis eam probabilitatem circumdabit, ut, licet,
deeds to be historically invented that, although we
quomodo acta res sit, ignoremus,
do not know how the thing happened,
ius tamen iurandae credulitatis
we would scarcely shudder at the right of sworn credulity,
vix perhorresceremus persuasi non aliter agi potuisse, § 509.
persuaded that it could not have been done otherwise, §509.
7) in ipsis fictionibus moralium poeticis
7) In poetic fictions of morals themselves it will
observabit certitudinem ex analogia cum mundo poetico § 511, 513.
observe the certitude resulting from analogy with the poetic world, §§511, 513,
et earundem interna verisimilitudine resultantem, § 589.
and from their internal verisimilitude, §589,
ut spectator tuus persuadeatur, non quidem,
so that your spectator is persuaded that, not indeed
quae facta
things that happened, but heterocosmic things such as ought to happen,
sunt, tamen verissime narrari, qualia fieri debent, heterocosmica; § 586.
are most truly narrated, §586.
8) ubique lucem et umbram
8) Everywhere it will so temper light and shade
in nuda veritate moralium pingenda sic temperabit, § 666.
in painting the naked truth of morals, §666,
ut haec aliquando plena in luce refulgeat, § 625.
that this truth sometimes shines in full light, §625,
nunc subindicetur tantum pluribus ad
now is only hinted, with more things left for
cogitandum spectatori relictis, § 654–662. nunc strictissime
the spectator to think, §§654–662, now things strictly true
vera pateant analogo rationis et fidei historicae, § 441.
lie open to the analogue of reason and historical faith, §441,
nunc in ipsis fabulis dominari veritatem, § 556.
now, even in fables, truth rules, §556,
vivide sentiens
and the spectator, vividly sensing this,
in admirationem simul,
is at the same time carried into admiration by
splendidorum mendaciorum, § 477.
a well-placed thaumaturgy of splendid fictions, §§477,
rapiatur spectator bene locata thaumaturgia, § 808.
808.
Ἦθος persuasorium 5) mores et facta, de quibus dubitari potest, nunc in bonam, nunc in malam partem interpretatur, non sine probabilitate, saltim aesthetica, secundum regulas veritatis moralis, de qua § 435, 467. secundum easdem 6) historice fingendis moribus et factis eam probabilitatem circumdabit, ut, licet, quomodo acta res sit, ignoremus, ius tamen iurandae credulitatis vix perhorresceremus persuasi non aliter agi potuisse, § 509. 7) in ipsis fictionibus moralium poeticis observabit certitudinem ex analogia cum mundo poetico § 511, 513. et earundem interna verisimilitudine resultantem, § 589. ut spectator tuus persuadeatur, non quidem, quae facta sunt, tamen verissime narrari, qualia fieri debent, heterocosmica; § 586. 8) ubique lucem et umbram in nuda veritate moralium pingenda sic temperabit, § 666. ut haec aliquando plena in luce refulgeat, § 625. nunc subindicetur tantum pluribus ad cogitandum spectatori relictis, § 654–662. nunc strictissime vera pateant analogo rationis et fidei historicae, § 441. nunc in ipsis fabulis dominari veritatem, § 556. vivide sentiens in admirationem simul, splendidorum mendaciorum, § 477. rapiatur spectator bene locata thaumaturgia, § 808. / Persuasive ἦθος 5) interprets morals and deeds about which one can doubt now in a good part, now in a bad part, not without probability, at least aesthetic probability, according to the rules of moral truth discussed in §§435, 467. According to the same rules, 6) it will pour such probability around morals and deeds to be historically invented that, although we do not know how the thing happened, we would scarcely shudder at the right of sworn credulity, persuaded that it could not have been done otherwise, §509. 7) In poetic fictions of morals themselves it will observe the certitude resulting from analogy with the poetic world, §§511, 513, and from their internal verisimilitude, §589, so that your spectator is persuaded that, not indeed things that happened, but heterocosmic things such as ought to happen, are most truly narrated, §586. 8) Everywhere it will so temper light and shade in painting the naked truth of morals, §666, that this truth sometimes shines in full light, §625, now is only hinted, with more things left for the spectator to think, §§654–662, now things strictly true lie open to the analogue of reason and historical faith, §441, now, even in fables, truth rules, §556, and the spectator, vividly sensing this, is at the same time carried into admiration by a well-placed thaumaturgy of splendid fictions, §§477, 808.
§ 869
Probabile porro Ciceroni est,
Further, for Cicero the probable is what
quod est in opinione positum,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.,
de inv. I. 46. Nos illud concessimus verisimile, § 484. neque tamen eidem generatim probabilitatem tribuere possumus, ne aestheticam quidem semper. § 485. Exempla Ciceronis sunt:
De inventione I.46. We have conceded that this is verisimilar, §484, yet we cannot generally attribute probability to it, not even always aesthetic probability, §485. Cicero's examples are: that punishments have been prepared for the impious in the underworld, and
Impiis apud inferos poenas esse praeparatas, eos, qui philosophiae dent operam, non arbitrari deos esse.
“That there are punishments prepared in the shades below for impious men.”—“That those men who give their attention to philosophy do not think that there are gods.”.
Primum est adhuc plurimorum opinio, neque tamen probabilitatem vel aestheticam apud aliquos auditorum nanciscerer argumentis ex inferno petitis, apud eos scilicet, qui futura post hanc vitam omnia negare magnum aliquid perperam opinantur. Nec apud alios nunc in confirmando plus proficerem, Sisyphi lapidem et aquas Tantali fugientes minatus, quoniam has inferorum poenas non amplius in suis habent opinionibus. Secundum est opinio verissima, si de diis et exactius philosophantibus loquaris, sin atheismum imputes philosophis, multos nunc invenies auditores, quibus eiusmodi criminationes non amplius imponant.
The first is still the opinion of very many, and yet I would not obtain even aesthetic probability among some hearers by arguments drawn from hell, namely among those who wrongly suppose it something great to deny all future things after this life. Nor among others would I now accomplish more in confirming by threatening the stone of Sisyphus and the fleeing waters of Tantalus, since they no longer have these punishments of the underworld in their opinions. The second is a very true opinion, if you speak about gods and those who philosophize more exactly; but if you impute atheism to philosophers, you will now find many hearers on whom accusations of this kind no longer impose.
Probabile porro Ciceroni est,
Further, for Cicero the probable is what
quod est in opinione positum,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.,
de inv.
De inventione I.46.
I. 46. Nos illud concessimus verisimile, § 484. neque tamen eidem generatim probabilitatem tribuere possumus, ne aestheticam quidem semper. § 485. Exempla Ciceronis sunt:
We have conceded that this is verisimilar, §484, yet we cannot generally attribute probability to it, not even always aesthetic probability, §485. Cicero's examples are: that punishments have been prepared for the impious in the underworld, and
Impiis apud inferos poenas esse praeparatas, eos, qui philosophiae dent operam, non arbitrari deos esse.
“That there are punishments prepared in the shades below for impious men.”—“That those men who give their attention to philosophy do not think that there are gods.”.
Primum est adhuc plurimorum opinio, neque tamen probabilitatem vel aestheticam apud aliquos auditorum nanciscerer argumentis ex inferno petitis, apud eos scilicet, qui futura post hanc vitam omnia negare magnum aliquid perperam opinantur.
The first is still the opinion of very many, and yet I would not obtain even aesthetic probability among some hearers by arguments drawn from hell, namely among those who wrongly suppose it something great to deny all future things after this life.
Nec apud alios nunc in confirmando plus proficerem, Sisyphi lapidem et aquas Tantali fugientes minatus, quoniam has inferorum poenas non amplius in suis habent opinionibus.
Nor among others would I now accomplish more in confirming by threatening the stone of Sisyphus and the fleeing waters of Tantalus, since they no longer have these punishments of the underworld in their opinions.
Secundum est opinio verissima, si de diis et exactius philosophantibus loquaris, sin atheismum imputes philosophis, multos nunc invenies auditores, quibus eiusmodi criminationes non amplius imponant.
The second is a very true opinion, if you speak about gods and those who philosophize more exactly; but if you impute atheism to philosophers, you will now find many hearers on whom accusations of this kind no longer impose.
Probabile porro Ciceroni est,
Further, for Cicero the probable is what
quod est in opinione positum,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.,
de inv.
De inventione I.46.
I. 46. Nos illud concessimus verisimile, § 484.
We have conceded that this is verisimilar, §484,
neque tamen eidem generatim probabilitatem tribuere possumus,
yet we cannot generally attribute probability to it, not even always aesthetic probability, §485. Cicero's examples are:
ne aestheticam quidem semper. § 485. Exempla Ciceronis sunt:
that punishments have been prepared for the impious in the underworld, and
Impiis apud inferos poenas esse praeparatas, eos, qui philosophiae dent operam, non arbitrari deos esse.
“That there are punishments prepared in the shades below for impious men.”—“That those men who give their attention to philosophy do not think that there are gods.”.
Primum est adhuc plurimorum opinio,
The first is still the opinion of very many,
neque tamen probabilitatem vel aestheticam
and yet I would not obtain even aesthetic
apud aliquos auditorum nanciscerer argumentis ex inferno petitis,
probability among some hearers by arguments drawn from
apud eos scilicet, qui futura post hanc vitam omnia
hell, namely among those who wrongly suppose it
negare magnum aliquid perperam opinantur.
something great to deny all future things after this life.
Nec apud alios nunc in confirmando plus proficerem,
Nor among others would I now accomplish more in confirming by threatening
Sisyphi lapidem et aquas Tantali
the stone of Sisyphus and the fleeing waters of Tantalus,
fugientes minatus, quoniam has inferorum poenas non amplius
since they no longer have these punishments of the
in suis habent opinionibus.
underworld in their opinions.
Secundum est opinio verissima,
The second is a very true opinion,
si de diis et exactius philosophantibus loquaris,
if you speak about gods and those who philosophize more exactly;
sin atheismum imputes philosophis,
but if you impute atheism to philosophers,
multos nunc invenies auditores, quibus eiusmodi
you will now find many hearers on whom accusations
criminationes non amplius imponant.
of this kind no longer impose.
Probabile porro Ciceroni est, / Further, for Cicero the probable is what
quod est in opinione positum,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.,
de inv. / De inventione I.46.
I. 46. Nos illud concessimus verisimile, § 484. neque tamen eidem generatim probabilitatem tribuere possumus, ne aestheticam quidem semper. § 485. Exempla Ciceronis sunt: / We have conceded that this is verisimilar, §484, yet we cannot generally attribute probability to it, not even always aesthetic probability, §485. Cicero's examples are: that punishments have been prepared for the impious in the underworld, and
Impiis apud inferos poenas esse praeparatas, eos, qui philosophiae dent operam, non arbitrari deos esse.
“That there are punishments prepared in the shades below for impious men.”—“That those men who give their attention to philosophy do not think that there are gods.”.
Primum est adhuc plurimorum opinio, neque tamen probabilitatem vel aestheticam apud aliquos auditorum nanciscerer argumentis ex inferno petitis, apud eos scilicet, qui futura post hanc vitam omnia negare magnum aliquid perperam opinantur. / The first is still the opinion of very many, and yet I would not obtain even aesthetic probability among some hearers by arguments drawn from hell, namely among those who wrongly suppose it something great to deny all future things after this life.
Nec apud alios nunc in confirmando plus proficerem, Sisyphi lapidem et aquas Tantali fugientes minatus, quoniam has inferorum poenas non amplius in suis habent opinionibus. / Nor among others would I now accomplish more in confirming by threatening the stone of Sisyphus and the fleeing waters of Tantalus, since they no longer have these punishments of the underworld in their opinions.
Secundum est opinio verissima, si de diis et exactius philosophantibus loquaris, sin atheismum imputes philosophis, multos nunc invenies auditores, quibus eiusmodi criminationes non amplius imponant. / The second is a very true opinion, if you speak about gods and those who philosophize more exactly; but if you impute atheism to philosophers, you will now find many hearers on whom accusations of this kind no longer impose.
§ 870
Assensus noster nobis incerto datus est OPINIO NOSTRA. Opiniones suas frustra persuadendis obtruderet aliquis confirmandi gratia, nisi sint eaedem simul opiniones eorum, quibus potissimum cogitat. Hinc ante omnia videndum in opinionum usu, an sint opiniones obiecti tui personalis primarii, an forsan aliorum tantum. Opinamur vel non ponderatis ad assensum rationibus OPINIONE PRAEIUDICATA, vel opinione nunc logice, nunc saltim aesthetice probabili, vel nobis etiam dubiae, vel omnino improbabili opinioni assentimur, quoniam id vel licere, vel omnino moraliter necessarium putamus, vel ponimus verosimilem nobis donec an probabilis sit, nec ne magis liqueat, ut ita dicam, interimistice et provisionaliter. Ad quam classem quaedam opinio intra mentem tuorum pertineat quum vix et raro certus esse poteris, post id, an in opinione eorum positum sit, quod ad confirmandum afferri possit, potior cura tuum erit, an opinio tuorum ex animi tui sententia sit error, an minus, ut agere possis ex § 574.
Our assent given by us to something uncertain is OUR OPINION. Someone would thrust his opinions upon those to be persuaded in vain for the sake of confirming, unless the same opinions are also the opinions of those for whom he chiefly thinks. Hence, before all else, in the use of opinions one must see whether they are opinions of one's primary personal object, or perhaps only of others. We opine either without weighed reasons for assent, by PREJUDICED OPINION, or by an opinion now logically, now at least aesthetically probable; or we assent to an opinion doubtful even to us, or altogether improbable, because we think this either permitted or altogether morally necessary, or we place it as verisimilar to us, until it becomes clearer whether it is probable or not, as I might say, interimistically and provisionally. Since you will scarcely and rarely be certain to which class a given opinion belongs within the mind of your hearers, after determining whether what can be brought for confirmation is placed in their opinion, your greater care will be whether your hearers' opinion, according to your own mind's judgment, is error or not, so that you can act according to §574.
Assensus noster nobis incerto datus est OPINIO NOSTRA.
Our assent given by us to something uncertain is OUR OPINION.
Opiniones suas frustra persuadendis obtruderet aliquis confirmandi gratia, nisi sint eaedem simul opiniones eorum, quibus potissimum cogitat.
Someone would thrust his opinions upon those to be persuaded in vain for the sake of confirming, unless the same opinions are also the opinions of those for whom he chiefly thinks.
Hinc ante omnia videndum in opinionum usu, an sint opiniones obiecti tui personalis primarii, an forsan aliorum tantum.
Hence, before all else, in the use of opinions one must see whether they are opinions of one's primary personal object, or perhaps only of others.
Opinamur vel non ponderatis ad assensum rationibus OPINIONE PRAEIUDICATA, vel opinione nunc logice, nunc saltim aesthetice probabili, vel nobis etiam dubiae, vel omnino improbabili opinioni assentimur, quoniam id vel licere, vel omnino moraliter necessarium putamus, vel ponimus verosimilem nobis donec an probabilis sit, nec ne magis liqueat, ut ita dicam, interimistice et provisionaliter.
We opine either without weighed reasons for assent, by PREJUDICED OPINION, or by an opinion now logically, now at least aesthetically probable; or we assent to an opinion doubtful even to us, or altogether improbable, because we think this either permitted or altogether morally necessary, or we place it as verisimilar to us, until it becomes clearer whether it is probable or not, as I might say, interimistically and provisionally.
Ad quam classem quaedam opinio intra mentem tuorum pertineat quum vix et raro certus esse poteris, post id, an in opinione eorum positum sit, quod ad confirmandum afferri possit, potior cura tuum erit, an opinio tuorum ex animi tui sententia sit error, an minus, ut agere possis ex § 574.
Since you will scarcely and rarely be certain to which class a given opinion belongs within the mind of your hearers, after determining whether what can be brought for confirmation is placed in their opinion, your greater care will be whether your hearers' opinion, according to your own mind's judgment, is error or not, so that you can act according to §574.
Assensus noster nobis incerto datus est OPINIO NOSTRA.
Our assent given by us to something uncertain is OUR OPINION.
Opiniones suas frustra
Someone would thrust his opinions upon those to be
persuadendis obtruderet aliquis confirmandi gratia,
persuaded in vain for the sake of confirming,
nisi sint eaedem simul opiniones eorum,
unless the same opinions are also the opinions of
quibus potissimum cogitat.
those for whom he chiefly thinks.
Hinc ante omnia videndum in opinionum usu,
Hence, before all else, in the use
an sint opiniones
of opinions one must see whether they are opinions
obiecti tui personalis primarii, an forsan aliorum tantum.
of one's primary personal object, or perhaps only of others.
Opinamur vel non ponderatis ad assensum
We opine either without weighed reasons for assent,
rationibus OPINIONE PRAEIUDICATA, vel opinione nunc logice,
by PREJUDICED OPINION, or by an opinion now logically,
nunc saltim aesthetice probabili, vel nobis
now at least aesthetically probable; or we assent to
etiam dubiae, vel omnino improbabili
an opinion doubtful even to us, or altogether improbable,
opinioni assentimur, quoniam id vel licere, vel omnino moraliter necessarium
because we think this either permitted or altogether morally necessary,
putamus, vel ponimus verosimilem nobis
or we place it as verisimilar to us,
donec an probabilis sit,
until it becomes clearer whether it is probable
nec ne magis liqueat, ut ita dicam, interimistice et provisionaliter.
or not, as I might say, interimistically and provisionally.
Ad
Since you will scarcely and rarely be certain to
quam classem quaedam opinio intra mentem tuorum pertineat quum vix et
which class a given opinion belongs within the mind of your hearers,
raro certus esse poteris, post id,
after determining whether what can be brought for confirmation
an in opinione eorum positum sit, quod ad confirmandum
is placed in their opinion,
afferri possit, potior cura tuum erit, an opinio
your greater care will be whether your hearers' opinion,
tuorum ex animi tui sententia sit error,
according to your own mind's judgment, is error
an minus, ut agere possis ex § 574.
or not, so that you can act according to §574.
Assensus noster nobis incerto datus est OPINIO NOSTRA. / Our assent given by us to something uncertain is OUR OPINION.
Opiniones suas frustra persuadendis obtruderet aliquis confirmandi gratia, nisi sint eaedem simul opiniones eorum, quibus potissimum cogitat. / Someone would thrust his opinions upon those to be persuaded in vain for the sake of confirming, unless the same opinions are also the opinions of those for whom he chiefly thinks.
Hinc ante omnia videndum in opinionum usu, an sint opiniones obiecti tui personalis primarii, an forsan aliorum tantum. / Hence, before all else, in the use of opinions one must see whether they are opinions of one's primary personal object, or perhaps only of others.
Opinamur vel non ponderatis ad assensum rationibus OPINIONE PRAEIUDICATA, vel opinione nunc logice, nunc saltim aesthetice probabili, vel nobis etiam dubiae, vel omnino improbabili opinioni assentimur, quoniam id vel licere, vel omnino moraliter necessarium putamus, vel ponimus verosimilem nobis donec an probabilis sit, nec ne magis liqueat, ut ita dicam, interimistice et provisionaliter. / We opine either without weighed reasons for assent, by PREJUDICED OPINION, or by an opinion now logically, now at least aesthetically probable; or we assent to an opinion doubtful even to us, or altogether improbable, because we think this either permitted or altogether morally necessary, or we place it as verisimilar to us, until it becomes clearer whether it is probable or not, as I might say, interimistically and provisionally.
Ad quam classem quaedam opinio intra mentem tuorum pertineat quum vix et raro certus esse poteris, post id, an in opinione eorum positum sit, quod ad confirmandum afferri possit, potior cura tuum erit, an opinio tuorum ex animi tui sententia sit error, an minus, ut agere possis ex § 574. / Since you will scarcely and rarely be certain to which class a given opinion belongs within the mind of your hearers, after determining whether what can be brought for confirmation is placed in their opinion, your greater care will be whether your hearers' opinion, according to your own mind's judgment, is error or not, so that you can act according to §574.
§ 871
Si tandem Ciceroni probabilia dicuntur omnia,
If finally Cicero calls probable all things
quae habent ad mores et opiniones aliquam similitudinem, contraria, paria, quaeque cadant sub eandem rationem,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.
[...]
But resemblance is chiefly seen in things which are contrary to one another, or equal to one another, and in those things which fall under the same principle.,
de inv. I. 46. vereor, ne verisimile et probabile, perspicuum et evidens, si sequaris, saepenumero confuderis. § 852. In ipsis exquisitis ab eloquentissimo viro exemplis fallor, an parva satis vis ad persuadendum analogo rationis deprehendetur, splendidum et oculos primo obtutu praestringens, ab evidenti si doctum est distinguere? Interim qui semper non dabunt, aliquando saltim probabilem confirmationem suggerent loculi; § 132.
De inventione I.46, I fear that, if you follow him, you will quite often confuse the verisimilar and the probable, the perspicuous and the evident, §852. In the examples sought out by the most eloquent man himself, am I wrong, or will a rather small force for persuading be detected by the analogue of reason, if one has learned to distinguish what is splendid and dazzling to the eyes at first glance from what is evident? Meanwhile, these little places will not always give, but at least sometimes suggest, a probable confirmation, §132.
Si tandem Ciceroni probabilia dicuntur omnia,
If finally Cicero calls probable all things
quae habent ad mores et opiniones aliquam similitudinem, contraria, paria, quaeque cadant sub eandem rationem,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.
[...]
But resemblance is chiefly seen in things which are contrary to one another, or equal to one another, and in those things which fall under the same principle.,
de inv. I. 46. vereor, ne verisimile et probabile, perspicuum et evidens, si sequaris, saepenumero confuderis. § 852. In ipsis exquisitis ab eloquentissimo viro exemplis fallor, an parva satis vis ad persuadendum analogo rationis deprehendetur, splendidum et oculos primo obtutu praestringens, ab evidenti si doctum est distinguere?
De inventione I.46, I fear that, if you follow him, you will quite often confuse the verisimilar and the probable, the perspicuous and the evident, §852. In the examples sought out by the most eloquent man himself, am I wrong, or will a rather small force for persuading be detected by the analogue of reason, if one has learned to distinguish what is splendid and dazzling to the eyes at first glance from what is evident?
Interim qui semper non dabunt, aliquando saltim probabilem confirmationem suggerent loculi; § 132.
Meanwhile, these little places will not always give, but at least sometimes suggest, a probable confirmation, §132.
Si tandem Ciceroni probabilia dicuntur omnia,
If finally Cicero calls probable all things
quae habent ad mores et opiniones aliquam similitudinem, contraria, paria, quaeque cadant sub eandem rationem,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.
[...]
But resemblance is chiefly seen in things which are contrary to one another, or equal to one another, and in those things which fall under the same principle.,
de inv. I. 46. vereor, ne
De inventione I.46, I fear that,
verisimile et probabile, perspicuum et evidens,
if you follow him, you will quite often confuse the verisimilar and the probable, the perspicuous and the evident,
si sequaris, saepenumero confuderis. § 852. In
§852. In the examples sought
ipsis exquisitis ab eloquentissimo viro exemplis
out by the most eloquent man himself, am I wrong,
fallor, an parva satis vis ad persuadendum
or will a rather small force for persuading be
analogo rationis deprehendetur,
detected by the analogue of reason, if
splendidum et
one has learned to distinguish what is splendid and
oculos primo obtutu praestringens, ab evidenti si doctum est distinguere?
dazzling to the eyes at first glance from what is evident?
Interim qui semper non dabunt,
Meanwhile, these little places will not always give,
aliquando saltim probabilem confirmationem suggerent loculi; § 132.
but at least sometimes suggest, a probable confirmation, §132.
Si tandem Ciceroni probabilia dicuntur omnia, / If finally Cicero calls probable all things
quae habent ad mores et opiniones aliquam similitudinem, contraria, paria, quaeque cadant sub eandem rationem,
But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true.
[...]
But resemblance is chiefly seen in things which are contrary to one another, or equal to one another, and in those things which fall under the same principle.,
de inv. I. 46. vereor, ne verisimile et probabile, perspicuum et evidens, si sequaris, saepenumero confuderis. § 852. In ipsis exquisitis ab eloquentissimo viro exemplis fallor, an parva satis vis ad persuadendum analogo rationis deprehendetur, splendidum et oculos primo obtutu praestringens, ab evidenti si doctum est distinguere? / De inventione I.46, I fear that, if you follow him, you will quite often confuse the verisimilar and the probable, the perspicuous and the evident, §852. In the examples sought out by the most eloquent man himself, am I wrong, or will a rather small force for persuading be detected by the analogue of reason, if one has learned to distinguish what is splendid and dazzling to the eyes at first glance from what is evident?
Interim qui semper non dabunt, aliquando saltim probabilem confirmationem suggerent loculi; § 132. / Meanwhile, these little places will not always give, but at least sometimes suggest, a probable confirmation, §132.
§ 872
Pari sunt in pretio, qui sequuntur, 48. probabilium loci, signum, credibile, iudicatum, comparabile. Signum esse dicit, quod quiddam significat. e. c. Hactenus quis neget? Quando vero de signis generatim addit,
The following places of probabilities, 48, have the same value: sign, credible, judged, comparable. He says that a sign is what signifies something, and so forth. Thus far, who would deny it? But when he adds concerning signs generally that
indigere ea testimonii et gravioris confirmationis,
That is a proof which falls under some particular sense, and which indicates something which appears to have proceeded from it, which either existed previously, or was in the thing itself, or has ensued since, and, nevertheless, requires the evidence of testimony, and a more authoritative confirmation,,
de signis illud omnibus eo minus concesserim, quo minus, 1) omnia signa tantum probabilia sunt, quoniam ex aliquibus persuasio completa, e. g. ex putrefactione totius corporis certitudo mortis, 2) probabilia etiam, si vere sint, quae dicuntur, semper gravioris confirmationis indigent, § 861, 865. Miseros medicorum filios, qui in sua prognosi probabili collatis signis morborum omnibus, tamen indigent ubique testimonii aut gravioris confirmationis!
I would grant this of all signs so much the less because 1) not all signs are only probable, since complete persuasion can arise from some, for example certainty of death from the putrefaction of the whole body; 2) even probable signs, if they truly are what they are said to be, do not always need heavier confirmation, §§861, 865. Miserable children of physicians, who in their probable prognosis, after all signs of diseases have been compared, nevertheless everywhere need testimony or heavier confirmation!
Pari sunt in pretio, qui sequuntur, 48. probabilium loci, signum, credibile, iudicatum, comparabile.
The following places of probabilities, 48, have the same value: sign, credible, judged, comparable.
Signum esse dicit, quod quiddam significat. e. c. Hactenus quis neget?
He says that a sign is what signifies something, and so forth. Thus far, who would deny it?
Quando vero de signis generatim addit,
But when he adds concerning signs generally that
indigere ea testimonii et gravioris confirmationis,
That is a proof which falls under some particular sense, and which indicates something which appears to have proceeded from it, which either existed previously, or was in the thing itself, or has ensued since, and, nevertheless, requires the evidence of testimony, and a more authoritative confirmation,,
de signis illud omnibus eo minus concesserim, quo minus, 1) omnia signa tantum probabilia sunt, quoniam ex aliquibus persuasio completa, e. g. ex putrefactione totius corporis certitudo mortis, 2) probabilia etiam, si vere sint, quae dicuntur, semper gravioris confirmationis indigent, § 861, 865. Miseros medicorum filios, qui in sua prognosi probabili collatis signis morborum omnibus, tamen indigent ubique testimonii aut gravioris confirmationis!
I would grant this of all signs so much the less because 1) not all signs are only probable, since complete persuasion can arise from some, for example certainty of death from the putrefaction of the whole body; 2) even probable signs, if they truly are what they are said to be, do not always need heavier confirmation, §§861, 865. Miserable children of physicians, who in their probable prognosis, after all signs of diseases have been compared, nevertheless everywhere need testimony or heavier confirmation!
Pari sunt in pretio, qui sequuntur, 48.
The following places of probabilities, 48,
probabilium loci, signum, credibile, iudicatum, comparabile.
have the same value: sign, credible, judged, comparable.
Signum esse dicit, quod quiddam significat.
He says that a sign is what signifies
e. c. Hactenus quis neget?
something, and so forth. Thus far, who would deny it?
Quando vero de signis generatim addit,
But when he adds concerning signs generally that
indigere ea testimonii et gravioris confirmationis,
That is a proof which falls under some particular sense, and which indicates something which appears to have proceeded from it, which either existed previously, or was in the thing itself, or has ensued since, and, nevertheless, requires the evidence of testimony, and a more authoritative confirmation,,
de signis illud omnibus eo minus concesserim,
I would grant this of all signs so much
quo minus, 1) omnia signa tantum probabilia
the less because 1) not all signs are only probable,
sunt, quoniam ex aliquibus persuasio completa, e.
since complete persuasion can arise from some, for example certainty
g. ex putrefactione totius corporis certitudo mortis,
of death from the putrefaction of the whole body;
2) probabilia etiam, si vere sint,
2) even probable signs, if they truly are what
quae dicuntur, semper gravioris confirmationis
they are said to be, do not always need heavier confirmation,
indigent, § 861, 865. Miseros medicorum filios, qui
§§861, 865. Miserable children of physicians,
in sua prognosi probabili collatis signis morborum omnibus,
who in their probable prognosis, after all signs of diseases
tamen indigent ubique testimonii aut gravioris confirmationis!
have been compared, nevertheless everywhere need testimony or heavier confirmation!
Pari sunt in pretio, qui sequuntur, 48. probabilium loci, signum, credibile, iudicatum, comparabile. / The following places of probabilities, 48, have the same value: sign, credible, judged, comparable.
Signum esse dicit, quod quiddam significat. e. c. Hactenus quis neget? / He says that a sign is what signifies something, and so forth. Thus far, who would deny it?
Quando vero de signis generatim addit, / But when he adds concerning signs generally that
indigere ea testimonii et gravioris confirmationis,
That is a proof which falls under some particular sense, and which indicates something which appears to have proceeded from it, which either existed previously, or was in the thing itself, or has ensued since, and, nevertheless, requires the evidence of testimony, and a more authoritative confirmation,,
de signis illud omnibus eo minus concesserim, quo minus, 1) omnia signa tantum probabilia sunt, quoniam ex aliquibus persuasio completa, e. g. ex putrefactione totius corporis certitudo mortis, 2) probabilia etiam, si vere sint, quae dicuntur, semper gravioris confirmationis indigent, § 861, 865. Miseros medicorum filios, qui in sua prognosi probabili collatis signis morborum omnibus, tamen indigent ubique testimonii aut gravioris confirmationis! / I would grant this of all signs so much the less because 1) not all signs are only probable, since complete persuasion can arise from some, for example certainty of death from the putrefaction of the whole body; 2) even probable signs, if they truly are what they are said to be, do not always need heavier confirmation, §§861, 865. Miserable children of physicians, who in their probable prognosis, after all signs of diseases have been compared, nevertheless everywhere need testimony or heavier confirmation!
§ 873
Credibile non tam
The credible is established not so much
sine ullo teste auditoris opinione firmatur,
That is a credible statement which, without any witness being heard, is confirmed in the opinion of the hearer;,
§ 869, 870. quam ob internam suam probabilitatem etiam tunc persuadet, quando testium etiam auctoritatem minus perspectam habeamus. Iudicatum est Ciceroni
§§869, 870, as it persuades by its internal probability even when we have less fully inspected the authority of witnesses. For Cicero,
res assensione, aut auctoritate, aut iudicio, alicuius aut aliquorum comprobata, idque vel religiosum, vel commune, vel approbatum. Comparabile
A case decided beforehand, is a matter approved of by the assent, or authority, or judgment of some person or persons. It is seen in three kinds of decision;—the religious one, the common one, the one depending on sanction.
[...]
But that is a decision admitting of comparisons, which in a multitude of different circumstances contains some principle which is alike in all..
dividit idem in imaginem, collationem et exemplum. § 871.
The same man divides the comparable into image, comparison, and example, §871.
Credibile non tam
The credible is established not so much
sine ullo teste auditoris opinione firmatur,
That is a credible statement which, without any witness being heard, is confirmed in the opinion of the hearer;,
§ 869, 870. quam ob internam suam probabilitatem etiam tunc persuadet, quando testium etiam auctoritatem minus perspectam habeamus.
§§869, 870, as it persuades by its internal probability even when we have less fully inspected the authority of witnesses.
Iudicatum est Ciceroni
For Cicero,
res assensione, aut auctoritate, aut iudicio, alicuius aut aliquorum comprobata, idque vel religiosum, vel commune, vel approbatum. Comparabile
A case decided beforehand, is a matter approved of by the assent, or authority, or judgment of some person or persons. It is seen in three kinds of decision;—the religious one, the common one, the one depending on sanction.
[...]
But that is a decision admitting of comparisons, which in a multitude of different circumstances contains some principle which is alike in all..
dividit idem in imaginem, collationem et exemplum. § 871.
The same man divides the comparable into image, comparison, and example, §871.
Credibile non tam
The credible is established not so much
sine ullo teste auditoris opinione firmatur,
That is a credible statement which, without any witness being heard, is confirmed in the opinion of the hearer;,
§ 869, 870. quam ob internam suam
§§869, 870, as it persuades by its internal
probabilitatem etiam tunc persuadet, quando testium etiam
probability even when we have less fully inspected the
auctoritatem minus perspectam habeamus.
authority of witnesses.
Iudicatum est Ciceroni
For Cicero,
res assensione, aut auctoritate, aut iudicio, alicuius aut aliquorum comprobata, idque vel religiosum, vel commune, vel approbatum. Comparabile
A case decided beforehand, is a matter approved of by the assent, or authority, or judgment of some person or persons. It is seen in three kinds of decision;—the religious one, the common one, the one depending on sanction.
[...]
But that is a decision admitting of comparisons, which in a multitude of different circumstances contains some principle which is alike in all..
dividit idem in imaginem, collationem et exemplum. § 871.
The same man divides the comparable into image, comparison, and example, §871.
Credibile non tam / The credible is established not so much
sine ullo teste auditoris opinione firmatur,
That is a credible statement which, without any witness being heard, is confirmed in the opinion of the hearer;,
§ 869, 870. quam ob internam suam probabilitatem etiam tunc persuadet, quando testium etiam auctoritatem minus perspectam habeamus. / §§869, 870, as it persuades by its internal probability even when we have less fully inspected the authority of witnesses.
Iudicatum est Ciceroni / For Cicero,
res assensione, aut auctoritate, aut iudicio, alicuius aut aliquorum comprobata, idque vel religiosum, vel commune, vel approbatum. Comparabile
A case decided beforehand, is a matter approved of by the assent, or authority, or judgment of some person or persons. It is seen in three kinds of decision;—the religious one, the common one, the one depending on sanction.
[...]
But that is a decision admitting of comparisons, which in a multitude of different circumstances contains some principle which is alike in all..
dividit idem in imaginem, collationem et exemplum. § 871. / The same man divides the comparable into image, comparison, and example, §871.
§ 874
Haec § 861–873. atque his similia postquam enarravit Cicero, 49. ita concludit:
After Cicero has narrated these things, §§861–873, and similar things, he concludes, 49:
At fons quidem confirmationis, ut facultas tulit, apertus est nec minus dilucide, quam rei natura ferebat, demonstratus est.
And the source of all confirmations has been already explained as occasion offered, and has been demonstrated no less clearly than the nature of the case required.,
§ 659. Neque tamen ipse sibi satisfecisse videtur, quando statim addit:
§659. Yet he does not seem to have satisfied himself, when he immediately adds:
In praesentia tantum modo numeros, et modos et partes argumentandi confuse et permisse dispersimus.
At present we have only dropped hints about the numbers, and moods, and parts of arguing in an irregular and promiscuous manner;.
Dicamus enim, quod res est, fontem confirmationis cuiuslibet non generalia quaedam aperient topica, sed natura thematis penitius cognita, confirmandorumque veritas, quam fieri potest, clarissime perspecta. Ipsa scientifica pulcre meditaturi convictio, rigoroseque demonstrandi habitus multum ipsi proderit, si vim rationis temperare, vim argumenta splendide collustrandi noverit excitare. Neque demonstrabit hos tam varios fontes rhetor ullus, ullus aestheticus, sed pulcra potius eruditio, § 63. et experientia, quae in rebus facti signis exsistentiam maxime probabilibus exponendi suppeditabit usum. Hausturis ex fontibus iam descriptis quaedam forte topica nonnumquam ansam aliquam dabunt, alias confirmationum aesthetice solidarum erunt arena pro fundamento. § 839.
For let us say what the matter is: the source of any confirmation will not be opened by certain general topics, but by the more inwardly known nature of the theme and by the truth of the things to be confirmed, seen as clearly as possible. The very scientific conviction of one who will meditate beautifully, and his habit of demonstrating rigorously, will profit him much, if he knows how to temper the force of reason and to excite the force of splendidly illuminating arguments. No rhetorician, no aesthetician, will demonstrate these so various sources, but rather beautiful erudition, §63, and experience, which will supply practice in expounding the signs most probable for existence in matters of fact. For those about to draw from the sources already described, certain topics will perhaps sometimes give some occasion; at other times they will be sand for the foundation of aesthetically solid confirmations, §839.
Haec § 861–873. atque his similia postquam enarravit Cicero, 49. ita concludit:
After Cicero has narrated these things, §§861–873, and similar things, he concludes, 49:
At fons quidem confirmationis, ut facultas tulit, apertus est nec minus dilucide, quam rei natura ferebat, demonstratus est.
And the source of all confirmations has been already explained as occasion offered, and has been demonstrated no less clearly than the nature of the case required.,
§ 659. Neque tamen ipse sibi satisfecisse videtur, quando statim addit:
§659. Yet he does not seem to have satisfied himself, when he immediately adds:
In praesentia tantum modo numeros, et modos et partes argumentandi confuse et permisse dispersimus.
At present we have only dropped hints about the numbers, and moods, and parts of arguing in an irregular and promiscuous manner;.
Dicamus enim, quod res est, fontem confirmationis cuiuslibet non generalia quaedam aperient topica, sed natura thematis penitius cognita, confirmandorumque veritas, quam fieri potest, clarissime perspecta.
For let us say what the matter is: the source of any confirmation will not be opened by certain general topics, but by the more inwardly known nature of the theme and by the truth of the things to be confirmed, seen as clearly as possible.
Ipsa scientifica pulcre meditaturi convictio, rigoroseque demonstrandi habitus multum ipsi proderit, si vim rationis temperare, vim argumenta splendide collustrandi noverit excitare.
The very scientific conviction of one who will meditate beautifully, and his habit of demonstrating rigorously, will profit him much, if he knows how to temper the force of reason and to excite the force of splendidly illuminating arguments.
Neque demonstrabit hos tam varios fontes rhetor ullus, ullus aestheticus, sed pulcra potius eruditio, § 63. et experientia, quae in rebus facti signis exsistentiam maxime probabilibus exponendi suppeditabit usum.
No rhetorician, no aesthetician, will demonstrate these so various sources, but rather beautiful erudition, §63, and experience, which will supply practice in expounding the signs most probable for existence in matters of fact.
Hausturis ex fontibus iam descriptis quaedam forte topica nonnumquam ansam aliquam dabunt, alias confirmationum aesthetice solidarum erunt arena pro fundamento. § 839.
For those about to draw from the sources already described, certain topics will perhaps sometimes give some occasion; at other times they will be sand for the foundation of aesthetically solid confirmations, §839.
Haec § 861–873. atque his similia postquam
After Cicero has narrated these things, §§861–873, and similar things,
enarravit Cicero, 49. ita concludit:
he concludes, 49:
At fons quidem confirmationis, ut facultas tulit, apertus est nec minus dilucide, quam rei natura ferebat, demonstratus est.
And the source of all confirmations has been already explained as occasion offered, and has been demonstrated no less clearly than the nature of the case required.,
§ 659. Neque tamen ipse sibi satisfecisse videtur,
§659. Yet he does not seem to have satisfied himself,
quando statim addit:
when he immediately adds:
In praesentia tantum modo numeros, et modos et partes argumentandi confuse et permisse dispersimus.
At present we have only dropped hints about the numbers, and moods, and parts of arguing in an irregular and promiscuous manner;.
Dicamus enim, quod res est,
For let us say what the matter is:
fontem confirmationis cuiuslibet non
the source of any confirmation will not be opened
generalia quaedam aperient topica, sed natura thematis penitius cognita,
by certain general topics, but by the more inwardly known
confirmandorumque veritas,
nature of the theme and by the truth of
quam fieri potest, clarissime perspecta.
the things to be confirmed, seen as clearly as possible.
Ipsa scientifica pulcre meditaturi convictio,
The very scientific conviction of one who will meditate beautifully,
rigoroseque demonstrandi habitus multum ipsi proderit,
and his habit of demonstrating rigorously, will profit
si vim
him much, if he knows how to temper the
rationis temperare, vim argumenta
force of reason and to excite the force of
splendide collustrandi noverit excitare.
splendidly illuminating arguments.
Neque demonstrabit hos tam varios fontes rhetor ullus,
No rhetorician, no aesthetician, will demonstrate these so various sources,
ullus aestheticus, sed pulcra potius eruditio, § 63.
but rather beautiful erudition, §63,
et experientia, quae in rebus facti
and experience, which will supply practice in expounding the
signis exsistentiam maxime probabilibus exponendi suppeditabit usum.
signs most probable for existence in matters of fact.
Hausturis ex fontibus iam descriptis
For those about to draw from the sources already described,
quaedam forte topica nonnumquam ansam aliquam
certain topics will perhaps sometimes give some occasion;
dabunt, alias confirmationum
at other times they will be sand for the
aesthetice solidarum erunt arena pro fundamento. § 839.
foundation of aesthetically solid confirmations, §839.
Haec § 861–873. atque his similia postquam enarravit Cicero, 49. ita concludit: / After Cicero has narrated these things, §§861–873, and similar things, he concludes, 49:
At fons quidem confirmationis, ut facultas tulit, apertus est nec minus dilucide, quam rei natura ferebat, demonstratus est.
And the source of all confirmations has been already explained as occasion offered, and has been demonstrated no less clearly than the nature of the case required.,
§ 659. Neque tamen ipse sibi satisfecisse videtur, quando statim addit: / §659. Yet he does not seem to have satisfied himself, when he immediately adds:
In praesentia tantum modo numeros, et modos et partes argumentandi confuse et permisse dispersimus.
At present we have only dropped hints about the numbers, and moods, and parts of arguing in an irregular and promiscuous manner;.
Dicamus enim, quod res est, fontem confirmationis cuiuslibet non generalia quaedam aperient topica, sed natura thematis penitius cognita, confirmandorumque veritas, quam fieri potest, clarissime perspecta. / For let us say what the matter is: the source of any confirmation will not be opened by certain general topics, but by the more inwardly known nature of the theme and by the truth of the things to be confirmed, seen as clearly as possible.
Ipsa scientifica pulcre meditaturi convictio, rigoroseque demonstrandi habitus multum ipsi proderit, si vim rationis temperare, vim argumenta splendide collustrandi noverit excitare. / The very scientific conviction of one who will meditate beautifully, and his habit of demonstrating rigorously, will profit him much, if he knows how to temper the force of reason and to excite the force of splendidly illuminating arguments.
Neque demonstrabit hos tam varios fontes rhetor ullus, ullus aestheticus, sed pulcra potius eruditio, § 63. et experientia, quae in rebus facti signis exsistentiam maxime probabilibus exponendi suppeditabit usum. / No rhetorician, no aesthetician, will demonstrate these so various sources, but rather beautiful erudition, §63, and experience, which will supply practice in expounding the signs most probable for existence in matters of fact.
Hausturis ex fontibus iam descriptis quaedam forte topica nonnumquam ansam aliquam dabunt, alias confirmationum aesthetice solidarum erunt arena pro fundamento. § 839. / For those about to draw from the sources already described, certain topics will perhaps sometimes give some occasion; at other times they will be sand for the foundation of aesthetically solid confirmations, §839.
§ 875
Post inventionem argumenti absolutionem argumentandi praecipit Cicero, 50. eamque ex inductione, vel ratiocinatione fieri putat. Nunc semestres etiam logici norunt inductionem esse ratiocinationis speciem. Idem evinci potest, si sumamus ipsam Ciceronis de ratiocinatione descriptionem, 57.
After the invention of the argument Cicero prescribes the completion of arguing, 50, and thinks it is done from induction or ratiocination. Nowadays even half-year logicians know that induction is a species of ratiocination. The same can be proved if we take Cicero's own description of ratiocination, 57:
Est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquod eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmat.
Ratiocination is a sort of speaking, eliciting something probable from the fact under consideration itself, which being explained and known of itself, confirms itself by its own power and principles..
Sed longaeuus error est inductionem a ratiocinatione, tanquam opposito aliquo ac plane diverso seiungendi, quoniam ratiocinatio et eius genus ad ordinarios syllogismos propius accedens paene ad haec usque tempora confusum est. Nos nunc de forma pulcrarum argumentationum multi non erimus, quoniam est aptior in aestheticis locus de eadem exponendi.
But it is a long-lived error to separate induction from ratiocination as from something opposed and plainly diverse, because ratiocination and its genus, approaching nearer to ordinary syllogisms, have been confused almost up to these times. We shall not now say much about the form of beautiful argumentations, since there is a more fitting place in aesthetics for expounding it.
Post inventionem argumenti absolutionem argumentandi praecipit Cicero, 50. eamque ex inductione, vel ratiocinatione fieri putat.
After the invention of the argument Cicero prescribes the completion of arguing, 50, and thinks it is done from induction or ratiocination.
Nunc semestres etiam logici norunt inductionem esse ratiocinationis speciem.
Nowadays even half-year logicians know that induction is a species of ratiocination.
Idem evinci potest, si sumamus ipsam Ciceronis de ratiocinatione descriptionem, 57.
The same can be proved if we take Cicero's own description of ratiocination, 57:
Est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquod eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmat.
Ratiocination is a sort of speaking, eliciting something probable from the fact under consideration itself, which being explained and known of itself, confirms itself by its own power and principles..
Sed longaeuus error est inductionem a ratiocinatione, tanquam opposito aliquo ac plane diverso seiungendi, quoniam ratiocinatio et eius genus ad ordinarios syllogismos propius accedens paene ad haec usque tempora confusum est.
But it is a long-lived error to separate induction from ratiocination as from something opposed and plainly diverse, because ratiocination and its genus, approaching nearer to ordinary syllogisms, have been confused almost up to these times.
Nos nunc de forma pulcrarum argumentationum multi non erimus, quoniam est aptior in aestheticis locus de eadem exponendi.
We shall not now say much about the form of beautiful argumentations, since there is a more fitting place in aesthetics for expounding it.
Post inventionem argumenti absolutionem argumentandi praecipit Cicero,
After the invention of the argument Cicero
50.
prescribes the completion of arguing, 50,
eamque ex inductione, vel ratiocinatione fieri putat.
and thinks it is done from induction or ratiocination.
Nunc semestres etiam logici norunt inductionem esse ratiocinationis speciem.
Nowadays even half-year logicians know that induction is a species of ratiocination.
Idem evinci potest, si sumamus ipsam
The same can be proved if we take
Ciceronis de ratiocinatione descriptionem, 57.
Cicero's own description of ratiocination, 57:
Est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquod eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmat.
Ratiocination is a sort of speaking, eliciting something probable from the fact under consideration itself, which being explained and known of itself, confirms itself by its own power and principles..
Sed longaeuus error est inductionem a ratiocinatione,
But it is a long-lived error to separate induction from ratiocination
tanquam opposito aliquo ac plane diverso seiungendi,
as from something opposed and plainly diverse,
quoniam ratiocinatio et eius genus ad ordinarios syllogismos
because ratiocination and its genus, approaching nearer to ordinary syllogisms,
propius accedens paene ad haec usque tempora confusum est.
have been confused almost up to these times.
Nos nunc de forma pulcrarum argumentationum
We shall not now say much about the form of beautiful argumentations,
multi non erimus, quoniam est aptior
since there is a more fitting place
in aestheticis locus de eadem exponendi.
in aesthetics for expounding it.
Post inventionem argumenti absolutionem argumentandi praecipit Cicero, 50. eamque ex inductione, vel ratiocinatione fieri putat. / After the invention of the argument Cicero prescribes the completion of arguing, 50, and thinks it is done from induction or ratiocination.
Nunc semestres etiam logici norunt inductionem esse ratiocinationis speciem. / Nowadays even half-year logicians know that induction is a species of ratiocination.
Idem evinci potest, si sumamus ipsam Ciceronis de ratiocinatione descriptionem, 57. / The same can be proved if we take Cicero's own description of ratiocination, 57:
Est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquod eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmat.
Ratiocination is a sort of speaking, eliciting something probable from the fact under consideration itself, which being explained and known of itself, confirms itself by its own power and principles..
Sed longaeuus error est inductionem a ratiocinatione, tanquam opposito aliquo ac plane diverso seiungendi, quoniam ratiocinatio et eius genus ad ordinarios syllogismos propius accedens paene ad haec usque tempora confusum est. / But it is a long-lived error to separate induction from ratiocination as from something opposed and plainly diverse, because ratiocination and its genus, approaching nearer to ordinary syllogisms, have been confused almost up to these times.
Nos nunc de forma pulcrarum argumentationum multi non erimus, quoniam est aptior in aestheticis locus de eadem exponendi. / We shall not now say much about the form of beautiful argumentations, since there is a more fitting place in aesthetics for expounding it.